Document 8R6VeEGNrYk7QRoqNGJa1KrBy

I 'V . * f 1 1 y i !*! .i i i \t i \ j; 3NVhfOR!ED w m ,i...T0R1ED & RIE!) i(Jit- j l9S7 Technical Note Num ber 62-68 THE PRESENT STATUS OP CHEMICAL CONTROL OP VEGETATION IN RELATION TO MILITARY WCTns ' 104 J. H. COATES L. M. SHARPE H. POLLACK Institutefo r Defense Analyses Research and Engineering Support D ivision TECHNICAL NOIE 62-68 THE PRESENT STATUS OF CHEMICAL CONTROL CP VEGETATION IN RELATION TO MILITARY NEELS December 1962 Submitted by: 5 \ x Y^\ L, M. Sharpe H. Pollack Approved by: l /* ' ffc .'W A A U ' Dr. S. S. Penner Director, IDA/KESD S H T U T E FOR DEFENSE `ANALYSES RESEAR.MCH'A.ND ENGINEERING SUPPORT DIVISION Contract SD-50 Project AGILE poM2-6f The authors wish to express their appreciation to Mr. S.J. Deitchraan of the Institute for Defense Analyses for his many valuable suggestions and advice. f TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction Recommendations 1. Short-range Problem 2. Intermediate-range Solution 3 Longer-range Problems 4. Advisory Panel 5. Systematic Botany 6 Phytotoxic Susceptibility 7. Program Management Discussion I. H. HI. IV. V. VI. VII. VIH. IX. The Problem Commercial Agents Inmediately Applicable in tile Field Industrial Chemicals at theDevelopmentalStage Fundamental Studies Proper Function of Fort Detrick in the Anti- Vegetative Program Other Government Efforts inPlant Chemistry Industrial Liaison Manufacturing Capability to Respond to Military Requirements Botany 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 6 7 10. 12 14 15 17 19 24 25 Appendix 26 1 INTRODUCTION Under Project AGILE, a subtask was undertaken to provide "technical advice on the state-of-the-art in the United States, both governmental and non-governmental,n on chemical means for controlling vegetation. The problem was broken down into the following categories: 1. . Commercially available agents which could be applied in military operations within six months. 2. Chemicals in conroerdal production or laboratory development which could be brought to the operational status within 18 months. 3. Fundamental studies on plant physiology relevant to these short and intermediate range problems. 4. Botanical studies in relation to the task. 5. The proper function and distribution of intramural effort at Fort Detrick in relation to these objectives. 6. Relevancy of non-military government efforts to the problem. 7. Liaison, proprietary rights, and contractural arrangements in facilitating this program. RECOMMENDATIONS Short-range Problem a. The evaluation of commercially available agricultural chemicals along the lines of herbicide-herbicide, herbicide- defoliant, herbicide-desiccant mixtures has the greatest promise for developing operational agents in the next six months. Formulations must be investigated as a key part of these evaluations. The particular choice of agents can probably be best made by Fort Detrick with the USDA in consultation with * representatives from industry, or by the panel discussed below. b. The initial evaluations can be best conducted in industrial laboratories, second choices are the USDA facilities and Fort Detrick. c. The field evaluation for tropical areas preliminary to operational testing can be carried out immediately at the facilities available to several of the larger companies. A good second choice is the Puerto Rican Commonwealth Agricultural Station. Independent USDA supervised facilities would have to be set up and manned; Fort Detiick supervised sites could be used if the others were unavailable. Intermediate-range Solution a. Industrial laboratories are the best source of candidate chemicals for phytotoxic evaluation. This should be implemented through 8 to 12 modest ($100,000) synthesis and screening contracts. The contractor should be given maximum latitude in pursuing the program; primary and secondary screening should be their responsibility 2 e. Closer interaction is required between those responsible for designing delivery equipment and those preparing the chemical agent regardless of their Service. d. Fort Detrick should utilize a wide range of consultants from industry, the universities, research foundations, and the federal, state, and commonwealth agricultural stations, representing divergent points of view. Advisory Panel An advisory panel on the anti-vegetative program could play a critical role in meeting the present difficulties and laying out an effective plan for the future. In addition to the required statutory representation, it should include both military and civilian representation from the Air Force and Navy. It would be desirable to have a representative of the Office of the Assistant Secretary cf the Army for BSD and the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army also represented. The panel should freely utilize consultants as suggested in Paragraph 3 (d) above. Systematic Botany An immediate effort should be made to compile a botannical register, from a qualitative and quantitative point of view, for Southeast Asia. A corresponding effort should be started for other potential trouble spots. Fhytotoxic Susceptibility The relationship between phytotoxic susceptibility and phylogenetic strain should be studied. 7. Program Management It would be an intrusion of an unnecessary administrative layer to have some institution such as Stanford Research Institute or Armour undertake a supervisory function in the expanding anti vegetation program. .The supervision of the anti-vegetation program as it applies to the military rightly belongs to Fort Detrick. 5 DISCUSSION The consensus in and out of government, with which we concur, is that the Crops Division of the U.S. Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick has responded splendidly to the present operational military requirements In view of their history of budgetary caprice, intramural resistance, and lack of support by the military command, a far less effective response could have been expected. Now that the anti vegetation program at Fort Detrick is being re-funded, it is appropriate to review the functions of the expanded staff in terms of the short and longer range objectives Conclusions based on discussions with govern ment and industrial contacts on die proper function of Fort Detrick are presented below It was made evident by our industrial contacts that rapport with the anti-vegetative program varied from satisfactory to antagonistic. Host companies appeared to be confused as to objectives and it was evident that the relationship was reciprocally unresponsive. Since no satisfactory utilization of the industrial capability can be made without improved rapport, this problem also will be discussed. Unlike many other technical fields, in which the principal expertise and com petence lies in the military, the development of new anti-vegetation chemicals is fundamentally ah activity of the commercial chemical industry The military applications are peripheral to, and derivative of, the industrial competence Industry must be utilized to a much greater extent if a more effective anti-vegetation program is to be developed. 6 -r From a botanical point of view, the above problem includes various aquatic plants, mangrove, and a wide range of grasses, ferns, palms, palmettos, trees, and herbaceous plants throughout South Vietnam. Although time did not permit an exhaustive search, conversations with a number of knowledgeable individuals make it appear unlikely that there exists an adequate botanical collation of this area from either the qualitative or quantitative point of view. Our information indicates that mangrove is controllable. However, there is a paucity of information on the relative susceptibility of the various other species to herbicides. It is known that: 1. There are no rain forests in the area of military interest. 2. T he upland area has a dry season in idle winter in which there is less than one inch of rain. The tree species there are largely non-deciducius broadleafs. 3. In tiie virgin forest, the principal obstruction to vision requiring defoliation is the broadleaf evergreens which grow up to a height of 100 feet. The ground has relatively little cover. 4. There is a tropical scrub growth consisting largely of such flora as broadleaf evergreens which are often mingled with bamboo (running up to 40 feet in height) and imperata grass. This tropical scrub appears to be typical of those areas in which civilization has intruded. The above categories do not clarify fully the tactical objective of the military defoliation program. The chemicals now in operational . 8 ( :V trials, as of November 1962, are effective against all of the categories r~ described above to a greater or lesser extent. The tactical problem to which research must be directed is the development of agents which attack i a broader range of botanical species more rapidly. The agents must be i applicable by air or ground spray devices. They should be non-toxic to \ * l the troops using it, to the natives in or passing through the area r treated, and harmless to their livestock. Certainly, acute effects i, must be guarded against and the likelihood of chronic effect minimized. r i/ Since any agent will, in most areas, be used once, or at most a few times, it is not necessary to conform to the high safety standards i required by* the Food and Drug Administration for commercial agriculture. It is important' also to guard against cosmetic effects, however transient, because of the propaganda value. t There appears to be a difference between the military and com mercial terminology. The term "defoliant" appears to be used by the military to mean an agent which causes the leaves to drop whether it t kills the plant or not. In commercial terminology an agent which kills a plant is a herbicide m whereas "defoliants" are exclusively non-herbicide r agents which cause the leaves to drop from a commercial crop plant in order to facilitate harvesting. Desiccant appears to have the same * meaning for the military and industry; namely, *an agent which.causes the dehydration of leaves and their withering but not necessarily causing them to drop from the plant. Another category of agent, the soil sterilant is recognized commercially as an agent which prohibits the growth of all flora in an area whether temporarily or permanently. 9 I i Diere was some confusion among our industry contacts as to whether l the military wanted, didn't want, or didn't care whether the agents trii . offered were herbicidal or soil sterilizing. This needs clarification. ri In our understanding, sterilants have a definite place in roadside [ clearance whereas they might bring about erosion problems in the forest r proper. Several companies which bid on the two recently granted contracts had only a vague understanding as to what the military objectives are. This lack of clarity undoubtedly hampered some in the preparation of a i satisfactory proposal. More specific information on the now classified aspects of military requirements would assist the bidders in submitting \I more responsive proposals. I H . Commercial Agents Immediately Applicable in the Field fi The most promising source of new operational agents for use in l. the next six months lies in the combination of commercially available /,,i iti . herbicides, defoliants, and/or desiccants. Formulation is the key to the successful field application of such agents. i Die United States Department of Agriculture appears to be aware of the performance capabilities of all commercially available herbicides, i defoliants, desiccants, and soil sterilants. They are familiar with the published literature as well as the results from the several state agencies. In addition, they have an extensive research program of their own. It is not clear that the able but overworked staff at Fort"Detrick, since the arrest of their efforts in 1958 and its resumption 10 in 1961, have been able to apprise themselves of the performance capa bilities of all marketed agents. It is ironic that the Fort Detrick dnti-vegetation program was aborted in 1958 since this is approximately the time that a number pf new agents representing different chemical types became available. The ready availability of the components of the agent used and the generally recognized range of effectiveness made it the logical first contender. Our contacts in industry were unable to suggest any agent as prom ising as those being tested operationally for two reasons: 1. They had not been given the military requirements specifically in terms of the situation in Vietnam; and 2. They had no reliable, comprehensive, organized body of data on the effects of their chemicals in tropical environments We make no specific suggestions as to commercially available agents which should be investigated in the field. .We do, however, recommend that mixtures of one or more different herbicides either with currently used agents or in various combinations, such as dinitrophenols and 2,4,5-T, should be tried. This type of combination should bring about rapid leaf drop and subsequent kill. One would expect that a defoliant (in the commercial sense) by itself would be of military interest only in certain tactical situations since growth in a few months would undo its short-term effect. A combination of defoliant and herbicide, however, presents problems which call for specific experimental work. One anticipates that if leaf-drop should occur too rapidly, the herbicide may not have tim to be absorbed and bring about a subsequent kill. Similarly, combinations of herbicides and desiccants also should be evaluated The third aspect of the utilization of current materials lies in formulation. The latter is the addition of additives, solvents, emulsifiers, etc., to basic agents in order to enhance their effective ness. Effective formulation requires an individual with long experience and a knack bordering on art. This competence is best embodied in a few private consultants and some Industrial laboratories. It is our opinion that the recommendation of the commercial agents to be investigated can be best made by Fort Detrick and USDA at Beltsville in consultation with some of the -larger corporations such as American Cyanamid, Dow, Monsanto, Shell, Amchem Products, and Giegy Chemical Corporation. ,We believe that the formulation and initial evaluation of these mixtures can be most rapidly, effectively, and economically accomplished through industrial contracts, whereas Fort Detrick's major contribution should be in large-scale field evaluation. H I . Industrial Chemicals at the Developmental Stage In the intermediate and long-range efforts of the anti-vegetative program, the accumulated laboratory and screening data as well as the current developmental activities of the herbicide manufacturers could be profitably applied to the program. In any technically oriented big business, such as agricultural chemicals, there Is a build-up of unused technical information available only to company employees. In wartime, in the name of patriotism and national defense, the barriers of industrial security are lowered. In 12 a cold war, demands of proprietary self-interest are still dominant. In peacetime industry, by and large, is reluctant to give to the military proprietary information which has been accumulated at great expense. In th e herbicide-defoliant field, a small company easily can accumulate data on 200 to 300 potential agricultural chemicals in a year. A large company can accumulate data on that many in a month. A vanishingly small percentage of the compounds initially screened for herbicide activity, because of unfavorable economics, toxicity, or an inappropriate spectrum of biological activity, is ever com mercially developed. It still may be to the company's interest to keep the performance data on these unsuccessful compounds secret to avoid aiding its competitors. The Food and Drug Administration requirements which must be met by agents that are to be applied to crops make the development of a ^ crop chemical exceedingly expensive - ranging from $250,000 to $2,000,000. This expense is incurred largely in animal feeding studies, field evaluations, residue determinations, and investigations of the metabolic disposition of the chemical in the plant. Such expensive studies probably are not necessary for a military agent. Several of the larger companies indicated that they did have, or might have, agents in their accumulated files which they would be willing to make available to the military if they were approached with a specific objective. It should be pointed out that the staffs of the state and federal agricultural agencies also are largely uninformed of the behavior of these test chemicals because of industrial security. 13 Chemicals under development present a delicate problem to industry. The revelation of performance characteristics might reduce a company^ lead time over its competitors by several years. The opinion was expressed frequently that a specific military request, coupled with a better safeguard of the^companies proprietary rights, would induce them to reveal data on promising compounds* An additional inducement would be to give the companies more responsibility than is presently the case for the screening and evaluation of their compounds. IV. Fundamental Studies There is a slow but accelerating production of fundamental studies on phytotoxic action. In spite of more than 15 years of investigation, there is no definitive account of the mode of action of 2,4-D, the oldest of the commercial organic herbicides. In contrast, there has been marked success in investigating the mode of action of several of the newer herbicides. Honuron, chlorophenyldimethylurea, has been shown by Todd and others to interfere with the Hill reaction in photo synthesis . Hilton of DuPont and others of Beltsville have shown that Dalapon, salts of 2,2-dichloropropionic acid, and other chloro-acids compete for pantoate in the engine involved in pantothenate synthesis. There also has been increasing activity in the study of absorption and translocation of phyto-active chemicals. These basic advances are being made largely in the universities and the USDA facilities in the United States and by a group of workers in England. 14 Fundamental studies at present are largely irrelevant to the short and intermediate range problems. In the long pull, these studies present the greatest promise since they are the foundation upon which our understanding of phytotoxicity rests and this knowledge could be crucial in the selection of compounds to be studied in the future. At one time, Fort-Detrick was a center of fundmental studies. It is no more and, in our opinion, it should not be. Fundamental work is best conducted in an uninhibited environment of free exchange such as exists at the universities. In our opinion, therefore, the military should provide support for basic research. We believe, also, that Fort Detrick should be given the opportunity to take full advantage of this information by the appointment of consultants representing disparate points of view. V. Proper Function of Fort Detrick in the Anti-Vegetative Program As pointed out above, the military applications of defoliants are a relatively minor but specialized aspect of the general technology of plant chemistry. The military have specific problems peculiar to their needs, but the principal resources to solve them re located in industry. Fort Detrick should, therefore, play the primary role in formulating these unique problems and in developing the appropriate technology to solve them. To do this, they need a capability which ranges from basic research to applied technology. One of the key problems is to achieve the proper balance of these activities. The Fort Detrick operation should go into the fundamental aspects of plant chemistry only far enough to maintain a competence at the installation 15 which will enable it to interpret fundamental research reports from all sources. On the other hand, fundamental studies in plant chemistry are currently under-funded at the universities and the Department of Defense would do well to support this activity. The second activity, that of evaluating new agents, can be divided . into two parts - synthesis of new agents, and their screening * By the very nature of organic synthesis, small installations cannot have a full spectrum of synthetic capability. Fundamentally, indsutzy and, to a lesser extent, the universities should be the source of new chemicals. The synthesis of these new compounds can be best done on a contract basis and these laboratories should be given wide latitude to investigate new chemical structures. However, Fort Detrick must have sufficient synthetic organic chemical capability to permit It to follow up promising synthetic *leads there an in-house effort is desirable. The other aspect of new agent evaluation is primary screening to select those chemicals which have h e slightest promise of phytochemical activity. Whenever possible, screening should be the responsibility of the organization synthesizing the compounds in order to provide a high rate of feedback of the results to the synthetic program. In this way, interest in the research would be heightened and economies in both time and money effected. Thirdly, the application of plant chemicals for military purposes should be the strong point of the Fort Detrick operation, i.e., problems connected with modes of delivery as well as operational evaluations, and 16 large-scale testing in those environments of military interest. In summary, the use of phytocheraically active agents is primarily a special facet of a much larger technology. Fort Detrick needs a full range of capability to stay abreast of developments but its emphasis should be overwhelmingly on those aspects which are peculiar to military applications, VI. Other Government Efforts in Plant Chemistry The principal focus of non-military federal government activity in phytotoxic agents is the United States Department of Agriculture; comparable agencies exist at the state levels. Their interests range from the improvement of agricultural yields without impairing the wholesomeness of food, control of undesirable plants in wooded lands to help the lumbering industry, control of growth along rights of way used for power transmission lines and transportation, to control of weeds in navigable waters and aquatic sports areas. These agencies conduct extensive evaluation programs at the applied level which are designed primarily to measure the effectiveness of new agents in their various fields of interest. The state and federal agencies usually are given only those materials which the manufacturer has decided, on the basis of his own evaluations, have a good chance of being commercially successful* Thus, the governmental agencies' forte is the knowledge of the effectiveness of comercial chemicals being marketed or being offered for commercial development. Their weakness is a lack of information with respect to the far greater number of materials rejected by the manufacturer for commercialization. 17 For the current military needs, therefore, the agricultural stations, In particular the USDA, are In a key position to recommend to Fort Detrick those commercially available agents which should be brought immediately to operational evaluation On tiie level of secondary plot size screening, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the state agricultural stations have conducted field evaluations for many years, especially in temperate zones. They do not have tiie manpower, which can be applied immediately to the short and intermediate range military problems.* Industry with its long experience in formulation must be utilized to the maximum. The proper function of Fort Detrick is to coordinate these two competences and to channel their efforts into a productive, efficient program. Particular attention should be given to tiie Puerto Pican Commonwealth Agricultural station which has a climate similar to that of Southeast Asia. The flora may not be comparable in their reactions to the phytotoxic agents. The Forest Service is, in general, interested in removing undesirable trees from those areas which are ccirmercially significant, for example, the selective killing of scrub oak in pine forests. Sapidity of response, a military necessity, has not been a Forest Service requirement. Secondly, their interest is directed toward selectivity or specificity of action. Thirdly, many of their tree-killing techniques such as frilling (prying a ring of wedges of bark away from tiie tree and applying the _ chemical to the wound) are militarily impractical. 18 In sunsnaxy, due consideration and emphasis should be given to the various aspects of the development program. The prime responsibility for formulation and its associated screening should be assigned to industryi directly or indirectly. The facilities for plot-size screening are most frequently found in the state, commonwealth, and federal agricultural stations. V H . Industrial Liaison It became apparent early in our investigation that the principal focus of phytochemical technology lies in industry. The military has not been receiving full advantage of this technology because of a failure to communicate its unique problems, and industry's fear of losing its proprietary rights. Economic Difficulties - Contact after contact in the industrial laboratories made the point that the agricultural chemical business is highly competitive. An awareness by the competition of the performance of a developmental chemical or even the general trend of new research, can mean large dollar losses* When data is {submitted to the various government agencies, it is with the understanding that secrecy will be maintained on proprietary information. In a few regrettable instances, this confidence has been violated, causing the suppliers to become over-cautious* Host of our contacts agreed that the individuals to whom the information is given initially act in good faith* Two effects act to undercut their good intentions. One is a relatively rapid turnover 19 1 of personnel and 'die other appears to be a needlessly broad dissemination t l. of information to those who have no real "need-to-know." Other diffi r* culties are the failure to clarify and publicize industry's opportunity to retain commercial rights and concern that an agent might be r i classified "secret" thus preventing the development of a patent position* l. In spite of these adverse reactions, the industrial representatives (" t. expressed a desire to serve the country, even at some risk to proprietary r. interest, provided: i 1. The prcblems were made explicit preferably through r' {Ii face-to-face contact; and 2. There is an opportunity to earn a fair profit. i l . The salient features of the last point are the firm guarantee of com I mercial rights to any agent developed in a government program, and the opportunity to turn previous laboratory investigations to profit by r developing military uses for agents which the company had previously L. ( rejected for commercialization. In this manner they will be able to i. retrieve some of their research expenditures. fv Cost Sharing - In connection with the granting of two recent t- contracts by Port Detrick which went to Penn Salt and Monsanto, respectively, a number of complaints were made with respect to cost i sharing. In this arrangement, the contractor absorbs part of the program's cost presumably because his commercial interests are being aided by the contract. Cost sharing tends to be promoted by those who will gain the most through federal subsidy, whereas cost 'sharing tends to be discouraged or not engaged in by those who have the least to gain but the most to give to the federal effort. A company with no great a* 20 commitment in a field may undertake a great deal of cost sharing, thus providing for itself an opportunity to break into a new field. In effect, rather than subsidizing a federal effort, it is utilizing federal money to subsidize its own interests. In contrast to this, the large company with a tremendous backlog of information and technology, when asked to engage in cost sharing, is subsidizing the federal effort. The industrial reaction to cost sharing, in most cases, was unfavorable. This attitude is based on the fear that in sane cases purchase price may take precedence over quality of research. Communication Problem - The failure to comnunicate adequately the military needs to Industry has been a major factor in retarding response. We will discuss .the problem in terms of (a) the Industrial Liaison Office which was organized officially to bring new chemicals into the military program, and (b) the handling of the two recent Fort Detrick contracts as specific examples of difficulties. (a) Industrial Liaison Office - The general attitude toward the effectiveness of the Industrial Liaison Office varied all the way from "very favorable11 to "ineffective." There is a tendency for those companies Who are active participants or who have a long standing history of involvement in military programs to consider the Industrial Liaison Office effective. Instances were reported where companies were recruited into the program by specific contacts with Dr. Metcalf, the Chairman. At the other extreme, the companies Which had relatively few dealings with the military felt that the Industrial Liaison Office was not doing a good job. They tended to look upon the acquisition program as indiscriminate and ineffective. 21 4. With respect to the herbicides, the opinion generally expressed was that the significant manufacturers already had screened most of (lI'- the compounds before they submitted them to the Industrial Liaison Office They felt that the military should not be conducting a redundant effort in screening these chemicals but rather should be consulting more closely with the synthesizer with reference to r Ii 4 the phyto-activity of the compounds More important was the state f ment that the compounds submitted to the Industrial Liaison Office t t were "highly filteredn It was said that only those compounds which were either known to be of low activity or for which there had been established a firm patent position were submitted 1 The most interesting criticism of all came from one company f which has submitted the names of hundreds o f compounds in the recent ) past and has received no request for evaluation samples. The con clusion drawn by this supplier was that not even the military is \. Interested in the Industrial Liaison Office acquisition program. A contrast to these criticisms relating to herbicides is the r awareness by industry of military interest in highly toxic materials. Almost without exception industry has cooperated by submitting samples of new compounds for tests where the preliminary data was suggestive. (b) Negotiation of Contracts - Our industrial contacts showed spontaneous interest in discussing the various aspects of submitting proposals for an anti-vegetation research contract with Fort Detrick. While none of toe remarks below could be said to represent the opinion of all the industrial companies there was sufficient consensus to merit presentation. 22 The biddersT conference seems to have left some contractors confused on objectives. A request for bids for the synthesis of phosphorus, acetylenic and other compounds was made. Many inter preted the request to mean too heavy emphasis on the first two categories* Also, there was a great deal of criticism of the limited screening requested of the contractor The latter was to screen the new compounds against one plant and Fort Detrick was to screen them against additional ones. One plant was not regarded as a singularly significant for diagnosis* Our contacts generally believed it was much more economical and efficient to permit the contractor to conduct the primary and possibly secondary screening. We believe the contract work would be more efficient and effective were the contractor involved in goal planning, synthesis * formulation, primary and secondary screening, and field evaluations. Also, many of the large corporations and some of the smaller ones have tropical and subtropical evaluation facilities in operation or available to them which could respond almost immediately to the military requirements for secondary and field screening* Such a systems approach could be most effectively carried out in dealing with the larger companies such as Dow, Shell, DuPont, American Cyanamid, Monsanto, etc. Some of the industrial contacts were sufficiently interested in the military program that they wished to initiate unsolicited contract proposals. Apparently the opportunity and the mechanism for doing this was not made clear to them at the bidders' meeting. 23 V I H , Manufactiirlncr Capability to Respond to Military Requirements An important question is the ability of the manufacturer to produce large quantitites of a new chemical in response to military requirements. This problem has two important aspects - manufacturing facilities and the cost of the products. ' For primary screening purposes, a few grams of material are quite adequate and are the scale on which a synthetic program is and' should be conducted. Field or plot screening evaluation might call for one pound quantities. In almost all cases, it was felt by the manufacturers that they could respond to such a requirement within a month. Should an agent be successful at that time there probably would be a need for quantities in the range of 20 to 25 pounds for a large-scale field evaluation. The response time in this case probably would not exceed three months. Application of a new agent at the operational level might involve synthesis of 50,000 to one million pounds per year. The larger manu facturers were, by and. large, confident that such a need could be met provided fairly broad latitude in cost was allowed in order to cover the extra expenses inherent in the large-scale production of a new chemical. It is our belief that in looking for this new military agent, one could justify, initially, several-fold higher costs than that allowable for an established commercial agent. We believe that if Industry were explicitly informed that such an opportunity exists, it would be greatly stimulated in its search for new phytochemical agents. 24 IX. Botany Our observations indicate that there is significant literature available on the botany of the Indo-Chinese peninsula This Is not well organized nor is it available conveniently in the English language. We believe that some taxonomic botany would be most helpful to those attempting to develop improved herbicides and defoliants. The objectives should be: 1 To gain a clear understanding of the relative military importance of the specific species; 2. To explore the relationships between chemical sensitivity - and taxonomy in temperate and tropical regions Our preliminary investigations suggest that considerable pertinent information is scattered among the various companies which have planta tions or commercial interests in the tropics: these are primarily the rubber, coffee, banana, and cocoa growers. A taxonomist with a chemical orientation undoubtedly could perform a useful service in collecting and codifying this information Of particular note is Maurice Schmid, a Frenchman, whose English, we understand, is excellent and who is considered to be the outstanding, authority on the botany of Vietnam, 25 APPENDIX The following organizations and individuals have been contacted in our attempt to evaluate the current state of the art of vegetation control by means of chemicals: 1. Biology Department, Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts a* Dr. Duncan Clement b. Dr. Kenneth Thimann 2. United Fruit Company Boston, Massachusetts Dr. N. C. Thornton 3. Colonel X. C. Emerson Office of the Secretary of the Army(RED), Pentagon 4. Smithsonian Institution Washington, D. C. a. Mr. Morton b. Dr. F. A. McClure 5. Esso Research Center Linden, New Jersey Dr. H. K, Yowell 6 W. R. Grace & Company Clarksville, Maryland Dr. W. K. Loughlin, Director of Research 7. Fort Detrick Fredericksburg, Maryland a. Dr.Minerick b. Dr. Brown c. Dr. Darrow d. Dr. Kingsolver 26 8, U. S. Department of Agriculture Washington, D. C. a. Forest Service, Dr. Donald Lynch b. Agricultural Research Center Dr. D. C. Haller Assistant Director c. Plant Industries Station, Beltsville, Maryland (1) Dr. W. D. McClellan (2) Dr. D. L. Klingman (3) Dr. Shaw 9. American yanamid Princeton, New Jersey v a. Dr. Frank Stark b. Dr. John King 10. Stauffer Chemical Company, New York City .a* Dr. Chester Arnold Vice President in Charge of Research b. Dr. Donald Mastick, Assistant to the Vice President c. Dr. D. Dorman Associate Director of Biological Laboratories d. Mr. Obrecht Research Director, Chemical Division 11. Boyce Thompson Institute Yonkers, New York Dr. George McNew, Research Director 12. Dupont Chemical Company Wilmington, Delaware Dr. Max Goebel, Director of Research 13. Texaco Research Center Beacon, Nevi York Dr. C. L. V/. Swanson 14. Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania Dr* Donald Frear 15. National Geographic Society Washington, D. C. 16. Ethyl Corporation Detroit and Baton Rouge a. Dr. Ellis Rifkin h. Hr. \T D. Lxbby, Jr* 17 Shell Development Emeryville and Modesto, California a* Dr. R. G. Larsen, Director of Agricultural Research b. Dr. J. Van Overbeak c. Other staff members 18. Standard Oil of California Richmond, California a. - b. c. d. Dr. B. F. Quisenberry Dr. I. Levine Dr. L. R. Gardiner, Director of Agricultural Research Other staff members 19. University of California Davis, California Dr. A. S. Crafts 20. California State Department of Forestry Sacramento, California Dr. L. Burcham 21. Dow Chemical Midland, Michigan a. Dr. W. P. Schambra, Defense Liaison and Planning b. Dr. K. C. Barrens, Plant Scientist c. Dr. L. C. Chamberlain, Assistant to the Director of Research 22. Chemagro Kansas City, Kansas Dr. vonRumker oc C. H. Russell - St. Louis, Missouri July 16, 1970 n-T Butyl Ester Mr. A. E. Leisy - Krummrich Mr. M. L. Haulard : Mr. R. E. Baynard You will recall that 28,560 pounds of the Tech. T Butyl Ester shipped to Imperial Chemical, Shenandoah, Iowa, against order number 605150 was returned. This material is stored at Mid-American warehouse and except for con taining 50 ppm iron, is good ester. This ester was some of the material we were using in Orange Band. The Krummrich Plant has, on a special form, asked "should this material be discarded?" If the ester is emulsified and cut to 4#/gal. with solvent, a jell will occur on long storage, however if it is formulated and applied immediately there should be no difficulty. Also, if one part of this is diluted with 5 parts low iron ester, the iron content will have been diluted to below 10 ppm and jelling will not occur in-the 4# formulation. So rather than discard it, I should think you can sell it at some discount to some formulator telling him the above. What about Farmland, Chlpman, Thompson Chemical here in St. Louis or at the worst, give it to someone who can use it if they'll pay the freight. Otherwise the product will apparently end up on the Krummrich toxic dump. Q /H ? C. H Ttu^sell mjm CONFIDENT! A' SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER. C22836 20 production, and human and animal toxicities for most wf these candidate chemicals were unknown, and any one of these factors could have .limited or delayed active help to Vietnam, In any case, it 3 extremely doubtful that anyone could have been convinced of the real worth of a chemical as a result of testing only a few grams or even a few gallons. With these limited quantities, only a small number of the array of unknown species of vegetation could have been tested. It is not Intended in any way to minimise the importance of such testing, but rather to put it in perspective in relation to the combined "research - aid to Vietnam/1 objectives. Thus, these candidates were tested in the latter part of December and in January, vccreas the major aerial i-sting of the 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T chemicals was conducted from August to Octobrr. The chronology of tests, equipment, chemicals, and observation dates are listed in Section VII of the tiuppicaasnt Actual figures on viscosities vers not available until 17 April 1962 because the necessary equipment vas not at hand. Table XI shows both absolute and relative viscosities for the purple, pink, and pink-green chemicals. c-n CO TABLE II. VISCOSITIES O? CHEMICALS COMPASEO WITH VATER/ Temperature #C ? Wat err Purple Pink Absolute Viscosity, ceutipal3es 33 100.4 0.6814 590.5 1023 32 89.6 0.7679 . 1115 2076 23 82.4 0.8360 1638 3450 23 73.4 0,9354 2981 6522 19 66.2 1.0299 4768 11370 14 57.2 1.1709 8441 22494 Viscosity Relative to Water 38 100.4 353.7 1508 `32" 89.6 1452 2703 23 32.4 2091 4126 23 73.4 19 66.2 - 3187 4oJ0 6972 ---** 14' 57.2 7209 a. Prepared by Ralph E.* Buschmann... b. lil mixture by volume. 19210 Piuk-Green/ 1319 2650 4270 7562 12930 30160 1934 3451 5108 8084 12550 25760 K II .... ' 1 tV*. : * <v ..i" f --, J Prarrloiia pages n ---- vers blank, therefore nat filmed 3 23 i . * III. E Q U I P A N T A.` VARIATIONS Inherent differences in various aerial vehicles for delivering sprays affect the deposition of the spray. Helicopter rotors provide a downward blast on the spray that can cause a desirable spray turbulence within a forest canopy, depending on the height above the trees frets which the spray release, is ns.da. Sts tins. 71-11 nf the Supplement describes the effect of spraying forests from a helicopter* Releases from fixed-wing aircraft are in the main defendant on settling of the spray. The turbulence created By the propellers causes the spray - frcsr each boom Co spiral out behind the aircraft to give the impression, under otherwise quiescent conditions, of two horizontal cylindrical clouds floating in the air. However, if conditions are not quiescent and *n in version does not exist,- the spiraling effect from the propellers seems to aid in the upward dispersion of the spray; the fine particles so imp.:-lied have little tendency to settle but are dissipated, aimability is thereby lost, and desired deposition rates are not achieved. The H-34, C-A7, and C-123's all had split booms; that is, essentially two separata booms are operated, one on each side of the fuselage. Thus, at very iow altitudes the two cylinders of spray may enter the foliage be fore coalescing, leaving unsprayed foliage, under the fuselage. At higher release altitude rh* prays have an opportunity to coalesce and even cut the spray deposit if the con-irions for settling are present.* To m y best knowledge, planned flow rates, altitudes, and airspeeds for various swath widths were made to match the deposition rates desired. Thus, the amount of chemical deposited was limited and the evenness and rate of deposition were dependent on fartors discussed above. Within a gives swath (and especially with a crosswind release) the spray will de posit with the larger particles impacting first and the finer particles being carried farther downwind. Obviously, at seme point downwind the quantity of chemical deposited tapors off and the amount becomes subl&thal* It is customary in spray work to use area as a parameter, which usually does not take into account the leaf surface of vegetation con tained in that ares There can be considerable variation in the area of leaves contained on a given unit of land, depending on whether the vege= cation is grass, corn, or jungle. There is no quick, easy, or exact metl-cf of allowing for total leaf surface. The rates of deposition sought in rh--.'.i tests and the flow rates calculated to provide them were,, therefore, qu.itv- arbitrary but ware guided by results achieved spraying about four square miles of forest at Cam? Drum, New York, in L959 (See Section VI of the Supplement for details.) -- ."1 i'^1 24 B. INSTALLATION* AND OPERATION l. C-47 Spray Equipment a. Description. ... The equipment installed and used in a VN C-47 aircraft had been used for several years by a USA? Insect Control Group at Langley Air Force Base. Th* tank bad a capacity of 675 gallons and was formerly used in a 3-26 as a bcab-bay fuel tank for increasing range. The tank size is approximately* 3 feet by 3 feet by II feet. A 3-*inch filler pipe and vent pipe- extend? up ward and to the outside of the fuselage. Connected to Che rear of the tank is a Karlov self-priming cen trifugal pump (Modal 2B2, 200-gpo output) driven by an air-cooled 5-hp Wisconsin engine. A 2-inch discharge line runs frea the pump to a T connec tion. One line from the T runs through a valve and hence into the tank. The ocher line runs through a valve to the outside of the fuselage at Che bottom of the aircraft and hence to a Y to connect to the left and right boema, The tvo valves are actuated by remote control from the cockpit. When one valve closes the ocher opens simultaneously. The pressure from the pump can be regulated .only by pump and engine 3peed. No pressure regulator is- incorporated into the system. The pimp engine is started and the speed set manually. A quick-dump valve is incorporated as a safety feature. T h e left and right booms are IV"inch (outside diameter) pipe and each has an effective length cf IV f*** `TK*V *ra mounted on wing braces and extend 22* leches below the lower wing surface. The two inboard ends of the booms are 36 feet apart. Each boom has outlets for 22 nozzles, a total of 44. The nozzles used were Spraying Systems B-10 Whirljec nozzles with diaphragm check valves. The orifice is 3/16 inch in-diameter and forms a hollow cone pattern of 72 degrees when operated in a static spray test at 20 psi (1.7 gpm with water). Soma minor difficulties were encountered during the installation of the equipment. The C-47 the VN were using was an older model than the US C-47 from which the spray equipment had been removed. Some changes were necessary in the wiring" between the pilot's control panel and the spray-valve actuating mechanism. Other changes In fittings were insignificant. b. Tests Because of the urgency of the situation in Vietnam there was nor. time to conduct test3 in the US with the C-47 and the liquid chemicals to be: sprayed. Tests to determine particle mass median diameter (HMD), flew rate,, and per cent recovery (mass deposit) of the chemical to be used in VN would have been highly desirable. Estimated dosage rates of the chemicals to kill large trees of unknown species are about five so ten pounds per acre. Previous tests with similar spray equipment and chemicals in the US have had aa their objective a small particle diameter and uniform large.-area coverage at deposit races of one pound per acre and less. This application rate ia sufficient to kill many economic food and fiber crops. Serna spray deposit tests were conducted during April 1953 at Beltsville. Maryland with the C-47 and the spray equipment described above. The liquid spray material was DBI and fuel oil, which is much less viscous the solution used la VM. The recovery ranged from 59 to 86 per cent for the six teat'tuna conducted- The highest recovery was obtained from the test conducted under good inversion conditions. The* MUD of the particles was 165 microns. * The C-47 spray equipment did not give the desired or anticipated effect at Chon Thanh (Test 2). Several factors are responsible: the pump- > eg system failed to provide the pressure required for the desired flow v azety S The amount of pressure drop in the lines from the pump to the nozzles is' not known. The pressure at the pump registered 30 p3i (the maximum) but at the discharge nozzles it may have been considerably less. c. Operational Difficulties Considerable delay was encountered in getting to the test site on the .ground because of lata arrival of equipment and of security clear ance to work ia the areaj Thus, the spray run was not started until 1030 hours, when the meteorological conditions were neutral or* lapse. Hence, mc-- t of the. ->*1l*r d r ^ p W s may have drifted off the target. The wind direction angled off the target by 10 degrees, and red indicator cards showed considerable drift of the spray off the intended target. 2* 143 Spray T a n k The 143 was designed to carry chemical or biological material externally on light piston- or Jet-engined aircraft. Two 14B tanks arrived in Saigon from Ivo Kuni, Japan, on 1 August 1961. The two units had apparently been in storage for some time. They were corroded, wires were misplaced or missing, and a few parts malfunctioned. USKC Sgt. McIntosh displayed much ingenuity in his efforts to get the units functional. By rewiring, interchanging, and repair, of parts one unit was made operational. Each unit ha3 three major components: the nose section containing the high-pre3sure compressed air tank and control assembly; the center sec tion containing the liquid reservoir (90-gallon capacity); and the tail section containing Che discharge valve and control assembly. Operation of the units is controlled from the pilot's control panel *-T' in Che cockpit. Three different flow rates can be selected during flight. "However, for a flow rate other than those present, the central microswitch in"0 the tail assembly can be adjusted and reset for any of several flow rates. r*o 26 Wien the unit is functioned, air Is'fed from the air tank into the center a tioa, (liquid reservoir) at 100 psi and liquid arid air are then directed out and around the spear valve and diffusion cone into the airs trees. The unit was ttounced on a VN AD6 aircraft and functioned perfectly. Particle HMD is estimated to have been about 290 microns.. Previous tests with the 14S revealed an HMD of 272 microns at ISO knots airspeed, .173 microns at 360 knots, and 1Q7 micyons at 5.50 knot3, 3. H-34. and BTPAI. Spray Equipment This equipment was designed and fabricated by the OS Navy for use `on rotor-winged aircraft to spray insecticides. It consists of a 200-gallon cylindrical tank located in the cabin. A 25-gpm electric pump, located at the bottom of the tank, transfers the liquid from the tank to the booms, w h i c h extend about 25 feet out and slightly to the rear of the fuselage in a delta design. Each boom was equipped with 21 Spraying Systems T-Jet nozzles. Eaih nozzle had an orifice diameter of 0.062 inch and delivered 0.6 g p m of water at 40 psi pump pressure. Some malfunctions were encountered during the Installation and opera tion of the equipment. A leak developed at the bottom o f the tank at the cutlet to the pump. A brass elbow threaded Into a nylon or plastic plate . did not provide a substantial seal. The plate was replaced with one made of braac-. The carbon vanes in the rotary vane pump br-?*-! after a shorf M m e . They were replaced with vanes fabricated of nylon. The upper forward boom - brace mounting cracked the fuselage of the aircraft and the HIDAL system was grounded for several months. A bracing cable was installed in late December to connect the left mount with the right mount inside the fuselage. 4. Buffalo Turbine Sprayer This is a ground-operated spray rig that can be towed behind a ve hicle or mounted in the bed of a pick-up or larger truck. A 36-hp Wisconsin engine drives the turbine and the nylon rollertype pump. The turbine delivers up to 14,000 cfm, the pump capacity i3 one half to 30 gallons per minute at pressures up to 150 ps`i. A stainless steel tank (100-gallcn capacity) is used for the liquid reservoir. - In operation the liquid Is pumped from the tank through a pressurerelief valve and Into the small'boom containing four liquid nozzles. The boom and nozzles are located inside a fishtail aLr notTie attached to the exhaust end of the air turbine. The high-velocity air stream breaks up the liquid and carries the particles soma distance away. The particle HMD is said to be 75 to 80 microns. Although the particle are ouch smaller chan chose from aerial releases, the effect of meteorological conditions on deposition is much less. The particles are released at ground level and are impacted an the foliage rather than being wholly dependent on inversion conditions cor sedimentation. 27 IV. TESTS A. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS Prom 10 August to the end of 1961 all chemical teat in which the mater~ iala were released freer aircraxt were performed with chemicals of the 2,4-D or 2,4,5-T type. These are well-known plant grewch regulators or vegetation control chemicals that have gained wide recognition and use in the United States for killing vegetation. / A very important point is that, no natter vhac chemicals ve*e to ha tested, they were to be tested as soon as possible, with the possibility of being used on a wide scale to aid Vietnam. Therefore, a host of ocher factors had to be satisfied as well; otherwise, any one of the following factors could have prevented their use. Sene of the acre obvious factors were availability, cost, and safety to humans under conditions of spray and handling. -----" '-- ' y Ratings in these tests were recarded by adjectives and/cr estimated percentages of effect as the situation allowed, bearing in mind the following factors: (a) Is the evidence sufficient to indicac-' chat the chemical has in fact been reasonably well deposited on the vegetation? 3atter effect can be achieved on a susceptible tree if all its leaves receive a few drops of chemical as opposed to only one side or only the very Cop of the tree re ceiving all the chemical. In c M * connection, forma of the chemical known as volatile esters ware requested subsequently in order to achieve -acre uniform coverage within a forest canopy. (b) Is tha vegetation in a stage of growth capable of responding? Actively growing (not dormant) vegetation responds more quickly and thor oughly to these chemicals, whereas dormant plant-, can usually respond only when they re-enter a state of active growth. (c) Are the species encountered (although unknown) susceptible to the chemical? Even the Soviets are having difficulty with Che unknown speci-' in North Vietnam, and they are free to roam the country (see reference JPRS: 11373 dated 29 November 1931) as indicated by the following excerpt. The title of this paper is "Soviet Botanists in Vietnam" by A. L. Takhtad-r -. n "As we had already known, in the democratic republic of Vietnam there are yet no botanical institutions capable of organizing or coordinating this study of the plant world of the country. 3otanical research i 3 performed mainly by the chair3 of various colleges an d universities; however, w_th the exception of a textbook on the Taxonomy written by the head of the Department of Botany of the Pedagogical Institute, La Kha Ke, unfortunately there are no refer ence books in Vietnamese on botany in general or on the vegetable o 23 kingdom of Vietnam.ia particular. There is no-good herbarium either. Therefore, identification of planta in Vietnam presents great diffi- cui ties,, and as a result, many Important trees providing valuable .wood, and also a relatively large number of medicinal plants have not been accurately identified until the present tice." (Additionally, the vriter took a special trip to Singapore from September 38 to October 3 in order to consult with Dr. Abbe, a visiting professor from the University of Minnesota who vai in Southeast Asia on a ^ulbrightt Grant. Ba had, he told me, a team of three collecting forest species in South Vietnam and in six months' time this team made 14,000- coil ecu lode'. Ha estimated per* haps 50 of these collections coula be identified a3 to genus only. The rest of the collection, ha indicated, would take several years to identify and all of his samples were dried, dead material not capable of the vegetativa propagation that would be needed in order to test chemicals. Neither did he have a supply of seed for these various species.) (d) Has sufficient time elapsed after spraying for the responses to occur? The length of time may vary from two to six or eight weeks for woody vegetation, depending on its state of growth, inherent susceptibility, etc. A given plant may, in fact, be dead (incapable of regrowth) for some time before it is really obvious and vice versa, that Is, it may appear to be dead and respisut. ' (e) And (in Vietnam) was it.possible to make observations of the kind necessary to evaluate fully the chemical effects? South Vietnam, is actually engaged in a shooting, bloody war; therefore, any movement within the coun try of personnel who ia there c a help then, though ncncocbat-int, arc gov erned by very stringent regulations. Included in these regulations is a rule that Intelligence has to grant permission in order to taka a road trip any where out31de of Saigon. If Intelligence indicate.-; that such a trip would be inadvisable, this becomes the lav. Even if Intelligence Indicates that it is all right to go, an arrmd escort is required to accompany the traveler. In order to make these ground trips, advance planning Is necessary to acquire Intelligence permission and for arrangements to be made for a suitable arsed escort. This is not a personal choice and 3 beyond the control or the responsibility of the individual. Thus, opportunities for close inspection were relatively rare. Remember, 'too, that the greatest effect achievable or to be expected under any circumstances as a result of chemical sprays may be roughly com pared with the condition of a.US hardwood deciduous forest in winter. A such better appreciation of this condition, insofar as it pertains to in creased visibility, can be obtained by viewing such a forest with snow on Che ground, whether it Is seen from the ground or from the air. Such an effect, if achieved, may be transitory, not because the "killed" vegetation comes back to life but because of seeds giving rise to new plants and be cause underacory species that received sublethal quantities of spray are capable of growth to fill in areas formerly dominated by the killed trees. The rapidity of this regrovth will be dependent cu the prevailing growth conditions and would be expected to be more rapid during a rainy season. The rating of effectiveness a the 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T chemical tests la therefore based on the above factors and Is primarily concerned with the killing effect or the chenicals. As the kill developed to a maximum, ob servations ware made in the best manner available or possible. It was not always possible to obtain colored photographs because of light conditions, rainstorms, other missions of higher priority cancelling planned air trips, or lack of ccnminic^tion and/or understanding achieved with 7ft pilots as Co positions of the aircraft desired in relation to the sun in order to get the best pictures. Efforts were made to take enough pictures so that slides could be furnished to the HAGRD-cniC, to ARPA , and to Crops Division, Biological Laboratories. The killing effect of the 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T chemicals should not be confused with "dagree of defoliation'* or "increase in visibility11 as such. It does follow, however, that a reasonable or high percentage of kill of the vegetation, (including roots) will ultimately lead to a reason able or high degree of improvement in visibility despite the fact that in transition certain species may die but not drop their leaves. Nevertheless, other natural causes can bring about the falling of dried, dead leaves such as high winds or heavy rains. In this connection a 7ft agricultural official estimated that under natural conditions as many as 90 per cent of the ju/gle species do not ordinarily drop their leaves in concert in any given season. These leaves are dropped only as their physiological condition naturally deteriorara. - The action of cacodylic acid (CA) in tests detailed below requires an* approach of understanding that differs from that for the action of the 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T chemicals. C A appears to be a desiccant in its action; that is, on contact vith the f o U a g * in sufficient quantity, drying and shrivelling of the leaves occurs relatively soon compared with the tine required for this to occur as a result of exposure to the previous chemi cals. Environment and growth factors affecting the vegetation appear to have a relatively small effect on the action of CA on the foliage. However, no tests with this material were exposed to heavy rain following application (the material, called ANSAE., Is fairly soluble in water). So the tests with CA were rated on the over-all ability to cause desiccation of the foliage only. It is entirely possible that even though all the foliage of a substantial portion of the vegetation was dried, the implication that the vegetation was killed is not warranted until conditions for active growth return. The rating of this chemical was, therefore, cu it3 effectiveness in drying the green foliage. 3. VARIABLES In the tests that follow it should be readily apparent that many variables are beyond control. Once the spray has left the cozsles no con trol exists. Even the most exact planning as to: il " " H iiiin * 'im *wijim imi 30 Swath width and length, Ground deposition rate desired Amount of chemical required, Flow rate, Particle size range, Altitude, Airspeed, Time of day for inversion, conditions and weather, and Spraying the area desired (aisability) dards for these factors is in fact obtained. Ksay of these factors are in- f extricably related and one can never be entirely sure of vtvrt has been achieved in the way of performance of equipment of equipment (especially if it has not been calibrated) or in spray drocaition except by Judging the over-all biological result. It is- roo frequently impossible in judging this result to pin down a single cause for failure to achieve an-optimal effect. On the other hand, if Che effect is good, it follows chat all of these fac tors as well as a host of biological factors have been reasonably wall met. To exemplify the above, progress reports, memos, and otner documents are pres anted (Sections IX through X I of the Supplement) that indicate the impressions of the writer at the time, or shortly after, the tests were per formed but before the spray affect had developed. It can be easily noted, for instance, chat for Test 1 on 10 August, the writer's sketch (Section X of the Supplenant) of the sprayed area reflects what was planned and was re quested of the pilots. The writer was told by Che pilots that the 9ketch was reasonably accurate. The VU Province Chief, however, later presented his sketch of the sprayed area (Ju3t after the mission), which was proved to be much more accurate by aerial observation on 28 August and was so re ported after that time (Section Id of the Supplement). It should be noted that five passengers were aboard the H-34, three of whom were VN. The sense of curiosity is generally highly developed in those people and the doorway of the H-34 is not lirge. Additionally,, the 200-gallon HIDA1 tank is carried internally opposite the doer. Suffice it to say, Che writer's ob servations were made frem the fourth be3t available place of observation and Hr. -Johnson had none. In regard to Test 2, the reports written after spraying but before spray effect was evident (Sections XI, XII, and XIII of the Supplement) include an unintentional deviation from the plan but reflects an effort to present the 31 facts with a convara ica to linear distance based on the 2 minutes 43 seconds *o spraying time at an air s;^aed of 120 miles per hour. The spraying tl^e information waa supplied by Sgt. B.oe and later Captain Cadori confirmed that the first pass was made at an altitude closer to 125 feet than the 75 feet requested. Because the observer waa on the ground at the time, ha wa3 un able to talk, with these men until acms time (a cay or so) after the spray was delivered. The point is made that in executing these experiment.:, where Che writer was responsible and desirous of trying to control the variables as much as posa ib la, the flights were performed by others. Although thai.v full coopera tion and effort waa appreciated, variations could not be prevented from affecting the operation. Later, when the U3AF "operational tecting" was performed (Appendix, Part B), technical guidance leading to these "tests" could scarcely ei.ter -- the echelons, much less influence than.- The USA? spray pilots ware the . major point of contact and were as cooperative c,; they could be under the circumstances but they, of course, had to be and were responsive to USAF - orders. Seas of these nan had seen, and appreciated what they saw, of the vegeta tica control at Camp Drum, New York. This work is reviewed in a five-minute movie with souni. A copy va3 left in Vietnam and a copy was forwarded to ARPA In early March. In this connection, Section II of the Supplement indicates the state of the art sa cf 24 February 1950, and was preparad for information in response to a query originating in the US Third Army area pertinent to a Fort Stewart, Georgia, vegetation proble.vu `The teats detailed in the Appendix had a:j their ultimata purpose the improvement ot vipioiiity from the air and on tin ground in the kinds of vegetation encountered in Vietnam along roadsides, in jungles, and in man grove areas. The chemicals used in most tests, and recommended for largescale use, are vegetation killers of the growth-regulating type. The impli cation la inherent that killed vegetation would allow improved visibility in one to two months and be relatively long Lasting, depending on the degree of . kill achieved. It had been Indicated to the writer before he left the US in July that time for effect of the sprays to develop was not critical. For general locations of test sites the re'der is referred to the marked map of Free Vietnam in Section XIV of tha Supples^nt. Section VII presents the chronology of tests in tabular form. ' ro tain ^ r j j^Tg^ 'Jr T r ir.LT1\ T J m T < Hr~ IH H 1 I ~ -~ ------ - - -t 32 'r.v. Discussion It:- should be noted that other Ct>t3 were perforced In addition to the IS already listed; however, it was not always possible to revisit and ob serve results and the record for these la therefore incomplete. In some instances informal information was received concerning these and In each ease the reaponse was favorable. Word appeared to get around and this gave rise to requests from many areas for "testing.11 Obviously, these could not be allowed to interfere vi::-'t the scheduling of the major efforts, although sue were a c c o m o d a t e d if thev uere feasible and could contribute to Che r'-search effort. Several were referred to Che US-VH planning centaltree for consideration as to whether they should be included in target selections*. The major record of results consists of colored slides, several of which were distributed some months ago. It is planned as soon as possible to make available duplicate seta covering the entire period. A reasonably complete set has been arranged _nd left with MAG2D-CI7IC. In connection, with the one aerial spray of cacodylic acid (Test 13), \ the writer could not in conscience recommend unlimited use of this material' for spraying jungles or roadsides at ten pounds per acre because more re- : search information is needed cn duration of effects, safety of handling, j compatibility with systems (the material is corrosive to brass; the HIDAL / has a flhar glass- tank and stainless steel booms, but soma brass connections 4 brass nozzles) and, most important, toxicity to humans and animals / either by contact, inhalation, or ingestion. To the writer's knowledge this test was the first aerial release of this chemical anywhere at rates of this magnitude. Toxicity teat information by others indicates that this rrctcric1 is less toxic than DDT. Its action on foliage at this rate appears to be that of a defliccar".,. with little evidence, of selectivity among the unknown Jungle species that were sprayed. About one month after spraying there vis s o q u evidence of naw leaves appearing on certain specie', where the old foliage which had been sprayed was totally brewn and shrivelled, or had fallen. Although the sprays delivered under USA? control were not the official responsibility of the.writer, it is unfortunate that certain technical as pects pertinent to the spraying could not be communicated or, if communicated; appropriate appreciation appeared lacking. For instance, the chemicals had been represented by the writer an 'Negetaticn control agents" or "vegetation killers" and not "defoliants," yet on 17 January (after sprays by the C-123 equipment on 1A and 15 January) a W letter of protest was received from a rubber plantation c l a i m i n g that 6C,COO rubbe;.' trees had been killed. This seemed to surprise all concerned. The writer was approached after the fact, yet he had not known which particular targets had been selected for spraying. Otherwise, he could have advised against spraying jungle in pr-.xiaity to a rubber plantation. (In this i/ 33 connection, it definitely appears fren the evidence available that the plantation vas not directly sprayed, bat the concentration of vapors from the chemicals was sufficiently high to affect the rubber trees when the prevailing wind reversed direction-some four or five hours after spraying). Many times extreme care was urged by the writer both on target selection and on spraying to avoid areas known to have such crop3 as citrus, rubber, tobacco, bananas, sweet potatoes, manioc, papyss, grapes, melons, rice, and the like. Perhaps this instance served an expensive but .useful purpose in making the point. Hany of these crops are far more sensitive to the spray or itc vapor chan the various unknown jungle species appear to be. Another instance is that the C-123 equipment had not been calibrated for spraying the relatively viscous materials for which it was being used for the first time. This need was pointed out rtveral times to several people; nevertheless, the system was still not calibrated when a second set of targets wa3 sprayed in mid-February. The onset of the dry season reached proportions toward the end of January that prompted a memorandum to the Chief, HAD Division, on 29 January (Se :ion X7 of the Supplement). This memorandum van brought to the attention of HAAG G3 the following, morning. The dry season markedly curtailed growth of upland species by the end of January. However, there were areas sprayed by the C-123'3 in the middle of January where very good effects were observed, namely, in two mangrove areas where lack of water did not limit growth. By mid-February lirge areas of mangrove were leafless. During this assignment the writer was subjected to many preconceived notion* and misconceptions from others on the general subject of "defoliation.11 Borne felt that if "defoliation" did not remote the trees or cause them to fall, che research was useless -- either total visibility cr none. Others were intermediate in attitude, granting chat vertical visibility world be improved but unable to visualise improved horizontal visibility. The ones who said "any increase in visibility would be worthwhile" were those who were faced with fighting in dense vegetation or being ambushed from it, or pilots or aerial photographers who needed to *ee down through it. (It should be noted thaL successful enemy ambushes have been conducted without firearms in hand-to-hand ccnbac.) Progressing from "defoliation" (an all-purpose-defoliant has yet to be discovered) to "vegetation control" (killing the vegetation) seemed beyond comprehension for some, and when it was stated that two to six or eight weeks might be required for a major improvement in visibility, the reaction was most negative. That th French spent huge sums of money unsuccesfullv fighting for several years an enemy ch.-.y couldn't see in the jungle made no apparent difference. The current conflict does not seeu co be nearing a uceessful conclusion; on the contrary the intensity of the conflict appea- to be ircreasing. Tnder these conditions it appears that the combat succe;*' CO 3 * V V I. ** 34 of friendly forces should be exp"dited if possible by improved visibility in fighting areas, or by exposing enemy roadside ambushes, Jungle trails or bases If that improved visibility car' be feasibly provided. Unfortunately, the rainfall maps (Section XVI the Supplement) were not available to the writer before the ground observation trip on Xoute 15 on 26 January (Section XV). Searches for ocher technical literature had been so disappointing that it did not seen possible that rainfall paps would be available. Neverthe less, the data they certain for the dry months of December through February certainly indicate that growth-regulator chemicals would have their immediate action impaired to a marked degree. Soil moisture continually diminishes, * with only one inch or less of rain per month on the average for large areas. December had acute residual moisture carry-over from November and. October, but January and February show exceedingly dim prospects for active growth. Thus, the TJSAF spraying va3 started in upland areas during the worst time of the whole year (mid-January) iron the standpoint of immediate chemical effectiveness. Because a high percentage of the Jungle species do not ordin arily drop chair leaves at any given cir.i in the'year (according to the VN authority listed in Paragraph 4 of Section XV of the Supplement), ^ distinct possibility exists that the action of the chemicals already sorayad will become obvious where conditions again favor growth. Mangrove areas along Scuta 15, where lack of water is not limiting, ware successfully sprayed in the same period (mid-January) and excellent r_3ulta w:.re apparent in two weeks, with a v e r y high percentage of the sprayed mangrove denuded In one month. CO VI. CONCLUSIONS In re la.ci.os to Che work reported here it la concluded chat: 1. Ia general, with regard Co the total progran, a. The chemicals reccm?.:'rded for uce, namely the eaters of 2 , ^ - 0 , ^ ^ and 2,-4,5-T, ara sufficiently active to kill a majority of species*' en countered in Vietnam if: (1) They are applied properly to the vegetation ,, * (2) They arc applied during .a period of active growth of the vegetation. b. Color photography 3 the best means of recording the effects of sprayed chemicals, but even the beat picture can fall short of being fully descriptive. 2. In regard to the research work conducted during both work periods, it can bs concluded that; a. Chemicals of the type being used are fully effective only when Che vegetation is in a period of active growth (See Sections I, XV, and XVI of the Supplement). Lack of rainfall in the period between December and February induces a stats of dormancy, and straying should be curtailed during this period. Spraying of mangrove or other species growing where water is plentiful could continue.. b. Chemicals cf premise he*- r-o'-d uccesnfully on a small scale, but more information concerning their use must be obtained through additional research (See Tests 14 and 16 in the Appendix). Ettra-contin- ental and in-hovra research in this area 3hould continue. Especial atten tion should be paid to caeodylic acid as one of the immediately available and premising candidate:.. Further testing with Diqu&t is indicated; how ever, this product is currently available only in restricted quantities. c. Technical information must be included in effective decision making. Its lack may result in inefficient use of chemicals or may have serious economic or public health consequences (See Appendix, Part E). d. Incorporation in the HIDAL and the C-47 spray system of a flov meter showing rate cf flow (gallons per minute) as well as the gallonage sprayed would be a useful de*'tce in spraying liquids of various viscositic-.* . Calibration of these systems with cho cheni'-.als to be used is desira ole. * See Sections II, XIII, ar.d XV of the Supplement. co .-"O *t- B VV*, !' \ 36 e. The HIHAL, equipment can serve a v.tsful purpose, but could ba im proved if i- had a higher flow rate, especially if such, higher flow rate could be adjusted for several rates for dispensing solutions of various viscosities (See A p p e n d s , lasts 1, 13, and 14). The C-47 system could ba made useful if it ware re*engineered to provide greater versatility in spraying adequate quantities of the re quired solutions (See Supplement, Section Tv). g. The 143 spray tank would be of greater ura- if it were simpler and more easily assembled, checked out, and operated (See Appendix, Test 2). Ir. Continuous spray booms for fixed-wing aircraft (across and under the fuselage) would allow greater freedcn of choice of altitude for spray releases (See Appendix, Testa 7 and S). 3. In relation to the operational portion of the second work phase as conducted by the USA? (3s Appendix, Part B), it can be concluded that: a* The recommended chcniesJi will work effectively, as demonstrated by tfca two operational tests on mangrove that ware actively growing in swamp areas. b. Ths chemical effect is seriously limited by dormancy in vegetation, as evidenced b y 1four operational tests on upland \egetaticn that was dormant because of drought (Sea upplament, Section 7). c. The C-123/uourgl*s8 system should bo calibrated for spraying the recommended materials. Additionally, the Inclusion of a flow rate meter in the system would enhance its experimental and operational use fer solu tions of different viscosities (See Supplement, Section XV). d. Operational tests with uncalibrated equipment can provide only minimum information because application .ate3 remain uncertain. Thus, logistic and operational factors fox future operations cannot be predicted (See Supplement, Section XT', and S-'.ction IV, B of this text). e. Operational tests must be guided by adequate technical advice until operational elements achieve a higher degree of familiarity with the materials and the effects of climate, vegetation types, end associated factors (Sea Supplement, Section XVII). k. iC1 i) S ti t 1 i i* f J 9iI i ! t vw-jy -:, 37 VII, RECOMMENDATIONS On the basis of the work done in South Vietnam and the resulting conclu sions, It is believed that the following recommendations merit careful con sideration and implementation. 1. That the use of appropriate formulations of 2,A-D and 2,4,5-T be / exploited for immediate use pending development of more active and rapid acting chemicals. Simultaneously, explore the possibility of enhancing the effectiveness of these formulations by suitable additives. 2. That research work be conducted toward- f i n d i n g - r a p i d acting and effective chemicals for defoliation and pLant killing. 3. That these chemicals be screened in areas such as Vietnam, Thailand, or other countries with similar vagetational types, a3 well as in temperate areas, because of the wide variation in vegetation response depending upon species, clients, and other associated factors. The required research could be performed with less interference in a country at peace. 4. That both the extra-continental research and the screening programs, as well as any future operational tests, be guided in all stages by compe tent technical advice. It is necessary that these technical advisors be on the scene and that they have a major voice in decisions. This is especially important when rhe safety of economic crops, possible toxicity, and validity of scientific data are concerned. 5. A. technically qualified civilian staff be developed for this in crease ir. effort- It is currently ent^mated that a minimum of 12 civilians is required, supported where necessary by an adequate number of military .personnel, in order to handle all phases cf the work including I-.-housa screening, contract monitoring, and test-site operations. 6. At each test sita the research should be conducted under the direct supervision of a civilian scientist supported by a staff composed of at least thrEe technically trained civilians and a sufficient number of mili tary personnel to support the effort. The lack of an adequate-sited tech nical staff hampered the accomplishment of th:i research objectives in. Viet nam during 'the research phase and prior to CSA7 spray operations. 7. Thoroughly .evaluated cacodylic acid and Diquat, two promising caudidata agents, as soon as possible In order to exploit their potential. 3. That, the HIBAL be re-eriglneered to provide i".creas^d flow rates as required to achieve adequate deposition of the necessary chemicals and that provision be incorporated to adjust flow rates as necessary. 9. Accurately and completely calibrate all spray devices prior to use for flew rat*, droplet sire, etc, using the actual chemical solutions or simulants with identical physical properties. CO C.O **v^ i 38 10. Provide a professional photographer Co record results of tests vith color photos* 11. Assign a helicopter end a light aircraft (L-20 cr similar type), conpletii vith operational and maintenance crawa, to the civilian scientist in charge for use in spray mi'irionii end for aerial observations of results. 12. Continue Co improve disseminating devices for both aerial and ground use. 13. Include the civilian scientist in charge in all decisiou-making discusaions pertaining to use of vegarational sprays. h*. 1 1 "i 39 APPENDIX A* DETAILS 0? TESTS 1* Teat 1 a. Description Date of Spray: 10 August 1961, about 1650 bouts. Place: Roadside areas north of Koutuxa. Vhs vegetation con sisted of relatively dense' upland- forest species with tree-' frsm 10 to 60 > feet tall; species unknown*. Chemical Sprayed: It was planned to spray Dinoxol for deposit rates o f ona ant' two gallons per acre (four and eight pounds per acre). This as to be accomplished by overlapping a portion of tvo separata swaths. -Despite the plan, the following was achieved. A total of 50 gallons of Dinosol was sprayed for an estimated swath width of 200 feet, laying separata single-pas3 swaths on each side of the road with no overlap. Deposited eveniy over a 200-foot swath, at one gallon pr acre,' 50 gallons of chemist] could be sprayed for a distance of about two miles,. Kaacurenants of the area actually sprayed were impossible to obtain. Equipment: H-34 helicopter equipped with HIDAL (Helicopter Insecticide Dispersal Apparatus, Liquid). 7lcw Sate: According to the literature, light oil sprays are uTcd, tfc* ystE*w' i*t- relatively fixed for delivering one-ha If gallon of spray per acre if flown at about 50 knots at an altitude of about 75 feet. Ocher .rates are possible by varying airspeed and altitude or spraying the same swath twice, but little data were available for adjustment. The pucip pres~ sure was 40 pounds, With less viscous liquids a flow rate of about 25 gal~ Ions par minute has been obtained. Airspeed: Requested 50, obtained 45 knots. Altitude: Requested 75 feet, varied between 50 and ICO* Wind: Crossvind very light from the west, estimated at less than 5 knots. Weather; Overcast and cloudy, A rainshower was observed a mile or two east of the area which, the writer was inform ?d, later passed over the sprayed area,. Observation Datasi Aerial flyover, 2? August; ground trip. 11 October, 40 E b. Results f' Very good Co excellent effects were obsrrved on 28 August, the area bains visible rcn the air on approach from a distance of about 5 ailes. No evidence was observed of overlapping svath3, no? were Che swaths of equal length or adjacent to one another along the road. The vegetation shewed clearly that leaves'were turning brown.. It is estimated that 70 par cent of the trees were either dead *' or dying on 11 October. c* Discussion Ifc.vaa not possible to observe' the results of these sprays with greater frequency because of several interfering factors. The site was quite distant and cormuni cat ions were intermittent at best, thus arrange ments fox* ground security were difficult for the VN to make, especially whan VX;,(enemy) activity was fairly frequent and often extensive, in this region** The airstrip at Kontua was often closed for relatively long periods because of the rainy season. After the spray mission the HIDAI* was gre-indad because of damage, to the E-34 fuselage* It was not until 12 January 1962 that it was used again. Its performance on three tests (1, 13, 14) was excellent a3 Judged by the results achieved. * Figures 1 through 4 show the r e s u l t of Teat 1 two months after the roadaida north of Kontum was sprayed with Dinonol with the EU3AL and H-3A helicopter. * Reference: "Weekly Intelligence Digest," So. 41-61 of the Pacific Command. 20 Oct 1961, pages 8-10. CIV W: