Document 8OK9OQOJaEB3d6dMrzKyZLQd

Chapter Twelve The Blue Asbestos Industry at Wittenoom in Western Australia: A Short History Lenore Layman THE INDUSTRY* The crocidolite industry at Wittenoom began in 1937 with a rush of prospectors to Wittenoom Gorge on the northern edge of the Hamersley Ranges in the North West of Western Australia The Wittenoom crocidolite industry is regarded as the worst industrial disaster in Australian history, by common consensus. On a global scale it also Tanks among the most harmful of asbestos industries, in terms of mortality and morbidity among the workforce and those who simply lived in its environment. By the end of 1986, 94 cases of mesothelioma, 141 cases of lung cancer, and 356 success ful compensation claims for asbestosis had been recorded in a cohort of 6,912 former miners and millers at Witte noom (males m 6,502; females " 410). An additional 692 cases of mesothelioma, 183 cases of lung cancer, and 482 cases of asbestosis have been predicted to occur in this cohort between 1987 and 2020 (de Klerk NH, Armstrong BK, Musk AW, Hobbs MST: Predictions of future cases of asbestos-related disease among former miners and millers of crocidolite in Western Australia. Med J Aust 151:616620, 1989). See also Chapter 7. Wittenoom has achieved notoriety in the Australian mass media, and its story has been told separately by Mc Culloch and Hills (McCulloch J: Asbestos--Its Human Cost. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1986; Hills B: Blue Murder. South Melbourne: Sun Books, Mac millan, 1989). Nonetheless, few accounts have appeared outside Australia. We believe (hat details of the Wittenoom experience deserve far wider dissemination. Remote as the Industry was--in '`outback*' Australia--its lessons are uni versal. They include the weakness of the individual and even government agencies when faced with bureaucratic inertia and competitive interests within the complexities of modem government. Wj consider this short history--based partly on the recollections of "those who were there''--to be a significant contribution to the global record of indus trial mishaps. In this chapter, some of the protagonists and workers are designated by name. We emphasize that names have been used only when they are part of the public record in Western Australia, for example those who gave evidence in open hearings. In Australia, asbestos (chrysolite) was also mined at Baryulgil in the Northern Rivers region of New South Wales. McCulloch's book also contains an account of the Baryulgil industry (pages 131-189). This venture operated from the early 1940s until 1979. The operation was very tiny, and the workforce--recruited from local Aboriginal communities, with only a few exceptions--never exceeded 40. Oral evidence from the workers and various docu- 305 f 306 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL. AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHEUOMA (W.A.). High asbestos prices encouraged the. prospectors to knap the mineral from the sides of the gorge, bag it, and carry it out by donkey train to the coastal port of Roebourne 320 kilo* meters away. Prices fell, fortunes did not mate rialize, and the rush faded away. Mining con tinued nevertheless, and milling began in a very small way under the control of Lang Han cock, a young pastoralist, and his partner, Pe ter Wright. In 1943 the tiny venture was taken over by Australian Blue Asbestos Ltd. (ABA), a subsidiary of the major Australian firm Colo nial Sugar Refining Company (CSR). ABA managed the Wittenoom works until their clo sure in 1966. The town of Wittenoom was brought into existence by the mining venture, becoming in the 1950s W. A.'s largest urban center north of the Tropic of Capricorn. It remained a single industry town. It was also isolated, being lo cated approximately 1,600 kilometers by road or 1,100 kilometers by air from Perth, the State capital, and 720 kilometers from the rail head at Meekatharra (Fig. 12-1). Australia had almost no experience in the mining of asbestos when CSR, a company with almost no mining experience at all, decided to develop the crocidolite deposits as an adjunct to its Building Materials Division, The federal government encouraged CSR in this wartime decision because of the strategic value of as bestos and a desire for national self-sufficiency. More than this, asbestos was hailed in the 1940s and 1950s as a mineral with almost un limited potential. "There is a strong possibility ments seem to indicate that conditions at Baryulgil were very dusty. McCulloch describes the occurrence of ashestosis among those who worked there. He also mentions 2 mesotheliomas by 1986. Mesotheliomas among former workers may be related to a disputed allegation that some hessian bags used to pack Baryulgi! chrysotile had previ ously contained asbestos from other industries--possibly brown asbestos from South Africa and crocidolite from Wittenoom (see Chapter 7, reference 89). The conse quences of this mine have, however, been dwarfed by Wit tenoom, and Baryulgil has received comparatively little at tention in the media, even in Australia. of the value of crocidolite production eventually eclipsing the value of gold production in this State," W.A.'s Assistant State Mining Engineer declared in 1942--not an inconsiderable claim, given the preeminence of gold as a mineral ex port earner since die eastern goldfields rushes of die 1890s.1 A 1943 Mines Department memo described the Hamersley deposit, of which Wit tenoom was part, as "one of die finest in the world."2 There were reserves "for at least a century" and therefore a prospective industry, the value of which would be "incalculable"-- one that would make Australia self-sufficient in asbestos.3 On die basis of die Commonwealth Bureau of Mineral Resources' assessment. Prime Minister Chifley noted in 1947 that "for all. practical purposes, the life of the [Witte noom] mine is unlimited.'*4 Consequently, CSR acquired the Wittenoom leases and primitive workings, in the expecta tion of a major, long-term, and profitable post war industry. This expectation was not real ized. The industry was always small in both output and value. In 1962, the peak year of Australian asbestos production, 18,416 short tons were mined, 95% of this total being cro cidolite from Wittenoom.5 However, asbestos contributed only 0.9% of the total value of Australian mineral production for that year. World asbestos production in 1962 was esti mated to total 3,088,000 short tons, of which Australia produced only 0.6%. Even in crocidolite, mined in Australia only at Wittenoom (Figs. 12-2 to 12-4), the greatest anpual output of 17,491 short tons in 1962 was small in com parison to 116,330 short tons mined in the Re public of South Africa in the same year.6 Nor did Australia achieve self-sufficiency in asbes tos production, even at the time of greatest do mestic output. In 1962, imports amounted to 39,105 short tons, mostly chrysotile from Can ada and amosite from South Africa. This ton nage was more than double that of domestic production, a disparity that was even greater for most of the postwar period (Table 12-1). Furthermore, the venture did not prove profitable. By 1955 ABA had accumulated BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 307 WESTERN-AUSTRALIA Figure 12-1 Map of Western Australia, showing the location of Wittenoom in relation to other regional centers and Perth. 308 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL, AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA lasses of approximately $1.6 million. These were gradually reduced in the second half of the 1950s--primarily because of a 5-year (1955-- 1959) export contract with Johns Manville, the major U.S. manufacturer--and a dividend of $364,200 was paid in 1960. From 1961 until 1966, however, the company again operated unprofitably, with accumulated losses reaching $2.5 million by its last year of operation.7 A combination of factors produced this out come. Preeminently, the company could not se cure its markets, domestic or overseas, be cause it was not competitive with large scale, low-cost suppliers like the Republic of South Africa and Canada. ABA's costs remained high because of its isolated location, the abrasive ness of the surrounding rock that escalated maintenance and milling costs, and the small scale of its operations. Labor shortages, partic ularly of underground workers, were continu ous, and the problem intensified in the 1960s BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 309, Table 12-1 Australian Asbestos Production, Imports, and Crocidolite Exports Year 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 Total production* CrockfoSte Chrysolite AS types 725 1,155 3,2g3 47249 8,160 13,313 14,472 17,491 11,888 12,841 -- 399 655 1,252 1,029 1,549 2,255 1,141 925 1,657 627 896 1,486 1,811 4,546 5,279 9.709 15,568 15,613 18,416 13,545 13,468 896 total Imports* 16,675 33,080 31,053 37,955 29,579 38,888 41,002 39,105 42,896 55,152 66,741 CroddoBte exports* N/A 387 N/A N/A 7.579 10,049 8,177 9,685 7.280 4,644 -- 'in short ton*. Soure*: Australian Mineral industry Annual Review. 1949-1968. with the attractions of the Pilbara iron ore ven tures. Labor costs rose significantly in this pe riod, and capital costs also escalated, as the company was pressured to improve fiber qual ity and the control of dust during milling. Fur thermore, the anticipated high-fiber yields we"* not realized as mining penetrated further fi' die gorge outcrops, and the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the geological information on which planning had been based were re vealed. In addition, the trend in prices was not what ABA anticipated. Strong overseas de mand for long fiber asbestos did not eventuate and, although prices rose after the war, this trend was not sustained. Instead, in the early 1960s there was increasingly severe competi tion for crocidolite in the market place from the Republic of South Africa, with overproduc tion and lower prices.* Thus, the asbestos industry at Wittenoom was always marginal and ultimately it failed, despite the high expectations that heralded its establishment. In this process of initial optimis tic planning, continued struggle for viability, and final acknowledgment of failure and conse quent closure, government was deeply in volved in supporting and facilitating the indus try. Both State and federal governments were predisposed to assist the establishment of the industry in the 1940s, because it promised to "populate the north"--a key goal of postwar politics.9 The size and status of the parent com pany, CSR, encouraged government support, as it had been recognized by 1946 that success ful development of the crocidolite asbestos in dustry needed substantial capital investment by a single producer.10 Consequently, throughout the life of the Wittenoom works, the State gov ernment reserved all ground outside ABA's leases from selection for crocidolite mining.11 This policy was just one of a package of such policies negotiated in 1946/47 between CSR and the W.A. and Australian govern ments. The State undertook to establish the townsite of Wittenoom (7 kilometers from the minesite in the gorge), providing the necessary surveying and the "amenities which are nor mally a Government function" (notably water supply and a school, police station, and hospi tal). It agreed also to upgrade the road to the coast and the port storage and handling facili ties at Port Samson and to provide a conces sional rate for ABA storage at the port, as well as a road transport subsidy for fracture (explo sive) from the Meekatharra railhead. The fed eral government agreed to join with the State in the provision of workers' housing (a total of 152 homes by 1953), in a shipping subsidy on SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL. AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA asbestos carried from Port Samson to Freman tle, and in a road subsidy on asbestos carried from Wittenoom to Port Samson, as well as on most goods carried from the port to Witte noom. Both governments shared in half the cost of construction of a bulk oil terminal at Port Samson.12 Both levels of government were impressed by CSR's enterprise, and the marginality of the industry--perceived at the time as only short-term--determined their united supportive role. Labor supply was another of the com pany's difficulties with which government as sisted. The problem of obtaining underground labor and of retaining all categories of labor existed throughout Wittenoom's operation. Few were prepared to mine in 42-inch stopes and the entire workforce was highly transient, 59% leaving in 6 months or less.13 In a single industry "company town" located in a sparsely populated region, ABA had no local sources of additional labor. The bulk was therefore contract labor, flown in by the com pany. From its commencement of operations, ABA recruited workers in Perth, paid their airfares to Wittenoom, deducted this cost from their wages and refunded it at the end of 6 months--an arrangement given legal status in 1947, in the first arbitration awards cover ing the industry.14 The federal government provided some relief to the company between 1948 and 1951 by allocating 134 displaced persons to work their 2-year contracts at Wit tenoom. 13 And others were redirected to Wit tenoom by the Department of Labour and Na tional Service when their initial placements broke down.16 More importantly, die Austra lian government gave CSR permission to carry out private labor recruitment in Europe. The men recruited in this way (and their fami lies) were accepted as immigrants after they had signed 2-year contracts with the company. The first of these trips was made in 1950 and had its greatest success in northern Italy and Holland; the last in 1965 recruited in Leba non. Overseas contract labor provided most of the mine's underground workforce and, with out it, the works could not have remained op erational.17 CSR did not obtain all the government aid it sought. Its requests for tariff protection in 1946/47 and 1954/55 were both rejected.18 Low-cost workers' housing in this period was dependent on asbestos building materials; be tween 1950 and 1953, 25% of all new Austra lian houses and 50% of all those in New South Wales (N.S.W.) and W.A. were built with asbestos-cement sheeting. Indeed, in the mid1950s Australia ranked fourth in total world consumption of asbestos-cement products and first in per capita terms. Nonetheless, asbestos-cement manufacturers continued to prefer imported asbestos because of its lower cost and, in the case of Canadian chrysotile, its superior quality.19 In this situation the Aus tralian government judged that the need to meet postwar housing demand took prece dence over its desire to encourage northern development and a new mineral industry. Consequently, ABA did not receive the pro tection it sought. Nevertheless, government assistance to the ailing industry increased after I960, chiefly in the form of annual deferments of freight in creases on the State Shipping Service.20 It was not enough to save the industry. Pessimistic assessments of future fiber quantity and qual ity, together with problems of labor supply and labor costs, caused CSR to close opera tions in December 1966.21 The plant was later sold to Lang Hancock, but no farther produc tion took place. It had been a failed mining venture, its legacy in illness and death among its ex-workers a massive additional negative outcome to set alongside its economic un soundness. WORKERS' EXPERIENCE Approximately 7,000 people worked for ABA in the 23 years that the company mined and milled asbestos. At its peak the workforce reached over 500, but for most of the time it was less than 300. The most striking character- ! i BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 31V ist . this workforce was its transience. Over the entire period from 1943-1966, 44% of workers stayed less than 3 months, 59% had left in 6 months, and only 22% stayed longer than one year. A high percentage of these workers were postwar migrants, somewhere between 35-50% being non-British immigrant in origin. Unfortunately, it is not possible to separate British from Australian-born to estab lish a reasonably exact percentage of migrants in die workforce; but it is certain that the ma jority of workers were recent migrants. Twenty percent of workers came from southern Eu rope, predominantly from Italy (12%) and Yu goslavia (5%); 5-6% were eastern European, almost all of them displaced persons, whereas German (3.4%) and Dutch (2.5%) migrants were also numerous. Ex-Wittenoom people re call that "every nationality" worked there. In the parlance of the time it was a town full of "New Australians." The workforce was young: 57% were less than 30 years of age and only 15.7% were aged 40 or older. The dominant age group was that between 20 and 24 years; it included 27.9% of all kers.22 Almost all were male. Very few of /wa's jobs were available to women. Min ing and milling was entirely male work and the closest women came to industrial employment occurred from 1960-1966, when four female bag-making machinists were engaged to sew the jute bags in which die asbestos fiber was transported. A few women were employed to do clerical work in the company office and to work as sales assistants in the company's store and in the town's hotel, which was also owned by the company. With ABA the town's sole pri vate sector employer, women's employment prospects were very limited and almost no women came to the town except as wives of ABA workers. The exceptions were a tiny number of State government employees, mosdy nurses and teachers. And so Wittenoom was a man's town with a male: female ratio of approximately 2: l.23 Housing for approximately 180 families was provided by the State Housing Commission, but most workers were single men or--more accurately--they came to Wittenoom as single men. They lived in the single men's quarters that consisted initially of small, shared hut ac commodation and later of dormitories. The men gave the name "Death Row" to the latter. Conditions were primitive and maintenance lacking, such that the Regional Health Inspec tor commented in 1965: "I seldom see such squalor, even among die dozens or so Native Reserves that I visit."24 Single men had no al ternative to this accommodation, although a few boarded with married couples and a larger number obtained their meals on a private pay ing basis. The work of mining and milling asbestos was hard, hot, and dirty. The mine was a lowback sloping operation in which face miners and scrapermen (who cleared the stopes) worked their Vh hour shifts in a crouched po sition.23 Because Australian miners, accus tomed to full headroom, were not prepared to work in these conditions, ABA recruited its face miners on 2-year contracts from overseas--mosdy from Italy--and trained them itself. Working conditions were worse in the mill because of the very high dust levels, and those who wanted, or were forced, to stay in Wittenoom moved to the mine at the first op portunity. Most of the mill workers were re cruited in Perth on 6-month contracts. It is not surprising, then, that this predominandy young, single, migrant, male workforce employed under contract to work in unpleasant conditions should be highly transient. In the war and immediate postwar years, before mass migration began, ABA was dependent on a class of workers it categorized as "drifters" and "no-hopers"--men who "work a few shifts and then 'snatch their time'"--as the employer's advocate at the 1947 arbitration hearings described them.26 Representative of these men was miner Thomas Martindale who gave evidence for his union--the Australian Workers' Union--at the same hearings. He had worked at Wittenoom for 15 months. When asked where his home was he replied, "I have 312 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL, AND |THICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA been in the North for years . . 1 have been ** However, the transience of most workers, par here off and on, from Darwin downwards, ticularly those categorized as "unskilled" or these 40 years."27 He liked life in the North, "semiskilled," was more commonly edged and his transience was a key element in his with desperation. These were economically lifestyle. At later arbitration hearings in 1949, vulnerable workers locked at the bottom of the ABA manager Broadhurst told of the financial wage structure. Laborer Cec Reem was a bag losses the company had to bear when, after ger in the mill in 1957. Although married with paying workers' airfares, they left before the four children he lived in the single men's quar money could be recouped. ters, his family having remained in Perth when he moved temporarily to Wittenoom to find Only recently three men arrived; one appeared in work. die mine for half a shift and the other two did not come in at all. They made it clear to people in the town that they only wanted to go to Witte* Doom on their way to Broome meatworks.2* Naturally I did not want to be separated from them but having been here over four months I feel the cost of living generally and the cost of bringing my family from South Perth would be This type of seminomadic worker persisted too great31 through die life of Wittenoom. For instance, in 1953 Welsh migrant Dennis Morgan had been employed as an underground fitter for 5 months before transferring to the garage as a motor mechanic. After 2 years he left Witte noom for Roeboume where he worked as a mechanic for 10 months before returning to Witttenoom in 1956. He had been back 9 months when he was asked in the 1957 arbitra tion hearings why he had returned. He ex Tradesmen could also be compelled to move by the exigencies of the labor market. In the sec ond half of the 1950s, for instance, unemploy ment in W.A. was the highest in the country. When work was scarce there were always jobs at Wittenoom. Mill fitter Colin McAvan moved back to the town with his wife and two children in mid-1956. He had been "almost forced" back, he explained: plained: At the time I came back there was a great amount I was passing through. I was oq my way south of unemployment in Perth. I had been working for my holidays, and there was a vacancy for a with a firm and they were liquidated--and naru- motor mechanic, and they came and asked me ... rally I had my wife and child--also I was paying about it, and I Just took it on.29 well above normal rent in Perth, and Iliad to go and find another job.32 ^ Without close personal ties, young men had no reason not to travel. One young fitter who spent 6 months on mine maintenance in 1962 could recall no particular reason for going to Wittenoom. I don't really know why I was there. It was round about those years that I'd done my appren ticeship as a fitter and turner . . . Wherever the work took me so to speak. I was single, didn't have a girlfriend at that particular point in time, so I just went where the work was ... No ties really.30 Many men came to Wittenoom desperate to find work. The least transient of ABA's manual work ers were the stope miners, the majority ofthem Italian migrants. Their 2-year contracts partly explain their longer stays but these same con tracts did not stop the last groups of contract workers recruited in 1964/65 in Lebanon from leaving virtually as soon as they arrived. When recent migrants found that they could save money in Wittenoom they tended to stay. For instance, one Italian couple remained for 8V2 BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 313 , ,.ars. After the company's 2-week training, he became a very successful miner. She took in Italian boarders among the single men and pro vided three meals a day and did some laundry for them. She usually had 7 or S such boarders, sometimes 12 and never fewer than 4. "Just to help my husband a bit," she explained. The couple stayed at'Wittenoom to save enough money to buy a small fanning property on the outskirts of Perth. She saw Wittenoom as "the place where you can earn something, better than in Perth, for example, specially for mi grants who just come here with nothing."33 For most workers, Wittenoom was a place to make money and then leave. Recent mi grants, in particular, were prepared to make short-term sacrifices to secure their future in Australia or to return financially better off to their former homes. Many Australian-born workers also went to Wittenoom with specific saving goals; perhaps to overcome debt and to "get straight again" perhaps to earn the money to buy a suburban home or a car. Some succeeded in improving their financial situa tion; most did not and moved on. One woman { .rose husband was a displaced person from Latvia explained: He was an ex-army person and when he arrived here without education, without trade, you're re ally stuck. You're always chasing that extra pound.34 They left after a year. "There was nothing there for us", she recalled, with no prospect of advancement for her husband and no possibil ity of saving any money. They returned to the transient farm work from which they had been attempting to escape when they went to Witte noom. Some people, desperate to leave, found themselves trapped in the town. Workers were in debt to the company from the time of their arrival; for their airfares to the town, for their bedding and, if their families accompanied them, for household furniture and equipment that was sold secondhand from the company- owned store. With weekly food, bills adding to the total, families often had difficulty clearing this debt. A school teaching couple who ob served workers' struggles in the mid-1950s commented critically of ABA that "you had Buckley's chance* of getting out of their daws for quite a long time really."33 When the works closed in 1966, hire-purchase debts totaling $5,500 were owed by 60 then-current work ers.36 People were deterred from leaving while still in debt, because airline tickets had to be booked at the company store. In the absence of a motor vehicle, the only other way out was to ride out to the coast--against company rules-- on the asbestos trucks. It was an avenue to which the desperate resorted. One worker in the mid-1950s with 7 children and no money at all after 3 years of labor in mine and null loaded his children and what household goods he had onto three asbestos trucks and managed to reach Roebourne.37 The most frequent metaphor in exWittenoom workers' oral histories of the town is that of imprisonment. People make state ments such as: "Not everybody could afford to leave: that was one of the traps ... if you went to Wittenoom it was as good as in prison ... I'd got to find a way of getting out."3* "A lot of people only served out their time in Wittenoom."39 "You were into the trap and then you were caught."40 "There was no way out... We were right in the middle of nowhere."41 "You supposed to stay two years. So at first you want to go. But after a while you say you have to stay--because there's no way out. You can't do what you want."42 `Buckley's (chance), no chance at all. \ 314 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL. AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA "Day by day you are always thinking how to run away."45 "Whichever way you turned you came up against the company. They called the tune."49 "No free."44 "Everything was belong to company."50 "All those huts in a concentration camp neatly in a row."45 "Nobody could do anything except the com pany."51 Even those people, most of whom had been independent of die company, who do not use the metaphor of imprisonment about their own lives in Wittenoom, use it of the mass of work ers. "You could get in but it was harder to get out," a former Wittenoom policeman ob served.46 People who had been government employees in the town stressed their "indepen dence" of the company: "We didn't have to be beholden to them " a school teacher recalled gratefully.47 Not everyone was unhappy with life in Wit tenoom. Some--mostly the self-employed and government employees--enjoyed the life. These people constituted a minority nonethe less. One woman remembered "a general air of discontent" pervading the town although she herself lived there happily for 13 years, and had 6 children in that time.4* "You made your own fun," people recall. The fun included pic nics, barbecues, card evenings, dances, and the weekly cinema. Pub life, two-up, card games, and s.p. betting entertained most of the single men.* These activities provided diver sions from the heat, isolation, shiftwork, long hours of overtime, and unpleasant working conditions that characterized the industry. The presence of the company was felt in all aspects of Wittenoom's life, a presence that many of its workers found oppressive. They recall: *Pub, Anglo-Australian slang term for a public house or hotel, especially its bar, where alcoholic drinks are sold and consumed. Two-up, traditional Australian game of chance, in which bets are laid on the fall of 2 pennies tossed into the air. S.p. betting, illegal but commonplace off-course betting, usually on horse races; s.p., starting price. "They played a little bit like a tin god."52 Wittenoom was a company town in the sense that ABA was the sole private employer, and that management dominated residential and so cial life as well as the workplace. The justices of the peace were senior managers and pre sided over the police courts. Together with the pastoralists, they controlled local government. The company owned the single men's resi dences, the only substantial retail store, and the main social venue, the hotel. Even the State Housing Commission homes were thought by many workers to belong to the company be cause it was the agent for rent collection, water rates, and house maintenance. ABA sought to encourage community activities and provided leadership for the Race Club, the Hospital Board, Country Women's Association, and the like; indeed, its approval was needed for any community venture to be successful.53 Like all mining towns, Wittenoom was a rigidly stratified society. The elite were the CSR staff, the managers, responsible to CSR's Sydney head office. These career men identi fied strongly with the company, worked hard for it, and in turn were well looked after by it. Their workplace authority translated into social power in the community and was expressed and reinforced in the maintenance of social dis tance from "the workers." The managers lived in the gorge on the lease, not in the town. The second tier of staff was the ABA em ployees: shift bosses, plant foremen, and cleri cal workers. They had "a lot of different perks" as one former ABA staffer put it.54 They received paid annual holiday air travel to Perth for themselves an their families, as well as their initial moving costs and free housing. BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 315 l ater, electricity, and firewood; but ABA had no superannuation fund and its staff had no ca reer mobility within CSR beyond Wittenoom and ABA's small Perth office. Their jobs ended with the closure of the works. ABA's wage and contract employees formed the bulk of Wittenoom's population. Best orga nized were the.dietal tradesmen, members of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. These men had a reputation among management as the only group of workers likely to "cause trouble"; they were certainly the most militant section of the workforce. Their tradesmen's "skill," acquired by apprenticeship, en trenched in workplace custom, institutionalized in the differentials of the arbitration awards, and defended by union organization, protected them from the precariousness of the laborer's situation. The regular working of overtime (paid at time-and-a-half or double time) gave them their opportunity to prosper. Most of die maintenance work, particularly weekend work on the mill, was done on overtime.5* Wages were the equivalent of those in Perth with the addition of a district allowance that was more [ tan absorbed by Wittenoom's higher cost of living; and so overtime was essential to boost workers* pay packets. The tradesmen benefited most from the constant labor shortages that made overtime the rule in the industry. For the mill and mine laborers it was more of a lottery, sometimes freely available and at other times elusive. In Wittenoom's social hierarchy, the mine and milt laborers, in particular the single men, had the lowest status. Isolated in the Compound, the name by which the single men's quarters was known, frequently unable to speak English or to stomach the food pro vided for them, and faced with grim working conditions in the mill and mine, the single men were the most transient of Wittenoom's population. They fled on the asbestos trucks, to be replaced by others who repeated the cy cle. No one much noticed; their labor was in terchangeable. These men recall that working and living conditions were generally intoler- able. Mill dust was an important component of this situation. Former Wittenoom residents recall the as bestos dust vividly. In the .language of their oral histories "dust" has come to stand for "disease/death.** This has happened because of their current circumstances: perhaps their own ill health and/or the illness or death of close family and friends; certainly their present knowledge of asbestos-related disease, of media-reported deaths of former Wittenoom people, and of the continuing threat to their own health. Wittenoom was an extremely dusty place. Foglike dust hung over both old and new mills and could be seen 7 miles away in the town. The same dust was brought into die town with the practice of using tailings, residue from the asbestos processing, as & road surface and a covering for house yards and public ven ues. A former mine worker who lived for 10 years in Wittenoom explained ironically: If you wanted tailings in town to make a drive way or for the backyard to look nice, you ask die company and they dump a load of tailings in your backyard. Hie schools and die kindergar ten, churches, everybody had it nice with tailings there. It's handy.* Parents recall their children's first years with despair: "I've got pictures of Robin, eighteen months old, sitting in it!" one mother la mented,57 whereas a father of 3 exclaimed "I suppose all the babies even ate the bloody stuff!"* When people describe Wittenoom's asbestos dust the dominant image is of a thick, suffocat ing covering: "Within five minutes [in the old mill] you were covered with all the dust... You were grey."59 "He [a mill worker] was like a snowman, all covered with dust."40 "As bad as any work [night shift maintenance] because everything was just smothered in dust ... It would stick to you."61 { 316 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL. AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA "The dust was just engulfing the whole crushing plant.''62 "I only knew him with having blue fingernails, blue lips--be was full of dust."63 "The gorges used to be so thick, full of it; it looked like a big fog at night time."64 "It was just impenetrable; it was like walking into smog."65 When people talk of the dust's enveloping asphyxial form they are doing so in the context of asbestos-related disease (asbestosis, lung can cer, and pleural mesothelioma) among their families or friends or other ex-Wittenoom resi dents, about whom they hear and read. What requires explanation is the failure of occupa tional health controls in this asbestos industry. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH IN THE INDUSTRY Asbestos was mined and milled at Wittenoom under conditions that were wholly inadequate to protect either the workers themselves or die town's residents from asbestos-related disease. Why was this so? After all, medical science had discovered a great deal about asbestos-related disease by the 1940s (see Introduction, pages 2, 4, 7, and S).66,67 In North America the health threat to asbestos workers was sufficiently well known by 1918 for U.S. and Canadian insur ance companies to cease selling them life insur ance.67 What was not fully understood until the 1950s, however, was the rapidity of onset of the disease after heavy exposure and the speed of its progression. In 1968, Dr. Jim McNulty of the State Department of Health reported surpris ingly short intervals from first exposure to clini cal onset of disease, on average 5 years among Wittenoom mill workers and 6V2 years among mine workers. At the same time, he reported the rapid progression of the disease: A man with two years exposure in the mill might have a normal chest x ray and no symptoms in one year, but have dyspnoea, finger clubbing, basal crepitations and an abnormal chest x ray the following year.6* An increased incidence of lung cancer among asbestos workers was established by the 1950s, and the association of pleural mesothelioma with exposure to asbestos was recognized in 1960 in South Africa (see Introduction, page 7). The first case of mesothelioma outside South Africa--in an ex-Wittenoom mill worker--was reported by McNulty in 1962.69 Thus, medical knowledge of asbestos-related disease increased substantially during the life of the Wittenoom works, particularly from the mid-1950s onward, and this reinforced existing knowledge of the other health hazards of asbes tos. At one level. Western Australia's particular historical experience made it aware of the dan ger of dust in the mining industry. Dust bad been identified as the major occupational health hazard from mining in Australia, from the beginning of the century. By the 1940s/ 1950s, there was a long-standing set of proce dures to monitor dust levels in the gold and coal mines and to check miners for pneumoco niosis. These procedures were effective for gold miners in Kalgoorlie and coal miners in Collie and in other settled, long-established mining towns. Not surprisingly, they were -much less effective in the smaller, more scat tered and isolated mines, particularly of the North West, where the workforce was transient and the mines mostly marginal and ephemeral. X-ray screening of North West miners was or ganized from Kalgoorlie, and in the 1940s a Commonwealth mobile unit made the Marble Bar-Yilgam-Wittenoom trip biennially.70 Until 1948 this unit also carried out initial medical checks and issued certificates.71 Given the high turnover of the workforce at Wittenoom, these procedures were clearly inadequate. When the plant grew larger in the early 1950$, annual xray examination was instituted, and in 1958-- as a result of the first diagnosis of asbestosis-- clinical examination was added to the annual UE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA %317 check.72 The x-ray changes in asbestosis had been found to be very subtle (see Chapter 9) and therefore difficult to detect, and it was hoped that additional clinical examination would enable earlier diagnosis.73 It took some time for public health authori ties to adjust to^the particular problems of asbestos--a mineral with which they had no experience. In this situation the Health Depart ment (and the Mines Department for that mat ter) applied traditional procedures that had been found to be appropriate to gold mining. One doctor stationed in Roeboume and serving Wittenoom as a flying doctor in the period 1952-1953 explained that: In a year or two ABA will produce the richest and most lethal crop of cases of asbestosis in the world's literature . . . Naturally I think some of these chests should be looked into.76 The Commissioner of Health responded posi tively, acknowledging that "these workers could easily incur a greater hazard than do workers in our gold mines." He explained that x rays in Perth would be required of all work ers before the commencement of employment, and that the Department was endeavoring to arrange for the Commonwealth Mobile Labo ratory to make annual (rather than biennial) visits to Wittenoom.77 Saint tackled the company at the same time: At this stage they were not concerned about lung disease caused by asbestos. They were more talking about dust on the lung which a miner usu ally gets. They were concerned about the miner that worked directly in the mine.74 Experience suggested to officials that it was the men with a history of mining behind them who ere the group in danger and therefore to be watched closely. The greater danger facing the mill workers who were almost all newcomers to, and transient in, the mining industry was not fully recognized until the mid- to late 1950s. First to realize the extent of the threat posed at Wittenoom was Eric Saint. One among a group of doctors recruited in Britain by the Health Department in the postwar period to ease die medical shortage in remote areas, he was appointed to Port Hedland and serviced Wittenoom as a flying doctor from 1948-1951. What made him unusual in W.A. at the time was his extensive knowledge of industrial health. He had recently gained his doctorate in the Department of Industrial Health at Newcas tle University in England. Furthermore, asbes tos manufacture near Newcastle had given him an understanding of the dangers of asbestos.75 Consequently, be was horrified by what he saw on his first visit to Wittenoom and wrote imme diately to Perth, stating that: I said "Look, you've got problems." . . . They pooh-poohed me and in fact they labeled me as a troublemaker. . . They didn't listen. I was just a young man, a flying doctor ... I'd only just come out from England and they thought "Who's this jumped-up fellow?"* That was the attitude.7* And so he made no impact on ABA, and the Department seemed to him uncomprehending of the scope of the potential disaster: It was the local experience. They'd never en countered asbestos; they'd never had occasion to look it up in the literature. It wasn't in the front of their consciousness. All they were thinking was what they knew, that there's a certain amount of silicosis among the miners in Kalgoorlie . . . The mining people were looking at the morbidity amongst miners; what interested them was silicosis.79 At this stage the Health Department did not have an Occupational Health Division. The State's small population and lack of secondary industry, together with the abolition of the Commonwealth Department of Industrial Hy giene in 1932, resulted in ignorance and ne glect of the area.*0 It was not until 1958 that 'Jumped-up, self-important. i 318 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL. MEDICOLEGAL, AND^THICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA Dr. D. Letham (tuberculosis physician at the' Perth Chest Clinic) was offered the opportunity to establish either an occupational health or ge riatric division in the Department. He chose the former because of an interest in preventive medicine, developed during his years as a phy sician at Woorooloo Sanatorium, where be treated former gold miners for silicotuberculo sis. The division was set up in 1959 with .a staff of one; there was no second physician until 1963, although a nurse and health surveyor were appointed in the interim.11 Increased interest and expertise in occupa tional health and growing W.A. knowledge about asbestos-related disease were expressed throughout the 1960s in stronger pressure on ABA to reduce the dust menace. In 1961 Le tham informed the company that dust counts were too high and a meeting of company, Health Department, and Mines Department representatives agreed that improvements to the ventilation of the mine and mill would be made and a system of dust counting begun.*2 In this period the Department also con demned the use of tailings in die township. When the Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. W. S. Davidson, visited Wittenoom in 1965 he "rebuked" the state school headmaster "in vigorous terms" for covering the school yard with tailings, and he informed the Shire Clerk that: Over the past years our attitude has been made perfectly clear to the Mines Department and the management of the mine on the use of tailings . . . The management ofthe mine has been given the opportunity to examine all the literature we have available on the subject.*3 In answer to the Secretary's complaint that the Shire had not been informed officially of the Department's views, Davidson replied: As your Council has always contained members associated with the management of the mine, I cannot accept a suggestion that the Council as a whole is ignorant of the Health Department's at titude in this matter.14 This evidence suggests that, although the De partment took an increasingly strong line in the 1960s, it was not always politically astute or effective, lb assume that information detri mental to the company and supplied to man agement would be disseminated on even a lim ited scale can be considered naive. A further area where the Department's doc tors attempted to intervene to protect workers was in their advice to leave Wittenoom, which they offered to individual workers during die yearly clinical examinations. There were prob lems with this, however, as the doctor most involved, Jim McNulty, describes: Perhaps the only medical advice one could have ever given, in view of the dusty conditions and history was "If you are thinking of going-- don't!" and "If you are there--leave!" but this is not the advice they wanted ... If there were no signs of clinical disease, one could not advise them to leave.*9 Few workers appear to have followed the ad vice to leave when it was given. Many workers "didn't want to be told" and some even tried to dodge the examination.86 There were prob ably a number of reasons for this response, but a major one was workers' perception of their lack of choice. They faced unemployment and loss of housing if they left Wittenoom; some were in debt to the company; others did not have the fares out for themselves and their families, hi material terms, many did not have a choice. The Health Department also struggled through the period to achieve more accurate dust counting in mine and mill. In 1959 the Commissioner complained that the konimeter used by Mines Department inspectors (who took the readings) "is not regarded as an effec tive instrument for dust counting in the asbes tos industry in Canada."*7 Nevertheless, it was not until 1966 that an industrial hygienist, ex- BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 319 in the use of more sophisticated equip ment, was brought across from New South Wales to take more reliable readings. His re port showed unsatisfactorily high dust concen trations in both mine and mill, but by the time it was completed the plant had closed." The isolation of Wittenoom made adequate occupational health supervision and servicing a difficult task for die Health Department until closure of the plant. A far greater impediment to its effectiveness was the legislative inade quacy and bureaucratic division of authority within which it worked. W.A. bad no occupa tional health legislation that could have pro vided the Department with the necessary power to effect change. Wittenoom was deemed a mine. Therefore, it came under the provisions of the Mining Act*9 (which did not touch on health at all) and die Mines Regula tion Act,90 which vested in die Mines Depart ment the powers of inspection and supervision and of framing regulations relating to sanita tion, safety, and health. The latter Act defined "mine*' widely to include not only the place of extraction of a mineral/metal but also "a place \ .. where the products of any such place are being treated or dealt with."91 Thus die mill at Wittenoom was a mine for the purposes of the Act. The Health Department had no right of inspection or power to intervene and insist on change. It could only liaise with die Mines De partment; it could advise but not direct. Knowledge and expertise were thus separated from authority over occupational health mat ters. There is archival evidence that for the entire postwar period the Health Department was conscious of the inadequacy of this administra tive arrangement. Although Dr. Saint was not aware of it, his letter in 1948 warning of the asbestosis danger spurred the Department to propose in 1949 that an area within 5 miles of ABA's works be excised from the jurisdiction of the Mining Act and brought within that of the'Factories and Shops Act, so that the Fac tory Inspector could "inspect the works and enforce improvements."92 The attempt was blocked when the Solicitor General, on the ad vice of the Mines Department, "ruled that Wit tenoom was a "mine" and therefore not a "factory."93 The Department tried again in 1953, in response to Kwinana's industrial growth, with a report that called for coordina tion to replace die piecemeal approach of the past. Industrial health, it argued: ... has largely been neglected in W. A. Hitherto this neglect has been of comparatively small im portance but the recent and potential rapid ex pansion of local industry requires us to take im mediate steps to close this gap in public health defence measures to protea the health of our growing industrial population.94 What was needed was legislation and orga nization that would place control of industrial hygiene in the hands ofthe Health Department, with representation provided for other depart ments. The response was again negative; the Assistant Parliamentary Draftsman and Chief Conveyancer advised that such legislation would cut across at least 10 Acts, as well as industrial awards. And it was unnecessary as "ample legislative power already exists to bring about what is desired without further ex pense to the State."95 The Commissioner of Public Health protested that it was not possible under existing legislation for his Department to maintain "adequate medical supervision" of other authorities who were "without the medi cal knowledge required to appreciate the probr lems involved."96 Nevertheless, nothing more was heard of the move. The Department had failed again. Thus liaison and cooperation remained the only tools the Department had at its disposal to achieve its occupational health goals, and it used them on the Mines Department and Fac tories Department, the two authorities that con trolled the bulk of the State's workplaces. Re lations with the Factories Department were close and cordial as evidenced by the 1949 at tempt to bring Wittenoom under its jurisdic tion. The Mines Department was more difficult 320 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL. ANDCTHiCAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA to influence and relations were often more dis tant, though apparently not embittered. Bu reaucratic divisions of authority produced by legislative inadequacy were most marked in the mining industry. Here, the Mines Department had statutory responsibility for health and safety in the mines whereas the Health Depart ment was responsible for the medical examina tions of mine: workers. The situation was furflier complicated by federal involvement; in the period before 1953 it was the Commonwealth Department of Health that carried out the x-ray program, a task that the State Department as sumed only after that date. Such divided au thority, and particularly that between the Mines and Health Departments, impeded effective action on occupational health. / Furthermore, the Mines Department was a large and traditionally oriented organization with a powerful ideology of development fuel ing its actions. In this it reflected the views of successive W.A. governments, both Labor and non-Labor.97 One health official labeled Mines Department officers "engineers who knew ev erything," a description that points to two ma jor characteristics of the Department: its developmentalism and its optimism. These determined the department's fundamental and continuing response to Wittenoom's asbestos production--that it was a valuable industry to be fostered and preserved. The Mines Department did not lack concern about the health hazards of mining, in particu lar those of dust and inadequate ventilation, but this concern was tempered by a pragmatic view about what was reasonable in a marginal indus try and by a strong desire to encourage new mining ventures. And, without callousness, its officers knew that a certain measure of dust disease was always associated with the mining industry. Dr. McNulty, who worked first as Mines Medical Officer in Kalgoorlie and then as Occupational Health Physician in the Health Department in Perth, explains that: When Cassandras . . . advised that dust was a problem and predicted the development of dis ease [at Wittenoom] it didn't ring any alarm bells in the people concerned in the mining in dustry because they were used to it; they ex pected it.91 Nonetheless, it would be wrong to portray the Mines Department and its inspectors simply as lax and ineffective. In the area the Department knew best, underground mining, standards were enforced firmly. It insisted initially that ABA find "a competent mining man" to take charge of underground operations.99 After the introduction of low-back stoping as the most efficient working procedure, the mine functioned smoothly, with a low accident rate100 and no major engineering setbacks, apart from an underground collapse in 1962.101 The Department ensured that the mine was worked in accordance with regulations, al though it made two concessions that illustrate its pragmatism: first, it allowed ABA to install diesel locomotives in the mine in 1945 because they were cheapest102; and second, it studiously ignored the employment underground of non- English speaking migrants, although this con travened the Mines Regulation Act. The De partment's awareness of the company's constant labor shortage explains the over sight.103 The Department was confident that it under stood and could handle the problems of the industry--a view reflected in the District In spector's report in 1945: , X The problem to be faced is the future develop ment of the asbestos industry in this State is purely a mining one. The metallurgical require ments of the undertaking axe comparatively sim ple, since the separation of the fibre is an entirely mechanical process, and since the deposits are so large and regular the geological aspect is also relatively simple.104 Such optimism proved to be misplaced, for sat isfactory quality and dust control in milling was never achieved and unexpected variations in the length and quality of fiber revealed the deficiency of geological knowledge.105 With BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 321 % . - Department's assistance, the mining prob lems were the ones most easily and immedi ately resolved. Satisfactory dust control (especially in the dry milling process of crushing, grinding, aspi rating, and bagging) was never achieved, al though die Department knew of die problem and tackled it evj$ year. Its basic premise was sound: The solution of the dust problem resolves itself into the willingness of the Management to accept the responsibility of seeing to it that die various machines release as little dust as possible into die atmosphere. . . Anyone constructing a dry treat ment plant of any description must realize that dust control is the major principle around which die rest of the plant is designed,106 provement in conditions all round."'10 Mill ex tensions brought renewed concern in 1952, but the inspector reported that "at my request the mill building is being totally enclosed and a great improvement can already be seen in dust control." By the close of the year he noted that "the dust is now controlled by extractor fans and cyclones placed in the roof"111 Nonethe less, a tour of inspection the following year by the Assistant State Mining Engineer found con ditions much less pleasing: Mill operation, at the time of our visit, was very dusty being brought about by the installation of new plant and the removal of dust curtains. The mill staff advises that the dust will only be a tem porary nuisance and should be well under control within a week or two.m Respirators were not an answer. The Depart ment knew from experience that the men could not (and would not) wear them in hot and hard mining conditions. Faced with this problem, the Department's response was to take the optimistic view. Year , fter year its inspectors ruled that dust control ' as unsatisfactory, and year after year they re ported that conditions were about to improve because of some planned change. Thus in 1945 it was noted that: The plant is equipped with a carefully designed dust collection system. Dust escapes at certain points, but these are minor matters and can be corrected. The collection of dust at the final dis charge is not satisfactory. This is to receive fur ther attention.107 The 1946 inspection recommended "a slow current of air distributed over a large area" to solve the continuing problem but concluded that "when this is carried out, and it can be done easily and cheaply, the dust nuisance will disappear.''108 In 1949 the erection of a new milling plant was noted with the addendum that "dust nuisance and similar defects will now be overcome.''109 Dust extractors were installed in 1950 in the mill resulting in "a general im- Dust control did not eventuate, however, and the 1954 inspection reported a "disgraceful" situation in the mill with "severe dust (or fi ber) concentration polluting the entire plant." Nevertheless, the inspector had yet another so lution, stating that "the most effective remedy would be to exhaust large volumes of air through the roof of the mill building."113 Thus, after more than 10 years of milling, dust levels had not been brought under control. What had seemed to die inspector in 1945 a "minor matter" was proving an intractable problem. It was to persist until die closure of the plant in 1966, despite some improvement after the new mill in Colonial Gorge began op-' eration in 1957. What is significant, however, are the common strands in die attitudes of Mines Department officials: (1) that the prob lem was capable of a simple solution that they could identify; and (2) that conditions, though bad at the time, were about to improve. The N.S.W. industrial hygienist who took dust readings in the plant in 1966 just before its clo sure concluded that the task of dust control in such an installation was one on which a deter mined and skilled industrial hygienist would need to spend a good deal of time to accom plish. It should cot, he concluded "have been 322 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL. AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA the responsibility of busy mines inspectors."114' began commenting critically on its inexperi Even so, the tact remains that the Mines De ence and labeling its management "ama partment believed it had the time, experience, teurs."116 One man who went to Wittenoom in and expertise to handle die problem. It clearly 1946 to work as a fitter in the mill recalled did not. that: Given that government controls did not op erate effectively to police the conditions for oc cupational health at Wittenoom, why were such controls so necessary? Why were the com pany's own standards so inadequate? CSR has been found legally "negligent" in its manage ment of asbestos dust in ABA's works, making CSR didn't know very much about crushing ore. They knew a lot about sugar cane and were try ing to apply the same principles and it didn't work ... I think they tried to do their best but they were forever experimenting.117 asbestos-related disease among ABA's former workforce its responsibility. This "negli gence" had several causes. Like any private sector enterprise, CSR was concerned with profitability and therefore with cost contain ment. Health costs were not, however, part of the company's calculations, being externalized in the public health system. Two additional fac tors further determined the company's behav ior. The first was CSR's inexperience and ap parent incompetence in managing the mining works, and the second was the continual weak ness of its market position. Although the W.A. government was delighted in 1943 that such a large and prestigious Australian company as CSR should be interested in developing Wittenoom's asbestos, ABA did not live up to ex pectations. The parent company had virtually no mining experience; it was a sugar company, and its only other mining venture was at Zeehan in Tasmania, where small quantities of white asbestos were produced. CSR had be come interested in asbestos fiber because it had entered the building materials field in 1938, with the manufacture of cane fiber insulation board, a by-product of its sugar milling.115 To this mining inexperience was added the ab sence of any Australian precedent for blue as He worked for ABA until 1930, becoming a mill shift boss and finally draughtsman. In this last capacity he joined in the experimentation, writing to the National Safety Council for "guidance as to the rules and regulations" on the designing of safeguards for mill machin ery."1 This level of managerial expertise had more is common with the traditional ad hoc practices of outback mining than it did with the effective operation of a large corporate enter prise. The inefficiency and ineptitude of these early years were repeated throughout the life of the mine, and stories illustrating the company's low standards are a common element in work ers* recall oftheir time in Wittenoom--whether they worked there in the 1940s or the 1960s. The description of the work process in 1966 given by die industrial hygienist. Major, to ac company his dust readings confirms thepjcture of continuing inefficiency: unskilled nrfodifications to machinery, spillages, leakages, and cut-away duct work. One metal tradesman, who worked from 1964-1966 as a leading hand underground, drew sharp contrasts between ABA and his later employer, Mount Isa Mines*: bestos mining or milling. The process would be one of trial and error and its success would depend on the expertise and innovativeness of management. ABA did not prove equal to the Mount Isa was different. When you went there you went to school for a week ... It was all safety, you know; learning all about safety. At task. Almost immediately on the company's es tablishment, in 1944, the Mines Department Located in the oorthwestem region of Queensland, the Mount Isa Mine is a major producer of lead, silver, copper, and zinc. BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT WITTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 323 Mount Isa they were very strict, you know. You had glasses and goggles and safety belts and they had blokes going around all the time there. If you didn't abide by the rules they'd suspend you. It wasn't as strict there [at Wittenoom] as what it was at Mount Isa.m > Casual inefficiency multiplied the dust hazard both inside the mill and in the surrounding en* vironment, which was grossly polluted as the exhaust system continued to discharge to some degree into the atmosphere. Inadequate mainte nance, the use of poorly adapted worn-out ma chinery, and constant improvisation and cost saving were characteristic management practices, which became more noticeable in the 1960s as comparisons began to be drawn with the new Pilbara iron ore ventures. Because Wittenoom was an isolated com pany town, where management had prior knowledge of official visits, ABA was able to disguise the extent of these health hazards, es pecially in the mill, by cleaning up especially for inspections.120 This action undoubtedly saved the company from greater departmental ssure. Also important was ABA's weak uiarket position. The industry was always mar ginal and ABA recorded a loss in all years 1943-1966 except those from 1956-1961.121 By 1955 it had accumulated losses of $1.6 mil lion, which had grown to $2.5 million by 1966.123 Although these losses were absorbed in CSR's larger bookkeeping, the effect in W.A. was to remove some of the pressure from die company on the issue of dust control im provements. Few wanted to see the industry close altogether; more than 200 jobs were at stake and another mining ghost town would be created. Thus a weak market position helped to limit health improvements. Organized labor complained of the "dust nuisance'' at various times across the whole period of Wittenoom's operation. In 1946, when the first award for the asbestos mining industry was being negotiated, the Australian Workers' Union (AWU) argued for the inclu sion of a dust allowance on two grounds: The question of silica would be involved here . . . But it is the discomfort caused by working in the dust that is why we are claiming it. Very often when men are working in the dust they have to wear respirators to keep the dust from clogging their mouth and nose, and if they have to wear something it is very uncomfortable.123 So, initially, although there was some suspicion of the threat of silicosis, die AWU perceived die dust essentially as discomfort that justified extra remuneration for workers. This claim was not granted, and die initial AWU award gazetted in 1947 went only so far as to declare that "no dry crushing plants shall be operated unless under such conditions as obviate dust as far as is reasonably practicable."124 The unions displayed a much greater aware ness of the dangers of the dust by 1949. Like the health authorities, however, they stressed the silica content in the rock containing the as bestos fiber and the danger of silicosis in mine workers. Asbestos was seen as dangerous pri marily in its capacity to accelerate silicosis.123 The company in 1949, though claiming that it was in the process of eliminating the "dust nui sance," was still not prepared to concede its danger. The employer's advocate insisted that: The Company does not admit that that [Witte noom's} dust is dangerous. Merely because there are clouds of dust, it does not mean that that dust is dangerous.126 The Award in 1949 was amended to include provision for a dust allowance, should a Board of Reference recommend it.127 A Board of Reference held in 1957 con firmed the poor working conditions in the mill: Conditions within the mill were extremely dusty and . . . mill workers were begrimed with dust ... A thick pall of dust was present in the near vicinity of the mill.128 The Board ruled that "the asbestos mining in dustry is necessarily associated with some de- i 324 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL. MEDICOLEGAL. AND EJHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA grce of dust nuisance,** but that at Wittenoom ' to survive in an isolated and harsh environ- the nuisance was "excessive.** Mill workers ment, compounded the situation. Within this therefore received a 6d per hour dust allow- complex of determinants, individual fate was ance (to add to the 1/6 already being paid by cast. the Company).129* Seven months later, because dust-reducing equipment had been installed, the allowance was reduced to 3d or 4d and re REFERENCES AND NOTES stricted to workers in the bagging and crushing areas, and in die dust rooms. In 1959 a union attempt to have the allowance increased was rejected.130 The trade unions representing Wittenoom*s The interviews cited in these endnotes are some of the 90 interviews containing the oral histories of 115 former Wittenoom residents that have been collected by the author. workers had very limited success in reducing the levels of asbestos dust in the workplace. Above all, they lacked knowledge, and they remained unaware of die degree of danger. Though they certainly struggled to have the dust recognized as a problem, they did so in die context of arbitration in an endeavor to gain monetary compensation for their members ex posed to dust. Union influence was weak in Wittenoom itself. Many workers were only nominal members of their unions, and the high labor turnover meant that the unions had diffi culties keeping local branches staffed with office bearers. Few workers supported industrial confrontation; either they could not afford it, or they wanted to save money quickly to get out. Thus, Wittenoom sustained no strong rank and file union presence to challenge the power of management and to effect improvements in working conditions at the plant level. A mesh of conditions determined the enor mity of occupational ill health and death that resulted from Wittenoom's asbestos industry. A company with insignificant mining experience and deficient safeguards was locked into an un economic venture in a State with an inadequate regulatory framework for occupational health, combined with a fiercely developmentalist ide ology. Especially powerless workers, hungry Predecimal coinage, based on the old British imperial system. At about die tune of conversion to dollars and cents, 6 pence (6d) was roughly equivalent to 10 cents, and one shilling and 6 pence (1/6) was worth about 30 cents. In terms of currency exchange, one Australian dollar was then worth slightly more than its U.S. counterpart. 1 J.S. Foxall, February 1942. Wsstern Australia Mines Dept file 1404/42. AN 350, Acc. 964 (WA State Archives, Battye Library). 2 WA Mines Dept, file 413/43. 3 WA Mines Dept, press handout, April 1945, file 321/43. Memo, State Mining Engineer to Under-Secretary for Mines, 5 September 1946, file 789/45. Report of the Dept, of Mines 1943, WA Votes and Proceedings of Parlia ment, 2, 1944, p. 31. 4 Letter, Chifley to WA Premier McLarty, 4 July 1947, WA Mines Dept, file 789/45. 5 Production data drawn from Australian Min eral Industry Annual Review, 1949*1968. Commonwealth of Australia, Bureau of Min eral Resources, Geology and Geophysics: Dept, of National Development. 6 Minerals Yearbook, 1, 1964, p. 231. United States Bureau of Mines, Dept, of the Interior. 7 WA Dept, of the North Wist, unnumbered file entitled Wittenoom General, Stack 15, AN 40/ ** 5 Acc. 1302. 8 For postwar price changes see Austrian Min eral Industry Annual Review, 1949*1968. 9 Commonwealth Northern Australia Develop ment Committee correspondence, NovemberDecember 1946. WA Mines Dept, files 789/45 and 413/43. 10 WA Mines Dept, file 789/45. 11 WA Mines Dept, file 374/46. 12 WA Mines Dept, files 789/45, 320/48. 13 Statistic from Dept, of Medicine, University of Western Australia. 14 Nos. 20/45 and 26/46 Western Australian In dustrial Gazette, 27, 1947, pp. 47, 52. 15 Appleyard RT: Displaced persons in Western Australia, University Studies in History and Economics, 2 (3) September 1955, p. 94. BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT W1TTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 325 ' 16 The evidence here is anecdotal. See the au thor's Work and Workers' Responses at Wittenoom, 1943-1966, Community Health Studies, 7 (1) 1983, p. 6. 17 My information on ABA's overseas recruitment is fragmentary; much of h is .drawn from oral sources. 18 WA Mines Dept, file 789/45. Commonwealth Thrift Board Report on Asbestos Fibre, 24 March 1955, WA Mines Dept, file 760/49. 19 Commonwealth Thrift Board Report on Asbes tos Fibre, pp. 6-15. 20 WA Dept of the North Wfest fries A21, 21/62, and `'Wittenoom General." 21 CSR Feasibility Study, 29 September 1966, WA Dept of the North Vrfest file "Wittenoom Gen eral." 22 All demographic statistics from the Department of Medicine, University of Western Australia. 23 Commonwealth of Australia, Census, 1954, 1961, and 1966. 24 WA Dept of Health AN 120/4, Acc. 1003, file 14/58. 25 Australian Blue Asbestos Ltd. Report of Oper ations at Wittenoom Gorge WA, undated c. 1953. Battye Library PR 7591. 26 Western Australia Court of Arbitration Nos. i 20/45 and 26/46 transcript, 10 June 1947, p. 106. 27 Ibid., 7 May 1947, pp. 24-26. 28 WA Arbitration Court transcript 41/48, 12/49 and 22/49, 15 July 1949, pp. 131-132. 29 WA Arbitration Court transcript 17,50,68,80, 118, and 207/1957,27 September 1957, p. 83. 30 Interview with former mine fitter, Australian- born male, resident 1962. 31 WA Arbitration Court transcript 17, 50,68, 80, 118, and 207/1957, 27 September 1957, p. 68. 32 Ibid., p. 79. 33 Interview with Italian-born female, housewife. 34 Interview with former mill worker/mine worker/hotel worker and his wife (office worker/housewife), Latvian- and Australianborn, residents 1953-54. 35 Interview with husband and wife, both school teachers, residents 1954-1956. 36 State Housing Commission report, 3 December '1966. WA Dept, of North West file 59/66. 37 Interview with former mill and mine worker, English-bom male, resident 1953-1955. 38 Ibid. 39 Interview with former mine worker/mill worker/hotel worker. Latvian-born male, resi dent 1953-1954. 40 Interview with former mine worker, Australian-born male, resident 1962. 41 Interview with former mine worker/storeman, Anglo-Celtic male, resident 1962. 42 Interview with former mill worker, Italian-bom male, resident 1951-1953. 43 Interview with former mill worker/trainee miner. Yugoslav-born male, resident briefly 1962 and 1963. 44 Interview with former mine worker. Yugoslavborn male, resident 1960-1963. 45 Interview with former nurse/housewife, DutchIndonesian born female, resident 1950-1954. 46 Interview with former policeman, Anglo-Celtic male, resident 1956-1962. 47 Interview with former school teacher, AngloCeltic female, resident 1955-1957. 48 Interview with wife of independent cartage contractor, resident 1949-1962. 49 Interview with former independent cartage con tractor, Australia-born male, resident 19491962. 50 Interview with former mine worker, Yugoslavborn male, resident 1960-1963. 51 Interview with former hospital matron, AngloCeltic female, resident 1954-1957. 52 Interview with former mine worker. Dutchbom male, resident 1965-1967. 53 The Wittenoom column of the Northern Times, the regional newspaper, reported on the various social organizations. 54 Interview with former first aid officer, resident 1962-1963. 55 Interview with former mill superintendent and manager. Australian-born male, resident 19491966. 56 Interview with former mine worker. Austrianborn male, resident 1957-1967. 57 Interview with former office worker/ housewife, Anglo-Celtic female, resident 1954-1959. 58 Interview with former ABA staff member, English-bom male, resident 1962-1963. 59 Interview with former electrician, Dutch-bom male, resident 1950-1954. 60 Interview with Polish-bom housewife, resident 1950-1953. 61 Interview with former mill worker/mine 326 SOCIAL-HISTORICAL, MEDICOLEGAL, AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MESOTHELIOMA worker, English-born male, resident 19531955. 62 Interview with former flying doctor, displaced person, male, resident at Port Hedland and vis ited Wittenoom in early 1950s. 63 Interview with German-bora housewife, resi dent 1965-1966. 64 Interview with former shop worker/hotel worker/housewife, Australian-born female, resident 1954-1967. 65 Interview with Australian-born housewife, res ident 1949-1962. 66 Elder JL: Asbestosis in Wtern Australia. Med J Aust 2:579-583, 1967. 67 Epstein SS: The Politics of Cancer, pp. 83-84. San Francisco: Sierra Club Bodes, 1978. 68 McNulty JC: Asbestos mining--Wittenoom, Wstern Australia. In: Proceedings of the First Australian Pneumoconiosis Conference, 12-14 February 1968, p. 451. Sydney, 1968. 69 McNulty JC: Malignant pleural mesothelioma in an asbestos worker. Med J Aust 2:953-954, 1962. 70 WA Dept, of Labour file 479/49, AN 25/1, Acc. 749. 71 WA Mines Dept, files 523/45 and 352/45. 72 McNulty JC: Asbestos Mining--Wittenoom, Western Australia, p. 449 (see ref. 68). 73 Elder JL: Asbestosis in Western Australia, p. 583 (see ref. 66). 74 Interview with Dr. Kowal, 30 August 1983. 75 Interview with Dr. Saint, 27 April 1984. 76 Letter, EG Saint to CE Cook, 6 June 1948; Dept of Labour file 479/49. 77 Letter, Commissioner of Public Health Cook to Saint, 16 June 1948; Dept, of Labour file 479/ 49. 78 Interview with Dr. Saint. 79 Ibid. 80 Gandevia B: Occupation and disease in Austra lia since 1788. Postgraduate oration. Univer sity of Sydney, 26 May 1971, pp. 217-222. Sydney, 1971. 81 Interview with Dr. DD Letbam, 15 May 1984. Dr. J McNulty joined him in 1963. Interview with Dr. J McNulty, 10 May 1984. 82 Cumpston AG: The Health Hazard at Witte noom, Division of Occupational Health, Clean Air and Noise Abatement, WA Public Health Dept., 8 December 1978, p. 2. 83 Letter, Commissioner of Public Health to Shire ~ Cleric, 20 October 1965, Dept, of Health file 14/58. 84 Ibid. 85 McNulty JC: Asbestos mining--Wittenoom, Western Australia, pp. 453-454 (see ref. 68). 86 Interviews with Dr. Letham and Dr. McNulty. 87 Cumpston AG: The Health Hazard at Witte noom, p. 1 (see ref. 82). 88 Major G: Asbestos dust exposure. In: Proceed ings of the First Australian Pneumoconiosis Conference, 12-14 February 1968, pp. 467518. Sydney, 1968. 89 Mining Act, 1904-1957; The Reprinted Acts ofthe Parliament ofWestern Australia, vol. 12. 90 Mines Regulation Act, 1946-1957; The Re printed Acts of the Parliament of Wsstera Aus tralia, vol. 10. 91 Ibid., p. 3. 92 Minute, Acting Commissioner of Public Health to Minister for Public Health, 14 November 1949; Dept, of Labour file 479/49. 93 Minute, Secretary of Labour to Chief Inspector of Factories, 15 December 1949; Dept, of La bour file 479/49. 94 Report, 1953; Dept, of Health file 473/64. 95 Response of Assistant Parliamentary Drafts man and Chief Conveyancer, 5 May 1953; Dept, of Health file 473/64. 96 Minute, Commissioner of Public Health, 28 May 1953; Dept, of Health file 473/64. 97 For a discussion of development ideology and policy in the period see the author's Changing Resource Development Policy in Wtstem Aus tralia, 1930s-1960s. hi: State, Capital and Re sources in die North and Wfest of Australia, `-edited by EJ Harman and BW Head, c)t. 8, Nedlands: University of W. A. Press; 1982. Also Development Ideology in Wfestera Austra lia 1933-1965, Historical Studies, 20 '(79), pp. 234-260, October 1982. 98 Interview with Dr. McNulty. 99 Letter to CSR, 4 April 1944; Mines Dept, file 321/43. 100 There were only seven fatal accidents in the life of the mine, two of them the result of min ers boring into butts containing unexploded fracture; Department of Mines Annual Re ports, 1943-1967; Western Australia Minutes and \fotes and Proceedings of Parliament (WAVP). 101 Telegram, ABA to Mines Department, 24 Oc- BLUE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AT W1TTENOOM IN W. AUSTRALIA 327 ( tober 1962; Wtstern Australian Dept, of North Wsst file 35/59. 102 Mines Dept, files 413/43 and 789/45. 103 Report of the Dept, of Mines, 1950; WAVP, 2, 1953. 104 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue (CF Adams), 25 October 1945; Mines Dept, file 352/45. 105 CSR's Feasibility Study, 29 September 1966; Dept, of North West, unnumbered file, Stack 15, entitled ``Whtenoom General." 106 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue, 1945; Mines Dept, file 352/45. 107 Report, Assistant State Mining Engineer (EE Brisbane), 6 August 194S; Mines Dept, file 523/45. 108 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue (CF Adams), 17 September 1946; Mines Dept, file 789/45. 109 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue (J Boyland), 1949; Mines Dept file 37/49. 110 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue (7 Boyland), 1950; Mines Dept, file 37/50. 111 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue (J Boyland), 31 December 1952; Mines Dept. file 31/52. 112 Report, Assistant State Mining Engineer (K Lloyd), 8 December 1953; Mines Dept, file 1238/53. 113 Report, Inspector of Mines Cue (AW Ibbot ion), 31 December 1954; Mines Dept, file 31/ < 54. 114 Major G: Asbestos dust exposure, p. 474 (see ref. 88). 115 Commonwealth Tkriff Board's Report on As bestos Fibre, 24 March 1955; Mines Dept, file 760/49. 116 Mines Dept, files 413/43 and 352/45. 117 Interview with former fitter/mill shift boss/ draughtsman, Australian-born male, resident 1946-1950. 118 Letter, National Safety Council to Chief In spector of Factories, 20 March 1950; Dept, of Labour file 479/49. 119 Interview with former metal tradesman/leading hand underground, resident 1964-1966. 120 Two mill workers, one who worked in Wittenoom from 1935-1955 and the other from 1957-1959, and one underground worker re called the clean-ups in interviews with the au thor. 121 Premier's Dept, file 258/56. 122 CSR's Feasibility Study, 29 September 1966; Dept, of the North Wsst file "Wittenoom Gen eral." 123 WA Arbitration Court transcript 20/45, 25 March 1946, p. 6. 124 Award AWU (Blue Asbestos Wwks) No. 20/ 1945; Wsstern Australian Industrial Gazette (WAIG), 27, 1947, p. 49. 125 WA Court of Arbitration transcript 41/48, 12/ 49,22/49, 3 June 1949, pp. 19-26. 126 Ibid., 15 July 1949, p. 98. 127 No. 41 of 1948; WAIG, 29, 1949, p. 21. 128 Decisions of Boards of Reference, AWU (Blue Asbestos) No. 41 of 1948 and Engineering (Blue Asbestos) No. 2 of 1953 (re: Claims for Dust Allowance); WAIG, 37, 1957, p. 161. 129 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 130 WAIG, 37, 1957, p. 803.