Document 71GZngJd4Xpj89KLM31Xnv9yj
July 30, 1991
Dow U.S.A
The Dow Chemical Company P 0 Box 400
Plaauemine Louisiana 70765-0400
Chip Troxclair CA 2 Bldg. 3601
cc: Art Royals, 3502W Kevin Johnson, 3601
REACTIVE CHEMICALS REVIEW - JULY 25, 1991
Chlor-Alkali 2 Plant - 2 Year Process Review
Project Rep: Chip Troxclair
Committee members present: Mark Mitchell, John Monroe, Brian Witt, Buck Bailey, Alan Sandow (for Steve Milligan), Gerald Wagener
Concerns:
1. Suggestion for Chlor-Alkali Reactive Chemicals training: Consider including discussions of the CA 2 Taffy Pot explosion which occurred in 1980 and also the CA 2 Gas Turbine HRU fire which occurred just a few years ago.
2. In the process of manually sampling individual cells to determine which cell is causing high hydrogen there is concern that a flammable mixture may exist in the sample cylinder. John Monroe offered his assistance in evaluating this potential hazard.
3. "Popping" in the iron cells from small hydrogen/ oxygen explosions should be eliminated.
4. Review the taffy pot cleaning/inspection procedures to assure compliance with LAD Pressure Vessel Program requirements.
5. Concerning materials of construction: Review CA 2 procedures to ensure that metallic parts issued are compatible with process. Specifically, does CA 2 have a program for checking parts as they arrive and as they are dispensed to verify material of construction. Consider conducting a random audit of parts in stock - Mark Bartel has a portable x-ray analyzer which could be used for this purpose.
c <r
DO A 037 f, OONFTDFNTT
Chip Troxclair July 30, 1991 Page 2 6. Consider developing a written policy for critical
instruments set point changes. Please respond in writing to the committee chairman within one month as to action taken or planned in regard to these concerns.
Gerald Wagener, Chairman Reactive Chemicals Committee eg
DO A 037600 CONFIDENT! Al
August 27, 1991
____Dow U.S.A.
The Dow Chemical Company P.O. Box 150
Plaauemme. Louisiana 70765-0150
G. P. Wagener. Chairman Reactive Chemicals Committee Building 2511
xc: K. L. Johnson. 3601 W. T. Austin. 3701 A. L. Royals, m. 3502W
REACTIVE CHEMICALS REVIEW FOLLOW-UP ACTION
Chlor-Alkall II Plant - Two year process review. July 25, 1991
Responses to concerns of the Committee:
1. Suggestion for Chlor-Alkall Reactive Chemicals training: Consider including discussions of the CAII taffy pot explosion which occurred in 1980 and also the
CA n gas turbine HRU fire which occurred just a few years ago.
RESPONSE: These items will be added to the reactive chemicals packet and will be available for the next review. Anita Dial should have this complete by November 1991. It is also requested that Gerald Wagener make a presentation in a 4th Quarter 1991 CA n safety meeting to explain the chemical reactions that caused the taffy pot Incident.
2. In the process of manually sampling individual cells to determine which cell is causing high hydrogen there is concern that a flammable mixture may exist in the sample cylinder, John Monroe offered his assistance in evaluating this potential hazard.
RESPONSE: John Monroe has been contacted to calculate the maximum pressure rise that is expected In our cell gas sample cylinders. Based on his findings we will determine what we should be doing from an equipment and procedure standpoint. We intend to document our findings to the Tech Center.
3. "Popping" in the iron cells from small hydrogen/oxygen explosions should be eliminated.
RESPONSE: I agree that "popping" should be eliminated, but unfortunately this Is easier said than done. Donnie Lambert is working on plans to modify the cathodes and anodes to include insulation to extend below the liquid level, which should eliminate the source of the "spark". These modifications will be Incorporated in future cell overhauls. Donnie will also look into the possibility of increasing the capacity of the ejector to pull more air from the vapor space under the cell covers. Both of these are longer term solutions. Topping" normally occurs on startup of the cells from a cold state when the load is being Increased on the cells. Recently this has happened infrequently due to longer times between maintenance on the cells. Until equipment changes are made, the procedure for loading the cells will call for slowly raising the load to minimize popping.
-1-
oo A 037604 CONF JOFNTTAl
G. P. Wagener August 27, 1991 Page 2
4. Review the taffy pot cleaning/inspection procedures to assure compliance with LAD Pressure Vessel Program requirements.
RESPONSE: CAII currently does Internal Inspections every three years on taffy pots, at which time the pots are cleaned and dried. External inspections and NDT testing are done as per P.V. program guidelines as are the internal inspections.
5. Concerning materials of construction: Review CA n procedures to ensure that metallic parts Issued are compatible with process. Specifically, does CA n have a program for checking parts as they arrive and as they are dispensed to verify material of construction. Consider conducting a random audit of parts In stock Mark Bartel has a portable X-ray analyzer which could be used for this purpose.
RESPONSE: The main concern would have to be the misuse of titanium parts in dry chlorine service, but other concerns would also exist for misuse of monel, nickel, steel, etc. in caustic or chlorine services. On larger parts, titanium Is easily detectable by its weight, but the problem comes in with small parts. The Texas Chlorine plants have purchased an X-ray analyzer to positively ED chlorine parts prior to installation. Ed Pittman is currently working with Mark Bartel and the Texas folks on a plan for the CA n plant to adequately ID Its parts.
6. Consider developing a written policy for critical instruments setpoint changes.
RESPONSE: Monty Heins is working on a written policy to Insure the Integrity of the critical instrument loops. This will be complete by November 1991.
CA II would like to thank the Reactive Chemicals Committee for a thorough and helpful review. If any questions arise from the responses listed, please do not hesitate to call.
E. J. Troxclalr, HI Production Supervisor Chlor-Alkali II
CHLOR - ALKALI 2
1991 REACTIVE CHEMICALS REVIEW MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING
SPECIFICATIONS
DO A 037606 CONFTDFNTTAL
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL REVIEW
AGENDA
JULY 25, 1991 8:30 AM
| k) H2-0 DU CT1
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GENERAL CONCERNS / MAINTENANCE
uAVT
POWER / CELLS / ECOLOGY
BRINE / HYDROGEN / CAUSTIC CHLORINE
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h'.soe:
(H4 i P ~nz^->caLA i a.
6: 39: os
DALE CROCHET
9- os -
9 -*50
RANDY HALEY
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DONNIE LAMBERT
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CHRIS FRYMIER
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
GENERAL CONCERNS
037606 oo * coMF t
CHLOR-ALKALI 2 REACTTVK ri-TFlvUCAL MATRIX
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1 )Acrtone 2)Acety lene 3)Activated Alumina 4)Ammonia Water' 5) Betz: 2020
6----------------------- DE 1187 ) 20K J 7) 8P6-10? S) Polymer 1 131L 9) Foam Trol (144or275)
33 3 33 3
--
'
10) Carbon-Tet 1 1) Chlorine
1 2) Chloroform 13) Chlorothene
l4)Derakane
15) Dichloromethane 16) Flurolube:
17) Freon' 1 1 & 12 '
1S)HCPD
19) '
20) h'.t
21) 1 hj-JrocMorio Aoid 22) Hydrogen
j -- ------
23) Hunter Soap ' 24)Kerosene
j |
25) Litt'nuro Bromide 2i) Lube Oils
| J
27) Marfax Grease
23) MEK Peroxide
29) Heverreeze
20) tiitric Acid
31) Sodium Hydroxide 12) SoJiurn Thiosulfate 33) Sulfuric Acid
1 1 3 1
.
1 1 1 222 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
1 1 l 323 33 3 l 1 33 33 2 1 1 1
3 33 22 2 233 32 33 32 1 3 73 1 1 1 1 2 _3_ 3_ J_ 1 1 _i_ _J_ i. J_ /. j? j_ "7
2
1 1 l1
1 111 11 11 11 11 1
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T_i_ T _2 1 T T T 7 T T ~i r \ _T 1 1
1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 2 1 r1
1 1 2 1 23 i 2 1 1 3 1 32 1 7
33 03 22 32
j_ 1 J_ 2 3 1 2 2 2" 1 2
11 11 2 L 2_
l T z_ T "2 1 _i_ 2
1 1 1 12 212
1 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 31 1 1
1 13 12 212
1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 J_ 1 1 7v' 7 .1 3
2 3 2 3 1 3 1 1 t 1 2 2 2 T2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
11 11 11 11 11 11
1 1 1 13 312
3 31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 y1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 y1 i 1
1 1 3 33 3 1 2 1 12 13 312 1 1 1 13 313
11 11 11 11
1 i 1 13 313
-- ------
1 1 1 1 1 j_ J 1 1 1 1 17
1 j_ J_ 1 3_ 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 3_ 3 1 7
1 11 11
-- -- -- ---- -- -- ---- - -- ---- -- --
11 1 11
1 _i_
1 11
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7' 2
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13
33 7" %7/
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2 12 212
22
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2
2
213
-- -- ----
-- ---- --
----
4. 2 2
12
------
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341 \rater
Thin chart is intended to bo a general miide. In 30111c islances
it may_be_permissable to mix chemicals which sliov/ a potential
Hazard. Check with vour supervisor before doinfl so.
l ~ LZAST ^Acti tie
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DO A 037609 OONFTDFNTT At-
BRINE
- HIGH AMMONIA CONCENTRATIONS CAUSE HIGH NCL3 IN PURIFICATION
- NaOCL CONCENTRATIONS SHOULD BE KEPT UP TO NEUTRALIZE AMMONIA
- LOSS OF HYPO'S CAUSES AMMONIA LEVELS TO INCREASE BY A FACTOR OF TEN
- LOSS OF HYPO'S AND T-505 INCREASES AMMONIA LEVELS 20 TO 40 TIMES
D0 A 037A10 CONFTDF-NTTAl
HYDROGEN
FLAMMABILITY IN AIR FLAMMABILITY IN CHLORINE FLAMMABILITY IN AIR & CHLORINE
4 TO 75 % 5 TO 85 % 4 TO 85 %
- HYDROGEN - CHLORINE FIRES - HYDROGEN STACK FIRES - HYDROGEN COLLECTION UPSETS - CROSS CONTAMINATION - AIR AND HYDROGEN - CELL STARTUPS - HCL AND SULFURIC ACID STORAGE TANKS - HYDROGEN SAMPLING - HYDROGEN FROM GENERATOR MIXING WITH OIL BEING
CONTAINED IN VAPOR SPACE IN OIL RESERVIOR
CAUSTIC
- IRON / CAUSTIC WITH HEAT OF 150 C AND CAUSE HYDROGEN FIRE
- IRON CELLS GENERATE HYDROGEN
- EXCESSIVE HYPO'S IN CELL EFFLUENT CAN AND WILL CORRODE NICKLE CLADDING
- STAINLESS STEEL AND CAUSTIC CRACKING
- CAUSTIC AND CHLORINE PRODUCES THERMAL REACTION
- CAUSTIC, WATER, OR AIR CROSS CONTAMINATION
- WATER ADDITION TO HOT 50% CAUSTIC PRODUCES VIOLENT HEAT REACTION
- CAUSTIC AND ACIDS - THERMAL REACTION
- CAUSTIC AND ALUMINUM
oo
CONF
A
00767?
CHLORINE
- CHLORINE AND HYDROGEN - FIRE - CHLORINE AND IRON AT HIGH TEMPERATURES - FIRE - CHLORINE AND LUBRICANTS - FIRE - DRY CHLORINE AND TITANIUM - FIRE - WET CHLORINE AND STEEL CAUSES CORROSION - HYDRAULIC RUPTURES DUE TO THERMAL EXPANSION OF
LIQUID
00 A 03761?
^ClNFf OFNTTAl'.'
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
MAINTENANCE
00 A 037614 CONFTDFNTTAL
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES SAFETY LUBRICATION METALS CLEANING AND PURGING EQUIPMENT REACTIVE MATERIALS
D0 A 037615
CONFIDENTIAL
LUBRICANTS
NON - SATURATED HYDROCARBON BASED OILS AND GREASES REACT VIOLENTLY WITH CHLORINE UNDER MODERATE TO EXTREME OPERATING CONDITIONS. ONLY APPROVED LUBRICANTS WILL BE USED FOR CHLORINE SERVICE.
APPROVED LUBRICANTS FOR CHLORINE SERVICE AT CA - 2 INCLUDE:
GREASES: FLUOROLUBE GR 544 (Sealant for gaskets) CLIMAX FL - 5
OIL: FLUOROLUBE FS - 5
APPROVED MULTI-PURPOSE USAGE LUBRICANTS FOR CA - 2 INCLUDE (Not to be used for Chlorine service):
CAP32W EMB MULTI FAX GREASE KOPPERS GREASE MF EP2 GREASE MF 2 GREASE (FITTING) MN EP2 ADD GREASE MO MIST 2 MERPA220 PERMA 6 CARTRIDGE R220 SEAL REGAL R & O 32 OIL SLIPKOTE GREASE SOLLUBE OIL
M150 MEROPA 50T SAMPLE
conf wfnt^6
METALS
DRY CHLORINE SERVICE:
SERVICE WHERE MATERIALS WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH CHLORINE WHERE THE MOISTURE CONTENT IS LESS THAN 5 PPM WATER BY WEIGHT IN CHLORINE.
RECOMMENDED MATERIALS:
CARBON STEEL - SAFE AT TEMPERATURES LESS THAN 155 C (311 F)
IRON - SAFETY AT TEMPERATURES BELOW 175 C (347 F)
DRY CHLORINE REACTS VIOLENTLY WITH HOT STEEL
- NO WELDING ON CHLORINE LINES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN ISOLATED AND DEPRESSURED
- WELDING CABLES MUST NOT BE CLAMPED TO CHLORINE LINES
WARNING:
AT ORDINARY TEMPERATURES, DRY CHLORINE REACTS WITH:
-ALUMINUM - ARSENIC -GOLD - MERCURY - SELENIUM -TELERIUM -TIN -TITANIUM
00 A 037017 CONFIDENTTAL
METALS
WET CHLORINE SERVICE:
RECOMMENDED MATERIALS:
TITINAUM - HIGH RESISTANCE TO WET CHLORINE GAS
THE AMOUNT OF WATER NECESSARY TO PREVENT A CHLORINE - TITANIUM REACTION WILL VARY WITH TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE NOTE: TITANIUM IS HIGHLY REACTIVE WITH DRY CHLORINE GAS AND LIQUID CHLORINE
STORAGE: TITANIUM EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED (PURPLE PAINT) AND STORED IN A DESIGNATED AREA IN CA - 2 WAREHOUSE. THIS AREA IS SEPARATED FROM OTHER PARTS AND LOCKED. MATERIAL CONTROLLER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS AREA.
no A 037618 CONFTDFNTTAL
METALS
CAUSTIC SERVICE: SERVICE WHERE MATERIALS WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH CAUSTIC VARYING IN CONCENTRATION FROM 8.5 % TO 50%. NOTE: HIGH CORROSION RATES WILL BE CAUSED BY ELEVATING TEMPERATURES AND / OR CONCENTRATIONS. RECOMMENDED MATERIALS:
STEELPIPE - 8.5 % CAUSTIC LESS THAN 150 F AND STRONGER CONCENTRATIONS OF CAUSTIC BELOW 120 F NICKEL PIPE - CONCENTRATIONS ABOVE 8.5 % WITH A TEMPERATURE GREATER THAN 120 F ALUMINUM IS RAPIDLY ATTACKED BY CAUSTIC AND ITS USE SHOULD BE AVOIDED.
DO CO Nip-
tr>F^TTAI
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS HEAT TRANSFER MATERIALS - HOT WATER, STEAM, AND "HI-TEC" SALT ARE RECOMMENDED FOR HEAT TRANSFER APPLICATIONS. AVOID ORGANIC MATERIALS THAT REACT WITH CHLORINE. FILTER ELEMENTS - WOUND FIBER GLASS AND SINTERED METAL ARE RECOMMENDED AS FILTER ELEMENTS. AVOID USING POLYPROPYLENE AND ORGANIC MATERIALS THAT REACT WITH CHLORINE.
OO A q37A?0
dfnttai
gonf t
CLEANING / PURGING EQUIPMENT AND LINES HOT WATER OR STEAM IN RECOMMENDED OVER SOLVENTS PREFERRED SOLVENT FOR CLEANING CHLORINE EQUIPMENT IS CARBON TETRACHLORIDE PURGE CHLORINE SYSTEMS WITH DRY AIR OR NITROGEN - TAKE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT CONTAMINATING AN INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM WHEN USING DRY AIR DRY ALL CHLORINE EQUIPMENT WITH NITROGEN TO A DEW POINT OF - 60 F
00 A 0376?1 OONFTDFNTTAl
REACTIVE MATERIALS
Listed below are soaps, solvents, and lubricants that will react in a hazardous manner with chlorine. Hydrocarbons and silicones in general should not be used without testing and consultation with the Reactive Chemicals Committee. Also, it should not be assumed a material is safe to use because it is not on the following list. The primary concern should be to use those materials which have been approved, and avoid those on the following list.
Acetone Activated Alumina Activated Charcoal Alcohols 495 Syn. Lube Oil 500 Syn. Lube Oil Chemola Lubricant (TFE #8155-2) Climax 400 Climax 400 and Iron Powder Climax 400 & Ferric Oxide Powder Climax 600 Climax 650 Climax 750 Climax 800 Climax FS Kerosene Linseed Oil Marfax #1 Mineral Oil Molykote BR - 2
Molykote Z Powder Neversee Z Perchloroethylene Permatex Form A Polychlorinated Biphenyl
Chlorothene Chlorothene COP - Anti-Seize Compound 400 600 1,2- Dichloroethane Dibutyphthalate Dimethyl Polysiloxane Drawing Wax Ethylene Glycol / Aqueous Fel-Pro C5-A Anti-Seize
Freon 13 Freon 22 Glycerine Humbletherm 500 Hydrocarbon oil Dow Corning Molykote Dow Corning FS 1281 Dow Coming Stop Cock Grease Dow Coming Valve Seal Dow Coming Valve Lubricant FS-3452 Dowtherm G Silicone Oil Sisco 300 Solox Clean
On Super Jet Detergent Co/Vfr * o.??6
Polyethylene Polypropylene with Xinc Oxide Power Silica Gel Dow Coming Fluorosilicone 1-3907 Dow Coming FS-1265
Turpentine Unirex
Varsol Vitrea 33
DO A 037A23 OONFTDFNTTAl
ENGINEERING SPECIFICATIONS UTILITY AND PROCESS PIPING INSTRUMENT & ELECTRICAL
D0 A 037SP4 OONFTOFNTTAi
V
PIPING SPECIFICATIONS
UTILITY
ID LTR SPEC
PIPE MATERIAL
MAX TEMP
(F)
MAX PRESS (PSIG)
Air
H CS
300 150
Carbon Dioxide
H CS
100 275
Condensate
D CS
350 150
Freon 11
R CS
250 165
Freon 12
R CS - 20 to 250 165
Freon 12
RR CS - 15 to - 20 150
Lube Oil
Z CS
200 125
Lube Oil
ZZ SS
200 150
Methane / Fuel Gas
J CS
100 235
Nitrogen
H CS
100 275
Steam or Condensate
DD CS
500 170
Steam or Condensate
E CS
650 250
Steam
F CS
750 650
Water: Cooling Tower
B CS
150 150
Water: Process
B CS
150 150
Water: Potable
C CS
150 150
Water: Waste
BB TELON Line
150
150
Brine: Hot or Cold
A CS
160 150
Brine: Salt Slurry
AX PPL
140 150
Chlorinate Brine
M FRP
200 25
(no hypochlorites)
Cell Effluent
FRP 200 25
Caustic: No Solids from 10% @
s
CS
- 150
170 F Max to 50% @ 120 F Max
Caustic: to 50%
W NI
350 150
Caustic: Low Salt 50%
T INC
300 550
Caustic: Low Salt 50%
TX INC
400 180
Caustic: 50% to 75%
G NI
400 150
Caustic: 50% to 75%
GH NI
350 300 ^Oaip- ro^
V.
UTILITY
ID LTR SPEC
PIPE MATERIAL
MAX TEMP
(F)
MAX PRESS (PSIG)
Wet Chlorine Gas: 20M H20
Vacuum to 25 PSIG Dry Chlorine Gas: -20 F to 275 F Dry Chlorine: Liquid @ -50 F to 125 F Gas @ -50 F to 50 F Carbon Tetrachloride - Dry Dry Chlorine Gas Hydrogen Wet Hydrogen Gas: 20" H2O
Vacuum to 3 PSIG Scrubber Effluent with Hypochlorites Sodium Hypochlorites & Caustic: 180 F Continuous / 230 F Max Hydrochloric Acid: 0 to 36% Hydrochloric Acid: 0 to 36% Sulfuric Acid: 91 to 98% and 50 to 90% Sulfuric Acid: >96% Sodium Thiosulfate
M
N NN
O NH K MH
MX
V
Y Y1 X
XY EE
FRP
CS CS
CS CS CS FRP
FRP
KY/PTFE
PPL/KY PVC CS
Alloy 20 CS
250 25
275 150 - 250
-50 to 125 -20 to 260
300 200
250 300 150
3
230 25
180 150
180 150 150 100 100 125
-20 to 400 150
150 150
037600
DO A
f,ONFT OF N7 ^
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
POWER AREA
00 ? ^76p7 ^FNTT^i
POWER & UTILITIES REACTIVE CHEMICAL REVIEW
1 - Power Area Overview 2 - Gas Turbine / Generator / Steam Helper Turbine 3 - Main Fuel Gas System 4 - Gas Turbine Fuel System 5 - H2 Fill System 6 - Lube Oil System 7 - Seal Oil System 8 - Cooling Tower System - Chlorinator 9 - Betz Chemical Addition
A) Boilers B) CTW 10- Reactive Chemical Considerations 11- Chemicals and Raw Materials 12 - Previous Reactive Incidents
a
POWER AREA
APD 7/91
CONFTDFNTT Al
FUEL GAS SYSTEM
FUEL GAS
T-402
a
A
FILTER
(S-401 KO
GT-2
GT-1
CONFTDFNTTAl
ZD) I>
OCvcrJ-j
o
AFD 7/91
FUEL GAS CONTROL SYSTEM
VENT
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AFD 71
GENERATOR SEAL OIL SYSTEM
afd Pumps
7/91
DO A 0 3 7 6 3 ?
OONFTDENTTAl
V POWER & UTILITIES CHEMICALS AND RAW MATERIALS
CHEMICALS: 1 - Lube & Seal Oil "Regal 32" 2 - Detergent 3 - Sulfuric Acid 4 - Anit-foam 5 - Betz 6409A 6 - Betz 38K
RAW MATERIALS: 1 - Chlorine Gas 2 - Hydrogen Gas 3 - Methane 4 - Water A) Condensate B) Process Water C) Steam 600/235/115/30 PSIG
OO A 037A33
CONFIDENTIAL
POWER & UTILITIES
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
POSSIBLE EXPLOSION/FIRE DUE TO METHANE - OXYGEN MIXTURE IN PIPE OR VESSEL POSSIBLE EXPLOSION/FIRE DUE TO METHANE - OXYGEN MIXTURE IN GAS TURBINE DURING STARTUP OR SHUTDOWN
POSSIBLE EXPLOSION/FIRE DUE TO HYDROGEN - OXYGEN MIXTURE IN FILL SYSTEM AND COOLING SYSTEM FOR GENERATORS
POSSIBLE EXPLOSION/FIRE DUE TO HYDROGEN FROM SEAL OIL SYSTEM ENTERING INTO LUBE OIL SUMP
1 - Established procedures on purging fuel gas lines with nitrogen before taking out of service or returning to fuel gas service.
1 - Double block & bleed system integrated with startup and shutdown sequence.
2 - Compressor discharge press switch to insure adequate air supply before injecting fuel gas.
3 - Flame monitors to detect presence of flame in combustion section. Trips unit if flame not detected.
4 - Manual Air solenoid with time out function to enable fuel gas valves only during startup operation.
1 - Procedure for connecting/disconnecting hydrogen trailers from Air Products.
2 - Sampling procedure to verify H2 purity.
3 - Purge procedures for pressuring/depressuring generators.
1 - Seal oil system is backed up by the gas turbine oil pumps.
2 - Hydrogen vapor extractor removes H2 gas before oil reaches lube oil sump. System is protected by a dip leg to prevent gas from entering sump.
3 - Lube oil reservoir has a blower to remove hydrogen gas/oil vapor from sump.
00
COhlp
A
037634
tofnttai
POWER & UTILITIES
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
FIRE INSIDE LINES CAUSED BY RESTRICTION OF AIR FLOW DUE TO OIL IN COOLING AIR SYSTEM
1 - Seal air system has low pressure alarm to prevent oil leakage.
2 - Cooling air flow indication with high/low temperature alarms.
3 - Auto swap on plant air to seals for startup and shutdown.
`-ji>
DO
CONF
A 0376
fOFNTT
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
CELL AREA
00 A 037636 OONFTDFNTTAL
rrom Brine Filters
CELL AREA
oD o
zT|: o
-t >
Z^1 LoO -->f O\i'
2> W
36% HC1
AFD
7/91
TO Hydrogen Recovery
CELL RAW MATERIALS
RAW MATERIALS: 1 - Brine (Saturated) 2 - Electric Current - 68,000 AMPS/Circuit Maximum 3 - HC1 - 16 % 4 - Salt Slurry
PRODUCTS: 1 - Chlorine Gas - 95 % 2 - Hydrogen Gas - 99% 3 - Cell Effluent - 10 % NaOH
DO A 037638 CONFTDFNTTAL
v CELL AREA CHEMICAL REACTIONS
ANODE:
2 Cl-
HC1 + OH-
CATHODE:
2H+ + 2 e-
2Na+ + 2 OH-
TOTAL CELL: 2 NaCl + 2H20
> CI2 + 2e_ > H2O + Cl-
--------------------->
>
H2
2 NaOH
e"
___________>
Cl2 + H2 + 2 NaOH
D0 A 037639
conftdfntjai.
CELL AREA
EQUIPMENT CHLORINE CELLS
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
LOSS OF BRINE LEVEL CAUSING ARCING
HYDROGEN FROM CATHODE COMPARTMENT ENTERING ANODE COMPARTMENT ALLOWING A CHLORINEHYDROGEN REACTION
1 - Dual level transmitters (flange mounted with condensate purge) auto selection of lowest level
2 - Main brine level control plus side feed automatic backup level control
3 - Anolyte low level carbon probes on each series
4 - Six rounds/day check of level in level sightglass
1 - Minimum standard cell head level is 4", except on flooded cathode cells where the minimum cell level is 6"
2 - Hydrogen Recovery is suction pressure controlled
3 - Seal legs on each H2 vent stack to relieve pressure
4 - Seal pots on each H2 log to relieve excessive pressure
5 - High H2 pressure alarms for each series
6 - Anolyte low level carbon probes
On OOftp
A
037 640
AFD TOff/v 7" M/
7/91
v. EQUIPMENT
HYDROGEN LOGS
AFD 7/91
CELL AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
PREVENTIVE .MEASURES
A CELL SERIES WITH HIGH GPL ANOLYTE SALT (>315 GPL) EXPERIENCES SALTING IN THE CELL EFFLUENT OUTLETS. H2 PRESSURE
BUILDS AT CATHODE. A HYDROGEN-CHLORINE REACTION OCCURS UNDER THE CELL COVERS.
1 - Six checks per day on anolyte salt
2 - D-108 maintains control over salt slurry density
3 - Voltage and volt-amp mismatch alarms on Mod5
4 - Series radial feed system flow controls salt slurry to cells
5 - Mod5 flushes radial feed if pressure or flow control is lost
6 - FCV and PCV leak-by is checked upon every flush (valve integrity)
7 - Mod5 flushes systems upon circuit shutdown
H2-AIR EXPLOSION DUE TO
HYDROGEN LOG GOING INTO A VACUUM CONDITION AND DRAWING IN AIR
1 - Hydrogen Recovery system shuts down at -1.5" H20 or 1/8"
H20 for 3 seconds
H2-AIR EXPLOSION DUE TO
CIRCUIT STARTUP WITHOUT AN INERT ATMOSPHERE IN H2 LOGS
1 - Detailed checklist for pre-startup to ensure N2 purge system is operational
2 - Mod5 opens a N2 purge valve (with flow meter) when circuit is de-energized. Purge stays on. Alarm activates if valve doesn't open
oo ^ C0^F1
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
ECOLOGY AREA
ECOLOGY PROCESS FLOWSHEET
\
IORNAOH
10XNAOH
Oo COMp
f C3764 TnpNTT4i
ECOLOGY AREA
Solids
HC1 from D-8 1 0
pH
n0 A 037644
CONF'TOFTNTT Al.
pH
P 250 A/B Celt Effluent
LOW PRESSURE SCRUBBER
Cell Header
D0 A 037645
OONFTDFNTTAL
AFD 7/91
HIGH PRESSURE SCRUBBER
AFO 7/9!
ECOLOGY AREA CHEMICAL REACTIONS
Vi
SODIUM THIOSULFATE NEUTRALIZATION OF HYPOCHLORITES
Na2203 + 4NaOCL
---------- > 2Na2S04 + 2NaCL + 2HC1
CALCIUM CARBONATE NEUTRALIZATION
CaC03 + 2HC1 + 2NaOH__________ >
CaCl2 + H20 + C02
CHLORINE NEUTRALIZATION WITH CAUSTIC
Cl2 + 2NaOH
___________> NaCl + NaOCl + H2O + 2HC1
CAUSTIC NEUTRALIZATION WITH HYDROCHLORIC ACID
NaOH + HC1
---------------- >
NaCl + H20
CAUSTIC NEUTRALIZATION WITH SULFURIC ACID
2NaOH + H2SO4
___________>
Na2S04 + 2H20
on A 0376A7
conftdpnttai
ECOLOGY AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
REACTION BETWEEN CL2 AND/OR CELL EFFLUENT WITH SCRUBBER VESSELS OR INTERNALS
HEAT OR REACTION BETWEEN CL2 AND CELL EFFLUENT
LOW pH ON CELL EFFLUENT RECYCLE TO SCRUBBERS COULD RELEASE CL2 HCL ADDITION TO WASTE WATER CONTINUING NAOCL COULD RELEASE CL2 HCL ADDITION TO SCRUBBER EFFLUENT TREATMENT TANK COULD RESULT IN INTERNAL WALL CORROSION IF pH TOO LOW
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Vessels are fabricated from Derakane FRP
2 - Titanium parts are only used on the wet CI2 scrubber
3 - Column Internals on the dry CI2 scrubber are Kynar or Fiberglass
1 - Fresh cell effluent addition and recycle rates are large enough to keep temperatures down
1 - pH control on scrubbers
1 - Sodium thiosulfate is used to neutralize NaOCl before NaOH neutralization using ORP/Hypo analyzer
1 - Mod5 logic stops treatment if pH falls below setpoint
DO A 037648 CONFIDENT! Al
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
BRINE AREA
A
rM/
SALT FROh
CHLOR - ALKALI 2 BRINE AREA
AFD 07/91
V BRINE RAW MATERIALS
BRINE:
Ca Mg NaCl
350 PPM 10 PPM 300 GPL
RESATURATED BRINE:
NaCl NaOH
350 GPL 1 - 5 GPL
CARBONATE:
NaOH Na2C03
3 - 6 GPL 60 - 80 GPL
HCIi 15 - 18% Dilute from 35% with Condensate
NaOH:
10%
BETZ 90820
D0 A 037651
CONFTDFNTTAl
BRINE PRODUCTS
TREATED BRINE: Total Hardness (Ca+2) 2-5 PPM
NaOH Na2CC>3
NaOCl NH3
NaCl
1.5-4 GPL 2 - 2.5 GPL
60 -80 PPM < 1 PPM
> 300 GPL
CLARIFIER UNDERFLOW:
h2o
NaCl CaCC>3 Mg(OH)2 Na2CC>3 NaOH SOLIDS FLOC
70.5 23.7 4.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.01
BRINE TREATING CHEMICAL REACTIONS
Ca + Na2CC>3
CaCC>3 + 2Na
Mg + 2NaOH
---------------- >
Mg(OH)2 + 2Na
2NH4CI + 2NaOCL
---------------- > N2 + 3NaCI + 3H20 + 2HC1
TANNINS + NaOCl
---------------- >
INSOLUBLE SOLIDS
2NaOH + CI2
NaOCl + NaCl + H2O
2NaOH + CO2
---------------- >
Na2C03 + H2O
DO A 037653 CONFIDFNTIAL
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
HYDROGEN RECOVERY AREA
Do A
Dohip
037 654
^DF/VTIai.
HYDROGEN RECOVERY
AFD 7/91
HYDROGEN RAW MATERIALS
HYDROGEN: Temp Pressure
NITROGEN: N2
NaOH: NaOH
Na2$2Q3i Na2S203
30 C 1.5" H2O
100%
10%
3%
Do
DO/y/r
HYDROGEN PRODUCT
Temp Pressure Flow Hydrogen 02
co2
n2
15 C 10 PSIG 2500 LB/HR 99.9 % 900 PPM < 10 PPM < 100 PPM
00 A 037657 OONFTDFNTTAt
HYDROGEN tyU&r CHEMICAL REACTIONS
2NaOH + CI2 + H2O
NaOCI + NaCI + 2H2O
Na2S203 + 4NaOCl + 2NaOH__________ >
2Na2S04 + 4NaCl + H20
C^^0TA ^0'5r7rrfc
HYDROGEN AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OXYGEN - HYDROGEN EXPLOSION
HYDROGEN - CHLORINE EXPLOSION
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Hydrogen Recovery trips when any two oxygen analyzers are above the trip point of 0.5 %. The Mod5 alarms at 0.25 %
2 - Automatic N2 addition to H2 Header when Hydrogen Recovery trips or is shutdown
3 - Hydrogen Recovery trips when two or more suction pressure analyzers are in service and see 1/8" H2O pressure for two seconds
4 - Hydrogen Recovery trips when only one suction pressure analyzer is in service and sees 0.3" H2O pressure for two seconds
5 - Hydrogen Recovery trips when a suction pressure analyzer sees - 1.5" H2O for one second.
1 - Maintain excess chemicals in CT-601. Cooling tower water checked twice a day. Adjustments are made at that time.
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
CAUSTIC AREA
DO A 037660 OONFTDFNTTAt
NaOH EVAPORATOR AREA
NaOH Centrifuges
7-91/lww
NaOH FINISHING AREA
DO tJ zn o
H>
ao zH--i 'CjP1 >- ^U)
7 9 ]/!wv
P-323 A/B
NaOH FINISHING AND STORAGE AREA
'f-; ONo<'JJ A
7-3 'I#*
CAUSTIC AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
WATER WILL REACT VIOLENTLY WITH HEAT GENERATION WHEN MIXED WITH 50% CAUSTIC.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Water is added to the Caustic Process throughout the plant. Most additions are closed systems and are kept flowing. The closed system eliminates any splashing. The continuous flow keeps the process temperatures near normal. When water is added to any open equipment, it is added slowly and protective measures are taken.
CAUSTIC ENTERING INTO THE PROCESS WATER HEADER. CAUSTIC COMING IN CONTACT WITH OTHER CHEMICALS AND PROCESS COULD CAUSE ADVERSE RESULTS.
CAUSTIC ENTERING THE CONDENSATE SYSTEM. CAUSTIC CONTAMINATION OF THE CONDENSATE SYSTEM WOULD RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT FAILURE.
CORROSION OF NICKLE CLAD BY HYPOCHLORITES WILL OCCUR WHEN EXCESSIVE HYPOCHLORITE CONTENT IS IN THE CELL EFFLUENT FEED TO THE CAUSTIC EVAPORATORS.
1 - A check valve is installed on the process water line to the Caustic Area.
1 - The wa^ water system is confined to the Caustic Area and uses CA - 2 product condensate. This condensate system runs a higher pressure than most of the process systems in the Caustic Area. Typically the places where the process is at a higher pressure than the condensate system are the condensate addition to pump suctions and other low pressure areas. In all cases, double block valve with bleeds are used on all condensate to caustic tie points.
1 - The cell effluent is analyzed for hypochlorites on a routine basis. The hypochlorites are neutralized with sodium thiosulfate before the cell effluent enters the Evaporator Feed Tank.
DO A 037A6r; OONFTDFNTIA!
CAUSTIC AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
HCL - NAOH EXOTHERMIC REACTION DUE TO HCL AND 50% CAUSTIC BEING CROSS-TIED AT IRON CELLS..
HYDROGEN EXPLOSION COULD RESULT IF HYDROGEN (GENERATED WITHIN THE IRON CELLS) REACHED EXPLOSIVE LIMITS.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Caustic is always drained from the iron cells and the cells are flushed with water before being acidized. The HC1 line includes a double block and bleed to isolate the HC1 from the iron cells when not in use.
1 - A vacuum system is operated to remove the hydrogen. The system is designed to allow enough air input to keep the hydrogen concentration below the explosive range. The system is open with hoods over each iron cell. The is no way to seal the system and keep air out, therefore, a large amount of hydrogen cannot build up in the system.
DO A 037666 CONFIDFNTTAl
CA-2 REACTIVE CHEMICAL
REVIEW
CHLORINE AREA
oo CO/s/p
o
Mj
CHLORINE AREA
9595 CL2 GAS FROM CELLS WITH 2% H20
AND 3% INERTS
98% H2504
GAS TO USERS
00 A 037668 CONFTDFNTIAl
CDC AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS TITANIUM IN THE PRESENCE OF DRY CI2 WILL BURN. BOTHCI2 EXCHANGERS, E-201 AND E-202, CONTAIN TITANIUM TUBES. D-209A CONTAINS TITANIUM BOLTS. WET CI2 REACTS WITH STEEL IN A VERY CORROSIVE MANNER.
WEAK H2SO4 IS VERY CORROSIVE WHEN CONTACTED WITH STEEL.
TUBE FAILURE E-215/E-216
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Exchangers are in wet CI2 service.
2 - Water is continually sprayed into the CI2 side of both of these exchangers. This flow is monitored and alarmed.
3 - Titanium parts in security storage.
1 - All piping in wet CI2 service is of Fiberglass-material. i,Weo firr
2 - All vessels in wet CI2 service are Fiberglass. u,jcO
3 - Mist eliminating elements in D-209A are Fiberglass.
4 - All chlorinated water piping is lined.
1 - The first drying tower, T-201, is an fftP
vessel.
c?\jc_
2 - Acid strengths/flows/temperature are monitored in both drying towers.
3 - Tray temperatures are monitored in both towers.
4 - Acid coolers for both towers.
1 - Conductivity probe on chill water with automatic dump.
Oo C'-Oh/p ro"^
CDC AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Cl2 - IRON REACTION AT COMPRESSOR C-201 A/B
Cl2 - IRON REACTION IN PIPING Cl2 - LUBE OIL REACTION Cl2 - ORGANIC CHEMICAL REACTION
1 - Interstage coolers to keep Cl2 temperature down.
2 - High temperature trip on the compressor. Triple redundant temperatures on 2nd and 3rd stages. Trips on two thermocouples at 325 F on 2nd or 3rd stage.
3 - Deluge system.
4 - Interstage and discharge temperatures alarmed and monitored.
5 - Moisture monitored and alarmed off of discharge.
1 - No steam tracing - only electrical.
2 - Drying procedures prior to startup.
1 - Bearing housing separated from compressor seals.
2 - N2 purge on compressor seals; air purge on bearing housing.
1 - Prohibit use of hydrocarbon based compounds inside Cl2 vessels and piping.
2 - Use Fluorolube as gasket lubricant and DP cell fill fluid.
3 - Use only water or steam for cleaning of equipment used in Cl2 service.
DO A 037A CONFTDFNTT
3> M
CHLORINE COMPRESSION
o oo
o^ T? O 2 CO
\1 \j Vi
AFO 7/91
Temp F
O STAGE
STAGE
STAGE
Suet
SuetpiseSuetDiscSuetDiscCont
too 265 1 15 265 1 10 190 1 10
Press PSIA
-3.7
15
13
50 -
48
80
78
Flow */HR
85,000
Enthalpy BTU/*
Total Enthalpy MBTU
240 20.4
85,000 260 22.1
85,000 242 20.6
85,000 257 21.8
85,000 240 20.4
85,000 249 21.16
0-10,000 239
2.39
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Tr2Q5;
- Heavies removed from hot gas by contact with cool CI2 liquid (20 trays). - Purified gas sent to liquefaction unit. - Bottoms liquid flow is adjusted to control overhead gas flow on T-204. - Continuous CCI4 addition to bottoms.
T-204:
- Remove CI2 from heavies (18 trays). - CI2 vaporized via reboiling in E-205. - Column pressure controlled to drying train at 40 psig.
E-205 REBOILER:
- Supplied with 15# steam heat source. - EBV on steam inlet. - Normally maintain 55% level, 170 F. - Level control with steam. - Temperature control into D-227's - Sample point. - Conductivity probe on condensate outlet.
Do CONF
A 37674 r^NTT At.
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
TAFFY POTS; - Bottom outlet - tangent to bottom of pots. - Low temperature steel. - 750 gallon capacity. - Vented to T-204 except during transfer (40 psig). - Normally run 60 * 90 F, depending on ambient temperature. - Level - redundant remote seal transmitters on each pot. - Rigidly piped to sniff header. - Sample points on bottom outlets. - Vapor phase PSV's, 4 X 6 set at 150 psig. - Redundant pressure and temperature transmitters with alarms - High "rate of rise" temperature alarms - impending reaction - Pot will go to "emergency dilute" on extremely high temperature (>_ 195 F) - steam on reboiler will be shut off - reboiler contents will be dumped to pot with high temperature - liquid CI2 will be added to dumping reboiler to help cool pot; level controlling T-204 - option to dilute pot with CCI4 by setting DK
DO A 007675 NFr OFNTTAI..
ccl4 addition
OBJECTIVE: - NCI3 dilution - CCI4 in taffy to help alleviate solids deposits (acts as solvent) - Amount of CCI4 added is dependent (proportional to generator load)
OO A 037676 CONFTDFNTTAI
PURIFICATION AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
NITROGEN TRICHLORIDE EXPLOSION IN TAFFY POT
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Monitor and alarm temperature in each pot (redundant).
2 - Alarm rate of temperature rise in pots.
3 - Analyze Brine for NH3 content bi-monthly (R&D).
4 - Analyze Taffy weekly for NCI3.
5 - Monitor and alarm pressure on each pot (redundant).
6 - Lowered PSV setting to 150# to catch pot overpressure.
7 - Maintain 80 PPM hypochlorite in the Brine.
8 - Maintain level below 40% to allow room for diluent should a reaction take place.
9 - Capability to automatically add liquid chlorine to the Taffy Pot in the event of a reaction. Also have capability to add CCI4 to pots.
10- Reboiler temperature controlled to decompose NCI3. Samples are always below 1000 PPM. Given 40 PSIG operating pressure, reboiler temperature set point is set at 170 F, over 30 degrees below the boiling point of the dilutant, CCI4.
A 0376,77 CONFIDENTIAL
PURIFICATION AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ORGANIC IMPURITIES; WET CCI4
CHLORINE - ORGANIC CHEMICAL REACTION
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - CCI4 provided by Solvents from "check tank". Check tank analysis to be obtained for each load.
2 - In plant capability to analyze each load for organics and H2O.
3 - Dedicated line from Solvent
1 - Prohibit use of hydrocarbon based compounds inside CI2 vessels and piping.
2 - Use fluorolube as gasket lubricant and DP cell fill fluid.
3 - Use only water or steam for cleaning of equipment used in CI2 service.
DO A 037678 oonftdfnttai.
TAFFY POT INSTRUMENTATION
PARAMETER TEMPERATURE
PRESSURE
LEVEL PSV
DESCRIPTION
1 - Redundant temperature transmitters
ALARM SET POINT
2 - High temperature alarm on Mod5
150 F
3 - Temperature history plot VAX history scheme
4 - Change in temperature alarm based on pot temperature rate of rise vs. ambient temperature rate of rise.
1 - Redundant smart transmitters on Mod5
2 - High pressure alarm
135 PSIG in steps where the pot is pressured up for transfer 100 PSIG all other steps
3 - Pressure history plot on VAX history scheme
1 - Redundant remote seal smart transmitters on Mod5
2 - High level alarm on Mod5
70 %
3 - Level history plot on VAX history scheme
1-4X6
150 PSIG
DO A 037679 CONFTDFNTTAL
E - 205 REBOILER INSTRUMENTATION
PARAMETER TEMPERATURE
PRESSURE T EVEL
CONDUCTIVITY PROBES SAFETY VALVES
DESCRIPTION
1 - Redundant temperature transmitters to Mod5
2 - High temperature alarm on Mod5
3 - Temperature controller may be trended on VAX history scheme
4 - Extremely High Temperature Alarm - Reboiler will dump contents and steam supply will close
1 - Same as T-204 pressure
1 - Redundant remote seal smart transmitters on Mod5
2 - High level alarm on Mod5
3 - Level history plot on VAX history scheme
4 - Level controlled via automatic level control valve by steam to reboiler
1 - Probe on Condensate outlet to indicate a tube leak
2 - Alarms on Mod5
1-11/2X2
ALARM SETPOINT 195 F 200 F
75 %
400 wMHo 250 PSIG
DO A 037680 CONFTDFNTTAl
DO A 0 3 7 6 8
OONFTDFNTTA
LIQUEFACTION AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS HYDROGEN - CHLORINE EXPLOSION IN TAIL GAS
WATER/MOIST AIR ENTERING LIQUEFACTION PROCESS FROM BRINE SCRUBBER CREATING SEVERS CORROSION PROBLEM
CHLORINE - IRON FIRE FROM LIQUID CL2 PUMPS OVERHEATING
HIGH MOISTURE CONTENT IN CL2 CAUSING ACCELERATED CORROSION TO CARBON STEEL H20 IMPURITIES ADMITTED TO PROCESS VIA FREON
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Monitor hydrogen in cell continuously.
2 - Redundant hydrogen analyzers monitor and alarm tail gas to Brine Scrubber (set point * 3.5% H2 in inerts) analyzers included on critical instrument program ; Generator runback: 4.75%
3 - Automatic N2 dilution into tail gas. Control at 2.4%
1 - Check valve installation on tail gas line to scrubber.
2 - High pressure alarm on Brine Scrubber.
3 - Moisture analyzer and alarm on T-505 tail gas inlet line,
4 - Liquefaction startup and shutdown procedures, on computer, call for blinding the liquefaction process from the brine scrubber when liquefaction is to be depressured.
1 - Alarm on low cooling flow.
2 - minimum flow lines provided to prevent dead-heading.
1 - Redundant moisture analyzers monitored and alarmed.
1 - Complete analysis on all freon shipments.
LIQUEFACTION AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
CL2 LEAK INTO R-12 REFRIGERATION SYSTEM (C-520 LEADING TO REACTION WITH COMPRESSOR OIL)
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Analyzer monitors and alarms CI2 in freon. This analyzer and alarm scheme is included in the critical instrument program.
2 - CI2 - R-12 exchangers have double tube sheets.
DO A 037AR-, CONFTOFNTTAl.
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CON
EVAPORATION AREA
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS NCL3 ACCUMULATION IN EVAPORATOR BOTTOMS HIGH PURITY GAS CONDENSING IN USER HEADER
H2O / IMPURITIES ADMITTED TO PROCESS VIA FREON
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
1 - Flush evaporator bottoms once daily to T204
1 - Redundant temperature transmitters.
2 - Superheater on R-1I system which operates independently of freon compressor.
3 - Computer monitoring of CI2 gas header pressure and temp to calculate dewpoint. Scam alarm when gas is 10 F from dewpoint.
4 - Electric heat tracing and good insulation on gas header to CI2 plant. Heat tracing designed to maintain 100 F heater temperature.
1 - Complete analysis on all freon shipments.