Document 6VdYzYYJ5gL5e0OXpeoOyaz6

I* v * T 9 \" J S. Metcalf, Sc. Louis B2NK February 12, 1979 o-Chlorophenol Crude Sturgeon, Missouri Spill File / (see attachment) On Friday, February 9, at about 7:30 PM I called Harry Gilmer and reported that we had detected 0.037 ppm of tetrachloro-dibenzo-pdioxin in our reserve sample of the tank car ruptured at Sturgeon, Mo. on January 10. The analysis was done in triplicate, and the actual values were 0.034, 0.036, and 0.040 ppm. The limit of detection of our method was 0.010 ppm. He asked if we had identified the isomer, and I told him we didn't have this analytical capability. Ve doubted it was the 2,3,7,8 isoner, but couldn't be sure. In response to his question, I told him that It was our opinion that this finding did not change the situation at Sturgeon. The citizens are not at increased risk. I told him that I planned to call Western Environmental Services (WES) the next'morning. He said he had several calls to make and would get back to me. On February 10 I tried several times to call WES, and Gilmer called me back before I got through to them. He had already contacted them, and they were using additional safety equipment. I did talk to Roland Miller of WES, who confirmed the conversation with Gilmer. He appreciated the call, but was not overly concerned that an additional hazard existed. Gilmer had calked to several people, including Renata Kimbrough and Dr. Doull. They had expressed varying degrees of concern. EPA had chartered an airplane and a sample taken at the site was being flown to Chicago*for analysis. He requested that the two portions of our reserve sample he had been promised earlier be taken to Lambert Field, where they could be picked up on the return to Kansas City. I called Jim Gloeckner (WGK Laboratory- Supervisor) who vent to the plant, packed the samples, and delivered then to the B Building lobby early Saturday afternoon. 1 called Dr. Paget at 11:50 AM. Gilncr had called him around 11 PM the night before and was told that our position had not changed. *Actually University of Illinois at-Champaign. COO -1:j7 ge 2 bruary 12, 1979 Le as uaable to get in touch with T. K. Smith, but did talk to secretary, Rose Ann Reily. She asked that we be sure Joe Nolan aware of the situation. Bob Ishan reported that he was armed. aer called back at 3:20 PM and requested a portion of our "extract" actual material Injected into the chromatograph. I told him I i't sure we could do this, but I would find out. lied Jin Mieure, who reported that the total extract was used he analysis. I asked him to call Bill Fairless, Chief, ratory Branch, EPA Region 7, who, along with Bob Kleopfer, had a to Chicago to analyze the site sample. Mieure called Fairless, lined the situation, and offered to work up another sample and the extract to EPA if necessary. Fairless said he would'let us He also told Mieure that they hadn't found any 2,3,7,8 isomer. >f our samples was going to an iJPA toxicologist. He indicated EPA was "up tight". ess called me later and said they planned to arrive at St. Louis d 7:30 PM. I picked up the samples and delivered them to iss and Kleopfer at about 7:35 PM. At this time Fairless told it they had found no 2,3,7,8 isomer. * called me on the morning of February 12 and said that EPA had ed 9 parts per trillion of the 2,3,7,8 isomer in the site sample nfornation had been given in a press release. I told him that a heard over the radio Saturday night mentioned only "dioxin - the most toxic chemicals known". unhappy about the release in that he thought the Mayor of >n, the N&W Railroad, WES, the landfill operators in Wright City sas, and Monsanto should`have been informed before the tion was released to the public. Nevertheless, he was quite that the level was so low. J. S. Metcalf