Document 6BDEKVebKRZkzkExyLMBG0zEE

16 Mu> 1975, Volume 188, Number 4189 for fair hearings, duo process, and public access to all relevant information. The American Association for the Ad Scientific Freedom and Responsibility vancement of Science (AAAS) is deeply concerned that such issues should he dealt with, and resolved, in a responsible fash i ion, It would of course be far ncyond the Report of the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom i and Responsibility. capacity of the Association lo act as a court of appeal in such disputes, except in very rare and special cases. However, be cause of its concern with the policy issues i involved, the Board of Directors of the John T. Edsall AAAS charged this Committee lo con sider the following matters: 1) To study and report on the generai conditions required for scientific freedom and responsibility. Problems of scientific freedom and re lation growth in our lime, largely a con 2) To develop suitable criteria and pro sponsibility are not new; one need only sequence of advances in medical science, cedures for the nhjeeiive and impartial consider, as examples, the passionate con sanitary technology, and transportation, study of these.problems. troversies that were stirred by the work of threatens the ecological balance of the J) To recommend mechanisms io enuhle Galileo and Darwin. In our lime, however, earth and raises the specter of catastrophic the Association to review specific instances such problems have chanced in character, famines. in which scientific freedom is alleged to and have become far more numerous, These and other problems have led to in have been abridged or oiherwise endan more urgent, and more .omplex. Science tense and often bitter disputes among gered, or responsible scientific conduct is ar.d its applications h.r.a. -vcome entwined members of the scientilie community, and alleged to have been violated. with the whole fao'.c our lives and between scientists and policy-makers. As The full text of our report in response to thoughts. On tile ar c basic science examples we may recall the controversies this charge is being issued as a special pub has enlarged our ir...-oceiual horizons -- over the biological hazards of nuclear lication of the AAAS. Here we set forth i one need only mentn-.; is examples ih< 1s- weapons testing, over the use of defoliants the major features of that report more | tas opened up by the lormulation of quan and herbicides in the Vietnam War, over briefly. i tum mechanics and the discovery of the ge the elfects of DDT and other chlorinated AS I 000014578 i netic code. Applied science has largely hydrocarbon pesticides, over the antioallis- freed mankind from the terrors of infec lic missile program, over the supersonic The Scientilie Community; tious disease: but these terrors have been transport, and over the extent of the haz Its Rights and Responsibilities replaced by new terrors, also the fruits of ards from nuclear power plants. In these science. These include not only nuclear conflicts the contestants arc often unevenly The American scientific community, as weapons with their incomparable powers matched, with powerful industrial and gov: we deline it, includes a wide range of very i of devastation but also such organic chem crnmental forces on one side and a small diverse individuals--basic scientists in uni icals as the dioxins, accidentally discovered group of critics on the other. There have versities. research institutes, and govern as contaminants of certain herbicides, been attempts to suppress important scien ment laboratories; engineers: workers in which can kill guinea pigs at dosages as tific data that appeared unfavorable to the medicine and public health: graduate stui low as MX) parts per trillion (/) and are policies of some powerful organizations. If vlcnis and technicians working on scientilie perhaps comparably poisonous for human wise policy decisions are to be made amid piolilems; and teachers of science in col beings. The unprecedented rale of popu such pressures, there is a compelling need leges and secondary schools. The dis cussion that follows applies primarily to Thi* article is an abbreviated version of the report of the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Respon scientists invoiced in basic or applied re sibility. prepared on behalf of the Committee H\ John T Fdvill The member* of the Committee. which w.is estab lished in I470. arc Allen V A si in. Dirciior Hncriiu* of the N.ihon.il Bureau of Siandartl* and Home Sccrctarv of the National Academy of Science*. C Horman lohn T Pri.lessor it llioehctmstrs I merit u*. If.ov.irJ Uni search, hut in large measure it is relevant to the whole seienlilie community. i versity, Walter J iiiekcl. former (losernor of Alaska am) former U S Secretary of the Interior John II Knowles. Pievdcnt ol the Rockefeller Foundation, Karl Warren, former v. hief Justice of ihc U S Supreme Court (who died in July and Dorothy Zinhcru. Lecturer in Souolotfv. Harvard University Mary Catherine Bateson, Asso ciate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Northeastern University, served on the Com mittee until curly 1972 The Committee concluded, early in its deliberations, that issues of scientific free dom and responsibility arc basically in Reprints of this article can he obtained from Dr Edsail at the Biological laboratories, Harvard University, Cambridge. Masvt'.nuscltsOJl JK. The full report of ine Committee, .St icniific t-rvrdnm and Rry^tnubiht\\ can he obtained from the Association separable. Scientilie freedom, like aca demic freedom (2), is an acquired right, at j 'O'd of $2.9* ft,r members and 4* fur nonmembers Checks should he made payable to the American Asso ciation for the Advancement of Science and orders sent to the Association at 1515 Massachusetts Avenue. NWt Washington, D.C. 20005. generally accepted by society as necessary for the advancement of knowledge from Ib MAY IV75 $ AK7 which society may benefit. Scientists pos sess no rights beyond those of other citi zens except those necessary to fulfill the re sponsibilities arising from their special knowledge, and from the insight arising from that knowledge. Later we shall have much to say of the activities often referred to as "whistle blowing" in which issues of freedom and responsibility are inextricably inter mingled. Whistle blowing involves situ ations in which a scientist, engineer, physi cian, or other expert becomes aware of hazards arising from some process, mate rial, or product, or becomes aware of pos sible improvements in technology or pro cedure that deserve to be adopted but are being neglected. Issues of public safety are frequently Involved, and often the whistle blower works for the marketer of the pro cess or product. Some may argue that per sons with expert knowledge have a "right" to release information in their possession, if such release is in the public interest. Oth ers would say that it is the responsibility of such experts to release the information, even though they might prefer to remain silent. Both rights and responsibilities are clearly involved here, but it seems clear to us that the responsibilities are primary. Presumably the potential whistle blower will begin by reporting his concern to his employer and urging that corrective mea sures be taken; if the matter can be settled without appeal to outside authority, so much the better. If this step fails, however, and the concerned employee decides that he has the responsibility to make the mat ter public, he faces obvious risks that may include the loss of his job. If whistle blow ers arc to be encouraged to take such risks--and we believe that they should be encouraged, when serious issues are in volved--they must be assured of some form of due process in passing judgment on the issues that they raise. This would call for the presence of outside independent members on any board that passes judg ment on the issues, and should also include some right of appeal. We return to these matters later. Should There Be Forbidden Areas in Basic Research? Those for whom the advancement of knowledge is a supreme value might be lieve that, in basic research as distinct from applied science and technology, no subject should be declared olf limits. Yet there are clear inhibitions on some kinds of research involving human beings, and indeed ani mals. Today we are increasingly conscious of the need for informed consent in studies 6S8 of liummi physiology .mil behavior that may involve risk to ihe experimental sub ject. With young children, informed con sent is impossible to obtain, parents or guardians inu'l take the heavy responsi bility oi giving consent for the child. Some experiments may endanger the health, or even the lives, of the participants; some psychological experiments could he re garded as morally degrading or psycholog ically damaging. In such cases, review of the proposed experiments by a qualified panel of experts may provide more effec tive protection to the subjects than the at tempt to obtain their informed consent, al though we would insist on the importance of the latter. Some experiments are justified, even if they involve great risks. The experiments that conclusively demonstrated the trans mission of yellow fever by mosquitoes in volved the death of one subject. Dr. Jesse Lazear. Those who took part knew they were risking their lives. Such heroic experi ments are fortunately seldom called for. but they may well be needed from time to time in the future. Recently, in a statement probably un precedented in the history of science, a group of eminent molecular biologists, headed by Paul Berg of Stanford Univer sity, have deliberately renounced, for the time being, certain experiments on the transplantation of foreign genes into bac teria because of potential though as yet un proven hazards to human health (J). This group has spuken with authority us the Committee on Recombinant DNA Mole cules of the Assembly of Life Sciences of ihe National Academy of Sciences. Their views have received wide public attention; of course, this committee has no police powers to enforce its recommendations, but its influence is great and as yet appears not to have been seriously challenged. The members of the committee are well aware of the dilemma; the experiments that are, for the present, being renounced are not only of great scientific interest but also might make positive contributions to hu man health and wcll-hcing. The decision involves an expert balanced judgment of probabilities and risks (Jo). The grounds cited for refraining from these experiments to protect human beings from possible new and dangerous infections--arc quite different from the ethical problems of present or future "ge netic engineering," as with the possible production of multiple copies of people with identical genotypes by cloning. The suggested threats here are not so much to health as to human integrity, dignity, and individuality. It seems to us proper to be on the alert for such possible threats, but we sec no juslilivation as yet for attempts to impose restrictions on ihe freedom ol genetic research. Wc hold that the dangers today arc remote, and that they arc deci sively outweighed by the great bene/its that such research can bring. Restrictions on Needed Research: Fetal Research as an Example As we have said above, the advancement of knowledge by research must often he balanced against risks to experimental subjects that may be involved in gamine that knowledge. The complexity of the is sues involved emerges from the diverse points of view that have been collected and set forth in much recent discussion, nota bly in a comprehensive book (4) and in a symposium (5). In some important instances we believe that current restrictions on research have gone loo far. Thus the National Research Act of 1974 has, at least temporarily, banned research on any "living" human fetus, either before or after induced abor tion, except in the very unlikely event that the experiment is intended, to save the life of that particular fetus (6j. Wc strongly oppose such restrictions. Research on the human fetus, over the past two decades, has yielded major henelits for human health. Behrman (7) has pointed out how many diseases that we can now diagnose or treat, or both, would have been unmanageable if a han on fetal research had been in elfect. Especially notable is Rh disease, which is now totally preventable, thanks in considerable part to fetal re search. The human fetus is extremely sus ceptible to many drugs, as the thalidomide disaster dramatically demonstrated. Like wise, the fetus is far more susceptihle to ra diation damage than the adult. Research on fetuses that do not survive abortions can help us to discover how to give protec tion from such harmful agents to thou sands of other fetuses that are destined to reach full term and to grow into healthy adults. We would urge that fetal research not only be permitted but iniensilicd, sub ject to careful peer review of the research projects involved. The Conflict between Science and Secrecy Many scientists, especially those em ployed in industrial firms and in some gov ernment laboratories, spend much or most of their time in work classified as secret. Often the grounds for secrecy appear com pelling. Nevertheless, science inevitably suffers from the imposition of secrecy on a SCIENCE. VOL. ixx ASI 000014579 research i project. The reasons were well stated in the report ol the AAAS Com mittee on Science in the Promotion of Hu man Welfare (S, p. 177): Free dissemination of information and open discussion is an essential part of the scientific process. Each separate studs of nature yields an approximate result and mes itably contains some errors and omissions. buenae gets at the truth by a continuuus process ol self-examination which remedies omissions and corrects eirors. This process requires free disclosure of resuiis, general dissemination of findings. inter pretations. conclusions, and widespread veri fication and criticism of results and conclusions. That report provided specific examples to illustrate these general conclusions and showed that secrecy almost always im pedes scientific progress; in applied science and technology it frequently permits haz ards to develop that could be eliminated if information were publicly available. We believe that, with rare exceptions, data that provide a significant advance in fundamen tal science should not be kept secret, ex cept in a major war situation, as with the atomic bomb in World War II. Even in such cases information should remain clas sified only for a limited and specified time; it should then be released automatically, unless a strong specific case can be made for withholding a particular piece of infor mation for a further limited time. We should look at claims of "national secu rity" with a very critical eye; such claims, as we have good reason to know from re cent experience, often serve to cover up governmental ineptitude or corruption. Technology and Innovation: Their Multiple and Complex Effects When we turn from the problems of ba sic science to those of applied science and technology, the problems of freedom and responsibility become even more formi dable. Whatever the intentions of tech nological innovators, the results of in novation are always more complex than the innovators intended, and usually more complex than they could even imagine. These facts, in our time, have created a compelling need for the assessment of ma jor technological innovations, and for their critical evaluation and control. The socalled "side elTects" of innovation arc of ten deleterious and not infrequently are so pronounced that they dominate the pri mary effect that was intended. The history of the use of DDT provides an example of such complexity (9). Its use brought a dramatic halt to a cholera epi demic in Naples in World War II; its ini tial success in destroying agricultural pests IS MAY 1975 was spectacular. C"iiy a few biological ex perts warned of trouble at that tune. Grad ually problems apocured. as insect pests developed resistance :o DDT; is. In many cases, the pesticide destroyed the natural enemies of the pests; as ;he long per sistence of DDT in soil was discovered, and its progressive concentration in tuod chains led to the killing of great numbers of certain birds and fishes. All this has led. in the United Slates, to the banning of DDT for nearly all uses. Yet in countries where malaria is widespread, the spraying of house interiors with DDT has proved the most effective antimularial technique available. In Sri Lanka (Ceylon) malaria had almost disappeared by 1963. when the DDT program was stopped. Then, in I96H and 1969, there was an explosive increase in the number of infections. In 1967 only 3.465 cases had been reported; in 190S the number rose to 425,937, and in early 1969 the rale of infection was even higher (10). Other factors were at work, of course; the World Health Organization attributed the rise in the incidence of malaria in large part to conditions that were unusually fa vorable to the breeding of the Anopheles mosquito and to unusual human popu lation movements that helped to spread the infection {II). Nevertheless, until we have something heller, DDT appears to be an essential eompunem of any major program of malaria control. Other complexities have arisen in con nection with programs for international development. Dams and irrigation schemes have vastly increased the in cidence of bilharziasis (schistosomiasis), a debilitating disease for wnich there is as yet no effective cure {12). The disastrous effects of the recent catastrophic droughts in the Sahel region, south of the Sahara, have been accentuated by some tech nological innovations, notably, for ex ample. by the drilling of thousands of deep boreholes which have lapped the abundant water far below the surface. The resultant wells encouraged a great increase in the size of the cattle herds; pasture instead of water became the limiting factor in num bers of cattle. As pasture dried up in the drought, countless thousands of dead and dying cattle were clustered around the boreholes, while the surrounding land, lor miles around, was ravaged by trampling and overgrazing. These wells, drilled by men of good will and technical skill tn or der to bring more water to the people and cattle of the Sahel, became a major factor in intensifying a great human and natural disaster (IS), These illustrations could be multiplied a hundredfold. Let us add at once that we are not among those who consider that mere is something inherently evil jhout technology. Technology has been indis pensable for the rise of all etvtii/aUons. and new technology is essential tor the survival ol our own civilization. As an example we need only mention the need lor the devel opment of new energy sources solar and geothermal energy and nuclear fusion, for instance -that may be less polluting than Tossil fuels and less hazardous than nuclear fission. Likewise we reject the notion of the socalled "technological imperative" the idea that we must pursue new tech nological possibilities, wherever they may lead. Thousands of projects may be techni cally feasible, including the destruction of all human life on Earth. Even among those projects that appear attractive at first sight, careful appraisal may lead to the conclusion that they will do more harm than good. The U.S. Congress drew such a conclusion in 1971, when it voted to cut off funds for the supersonic transport pro gram. which it had been generously fund ing a few years earlier. In .summary, the development of new technologies is indispensable; the training and encouragement of gifted and imagina tive technologists deserves a high priority among our national needs, but the mulnple repercussions of new technology need to be critically evaluated before thev are in troduced and constantly monitored alter their first introduction. Many schemes that are technically brilliant must be rejected because their wider impact would, on the whole, be more damaging than bene ficial. In some eases it would be prefer able, in the eves of some thoughtful sci entific policy advisers, not to carry a protect from the stage of research even into preliminary development, lest pres sures would then arise that would lead to its full development. Conflicts Involving Scientific Freedom and Responsibility We turn now to the second item in the charge to tltis Committee, which calls lor u.s "to develop .suitable criteria and proce dures for the objective and impartial study of these problems." The conflicts that call for such study generally lie in the realm of applied science and technology, including medicine and public health. In most in stances they involve the right, and the re sponsibility, of an employee to warn con cerning the dangers inherent in some prod uct or process with which he has become familiar in the course of his work; that is. the "whistle blowing" activity of which we have spoken earlier. The employer may 6*V AS I 000014580 pui intense pressure on 'he ertip.uste to keep quiet; the employee may tie lired, or life may he made so uncomfortable that he decides to resign. Interested parties may seek to suppress scientific data that are vi* tal for the proper resolution of a con troversy, On the other hand, the employee may he acting not in the public interest but out ol prejudice or spite against the em ployer. To be an "objective and impartial" judge in such circumstances is not easy; one person's "objectivity" looks like bias to another. In all these cases scientific evi dence is an essential part ol the whole situ ation. blit wise decisions involve complex human factors, ethical judgments, and standards of value that go far beyond purely scientific argument. We consider briefly a few specilic cases, before dis cussing criteria and procedures. The problem of standards for exposure to radiation. A few years ago. Drs. J. W. Gofman and A. R. Tampltn. who worked at the laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission (AHC) in Livermore, Califor nia, claimed that existing standards for ex posure to ionizing radiation wore far too tolerant, and would permit a large increase in the number of deaths from cancer if ex posures rose to the allowed levels. They publicized their views widely. The chief au thorities in the AHC sharply opposed these views and held them to be invalid. Gofman and Tamplin eventually left the A EC, after what they believed to be considerable ha rassment, and eventually the A EC did im pose considerably stricter radiation stan dards for the protection of workers within its jurisdiction. A committee appointed by the National Academy of Sciences, after intensive study, produced a report, com monly known as the HEIR (Biological Ef fects of Ionizing Radiation) Report {14), winch stands at present as the most author itative statement on the hazards of ionizing radiation. In our full report we consider this controversy at somewhat greater length. The case of the BART engineers. A ma jor feature of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in the San Francisco Bay area was to be the Automated Train Con trol (ATC) system, for which a contract was awarded to the Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1967. Beginning in April 1969, three of the engineers on the project became increasingly concerned about what they saw as serious defects in the system. They expressed their concerns to the man agement but drew no significant response except vague warnings not to be "trouble makers." Late in 1971 iho'three engineers decided to take their case to the Board of Directors; this led to a public hearing in February 1972, after which the Board voted 10 to 2 in favor of the management MO and against the engineers. The managers sponded by recommending a precau then told the three engineers that they tionary label that made no mention could choose between resigning and being ol toxic elTects on animals or people; in fired; they refused to resign and were sum other words, o appears to have deliberately marily dismissed. Subsequent events vindi deceived NIOSH regarding the true facts. cated their concern. The ATC system Apparently MCA has claimed that the failed on several occasions; the failures withholding of data was due to their agree were so dangerous that the system could ment with the European manufacturers to not be used, and it became necessary to keep the data conlidcntial until an agree control the trains in the traditional man ment for their release could be worked out. ner. The fact remains that, because of the sup The California Society of Professional pression of these data, lens of thousands of Engineers (CSI'L) initiated tin inquiry. workers were exposed without warning, for However. BAKT'.x lop management perhaps some 2 years, to toxic concentra refused to meet with them, or to oiler ex tions of vinyl chloride. On 22 January planations to anyone. Then CSPb under 1974, B F. Goodrich announced thai three took a full investigation of the firings, polyvinyl chloride workers, in just one of which brought out much disturbing infor their plants, had died of angiosarcoma of mation, and the California State Legisla the liver since 1971. On the same day ture set in motion a study, resulting in a re MCA revealed the Maltoni data to port (the "Post Report") which essentially NIOSH. The Occupational Safely and confirmed the warnings of the three engjv Health Administration, on 5 April, in an neers. Although CSPE took tentative steps emergency action lowered the permissible toward a court action on hehalf of the engi exposure level from 500 to 50 ppm; drastic neers, the society did not follow through on further lowering, to I ppm or less, is in this. The engineers themselves launched a prospect {id). suit against BART for SXX5.000, the out The evidence here seems clear a consid come of which we have not yet learned erable number of scientists were aware of the hazards of vinyl chloride long before The case ofdata suppression concerning! the facts were made available to NIOSH the carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride. In/ or to the public; yet they kept quiet and May 1970 an Italian investigator. Dr, P. L| gave no warning. As the Federation of Viola, reported at a cancer congress that American Scientists states, .. industrial high concentrations of vinyl chloride scientists who fail to challenge conspiracies caused cancer in rats. Up to that time there of silence within their firms are not re had apparently been no research in the buked; rather, they are often quietly re plastics industry concerning the possible warded for their loyalty." hazards of vinyl chloride.'although lens of In industrial medicine and public health thousands of workers were exposed to it. similar situations olten arise. In recent More than a year later, the Manufacturing books Paul Brodeur {17) and Rachel Scott Chemists Association (MCA) in the {lb) have described the medical problems United States initiated its own research of workers exposed to asbestos particles, and in October 1972 entered into an agree beryllium dust, and other hazards. Many ment with the plastics munufaeiurers. who of these workers develop eaneer. or fatal sponsored the European research, to share respiratory or other diseases, over the information hut not to reveal it without the course of 10 or 20 years; the risk is high. consent of the European manufacturers. In Yet the company physicians who look af August 1972 Dr. Cesare Maltoni of Bo ter the workers sometimes join their em logna found angiosarcomas and various ployers in minimizing the need for more tumors in experimental animals exposed to rigorous standards of health protection. vinyl chloride concentrations as low as 250 This appears to be a clear abdication of the parts per million (ppm). At that lime the prime responsibility of physicians or public allowed exposure limit for workers in the health workers to place the health of the United Slates was 500 ppm. In January people for whom they are responsible be 1973 U.S. scientists visited Dr. Maltoni fore all other considerations. Obviously a and learned of his findings. However, they doctor who is paid by a commercial enter did not notify the National Institute of Oc prise will find it very difficult to act con cupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) trary to the policy of the company. The concerning these extremely ominous find doctor who works for an independent in ings, nor did they make any attempt to specting agency will be in a much stronger warn the public or the workers exposed to position. Even so. we know from experi vinyl chloride. In late January 1973 ence that regulatory agencies often become NIOSH requested information on possible the subservient allies of the organizations hazards associated with occupational ex that they are supposed to regulate and may posure to 23 chemical substances, includ collaborate with the commercial organiza ing vinyl chloride. On 7 March, MCA re tion in concealing the hazards. SCI I.NC li. VOl.. Ihx AS! 000014581 . W.JUii.*tnn>|i I lip )!JP 'JI"-,-l| 1113v til*"..MitiQXn IIWWMI the Resolution of Conflicts Having now indicated the character of the problems, we now turn to criteria and procedures that ma;. aid in resoi. ;r,g them. We approach the problem ol establishing criteria by asking questions rather than by offering answers. How will the proposed decision or procedure affect human health and safety, and the general quality and amenities of life, for all the people con cerned? Will a decision to require a drastic cleanup of operating conditions in a cer tain industry cause much of the industry to close down, with loss of jobs and produc tion? How should such risks be balanced against considerations of safety and health? What are the possible large-scale environmental effects of the present opera tions and of the proposed changes? Have possible future effects been carefully con sidered, as, for instance, with the widely used aerosols, which liberate Freons that, in a decade or two. might (but again per haps might not) destroy much of the ozone in the stratosphere? These are some of the problems that will have to be laced in the formulation of criteria. Obviously it is far easier to impose suitable regulations on a new enterprise than on a powerful industry that is already established, with a huge capital investment and with faults of oper ation and production that arc already deeply entrenched. Thus the need for loresight in technology assessment is over whelming; yet foresight is always imperfect and needs constantly to be corrected by further experience. We turn now to procedures: how is the whistle blower to be assured of a fair hear ing. without fear of reprisals, and with a good prospect that bis recommendations, if they are found to be sound, will actually be put into practice? Many scientific and engineering societies have developed codes of ethics relating to the responsibility of employers and to the professional and per sonal conduct of scientific and technical employees, A highly articulate expression of such concerns is to be found in a state ment on "Employment Guidelines," which has now been adopted by at least 20 engi neering and scientific societies. For the most part, it is concerned with the general principles that should govern relations be tween employers and employees, but it also contains the significant statement: "The professional employee should have due re gard for the safety, life and health of the public and fellow employees in all woik for which hc/she is responsible. Where the technical adequacy of a process or product is involved, he/she should protect the pub lic and his/her employer by withholding of plans that do not meet accepted profes- the consequences to i>c expected d his/her professional judgment is not followed" (/9, p, 59). The formulation of such a declaration is a significant event. How much it means de pends, of course, on the effectiveness with which it is applied. Moreover, these guide lines, like most such codes of ethics that we have seen, lack a very important in gredient. namely, a provision for the arbi tration of disputes. The protection of indi viduals from arbitrary action by authority is deeply ingrained in English common law, and the U.S. Constitution provides that "no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro cess of law." We believe that some form of due process should be an essential part of any employer-employee agreement or con tract, to protect the employee from arbi trary action by the employer, allegedly based on professional or personal miscon duct, A minimum requirement for such due process would involve a hearing by a board, including independent members, with the right of appeal to some reasonably neutral hut professionally qualiiled higher authority. Codes of professional ethics are likely to he ineffective unless some type of due process is provided lor tlie resolution of disputes. Without this, sclent die free dom is likely to be abridged. We therefore strongly recommend that all employment contracts involving scientific or profes sional employees include such provisions for the review of disputes through hearing und appeal processes. Provision lor neutral or third-party participation is important, particularly when issues of public interest are involved. Professional Societies as Protectors of the Public Interest How active can. and should, profes sional societies be in actively fighting on behalf of their members who arc attempt ing to defend the public interest? Most such societies have in the past remained aloof from conflicts or this sort and have often taken the altitude that the purity of llieir devotion to the advancement of their res|Kclive sciences would somehow lie con taminated if they entered the public arena to contest such issues. We believe that such attitudes are no longer appropriate. The scientdic community can no longer remain apart from the conflicts of our lime, where so many technological decisions are being made that vitally affect the well-being of society. We are not proposing that profes sional societies should take public stands on large general political issues, such as the legitimacy of the Vietnam War. individual ,, .ti, ....... . Hiv.-.iLS, "lien lucir ^..neern is aroused, should deal with ihese matters by other mechanisms. However, in matters directly related to the professional competence of members ol the society, where the public interest is clearly in volved. we hciievc lhat the societies can and should play a much more active role than they have in the past. They can deal with such issues by setting up committees of inquiry in cases where a serious viola tion of scientific freedom or responsibility is suspected: by publicizing the results of the inquiry in professional journals, and, if necessary, in the more popular journals and in the news media; and h> calling the matter to the attention of governmental bodies, as with the California Legislature in the BART ease. They can on occasion launch lawsuits on behalf of their members who have apparently suffered injustice when acting on behalf of the public inter est. In stating this, our major new proposal for dealing with "the objective and impar tial study of these problems," we are aware of the dtfliculties that the proposal will face. The most serious problems arc those of time and money. Most professional so cieties have limited funds: many operate more or less on a slmcstiing. I hey keep members' dues lairlv small; otherwise members drop out. particularly in times of economic hardship. The lighting of dfllicult cases, on behalf of members involved in controversies, can be a very expensive business, especially if the ease goes into the courts. In any event, responsible scientists would be required to spend substantial amounts of precious time serving on hear ing panels, studying large bodies of evi dence, and preparing reports. When a professional society does tight for the rights of its members, it is more likely to he concerned with defending their status and pay than to be acting primarily on behalf of the public interest as its pri mary motive. The impetus to take actions of the latter sort is likely to be much less strong than the desire to provide direct help to members of one's own professional group. These are powerful obstacles to our pro posals, but they are mil iiisiipet.ible. So cieties that share common mteicsts, but which may lie individually too weak liii.mcially to support such activities, may hand together in groups to finance the necessary operations. There are increasing pressures upon seientisls, engineers, and other mem bers of the seienltlic community to lace these public issues and deal with them ef fectively, These pressures come both from the public and from within the ranks of the scientists themselves. We are well aware of the mistrust and hostility toward science IS MAY 1975 691 AS I 000014582 mm that is manifest in mans quarters; one re flection of this attitude is the decline in government support of scientific research in recent veers Such riosuliiy will almost certainly grow unless scientists exhibit greater concern lor preventing the misuse of science and technology. As these con cerns become more intense, it should be come easier for the professional societies to ohtain additional funds to finance the expenses of lawsuits, hearing panels, and other activities undertaken in the defense of the public interest. Whether government funds could or should be available for such purposes is open to question; but it is likely that some of the major private founda tions, either those now in existence or those yet to be created, will see the urgency of supporting such puhlic service activities. The need for these activities may also lead to the creation of other social mechanisms for dealing with .these problems, of a sort that we cannot now foresee. We look to in creased activity of the professional so cieties as the most hopeful approach to the problem in the immediate future. The Role of the AAAS in the Defense of Scientific Freedom and Responsibility We now consider the third charge from the AAAS to this Committee; "To recom mend mechanisms to enable the Associa tion to review specific instances in which scientific freedom is alleged to have been abridged or otherwise endangered, or re sponsible scientific conduct is alleged to have been violated." The domain of the AAAS is very broad, including all of the sciences and a large number of profes sional societies which belong to it as alliliates. Hence, by its nature the AAAS can not undertake the role that we have envisaged for the professional societies in the preceding section. The number of pos sible appeals to the AAAS, if it were to un dertake the responsibility of reviewing par ticular instances of alleged threats to scientific freedom and responsibility, would be immense. I f it were to agree to handle some such cases, it would have to be rigorously selective and deal only with those that were at once so important and so broad in scope that they would fall out side the domain of any individual society. Because of its multiple affiliations with the professional societies, the AAAS can play an important part in coordinating many of the activities of the societies. A number of the societies, for example, are now formulating, or revising, codes of eth ics for their members, which will involve policies for dealing with issues such as we have been discussing here. The AAAS can 692 help to provide an exchange of information on thes- matters among the different so cieties end therebv promote a more unified approach to these complex issues. The AAAS is already playing a signifi cant role in dealing with alleged abridg ments of scientific freedom, and alleged vj. olations of responsible scientific conduct, through active discussion of such matters in Science, chiefly in the News and Com ment section, hut also in some of the lead articles and in the Letters section. Since Science is so widely read, both inside and outside the scientific community, this is one of the most important channels now available for bringing such problems to the attention of the public. To focus public at tention on such problems, of course, is not to resolve them, but it is an essential step toward sueh resolution. We recommend that Science, without any drastic change of its present editorial policies, enhance its coverage of such matters, particularly by inviting distinguished academic, industrial, and government scientists who arc well in formed on some of these controversial is sues to set them forth in its pages. In some cases, it will be desirable to present two or more articles by different authors, ex pressing more or less contradictory points of view. In scientific controversies, it should not be necessary for the champions of different views to operate like adver saries in a court of law; the opposing sides presumably should be able to find a large area of agreement about scientific facts that are not in dispute. The real dis agreements in such cases usually turn not on the scientific facts but on the relative weight to be given to different kinds of sci entific facts, and on extrascientilic issues involving political judgment and broad general perspectives on human nature and human motives. These factors always enter into the practical decisions that must be made in applications of science and tech nology. When a scientist or technologist states a ease for action of a certain sort on such an issue, it is important that he make clear the general presuppositions from which he starts. He may. of course, he un conscious of these presuppositions: if so. Science should as a matter of editorial pol icy bring them to the surface. This is im portant, both lor the rational discussion of the issues involved and for the main tenance of public confidence in' the honesty and objectivity of scientists. On rare occasions the AAAS may and should become actively involved in broad issues that are important and con troversial, as it did when it decided to con duct an investigation of the excels of defoliants and herbicides in Vietnam. This was an important attempt to obtain scien tific evidence on an issue that had arouse passionate controversy (20). The Nation. Academy of Sciences, ,u the request t Congress, later undertook a more esten stve study of the same problems, with m creased financial support provided by th Department of Defense The resulting re port of the National Academy commute (21) greatly extended and amplified th AAAS report: the Imdings of both are In the most part reasonable concordant, hu some discrepancies have given rise to con troversv (22), These disagreements can b resolved later, when it is possible to eon duet studies of ihe Vietnamese forests oi the ground in a peaceful setting, as long a war continues, only aerial observations an possible. In any case the AAAS study per formed a valuable service and was in n< way rendered superfluous by the late study of the National Academy of Sei cnees. This raises the more general question What should be the relation between tht AAAS and the National Academy m mat lers such as we have considered in this re port'.' Ihe National Academy has specia prestige and a unique relation to the U.S government. It, and us committees, can speak on many issues with fur more au thority than the AAAS, and it can gener ally command much more financial sup port for its investigations. However, the AAAS, with its much broader member ship, is more widely representative o' American science in general, and Us greater independence from governmental lies gives it a greater freedom of action Both organizations clearly Have very im portant and somewhat dillerent roles to play in the maintenance of scientific free dom jnd responsibility. The problems we have been considering here will certainly continue and will prob ably become more numerous and more acute in the years to come Vv'e hope that the concern of the AAAS will continue. We suggest that, not more than 5 years hence, the AAAS should reexamine the whole problem, perhaps by setting up a committee similar to this one, to see where we stand at that lime. Alternatively or m addition, it might set up a committee to re ceive complaints concerning violations of scientific freedom and responsibility and refer them, when possible and desirable, to appropriate bodies for further study and possible action. Such a committee should not itself serve as a judicial body: us func tions should be to refer complaints for pos sible action elsewhere and to analyze the information received, with an eye to pos sible recommendations concerning future policy initiatives by the AAAS in the light of this information. The terms of reference AS I 000014583 SCIENCl,, VOL. IX* of .Men u ciMiuviiiivC a,i)Siiii rued he vcr\ cj(c!\aiy drawn. U> prevent the uimmiUcc from being overwhelmed by a muss of un manageable complaints. Rtferenci's and .Note* 1. Perxpeittu* on Chlorinated Diben:odio\m\ and Pibrn:oturun\ U nvirortim.ni.B Health Rerupcelives. Experimental Issue No 5. Department of Holth, I ducanon, ami Wli,*rc Publication No NMI 74*128. National Institute ol I numnmenu I Health bounces, Box 1223V Research In angle Park. NC, September 197)), Several arti cles deal with the toxicity of the dioxins See particularly table 4 in the article bv R Baughman and M. S. Mosel son. pp 27 35, which summarizes the results of earlier workers. 2. V. Earle, Ed. On AmJemu Erred"w (American Enterprise Institute, Washingmn, D C, Id?n 3. P. Berg et ai.t Science 185, 303 (1974k N. Wade. ibid. p. 332. 3a. In February 1975, jn international conference of experts at the Axilumar Conference Center in Cali fornia devoted several days <f intensive discussions to this problem and concluded with a recommen dation to lift the voluntary moratorium on imm of these proposed genetic experiments, However, such experiments were to he done only subject to rigorous precautions for containment ut the possibly hazardous organisms, the stringency of the precautions increasing with the estimated risk in different categories of espenments Indeed, for many of the possible experiments, the required cMHinio:|s v.,,uu'* b* Vl wtiiHitii III-. lcvt,i**|*Mv nl ut new organisms a** 1 new leUimtpjcs. so dial the moratorium is in clt* < being continued lor >ah experiments. Sec N W.n|c. Sucnee 1H7, 9,11 (19751. 4 J. Kat/. f.d, kxptnrn ntatmn with Human Heinz* (Kusseil Sage I >uiu New York. I`>"2>, 5, "Clinical Studies in (be Human The Ethuai and Scicntihe Problems.' svmrusium bv A <' B.tfnvs. k. (J M.irsion. II Barber, and J, K.U/ |bertd. Surd 23. v)t(j9 73i| (>, B J Cullimn. .St tern e 1X5. 42b (1974) 7 I , I Mdtrman, \> York Junes (U June 1974), opposite editorial page 8, AAAS Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Wcliure, "The integrity ol science," -dm. Su 53, 174(196'). 9, For.i useful short history of the use ofl>f>T. sccfi. Mkinlirc. Environment jSt l.ouiM 14 (No. b). 14 11972). U). These figures arc from WorU Health OrzumzaUon Helcvi fipidrminlagujue llebdumudttire (h August 1969) 11. R. fiarcia. Environment iSt. Louts) 14 (No, 5l. 2 11972). 12. For numerous examples of this and manv other problems in intcrn.iUon.il development schemes, see The C arete\\ idhnedoge Earingv and inter* national Development. M T. Kirv.ir and J P, Mil ton. Eds (Natural History Press. Carden City, N Y,, 1972), 13 C. Sterling. Atlantic Monthly (May 1974). p 98: N Wade.-Vur-mr 185.234(1974). |4, Report of the Advisors Committee tin the Biologi cal Llfcels of lom/ing Radiations, The i.tjeti* on Populations oj Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing if,luhiin-/f 11 >iv imiin (i| Mi tin .41 'ai it*m ov N tU*Mul Academy i>| N, a net's National Kcscnri b ( otmul, W oslor.gion, H ( , P> 12) 15 Our description in i.ikcn Horn a more deluded re port hy N H L ngcr |"Ihc BAR I C a sc I ililts ami the Employed Inyinccr. ` ln*l tlciir I hr* trt/n l.nv Comni Sot !'npl,i litlonx luhrt.d %/ii ,\ti 4 (Sept J97H. p 6 |V Klig. id.. 407 Park Avenue. I tuiu.i, N I lb Our tliM ussttui is h.iMil mi led 1 m S< i Prof Hid! 2 (No 8), 1 17 P Rrodcuf. Lxpenduhie A*ru rn un\ (Vikmu Press, New York. 1974) ( imeerninp the hi/.nds oj asbestos. and steps ukd to control them, s^e also A K Ahmed. U R Mad coil. J ( urirndv jEn\ironmerit tSt J.imts 14 ( No. |0l. |o(|972)| 18. R. Neull, Muule and HlootJ (l)uuon, New York, 1974) 19. Statement on "Employment Oiudclines," hut //*!/ Het (ton hnj: Spettrum 197,1, s7 (z\pnl 1971) l he statement has been adopted h\ at least 20 engineering and suenulis. soeieucs. 20. M. S Mcselson, A H Westing, J I), Constable Herbicide Assessment Commissum ol the Ameri can Association ftir the Advancement ol Science, Background Material Relevant lo Prcsciii.uions.it the 1970 Annual Meeting ol the A AAS (reprinted in the < dttgre* mwul Heeord 118 (No l2). S322A S3233H March 1972)| 2f Committee on the (Beets ol Herbicides m Viet nam. I he hllecK <d livfbnnte< in .South ) aiiium (National Academy of Sciences, Washington. DC. 1974). 22 Concerning this coniroversv, see for instance. I). Shaplcy (.Swi-mc 183. 1177 <|974i| and C. Nor man [Suture I Lund ) 248. IM (1974 )j Social Indicators Social science researchers are developing concepts and measures of changes in society. Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Robert Parke A statistical report entitled Social In dicators. 1973 was published last year by the U.S. Olfice of Management and Bud get (/). Social Indicators contains chans and tables presenting statistical lime series selected and organized around eight "so cial concerns," namely, health, public safety, education, employment, income, housing, leisure and recreation, and popu lation. The report is the first of its kind to be issued by the U.S. government. Its pub lication is symptomatic of the widespread interest in social indicators. This interest is further reflected in a so cial indicators bibliography that was pub lished in late 1972 (2). More than half of the 1000 or more items listed in the bibli- Dr. Sheldun is president of the Social Science Rejrafwh Courted, 605 Third Avenue. New York, N.Y. IU0I6 Mr, Parke is director of the Council's Center fur Coordination of Research on Social Indicators. 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036. ographv were issued in 1970. 1971. and 1972. Government agencies both in the United Stales and abroad (J), as well as private seliolars and research institutes, are concerning themselves with social in dicators, as are international organizations such as the Conference of European Statis ticians (l. the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (5), the United Nations Research Institute for So cial Development (6), the United Nations Educational, Scicnnlic and Cultural Orga nization (7), and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (#). "Social indicators," and allied phrases, "social accounting." "social reporting," and "monitoring social change" came into use by social scientists, commentators, and policy-makers in the mid-l960's. These phrases and the ideas they represented emerged from an awareness of rapid social change, from a sense of emerging problems with origins deep in the social structure, and from the ambience of the early John son Administration which encompassed a commitment to the idea that the hcnchts and costs of domestic social programs are subject to measurement and to the belief that each newly perceived, albeit ancient, inadequacy in the society should, and would, call forth a corrective response from a federal government whose cllicacy would be assisted by social measurement, planning, and new management analytical techniques. Impetus was provided by a handful of social scientists and public ad ministrators, The enthusiasm elicited re sponses from economists who saw a role for their skills as theorists and measurers of welfare, sociologists who saw the rele vance of their own research tradition m the measurement of social trends, political sci entists who sought ways to rationalize gov ernment programs, social workers, public administrators, and a broad array ol social researchers and practitioners. Out of this emerged what came to be known qs the "social indicators movement," an apt des ignation in that, as in all movements in their initial stages, the participants were ill-delined as to membership, had little or ganization, and shared few specific objec tives, but sensed great needs and opportu nities for change, celebrated shared but necessarily ambiguous symhols, and were led by able and articulate idealists. From the ambiguity of the early dis cussions several distinguishable types of research activities have emerged. Social indicators. Conceptual, method- 16 MAY 1975 ASI 000014584 693