Document 5kyy49XZ9axaQ7YRd0BxVbxm0

FILE NAME Manville JMA DATE 1973-1974 DOC JMA342 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION M Selikoff Controversy over British Standard - Memos & British TV Transcript - Killer Dust - A Standard Mistake Manville F. J. Solon Jr. From G. W. Wright M.D. Copics File & C Subject MEMO Internal Internal Internal 5307 Corespondence Cor espondence Correspondence Correspondence Correspondence Correspondence Corespndce Corespndc CorrespCoornesdponedenncece CorespondecCorespondec CoresCoproesnpodndeencce Correspondence Correspondence Corespondence Correspondence Corespondence Corespondence Correspondence Correspondence Correspondence Correspondence Correspondence Correspondence Date June 22 1973 Even as far back as the preparation of the earliest criteria document for setting a standard of safe asbestos exposure Dr. Selikoff has insisted that the standard should be much less than 2 c~ weighted average He bases this on his experience with insulation workers He appears to believe that the exposures of insulation workers measured in the last two or three years is characteristic of their exposure over the past 40 years Also he uses a weighted average arrived at by dividing the calculated exposures by the total number of months worked in the year paying no attention to the fact that there are long periods of time when his insulation workers have no exposure whatsoever to asbestos Be completely ignores the probable more adverse effects of the high intermittent his weighted average but on exposure when he constructs other occasions makes the point that persons exposed for only a few days may experience adverse health effects It is not surprising therefore that he is now mounting a campaign to reopen the U.S. asbestos standard and do everything in his power to lower it below 2 fibers and in my judgment to abolish the use of asbestos fiber completely I say this in spite of his repeated statements that asbestos can be used safely and he has no itention of banning its use With the above in mind I believe the transcript of his statements at the American Industrial both the formal I urge that Drs paper and discussion Holmes and Lewinsohn Hygiene Conference are of great interest as well as Mr. Luxon be given copies of this transcript and asked for their comments with respect to accuracy of statements from the point of view of their own knowledue I am certain there are out grave inaccuracies but would prefer to by the men intimately involved end who have these would know pointed first hand about these comments of Selikoff with regard to the British experience When it suits his Lewinsohn's ray purpose as for data to that of example in comparing John Knox he praises the dust counts at Turner Brothers from 1950 on but in my presence and at the hearings he and his associates have declared this information to be of no use whatsoever Furthermore he completely ignores the large body of data available in the Quebec asbestos and mining industry F. J. Solon Jr. Page 2 June 22 1973 I believe there are serious faults in his utilization of Lewinsohn's information unless in fact Hilton has some new information that he has passed on to Dr. Selikoff and which I have never seen The following questions related to Hilton's paper published in the Royal Society of Health Journal Volume 92 No. 2 April 1972 will illustrate the areas in which Dr. Selikoff in my judgment has distorted or perverted Hilton's information The questions are designed not only to point this out but also to assist me in better understanding of Hilton's paper The questions are as follows 1 In Table 2 were the criteria asbestosis the same in 1968 as and 1930 for a diagnosis of they were in 1957 2 Was the diagnosis of the single case in 1968 and also in 1957 in the group exposed 10 to 14 years based on definite ray abnormality or was it based predominantly on rales It would appear Dr. Selikoff doesn't consider the reduction from a 32 incidence to a 0.72 incidence in the 10 to 14 year exposed group as evidence of a good control of fiber 3 Is it possible to learn whether or not the single case in the category of 10 to 14 year exposure and 15 to 19 year exposure as shown in Table 2 were in fact never exposed to more than 2 cc throughout that period of time Steve Hilton and Mr. Luxon should be prepared by Selikoff and shown at the shown the tricky graph Boston meeting and from which he apparently derived support for his contention that asbestosis was developing in less than 100 fiber years of exposure I have the following questions about this and they pertain to Figure 2 in Hilton's paper as well as some questions that would be useful to have an answer to for my own knowledge These queries are as follows 1 What are the in Figure ? criteria for the categorization of fibrosis 2 Is fibrosis counted more than once in any one person as was apparently done for changes in the pleura F. J. Solon Jr. Page 3 June 22 1973 3 Were the criteria for ray series read by John Knox as series read by Hilton fibrosis different in the contrasted to the recent 4 What does Hilton mean by abnormal rays 5 / Does Hilton have age matched controls from a exposed population for ray reading In my experience a small percentage of people will have 1/1 or even 2/1 especially the older age group but who have never been exposed to asbestos fiber 6 Does Hilton have ray data for men only I agree fully with him that the categorization of 1/1 or 2/1 is very difficult in the films of most women More specific questions with respect to Selikoff's chart are as follows 1 Does Hilton's years of exposure coincide with or express the same thing as cumulative fiber years Selikoff leaves the impression at first glance that the Knox curve and Lewinsohn curve both relate to the abscissa One must note that in fact Knox's is based on fiber years whereas Lewinsohn's is based on years of exposure 2 The second question asks whether or not criteria in the Knox data were the same the Lewinsohn data the ray as those in I believe I know the answers to many of these but I would like to have it with assurance from those whom you are planning to visit In addition their considered comments with respect reference to to Sclikoff's presentation particularly erroneous statements or inferences would with be enormously helpful might add that in the past few weeks I have been trying to educate myself by visiting insulation operations and discussing exposures as monitored visually with old timers in the trade in the hopes that they could tell me something about carlier days the days of exposure causing the disease now being observed Without exception thus far the insulation operations look very clean make little or no use of asbestos fiber a great deal of fibrous glass and it would appear to F. J. Solon Jr. Page 4 June 22 1973 support the contention that the number of fibers to which the workers are exposed is low at present The exception not observed by me as yet is the unanimously repeated statement that there are occasions when insulation workers handle crude asbestos fiber intermittently in a manner that creates a great deal of dust in the immediate breathing zone Naturally if these high exposures are worked into a weighted average including the many months of zero exposure to asbestos when fibrous glass is being used the weighted average would be very low Without exception all of the men who worked 25 years or more ago have told me that conditions are enormously less dirty now than in those early days They spoke of working many hours each week in the early days when even in the application of new insulation 85 magnesia the dust created by pummeling the material into place was so dense that they would be unable to recognize anybody four or five feet away This of course was amosite exposure Thus far I have not been able to speak with anyone who has worked as far as 40 years ago I hope to do so I have learned that from time to time foreign vessels in the shipbuilding yards more so on the West Coast than on the East Coast were often repaired and members of the Heat and Frost Workers Union had exposure to blue asbestos In some instances this apparently was quite high but it would appear that many insulation workers in the U.S.A. have probably never been exposed to blue It is most unfortunate that Dr. Selikoff in many of his publications has never attempted to reconstruct the exposure histories in detail comparing the exposure of those with mesothelioma etc to those without In spite of the failure to do this or to look at total dust exposures based on concentration of dust as well as time Selikoff continues to assert that the mild or moderate exposures of the last few years have caused the severe experience of the insulation worker G. W. Wright M.D. GWW chr Mi Mi % Mi d4 ManvillManvile e 53141 53141 . Internal Internal Correspondence To See Distribution List Attached From F. J. Solon Jr. - 4 North DEN GHQ Copies File & Chrono Date October 30 1974 Subject BRITISH TV PROGRAM KILLER DUST - A STANDARD MISTAKE THE LEWINSOHN CONTROVERSY The attached transcript of subject British TV program has just been received from Wilfred Howard Secretary of the Asbestos Information Committee of the U.K. Apparently following the revealment of Dr. Lewinsohn's figures in Jane Brody's New York Times article of September 19 Granada Films an independent British TV producer decided to do a special program in their World In Action series on ITV the independent tele- vision network in the U.K. The thrust of the program is obviously to dramatize the apparent controversy between Dr. Lowinsohn of Turner Brothers Asbestos Limited at Rochdale England and Dr. Selikoff of Mount Sinai You will note at the end of the transcript that the controversy will not be settled in the minds of British government people until a new study by the British Occupational Hygiene Society is completed early next year It's my feeling that since the U.S. OSHA standard on asbestos existing exposure is based on guidelines set by the British standard which in turn was based on the original Holmes studies - that OSHA may well wait for the results of the new study by the BOHS before issuing the proposed revision of the OSHA asbestos standard now being developed As Wilfred Howard notes in his letter a film of this program should be in our hands in two to three weeks Anyone who would like to screen it should phone me 0 wore 0 r : 4 weed =. _ bee we Report No TN 12 ee Transmitted .1TV .1TV World Action mn ee Length mins Date October 30.p.m e Killer Standard Mistake Dust A Short TitlePee Killer Killer Killer Killer Dust Dust Dust - A Standard Standard Standard Standard a Narrator Acre Mill Yorkshire three years ago World in re Action reported that men working with asbestos in this me factory had contracted asbestosis a disease which scars the lungs and is often fatal The factory was closed in 1970 Doctors now know that the disease that killed many workers at Acre Mill was caused by asbestos dust particles in the air If the concentration of asbestos dust is too high it can seriously damage the lung tissues Concern at the mounting casualty rate led the asbestos industry to agree on a British asbestos standard a safe level of concentration for asbestos workers to breathe The British standard was taken up and copied all over the world But today there's mounting evidence that the called safety level doesn't after all prevent asbestosis even in factorics where dust concentrations have been reduced to conform with the British standard workers are still contracting lung disease Tonight World in Action reports on controversy which has broken out between scientists a bitter who say the safety level isn't safe at all and the asbestos industry which defends the British standard . Turner Brothers Asbestos Limited at Rochdale a textile asbestos factory which employs three thousand people part of the giant Turner & Newall Group in an industry with twenty thousand workers Here raw asbestos is spun and woven ready to be processed for industrial and domestic use Back in 1951 it was this Rochdale factory which pioneered the study Report No.TN.12 Continuation No.1 of asbestos dust and its effect on the health of workers They began to measure the level of dust in the factory they took regular dust counts and began to see the effects on workers by raying them The study went on for more than twenty years for the first time it was thought possible to work out what level of asbestos dust was causing asbestosis The two pioneers in this study were Turner Brothers Chief Medical Officer Dr. John Knox who's now dead and the company's Industrial Hygienist Dr. Stephen Holmes Dr. Holmes We were trying to record the dust levels which were the result of the engineering improvements taking place in the the factory changes and at in the the same time Dr. Knox health of the employees was trying to record as a result of the improvements in working conditions Interviewer Dr. Holms the factory And this was done together This was done as a joint exercise I was monitoring Dr. Knox was monitoring the health of the workers Narrator had begun In their 1966 fifteen years after Rochdale experiments thethe Dr. Knox and Dr. Holmes British occupational hygiene Society set up a committee to work out a safety level for asbestos exposure Dr. Holmes and Dr. Knox were invited to sit on the committes along with industry and other experts and a Government representative The results of the Rochdale study were offered to the Committee as evidence for a safety standard Dr. Knox selected 290 men who'd worked for Turner Brothers for at least ten years if any had got asbestosis it was appear on the rays and medical tests First he reviewed their rays then he measured their breathing The noisy crackles heard through the stethoscope were a major indicator of lung damage due to asbestosis Report No.IN.12 No.IN.12 ContimatioNno.2 No.2 In 1968 Dr. Holmes and Dr. Knox were ready to present their sed conclusions to the committee Of the 290 men studied only eight showed evidence of asbestosis less than % of the group More encouragingly in a section of eighty men who'd been exposed to low levels of asbestos dust that is 3 to 6 fibres per cubic centimetre of air only one man had asbestosis The British Occupational Hygiene Society used this data to settle on a safety level They decided that if only one man in {3 eighty had asbestosis at the 3 to 6 fibre level then practically one would contract it if levels could be brought as low as 2 fibres So a new British standard safety level was agreed - 0 2 fibres of asbestos dust per cubic centimetre of air a cubic centimetre is roughly a thimbleful But over a working day those u 2 fibres add up to sixteen million fibres breathed in over an ae eight shift In 1969 the 2 fibre standard became the guide- % line for factory inspectors in new Government regulations for the industry Some factories which couldn't reduce their dust levels closed down of dust more Others were prosecuted for allowing concentrations than six times higher than the 2 fibre standard But one the the standard itself was based only on a single study in this factory no other doctor had checked Dr. Knox's rays and method of taking the dust counts was known to be difficult and inaccurate The British Occupational done an independent check on the figures to Dr. Holmes of Turner Brothers Hygiene Society hadn't We put these criticisms Dr. Holmes At that time the Committee did not examine the clinical evidence As far as I am aware the rays were examined by Dr. ' Knox himself and his data from the rays was given to the Newnt Committee Interviewer - es Interviewer te we Interviewer So in fact we are now talking about just the evidence of one company where not even the clinical data was examined by the Committee ie OE | bin ed > Las eS Cod ete ee oe Sm. et ee: re re c|= ws i oe a ee - . 2 er Report No.TN. No.TN. 12 . Continuation No.3 Dr. Holmes That is so Interviewer Dr. Holmes And on Yes this a whole standard was based Interviewer In looking back on the data why didn't the Committee publish the fact that dust counts can be notoriously inaccurate by as much as 30 either way Dr. Holmes At that time we did not know just what the situation was regarding the accuracy of dust or minus 30 which is quoted today is based counts The plus on experience with fibre counting since 1961 or thereabouts Interviewer. So that in fact the dust counting may have been even more inaccurate Dr. Holmes Dust counts are notoriously difficult inaccuraciearse accepted - in dust counts just as many other similar situations to do and they are in Narrator In 1969 Dr. Knox was succeeded by a new Chief Medical Officer at Turner Brothers Dr. Hilton Lewinsohn The study started by Dr. Knox was continued by his successor The original 1970 Dr. medical records had been kept Lewinsohn examined the 290 so had the rays In men who had been studied by Dr. Knox four years earlier signs of asbestosis signs like figure the 2 fibre standard had Knox had found only % with swollen fingers and on that been based but Dr. Lewinsohn's examination of the same men four years later provided a result that was startlingly different On the study where Knox had found that only % had the discase Dr. Lewinsohn found that nearly 50 of the group had developed significant lung changes which could lead to asbestosis this was a much bigger increase than could be accounted for by an interval of four years or by improved ray technology If Dr. Lewinsohn's C Co | C | . te ![hovenre ees e as! el ~m ee a te e i ose des Report No.TN.12 Continuation No.4 rays were right Dr. Knox's must be wrong and so it seemed was the safety standard The results of the new study were first disclosed in 1972 when Dr. Lewinsohn gave a talk to a local medical group Dr. Lewinsohn My talk was to illustrate the way in which we at this factory kept our asbestos workers under observation As part of that paper I presented a graph and some figures of a preliminary nature to illustrate what we hoped to do with the information which we were collecting at the time Interviewer Dr. Lewinsohn in the journal And how did that data become public The talk which I gave was subsequently published of the Royal Society of Health as is their custom Narrator But the results failed to cause any stir they were presented in a series of complex graphs and one in Britain spotted their significance But they were picked up in America at New York's Mount Sinai Hospital has been studying asbestos diseases Professor Irving Selikoff for twenty years his clinic in Paterson New Jersey he's been following his own group of asbestos workers for the past sixteen years Selikoff knew of Knox's study examined the in 1966 and spotted original data Lewinsohn's paper which had Prof. Selikoff We have a computer programme that reviews all the world's literature on asbestos disease and my computer told me that here was an article written on asbestosis and we obtained the article and read it people of the 290 working Dr. at 2 Knox reported that only eight fibre level or 4 fibre or 5 fibre levels had rays that could be interpreted as asbestosis and therefore we could say that this was a safe set of working conditions and the second set of data indicated that there was a fair amount of lung scarring which would suggest that these were Y a i J ed we A ' en a = eee we te So sy Re Re,tre me ee ey er) C Report No.TN.12 Continuation No.5 not safe working conditions for the prevention of asbestosis I think we all owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Lewinsohn for having evaluated these data the standards that had been set been based upon this experience This is very important because around the world in Great Britain have largely and if there is a hazard in this plant then we've made a mistake in many parts of the world Interviewer or small When you say a mistake - mistakes can be large Prof. Selikoff Oh a large mistake we have told hundreds of thousands of workers that it's safe to work under these conditions that if you are inhaling air that contains two million fibres that it's safe for and every if we cubic metre for every are wrong then we have hour told of breathing these workers something which was totally in serious disease among them unwarranted and may result Narrator Professor Selikoff wrote to Dr. Lewinsohn for more information ~. = Dr. Lewinsohn Professor Selikoff first wrote to me in 1972 and on receiving his letter I sent to him all the information that I possibly could upon .. giving him all the data upon which my graph and figures had been based Prof. Selikoff Selikoff I was confused we had been under the impression based upon the original reports that in this factory very few people showed any lung scarring on ray I think out of 290 people who had worked for more than ten years only about eight had abnormal rays of a type that could be asbestosis and the new report indicated that oh in some groups 50 had evidence of lung scarring this didn't seem to jell Narrator | Professor Selikoff raised the matter at a public meeting the following year and openly questioned the British bod [| 3 - 0 0 " : f - meal tem my ee Se e Report No.TN.12 Continuation No.6 safety standard at a conference in Boston His decision to go public was attacked by Dr. Lewinsohn's colleague at Turner Brothers Dr. Holmes Dr. Holmes We felt at the time that he would have been better rather to discuss his differences on the scientific level than making a public pronouncement in a conference without consulting Dr. Lewinsohn or myself Prof. Selikoff What was not known to me was that some people in the asbestos industry were taping the lecture and later sent this taped copy to Dr. Lewinsohn Narrator When Dr. Lewinsohn received the tape a furious correspondence broke out between the two scientists The raised about the safety level were now in Dr. Lewinsohn wrote to Professor Sclikoff the open in July 1973 1973 doubts Reader We cannot accept the implication that the publication allows doubt to be cast on the validity of the standard and are of the opinion that such a conclusion is unwarranted You have used the information we provided in order to launch what seems to us to be ^ political campaign in the U.S.A. aimed at discrediting a hygiene standard for asbestos Narrator To which Selikoff replied - Reader I requested that you send me numbers to translate to figures and you did My references were then made only to what you reported in your published paper You suggest that the information campaign in is being used to the U.S.A. aimed launch what seems to be a political at discrediting our hygiene standard for asbestos 1 note you sent your letter to the Asbestos Information Association of North America Narrator incomplete Lewinsohn hit no conclusions out by arguing that could yet be drawn his study was eee wow ernrm ten Fe mae ee Report No.TN.12 Continuation No.7 Reader The results and in results presented in the paper were preliminary the discussion section it was clearly stated that from the information currently available only tentative opinions can be expressed Narrator Selikoff replied - Reader " fail to see the relevance of the implied complaint Nowhere did 1 quote your opinions I was interested only in your data The problem is a serious one if the ray surveys have been inaccurately evaluated then the standards are wrong and these workers are at serious risk of irreversible often fatal disease Narrator We asked Professor Sclikoff about the difference between the first study which produced the safety standard and the second which raises doubts about it Prof. Selikoff Generally the progression of asbestosis - scarring of the lungs on ray isn't that rapid There would of have been in the normal course events in four years some additional scarring but not that much I think part of the problem has got to be that two different people read the rays and perhaps two different people are giving two different results Interviewer _ Or somebody made a mistake Prof. Selikoff That's also possible It may be the other has read the rays in a peculiar way and to results that the other one came to that one or didn't come Dr. : Lewinsohn : --- --- --- --- --- I wouldn't disagree with Dr. Selikoff that I saw more ray changes using the technique that I reading rays than would have been described in employed for 1966 before this classification was available I'm not certain that I would accept a tenfold increase because we differ on interpretation of the results = mee mee e e e emr Report TN.12 TN.12 Continuation No.8 Narrator taken by two It's the interpretation of doctors at different times the two sets of which is at the rays heart of the dispute in lung changes Professor Selikoff says must mean a big increase that the big increase in asbestosis Dr. Lewinsohn says the lung changes at all to do with asbestosis he's observed may have nothing Dr. Lewinsohn The rays which I had interpreted did not necessarily mean that because there were changes present on them these people suffered from any form of disease ray changes can be caused by many things some of which have nothing to do with the person's occupational exposure For example living in an industrial environment the effects of ageing the effects of other diseases previous occupations smoking | habits etc. Prof. Selikoff When lung scarring occurs among workers in an asbestos factory I think until we prove otherwise we've got to say that that's asbestosis If it's not asbestosis then it would be a striking new discovery that workers have lung scarring from some other cause we ought to look to it in asbestos factories and I certainly think - Narrator | One reason for the dispute was that Dr. Lewinsohn's ray survey although it showed the increase in lung changes didn't show how many of these changes had been confirmed as cases of asbestosis figures to World in Last month Action Turner | Brothers , released these By December 1972 of the group of 290 men 285 had been traced 26 confirmed cases of asbestosis were found three had died of it Prof. Selikoff That would be about 10 - Interviewer 9.5 5 howe i er ad iu. ous eekee , e a ee ~~, i.e te ie . ay eo me e Report No.TN.12 Continuation No.9 Continuation Continuation oe Continuation te ee ee Prof. Selikoff That's threoer four times as much as we had originally been told In the United States if we knew now about this that 10 would within the relatively short period of time because some of these people had only worked for ten years We would not be allowed to use that as a standard In the United States - and I can only speak for the United States - most excess deaths among asbestos workers are no longer due to asbestosis they're due to cancer Narrator Lung cancer a new and deadly complication in the tangled dispute over the figures yet when the 2 fibre safety standard was set up in 1968 it deliberately excluded the cancer risk it was a of asbestosis safety standard The Committed only against explained - the lesser disease Reader ere Reader ee ne ee The quantitative relationship between asbestos and cancer risk is not time to specify an known consequently it is not possible at this air concentration which is known will be free of risk in this respect Interviewer Is cancer a major consideration with asbestos workers Dr Lewinsohn I figures are at the believe present that - I don't know what time but 50 of persons the who exact suffer from the disease asbestosis are likely to die from lung cancer Interviewer So at the moment of the 26 cases of asbestos that came througthroughh from Knox's grougp rougroupp youyou exp expect ect 13 of them to die of cancer Dr. Lewinsohn I hope they don't but on the basis of statistics available they have a very much higher risk of dying of cancer Narrator One of the deadliest forms of cancer attacks the chest walls doctors call it meso thelioma The safety standard is no protection even at very low dust levels workers can contrac it Worst still new reports indicate that the families of 1.12 No.10 Continuation Continuation kers are getting this cancer off in the These reports originally originated from Some brilliant research was United Kingdom umber of your scientists they reported that a this hildren extraordinary tumour who lived in the same was being found households with among in rkers or in residence about asbestos plants this due to the workers coming coming home with the dust othes their hair on their shoes and it became household dust We asked Turner Brothers Brothers how many Dr. Lewinsohn had studied had now of the 290 workers died of cancer updating of Knox's original group ohn's latest > World in Action shows that by the end of 1972 died of cancer of the lung and han seven of the group mesothelioma out of a total of twenty dead but se figures to Professor Selikoff koff : Seven out of twenty would suggest that eee . oe uw t of every four - 25 - had died of lung cancer in the States We see one cut nerally more than we see and about % % dying of r 20 dying of lung cancer the 10 here However these numbers oma in contrast contrast to that the experience experience in the and I wouldn't conclude yet to be worse than that of the hat you mentioned is going going ates but l'm certainly concerned to hear this But once again Dr. Lewinsohn disagrees _ I would think that that is a misleading way of sohn at the lung cancer deaths hese statistics If one looks ortion of the total 285 men in the group then I would one would expect as a medical they are about the same as Report No.TN.1No.T2N.12 . Continuation No.11 Continuation eee statistician would expect to find in the general population It's therefore wrong I believe to give the impression that 25 of the 285 men died of lung cancer or that 10 of the 285 men died of mesothelioma Narrator Scientists will continue to argue about the interpretation of the Turner Brothers study but none will disagree that more could be done to lessen the risk to the health of asbestos and their familics Studies now show that quite low levels of dust can cause mesothelioma among wives and children because particles of asbestos can be taken et home on clothing and especially in the hair workers have been e urged to take precautions to protect themselves with special clothing provided ie te Dr. Levinsohn We have been unsuccessfully attempting to we influence people working with asbestos particularly women and haired men in the use of headgear This has been unsuccessful and as the regulations the present regulations do not demand the use of headgear in the levels of exposure where these women are working there is no legal means of enforcing the use of headgear Furthermore it is not a condition of employment by the company Interviewer oIne terviewer YO Interviewer ie ee Why isn't it made a mandatory condition like matches down a mine Dr. Levinsohn I not decide company have repeatedly on completely agree with you policy I merely advise the many ccasions offered this However I do company and I advice to the company We have in fact got a committee of our Health and Safety Committee at the present time under the chairmanship of our chief Shop Steward attempting to find ways and means of encouraging the use of headgear in our factory Report No.TN.12 No.TN.12 No.TN.12 Continuation No.12 Interviewer Dr. Lewinsohn You I could simply make it mandatory couldn't the company could Narrator But critics of the industry like Professor Selikoff believe enough that the enforcement . of safety regulations won't be Interviewer To prevent discases would mean massive sums of money to change working conditions it might totally ruin the industry Prof. which which Selikoff There will be some products and some operations would require the vast expenditures that you detail and would therefore be uneconomic I think in those circumstances we probably will have to abandon those products and those processes Narrator The British yet another Concern in the asbestos industry Occupational Hygiene Society has review of Turner Brothers data is running high now undertaken This time four doctors three of them independent of the asbestos industry will examine all the rays On their findings which are me expected early next year will depend the future of the British e asbestos standard and perhaps of the asbestos industry ee ... 00000 e C Distribution List J. L. Burnett R. P. Carter A. A. L. Cini W. W. A. Cooper E. E. M. Fenner A. A. C. F. Finkbiner III R. R. L. Fricklas W. W. F. Goodwin N. N. W. Hendry D. D. E. Hillier J. R. M. Hutcheson Paul Paul Paul Kotin M.D. AFD Asbestos J. V. Magee J. A. McKinney F. L. Pundsack D Denver W. B. Reitze Ivan Sabourin W. A. Sells F. J. Solon Jr. W. C. Streib D Denver W. L. VanDerbeek G. W. Wright M.D.