Document 5kRXBVKa8vJB80wVGEjv6Y8qR

case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 1 of 45 No. 15-17447 IN THE UNFIOTREDTHSETANTINESTHCOCUIRRCTUOITF APPEALS HAWAIISWURILPFDRRLEIDISFEEERRFVFUAONTUDINO; DNSAIEATRSIOSROANC;CIWALUETSIBOT-NMM,AAUUIIGROUP; Plaintiffs-Appellees, COUNTY OF MAUI, Defendant-Appellant. ONon.A1p2p-ceva-l1f9r8o,mHtohne. USu.Ss.anDiOstkriicMt oClolwuarty,,DDisist.troicftHJauwdgaiei BRIEFINFOSRUPTPHOERUTNOITFEPDLASTINATTIEFSFAS-SAAPMPEICLLUESECSURIAE OF COUNSEL: UWKOAf.PSafirRs.coheYEtienNoncgfvtWtiGiooronenEn,nNAemDDrg.aeCeElnn.LtCcaOyol uWnSseKlI AJOsHsisNtaCn.t CARttUorDnEeyNGeneral AAWRFEPf(r2.R.neAtO0atJvdE2oRs.Ue')rhtDOBnrSi3i&EneNoc0TygxRk5NIstP.-INo7t,0.Caun4U6Atr1K,Su4n.5VMDSr1eHa.ICrILl.@DTARTHe2ueUp0ss'd0Rtoo4uoNj4rf.gEcJoeRuvsstDicive. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00001 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 2 of 45 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................iii INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.....................................................1 ISSUES PRESENTED..................................................................................2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................... 3 I. Statutory Background................................................................... 3 II. Factual Background...................................................................... 6 III. Procedural Background................................................................7 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.....................................................................10 ARGUMENT................................................................................................ 13 I. The the LDaisntgruiactgeCaonudrtP'surDpeocsiesioofnsthAereCWCoAn..s.i.s..t..e..n...t...w...i.t..h............... 13 A. Discharges of Pollutants to Jurisdictional Surface WCoantneresctTiohnroPurgohpeGrlryouRnedqwuiarteerCwWiAthPaeDrmirietcst...H...y..d..r.o..l.o..g...i.c.a..l......14 B. The District Court's Decisions Give Full Effect to Congress's Intent to Restore and Maintain the Nation's Waters............................................................................20 C. wThitehDEiPstAri'sctLCoonugrstt'asnFdiinndginPgosoiftiLoina.b..i.l..i.t.y...i.s...C...o..n..s..i.s..t.e..n..t............ 22 II. tDThhueeeGCtorooutunhntedy"wDIsairLteeicartbalHnedyfdtorhroeUlOongcpieecraamnl.i.tC..t.o.e.n.d.n..D.e..ci.s.t.c.i.oh..n.a.."r..gB..e.e.s.t..w...e..e..n........26 III. HThaed DFaisitrrNicottCicoeufrotrCPourrrpeocstelsyoHfeClidviTlhPaetntahletCieosu...n..t..y............ 32 CONCLUSION............................................................................................36 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA l Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00002 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 3 of 45 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE..........................................................37 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................................................... 38 Sierra Club V. EPA 18CV3472 NDCA ii Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00003 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 4 of 45 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bath Petrol. Storage, Inc. v. Sovas, 309 F. Supp. 2d 357 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) ................................................ 22 Che4v6r7onU,.SU..S8.3A7.,(I1n9c8.4v). .N..R...D..C...,..I..n.c....,................................................ 12, 24 Frie7n3d8sFo. fSSuapkpo.n6n2e3t (vD. D.Ru.It.ra1,990) ........................................................ 15 Gre6a4t1erFY. eSlulopwps.t2odne1C12o0al(.Dv.. ILdaarhsoon2,009)....................................... 31, 32 HawN.o.W1i2ld-1li9f8e,F2u0n1d5 Wv. LCt3y2. 8o2f2M7a(uDi., Haw. Jan. 23, 2015) .... 6, 7, 8, 9, 28 HawN.o.W1i2ld-1li9f8e,F2u0n1d5 Wv. LCt3y9. 0o3f9M1a8u(iD, . Haw. June 25, 2015) .................. 9 Haw24aiF'.i SWuipldpl.if3edF9u8n0d(Dv.. CHoauwn.ty20o1f4M)a.u..i.,..................................... passim Hea2d4w3aFt.e3rds,5I2n6c.(9v.thTaClier.nt2I0r0r1ig) a.t.i.o..n...D...i.s..t...,............................................. 5 Her5n9a9nFd.ezSuv.ppE.ss2odS1t7d5. (ODi.lPC.Ro..,2009) .................................................. 19 Hud7s5o1nFR. .SFupisph.e1r0m8e8n'(sS.ADs.sN'n.Yv.. 1C9i9ty0)of..N..e..w....Y..o..r..k.,................................ 22 Idah14o3RFu.rSaul pCpo.u2ndci1l1v6.9B(oDs.mIad,aho 2001)........................... 11, 18, 19, 21 Inla9n01d FS.t2eedl 1v4. 1E9P(A7,th Cir. 1990) ......................................................... 22 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA in Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00004 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 5 of 45 In r8e0E3PFA.3d&8D0e4p('t6othf DCeirf.. F20in1a5l)R..u..l.e..,..................................................... 24 McNCol.el8l6a-n47E5c,ol2o0giEcnavl tSl.eeLp.aRgeepS. i2tu0a,8t7io7n(Ev..DC.hCenael.y,Apr. 30, 1990) ...... 31 McC76le3llFa.nSEucpopl.og4i3c1al(ES.eDe.paCgael.S1i9tu8a9)tio..n...v.....C...h..e.n..e..y.,............................... 31 McC70le7llFa.nSEucpopl.og1i1c8a2l S(Ee.eDp.agCealS.it1u9a8t8i)on...v.....W...e..i.n..b..e..r.g..e.r..,........................ 30 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................ . 8 N. Cal. River Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. 04-4620, 2005 WL 2122052 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005) ... 16, 17, 19 NwN. Eo.n0v8tl-.5D48e,f.2C00tr9. vW. LGr3a6b7h2o8r9n5, (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009)..................... 19 O'L5e2a3ryF.v.SMupopy.er6'4s2La(En.dDf.ilPl,aI.n1c9.,81) .................................................... 15 Rap5a4n7oUs.vS.. U71n5ite(d20S0t6a)te.s.,................................................... 2, 8, 10, 15, 16 Rice v. Harken Expl. Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) ..................................................... 19, 20 S.F8. 1HFe.rrSiunpgpA. s3sd'n8v4.7P(aNc..DG. aCsa&l. 2E0le1c5.)C.o...,............................................ 18 Sier6r2a0CFl.u2bd v4.1A(b5sthtoCniCr.o1n9s8tr0.)C.o...,.............................................. 10, 14, 15 Sier4r2a1 CFl.u3bd v1.1E33l P(laOsothGCoilrd. M20i0n5e)s,.I..n.c....,................................................ 16 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA iv Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00005 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 6 of 45 SierNroa. C15lu-1b1v2., V2a0,1E5lWec.L&68P3o0w30er1C(Eo..,D. Va. Nov. 6, 2015) .................. 18 Un5it2e0d FS.t3adte9s7v6. A(9ptphroCxiri.m2a0t0e8ly) 6.4..,.6..9..5...P..o..u..n..d..s...o..f..S..h...a..r.k...F...i.n..s.,............. 33 Un4it7e4d USt.aSt.e1s2v1. R(1i9v8e5r)sid..e...B..a..y..v..i.e..w...H...o..m...e..s.,..I..n.c....,................................... 20 Un4it3e8d FS.taStuesppv.. 9V4e5ls(icWo.lDC.hTeemn.n.Co1r9p7.6,) ............................................... 16 Vill2.4oFf O.3cdo9n6o2mo(7wtohcCLiar.ke19v9.4D)a.y..t.o..n...H...u..d..s.o..n....C..o..r.p....,.............................. 19 Wa8sh7.0WF.ilSduerpnpe.s9s8C3o(aEl..Dv.. WHeacslha.M19in94in)g..C..o....,........................................ 21 YadNkoi.n1R4i-v7e5r3k,e2e0p1er5 vW. DLu6k1e5E77n0e6rg(yMC.Dar.Nol.iCn.aOs,cLt.L2C0,, 2015) ............... 18 Statutes 33U.S.C. 1251(a) ................................................................................ 3 33 U.S.C. 1311............................................................................ 3, 4, 14 33 U.S.C. 1318(a)(A) .......................................................................... 34 33 U.S.C. 1319...................................................................................... 4 33 U.S.C. 1319(d) ........................................................................... 5, 35 33 U.S.C. 1341(a) ............................................................................... 35 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1)........................................................................... 31 33 U.S.C. 1342 ............................................................................. 1, 3, 4 33 U.S.C. 1342(a).................................................................................. 4 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA v Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00006 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 7 of 45 33U.S.C. 1342(b) ................................................................................. 4 33U.S.C. 1342(d) ................................................................................. 4 33U.S.C. 1344 ................................................................................. 3, 4 33U.S.C. 1362 ..................................................................................... 3 33U.S.C. 1362(6) ................................................................................. 3 33U.S.C. 1362(7) ............................................................................. 2, 4 33 U.S.C. 1362(8) ................................................................................. 2 33 U.S.C. 1362(12)(A) .................................................................... 3, 14 33 U.S.C. 1362(14) ............................................................................... 4 33 U.S.C. 1365 ..................................................................................... 4 Federal Register 39 Fed. Reg. 43,759 (Dec. 18, 1974) ...................................................... 4 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Dec. 2, 1990) ....................................................... 23 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (Dec. 12, 1991) ................................................. 5, 23 66 Fed. Reg. 2960 (Jan. 12, 2001) ...................................... 12, 23, 24, 26 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) .............................................. 17, 25 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA vi Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00007 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 8 of 45 The United States respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a). INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implements the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, together with the states. That includes promulgating regulations regarding the CWA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). Id. 1342. The United States participates as amicus curiae because it has an interest in the proper interpretation of the NPDESpermit provisions and the framework for analyzing whether discharges ofpollutants to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater are subject to those provisions.*1The United States also has an interest because it enforces the CWA and because it is a potential defendant in actions alleging the discharge of pollutants from federal facilities through groundwater. The United States agrees with the result the district court reached in this case and urges affirmance. In the United States'view, a NPDES t1oWmeeuasne"twheatteerrsmof"tjhuerisUdnicittieodnSaltastuersf.a"ce waters" throughout this brief 1 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00008 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2018, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 9 of 45 permit is required here because the discharges from the DefendantAppellant County of Maui's wastewater treatment facility are from a point source (i.e., the injection wells) to waters of the United States (i.e., the Pacific Ocean2). To be clear, the United States does not contend that groundwater is a point source, nor does the United States contend that groundwater is a water of the United States regulated by the Clean Water Act. Moreover, the United States does not agree with the district court's apphcation of the "significant nexus" standard from Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). ISSUES PRESENTED This amicus brief addresses the following issues: 1. Whether a discharge of pollutants from a point source to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct hydrological connection to jurisdictional surface waters is regulated under the CWA. 2. Whether the site-specific facts here give rise to a "discharge of a pollutant" under the CWA. 2StMatoerse'tseprerciitfoirciaalllys,eianstounthdeerPtahceifiCcWOAc.ea3n3tUh.aSt.Cis.pa1r3t 6o2f(t7h)e, (U8)n.ited 2 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00009 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 10 of 45 3. Whether the County had fair notice that it was subject to civil penalties for its discharges to jurisdictional surface waters without a NPDES permit. STATEMENT OF THE CASE I. Statutory Background Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). Congress therefore prohibited any non-excepted "discharge of any pollutant" to "navigable waters" unless it is authorized by a permit. Id. 1311, 1342, 1344, 1362. The CWA defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."Id. 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added). Pollutant means "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." Id. 1362(6). The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas"; and a point source is "any discernible, confined and discrete Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 3 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00010 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 11 of 45 conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. 1362(7), (14). The CWA authorizes EPA to issue NPDES permits under Section 402(a), but EPA may authorize a state to administer its own NPDES program if EPA determines that it meets the statutory criteria. Id. 1342(a), (b). When a state receives such authorization, EPA retains oversight and enforcement authorities. Id. 1319, 1342(d). Hawaii obtained such permitting authority in 1974. See 39 Fed. Reg. 43,759 (Dec. 18, 1974). The CWA is a strict-liability regime that prohibits non-excepted discharges unless they are authorized by a CWA permit. Id. 1311, 1342, 1344. An unpermitted discharge constitutes a violation of the CWA regardless of fault and is subject to enforcement by the state or federal government or a private citizen. Id. 1319, 1365. To estabhsh liability for a violation of the permit requirement, a plaintiff must show there was (1) a discharge (2) of a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 4 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00011 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 12 of 45 from a point source. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001). The CWA includes a civil-penalty provision for those who violate the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1319(d). When determining a civil-penalty amount, courts must consider "the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require."Id. EPA's longstanding position is that a discharge from a point source to jurisdictional surface waters that moves through groundwater with a direct hydrological connection comes under the purview of the CWA's permitting requirements. E.g., Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,982 (Dec. 12, 1991) ("[T]he affected ground waters are not considered waters of the United States' but discharges to them are regulated because such discharges are effectively discharges to the directly connected surface waters."). Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 5 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00012 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 13 of 45 II. Factual Background The County operates the Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. ofMaui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 983 (D. Haw. 2014) [Hawaii i]. The facility receives approximately four million gallons of sewage each day. Id. After treating the sewage, the facility releases three to five million gallons of effluent into four on-site injection wells. Id. at 983-84. The effluent travels into a shallow groundwater aquifer and then flows into the Pacific Ocean through the seafloor at points known as "submarine springs."Id. at 984; see also Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. ofMaui, No. 12-198, 2015 WL 328227, at *1 (D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2015) [Hawaii II]. EPA, the Hawaii Department of Health (DOH), and others conducted a tracer-dye study that confirmed this conclusion for injection wells 3 and 4. Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984. According to the study, it took the leading edge of the dye 84 days to go from wells 3 and 4 to the ocean and about 64% of the dye injected into these wells was discharged from the submarine springs to the Pacific Ocean. Id. The dye's appearance in the ocean "conclusively demonstrated that a hydrogeologic connection exists."Id. at 985-86. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 6 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00013 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 14 of 45 Although tracer dye was not placed into well 1 and dye from well 2 was not detected in the study, the County "acknowledge[d] that there is a hydrogeologic connection between wells 1 and 2 and the ocean." Hawaii II, 2015 WL 328227, at *1-2. The tracer-dye study models indicated that, in some circumstances, treated effluent from well 2 would move along flowpaths similar to those traveled by the dye injected into wells 3 and 4 and emerge at the same springs. Supplemental Excerpts of Record (SER) 237, 240, 243. There is no dispute that given the proximity of wells 1 and 2, the modeling for well 2 predicts the flowpaths for discharges from well 1. Excerpts of Record (ER) 443; SER 189. III. Procedural Background In April 2012, Plaintiffs-Appellees Hawaii Wildlife Fund, Sierra Club-Maui Group, Surfrider Foundation, and West Maui Preservation Association filed suit seeking to require the County to obtain and comply with a NPDES permit and to pay civil penalties. Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 986. The district court issued three partial summaryjudgment opinions in favor of Plaintiffs. The parties then entered into a settlement agreement, in which the County stipulated to terms Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 7 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00014 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 15 of 45 contingent on a final judgment that the County violated the CWA and that the County was "not immune from" civil penalties. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. ofMaui, No. 12-198, ECF No. 259. The court entered final judgment in accordance with its opinions and the settlement agreement. The district court's first opinion held the County hable under the CWA for unpermitted discharges from wells 3 and 4. Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1000. The court started its analysis with the language and purpose of the CWA, and also rehed on EPA's interpretation and case law. Id. at 995-96. The court explained that Plaintiffs "must show that pollutants can be directly traced from the injection wells to the ocean such that the discharge at the LWRF is a de facto discharge into the ocean."Id. at 998 (emphasis in original). The court found that Plaintiffs had met this burden. Id. at 998-1000. The district court also found CWA liability under the "significant nexus" standard from Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755-56, and the Ninth Circuit's application of that standard in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007). Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 8 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00015 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 16 of 45 The district court's second opinion held the County hable for unpermitted discharges from wells 1 and 2. Hawaii II, 2015 WL 328227, at *6. The County "expressly conceded] that pollutants introduced by the County into wells 1 and 2 were making their way to the ocean," and the court rejected the County's argument that liability does not arise unless a pollutant passes through "a series of sequential point sources."Id. at *2-4. The district court's third opinion rejected the County's argument that it was not subject to civil penalties for its unpermitted discharges because it lacked fair notice. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. ofMaui, No. 12-198, 2015 WL 3903918, at *6 (D. Haw. June 25, 2015) [Hawaii IIT\. The court determined that the County had notice because the discharges "clearly implicate[d] each statutory element." Id. at *4. The court further held that its adjudication of the first motion for partial summary-judgment provided notice to the County. Id. at *6. The parties then entered into a settlement agreement, in which the County stipulated that it would make good faith efforts to obtain and comply with a NPDES permit and that it would pay $100,000 in civil penalties and $2.5 million for a supplemental environmental Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 9 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00016 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 17 of 45 project, all contingent on a final judgment and ruling that the County violated the CWA and that the County was "not immune from" civil penalties. Haw. Wildlife Fund, v. Cty. ofMaui, No. 12-198, ECF No. 259. The district court then entered a final judgment. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The judgment should be affirmed because it is consistent with the language and purpose of the Clean Water Act and EPA's longstanding interpretation and practice of issuing NPDES permits for discharges of pollutants similar to the ones here. As Justice Scalia said in Rapanos, the statute's language prohibiting "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source" does not limit liabihty only to discharges of pollutants directly to navigable waters. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (plurality op.) (emphasis in original). Courts have interpreted the CWA as covering not only discharges of pollutants directly to navigable waters, but also discharges ofpollutants that travel from a point source to navigable waters over the surface of the ground or through underground means. E.g., Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1980). The discharges in this case fall squarely within the statutory language. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 10 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00017 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 18 of 45 In the United States'view, a NPDES permit is required here because the discharges at issue are from a point source (i.e., the injection wells) to waters of the United States (i.e., the Pacific Ocean's coastal waters). To be clear, the United States views groundwater as neither a point source nor a water of the United States regulated by the CWA. The United States therefore agrees with the district court's conclusion that a NPDES permit was required here, but only to the extent that the court's analysis is consistent with the above-stated principles regarding groundwater. The district court's conclusions accord with the CWA's purpose. Congress enacted the CWA "to restore and maintain . . . the country's waters"; and to achieve this goal, Congress created a strict-liability regime prohibiting discharges unless they are authorized under the CWA. Recognizing Congress's goals in the CWA, courts have concluded that in certain circumstances discharges ofpollutants that reach navigable waters through groundwater fall squarely within the statute's terms. E.g., Idaho Rural Council v. Bosnia, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179-80 (D. Idaho 2001). Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 11 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00018 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 19 of 45 Even if Congress's intent on this issue had been ambiguous, EPA has clearly stated for decades that pollutants that move through groundwater can constitute discharges subject to the CWA, and that interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). It has been EPA's longstanding position that discharges moving through groundwater to a jurisdictional surface water are subject to CWA permitting requirements if there is a "direct hydrological connection" between the groundwater and the surface water. See NPDES Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3017 (Jan. 12, 2001). This formulation recognizes that some hydrological connections are too circuitous and attenuated to come under the CWA. Id. The County argues that the district court dispensed with the requirements that a discharge be "from a point source" and "to navigable water" because the effluent was discharged from a nonpoint source and because the effluent was discharged into groundwater, which is not covered by the CWA. Opening Brief (Op. Br.) at 21, 27, 30. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 12 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00019 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 20 of 45 This attempt to bifurcate the movement ofthe pollutants into two separate events is inconsistent with the statute's language and purpose. It also ignores the undisputed fact that the pollutants moved through that groundwater to the ocean. The County's argument that no civil penalty should have been imposed because the County lacked fair notice lacks merit. The County was on notice both as a general matter--through the CWA's language and EPA's statements in rulemakings--and specifically--through communications from EPA to the County. In any event, the question of fair notice goes to the amount of the civil penalty, an amount the County stipulated to, and is only one of many factors informing a civilpenalty amount. ARGUMENT I. LTahnegDuiasgtreiacntdCPouurrpto'ssDe eocfitsihoenCs WArAe. Consistent with the The district court's judgment holding the County liable under the CWA is consistent with the text and purpose of the statute. It is also consistent with EPA's long-held position governing when the CWA requires permits for discharges ofpollutants that move to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct hydrological 13 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00020 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 21 of 45 connection. The County cannot recast the nature ofthe discharges to avoid that result. A. TCDhoisrnconhueagcrhtgioGensrooPfurPnopdoewllrualtytaeRnr tewsqitutohirJeauDCriWisrdAeiccPttieHornymdairltsoS.luorgfiacacel Waters When Congress prohibited the unpermitted "discharge of any pollutant," it defined this term broadly as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." 33 U.S.C. 1311, 1362(12)(A). As the County concedes, "a point source does not need to discharge directly into navigable waters to trigger NPDES permitting." Op. Br. at 27. Because Congress did not limit the term "discharges of pollutants" to only direct discharges to navigable waters, discharges through groundwater may fall within the purview of the CWA. This reading of "discharge of a pollutant" has been apphed in other similar contexts where discharges of pollutants have moved from a point source to navigable waters over the surface of the ground or by some other means. In Sierra Club v. Abston Construction, which addressed discharges from mining operations that traveled to navigable waters in part through surface runoff, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[g]ravity flow, resulting in a discharge into navigable body of water, Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 14 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00021 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 22 of 45 may be part of a point source discharge if the [discharger] at least initially collected and channeled the water and other materials."3620 F.2d at 44-45; see also Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 628, 630 (D.R.I. 1990) (defendant hable for discharge of "raw sewage [that] was running directly from the leaching field, on the surface of the ground for approximately 250 feet, into the [surface water]"); O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("[T]here is no requirement that the point source need be directly adjacent to the waters it pollutes."). That Congress gave the term "discharge of a pollutant" a broad meaning finds support in cases where CWA habihty attached for discharges from point sources that traveled through other means before reaching surface waters. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (noting that courts have found violations of Section 301 "even if the pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit `directly into'covered ppit3fCnhoooToresiAnhnitgbstehtitrseorsCat.noovUouCnituntrhoycnCi.a,ettfeoytNltdnodomowsiS.tjsirutcso7uarchf7citoasr-et2iandrsog5isinncae3tr.stws0uiSoAoea(enf5smteeaptthirlOhocsceluCpluo.suiUrmrBtf.Caanerncu1i.wte9rteasi8iadwt0ttehh)3aS,.i0atntae-ta3trttt1she3r.eas5th'vT-sp3rehco6oleoe,uspdiUgSetihiinoeoninrsfdtruetiaahrrdsfeeCaScacCtlmteluaWybtirceAfuvusrn..ostoAmBocfborfuasikroetiorftahnee 15 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00022 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 23 of 45 waters, but pass `through conveyances'in between") (citing Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2005) (defendant could be hable for discharges conveyed from its point-source mine shaft to jurisdictional surface water through a tunnel that defendant did not own); United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 946-47 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (holding that CWA covered pollutants discharged from defendant's point source to jurisdictional surface waters conveyed through a sewer system that the defendant did not own)). Because courts have interpreted the term "discharge of a pollutant" to cover discharges over the ground and through other means, exempting discharges through groundwater could lead to absurd results. As one court noted, "it would hardly make sense for the CWA to encompass a polluter who discharges pollutants via a pipe running from the factory directly to the riverbank, but not a polluter who dumps the same pollutants into a man-made setthng basin some distance short of the river and then allows the pollutants to seep into the river via the groundwater." N. Cal. River Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. 04-4620, 2005 WL 2122052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005). Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 16 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00023 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 24 of 45 The County concedes that discharges need not be direct and that a discharge through a conveyance requires a permit. Op. Br. at 27. The County argues, however, that the conveyance itself must be a point source and that because groundwater is not a point source, the district court "impermissibly `transform[s] a nonpoint source into a point source.'"Id. at 27-28, 33. The County's interpretation is flawed. Contrary to the County's argument, the district court did not ehminate the requirement that a discharge be "from a point source."All it said was that pollutants from a point source need not be emitted directly into covered waters. The case law does not require the means by which the pollutant discharged from a point source reaches a water of the United States to be a point source. While the County's statement that the statutory definition of "navigable waters" does not include groundwater is accurate, Op. Br. at 21, it is beside the point. There is no dispute that groundwater itself is not a "navigable water," 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,055 (June 29, 2015), but the district court's decisions hinge on the movement of pollutants to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 17 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00024 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 25 of 45 hydrological connection. Such an addition of pollutants to navigable waters falls squarely within the CWA's scope. The County rehes on the treatment of groundwater in legislative history, Op. Br. at 21-23, but this "only supports the unremarkable proposition with which all courts agree--that the CWA does not regulate isolated/nontributary groundwater'which has no [effect] on surface water." Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. It does not undermine the conclusion that discharges ofpollutants through groundwater to jurisdictional surface waters are subject to the NPDES program. The County contends that case law does not support the district court's interpretation, Op. Br. at 35-37, but this argument largely ignores the majority of the courts that have addressed this issue and concluded that discharges that move from a point source to jurisdictional surface waters via groundwater with a hydrological connection are subject to regulation under the CWA. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., No. 15-112, 2015 WL 6830301 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2015); Yadkin Riverkeeper v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. 14-753, 2015 WL 6157706 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2015); S.F. Herring Ass'n v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 81 F. Supp. 3d 847 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Hernandez Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 18 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00025 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 26 of 45 v. Esso Std. Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.P.R. 2009); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, No. 08-548, 2009 WL 3672895 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009); Mercer Fraser, 2005 WL 2122052; Bosnia, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169. The County's reliance on other case law (Op. Br. at 35-36) is unavailing for three reasons. First, none of the cases are controlhng precedent. Second, most of these decisions are inapposite because they do not address the issue of discharges ofpollutants that move through groundwater to jurisdictional surface waters. In Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson, Corp., the court examined whether groundwater itself was a navigable water, i.e., a water within the meaning of the CWA. 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994). That is distinct from whether a CWA permit is required when pollutants travel to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct hydrological connection. Third, these cases do not foreclose apphcation of the CWA where a direct hydrological connection to jurisdictional surface waters can be found. In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., the court concluded that a discharge of oil that might reach navigable waters by gradual, natural seepage was not the equivalent of a discharge to navigable waters. 250 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 19 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00026 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 27 of 45 F.3d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 2001). The court suggested, however, that it would be open to finding a discharge had occurred through groundwater when it underscored the plaintiffs'failure to provide any "evidence of a close, direct and proximate link between [the defendant's] discharges of oil and any resulting actual, identifiable oil contamination of a particular body of natural surface water."Id. at 272. B. WCTohanetegDrrsei.sstsr'sicItnCteonutrtt'os RDeesctiosrioenasnGdiMveaFinutlaliEnftfhecetNtoation's Congress's purpose in enacting the CWA--to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters"--embraced a "broad, systemic view . . . of water quality." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985). The County attempts to minimahze that goal. Adopting the County's theory would allow dischargers to avoid responsibility simply by discharging pollutants from a point source into jurisdictional surface waters through any means that was not direct. Courts have viewed the CWA's broad purpose of protecting the quality of navigable waters as a clear congressional signal that "any pollutant which enters such waters, whether directly or through Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 20 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00027 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 28 of 45 groundwater, is subject to regulation by NPDES permit." Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 1994). "Stated even more simply, whether pollution is introduced by a visible, above-ground conduit or enters the surface water through the aquifer matters httle to the fish, waterfowl, and recreational users which are affected by the degradation to our nation's rivers and streams."Bosnia, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80. The state's authority to protect groundwater is in no way impaired by subjecting point sources to NPDES-permit requirements to protect surface waters. Thus, the County's argument that it should not be liable here because "preservation of states'authority over the regulation of groundwater" is a "co-equal" goal of the CWA misses the mark. Op. Br. at 34-35. This emphatically is not a case about the regulation of groundwater. Instead it is about the regulation of discharges of pollutants to waters of the United States. To the extent the County's argument rehes on the regulatory scheme governing disposal into wells, Op. Br. at 24-27, that is flawed because the regulation of wells under the Safe Drinking Water Act's (SDWA) Underground Injection Control (UIC) program does not preclude or displace regulation under the Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 21 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00028 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 29 of 45 CWA's NPDES program.4See Hudson R. Fishermen's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991) (objectives of the CWA and the SDWA are not "mutually exclusive"); see also Bath Petrol. Storage, Inc. v. Sovas, 309 F. Supp. 2d 357, 369 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). C. ETPhAe 'Ds iLsotrnigctstCanoudrint'gs FPionsditiinogn.of Liability Is Consistent with EPA's longstanding position has been that point-source discharges of pollutants moving through groundwater to a jurisdictional surface water are subject to CWApermitting requirements if there is a "direct hydrological connection" between the groundwater and the surface water. EPA has repeatedly articulated this view in multiple rulemaking preambles. In 1990, EPA stated that "this rulemaking only addresses discharges to water of the United States, consequently discharges to ground waters are not covered by this rulemaking (unless there is a IittFm4aonhd.ToNj.ee2ehadaPcacentttoD1itCotn1e4Ehnn4n1oSa2e9uuwtc2npa(t-e"tti7e2ilyoenrtl3dnshmj.meabtTCiciortestih.eitrc"boaw.odrOnti1neinpps9iesngc.o9tnrhts0Buotita)htrhe.ri.wesegoEaenedEwPtlsilPA(se2soecAl7mfilha.ss'prsabgnaorprgnuolaoletdecussdeaitndtauitadnohnbvitnsaydiscgteithuanrhnabneotIrldhngteSeeleaawrelpovnltauhfeddtrpeneivSsortiChpsteleolWwiuCesnltAaiaortlv,cnhsf.uattaEihsinnttPe)tdrcoAedaCtq,shoWuee9ais0Atrw1in.naogst 22 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00029 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 30 of 45 hydrological connection between the ground water and a nearby surface water body)." NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,997 (Dec. 2, 1990). And in the preamble to its final rule addressing water quahty standards on Indian lands, EPA stated: bt"rgs[oweTiertgot]utawhhuuateeelnetairedotdsneAwnidrsocae,tftbcgetetrtrlhrcohyeweaueqcunhousUdeaneiwrrfnneefsieeastucctetchettdeehreNdsdrSdPesitDgusaiascrrtEnofehadSausac"nrdegdibpsewrwueuesrarctafmatttaeerdcheirritseysss.ecdfhrafwofaerolercaorgttgieevnisrdceosalit.ytslocccdhIotoiahnsnnrcegnshmieedatschretgeraioesertodeens 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,982. In 2001, EPA reiterated its position: "As a legal and factual matter, EPA has made a determination that, in general, collected or channeled pollutants conveyed to surface waters via ground water can constitute a discharge subject to the Clean Water Act." 66 Fed. Reg. at 3017. EPA recognized that the determination was "a factual inquiry, like all point source determinations," adding: pTcssuuorhorcnefphnaoteciscaemitsneewgdgaatetnotoeodlreossgsdtwuyias,ribtflaalhfnclsboechewe,awabfnyaafyetnewcdsrtphesdeiscclvhboifiypiaacem.phcaroyTinidthnyeretorrislesaoioftgoeubirrecescyap,eloelnycEddiiPfsciAcccoohnfnaanirfsceigtncoenitrneosigds,t Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 23 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00030 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 31 of 45 tah"edisrceocpte" hoyfdthroeloreggicuallatcioonnnteoctdioisnc.harges to surface water via Id. A general hydrological connection between all groundwater and surface waters is insufficient; there must be evidence showing a direct hydrological connection between specific groundwater and specific surface waters. Id. To the extent there is statutory ambiguity about whether the CWA applies to discharges to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater, EPA's interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The County's contention that the direct-hydrological-connection standard is at odds with EPA's recently-stated position on whether groundwater is a jurisdictional water misinterprets EPA's statements. Op. Br. at 38-39. The Clean Water Rule, which was promulgated in June 2015 (and stayed by the Sixth Circuit pending further order of the court, see In re EPA & Dep't of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015)), expressly excludes groundwater from the definition of "waters of the United States." 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054. But, as EPA clarified, the fact that groundwater itself is not jurisdictional under the CWA does not mean that pollutants that reach waters of the United 24 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00031 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 32 of 45 States through groundwater do not require CWA permits. "EPA agrees that the agency has a longstanding and consistent interpretation that the Clean Water Act may cover discharges of pollutants from point sources to surface water that occur via ground water that has a direct hydrologic connection to the surface water. Nothing in this rule changes or affects that longstanding interpretation, including the exclusion of groundwater from the definition of waters of the United States.'" See EPA, Response to Comments - Topic 10 Legal Analysis (June 30, 2015); available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/response-commentsclean-water-rule-definition-waters-united-states. The County erroneously attempts to conflate the jurisdictional exclusion of groundwater with the role that groundwater can play as the pathway through which pollutants from a point source reach jurisdictional surface waters.5 Htt5fag[hhiftrTneatraoeacaohtuilmluelidntizghtpsddeyhibtdiw]sisu,ngtcawrrgirotgitoeocu.tr"uutolwHdnlicdtaodaosnpuwweauoplflrtadaffltyeitiitleiscsisHtrtkIeai,wetreltor2fleayeh4bdljleduemeFttsrvhhc.ibesaeoauSadnrntnruitsgPciptifttlpdhobiato.ehaeiwrnnc3teetaadhtdipulhfearfswetwostehpageac1totrhort0eoseu0erderusl1isdjdn.surcodCaBerhfwilqlsusateuodhatraigtietrnpecheerrtUsWeieNounvtcnnhaPiaotatdaiDeeulletdrrEurstmRtSnSteahoudtrtpvaelrueeeeetrserdwmso'ia"fnistasn. d 25 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00032 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 33 of 45 II. tGThhreeo"uCDnodiurwneatctyteIHrsyaLdniradobtllhoeegfiOocracleUaCnnpo.enrnmecitttioedn"DBisecthwaeregnetshDeue to Discharges ofpollutants from a point source that move through groundwater are subject to CWApermitting requirements if there is a direct hydrological connection between the groundwater and a jurisdictional surface water.6Ascertaining whether there is a direct hydrological connection is a fact-specific determination. 66 Fed. Reg. at 3017. To qualify as "direct," a pollutant must be able to proceed from the point of injection to the surface water without significant interruption. Relevant evidence includes the time it takes for a pollutant to move to surface waters, the distance it travels, and its traceability to the point source. These factors will be affected by the type of pollutant, geology, direction of groundwater flow, and evidence that the pollutant can or does reach jurisdictional surface waters. Id. Here, the district court correctly held that the County discharged pollutants to the ocean through groundwater. In Hawaii I, the court b6froeeScromuomgnundeliaezctreioostuhntre,htshaCortWewsfoAeemvr'seteorp,cuaiorsvn"haineyew"dcdtr.iioroelnocsgtiahcryaedl rtcoooolnoncgieircccatuiloictnoo.u"nsnTeahcnetdimoanot,r"teewnahuciacctuherdatteo 26 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00033 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 34 of 45 determined that a direct hydrological connection exists between the groundwater and the ocean. The tracer-dye study clearly established that the discharges moved from wells 3 and 4 to the ocean in relatively short order.7Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984. The study concluded that after 84 days, the dye began to appear along the North Kaanapah Beach, half a mile from the facihty. Id. The tracer-dye study also estimated that 64% of the treated effluent from wells 3 and 4 followed this route to the ocean. Id. Although the court's ultimate conclusion was correct, the court's alternative explanation for the County's habihty under the "significant nexus" standard from Rapanos and Healdsburg was erroneous. Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1004. Rapanos and Healdsburg apphed the "significant nexus" standard in determining whether the receiving waters were "waters of the United States." In contrast, here, there is no dispute that the Pacific Ocean (the receiving water in this case), as a "territorial sea," is a "navigable water" under the CWA. This Court p7caoroAenlllntnuheotcoattunitoghtsnhe.ttaoIhkntilesaylttsmrooaeecisasetnrna-sdobotylifensdhesecttumehsdaosytanrsasyitmrdtaioprtieltnircfgaticehadeydtdthhirreoeelcaoetnxghaaicylcyadtlsrpicosaol,tonhsgnwuieccacahytlisotthnuadetxietihsstes. 27 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00034 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 35 of 45 should clarify that the "significant nexus" standard has no relevance here. In Hawaii II, the district court correctly held the County discharged pollutants from wells 1 and 2 to the ocean through groundwater. But the court's opinion did not go into great detail about the movement through groundwater because the County "expressly conceded] that pollutants introduced by the County into wells 1 and 2 were making their way to the ocean" and "acknowledge[d] that there is a hydrogeologic connection between wells 1 and 2 and the ocean." Hawaii II, 2015 WL 328227, at *2. There was additional evidence that a direct hydrological connection existed between wells 1 and 2 and the Pacific Ocean. First, the tracer-dye study models indicated that in some circumstances treated effluent from well 2 would move along flowpaths that were similar to those traveled by the dye injected into wells 3 and 4 and would emerge at the same submarine springs. SER 237, 240, 243. Because wells 3 and 4 are located between the springs and well 2, the flowpath for these discharges would be affected by the amount of effluent injected into each well. SER 237. When most of the effluent was Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 28 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00035 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 36 of 45 injected into wells 3 and 4, the effluent from well 2 would travel northwesterly from the wells and not toward the springs; however, when well 2 received all of the effluent, the study indicated that the discharges would emerge at the springs. SER 240, 243. There was no dispute that given the proximity of wells 1 and 2, the modeling for well 2 predicts the pathways for discharges from well 1. ER 443, SER 189. Second, Plaintiffs'expert stated that the effluent discharged from wells 1 and 2 "will be conveyed . . . relatively quickly (i.e., with first arrival at the ocean in a matter of months)" and concluded that "[s]ince the aquifer material and hydraulic gradient in the area of all four . . . wells are similar, the groundwater flow will also be similar." SER 183. Although the County's expert argued that the point of entry for pollutants into the ocean from wells 1 and 2 could not be identified, the County did not dispute that the study showed effluent emerging at the same springs where the effluent from wells 3 and 4 emerged. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. ofMaui, No. 12-198, ECF No. 136, at 16. Any fears about the imphcations of point-source discharges to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct hydrological connection being subject to NPDES-permit requirements Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 29 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00036 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 37 of 45 are unwarranted. Op. Br. at 43-44. EPA and states have been issuing permits for this type of discharge from a number of industries, including chemical plants, concentrated animal feeding operations, mines, and oil and gas waste-treatment facilities. See, e.g., NPDES Permit No. NM0022306, available at https://www.env.nm.gov/swqb/Permits/; NPDES Permit No. WA0023434, available at https://yosemite.epa.gov/rlO/water.nsf/NPDES+Permits/CurrentOR&W A821. Further, only those discharges that move through groundwater with a direct hydrological connection to surface waters are affected. That not all discharges through groundwater are subject to NPDESpermit requirements is shown by cases where the hydrological connections were too attenuated. In McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Weinberger, the court agreed with the plaintiff that discharges through groundwater may be subject to the CWA and allowed the parties to submit evidence on the issue. 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 1988). Based on evidence indicating that it would take "literally dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of years for any pollutants in the groundwater to reach surface waters," the court found that there Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 30 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00037 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 38 of 45 were no regulated discharges. MESS v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431, 437 (E.D. Cal. 1989). And even after allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to provide more testimony at trial, the court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to meet its burden. M ESS v. Cheney, No. 86-475, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,877 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1990), vacated on other grounds, 47 F.3d 325, 331 (9th Cir. 1995). Likewise, in Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Larson, evidence indicated that the connection to surface waters was too attenuated. 641 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Idaho 2009), aff'd 628 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2010). In that case, federal agencies determined that a CWA Section 401 certification was not required for a mining operation. Under Section 401, "[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State . . . that any such discharge will comply with the applicable provisions." 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1). The agencies based their determination on evidence that before reaching surface waters, the pollutants would pass through hundreds of feet of overburden and bedrock, and then travel underground through soil and rock for one to Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 31 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00038 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 39 of 45 four miles. Greater Yellowstone, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. Modeling predicted that the movement ofpeak concentrations would take between 60 and 420 years. Id. The court weighed competing evidence from the plaintiff and ultimately deferred to the agencies' determination that the hydrological connection was too attenuated. Id. at 1141. Unlike M ESS and Greater Yellowstone, in which the connection was too attenuated, the discharges here resulted from a direct hydrological connection, and thus require a permit. III. TFahierDNiosttricicetfoCrouPrutrCpoosrerseoctflCyivHilelPdeTnhaalttitehs.e County Had In the Argument section of its brief, the County maintains that this Court should direct the district court to set aside any civil penalties "imposed on the County regardless of the outcome of the challenge to the district court's liabihty rulings" because it lacked fair notice. Op. Br. at 47. As an initial matter, the County would seemingly be precluded from appealing the fair-notice issue as to civil penalties because it stipulated to their amount in the settlement agreement. To the extent that the County has reserved its right to appeal the issue, however, the County's argument lacks merit. 32 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00039 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 40 of 45 This Court has held that a party may not be deprived ofproperty through civil penalties without fair notice. See United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2008). To provide notice, "a statute or regulation must `give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly.'"Id. This Court looks first to the language of the statute when determining whether a party had fair notice. Id. As discussed above, Congress used broad language in the CWA in defining the discharge of pollutants, and that expansiveness provides a reasonable opportunity for a person to know what the statute prohibits. The breadth of that language is only bolstered by the intent ofthe CWA. Moreover, EPA has made multiple public statements in rulemaking preambles that consistently described its interpretation that discharges ofpollutants to jurisdictional surface waters through groundwater with a direct hydrological connection are subject to NPDES permitting under the CWA. Further, with respect to specific communications with the County, EPA sent two letters to the County in early 2010. In January 2010, EPA stated that it was "investigating the Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 33 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00040 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 41 of 45 possible discharge ofpollutants to the coastal waters of the Pacific Ocean along the Kaanapali coast of Maui." SER 5. This investigation was spurred in part by a 2007 study concluding that much ofthe nitrogen in Kaanapali coastal waters came from the County's facility and a 2009 study that found the same nitrogen signature and other "wastewater presence"in the ocean. Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984. The letter continued: "In order to assess the impact ofthe [facihty's] effluent on the coastal waters and determine comphance with the Act, EPA is requiring the County to sample the injected effluent, sample the coastal seeps, conduct an introduced tracer study, and submit reports on findings to EPA." SER 5. EPA required this samphng, monitoring, and reporting pursuant to CWA Section 308, under which "the [EPA] Administrator shall require the owner or operator of any point source" to provide the information. 33 U.S.C. 1318(a)(A). The letter provided notice that there was evidence suggesting a hydrological connection. In March 2010, EPA responded to the County's request for a UIC permit renewal under the SDWA "by informing the County that recent studies `strongly suggest that effluent from the facility's injection wells is discharging into the near shore coastal zone of the Pacific Ocean." Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 34 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00041 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 42 of 45 Hawaii I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984 (quoting ER 122). As a result, ERA required the County to apply for a CWA Section 401 water-quality certification for its injection facilities as a prerequisite to EPA's issuance of a new UIC permit. ER 121-22; see 33 U.S.C. 1341(a). The County's assertion that this letter did not put it on notice ofpotential CWA liability because the certification was related to its UIC permit rather than any obligations under the NPDES program is unavaihng. Op. Br. at 56-57. A UIC permit does not preclude the need for a NPDES permit where required, and the March 2010 communication reiterated EPA's position that the discharges might be covered by the CWA, depending on the results of the ordered samphng, monitoring, and reporting. The County was on fair notice. In any event, fair notice is only one of many factors informing a civil-penalty amount, see 33 U.S.C. 1319(d), and thus the County's argument that the penalty should be set aside for lack of fair notice alone is flawed. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 35 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00042 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 43 of 45 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, OF COUNSEL: UWKOAf.PSafirRs.coheYEtienNoncgfvtWtiGiooronenEn,nNAemDDrg.aeCeElnn.LtCcaOyol uWnSseKlI AJOsHsisNtaCn.t CARttUorDnEeyNGeneral AAWFREPf(/2r.sR.nAetO0at/dJvE2oRs.Ue'F)rhtDOBrnSir3i&EneNoce0TygkxdR5NIst.Pe-INto7,r0.uCan4iU6rAtc1K,Snu4k.5VMeDSr1HHar.IC@ILl..DTARTuTHe2eUspu0ds'r0Rtoon4uoNje4.rfgrEcJoeRuvsstDicive. M90a-1y23-11,46270216 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 36 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00043 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 44 of 45 REQWUIITRHETMCYEEPNRET-TVSI,OFAILCNUADMTTEEYLOPIFEM-CSITTOAYMTLPIEOLINRA,ENTQCYUEPIERFEAMCEENTS This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) (for amicus briefs as provided by Fed. R. App. P. 29(d)) because it contains 6,904 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 14-point Century Schoolbook. UWFEPf(I2rs.Rn.eO0Sa/dvE2s..e'F)htDDBrir3i&nEocee0gxkdRp5Nt.ea-oIt7r0uCarn4i6trtc1K,mnu4k5Der1eHHarCn@l..tRTuTo2eUsuf0dsrJ0Roonu4uNjes4.rgrtEcioceRves Div. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 37 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00044 case: 15-17447, 05/31/2016, ID: 9997388, DktEntry: 40, Page 45 of 45 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on May 31, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit using the appellate CM/ECF system, which will serve the brief on the other participants in this case. UWFEPf(/r2.sRne.O0S/avdFE2s..e')htDrDBrei3i&nEodce0gxRkpe5Ntr.a-oI7t0iCarun4c6tt1rK,kmu4n5Dr1HeeHaCnr.l.@tTRTo2uueUf0srsdJ0Rnouo4euNsj4rr.tgEcioceRvse Div. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA 38 Tier 2 ED 002061 00106876-00045