Document 5bp288aj08bY8nr9xgxOz1JZN

APR 2 5 1980 CONFIDENTIAL: Subject to Protective Order Of 14th Judicial Dist^^<OT)USTKlEt> No. 91*1145 EXHIBIT H-3 RES 608.1 Confidential The Reliability Study of the VCM Low Pressure Storage System March 27, 1980 D. C. Huffman and D. V. Mumm Distribution J. S. MurchX C. R. West/G. B. Edwards R. E. Sanders - Lake Charles Key Worth Reliability Study Vinyl Chloride Low Pressure Storage Water Shipments SL 012265 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION DISCUSSION RESULTS LEVEL m STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSIONS APPENDIX PAGE NO. 1 2 3 7 11 14 A1 to A17, plus Ala, A2flj Alla, A12a CONFIDENTIAL: Subject to Protective Order of 14th Judicial District Court No. 91-1145 SL 012266 ABSTRACT Level II and Level III Reliability Studies were done for the future Lake Charles Dock Area VCM Low Pressure Storage Unit. The Level II Study was an overview of the P&I diagrams for process and utility piping, and resulted in three sets of marked P&I diagrams: 1. PAID changes to be made. These were for omissions and mistakes on the drawings. There were 62 of these items corrected. 2. Process changes. These were for changes recommended in order to accomplish the various process steps. There were approximately 25 of these changes. 3. Reliability suggestions. These were possible changes which could result in a safer unit. There were approximately 15 of these. All but three of these suggestions were implemented. It was later found that the items not implemented had little effect on the overall hazard rates. Due to the stage of detailed engineering at which this project was, the P&ID and process changes were presented at a meeting on 10-19-79. The Level III study consisted largely of the generation of fault trees for hazards, with accompanying hazard calculations. The fault trees were based on the implemented Level n study items mentioned above. Additional fault trees were developed to show the implementation of Level m study recommendations. A gas dispersion model was not run, since the adjudged main hazard is release of highly flammable gas, and also since the acute toxicity of VCM is not nearly as severe as, say, chlorine or phosgene (the gas dispersion calculations are based on various toxicity hazard classes). Release of VCM vapor from T-l/T-2 relief valves can be expected once every 3.4 years, and release of VCM vapor or liquid from other sources at the unit can be expected once every 14.1 years. The resultant then is that VCM release from the unit regardless of source and regardless of amount (except for very small amounts) can be expected once every 2.7 years. A VCM fire or explosion may be expected once every 68.6 years. Implementation of the Level in recommendations will decrease the vapor releases to once every 8.0 years and fires and explosions to once every 201 years. General recommendations are given for design, construction and operation. Then, specific recommendations based on the Level n study of the P&ID's are given. Finally, Level HI study recommendations are given, which could increase the duration between T-l/T-2 relief valve releases and reduce the incidence of fires and explosions. SL 012267 of -i- INTRODUCTION fii the PPG Industries Chemicals Group, every capital project request is to include a Level I and Level D reliability study, or an explanation should be made why a reliability study is not considered necessary. Funds are to be included for the Level 01 through V studies. For this particular project, time constraints were such that it was not possible to do a Level n study prior to project authorization. That is the reason why Level n and Level III studies were done in subsequent fashion, one following directly after the other. The studies were done during the latter phases of detailed engineering work. Reliability studies are especially important for VCM due to its high flammability and severe environmental restrictions, and that is the overriding purpose of these studies and this report. Subj^c<-C<JfJFlJ'ENTlAr'' 1' 14th '.Jinu,O;-'c.U-ij nir r'ir>e: SL 012268 -2- C O N F ID E N T IA L DISCUSSION The number one top event for this unit was judged to be a VCM vapor fire or explosion. Ranked below it are other top events, such as: storage tanks at pressure below atmospheric; VCM vapor release; storage tanks' relief valves operating; flow of combustibles to incinerator area when incinerators are down, back flow from incinerator line, and liquid into vapor lines. Listed below are given events and under each event is shown the contributors to that event. These contributors, in turn, are events themselves, and they have their own contributors. This subdivision listing will portray how the fault trees were generated at and near the top events for this unit. Items marked * will not be further subdivided. VCM Vapor Explosion, caused by: A. System with VCM and air mixture in the explosive range, internal in the system (such as in the main storage tanks), and B. An ignition source; or C. System with VCM and air mixture in the explosive range, external to the system, and D. An ignition source. (Subdividing the Above) A. Internal Explosive Mixture, caused by: 1. Improperly purged equipment or piping, or 2. Improper degassing or regassing of main storage tanks, or 3. Air admitted into VCM operating equipment or piping. B. Internal Ignition Source, possibly by: 1. Static electricity*, or 2. Lightning*, or 3. Hot metal*. C. External Explosive Mixture, caused by VCM vapor release, from: 1. Operating events, or ^2. Equipment or piping damage due to external forces. D. External Ignition Source, possibly by: "1. Hot metal*, or 2. Matches or cigarettes*, or 3. Weld sparks or oxy-aeetylene burning torch*, or 4. Electrical spark from unit equipment*, or ^5. Lightning*, or 6. Static electricity*,or 7. Passing trucks, automobiles*, or '8. Miscellaneous sources*. o w h- C cr -(T UJ 3* O n <U rr c ZO aH- rCr *n VO Qj rr (--1 i--> O I rr MH CH- fOl> to i-r W rr r- H!--!f<l) * O rr O no fal>. Cn >1 rr SL 012269 -3- (Subdividing Some of the Above) A. l. Improperly Purged Items, caused by: a. Improper nitrogen purging*, or ' b. Air mistakenly connected for purging, instead of nitrogen*. A. 2. Improper Storage Tanks Degassing or Regassing, caused by: a. Improper degassing operation leaves VCM-air mixture in tank*, or b. Improper regassing operation leaves VCM-air mixture in tank*. A. 3. Air Admitted into Equipment or Piping, caused by: a. A leak to admit air, and b. Internal pressure below atmospheric. C. 1. Explosive Mixture from Operating Events, caused by: a. Release from main storage tanks relief valves, or b. Partial rupture of main storage tank from overpressure*, or ^c. Equipment or piping damage from thermal expansion of liquid VCM*, or ^d. Leak source, such as: open valve, loose pipe joint, faulty equipment*, or ' e. Broken dock hose*, or f. Storage tank contents siphon out through broken mixing eductor line*. C. 2. Explosive Mixture from Externally-Caused Damage, caused by* a- Severe weather*, or b. Sabotage*, or c. Shifting of main storage tank base*, or d. Strain on bottom tank nozzles*. (Subdividing Some of the Above) A. 3. a. Leak to Admit Air, caused by: 1) Partial collapse of main storage tank from vacuum*, or N 2) Other leak source, such as: open purge connections, loose pipe joints, faulty equipment*. A. 3. b. Internal Pressure Below Atmospheric, caused by: 1) Main loading pump pumping to barge*, or 2) 300 CFM compressure running while its suction is lined up to main storage tanks*, or 3) VCM condensers condensing at low temperatures*. SL 012270 -4- ourfc 0 T" C-v , C H- X vr % K- tr (V- I**-- r* O n y * CONFIDENTIAL: C. 1. a. Release from Main Storage Tanks Relief Valves, caused by: 1) High VCM operational pr ssure, or 2) High nitrogen pressure*, or 3) High source of energy (such as an external fire) rapidly boils off VCM*. (Subdividing One of the Above) C. 1. a. 1) (Subdividing One of the Above) C. 1. a. 1) High VCM Operational Pressure, caused by: a) Normal source of high pressure VCM, and b) Inadequacy of 300 CFM compressor to hold (town pressure*, or Vapor rate from ship, higher than pressure control system can handle*, or d) Incorrect valving* a) Normal Source of High Pressure VCM, caused by: I. No refrigeration for VCM condensers*, or n. Vaporizer on*, or m. Heat exchange area in VCM condensers reduced by nitrogen bUnding*. IV. High temperature VCM to main building storage tanks* o p- c JS. vT rr i--irr a> o U rr C z Dj rr 0^-0 0 p- P3 VO 01 r( PHC t rr pP-> SH*OCi J* U) rr Ui ft p- K< H- (D n rr O n n o* O (0- C ri p( rr Also, if a VCM-air mixture burns instead of exploding, this in itself is an event which can be considered to be ranked only slightly lower than an explosion. Further, the fire could be an ignition source for a subsequent vapor explosion. 'One other top event is the release of combustibles into the incinerator line while the incinerator is down. The analysis carries to the storage tank area boundary, and does not take into account safety shut-off valves, etc., at the incinerators area; this would entail a separate study. Failure Rates - The following rates were used, either suggested from ICl sources, or assumed based on experience. Item Failures/Year Temperature Transmitter Pressure Transmitter Controller Pressure Switch Alarm Control Valve Positioner Automatic Shutoff Valve Solenoid Valve Transducer (P/I or I/P) Common Mode 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.052 0.02 0.25 0.03 SL 012271 -5- Frequencies - The assumed frequencies for items such as ''operator fails", "ignition", "VCM not completely removed", etc., may be seen on the individual fault trees. Information Utilized - Main information came from the four unit P&ID's: 27A-10003 27A-10004 27A-10005 27A-10007 Other information came from sources such as: The Process Flow Diagram Instrument Loop Sketches Ladder Diagrams (Partial) Equipment Specifications Utility P&lD's Penjerdel Refrigeration P&ID's Other Penjerdel Drawings Vaporizer Controls Diagrams ICI Failure Rate Data ASME Pressure Code Section VRI Division 2 Appendix R (concerning stop valves in pressure relief lines) PPG Interoffice Letter of 11-22-77 from G. B. Edwards to K. W,, Richardson (concerning Puerto Rico VCM Storage Area Reliability Study) PPG Interoffice Letter of 8-1-79 from L. W. Carter to JJ5. Murch (concerning signals to be sent to VCM R Control Room) Various Conversations with Specialists Assumptions - The major assumption made in regard to fault tree construction is that instruments and loops (except for analyzers) wUl be proof tested once a year. SL 012272 Of 'S'? -7 i , i O t r -6- results The following tabulation lists the calculated frequency of major hazards (or events) with system as designed: Item Rate, Once Per x Years 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) I 13) i134) yv 15) s* K>) VCM Vapor Explosions orFires Major VCM Vapor Release VCM Vapor Release VCM Vapor Release from T-l/T-2 Safety Valves High Pressure Due to Nitrogen High VCM Pressure in T-l/T-2 High Temperature VCM to T-l/T-2 Normal Source of High Pressure VCM Flow of Combustibles to Incinerator Area after Incinerator Shutdown Oxygen in T-l/T-2 Vapor Space (possible catalyst for polymerization) Backflow from Incinerator Line Liquid to C-4/C-5 Liquid to C-6 68.8 2.8 2.7 3.4 476 3.5 45.7 0.018 (see page All) 32.5 37.8 9.2 20.9 5017 (jj SL 012273 7- `fS c The Reliability Team has used conservative figures through most of the calculations. Thus it may be quite safely assumed that the hazard rates represented above are the most often that they may occur, and most probably they will occur much less frequently; say 1-1/2, 2, 3 or more times less frequently. But in order to come up with one rate for each hazard, and owing to the uncertain nature of reliability calculations due to published failure rates and assumed frequencies, a conservative approach was used. The following general recommendations are offered, which should help to stretch out the hazard rates and justify the statements of the above paragraph: A. Design 1. 2. 3. ''4 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. ^ 9. Specification of high quality equipment, especially instruments, and secondarily, electrical components. Careful attention made on area electrical classification and its implementation. Special care to see that T-l/T-2 nozzles will not break due to thermal or other stresses. This is especially true of the 14" pump suction lines. Design of piping anchors at the dock so that if a ship's motion straightens the hoses, the hoses will break instead of the pipeline breaking beyond a safety shutoff valve and allowing a very large quantity of VCM to be released. Careful design of purge points for equipment and piping, to insure that purging can be done quickly and completely. Careful analysis of the procedures used for degassing and regassing the storage tanks, in order to determine if all the proper connections are allowed for, if they are in the proper locations, and if they are the proper size. Design of instruments (valving, location, isolation, etc.) and loops and electrical diagrams such that proof testing can be carried out periodically, safely, and with a minimum of spurious trips and alarms. Issuing clear, unambiguous design documents. Elimination of static electricity hazards by good design (groumfing, etc.). B. Construction 1. Selection of a competent and experienced general contractor. 2. If a schedule must be met, and it is felt that a proposed shortcut or solution will jeopardize a reliability feature, then deal with it by authorizing required overtime or paying a premium for quick delivery, rather than creating a situation that risks the entire unit. 3. Close monitoring of field work to see that work is done according to design. 4. Calling quick attention to design or work that seems to create a possible hazard, in order that it might be evaluated and acted upon if necessary. SL 012274 -8- c. Operation 1. Issuance of a complete and understandable operating manual. 2. Careful training of operators. 3. Avoidance of the stigma that operation and monitoring of this unit is a second-class or helper's job, thus leading toward carelessness and bad habits. 4. Operators should know what to do if an emergency arises during any of the various operations at the unit (degassing, cooling transfers in, pumping to barges, etc.). 5. Elimination of as many ignition sources as possible in the vicinity of the unit. This would be elimination of flames, smoking, matches, etc., and strict enforcement of burning and welding permits, also limits on vehicles in the area. 6. Adherence made to the proof testing periods for instruments and loops; testing to be done by high quality technicians; components after testing to be carefully reassembled and/or re-installed, if such is necessary- (this should be at a minimum). o t--rt 7. Regular testing of fire loops, monitors, sprays, etc. 0) tA-1 jO*. The following specific recommendations have been made for the P&ID's. These rfff'J(0- were a result of the Level B study and no figures were generated for them; rather. Ci Cl rr most Level II reliability studies made of the same P&ID's by other teams would 92j have come up with similar suggestions. The changes resulting from thoseo w- recommendations are included in the hazard rates in the results tabulation, Th n H* items not completed are not considered serious. VD ft 27A-10003 1. 2. 3. r- AW U1 -- r* A discharge high pressure switch for each of the vent compressors C- e\ * ft) 4 and C-5, located between the compressor and the discharge shutoff Ci valve - (Done). rr :d a. An alarm signaling high temeprature at E-2 outlet and sounding in the CD i-l local control room - (Done). rr Discharge check valves for P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4 should be a quality, reliable brand - (Done). 27A-10004 1. For the dip-pipe in T-3, from 1" line 1604: size the vapor relief holes at the top of the dip-pipe according to how much vapor might be generated when VCM moves from T-7 to T-3 through level control valve LV-6215 - (Done). 2. F-l filter cartridges to be compatible with VCM - (Done). 3. From the LT6215 signal at T-7: SL 012275 a. Add a local level indicator (from level transmitter). b. Add a local high-low 1 vel switch and local alarm (level switch and alarm in control room). -9- 27A-10005 1. The 6" line 1551 which feeds material from E-2 to tanks T-l and T-2: A check valve in this line would prevent possible siphoning of tank contents through an eductor if the line had a break or open valve down near ground level (no check valve). 27A-10007 1. Adequate thermal expansion to be allowed for in all three major lines: 8" - 1575; 10" - 1546; 4" - 1569. (Done) .2 On the 8" vapor line, locate a high pressure switch between shutoff valve XV6815 and the vapor hose, to sound a local alarm (pressure indicator). 3. Rigidly anchor ends of lines at hose connections. (Done) 4. The 3/8" nitrogen fail-safe hose must be lengthened or shortened by the same length as the 10" VCM hose, or it will not work. (Operating procedure) 5. Low pressure switch PSL 6490 on 10n VCM line must have a proper setting to satisfy a valid low pressure condition arising from either low or high pressure loadings. (Done) 27A-10008 (Utility Diagram) Low pressure switch and control room alarm for instrument air. (No switch or alarm) Low pressure switch and control room alarm for nitrogen. (Pressure indicator only) 27A-10009 (Utility Diagram) Check to see if a 6" firewater supply line and 6" ring header around T-l (or T-2) can furnish adequate water pressure for twelve 2-1/2" Elkhart nozzles, sufficient to cover the tank surface during a fire. (Done) r ^ SL 012276 10- LEVEL HI STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS A. Improving Reliability of C-4, C-5, and C-6 C-4/C-5 not pumping nitrogen from E-3/E-4 condensers contributes about 65% of the total hazard of VCM vapor release. Since the nnormaT trend toward high pressure in T-l/T-2 is quite slow (a 2 or 2.5 PSI increase may take from 1 or 2 days to over 2 or 3 weeks, depending on weather, tank levels, nitrogen content, etc.), almost any situation can be corrected before C-6 emergency compressor must be used to reduce tank pressure which has risen to above, say, 3 PSIG. Of the demands put on C-6 to reduce tank pressure, calculations indicate that most of the demands pass through, that is, C-6 does not get the job done. To reduce the demands on C-6, the following recommendations are made. 1. Operators frequently check that the valves from E-3 and/or E-4 through to the compressor discharges are lined up correctly, particularly after changing condensers. 2. Both compressors and their support systems (motors, belts, wiring, safeties, etc.) be maintained in top operating shape. 3. Test and check relief valves twice a year. r' 4. Test and check shutoff valve XV6806 twice a year as well as its solenoid valve XY6806. Possibly a position indicator and alarm on XV6806 would indicate if it had closed. The above recommendations could reduce demand on C-6 from C-4/C-5 not pumping to about 60% of normal calculated demand. Upon inspection of the P&ID's, it can be seen that in order for C-6 to perform correctly, the following obstacles must be overcome: 1. High pressure alarms' failures. 2. Operator fails to turn on C-6. o 3. C-6 not able to run due to possibly: a. Down for maintenance. b. E-8 cooler not running. c. Broken belts d. Motor failure e. Safety shutdown f. Power failure g. P-7 oil pump off h. Compressor mechanical failure. SL 012277 -11- rr < 4. C-6 running, but not pumping vapor to the incinerators, due to possibly: a. Incinerator is shut down. b. Shutoff valve XV6806 is closed. c. Control valve FV6005 is closed. d. Discharge valve on compressor is closed. e. Compressor relief valve is open. f. Flow is going through the recycle loop back to the suction tank T-5. 5. Suction valves on C-6 not lined up from T-l/T-2 through to C-6. To reduce the unavailability of C-6 to reduce tank pressure, the following recommendations are made: 1. AU applicable operators should be well instructed in all phases of this unit. The possibility of not turning on C-6 when it should be, would thus be lowered. 2. All mechanical aspects of C-6 should be kept in top shape. Safeties should be tested twice a year. 3. As in #4 above, test and check shutoff valve XV6806 twice a year as well as its solenoid valve XY68Q6. Possibly a position indicator and alarm on XV6806 would indicate if it had dosed. 4. Test and check control valve FV6005 twice a year as well as its solenoid valve FY60Q5A, transducer FY6005B, and the flow controller in the VCM control room. A remote indication of stem position would also be useful. Use bypass if valve failure is indicated. 5. The compressor relief valve to be checked twice a year. 6. The suction recycle control valve PV 6427 should be checked four times per year, as well as its associated control items, PT6426, PIC 6426B, PT6427, PIC6427, PY6327A, and PY6427B. The control valve fails open, so it is especially important to maintain these loops in top shape. The above recommendations would reduce the unavailability of C-6 to about 15% of its normal calculated value. Thus, all recommendations taken together for C-4, C-5 and C-6 could result in the contribution of this part of the high VCM pressure lowering the hazard of VCM release from T-l/T-2 safety valves to about 10% of its normal calculated value. o f 14 t i S'" Zh c ' H~ Jf : [ L'} (T - c n1 O <? > c. B. Reducing Backflows from Incinerator Line Backflow from the incinerator line into the low pressure storage tanks can result from any of several events. The EDC tank vent compressors at the dock storage area have somewhat increased the probability of backflow. Normal backflow would only contain nitrogen and mixed organic vapor. However, with other possible failures xygen, HC1, or water could als be present. These could cause polymerizati n, tank corrosion, contamination, r other serious results. SL 012278 It is recommended that an anti-backflow device be installed on the incinerator line. This would reduce the probability of backflows by approximately 85%. The device could be installed using an existing valve and flow measurement element. Reducing Liquid Flows into Vapor Lines Several possibilities exist if condensers, tanks, vent lines, etc. are incorrectly valved of getting liquid VCM into vapor lines. The most serious result of this would be to get liquid into one of the compressors - C-4, 05, or 06 - which could cause an explosion and vapor release. The frequency of getting liquid into 06 or into C-4/C-5 through the knockout drum is very low and no revisions are necessary. However, the frequency of getting liquid into 04/05 through the discharge side is very high, once per 22.1 years. If the discharge valve of the compressor in service has just a slight leak, liquid would get into the cylinder. Subsequent start-up would result in a probable explosion. To reduce the frequency of getting liquid into 04/05 through the discharge, the following recommendations are made: 1. Install liquid sensors in the vent line from T-7, the non-condensible lines from E-3 and E-4, and the incinerator line and connect these sensors to alarms. OR 2. Revise the discharge piping on C-4 and 05 such that the piping makes a loop higher than the first pipe 1 then ties into the top of the incineration line. Failure rate data on the liquid sensors is not available but it is estimated that the hazard rate will be reduced by at least a factor of 10 reducing the hazard frequency to once per 221 years. Revising the discharge piping would reduce the hazard to essentially zero. The liquid sensors are recommended as they provide adequate protection. SL 012279 -13- CONCLUSIONS The implementation of the Level ID study recommendations will result in the reduction of hazards as follows: Rate, Once Per X Years Before After 1- VCM Vapor Explosions or Fires 2. Major VCM Vapor Release 3. VCM Release for T-l/T-2 Safety Valves 4. Backflow from Incinerator Line 5. Liquid to C-4/C-5 68.8 2.8 3.4 9.2 20.9 201 8.5 10.3 54.0 209 S u b je c L lO f `i tl> b Vi '' U* V !*"i - Cl --* C r" SL 012280 -14- APPENDIX PAGE NO. A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 -A7 A8 A9 - A10 All A12 - A13 A14 A1S A16 A17 Ala ) A2a ) Alla) A12a) (Fault Trees) CONTENTS C-6 Compressor C-4/C-5 Compressors Removing Ng from Condensers Vaporizer Running; Deriming High Nitrogen Pressure High Temperature VCM to Storage Lack of Condensing for VCM Vapors Lack of Condensing for VCM Vapors Pressure Below Atmospheric Degassing and Regassing T-l/T-2 Purging and Repairs Summary Trees Summary Trees Incinerator Shutdown Incinerator Line Backflow Summary Incinerator Line Backflow T-7 Overfills Liquid to Compressors Illustration of Changes Resulting from following Recommendations from Level HI Study SL 012281 -15- xA.it Lo"'*'** ^ H, Ts-/ `3oa C-1- HOT RviriH Mt. D^VitJ v(t OVtftfthML fc'fc NT ftvJNNtNfc; PoWER FMU/Rt; 6ff.0ttfert BELTS; mTaR Failure; Sfrfrvi Shutdown; P-l OIL iff - C5nfftC-55cA mtCU6r*it*L FRAVLt>^Wrl; fust [circuit 6ftA*tR OUTAtft. tT6L fratWlfc RaTES-ISm/sR; Nh _'?322lA y C-f> Not PUATPlNt To INCINERATOR Mr i_ ja VR L____________________ __ - ~3 (j6t G*PAN* I______ ' m--dtj TREE 66L*w) ht**>Tt pPloiFmfIKt PRoft T-i/t-1. USE -* Pn > [b> 8*~*A D Sftffc DEi^rkd (stfe ReE> .09/0 /w iNClwtRRToR SW'JTtcvwjj fM'.ePifl .o3j Assort tr^,/4 LASTInC. 3 pmnuTes <'tf* ?^Vi ' .*** SL 012282 . OOOisS/'iK .0<?o?y/iK LD- ,Oo3SC?/MR SUUToff VAWtj 1 c^r- tO&mh*. closei> :* ______________1 - -- xs^ot, ru- T w E> Control valve C Los Eli PV CpOiT V Pa O = .072. N 1-------- FDTs: .03t 0 - 3V LoSS of InSTR. MR; W- ^ ,&6P5^7 e-'fi 50LEN016 V-V fMLuRt; Loss oF Imstr. AiR; LOSS of VoLTAEe T VALVE cotL ; fcftaKt* TllftlNfr ScLEWO'H \fALVfc fMLVRg; Lo|S of VOLTHC^T A Co1t.;Tf^^VCR fiWi*-E jussJWignal fR.ot'T control LER * LW $1CNRU fTRotn ConTMU-e^ .061*8 /hr ,0/7fC?./'iR C*SOURCE .o| VALVE CLOSEt> USE .* .ais/r C-t UUMfMLMLE To LoWtR PRESSURE IN SToRME TANKS ONCc/y.tNRS -------PACE All rc(iv;j. , ' 1 > t ^hi:. "U- Ir .oooill .0*77if/'IR ,oloffa PlEUEf VALVE oPtN .04 filOZOI .o'63//,A(r . onct/^ ^ECTCLfe Loo? fLOVj hM 6g tUETo*. LeSSOf \NSTR.RR;TR.AHSOU<-tR fAiLURfc;VMVfc PV C.MZT? Wutx 0<t*l;LoVj SELte-r fleiM fAnt LVi; Atfiort RfVtR't(j ON LW Scleo-t RelM; Sisnm fRofr Pic 4VT9; Uw sicnm nta^ 9\f in 1 # R JT A .oo^ZJhk PEi^rno (see ft save) L> .oa/yn, SL 012283 '.f7V SoLEftoic VfcW fA\L5 XMtfcot e~.*a [ n H= 6 (,-e^) H * 0/ llfO/sR X SUUTofV' YALve fwt-s XYt'goU Q s .l 3 ti h =e 3<?fofa 3Vy/ , ,033'?Wi/ir. ?, t#55,)(|^) ' .06*32$ f>c> /.a-89 t SubjeetCtoFpDEH'J!,I,.- Uh oMer Wo a2 ^strict rv 9i'll45 curt T-l/T-l PKESSLRf AT X*fStfr Ano RlS'Ht sA*. A4.Tz8^Ar _y-- N ... 1 Switch USE .oot i** mA*. SAFE ft55Vr>t o^ V\)To" or*Vi WHfcM ?MplrtO VCro, To fiARGES. T5>hV to (HR-GES/mr, M*"* Tc*ij/6aR.GE, lioo G1^ Lsftfcmt HMe gw 5 ,0)^3 Hit. M CoR-TVod vf 'ift. TUfcl VAfoRiZ*tt H W NftuW .00 stAn J--Th PRESS. TEamS*. fMtS L*W bn^mm !|J-Y E>.cniA* Either. one of two PR& SSVRg TRAtaSMi T1 tft j fMUuC U>W WILL LCltvf TUt. VfcfoRIZER Punnwtr. PRtSS. CohTR. fAlLS U>W pc M'lt.FCW'n :---------------- c .polsM .i M -------\ SAFE ____ , r &L.w i .*& foR TWO,**1 fOT *t._TO>; EITHER CtfE Of Two PRESSURE c;nTfoU.e5 fUlUttCr law WILL UlWfe YRfc V6pottZ(t (LUhHIHW T*f uw s *t fA TWO, --"L PtH * UT-10 : J PUMf P-^*aRP-t. HoT f'ur.PiNCr W*Rm> VCftN .E*/sR funf nqT Pv/mfiwC \ALVE2, CLoSEt; Wftowfc ?V^P ti*4E) UP; Rt'/etf.SE RoTATiatt; SNT Dow4 ecfadE DERwnhV COMPLETE*; film* THERMAL cuTeUT; etc. Total t .el'sAa, __________________________________ DERitmhC Nr rULS------------- tHE, ice Tubes 14 J AU OTHER CAUSES, .i>Ar Ohicc/te NRS For. DtRininO- akt lElHfr fcoRfc. WL AH OTHER CRUSES ?xfR.teRftrtoi4 left tfR/Ct VpjoRt n6LT;A*T tERiME9 UH& CroviEr; ItNEO UP *To VMRaWC Uh\T;V^ N>T WARM tnoU&H FioRfe Rfc 1HAN VSVJAL; VALVEJ NOT LINEA Uf CoRR*tTLW* ETC. Total *. .t*Aft. SL 012284 5>l^)R |VAPRIZtR e*>, STASS om 0M/t4 *H15 P4Ce AII 'ir t ChOr!NPFIrDoEtcNcTtiI.AVLG: <">Z I-Rh .Judicial Dtetri'. 'u, yi~ll-15 N-l SVWToff NUi-Vt OftiJ VJUtrt >T S)V>VliiT ftE ?v L411 fv /.1S /rg ywujfci oy- l^.GVLn,Toft pcv j |--1 \ .01*7Affc f-- ALftRm fft'VS P'TL'm PSULl^, U A Ll*> I .oot 5 y .0i> N ;WM_ e S .03 T' I H-eO-eT^ CU^ 5{^ fo/" 7"" i) T~\ A ^ s 2.V< y/*'r ofeRpwR | fpVS To ClsJt UftflB VftL*fc us--t--.-1----- * 1 * ,ol87/H)t (A it /Uteli 0=.O3 F>T o .d/>sr poft GlTUtR 5 UvJTafr VfcLVfc*. Pf fitVS L3V* 'e.\o P$LU. PuivJ Liw e.oj La^j of yoLTfc&g Los3 Ui) *r AIR $o-Cw*'B fluVi 0*02 (*N W7t,?"fW7*0 f-R'o./o A 0.0 ( /. 0 *A .Hi" *** OOH l.tS fan .1 *ONfc ft f>lL tS * *GVt(ktC!> ffcsit? TWftovCM P5HL ** cr>*i VOWT>6G L*3i to43tDeRs?>( fc>TWtR *nUW A*4 IWOWIWU. YMU f'A'tVT *** 6fcfJC<t*l Loii f ML CBHSlDtft.6#, SsKifc fuftflAV CMfiVT ps* ).*. U5J ,5Aft [?>peal /sr UlGU PR6550RE Cj\JG To UnRoGCri it^76 *IR* -^> PA*e A H %V /%., /, , - 0< - > v < V '-V. ` e> SL 012285 / SL 012286 1 IwTo AoVMT)0Sfe fOT *.oZ. -3 fl'-T? E-M--HyUrtGr. ca^i p,t rf'tftN*. of Twilec m FAILURE WWLE OTHER. u<r IW ConDcnSVE flvofcfe MSFmct VMS: K Stff'Vl-TAriEoyS AtLU(t.fe W'l'Lfc (bTU RtL* U COW OSH Slut, r*VoOfc. PA'LVfLfc of oWS IN CjWOMUln C- (t\o0< WL'lE Tuc OTWCR. IS l4 Sst^E eYS.(L Service. 3. Limrrv*J f^oOfc fA'UMU., Gveht OUT faft RaPaoR* Lo ><* WE _ /2.00 VHC-H PRESSURE WhOCmSihC. fo.o *>*twer .! : tHAATUrt.ttrtS t 2,0 e.33 ______ _2.o___ H.o .... 4.7 .._ _2.o . *to \>6V6Lsf lt-6 TW Mba/c: '* (. aw&>us fsiuvM. csf* r -- NUj V-CVtL Co NT(Loll eft, fAH-S -Level valve fwus^ne-L. PasrTiorfR>) -- SoLErSoi VALVE fASLS , gvenTVve f. tuHJCTi3H,t>Mjs 0.1- O.V o.oo/ /. /.o <5t. 0.1~ 0.1- C.OO# -- SEtsexsjL 14 HAUO fc>$lTui,SET fsmt at we.cntr Clal& ... -Slave itesf. TftAwsr. pails -- Si-kve ?Re5S. controller. pails o.4 e.io. I L* I- o t.o o.o1/ O.L o.l -- 9R.CJS. CONTROL 'fAVVE fAlLS (imcl. ?SITuWt|t.) O.* Lo *.1. w T --5?" r*1> Aa O.tW tAVJ A.. Loss f IlVSTR. BSe.oWvA t Lss of c**TRoV VolTA&E . .. < .oi/ve c. rusrrfc*. PM. TR*wsm. Fails___ yss Jl, piaec. p(U. cngioneE vails wsc CoTnjoyl rv*Ofc * JV-hr V IL.-7 Cf *tui - :Tq777 = *. t>w ^ rCL^I/isE - fNl Stll\>LTAN6*V3 Failure f, * 4^+i.) s 1 'it-T V ' (. 1 + 0 a .< *Vm. 3U SL 012287 (pREWWLe offtR not In .|1> A*. CeHSAcEftKVSlCinfcO Cortmoi4 PW>t>fc JVve PA6L A1 DAfiPtd. fails W 2*? IAS pS/'fd. oMe Fft*4 Fails (VTtU. ovi) C~z-X .sSs)f.ntAn FAN moTo ft fftu-VjR-t L*t-M. foWfefL oviTA&t GCAftfic* fwtwfcfc CoUfUMfc. fAVLVlftt fM 0Ar<\A&& Ut/w 1156 .S ____________ pTI P&ftTI<*> F HaR ift (lien S?666 .iirK/w* ________ *to Alt Temp. \ *** `irf'F jI J U *f we .37 1mA* WJt "L ult .oil .* At* fbF-T) 9i4 of M 6 Aft- (K D>W ' SPeen i V J pimtA* shu/sk -*S Air Tewf. ftfiovt J0*F B*Ttftr<\tME Tkt PofcttoN F TPt MEAft T\*AT Tttt toNDEMjeft, fcyriNlML Orl on& FAN, WILL 6fe &6LeVJ Tfc AlIL TtT*\?ftAVI/ftfc 5mew TUAT Com* EH SWA CAN S*T1U- Ifcltfe. pLACfc - on Uicu Sftc 3>o M-s/wa #oa -$.(11 -- M-ltoN *>f HEARTIiAT HCTKt^e t* AfcW* - i^CTxsti -if MtAlL rl UN Sf*t f.o - oj-fl * C.SlI -- <J(LT\oM <SF MEAd. THAI Aid TCr'f. IS Afcrtfc t*f * o,*4 U' Sf0 lww tff) .m * po ; .U (Lp SPiec) (6tUW t*f) .tXi * JU 'jflL .1^ NtT-T, WWfcT UAt LiUoP TktA* IS TUftT WITH ONE FAN OFF, TUfe TUt<L WILL AlSo fl6 o>'f. FfitLUfl-6 (LATt A5PVML ( fftt<>t>Aft (t-AST5 2 !) FA>U*ft6 A Lie TAKtS \ Ph^O To Ft* TsTal OOTftoC r f>ft Z fANS.TWIS IS 3.1/t/Hft (/3. Ill'll.) * C.'JJ'L teis/'rft. gut 4"i. & , . Epth fm> ovT fw SfEED Am*> Aid. TEw>PPOftTtoN Jp- Pace At SMSTern C-3 tx^n .fis/id /WO 5M5Tte\ G -11 Fails| 1 E-3 Amp -M JoIMAa -,VC|\ Ca>JDCM5L5 j1 Fail IflefRlGe (tftHT i CoN&ENSfcftS 1 fail ,33llAft L^icAa No CoNCetlSiML 4- OF TANK. VAPoRS_______ ow/e.tW *iM free AM SL 012288 P-1 OR, P-1 PUMflNlr To 6A-66 AT I Too GPM LoVJ LEVEL !M T-lfT-L .tfrj SAT ^3 of TH6 Tir*E \./VflAr ALARM FAILS tow fRESSURG 1)------ J of one PReSJWLfi *TRahsp\'Ttc^ (jI OHE FR.LS5UR* 5\NiTc ( s.3^ At<P WE ALARM (0.| ) .%d,.33 Tr I/me V t./MR 3 Af = . as &'0 wit H - U'*' % 6' -4 - .W11 - dPeRator Pails *To TAKE Correct A^hoas use .| x V. yr)Lii Two ALTVlATaR.S, EACH CONSISTS OF o**6 PRcSSWCE TRANSMITTER (^'.l),ANt> Of** fMSJUftfe CoNTRoLLE* ( -.t) r * .3 ") T - 1/ma. ynO. .0' - .14/ VAfURtT-CR. ff VLS To VioRU =E>aft -o20G/yr A* >.iBo?/yr punP SWiiT&oWN Fails n V ,o|0O* oo t8a/yr -) O1 ?UMf SUUTDoWn. ActWATisW .000009 -- o 1 V .ce va*/ ALARMS fail, s Lw Low fRESSUft G ft 1 18/A' can 6C 6T ANM one of fovR Car(SiNfcTio4S op PRESSURE TRANSMITTER (, *.() and pressure Switch(.o3). SHUTV9NN <sv o*ie (tU^6s.e^) TUio ALARMS. Gjusiss 3,5 foR PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS (, *.i) fwR ('(Leisure Switches ( ..cfi), tw* alarms ^*.Ol) USING MINIMUM OPERATojR f> LS To TAKE CoRf =CT ACTION | USE ,o\ 1--LH LJ .OOO tWjVVr .*>i N rys*ure 00000|OJ HITRoCCN * PRESSURICInCt V' . *eoTteif FAILS 1------ N 1 aps M-AR/HS FAIL. LoW Low Low PRESSURE .0116 OVERALL f t>T -s * .o (O04 P* ioi /yr operator fails To TAKE correct aotqij USE / M SL 012289 Gut-SETS! OVERALL ffcTs ,, *-1 4,-^J + j( '<*) + lHX.o5^d+.fi| = oovay <TJ O PRESSURE Below Atmospheric 7>jfs, ___y As cam ee SECH^miour TAKtft- |f4'f-0 AcavfST . Comm* f\rts;lte*6 I* S ** teAUHArtT InTHIS SHJTEfA .THAT IS V'ff* V LirrL/Z ctiA&ce Of having k Vacuum ** TAMES T~l Also, THE other^MS M wmc+i a tchoencv TowaRa Low PRt^ptE U e4Ail<>(.G.L CvMPiUSSvR. oh An a RLNhjfc^^-,3/g.^t9NC6NSlNE IT Low ammonia TcmPE(UTv<VE^ V* Up AT AlbooT TtRo. ToTAljtHE^ IS 2tRo. ADO SiJ Com MOW M9QE V56 HAT-AF also .VhR (CoustmT PRessmRitinC^. Consists of Two W^sswts Transmitters (e*.l)fw fRfeSSuRE switches r.o3),TW0 Nv (NLfcT VALVCJ .OIL). USimL- minimvm CuT-SfcTS*. ,. a overall rw.4l^ + - pent**' Alarms, consists of Tw- pressure transmitters( 5.tX Tw pfttssuAfe Switches^ *.o3), Two ALARMS ( .J ). USING fmwiMUM CUT-sets: ^ overall fDT i ^44 "6v c!76 S(,b*jct C0;!?Tnr": i ) ! ^pgMv ICI Ref. &^A, fftPR wo. A! section 4.1 ?ARALRa?h \ o^t/33.3 ^ll 0 SL 012290 * 3.t V<5L*/. 1*1 # fc-.r ,oottjAtA p* ' 1 r ffeAltH AA|vID AV.'tt.ER GVES ASfcCsft^') Re*t**& i------- ft55i/c^ - I /nit Tfsfttt 4 rit^s/Hn. H* M- & *0 z .otbZf I> S.fe -% TVECWAmCgS Of 6MCr IH'fVtRfeHCt ARE ^urtt Rer\oT6. 5M I it* 2.S& (u.tA.* 33 Vol \|CM m MR) =3> ,ol &/<& I PAMLTi HWt) ftWMVZER GWfeS rfii-seC'Sfcffc*') jx*" ReftWNfr C=1-W_JOr)OSVvR X oCEPAVsR TAKES GoRIAECTIVE r> E>.IoM/ha u .1 jaw*' /hr Action O11= O, In YAfwl SfA^t. MRH ACT AS CATM-VST poR. vcr*\ t* fort\ foLHrvER ymiEi. RvfTvAfc tSCJ, m Huts Awr> Cwt>63ER*,IM PRESSURE TOANiwrrTtRs ONCE/g-),! HRS PuRG'tJtr. USfc 2/hr that There arc `*WT 2* fitcts Of EijU\frvtT CR pipiN6 ^mvji cm afit moftt livelv f fKRGCO THArt OTHERS. " P5Sui^6 THAT TUli I^GHT TMCfc fUC6 Twice A neufi U^f SEftVi, etc) ihn Wy /vft PRofeR.LV Located GotJNfcCTiOtfi .17 ^.Ol _ "\ .o4/hr A55um* that RfeauT J Vt af flCCEj to *T Hfcvt PRefeRLV LeOfcVtfc CoHMecTiotJl HT fURGtt) PRoftRLV Tints M nI OCi I------- / V.oi WN/vr ---------' - .071*//VR --i_y rr . fifiKG oPfctJEb To THt MR ---------------------C . M ALnos'f a li Tint. SftV 1. (irtlUt fUTUfiC^ AlR nMSTAKtNLV CtMntcfi'' Te N'TRG*,t fuftt,* fofi fvRG'HC- Die UKZfcRt) .ool'/xR "F .o7S13/h(j, ----------;---------tt1--iMpX .ooiyVR LoWfcR t<fL. Limr ------------------- IT E>13! 5"fe. i)S6:| ovjt if tVeRv o Tints Ale lG>in l tsl SOU R CE. 5AV | out op 2i Tines .ooiX/vi .Q6)(7/hR Repairs dome W PLftCE H -Zff 1------- ^ --Jj Assume TWAT 3 ou-T of *1 fURGtt Pieces ARe RfcfMRES \*i fLte-6 . OTHERS TRVtEtl To SHf ^ IMHCRC THEV ARfe L1RELV To 6fc fufiTHER Dl5A5SP\6Ut Ofl fufLt> .QOOfagAlR STILL 14R5 EKfLoSlVt r'MiATuRe ---------------------- 1 5w 3 out *p (O Tints .o'! \.OC*c7S7hr ExPLoSUH tv "] UNIT AREA i-----ptp> otjee/u^'i spy Page Atx ,Oooi|7.5/vr M .*? 7\S*fe - -* / p~ E)fl poo ii>% SHaf iN\t:iil Sovfi.ce. Stv 1 otfr of H Times (buRM'^G (\VLW*Er, SnoRtWG.GTC./ SHOP E*f>lo$lo>J or^t/zi^lS HRS I r OHF IT}PViTtiM=> P f i. ve r i. ntd'2i-' .t- f'oUC ** ;i-F <1\ - i 'i *= r SL 012291 tttsc. BtfCRHftL foRcci. ^eathe^-Tank BASE 5Mll-'T;TAmc ^C2-z Lt ST^Aivt; 5Ae*/r*cf. Etc. PRESSURE fiitlov ATnojPHERlC (see Pace AS) JP?M J Mo. of TimES THAT There wili eE a f*-niu CoLUfSE Of T-l RT-T DUE To A VACUUM, fJsfoRf fc,4 OPERATOR CoRReCTS IttE CoNBrTloH USE I I hi loTtmcs ooVV PartiAL tam* * /" CoLLAfSt PACE ah imsc. PiPcjAMK ! cr wuifmcnT DAma& other Sources of Leaks. PuRCe Connections; Loose P>Pe 3*mTS; fAULTf egUipR\6t*T; ETC. .o3/S USt.O^R VACUUM llJODEHCE OOIV/WR DEGA55fN&, f r,,,, E*PloSlvE fAtK-ryipg .ooS3f/Nft US IH STaRAct TA*K j PACE 1 H R66AS5W, E.y.fLoiTV MKTURe ^OOOjOllAtR W STORAGE TAUK PACE A1 .oo77R/fC )6Htioh. SAT OUC.E EUERf V( i*GS 1 I .oi^as /h* TAte All "\ ,cooif3/ .ooe*OiT/tt 'If^ PACfc Al0 VCM VAf^A EKPLeS'ort AT UHT OACE/gg.8^*! All Snbjvct. CtOoNFPIxDoEtNX:ToI1AiLv: Of i 4 tti Jud i c j <; 1 D i rA W i i c fc yi-ii-ir, r SL 012293 ,v: Inonerrt.;r ' 16 A use 3sc/ha j I \/l<~ \i>- V .6 WON. 5K0Tt>oVJN iNTtRLoqc pails, oje 0 = .o3 N <3 6An c7i/sR foR high 9 - . 03 -fos- Co*ttnffS rfedz XN/tfcol Does MOT CLOSE 9.'73- K1 SoUroiS *! V* /vt __^i d 1 -oil h* d 'N ~ 36 /hr / XVt&=>4 Does mot close T,6HT- 6..0S T h ASSVP'E FunwHiC- poRTK=H of Mfftrt. Fod tfcittvti Total C-H oK C-S Cofifft. OUT of Ttt( HE* R IS fiUMHltlfi Vsi?."* . tlb'M ~~NycfVo8/yr .iliAe <h 4> CoP\fR. C-H/c-S- DOES NOT <MUT Cff. ASSUME FDT.oot> 7>? 7^07,^- .00i* J Nf -i \5AFE > .IXL/'iR _r Fv too;f Dots . M T CLOSE. : -U-S--E---F--D- T---,'N3l= | V* /i/t c * ^ 5 t /( * , * - Vrt -* . "3 ** ,ooV3f Ar .3t E> .MIC An E).ogstAie Fv to: Ccs t .CW NOT CLOSE j 'TMT..OS- | EDft>T*,oa^ L_ SAFE l> .oowAr r Pvt^ Does ! 'o3t NOT CLOSE R>T*.o3fc | Jn Yoooifc6lV/vr .00 lo'tf'fr y.OCor?7//r fWWib Dots (Joi CLOSE TIGHT d*-**' r-- ,035" N N SAFE ppT ~ .C3S' T*( .0073VHR --p"vo^^ <c3r~ 1 ^.QQOSbS/vR D> &ARGE LINED UP M Correct lv To non.^via valves) USE .f T O'0- jOclASh* 'OOOOii/Y' CoWPR. C-t | R0 4NW6 PoRTLrf of HEAR 1 1 CotAPR. C-t DOES NOT SHUT OFF USE .OOS <fc.popW/Ar .OO0TV/A I .HE T-T VENt,N FoRTlort oF tear * SAH 1 WK out of HEAR:i-.ol*U ooooc fi *f/y* J .ooow/Af 3(oooooOtjyr .ol>T Barge vaRdRs fbRTIci* CF i HEAR ! ) 6AR6t/fAov M 000 Tow j pa. &>.o3 /SR It> .000o7oy/'iR i^' ~ LoAC'Mt RATE Iboc 6?m F0RT10M *f HR* .IS .ooo7is/y<- P"------------- l^v^.ooooooa/HR CONFIDENTIAL: Subject to. Protective Order of 14t.h Judicial District Court No. 91-1145 SAFE u JP36S /HR fLoW of ComfeysTiELES To InoneRATor AREa AFTER INCINERATOR SHUTDOWN ONCE I 35. S' y#-j SL 012294 AH' SL 012295 '* v- 6 v;r Fd//j O/Gt) ,2 a?A" ?r- .} /t/r~ n<-- .X PY - ./ rr - .2.-5- pv " . o 5 . 6> 9/y fll P'Ul 0yyS#U Ofit* A i- c* 34/v > j~) 03VC/l/<|J .-toVv Y/djOj'" tiOt -t<-en M.* t f , 30? Vy* _____ ^ o3>63/ =D-- 3U V* / *<1 -P-.** f-z/t +<) O& <>/>< i4 . I a/ . 336 yftjr S^-fc i> ???//' FV-^t^g?) L^ O s>oo // .3 o*3/V* D ,30? 2/y, /. V-fc*/a? a*d C'6 ./ l..r ,5-cft {Au /oo90 .aaVyi .j-feVJ/yr G> C**dfjo -3/y t/dttfed 3>*^ecTl') U. J t . ( A/ S \fir & i P/ "f ^ (. ^ < * T W/fl y j -f. A** A* 3"5(A< ,o2Ho}ijt >3363/$" E> -{> Pa.f A IV Q/jCt ffO.b jfl corin^iU oi-^aTt tC? nir.tsj-ot SUD Jv HU^VC\''' \ , Dr VAO* tta n~i-w SL 012296 AAA .0 17 8/ far- v% mi. * i* An L i Cimd / .'* - J rttiarlfts* *' L ,yI' C ~vAT ffe>s?jf)/e */>/*->:f g.11 * CONFIDENTIAL? ^"ac'udlJcStD' ",Vf...?^er , Ho- H-nis Ut Cc,urt ------ - tu-vt/yr --J .O03/V --TTvii^l?j ...... \ ,6O07A/r Jj ja .OS' /V UtsC .0^' V T'*i One < .too?/'/'' > .ooa/?/y^ .^ea/y H = 6(l-t-&) .00^*77 TV | 00*63 .OiT co/32v fo Cecflf/ Use .05- UL 5<-fc \ .2/003A/*- J-- 'J -S' V A/ .ooa^/yr H 5 <9('-c'^0 j, .ooinyy/- 4 o '-T ~ f. i-y/r at'/'-j tyfilotitf \Apor Rtlt**t Oa<- fa/oy^ &>.00 20 A/ r .*12/y- ^> O**/l0 ( u,j SL 012298 ./3a3/v* /oT^t > p-j) C-t ny Mfr ivl C-L HOT RvHOWt. Dswtl fR otewaiwl; E-E **v Rw*1M***; paw ed ftR0*** BELTS; mafaR ffOLVAE; SAFETY SUUTtPW**; ?-T Stt FUn\? vff jt&mflUsSoR mtC-Utw.MIL (UUMCBtWiI; FUSE (CIRCUIT efUA&CR eVTAOC. ToTfcj. FPLURt CUTs.'ao/'mI/?\ for z ** r* C-t Mot pumptws To INCINERATOR 1N .019/ I------- / s> 1 I --------------- % \ J/-5^ =Ey^ t$6E c<fAJ06* TREE 66Lw) rClf--XL-*h*t PomfwC 1 .oest PRpmT-tfT-J. o27S USE -*oa ^ f(A*t o SAFE >1 orr. _Mi ,j*Gci COtx?-;F* 7n-- ..-.-,_- '. * 1 4 11! ,-fr -7 ; 7 . . .' Ho ,, S: i _ > r , .oaoVy/ C-l UNAVAILABLE TV IpMER ?*ESSUM |M SToRACfc TUMUS OM face All DEr'AHU (set Ae&) .^73/** . ooc'hSS/'m. A^umt *f tMimfc 3o rvuVUs SL 012299 L5S Of lST*. Wft- SoLEMotb VALVE Ft'LvRfc; LOSS of VoLTAAe To e*3* lA$t *0/ Loss OI? instr. AiA; soLEtioi* Valve failure; ct A FAiluAE ;Ltssop ICNfU F(LK\ ComTIoLLEA -f LW 5t6**L^FRom Cot^A*tLt(L /\SStOtlL t3v/>a^ ,{ W*,w f^R. /* fCCTCLfe Loo? FL>W BH tJfeTo: l.sso? U*STR.*iR;TfcAt*VLfc(t. fikiLuAt;VALVE PV till STVC4C oft4; LoM SELECT Rufe/ f(m,5 L,w. RtTiarf VCAitt> on Law Select RfcLAT; law S'tNAL fftom Pic tlTT; Law sicnal fRem f,|c *6 . 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