Document 4Q4jzL4g9ErKRX5QG0dYkVqpQ

390 Twenty-third Annual Safety Congress---National Safety Council There is one change tha- has been under consideration on several occasions: that is. the weighting*.! employee fatalities in our Railroad Employees* National Safety* (.'oiliest: and it is a subject tiiat I lx-lcw should be given serious consideration. I'ossihlv others liavc imtcd xliat in one or two eases small Class 1 railroads liave reported a single employee cisualty ior the year and--as recorded--that one casualty haiqx-ned to lie a fatality. Ollier small roads with two or three in* juries and no fatality naturally felt that their somcwltat larger total casualty rate represented, in reality, a lielter safety record. On the other Iiaml. we arc confronted with a situation which lias heen recognized by many; that the longer we can keep the rcsjcetivc contenders working hard for first honors, the more acci dents will lie prevented, and when a iatalitv occurs on tlic small road and is weighted by five <r ten tiiat road's cltattces of winning an award Itavc liccn elim inated. Furthermore, if fatalities were to lie penalized through weighting we would find instances where it would Ik* necessary to dtarge heavily for an accident earning no violation of rules as against an unweighted injury due to flagrant violation of safe practice. It must !>c rememlnrerl that a fatality, in many* eases, is such by virtue of a fraction of an inch or a fraction of a second, or hv a number of other uncontrollahle variables. After serious consideration of these pltases of the situation it was deemed inad visable to weight employee fatalities in our Railroad Employees' National Safety Contest, for it was generally c meetled tiiat the way to prevent fatalities is to elim inate accident cause's, anti that tw> much emphasis on fatal eases might tend to discount the real importance of reportable injuries and the need fiir investigating the causes *f minor injuries and even the near accident tiiat might reveal a serious hazard. This leads tip to another inqiortant principle. Years ago it yeas discovered tiiat the one-day lost-time ease was the "lowest denieninatitm** tiiat could, with ultimate safety, lc utilized in an employee safety contest. Report of Committee on Train Accidents By G- H. WARFEL Chairman of Committee, and Assistant to Executive Vice President, Union Pacific System, Omaha, Nebraska The sjieaker said hy part: A train accident is tme with or without casualties, arising in connection with the ojxTaiinn or movement of a train, locomotive or car. yvhieh results in damage to equipment or other railway projxTiy in excess of $150 (including Ci*st of clearing wreck and local expense of transferring lading, but not <lanuge to the lading). Tile outstanding features revealed by the 1935 statistics on train accidents arc: 1. A slight increase in freijnene.v of occurrence, jwrlicularfy derailments. 2. Several accidents with an unusually large number of jicrsons hurt, notably rear end collisions. 5. A greater number of casualties than in any year since 1930. resulting In a casually rate per million train milt's 5 per cent aliove 1930. instead of the 33 per cent reduction h|ed for. 5. Train accidents accotmted for 22 of the -18 passengers and travelers killed and 65 of the 468 employees killetl (on dmv) in accidents on Class I railroads. The year's total .* >.f23 tram accidents of all kinds occurring on the road and in the switching yards is the smallest numlier ever recorded in any year. It includes 1.219 collisions. .'J**! derailments. *178 locomotive breakdowns ami 635 miscellaneous accidents. There wtTe 153 persons killetl ami 1.253 injured, exclusive of trespassers. Itoth figures luring higher titan in tlx* preceding year. \YIk*ii these accidents are classified by causes, we find: 1.713 due t negligence 4if employees: 2.534 dtty' to defects fit or failures of equipment: 656 due to defects in or improjRT maintenance of wav and structures; 930 due to miscellaneous causes. The forms of negligence most disastrous from the standpoint of human casualties in 1933 yvere: first, tlisrcgartl of fixed signals: second, excessive speed in violation Safely Section. ARA--Steam Railroad Section. SSC 391 of restrictions: third, failure to properly protect by flagmen: fourth, overrunning meeting {mints with other trains: fifth, switches set in wrung jiosiiion. While the frequency rate of train accidents showed a small increase in I93J_ as cumjiarcd with tlie remarkably low figure oi the preceding year, the rate of * -22 accidents per million train miles run remains much Imver than for any year prior to 1932, and represents a reduction oi 63 |x*r cent under the base year of 1922. The frequency rates of collisions and derailments are slightly higher in 1932. while luce* motive and miscellaneous accidents attained a new low frequency of 1.43 per million train miles. However, when we look at tlie figures for human casualties in train accidents, we find there lias been a disturbing increase in both fatal and mm-tatal injuries, the total casualty rale for 1933 Ix'ing higher titan for any year since 1929. This increase in casualties was due almost entirely to tlie unusual munlicr of i>crsuns killed and injured in four or five accidents occurring ni different roads. There were 83 |K-TSons legitimately riding on trains killed in train accidents in 1933. including trainmen, persons carried under contract and passengers, as compared with 61 the preceding year. Moreover there were 1.099 trainmen, persons carried under contract and passengers, injured in train accidents in 1933. as compart'd with 779 m 1932. . , .. The 1.219 collisions, yvhieh involved 42 passenger trains, resultetl in 32 fatalities and 630 injuries exclusive of tres|iasscrs. Certainly, tlie imperative necessity for taking all |>ossihlc practical measures for the prevention of collisions must lx* obvious to every officer, supervisor and employee on American railroads, when it is realized tiiat more than 200 casualties resulted from a single accident of this diameter last year. The conclusions of tlx: I. C. C. Bureau of Safety investigators in each of the major rear-end collision cases reads almost tlie same: '`Failure of an eiigineman properly to nhey signal indications and stop at signals of a flagman." In litany other reports of similar accidents with a smaller toll of casualtjcs. the cinclusions reveal violations of rules by various employees as well as engincmeo. and in several eases referred specifically to failure of operating oflicers to properly enforce observance of rules. The press and public usually ascrflic such occurrences to "human falliliility." and place the onus of responsibility almost entirely on the shoulders and conscience oi the erring employee. Without any desire to minimize the employee resixaisibility. candor compels us to point out that there are occasional cases in wliieli the greater degree of responsibility properly rests iqxm the management and <q>eratmg officers of the railroad involved, for their failure to utilize methods which have liccn found highly effective for prevention of such accidents. We refer to tlx* inauguration of continual Ixma fide surprise tests, carefully arranged to assure the surprise feature, made by men who truthfully report every detail of the actual performance of all mcmlicrs of the crew, and followed hy severe ami unremitting discipline for failure or negligence in any detail of performance. These vigorous measures must, oi course. Ik preceded by a thorough campaign of education and examinations to assure that the oiwraling rules arc fttllv tmderstnod. not only hy tlx* rank ami file of em ployees. but by rlisjatcliers. trainmasters, rood foremen of engines. sn|xTilwleiits and supervisors in mechanical and maintenance of way departments. Preventing Collisions and Derailments Due to Negligence of Employees By C. H. LONGMAN Assistant to General Manager, Chicago and North Western Railway Company. Chicago The jqtcaker said in part: An analysts of the collisions and derailments on my own road shows that 88 per cent of the collisions and 25 jxr cent of tlx* di*railments can !>c traced to the failure of employees to observe the rules or sjiectal instructions. One of the most serious derailments which we have fiad was due to the failure of tlie cngincman to properly control the speed of his train on a four degree curve.