Document 4J2gwm6JzgpmX3B5eawvwnak1

SCF-FORD-3780 I Ford's Research Efforts in Assessing the Activities of its Subsidiary in Nazi Germany Simon Reich Commentary Ford's Research Efforts in Assessing the Activities of its Subsidiary in Nazi Germany By Simon Reich Professor of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs Department of Political Science University of Pittsburgh At the turn of the millennium,"globalization" is the new catchphrase for describing the central forces of the world's economy, polities, and social structure With globalization comes a new vocabulary, including terms such as "civil society" "nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)," "global contagion," and "protocols." The public became familiar with these terms through media reports of the street demonstrations that stretched from the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle in 1999 to the Group of Eight (G8) summit in Genoa in 2001 Powerful multilateral organizations have been created or emerged, including the United Nations (UN).International Monetary Fund (IMF),World Bank, and WTO Their membership is composed of governments. But also of growing importance are NGOs that often focus on issues of the redistribution of wealth and of social justice. Although not elected, many NGOs have established themselves as the credible representatives of public concerns Finally, the number and importance of multinational corporations has never been greater In addition, the decision-making processes that influence the agenda of world affairs, the key actors in that decision-making, the core values that dominate the process of decision-making, and the major issues for deliberation and action have ah been altered precipitously by the forces of globalization. The governments of the world, even those of the strongest countries, no longer hold a monopoly on power International conventions have replaced national treaties in importance Many global organizations have significantly expanded their efforts to deal with economic, social, medical, and environmental problems common to humanity Despite their proliferation and expanded mantle of responsibility, corporations have become the subject of more critical scrutiny than ever Major corporations have been accorded a new stature far beyond their traditional primary economic purpose m at least four areas As agents of progressive social and economic change in their role as employers, particularly in relation to Issues ofwages and working conditions As sources of monetary compensation for histone injustices or development projects. i Ford's Research Efforts in Assessing the Activities of its Subsidiary in Nazi Germany As catalysts of economic growth in the interdiction and other forms of transnational crime - underdeveloped world. such as money laundering and illegal immigration, As conduits for dealing with the environmental impact of trade, investment, and finance. with its relationship to poverty - and a heightened awareness of ethnic conflict and the need for preventative intervention There Is a growing The meeting of leaders drawn from the largest governments and major corporations of the world hosted annually by the World Economic Forum of Geneva, Switzerland, attests to a growing belief that even the most powerful governments cannot address these fundamental issues alone The private sector has appreciation among policy makers and analysts that the roots of many of these security problems are economic. The term "human security," which is applied by the UN to a host of problems concerning economic development and personal safety, reflects such recognition an unprecedented role to play in addressing dimensions of soda! and economic problems 1 What are the emerging core values accompanying the spread of globalization' A theme that runs through While national legislatures retain many of their traditional roles associated with taxation, security, and welfare, an increasing number of the crucial decisions affecting the health,safety, and prosperity of the world's citizens are dedded by international convention, by international organizations, and by dynamic market forces in which the world's corporations play a central role. Problematically, while governments remain accountable to their electorates, the forces that influence the welfare of dozens are increasingly beyond the control of those electorates. Multinational corporations are largely seen as partially filling that vacuum as a new source of power, given their capacity to transcend national boundaries Yet, unlike (at least) democratic governments, corporations are not elected and are considered sheltered from accountability to the general public This gap between power and accountability has generated widespread concerns among both governments and dtizens about whether corporations will accept their role as agents of democratic, peaceful, and prosperous change the agenda generated by international institutions such as the UN and many NGOs in responding to the forces of globalization is a focus on the benefits of democracy and of the need to ensure human rights be guaranteed for the aazenry by governments in all comers of the globe One aspect of this emphasis is a respect for the rights of those who either have suffered historic injustices or are suffering contemporary ones at the hands of governments and corporations alike These Injustices take many forms, and include the claims of indigenous peoples who have had their land confiscated in the age of imperialism, the demands for decent working condinons by laborers subject to sweatshop rules, and the claims ofvictims who suffered the denial of their economic, political, and human rights as forced and slave laborers during the Nazi period In many of these instances, groups seeking compensation for the denial of their nghts have sought public support for their claims and financial redress through the court system, often the Amencan court system for technical reasons Certainly, new and evolving issues abound, often intersecting and blurring the traditional distinctions between pohdcs and economics, or between military and social affairs. Examples ofthese Issues include drug 1 Ford In (his context is a prime example of such a corporation. Its response to suggestions that K may have played a compUcu role in a historic injustice regarding the use of forced and slave labor provides a very public forum for evaluating bow the company is viewed as a corporate ddzen For my purposes, the term "slaw labor* here is exclusively applied to the use of concentration camp victims `Forced labor" refers to conscripted civilians from occupied countries. It is dearly in this latter context of redressing inequities and injustices that the purpose and substance of Ford's report resides For although governments have often been the target for those petitioning for either financial compensation (such as the land claims of the indigenous peoples of Australia) or an apology by way of recognition of the past suffering (for example, in the case of African-Americans whose ancestors were enslaved), multinational corporations have moved to a central position in many disputes Indeed, the term "corporate social responsibility" has Qj 3 Simon Reich Commentary been coined in the last decade to reflect the Important opinion Finally, "integrity" is invoked as an appeal to role that multinational corporations play in these ethical conduct that extends beyond the immediate situations. self-interest of any company to a broader set of What does the term "corporate social responsibility" mean* It encapsulates the central role of multinational enlightened values, particularly In areas of environmental degradation and labor practices corporations in accepting responsibility for the Impact It is only in the context of this rather extended of their actions on society and the environment, as well Introduction that one can understand the significance as addressing problems across a variety of issues in of the report entitled Research Findings About Ford- which claimants call for redress. The latter role implies Werke Under the Nazi Regime Faced with a series of that corporations respond to demands such as crucial questions regarding the historical injustices compensation for South African workers who endured by forced and slave laborers in Nazi Germany, contracted asbestosis as a result of hazardous workplace the management of Ford Motor Company chose to conditions or for former forced and slave laborers put respond effectively and credibly to a senes of concerns to work in factories ui Nazi Germany. initially raised by a documentary aired by the British In essence, "corporate social responsibility" asserts that major corporations have more dimensions to their role than purely the economic one of satisfying stockholder demands. Through their behavior, they Broadcasting Corporation in February 1998 The questions raised by the BBC's documentary, and a rather more accusatory article that subsequently was published in the Washington Post, concerned may also choose to contribute to maintaining political the relationship between Ford's Amencan parent stability, providing public welfare services, and firm and the Nazi government in Germany addressing a series of social and developmental between 1933 and 194S, problems across the globe. In many of the worlds poorer countries, multinational corporations have a greater capacity to administer educational and medical services, feed and clothe populations, and ensure that the relationship between Ford's German subsidiary, Ford-Werke, and the Nazi government during the same penod, rights are respected than do the governments who at least nominally rule those countries. the issue ofwhether forced and slave laborers were used at the Ford-Werke plant in Cologne, and, if The notion and underlying code of ethics generally described as "corporate social responsibility" attempts to imbue corporadons with three core values so, whether Ford Motor Company officials In Dearborn cooperated in and were complicit in their use, and "transparency," "accountability," and "integrity" Collectively, they lie at the heart of what is more commonly described as "good governance " Why these three? Well, they axe values consistent with democratic whether Ford or its subsidiary benefited financially from the company's wartime activities In Nazi Germany government "Transparency" focuses on what My book The Fruits of Fascism. Postwar Pruspenty in corporadons do in terms of their employment and Historical Perspective (Cornell University Press. 1990) did, social practices, why they take the actions they do, and m part, attempt to address these very questions posed how these policies are implemented. Corporadons by the media. As a comparative study of the invoking the concept of "accountability" attempt to governments' treatment of domestic and foreign defuse accusauons that they stand outside the automobile producers in Great Britain and Germany, junsdicdon of national and international legislative the book sought to determine how and why the auto bodies Rather, "accountability" suggests that industries in these two countries, which looked so corporations are subject to more than the interests of similar in 1929, were so profoundly different in the their major shareholders, they are also subject to the postwar period What were these differences* By far rules of law and are answerable to the court of public the most important factor in this divergence was that v a -------- - o x vn um Ford's Research Efforts in Assessing the Activities of us Subsidiary in Nazi Germany while the two American producers - Ford and General subsidiary remained an isolated and marginalized Motors - dominated production in both countries in producer - despite Hitler's knowledge of Henry Ford's the prewar period, they shrank in importance in sponsorship of anti-Semitic publications, his personal Germany in the postwar period while remaining robust admiration for Ford himself, and his adaptation of the and dominant in Great Britain. mass production techniques in Germany that Ford had made famous Ford-Werke's linkages with the There were some important differences between the Dearborn headquarters became increasingly attenuated American firms in the two countries in the prewar dyrlnfctjje course of the decade of the 1930s - and period. Although Ford was the larger producer of the (nonexistenTfjy the outbreak of the war in the Pacific two in Great Britain, it was General Motors that played TEeaterm 1941 the much larger role in Germany, dwarfing Ford's producdon there. Indeed, Ford accounted for less than Of course, this analysis Is the work of one solitary 2 percent ofall American investment in Germany in the prewar period Yet collectively the subsidiaries of the two companies accounted for approximately half of all German production in the 1930s. They were not scholar seeking access to documents dispersed across at least two continents. It was as comprehensive a study as circumstances allowed, but its findings were certainly not definitive. In an attempt to answer the overtaken in volume by the German firms until after questions raised by the BBC, Washington Post, and others. 1945 Ford Motor Company in this report offers a response that is far more thorough I sought to account for this striking difference m the fate ofAmerican firms in Great Britain and Germany in Ford Motor Company officials reacted to this public the postwar period, and to consider the implications scrutiny by promising an exhaustive and for the postwar pattern of development in the two countries. I concluded that the difference was in how the firms had been treated by the two national governments in the 1930s and 1940s. While Ford and General Motors were assisted by a policy of national treatment in Great Britain that often, in effect, privileged them as producers, these same two firms suffered from consistent, explicit discrimination at the hands of the German government That pattern of uncompromising assessment regarding accusations about profiteering, collaboration, and the use of forced and slave labor, resisting the public clamor for immediate answers. They decided that the report (Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime) was to be purely descriptive in these claims, not interpretative or even a historical narrative, allowing interested readers to draw their own conclusions Ford appointed an investigative team of discrimination originated in Germany in 1933. 45 people, made up of historians and professional Furthermore, my own study found that Ford-Werke was consistently treated much worse than General Motors' Opel subsidiary. Ford-Werke's small size made it relatively unimportant in terms of Nazi strategic thinking and thus it was far more disposable I argue that Ford-Werke was persistently treated as an outsider bulbed, manipulated,and denied the material resources allocated to other firms. Indeed, government regulations threatened Ford-Werke's existence. Alarmed by its slumping sales in Germany, the Ford parent firm in Dearborn tried to improve the business prospects for Ford-Werke by placating the excessive demands of the Nazi government But the German archivists of the highest caliber This staff eventually compiled over 98,000 pages ofdocumentauon As part of that process, I was hired as a consultant to assist in locating materials, to read and comment on the research team's findings, and to ensure that the report was an accurate reflection of the materials collected Burt' My role has therefore been as an informed and critical outsider, rather than an intrinsic member of Fords yu effort Consistent with the principles of "corporate social responsibility," part of my role has been to ensure that Ford's efforts in addressing these questions were credible, demonstrating the virtues of accountability, transparency, and integrity in collecting and collating materials and describing what happened I believe that Simon Reich Commentary the outstanding effort of a dedicated staff of professionals has yielded a report that offers honest answers to the sensitive questions raised by the media. My conclusions regarding Ford's actions m during the Nazi period are dear and beyond reasoi dispute, based on the data collected and presented the report. They are as follows: in Dearborn had no knowledge of. and thus no control over, these activities The record revgak that communication between the Ameriealfparent and the German subsidia/pceasedjly November - 19+1, before the use of forced or slave labor gan There is no evidence that executives at Ford's other European subsidiaries acted as intermedianes between the U.S parent and its The management at Ford's German subsidiary German subsidiary at any time between 1941 and acted with growing autonomy from its American parent firm American executives were often illinformed about activities in Germany, as they were denied information by their German employees a practice that extended to greater areas of policy over time. Ford's American management did try to influence policy in Germany where possible, but with decreasing effect. Ford's German management focused its efforts on gaining the 1 ^-acceptance of the Nazi government in order to fog *_..cnnanue to do business in Germany, but y\ I'Amdered in this regard. Ford remained a , ^marginal producer^ terms of both volume and strategic significance to the German war effort. > Financial records^analyzed by PncewaterhouseCoopers suggest hide evidence that Ford-Werke made profits during the war. The analysis reveals that modest profit figures were recorded during the first few years of the war, but these were wiped out by enormous losses in the last two years. 'Indeed, the actions of the Nazi government, a postwar claims commission, and the Congress of the US government all provide evidence to support the view that there were significant damages inflicted upon Ford-Werke. Each of these bodies awarded modest compensation to Ford or Ford-Werke. representing a small fraction of Fork's LOUMt 4 Short ofdivestment by the American parent. Ford's claims, pGerman managers had litde choice but to try to No historical record can ever be adiudgedfas 7 address Nazi demands After 1933, government I definitive There is always the possibility that nlew I regulations and restrictions on production materials may be located and we will have to reconsider consistently reduced the company's capacity to act our assessment of Ford and Ford-Werke's role in the 1 autonomously. As commercial passenger vehicle events that took place in Germany between 1933 atnnd dj production was slowly eradicated, government 1945 contracts became the sole source of business. Without those contracts, predominantly for trucks Using the information available to me, I have studied inFord-Wexke'scase. Ford would have lost all of its the issues raised by the media reports of 1998, and German investment as the subsidiary withered due believe the following with regard to Ford's response to a lack of a market. Slave laborers were at For -Werke's Cologne The evidence provided by the data suggests that there was no complicity on the part of Ford's -Ml plant in 1944 and 194S The best available " * Dearborn management in assisting the Nazi evidence suggests that they totaled a maximum of$/^{^government's wartime effort 6Sjkver time. Prisoners of war and forced ireis, mostly from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but also a number from France and Italy, were also used But according to the copious data collected regarding communications between the parent and its subsidiary, the parent co: Ford Motor Company has done everything reasonably possible to address the concerns originally raised by the media The investigation that was the basis of the Ford-Werke report has taken 3S4 years to complete. It has been conducted (X 'fsr' A-* p 4^An fk Ford's Research Efforts in Assessing the Activities of its Subsidiary in Nazi Germany at great cost and effort, with the compilation of an exhaustive and comprehensive report. In an effort to provide complete "transparency"on the matter, Ford has decided to make available allJ documentation collected and compiled to the eneral public. All materials will be indexed and escribed m detail in a database for easy access. These actions, in my opinion, all reflect the extent and credibility ofFord's effort They are consistent with the core values of "corporate social responsibility" described previously " "transparency" in both the generation and reporting of Ford's wartime activities, "accountability" to those with legitimate concerns about the abuse of forced and slave laborers and possible profiteering, and "integrity" in the way that die company has addressed the issue by sparing no effort, including using external experts in their respective fields to ensure that a system of checks and balances remained in effect. No study is ever foolproof But 1 am as confident as I can be that Ford has performed with due diligence in locating and compiling materials, and accurately reflecting their content in the report,Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime. It is a credible example of a company accepting and implementing the code of "corporate social responsibility" regarding a most delicate issue. I invite you to read the report and draw your own conclusions Simon Reich Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania November 2001 'ft*d s Research Findings About Ford-Wefkc Under the Nazi Regime a Research Findings About Ford-Wtrkt Under the Nazi Regime Table of Contents Repent Summary.................................................................................................................................................... a... 1. Introduction/Project Background.................................................................................................................... J- 1.1. Report Content................................................... .............................. ... 1 1.2. Origins of Project................................................... . . .2 1 3. Project Scope............................................................................ . .... 3 2. Historical Background ofFord Motor Company and Ford-Wer be..................................................... S. 2.1. Establishment of Ford Motor Company...................................... ..................... 5 2 2. International Expansion........................................................ ... . .5 2.3. Establishment ofFord-Werke...................................... ...................................... 6 2.4. Ford-Werke Board and Management ... .......................................................... 6 2.5. Ford's Changing Relationship with Ford-Werke ... . .13 2.6. Ford's Response to the Threat ofWar.................................... ....................... 14 3. Nazi Economic Policies and Controls Over the Automotive Industry ................................................ 17 3.1. Nazi Regulation of Economy ... ........................................... ... .17 3.2. Nazi Controls Over the German Automotive Industry . . .................. 18 3.3. Status of Ford-Werke Plant................................................................................................ 19 4. German Industrial Mobilization and Preparations for War, 1936-1939............................................ 23 4.1. Four-YearPlan ..................................................................................................................... 23 4.2 Ford-Werke and German Military Mobilization .. . . . .. 24 5. Board-Werhe in die German Wartime Economy, 1939-1945 ........................................... ........................ 29 5 1. Outbreak ofVi^r .............................................................. ............................... 29 5 2 Robert Schmidt's Appointment as lAfehrwirtscbaftsfuhrer ....................................30 5.3. Government Oversight of Production............................................................................31 5.4. German Government Custodianship of Ford-Werke...................................... 32 m Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime 6. Military ftoducthm at FOrd-Wer fee..................................................................................................................... 35 6 1. Production Overview............................ .................................................................. 35 6 2. Start of Thick Producuon, 1939 .............................................. .. 36 6 3 1940 Production.................................................. . .. 36 6 4 1941 Production............................................................................. ............... 37 6.5. 1942 Production................................................ ................................. .38 6.6 1943 Production................................................ . .. 39 6.7. 1944 and Early 1945 Production . .... .... . .40 6 8. Relocation of Plant Equipment, 1944-1945 ........................................................... 40 6.9. Arendt Plant............................ .................................................................... 41 6.10. Repair Facilities................................. . . .........................................42 7. Foreign and Forced labor at Ford-Wer fee ....................................................................................................... 45 7.1 Overview of Foreign and Forced Labor in Germany..............................................45 7.2 Overview of Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke . . .. .. 48 7 3. Number of Foreign and Forced Workers at Ford-Werke ............ ... 51 7 4 Obtaining Foreign and Forced Workers ........................... .... 53 7.5. Compensation for Foreign and Forced Workers at Ford-Werke . ... .54 7.6. Conditions for Foreign and Forced Workers at Ford-Werke................................... 57 7.6.1. Working Hours and Tasks............................ .. .........................................57 7.6.2. Housing Conditions ............................................................................... 58 7 6 3. Supervision and Control of Foreign and Forced Workers............................ . .59 7 6.4. Living Conditions ........................................................................................ .62 7 6.5. Food......................................... 64 7.6 6. Medical Treatment......................................................................... . ... 65 7.7. Slave Labor from the Buchenwald Concentration Camp........................................... 67 7 8 Liberation at End of War........................................................................... ..71 iv Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime 8. Ford-Wex he's Relationship with Other Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe ....................................73 8.1. Ford of France................................... ................................. .. 73 8.2. Ford of Belgium...................................................................................... ............. 76 8 3. Ford of Holland.................... .. , . ..78 8.4. Other Ford Facilities............................................................................... 79 9. Impact ofthe Vftr on Communications........................................................ ......................................... ....85 9.1. US. Government Regulations Governing Communications .... .85 9.2 Direct Communications Between Ford and Ford-Werke, 1939-1941 . 85 9.3. Communications Between Ford and Ford of France. 1939-1941 . .87 9.4. Commumcauons with Ford Subsidiaries m Neutral Countries, 1939-1941 . .88 9 5. 9.6. Communications Between Ford and Ford of France, 1942-1944............................ 88 Ford-Werke Communications with Neutral Countries, 1942-1944 ............... 90 9.7 Ford Communications with Neutral Countries, 1942-1944 ......................... 90 9 8 Restoration of Communications with Europe . .. .... 91 10. End-of-War and Postwar Military Go vermnent Supervision.................................................................. 93 10.1. Initial Period of U.S Military Control, March-June 1945 ...................................... 93 10.2. British Military Government Control of Ford-Werke................................................94 10 3. Producnon During the Military Occupation ... ...............................95 10 4. Military Government Investiganons of the Plant.......................................................... 98 10 5. Denazification at Ford-Werke.............................................. ... 99 10.6. Decontrol ofFord-Werke................................................................................................ 101 10.7. Rehiring of Robert Schmidt.......................................................... ... .102 11. War Damage to Ford-Wer ke................................................................................................................................ 10S 11.1. Damage Between 1939 and Autumn 1944..................... . . .105 11.2 Damage Between Autumn 1944 and March 1945 .................................................. 105 113 Postwar Assessment of Damages . . ....................... ... 106 11.4 War Damage Claims.................................... ............................ ... 107 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nan Regime 1Z. financial Overview ofFbrd-Wer be................................................................................................................. Ill 12.1 Brief Financial History..................................................... . ... Ill 12 2. Balance Sheet Information................................. ...................................... 112 12.3. Results of Operations/Net Income .... 113 12.4. Capital Structure and Dividend Analysis........................................................................115 13. Disposition of Research Findings...................................................................................................................... 119 Appendix A Investment of U.S. Companies in Germany, 1943 ......................................... 121 AppoodixB Board of Directors-- Ford-Werke, 1925-1953 .. ..123 Appendix C Ford's Contributions to the Allied War Effort, 1939-1945 ......................... 125 Appendix D Numbers ofWorkers at Ford-Werke, January 1941-December 1944 ..................127 Appendix B War Damage Claims................................ 131 Appendix F AppendixG Ford-Werke Balance Sheets.............................................................. Ford-Werke Results of Operations. 1933-1953 ... 133 135 Appendix H Glossary of Repository Sources ................................................ . . 139 Appendix I Bibliography ..................................................... .. .. 141 VI Report Summary Introduction/Project Background This report summarizes information from a 3K-year research project conducted by Ford Motor Company ("Ford") into the Warld War n activities of its German subsidiary, Ford-Werke' AG ("Ford-Werke" [FordWbrks]). The project was launched in January 1998 following an inquiry from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) regarding the use of forced labor at Ford-Werke during World War n. On March 4, 1998, attorneys Hied a class action lawsuit against Ford The suit has since been dismissed. Ford instituted the research project in an effort to locate documents that would shed new hght on the historical facts. More than 45 archivists, historians, researchers and translators were involved in the effort to collect and study documents from three countries and two continents Research was conducted on records held by the company and on records held by more than 30 public and private repositories in the United States, Germany and Great Britain The project yielded more than 98,000 pages of source material. Historical Background of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Wer ke Henry Ford founded Ford Motor Company in 1903 and was its president from 1906 to 1919, and 1943 to 1945 Ford-Werke was incorporated as Ford Motor Company AktiengeseUschaft (AG) [joint-stock company] on January 5, 1925, in Berlin A plant was built along the Rhine River m Cologne and opened in 1931 Ford's direct and indirect ownership stake fluctuated widely from 1925 through the early postwar period At the start of World Wur II, 250 American Arms owned more than $450 million in assets in Germany Ten of those firms owned 58 5 percent of the total Ranked 16th by investment holdings. Ford held 1 9 percent of the total American investment A chart showing the top 59 firms is attached as Appendix A, Investment of U S Companies in Germany, 1943 Although Ford owned a majority interest in FordWerke, the Dearborn company's control over FordWerke's operations was constrained by Nazi policies aimed at limiting foreign influences in German businesses. The board meeting in April 1938 was the last one attended by an American or Briush member until after the war On May 15, 1942, the Nazi government, through a court order, declared FordWerke enemy property, appointed a custodian and replaced the board of directors with a board ofadvisors Heinnch Albert, a former German diplomat and prominent lawyer whose clients included major U S corporations doing business in Germany, was chairman of the board of directors from 1937 through Research Findings .About Ford-Werke Under th< Nazi Regime May 15,1942, when he became chairman of the board of advisors through the end of the war AU^o^ll board members of Ford-Werke from 1925 through 1953 Is attached as Appendix B. Board of Directors Ford-Werke, 1925-1953 Henry Ford remained opposed to war, except m direct defense ofthe United States, even afterWorldWar II began in Europe However, in 1940, Ford Motor Company accepted aU5 government contract to build aircraft engines, and Ford engineers assisted with^ in exchange for licenses to buy crude rubber from Ford subsidiaries. German tire manufacturers got the rubber and the German government got 30 percent ofthe ores Under later, broader agreements. Ford shipped other raw materials to Ford-Werke in exchange for parts. Some of the raw materials were distributed throughout Germany under government order The allocation of raw materials to Ford-Werke was tied to the expansion of exports. At the German government's urging, and with Ford's design of the jeep. In March 1941, construction of approval, Ford-Werke and a supplier produced troop Ford's Willow Run plant began. By early 1942, Ford was a major contributor to the Allied war effort And by early 1944,Willow Run was the leading producer of heavy bombers for the U.S military. See Appendix C, carriers for the German military in Berlin, lb meet i government demands, Ford-Werke imported partially j tfOQ I assembled U.S -built trucks from Ford for assembly in I , {Cologne in late 1938 The trucks were used m the '-/t'ucL* Ford's Contributions to the Allied War Effort, 1939 uvasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia 1945. ke in the German Wartime Nazi Economic Policies and Controls Economy, 1939-1945 Over the Automoti ve Industry After war broke out in September 1939, commercial In 1933, Adolf Hitler's Nazi government instituted transactions between the United States and Germany measures to extend its influence throughout German were difficult Ford and Ford-Werke had problems society The regime promoted German self-sufRaency communicating In June 1941, the German m raw materials and military production. Economic government froze all U S assets in Germany A postwar controls increased, particularly on foreign trade and US. military investigation concluded that American currency transactions. In 1935, binding regulations influence over Ford-Werke decreased after the outbreak required that automotive parts sold in Germany be of wax and ceased altogether m December 1941 with German-made using German raw materials, and that US. entry into the war they be standardized. Government policies regulated the industry, allocating and distributing raw materials based on approved production. Ford-Werke resisted standardization and rationalization, and its production initially fell As pan of the wartime economy, Ford-Werke and its operations fell under the control of the German armaments ministry and other government agencies In April 1941, the German government appointed Robert Schmidt, co-manager of Ford-Werke. to the German Industrial Mobilization and Preparations far War, 1936-1939 position ofWehrwirtschaftsfuhrer, one of the economic leaders who coordinated army needs with industry A German Army Inspection Office was established at the In 1936, the Nazi government Imposed the Four- plant Year Plan to make the economy self-sufficient The underlying motive was military buildup. During the implementation of the Four-Year Plan, German firms with foreign connections were used to import raw materials in barter for exports. Ford and Ford-Werke entered an agreement with the German government in 1936, whereby Ford-Werke exported vehicles and parts Soon after the Umted States entered the war in December 1941, Ford-Werke was directly regulated by the Reich Commissioner for the Theatmem of Enemy Property On May 15, 1942, the Superior Court m Cologne declared Ford-Werke to be under enemy influence and appointed Schmidt, a German who had been a key manager at Ford-Werke since 1926, as II I Report Summary custodian. Schmidt was required to submit reports to the Reich Commissioner and to get approval for major business decisions. He was forbidden to have any contact with ''enemy stockholders or their intermediaries" without approval from the Reich Commissioner, a Nazi official vested with broad authority over businesses whose controlling Interests were based in countries at war with Germany (The Reich Commissioner named Heinrich Albert as chairman of the board of advisors, the body which by government order replaced the board of directors.) Ford-Werke sent mechanics and skilled workers to the Eastern frontlines to train soldiers in vehicle repair Several independent Ford-Werke dealers were involved with their own repair shops set up and run by the army as quasi-military operauons near Eastern combat zones. Jewish laborers were employed in at least one of these repair shops Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Wer ke Overview - Germany Military Production at Ford-Wer ke From 1939 to 1945, millions of non-Germans were registered to work, usually forcibly, in factories, farms, At the beginning of the war, Ford-Werke was one of mines and construction sites throughout the German the four largest automotive firms in Germany and Reich, as military conscription worsened an existing manufactured cars, trucks, vans, tractors and other labor shortage Most industrial companies in Germany vehicles. During the war, Ford-Werke produced three- applied for and used foreign workers during this time ton trucks, a half-track personnel earner, spare parts The foreign work force comprised several different and engines, and provided vehicle repair and groups The overall treatment ofthe various groups was reconditioning services. From September 1939 determined by Nazi ideology and practice that placed through early 1945, Ford-Werke produced between foreigners on a scale according to race, nationality and 87,000 and 92,000 vehicles, mostly for the German gender The foreign work force included laborers army, accounting for about one-third of Germany's recruited from German allies, who were paid and wartime military truck produalon. From 1938 to the treated better than any other group of foreign workers, end ot me war, the Nazi government determined the prisoners of war (POWs), who received only token ype and number of vehicles to be produced by Ford wages, forced workers (civilians) taken from occupied idke and other manufacturers By 1940, passenger territory in Western and Eastern Europe, the latter production was prohibited. Ford-Werke gradually receiving lower wages and worse treatment than their switched to trucks and, after February 1941, produced Western counterparts, Italian Military Internees sent to only military vehicles and pans for Ford subsidiaries in Germany after Italy's surrender in September 1943. and occupied Europe. In March 1943, Schmidt was concentration camp inmates who worked unpaid. as_ assigned by the armaments ministry to coordinate slave laborers. military production at Ford subsidiaries in all Axis * territories in Europe. Ford-Werke production peaked in 1943. Operations were hampered in late 1944 due to supply shortages, dispersal and war damage. Ford-Werke had ties to other government military contracts In late 1939, the German authorities asked Schmidt to establish a new firm to manufacture war large-scale use of foreign workers started almost immediately after the war began in September 1939 and was expanded after Germany occupied Western Europe in the spring of 1940 Extensive recruitment in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union began in early 1942, and evolved into a more coercive system Forced workers were distributed to industries that materiel Without Ford's pnor approval, he and Albert requested workers through government labor offices Joined with a supplier to manufacture military Eastern workers were subject to additional regulations equipment in a separate facility using machinery and enforced by guards and the Gestapo, and lived in equipment from Ford-Werke. Schmidt described it as a te camps surrounded by barbed wire Their strategy to permit Ford-Werke to continue 'were lower than for Western and German manufacturing vehicles rather than war materiel Also, 'workers, and they had to pay extra taxes Their food rations were poor Italian POWs sent to Germany after Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime the autumn of 1943 sfere often treated as poorly as managers provide some informanon, as shown in a Russian workers In mid-1943, the SS began to send chart, Ford-Werke Wage Schedule During World War II, slave laborers from concentration camps to satellite in Section 7.5 of the report French and Italian POWs camps, or subcamps, at companies throughout Germany initially received less than Western civilian workers and in order to support the war economy At first, concentration camp labor was restricted to construction work, bomb clearance and critical war industries. In August 1944. the automotive industry was permitted to apply for concentration camp labor The government set the rules for payment, food, housing, clothing, working hours and reporting procedures. The SS guarded the prisoners. Wages were paid by die companies to the government; prisoners received no wages Companies could deduct expenses for food and housing bad 60 percent of their pay deducted and sent to the POW camp that supplied the prisoners. Both groups eventually were reclassified as civilian laborers and received more pay, with deductions of 25 percent Western civilian workers were paid about the same as German workers, minus deductions for those who lived on the premises In keeping with government decrees. Eastern workers at Ford-Werke initially were paid less than all other workers, with women receiving less than men Deductions for taxes and living expenses Overview - Ford-Wcrke amounted to over half the pay for Eastern workers. In the autumn of 1943, Eastern workers' pay was Wartime use of foreign and forced labor at Ford- increased and their deductions reduced Postwar Werke generally followed the pattern described. financial records from Ford-Werke include references Foreigners from Eastern and Western Europe. Italian to monies owed to former foreign workers. As of POWs and men from the Buchenwald concentration December 31. 1945, RM (Reichsmarks) 63,419 in camp were put to work at Ford-Werke. Foreign workers unclaimed wages and salaries offoreign workers was in lived in barracks adjacent to the plant The first | contingent of POWs -- between 100 and 200 men, possibly*French -- arrived at Ford-Werke m September 1940. This occurred after Ford-Werke, with an acute labor shortage, was asked by the government to quickly produce a large number of specialized motors for barges. By April 1942, more than 300 Eastern civilians were working there. The total number offorced laborers at Ford-Werke is hard to determine for several reasons. Some records provide general numbers, others provide numbers for selected groups or periods, and records difier in describing workers. The range shown in Ford- a blocked account at the Deutsche Bank, Cologne, by order of the military government During 1947, the funds were transferred to a special account at the Deutsche Bank and thereafter do not appear in FordWerke's financial records (In May 1952, the Allied High Commission asked the West German government to accelerate the collecnon of back pay owed to former POWs and foreign workers As determined by the London Debt Conference, former workers were entitled to apply for the money that had been placed in financial institutions ) Werke's financial records for 1942 through 1944 goes from a low of 314 foreign workers in April 1942 to a high of 1,932 in August 1944. A chart. LaborTYends at Conditions for Foreign and ForcedWorkers atFord-Werke Ford-Werke, shows the makeup of the work force from January 1941 through August 1944 See Section 7.3 of die report See Appendix D, Numbers of Vvbrkers at Ford-Werke, January 1941-December 1944, for monthby-month statistical breakdowns for the period The average workweek for all workers at Ford-Werke grew longer as the war continued, from 40 hours a week to 60 hours or more Most former forced workers interviewed in recent years recalled doing manual labor in production, postwar documents indicate that Compasation for Foreign and ForcedWorkers Germans and foreigners worked together. Some POWs were sent to work at Ford-Werke supplier companies. atFord-Werke Few records are available regarding compensation. Postwar reports and interrogations of Ford-Werke Foreign and forced workers lived in wooden barracks adjacent to the plant, separated by nationality and supervised by plant guards and the Gestapo. The Eastern workers' camp was surrounded by barbed wire IV Report Summary Western workers lived in an unfenced camp, or offsite Some Western workers were allowed vacation time In February and March 1945, shortly before the American army liberated Cologne, 48 Buchenwald Plant guards administered punishments, including inmates were transferred from the camp, and one fled house arrest, and foremen delivered punishments on the plant floor Some arrests were made by German authorities, and there are indications that male and female forced laborers from Ford-Werke were imprisoned in the Gestapo prison in Cologne. Food was prepared in kitchens according to nauonality Denazification files Indicate that Russian workers and their children received poor food rations. Several foreign workers remembered that food was in short supply Three physicians, several nurses and a Liberation at End ofWar The factory had become a combat zone during the final fighting in Cologne, and production was limited Equipment and materials had been largely dispersed. American army units found 300 to 500 foreign workers bring in the Ford-Werke factory, primarily in a large shelter Foreign workers were sent to nearby displacedperson camps operated by the U.S Army dentist were responsible for medical needs in a medical Ford-Wer ke's Relationship with Other barracks that included an operating room and separate Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe men's and women's infirmaries. An air raid shelter was available for foreign and forced laborers. The foreign Several Ford subsidiaries m occupied Europe did I workers' camp sustained air raid damage in October business with Ford-Werke during the war Ford-Werke 1944 The names of about 15 foreigners from Ford- coordinated production of Ford vehicles throughout Werke appear on surviving portions of Cologne death occupied Europe Shortly after the Germans overran lists from the war, but without any indicadon as to the Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and France in 1940, cause of death. the Germans appointed Schmidt commissioner for those properties. After the U S entry into the wac these After the war, the chief physician was accused of subsidiaries were placed under the control of the Reich i p4'-performing unwanted abortions on Eastern forced Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property, laborers. The physician. Dr. Carl Wenzel, estimated who appointed Ford-Werke personnel as custodians. there were 10 abortions on Eastern workers. He said Ford-Werke had business ties to subsidiaries in other the women chose abortion because of their occupied countries and established its own subsidiaries circumstances. He said he initiated improvements in in Austria late in the war Ford-Werke had some maternity and nursery facilities Other medical staff involvement with Ford operanons in countries allied corroborated his statements, as did some former with Germany early in the war Eastern workers who said he gave good care. Slave Labor from the Buchenwald Concentration Camp In August 1944, shortly after concentration camp labor was made available to the automotive industry, 50 men from Buchenwald arrived at Ford-Werke At any given time from August 1944 through February 1945, about 50 or fewer Buchenwald prisoners worked at Ford-Werke. Altogether, at least 65 different men were assigned there at one time or another. Sixteen SS men guarded the prisoners, who lived in separate barracks and performed outside work. Work records indicate the men worked seven days a week, six to 10 hours per djy A former worker recalled 12-hour days in production. Five inmates fled during 1944,one died at Ford-Werke Impact ofthe War on Communications With the nse of tensions in Europe in the late 1930s, the U S government began examining the economic St.activities of U S firms and their European subsidiaries. Monitoring increased after 1940 The US government* investigated correspondence between Ford and Ford of France, but dosed the matter in 1943 No action was taken. Ford corresponded periodically with its Germanl| " subsidiary and with subsidiaries in countries under! German occupation until the U.S entry into the war in! 1941. Direct communications did not resume until' after the war The final Ford-Werke board meeting attended by a non-German board member occurred in April 1938 Ford, Ford of Britain and Ford-Werke Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime continued to have contact with subsidiaries in neutral needs and die health of foreign workers and refugees. countries. Allied liberation of France in August 1944 The U S military government undertook an in-depth opened up some communications with subsidiaries in investigation, completing an overview on June 21, occupied Europe. A delegation from Ford of Britain 1945, and a detailed report in September 1945. visited Fnrd-Werlrf In 1QAC 1 *^pr>rt Military authorities conducted personnel investigations on Ford-Werke's activities during the wan The first at Ford-Werke in 1945 and 1946 as part of the known direct postwar communication between Ford denazification effort to nd Germany of National and Ford-Werke was in November 1946. Socialism. Approximately 40 employees were arrested by the Allies. Most were released and later re-employed End-of-War and Postwar Military by Ford-Werke Among them was Schmidt, who was Government Supervision Ford-Werke and other industrial facilities in Cologne were administered by U S military authorities from March to June 1945 In July 1945, Cologne became part of the British military occupation zone, and FordWerke was placed under British military government control. ErhardViiger, a key manager at the plant before and during the war and a Dane, was appointed as custodian Directors and shareholders had no authority, and permission had to be sought to transfer stock cleared in 1947 and returned to work at Ford-Werke in 1950 as a technical adviser, with the support of Ford executives. He and Vitger served on the management board until 1958 Both served on the board of directors. Military government controls were removed gradually beginning in 1947 On August 8, 1948, Vitger became general manager. In December 1949, German courts formally ended the custody order that had been imposed on Ford-Werke on May 15,1942, by the Nazi regime. ownership and to do repairs. British military officials War Damage to Ford-Wer he determined steel supply quotas, regulated producnon, approved prices and determined who received vehicles Early in the war, most damage was to parts m produced at the plant. Trade had to be approved by warehouses and materials in transit In August 1944, Allied authorities bombs caused some damage. Twice in October 1944, Limited operations resumed in March 1945, beginning with servicing and repair of U.S military vehicles. The plant was authorized to produce new trucks from existing spare parts, and on May 8, 1945, V-E Day, produced its first postwar vehicle, a truck for the U S Army After the British military government the plant was targeted by bombs that damaged the proving grounds and the labor camps In early March 1945, as the Allies moved into Cologne, artillery shells destroyed the recreation hall and shed buildings, damaged offices and a garage, and broke many windows m the plant. took over, Ford-Werke began repairing and producing trucks for the British military. Production in 1945 was limited by scarcity of raw materials and parts, and by war damage. In 1946, Ford-Werke increased production and began reconditioning motors for the British Production dropped in 1947 because of supply problems, but climbed in 1948 and 1949. A summary is provided in a chart,Overview of Ford-Werke Postwar Production, May 1945-1949, inSection 10.3. Ford-Werke submitted war damage claims of RM 11,929,803 to the German government and received RM 361,181 for damages in 1941 and 1942 A 1942 law kept Ford-Werke from collecting subsequent damages from the German government. War damage claims were filed after the war with the US government In 1965, Ford submitted a claim for (7,050,052 for losses and damage to Ford-Werke and its subsidiaries in Austria. The claim was based on fcJTi M. Investigations at Ford-Werke began immediately after the Allies occupied Cologne and continued for months Military officers reported on conditions and operations, equipment dispersal, suppliers, operational $12,461,427 in damages (the claim reduced in keeping with Ford's 56.575 percent ownership ofFordWerke). A settlement commission agreed to award Ford $78S,321 An itemized List summarizing the 1965 claim is attached as Appendix E, War Damage Claims \(hn'9% Report Summary Financial Overview ofFord-Wer ke Results of Operations/Net Income Brief Financial Histoqr A wide array of taxes and controls imposed by the Nazi regime affected sales, trading income, net income From the time of its incorporation in 1925, FordWerke experienced periods of prosperity as well as instability as a result of management decisions and prevailing economic and political environments. In 1933, Foid-Werice completed a major upgrade to permit a new line of smaller cars to meet consumer demand An earnings deficit forced a reorganization and production levels from 1939 to 1945. Drading income was a prominent performance measurement and was defined as sales less the cost of operations, excluding salaries and wages. Between 1933 and 1935, trading income rose as a result of increased sales and production After price controls were enacted in 1936, trading income fell Changes m taxes and controls, and change in the capital structure in 1934 An combined with other changes, resulted m generally aggressive global exporting program began during the Increased trading income after 1939 Net income was 1930s Economic growth resulted in rising demand In flat in the mid-1930s but grew from 1938 until 1943, the late 1930s, Ford-Werke expanded capacity and with losses in 1944 and 1945 Ford-Werke Income increased investment in machines and equipment fluctuation during the years 1933 through 1953 is Sales rose from 1940 through 1943, but fell in 1944 shown in a chan, Net Income and Tkading Income as a and 1945. Balance sheets and results of operations were affected by taxes, government controls on production and prices, war damages and related costs. Sales and production in 1946 were constrained by Percentage ofSales, Ford-Werte, 1933-1953, in Section 12 3. Additional detail is provided in Appendix G, Ford-Werke Results of Operations, 1933-1953. shortages of supplies. In the early 1950s, significant investments were made to increase the facility's productive capability and reduce per-vehicle costs. Capital Structure and Dividend .Analysis Ford's ownership in Ford-Werke evolved from nearly 100 percent at the outset to varying proportions of Balance Sheet Information Currency reform and devaluation instituted by Allied military authorities in June 1948 is of significance in reviewing balance sheets German currency changed from Reichsmarks to Deutsche Marks (DM). Companies had to devalue monetary assets and liabilities, but were allowed to revalue inventories, property, plants and equipment As a result, FordWerke s cash balances, accounts receivable from customers and amounts payable to suppliers, all of which had increased significantly during the war, were devalued by 90 percent or more. Most buildings, machinery, equipment and inventory balances were revalued at higher amounts. The net result was a reduction in reserves and other stockholder equity accounts. In 1950, capital investments were made for expansion, modernization, reconstruction and repair from war damage. In 1951 and 1953, additional expansion was undertaken to meet demand for products. Ford-Werke's assets and liabilities, as reported in financial statements at key points during the war and in the postwar period, are presented in Appendix F, Ford-Werke Balance Sheets direct and/or indirect ownership In 1943, as permitted by U S law. Ford recorded its investment in Ford-Werke as a total loss by establishing a reserve account equal to its investment balance (about $8 million) In 1954, Ford restored its investment in FordWerke at about 8557,000, the estimated fair value at the time ofrecovery (August 8, 1948) Ford-Werke's first shareholder dividends were payable in March 1930 At the tune, Luxembourg was the only Ford entity with a direct interest in FordWerke Payments were delayed or incomplete because Ford-Werke had to request permission from the German government The next dividends were declared in 1938, when Ford controlled, directly and indirectly. 81 percent of Ford-Werke stock These dividends were held in a blocked account because the German government prohibited distribution outside Germany. Dividends from 1939 through 1943 also were blocked No further dividends were declared until 1950 In 1951, blocked dividends from 1938 through 1943 were devalued by 90 percent in the conversion from Reichsmarks to Deutsche Marks Ford used the resulting funds (about $60,000 in 1951 dollars) to vii Research Findings .About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime underwrite part of the cost of acquiring Ford-Werke stock held by I.G. Farbenindustrie AG (I G. Farben), which was being liquidated. Disposition of Research Findings Each of the 98,000 pages of source material collected for this project carries a unique alphanumenc label that specifies the document and page, and identifies the repository where the original document was located. Descriptions of each document have been entered into a searchable database. The database and collection are being donated (except where prohibited by privacy laws or regulations of the original repositories) to Henry Ford Museum fe Greenfield Village, an Independent, nonprofit educational institution unaffiliated with Ford Motor Company At the museum, the donated collection and database will be made available to the public at the Benson Ford Ppnrrh />mfr See Appendix H, Glossary of Repository Sources, for a guide to the repository abbreviations used in the document labels See Appendix I (Bibliography) for a bst of relevant published sources Ford Motor Company's goal in instituting this research project was to conduct a deep search for additional facts to supplement the historical record. Every effort was made to perform a thorough and comprehensive search As additional information comes to light, Ford Motor Company will update the document collection and the database at the Benson Ford Research Center, an archival repository The material collected as a result of this project will provide a significant resource for understanding the history of this period and of Ford-Werke under the Nazi regime. Section 1 Introduction/ Project Background 1.1. Report Content The following report summarizes information uncovered during a comprehensive, 3Vi-year investigation by Ford Motor Company ("Ford") into the World Tter H activities of its German subsidiary, Ford-Werke AG ("Ford-Werke" [Ford-Works]) 1 The research was conducted in three countries and on two continents. More than 45 archivists, historians, researchers and translators worked in teams based in Dearborn, Michigan (where Ford Motor Company is headquartered), in Washington, D.C , and in Germany The team in Germany, based in Hanover, searched repositories in Germany. Team members from Washington and Dearborn searched repositories in Great Britain This historical investigation yielded more than 98,000 pages of source material from more than 30 public and private repositories The types ofdocuments i During the time period covered by this report.the name of Ford's subsidiary in Germany changed It was Incorporated in 1925 as Ford Motor Company Akdengesellschaft (AG) See Section 2.3. The name was changed to Ford-Werke AktlengeseHschaft (AG) in 1919 and Rill Is In place today See Ford-Werke Records, File Minutes of General Meetings and Board of Directors Meetings. 1925-1941, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, June 8. 1939 (FW 0002849), and NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 37. Translation of No. Ill of the Notarial Register of 1939, July 21, 1939 (NARA 0000126) For the sake of alinpUdty and consistency, the German subsidiary will be referred to as Ford-Werke throughout this report. located by this research project include Ford Motor Company correspondence, reports and financial records, military reports, Ford-Werke wartime correspondence, reports and ledgers; oral history interviews and interview transcripts; and other documentary information in both the English and German languages Research focused on the following topics Nazi1 economic policies and controls over the auto industry and Ford-Werke German industrial mobilization and preparation for war Ford-Werke's role in the wartime economy Military production at Ford-Werke The use of foreign and forced labor at Ford-Werke Ford-Werke's relationship with other Ford facilities in occupied Europe The Impact of the war on communications between Ford and Ford-Werke Postwar military government supervision of FordWerke 1 Nationalsozialisrtsche Deutsche Arbeiterpartci (NSDAP) [National Socialist Gentian Warktrs' Party] was the official name of AdolfHitler's Nazi party See Louis L Snyder, Encytbpcdla of the Thiid Reich (NewYork Marlowe ft Co , 1976), p. 243 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nan Regime War damage to Ford-Werke. Hie finances of Ford-Werke during the war. not apply to individuals who served in public roles, including Ford-Werke management positions. Documents collected for this project were tracked by means of an alphanumeric labeling system that indicates the source repository for every document and gives eachnarf gation number. These alphanumeric document and page Identifiers are included in parentheses in the footnotes, along with source information.' Appendix H Includes a glossary of the repository abbreviations used in the document identifiers. A bibliography of relevant published sources is attached as Appendix I. Copies ofmost of the research materials collected for this project are being donated, with a searchable database, to Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield Village; where they will be available to the pubhc through the Benson Ford Research Center (See Section 13.) In some cases, materials could not be donated because of privacy laws or regulations of the individual repositories. 1b enable research In these materials, the exact sources have been recorded in the footnotes ana in the database. 1.2. Origins of Project This project was launched in January 1998, when Ford received an inquiry from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) regarding the use of forced labor at Ford-Werke during World War D Researchers at Ford's archives searched books and company records to help the company prepare a response to the inquiry. On March 4, 1998, attorneys filed a class action lawsuit against Ford * The suit has since been dismissed. The attorneys represented 0sa Iwanowa, a Belgian citizen who said she was abducted from Russia as a teenager by the Nazis during World War n and forced to perform heavy labor at Ford-Werke in Cologne, Germany Some of the claims alleged by the attorneys contradict published histories about FordWerke's operations in wartime Germany Among the inaccuracies suggested by the lawyers' complaint are the following- Some documents, including many that are cited with English descriptions or titles, are in the German language. Wherever possible, one or more English translations also are cited Monetary amounts are in the currency presented in the research materials. Conversions to U S. dollar values are given if reliable exchange rate information is available Throughout this report, Including in the footnotes, the Identities of some individuals have been obscured in accordance with German privacy laws. These laws stipulate that private information about any individuals who could still be alive may not be released This restriction does That Ford-Werke was treated differently from other American-owned companies in Germany, in that it was not placed under Nazi control when the United States entered the war That executives of Ford Motor Company exercised control over Ford-Werke throughout the war years That Ford and Ford-Werke knowingly utilized unpaid, forced labor to generate enormous profit^) On March 4, 1998, Ford commented publicly in In the case of primary documents, the footnotes generally response to a report broadcast by the BBC and the provide die following Information about the original source the lawsuit- abbreviation far the repository (see Appendix H), the collection I (for example, record group or accession), the box number and die file title. The unique alphanumeric identifier refers to the "First, it must be said that by anyone's measure specific page or pages cited Secondary sources are identified with complete information about the author, title, publisher and date the first time a source is mentioned Subsequent citations include the author's last name and a shortened version ofthe tide Page numbers are provided where applicable Footnotes describe and refer to other relevant primary or secondary sources, and In some cases provide additional information pertinent to the text 3'Studies which examine the history of Ford-Werke during this period include Allan Kevins and Frank Ernest Hill, Ford Decline and Mirth, 1933-1962 (NewYork Charles Scribner's Sons, I962).pp 273-293, Simon Reich, The Fruit! of Faicum ftetwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1990), pp Bsa Iwanowa et al. v. Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke AG, 107-146, Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill, American Businas US District Court for the District of New Jersey. Civil Action No Abroad Ford an Six Canlinm&its (Dietroit Wayne State University Press, 98-9S9.March 4,1998 lx1964), pp 270-285 I Introduction/Project Background this was one of the darkest periods of history mankind has known. records in Cologne were destroyed by two fires, one during and one after the war. Over the years, we have relied on the work of a number of prominent historians who have researched and described events during World War n when the Ford Cologne plant was used to produce trucks for the Nazi government. Those historians and existing records report that the plant was under Nazi control during the war and not returned to Ford control until after the war by Allied military authorities. The management executive committee was disbanded and a custodian was appointed by the Nazi government However, the BBC story recently raised the issue of forced labor again and created a renewed awareness of the wartime situation more than 50 years ago Therefore, we have instituted an active and deeper search of Ford archives in the U S to see if there are additional facts available than those used by earlier historians. We also are instituting a similar search in Germany. This effort is complicated by the fact that many 6 Elizabeth W Adkins, a certified archivist, was manager of Ford Motor Company Archives Services at the time this project was launched. She has since been named to the position of manager of the Global Information Management department, which Includes die Ford Motor CompanyArchives. She has had 20 yean of experience In managing business archives, and has served in leadership roles in the Society of American Archivists, the Academy of Certified Archivists and the International Council on Archives. She has made presentations and published articles m die field ofbusiness archives ' Lawrence Dowler Is a librarian, archivist and historian. His 30year career includes 16 yean at Harvard University and 12 years at TUe University He played a leading role in developing and implementing national standards for describing primary sources At Harvard, be led an effort to create a "gateway* to research resources within the university and beyond, and subsequently published a book, Gstcmys to Knowledge (Cambridge. Mass MXT. Press. 1997) on these issues He has published mote than 25 other books, chapters and articles At Tide University, he played a major role in developing a cataloguing format for machinereadable descriptions of manuscripts and archives, a format that became a national standard. He has done consulting work for leading universities.archives, libraries, foundations,and am and cultural institutions. He was retained by Ford Motor Company in 1998 to perform an assessment of the objectives, methods and Rsults of the research project summarized in this report. When we receive the results of this effort, we will proceed from there " Ford's manager of Archives Services, Elizabeth W. Adkins/ was asked to plan, organize and implement a research effort to locate any documents that would shed additional light on the histoncal facts To validate the thoroughness and objectivity of its research methodology. Ford retained a recognized authority on research methodology, Lawrence Dowler,' as an independent adviser Another expert, Simon Reich,* a political scientist who has independently studied business history during the Nazi era, was retamed to review and provide guidance on the research findings. 1.3. Project Scope In addition to investigating the company's privately held records in the United States, Great Britain and Germany, the research team searched records at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, the U S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, the US Library of Congress, the U S. Department of Jusuce, the Public Record Office and the Imperial War Museum in Great Britain, several branches of the Federal Archives of Germany [Bundesarchiv], the Buchenwald archives [Archiv der Gedenkstaette Buchenwald], regional archives in and around Cologne; and a number ofother * Simon Reich holds an appointment as professor at the Graduate School of Public and international Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh His areas of expertise indude the study of Germany and of international political economy He has authored or co-authored several books, mdudlng lhe Fnnts of Racism. Rumor Prosperity in Historical Perspective (Ithaca and London Cornell University Press. 1990). The German Predicament. Memory and Power m tbe New Europe (Ithaca and London Cornell University Press, 1997), and The Myth of the Global Corporation (Princeton, N J Pnnceton University Press, 1998) He has authored artides in numerous journals. In 2001, he completed an appointment as the director ofresearch and analysis at the Royal Institute of Intemauonal Affairs, Chatham House, in London, focusing on trends and Issues related to corporate soda! responsibility He has received fellowships and grants from the Coundl on Foreign Relations, the Sloan Foundation, the Kellogg Foundation and others. He is a consultant to Ford Motor Company regarding the research project that is summarized in this report. Hu role has been to assist in locating materials, to read and comment on the research team's flndings,and to ensure that this report is an accurate reflection of the material collected I Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime public repositories. The research has uncovered documents that detail business operations and circumstances at Ford-Werke before, during and immediately following the Nazi era, and which help to clarify the issues being examined i 4 Section 2 Historical Background of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke 2.1. Establishment of 2.2. International Expansion Ford Motor Compan y From the company's earliest days, the shareholders Ford Motor Company was founded in 1903 as an outgrowth of Henry Ford's design and manufacturing of motor vehicles, which began in 1896 * Henry Ford was the driving force behind the company and served as its president from 1906 to 1919 and again from 1943 to 1945 18 In 1913, Ford's Highland Park, Michigan, factory first employed the use of a massproduction assembly line, a modernization often credited with changing both industrial history and modem life" As a result. Ford dominated the automobile industry through the 1920s, gaining a 45 percent market share by 1925 However, due in part to increased competition from General Motors and Chrysler, and in part to the overcentralization of Ford's and the Ford family demonstrated a keen interest in establishing an international presence for Ford and its products On October 15, 1903, shareholders instructed the board of directors to "take necessary steps to obtain foreign business." Ford's first foreign subsidiary was established In Canada in 1904. By 1907, Ford vehicles were being sold (mostly as imports) in the United Kingdom. France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Holland, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Poland, Russia, Australia, Africa, Asia and Latin America " With the introduction of the Model T in 1908, the company established a "universal car" which became one of the most popular vehicles of all time, with a worldwide presence.14 management structure. Ford's market share gradually The real growth for Ford and other American declined By 1941, its share was down to 20 percent.11 * * companies with investments in Europe came after World Vfaz I In 1914, the book value of American direct investment in Europe was 5573 million. By 9 David LLewisJAike McCarviHe and Lonn Sorensen. Ford 1903 to 1984 (NewYork Beckman House, circa 1983). pp 6-12 10 ford Motor Company News Release, 'Presidents of Ford Motor Company,' Apnl 29,1997 11 lewis, McCamlle and Sorensen, ford 1903 d> 1984, pp 6-12, FMC AR-65-92, Box 1, File Annual Reports - Stockholders' Relations, Ford Motor Company 1952 Annual Report (FMC 0013783-0013784) 11 FMC, AR-71-20, Box 4, Draft of speech by Browning. 1947 (FMC 0011117-00111130) and Box S, Breech. "The Ford Spint ford In 1946," May 19. 1953 (FMC 0011131-0011134) > Wilkins and Hill, American Bonnes Abroad. pp 1,19 and 22-27 ' Wilkins and Hill, American Buiuhsj Abroad, pp. 33 and S3, Floyd Clymer. Hairy s Wonderful ModdT. 1908-1927 (NewYork McGrawHill Book Company, Inc, 19SS), p 11 S Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime 1929, that amount had risen to $1.3 billion (total 1931, despite economic difficulties throughout worldwide American investment increased from $2 7 Germany." billion in 1914 to $7.6 billion in 1929). The number of American firms with service or manufacturing operations in Europe by 1929 exceeded 1,300." At the start ofWorld War D, 250 American firms owned more than $450 million in assets in Germany Ten of those firms owned 58 5 percent of the total Ranked 16th by investment holdings, Ford held 1.9 percent of the total American investment.'* A chart showing the top 59 firms is attached as Appendix A. In October 1928, Ford reorganized its European operations, and Ford-Werke became a subsidiary of Ford of Britain, which was led by Sir Peraval Perry10 Ford's stake in the German firm was reduced from a direct ownership of 99 9 percent to redirect ownership of 60 percent, through Ford of Britain11 After another reorganization in 1934, Ford-Werke again became a direct subsidiary of Ford when the American parent company assumed direct ownership of a majority of 2.3. Establishment ofFord-Wer he Ford-Werke shares Although Ford's stake fluctuated over the years.it retained a majority ownership in Ford- Ford-Werke was incorporated in Berlin as Ford Motor Werke." Company Akriengesefischaft1' (AG) on January 5, 1925, and originally was headquartered in Berlin." Assembly of trucks began in April 1926, followed by the manufacture of Model T's in June 1926 In 1929, FordWerke acquired a 52-acre tract of land on the banks of the Rhine River in Cologne, and on October 2, 1930, Henry Ford laid the cornerstone of a new manufacturing plant there. The plant opened in June 2.4. Ford-Wer ke Board and Management Ford-Werke's board ofdirectors was reconstituted in 1929 as a result of the 1928 restructuring In addition to Ford executives Charles Sorensen and Edsel Ford from the United States, and Su Perdval Perry and Sir John Davies from Great Britain, the new board induded i Frank CostiglloU, Axkvwi Dwnmitin. American Millcal.Economic,ao<J Cultural Rdaticns with Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithica.NewYork.Cornell University Press, 1984), p 149 14 NARAJIG S6,Acc. 56-68A-209.BOX J8Jile:TTR-500.Buslness Holdings In Germany of United States Finns,drca 1943 (NAHA 0005991-0006838) ' Aktiengesellschaft denotes a joint-stock company. * Ford-Werke Records, File Minutes of Board Meetings, Nix 6 of the Notarial Register far 192S and Articles of Ford Motor Company Aktiengesellschaft. January S, I92S (PW 0004074 0004085, for English translation, see FW 0004086-0004098) is Wilkins and HID, American Business Abroad, pp. 139, 204. 206 and 234 is Sir Perdval Ferry later became Lord Perdval Perry. several German members for the first tune." Henry Ford wanted "the best farmer, the best lawyer, and the best industrialist" that Perry could find In Germany to serve on the new board. The farmer chosen was Alwin Schurig. the industrialist was Carl Bosch, general manager of IG Farbenindustne (I G Farben).1' The lawyer selected was Heinrich Albert, who had represented Ford-Werke on legal matters since the mid1920s. Highly regarded as one of Germany's leading attorneys,Albert served as Germany's ambassador to the United States Immediately after World War I and represented several other American firms operating in14 > HFM, Acc. 713, Bax 11, File Corporate Structure, European Operations, Preliminary Report. February 20. 1948 (HFM 0002640-0002642) FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 57. File Investments 19S1-S2, Mellema to Edwards, January 25. 1952 (FMC 0003293 0003306), FMC AR-75-62-616. Box 23, File: European Countries - Investment Ledger, Ford-Wert AG, no date (FMC 0000346-0000350),Coopen 8t lybnnd Records, Lybrand.Ross Bros. It Montgomery to Henry Ford n. March 19, 1948 (CL1 0000316-0000318), Wilkins and Hill, American Businas Airood, pp. 193-195 >> FMC.AR-98-213546, Box 2, File History of Plant - All Aspects, 1925-1946. Ford, 1925-1946. by Erhard Vltger, September 24, 1946, hereafterVltger Repott (FMC 0001967) 14 HFM.Acc. 880, Box 7, File. Germany, Notes on interview with Heinrich Albeit. July 26, I960 (HFM 0000880) Bosch was general manager and chairman of the board of directors of IG Farben.one of the largest and most powerful firms in Germany After Bosch's death in 1940, he was replaced by Cart Krauch, who had become chairman of LG Farben, see Appendix B On April 24,1929,LG Firben organized a U Subsidiary, American LG. Chemical Corporation, later known as General Aniline and Film Corporation Edsel Ford was a director, but he never attended any board meetings and resigned in 1941, see NARA, RG 60. Entry 28SB, Box 78. File General Aniline and Film, History and Analysis of the Control of Genera] Aniline and Film Corporation, October I, 1941 (NARA0003920-0003928). 6 Historical Background of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke Germany In the 1920s and 1930s." He was elected to the board on March 27, 1930, became chairman of the board on June 11, 1937, and was the first German to hold the chairmanship " Albert would play an important role in shaping the development of Ford- Werke. Henry Ford II would later refer to him as "the founding lather of Ford Germany."1' (A list of all board members from 1925 through 1953 is attached as Appendix B.) 11 NAHA, RG 260.Economic* Division, IG Farben Control Office, Box 107, File Thtgets - Industrial, Memo by Schmidt on Albert, June 22. 1945 (NARA 00D68S5). HFM, Acc. 65, Box 67, File. Sorensen Final 67-5, Oral History of Charles Sorensen, January 1953 (HFM 0005529-0005531). NARA. RG 56. Acc. 56-69A4707, Box 81, File Interrogations. Mlsc, Report of Interrogation of Albert, September 16, 1945 (NARA 0007168 0007173). In a postwar memo and attachment,Alberi said he provided legal advice to several large American companies that were doing business In Germany In the 1930s and tried to protect their interests during the war In addition to Ford, his clients Included IBM,Gillette, Wbohvorth. Chase National Bank, DuPont and Colgate Palmolive. See WNRC Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 540, File 96/4. Memo from Albert, July 16, 1945 (DOJ 0010430-10434) Erhard VUgei; a co-manager of Ford-Werke, said in a postwar Interview that Albert was a man of great experience and very clever, a diplomat, and that Vltger had learned a great deal from Mm- Albert had a law office In Berlin and stayed there rather than in Cologne. See HFM,Acc. 880,Box 7, File Germany, Interview with Erhard Vltger, July IS, 1960 (HFM 0000884-0000885) According to historians Mira WlOdns and Frank Hill.Albert kept himself fully informed about Ford-Werke and participated in negotiations with the government and industry, see Wilkins and Hill, Amencm Business Abroot1, p. 233 i FMC, AR-98-213S46, Box 2, File History of Plant - AD Aspects, 1925-1946, Vltger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0001967), Ford-Werke Records. Board of Directors Meeting Mlnutesjune 11.1937 (FW 0002829) v FMC, AR-71-20, Box 38, Remarks by Henry Ford n to London Dealers Meeting, December 21, 1979 (FMC 0013389) In a postwar memo, Schmidt said Albert had the trust of the Americans and the Fords, see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Bax 1032, Report on Investigation of Ford-Werke, by Henry Schneider, September 5, 1945, hereafter Schneider Report, Exhibit 3, Mono by Schmidt on relations between Albert and himself; August 13. 194S (NARA 0000051) Historians Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest HiD described Albert this way "Writing and speaking English with ease, widely traveled in Europe and the United States, learned in the law, familiar with the automobile industry he had unusual talents for shaping company policy" See Wilkins and Hill, American Busina Ahmad, pp 233 and 271 Historian Allan Nevins wrote that, in more favorable drcumstances^lbert might have became a statesman of eminence, see Nevins' Introduction to Willems and Hill, American Busina Abroad, pp zit-xlU See Section 5 4 for information about Albert's arrest and imprisonment in 1944 for suspected Involvement in an assassination attempt against Hitler During World War I, before be was associated with Ford Edsel Ford, Henry Ford's son and the president of Ford Motor Company, had served on Ford-Werke's board since its incorporation, although he did not take an active part in the business and generally only attended board meetings when they discussed issues of special importance." Sorensen, the head of Ford's worldwide production, was more directly involved with Ford's overseas operations. As Sorensen recalled in his memoirs, Edsel Ford "confined himself largely to administrative work I was in charge ofproducuon and plant operation Sorensen visited Europe yearly and attended most of the board meetings held each year" He also communicated regularly with Ford-Werke throughout the 1930s on a variety of issues relating to Motor Company, Albeit came to (he United States as a purchaser for the German government in July 1915Jit left his briefcase on a train m NewYork City H was picked up by a U S Secret Service agent who was following Albeit's companion. The briefcase was full of documents describing German-instigated sabotage; subsidies of newspapers in America, and plans to acquire or control chemicals, munitions and other goods. The US Secretary of State concluded that while the papers offered no basis for legal acuan. they revealed activities in violation of US neutrality laws, and be leaked the contents to (he press. Despite the ensuing controversy, (he evidence against Albeit was considered 'not convincing," and be was allowed to stay in the United States He returned to Germany in February 1917 See NARA. RG 131, Entry 247, Box 170, File. Germany - General File Vol II, Memo from Krauss to O A. Schmidt and Ball, May 11. 1943 (NARA 0002511-0002514), Johannes Reiling, Deutschland Safe for Democracy' Deutsch-amenkaaiscfu Bafduagai atu dan Tdtigkdttbereich Hanikh EAlberts, kaiscilichcr Gcheimrat in Amtrika, enter Staatssdmtdr der Badishanrla derWimaicr Repuhlik.Raclisniaistcr, Bctieurcr der Ibrd-Gesellsrhoften un Henscbaftsgebut des Drltien Reiches 1914 Hi 1945 (Stuttgart Franz Sterner Verlag, 1997). pp 216 242, and NARA. RG 56. Acc 56-69A-4707, Box 81. FUe Interrogations - Miscellaneous. Report of Interrogation of Heinrich Albert, September 16, 1945 (NARA 0007170) See also HFM, Acc 50 - Tklegrams. Box 2, File February 1-10. 1945,THegram from Donohue to Thompson, February 7,1945 (HFM (0000186). and NARA, RG 260, Box 486, FUe Dt Heinrich Albert 14 470,Memos from Cassoday and Kagan,May 12 and May 28. 1948 (NARA 0004373) 11 HFM. Acc 507. Box 98. FUe- Cologne 1934-1935. Albert to Sorensen. February 8. 1935 (HFM 0004042-0004044), HFM. Acc 285,Box 2093.File 12 30.Edsel Ford to Diene], January 4. 1939 (HFM 0000011), HFM. Acc 860. Box 7. FUe Germany. Notes on interview with Heinrich Albert, July 26, 1960 (HFM 0000880) and Interview with Erhard Vltger. July 15, 1960 (HFM 0000886-0000888) ** Charles Sorensen, with Samuel T Williamson, My Forty Yean with Ford (NewTbrk WW Norton & Company, 1956), p 3715 15 HFM.Acc 67, Charles Sorensen Oral Reminiscences (Excerpts), no date (HFM 0001374-0001375) 7 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime production at the facility, changes in management personnel and general policy questions.1' During the 1930s, Focd-Werke faced a number of business challenges and problems that impacted the management of the company Worldwide economic distress caused by the Great Depression was a factor, as were the American image of the company in light of increasing German nationalism and the growing influence of the Nazi party and ideology During this period of economic and political difficulties, two successive Ford-Werke managers were forced out of their jobs amid questions about their qualifications and performance " As part of the restructuring of international operations in 1928, Ford had emphasized the use of nationals in the various countries where it did business. However, Edmund Heine, a German-bom naturalized See, for example, HFM.Acc 6.BOX 262,File 1930 Berlin,Board Meeting hfinutes, June 27. 1930 (HFM 0006560)- HFM. Acc 38. Box 28, Hie. Cologne List C Sorensen to Albert, February 8, 1935 (ISM 0003623-0003624), and KARA. RG 407, kntry 36BB. Bax 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 118, Albert to Sorensen, December 1, 1937 (NARA 0000321) For more on Fold Motor Company's working relationship with Ford-Werke, see HFM.Acc 65, Box 56. File Roberge - Draft, Reminiscences ofRussell Roberge. 1954-1955 (HFM 0005142-0005200) and Wilkins and Hill, American Burinas Abroad, p. 110. ** Wilkins and Hill, Amenam Borinas Atroad, pp 233-236 and 270 283, see also Section 3 and Section 12 Ford-Werke Records, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, September 23. 1929 (FW 0002697). Fnor to Heine, FordWerke employed two general managers Hugh Stanley Jenkins (1925) and George Carlson (1926-1929) See Ford-Werke Records, notarial Register Entry Na 89, August 18, 1925 (FW 0002650) and Notarial Register Entry No. 99, March 15, 1926 (FW 0002653-0002655),and Wilkins and Hill, American Budnee Abroad, p. 233 >* Wilkins and Hill, American Businas Abroad, pp 233-235 and 273 Heine's chief associates agreed later foal his appointment had been a mistake. 11 The German authorities' grounds for objecting to Heine were Ills inability, inslncerety [sic] both inside and outside of the Ford Motor Company, and general tendency to maneuver the business for his personal benefit rather than to build up the business." They also considered Heine unfit to lead German workmen because be was bom a German, became a naturalized American and that returned to Germany to earn his fortune and "overlorded" his position a bit. See FMC. AR-98-213541, Bos 131, File Supplemental-Excerpt Grom Ford-Cologne-1930s. Diefenbach to Roberge, September 12, I93S (FMC 0006541 0006544) In early 1934, Charles Sorensen asked Heine to become a German citizen. Heine replied that be would be willing to take such a 'far-reaching" step (because the company American, was appointed Ford-Werke manager in September 1929." By 1931, when the Cologne plant was completed, business conditions m Germany were worsening An accountant sent from England to examine the Ford-Werke books in the autumn of 1931 produced a scathing report ofwaste and inefficiency In 193 3, the company was a defiat operation and was soil foundering Id 1934- " Meanwhile, the German authorities had made it increasingly clear that Heine was not acceptable to them11 * * Albert and Bosch recognized prohlems with Heine's management of the company and his relations with the government and public, but had no German candidate to replace him " By early 193S, Albert, Bosch and board members had sent word to Dearborn that the situation was "unworkable" and Heme was "muddling dungs.''17 An auditor sent from Dearborn submitted a strongly critical report on Ford-Werke operations on May 24, 1935. Among other problems, it described "loose management and supervision" and indicated that many apparently considered his citizenship a "serious handicap") only If he could be assured that his job was secure. See HFM, Acc 572. Box 16, File Germany 1930s, Heine to Sorensen, January 22. 1934 (HFM 0006230) In a 1941 statement to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, Heine said that other German automobile concerns had sent a letter to Hitler saying that Heine escaped to the United States from Germany shortly beforeWorld VAr I Hie letter accused Heine of making ammunition to be used against his native countrymen Heine told the FBI that this letter caused Hitler to blacklist Ford-Werke's products to the extent that all government institutions were ordered to refrain from purchasing Ford-Werke vehicles Heine also told the FBI that his American citizenship was resented by German automotive manufacturers who, as a result, fought Ford-Werke "at every turn"and eventually took legal action to try to prevent the company from advertising its vehicles as German products (See Section 4 2 ) See NARA.RG 60,Box 2+Jile 146-43-278, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation File No 100-7886, October 16, 1942 (NARA 0007527), and Ford-Werke Records, Ford Motor Company A/G Board of Directors Meeting Minutes. September 6, 1933 (FW 0002763-0002764) w Wilkins and Hill, Americas Business Abroad, p. 271. In a letter to Sorensen after Heine's departure, Albert recounted a conversation be bad had with Commerce Minister Wilhelm Krppler, Hitler's economic advisee Keppler said that Heine "bad made a point of affronting all departments concerned." referring to the party and the authorities In the same letter, Albert lamented that Heine had caused problems for the company with the German public by describing Ford-Werke's vehicles as "German" when in fact they were not yet made entirely of German parts. "This misrepresentation will always be cast in our teeth" See HFM.Acc 38, Box 33, File I68-F-1 Jan-Jun,Albert to Sorensen, January 20, 1936 (HFM 0000457-000046S) >' HFM.Acc 6. Box 292, File 1935-Cologne, Bosch et alto Edsel ford. January 22, 1935 (HFM 0000528). 8 Historical Background of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke employees were unqualified." Four days later, on May 28, 1935, the Ford-Werke board accepted Heine's resignation " Albert had always known ofHeine's deficiencies, but he had hesitated to recommend his dismissal because of the chance that the German government might interfere with suggestions of its own as to who should be the manager of Ford-Werke." As Albert noted in a letter to Sorensen, it was exceptionally difficult to find a suitable person. Due to the boom in the German automobile industry and the antagonism against FordWerke as a foreign company, no "efficient man" would leave a German automotive firm to join Ford-Werke > HFM, Ate 41S, Box 1, File Ford-Werfe Audit Reports. Audit Report. May 24,1935 (HFM 0004309) J' Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes, May 28, 1935 (FW 0002807-0002811), FMC. AR 68-5 1-B. Box 8. File International - Executive Files, Memo on liebold. area 1944 (FMC 0014148) in 1942, Heine was convicted of two counts of espionage in the United States and sentenced to 18 yean imprisonment for providing the Volkswagen Wferke with information on the American aviation industry The conviction an the second count was reversed on appeal in 1945 Heine testified that Ik had used public sources for the Information,and the court held that whatever was lawful to be broadcast throughout the country was lawful to be sent abroad. SeeNARA, R.G 60.Box 24,Flle 146-43-278,Memo from Assistant Attorney General to the Attorney General.November 21,1945 and Memo from Assistant Attorney General to Solicitor General, December 12. 1945 (NARA 0007584-0007598). After his release. Heine returned to the Detroit area and operated a hardware store. See HFM.Acc 65, Box 41. File liebold (115) 41-5 Final-Folder 9, Reminiscences ofE.G liebold, January 1953 (HFM 0005001) 44 HFM. Acc 507, Box 98. File Cologne 1934-1935. Albert to Sorensen. February B.1935 (HFM 0004034-0004035) As early as 1933. Perry had begun to warn Bdsel Ford and Sorensen that the Nazis were putting their nominees everywhere under the flimsiest of excuses Sorensen pictured the situation in Gemtaty much the same as In America, which was experiencing numerous difficulties with a new political regime. However, Perry informed Sorensen that it was extremely difficult to form an accurate opinion of the political and economic conditions prevailing in Germany "Most certainly you cannot Judge them by any analogy or comparison with American conditions " See HFM, Acc. 572, Bax 16. File. Germany 1930s, Perry to Bdsel Ford, June IS. 1933 (HFM 0006172-0006173) Perry continued to advise Dearbom that it was desirable to avoid giving German politicians any opening to interfere with economic affairs. See HFM, Acc 572, Box 16. Hie. Germany 1930s,Perry to Sorensen, December 19, 1933 (HFM 0006146 0006147) .Sorensen to Perry, January 30,1934 (HFM 0006152 0006153), Perry to Sorensen,March 13,1934 (HFM 0006155 0006156), terry to Sorensen,March 13,1934 (HFM 0006157 0006158) and Perry to Sorensen, September 4, 1954 (HFM 0006170-0006171) There was no choice but to take an industry outsider. Albeit wrote. He chose Erich Dlestel, a lawyer and former manager of the Berlin Electric Works, because "the information collected on him is excellent " Albert and Bosch reasoned that Diestel's lack of automotive experience would be an advantage because he could leant Detroit methods and would not try to pursue his own course *' The Ford-Werke board appointed Diestel as manager on the day Heines resignation was accepted.** Three months latex E J. Diefenbach, a Ford employee who had been sent from Dearborn to help Cologne with sales, was informed by a Ford dealer in Hamburg that Diestel "appears to be a Jew"** About the same time, several highly placed Nazis approached Diefenbach in an attempt to open a direct line of communication with Dearbom Diefenbach bypassed Albert and wrote a long letter to Dearbom detailing the Nazis' concerns about business issues at Ford-Werke 41 HFM, Acc 507, Bex 98, File: Cologne 1934-1935, Albert to Sorensen, February II, 1935 (HFM 0004036-0004039) Diestd's inexperience was noted by the May 1935 audit report that had faulted Heine's performance The report said that Diestel Tacked the essential qualifications for the Job." His business experience had not been along manufacturing lilies, and he had no experience whatever in automotive manufacturing, sales or service Sec HFM.Acc 415,Box 1, File Ford-Werte Audit Reports, Audit Report. May 24. 1935 (HFM 0004310) Some authors have written that Diestel previously worked foT Albert at a German steamship company or companies. See Wilkins and HiD, Amman Businas Ahead, p 275, Nevins and Hill. Font Dcdioc and Rrturth, 1933-1962, p. 96. and Reiling, Deutschland. Safe br Danoaucy2. pp. 363-364 Another author wrote that Diestel knew of Albert through his connections. See Hinns-Peter Resellen. Und Tiondon Vorwaru End in Deutschland 1903-1945 (Frankfurt Zylclam-Verhg, 1986), p. 115 In a letter to Sorensen m August 1935, however, Albert expressly stated that he did not know Diestel before discussing die possibility of his becoming Ford-Werke manager. See HFM, Acc 38, Box 28, File- Germany Cologne - List "F," Albert to Sorensen, August 23,1935 (HFM 0001938). 42 Ford-Werke Records, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, May 28,1935 (FW 0002808-0002811)42 * 42 HFM, Acc 38, Box 28, Hie Cologne List E, Ohisen to Diefenbach, August 19. 1935 (HFM 000376S) and Director of Hamburg Electricity Warks to Ohlsen, August 19, 1935 (HFM 0003766) The dealer forwarded a letter from a director of Hamburg Electrical Warks describing the lineage of Diestel's mother, whose paternal grandfather was a "Jewish merchant" The letter said that Diestel had been forced to give up his Job at the Berlin Works when it was discovered that he had claimed 'Arlan [sic] descent" when applying for membership in the Nazi party Research Findings About Ford Werke Under ibe Nazi Regime and their distrust of Albert. The letter indicated that requires no record here," Sorensen wrote." Albert ) Albert had promised the German commerce minister emphasized to Sorensen that he would "fight every that a man would be appointed whom the government effort. to interfere with our private business " That could trust The choice of Diestel - "an Inexperienced did not, unfortunately, exclude the possibility that "the mas, and particularly a man rated as a Jew" - was "the Jewish question" could materialize into real sales last straw" for Albert with the government, DIefenbach resistance, Albert wrote ** wrote. He indicated that the commerce minister, who was directly under Hider, was very much incensed by Albert's "latest mistake" and the government could not prevent discrimination against Ford products in Germany ifDiestel were not replaced.** Reacting to the letter, which was addressed to Russell Roberge, Sorensen reassured Albert that everyone in Dearborn had been impressed with the way that Diestel had devoted himself to the problems of the German business, and that the DIefenbach correspondence file was being returned to Germany. "It is a matter that In 1936, correspondence indicates increased government pressure regarding business matters of Ford-Werke." At the same time, it was becoming apparent to Ford-Werke management that Diestel sometimes had "particular ideas which did not coincide with Ford methods and tradition "" There were discussions about replacing Diestel with the manager of a German firm that was being considered for a merger with Ford-Werke." (See Section 3 3. for more on the proposed merger, which fell through ) In June, Perry wrote to Sorensen that it was a great pity that after all the money that had been spent in training 44 FMC, AR-98-2I3S41. Box 131, File. Supplemental - Excerpt Diestel, it looked as though he would have to go " Two from Ford-Cologne - 1930s. DIefenbach to Roberge, September weeks later, in another letter to Sorensen, Perry noted 12, 1935 (FMC 0006541-0006544) In his letter, Diefenbacb that it was hard for both of them to properly appreciate said Albert was "in a very dangerous position'' and the Nazis would have him In a concentration camp within 48 hours if be the German situation, but that he was not optimistic tried to Interfere with Diefenbach's attempt to conrey the Nazis' Perry subsequently informed Sorensen that Albert had concerns about Ford-Werke directly to Dearborn. See Section 3 3 for more information about Ford-Werke and the German government (hiring this period. . 47 See, for example. HFM. Acc 38, Box 33, File 16-F-i Jan-Jun, Sorensen wrote that he felt that Albert knew *o0 then is to know Albert to Sorensen, January 20. 1936 (HFM 0000457 about Ua (Diotef)' [emphasis Sorensen's] He called DIefenbach 0000465) One of those matters was a proposed merger "a fool" for trying to bypass Albert by writing the letter to between Ford-Werke and a German firm, Stoewer-Werke, AG. Dearborn after Sorensen bad Instructed him to deal with Albert Although favored by the Nazis, the plan was dropped due to See FMC, AR-98-213541. Bax 131, File. Ford Cologne 1930s- opposition from Dearborn. Albert wrote in August 1936 that Nazl Influence. Sorensen to Albeit, September 18, 1935 (FMC while the merger was pending, 'nobody dared attack us." 0018709) In a postwar oral history interview, Roberge said he However, after the merger was rejected by Dearborn, it seemed did not believe be ever heard Diestel's background discussed at Dearborn. He said It was very unfortunate, in view of the as ifFord-Werke would never get any government business. See HFM.ACC 6,Box 97.File 1935 - Cologne. Albert to Edsel Ford. attitude of the Nazi party, which had absolute control over August 17. 1936 (HFM 0000542-0000551) For more everything in Germany, to find that Diestel did have Jewish information on the impact of the merger failure, see NARA. RG blood, ``but as far as I know there was no effort on the part of 407, Entry 368B, Bax 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 99A, anyone at this end to have him dismissed . 1 don't believe we Memo by Busslen on army truck of the Reich War Ministry realized the extent of the situation in Germany in regard to Wfcapons Office, June 15, 1937 (NARA 0000284, for English people of Jewish ancestry" See HFM. Acc 65. Box 56, File translations, see NARA 0000283 and NARA 0005877 Roberge - Draft, Reminiscences of Russell Roberge, 1954-1955 0005878) See also Section 3 3 (HFM 0005173-0005174)44 NARA. RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. 44 HFM,Acc. 38, Box 28, File Cologne List E,Albert to Sorensen, Exhibit 120,Memo by Schmidt on command car, July 26,1945 October 2. 1935 (HFM 0003763-0003764) In a letter to (NARA 0000326) For more commentary on Diestel's Sorensen the following day. Albert acknowledged that it must appear ridiculous to Sorensen that die fact ofhaving a non-Aryan management style see HFM.Acc 6S.Box 72,Fde Tallberg (214) Final 72-1, Reminiscences of YY Tallberg, July 1956 (HFM grandparent oould cause so much discussion about Diestel. He agreed that It was ridiculous, and that they would overcome it 0004840-0004845) and Box 56, File Roberge - Draft. Reminiscences ofRussell Roberge. 1954-1955 (HFM 0005171). without detriment to the business, but that they had to lake such things seriously In Germany "according to the present mentality of the people, it will pass" See HFM. Acc 3B, Box 28. File HFM.Acc 38. Box 33, File- Item "D," Sorensen to Albert, June 18,1936 (HFM 0007300)14 Cologne List E. Albert to Sorensen, October 3, 193S (HFM 14 HFM.Acc 38. Box 33,File January to June - Item "F." Perry to 0007297-0007298) Sorensen, June 29, 1936 (HFM 0000496-0000497) 10 Historical Background of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke been subjected to continuous bombardment by party officials about Dieste) and had to virtually promise that he would make a change. Perry advised Albert to dispense with the services of Diestel, "by no means the right man in the right place 100%"" Albert's suggestion was to designate Robert Schmidt (assistant manager in charge of purchasing*1) and Erhard Vitger (the company's chief clerk") as co-managers In a letter to Perry, Sorensen wrote that he was "very much disturbed" by Albert's attitude toward Diestel, because he would be spoiling something that was really functioning. Schmidt was "absolutely incapable." And Vitger, though "thoroughly reliable and responsible," was "inexperienced,'' Sorensen wrote In spite of whatever the government thought of Diestel, "our business is prosperous, and we have sold more cars during the past year than we ever did before. Whatever you do, don't let Dr. Albert disturb this. He is altogether too impressed with the necessity of co operating with the Government Authorities."" Perry wrote back to say that he and Edsel Ford agreed that a joint management arrangement with Vitger and 51 HFM.Acc 38, Box 33, File Item No 3 - Germany 1936, Perry to SorensenJuly 14,1936 (HFM 0002861-0002864) u HStAEt NW 1049/76620, Military Government questionnaire of Schmidt, June 19, 1946 (HSAD 0791) " HFM, Ace 41S, Box I, File: Ford-Werb Audit Reports, Audit Report, May 24,1935 (HFM 0004310).* 31 '* HFM, Act 38, Box 33, File Item Na 3 - Germany 1936, Sorensen to Retry, July 29, 1936 (HFM 0002717) In August 1936, Edsel Fend traveled to Cologne and, according to Sorensen, calmed Albert down See HFM. Perry to Sorensen, August 18,1936 (HFM 0007301) and Sorensen to Perry. August 31, 1936 (HFM 0007302) As Edsel Ford was leaving to return to Dearbom.Albert handed him a confidential letter and report. Albert wrote that anti-Semitism had become an established national policy in German-. A new wave of anu-Sanlusm would exploit the fact that Diestel had Jewish ancestors, already, it was Impossible fin Diestel to attend certain conferences with authorities and Nazi party departments. Albeit believed that his attempts to protect Diestel had to be considered a fiulure. The assumption had been that the anti-Semidc movement would diminish, he wrote, but instead it was "on the ascent" Now; Albert anticipated "increasing pressure"in the future. Albert also wrote that Diestel was being given too much credit for FordWerke's present success It was through Dearborn initiatives that production and sales departments were reorganized and quality was again "first class." The financial reconstruction of the company took place before Diestel Joined Ford-Werke, Albert wrote. See HFM,Acc 6, Bax 97, Hie: 1935-Cologne, Albert to Edsel Ford, August 17,1936 (HFM 0000542-000055!) Schmidt would never wort With regard to Diestel. Perry said that Albert had agreed to "bold his hand" until a better suggestion for altemanve management could be found.1* Diestel remained on the job. However, during 1937 and 1938, his management style and actions drew criticism from Sorensen and other executives in Dearborn as well as Perry, Albert and members of the Ford-Werke board, who reacted to "a certain tendency on the part of Mr Diestel . to dictate" Dearborn executives criticized him for disregarding specific management directives and Ford business policies." Albert and Diestel each complained to Dearborn about growing tensions*' In the summer of 1938, Diestel was chasused by Sorensen and Albert for separate " HFM, Acc, 38. Box 33. File Germany July-December 1936, Perry to Sorensen. August 18, 1936 (HFM 0007301) In this letter. Perry mentioned that the situation was "complicated" regarding the manager from the company involved In the merger talks The man bad been discharged by the company in question, and "it would not be easy for Ford Motor Company A/G to hire him, even if he wished to enter the Company's employ" 54 HFM, Acc. 712, Box S, File* German Pig Iran, Albert to Craig, September 20, 1937 (HFM 0004692-0004695) In a letter to Ford executive BJ Craig, Albert reported that the Ford-Werke board added Robert Schmidt and Erhard Vitger to the management structure partly because of DlesieTs behavior The criticisms levied against Diestel included such things as violating company policy by making loans to dealers, see HFM^cc, 38, Box 38,File.Germany Jan-Jun 1937,Edsel Ford to Diestel.April 2, 1937 (HFM 0001996) For other examples, see HFM. Acc 3 8,Box 38,Fdc Germany Jan-Jun 1937,Craig to Sorensen.May 12, 1937 (HFM 0002018), Memo to Sorensen, May II. 1937 (HFM 0OO72S1). Perry to Diestel. May 18. 1937 (HFM 0007252) and Perry to Sorensen, May 18, 1937 (HFM 00072S3).* 6 47 HIM. Acc 38. Box 38, File Germany Jan-Jun 1937, Albert to Sorensen, February 11, 1937 (HFM 0001994).Diestel to Craig, April 27,1937 (HFM 0002019-0002020). Albeit to Craig, May 6. 1937 (HFM 0002014-00020IS) In his May 6. 1937, letter; Albert complained that neither Dearborn nor Ford-Werke`s board was being kept sufficiently informed by a manager who was so independent that he had assumed practically all funcUons.including those of the board (See Section 4 2). In a postwar interview, Erhard Vitger said that Albert and Diestel fell out after Diestel suggested to Dearborn that Albert's salary should be reduced Albert was paid by Ford-Werke for his services as a director and also drew a $40,000-a-year salary from Dearborn On a trip to Dearborn in 193 6,Dieste] bad suggested that Albert should not be paid this salary from Dearborn. According to Vitger, when Albert learned of this he turned against Diestel See HFM, Acc 880, Box 7. File- Germany. Interview with Erhard Vitger. July 15. 1960 (HFM 000088S) ini Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime incidents of violating pohcies and directives.'* According to Schmidt, Albert issued an ultimatum - either Diestel or Albert had to leave." In November 1938, Edsel Ford, Sorensen, Perry and Albert met unofficially in Dearborn to discuss FordWerke and unanimously concluded that it would be in the interest of the German firm to part company with Diestel." He was informed that his contract would be canceled. He preferred to resign rather than be dismissed, and he received a severance package approximately equal to his annual salary.*1 In spite of earlier concerns about such an arrangement, the board elevated Schmidt and Vitger to be co-managers, replacing Diestel." Schmidt began his career with Ford-Werke in 1926 as a buyer" From 1928 until he was made co-manager with Vitger, J'NARA, KG 407, Bony 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 147A, letter from Albert to Diestel, June 18, 1938 (NARA 0000370). Diestel had applied for Ford-Werke membership In the Reich Automotive Association without board approval On another matter, Sorensen demanded an explanation for Diestel's revival of a wood gas generator program that had been ordered to be dropped in Germany; see HFM.Acc. 38,Box 40, File. Germany Jul-Dec 1938, Sorensen to Diesfeljuly 29,1938 (HFM 0007363),Sorensen to DiestelJuly 29.1938 (HFM 0007362) and Sorensen to AlbertJuly 29,1938 (HFM 0007361) * In a postwar interview with historian Mira Wilkins, Schmidt recalled that after Albert and Diestel quarreled Over various policy questions,Albert put the issue squarely before Dearborn. Natural})! Schmidt said. Dearborn those Diestel as the one who would leave. Schmidt said that Diestel jeopardized his career by trying to be everything Schmidt said Diestel had no idea about automobiles, hut after a short period, he thought he knew everything He turned against Albeit, who had hired him, and refused to listen to Vitger and Sdumdi. See HFM.Acc. 880, Bax 7, File. Germany Interview with Robert Schmidt, July 18, i960 (HFM 0000900-000901). In a 1945 memo, Schmidt said that he and Vitger vlevred Albert as more than the board chairman they considered him the representative of the shareholders' majority, i e..Messers Henry and Edsel Ford and their executives. "People like Heine and Diestel who thought different [sic] had to leave the company'' See NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 3, Memo by Schmidt on relations between Albeit and himself August 13. 1945 (NARA 0000051). * At the Dearborn meeting, it was decided that business should be carried on by Schmidt and Vitget and that a young engineer should be found to be groomed to be a third member of the management board [Vorstand], which was responsible for dayto-day operations See HFM. Acc 6, Box 306, File 1938 Cologne. Albert to Sorensen and Edsel Ford, November 14 and 15.1938 (HFM 0000008) and Memo by Albert, November IS, 1938 (HFM 0000009) Schmidt held several ddes. Including assistant manager in charge of purchasing and purchasing manager." Vitger was part of Ford-Werke management from the beginning When the German company was created in 1925, the manager of Ford operations m Denmark, George Carlson, was asked to assume the duties of managing Ford-Werke, as well Vitger, who worked for Carlson at Ford of Denmark, was brought from `i HFM.Acc. 38, Box 40, File Germany-Jul-Dec 1938, Diestel to Sorensen, December 9, 1938 (HFM 0000297), FMC, AR-6S1500, Box 6, File Germany 1939-194S (Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen. December 22. 1938 (FMC 0003179-0003180) Albert wrote to Sorensen that he did not object to Diestel's wish to announce that he had reorganized the company and was resigning after completing this task. Diestel wanted to become a dealer in Berlin,and it would improve his chances of finding a new JohAlbert wrote See HFM,Acc 38.Box 40.File Germany - Jul-Dec 1938, Albert to Sorensen. December 15. 1938 (HFM 000029S-0000296) In a postwar interview. Schmidt recalled that Diestel stayed in Germany most of the war, until he was put in charge of a Dutch enterprise by the German authorities. Schmidt also stated that Diestel was arrested for collaboration after the war, lee HFM.Acc 880,Box 7 .File Germany, interview with Robert Schmidt, July 18, lqe0 (HFM 0000900) Another former Ford-Werke employee said after the war that Diestel was a manager for Nazi-operated companies in the East "[T]hey knew, he knew his job" See FMC. Interview ofA.S. December 1999 (FMC 0018557-OOI8S58) Ford of Britain employee Thornhill Cooper said in 1960 that Diestel was living in Hamburg and had a company of his own. see HFM.Acc. 880. Box 5,FUe England.Oral History of Thornhill Cooper, June 27, 1960 (HFM 0000838) " Ford-Werke Records, File Minutes of General Meetings and Board of Directors Meetings, 1925-1941, Board of Directors Meeting Mutates, June 8. 1939 (FW 0002851). FMC AR-6S1500, Box 6, File Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Albeit to Sorensen. December 22.1938 (FMC 0003179-0003180) " HFM, Act 713. Box 4. File Cologne Personnel 1946-1948. Schmidt to Henry Ford n. October 6, 1947 (HFM 0003104)22 * * * * * * M Schmidt's denazification file lists his titles as buyer in the purchase department. 1926-1927, purchase manager, 1928 1935, assistant manager in charge of purchase, 1935-1937,and manager In charge of purchase, 1937-1938. See HStAD, NW 1049/76620, Military Government questionnaire of Schmidt, June 19,1946 (HSAD 0791) According to a postwar statement filed by Schmidt with military authorities, he entered the company as a buyer in 1926, was head buyer beginning in 1928,purchase manager starting in 1930, assistant manager in charge of purchase surting in 1933 and manager In charge of purchase starting In 1935, see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,Schneider Report,Exhibit 12, statement by Sdunidt. June 22, 1945 (NARA 0000068) Schmidt's postwar statement Indicated that he was bom in Berlin and left school to work In an automobile repair shop He was in the German army during \Aforid War I and returned to Berlin to work in various repair shops. He worked as a buyer for hardware, for parts for agncultural implements and for bicycle manufacture, and was out of work for nine months before being hired at Ford-Werke. I2 Historical Background of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke Copenhagen to Berlin to be works manager of the new German operation." In a 1987 interview, Vitger said that in the early days he handled `'everything" because Carlson was in Berlin only two or three days per month." On June 11, 1937. Schmidt and Vitger had been appointed to the management board [Vorstand], which was responsible for day-to-day operations." When the two men were named as co-managers in December 1938, Schmidt was given responsibility for production, technical needs and negotiations with the authorities, as well as his purchasing duties. Vitger took over all export sales and employment matters, along with his existing responsibilities, which included financial matters." Although Vitger and Schmidt were technically equals during the early years of the war. in practice Schmidt had greater authority, since Vitger was a Dane and considered a foreigner" On June 17,1941, at a general meeting held by the Ford-Werke Board of Directors, Schmidt was elevated to the chairmanship of die Vorstand, in addition to his other responsibilities (See Section 5 2)" When Ford-Werke was placed under German government control on May 15, 1942, German " Wilkins and mil, American Burines Abroad, pp. 98 and 139 See also HFM, Acc 67, Charles Sorensen Oral Reminiscences (Excerpts), no date (HFM 0001375). FMC.AR-98-213541 .BoxV, Oral History of ErhardVitger by D 8. TUmin^pd] 1987 (HFM 0000565-0000566) In a 1935 audit report ofFord-Werke done by a Ford employee from Dearborn, Vitger was described as playing a major role "Mr Vitger, Chief dak's position but performing the duties ofOffice Manager He is the best qualified employee In the Flint. Capable, honest and well Informed on all details in conducting the general business of the Flam." See HFM,Acc 415, Box l.Hle Ford-Werke Audit Reports. Audit ReportJAiy 24.1935 (HFM 0004310) See also Willdns and Hill, American Borises Abroad, p 139 Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes, June II, 1937 (FW 0002831) *FMC, AR-6S-1500, Box 6, File Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Albeit to Sorensen, December 22. 1938 (FMC 0003179-0003180).69 69 NARA, RG 260, Property Division, External Assets Investigation Section. Bax 546, File. Ford Wferke AG (Inv), Memo on conversations with Schmidt, June 13. 1945 (NARA 0003SS9), FMC AR-98-213 541JkutV Oral History of ErhardVltger by D B. Tbmln, April 1987 (FMC 00000573) "During the war I was not allowed to enter the factory, only the office,* Vitger recalled in a postwar oral history interview. government officials named Schmidt as custodian of Ford-Werke, reporting to the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property" The board of directors was replaced by a board of advisors appointed by the government to assist the custodian in the administration of the company Albert was appointed chairman of this new body, which, at Alberts suggestion, consisted of the German members of the old board " 2.5. Ford's Changing Relationship with Ford-Wer fce Political developments in Germany during the 1930s weakened Ford Motor Company's control over FordWerke, in large part because Nazi policies set out to limit the influence of foreign business owners Compulsory automobile parts standards established in 1936 as well as a number of other regulatory measures taken by the German government ensured a reduced role for Ford Motor Company in the operation of its 70 Ford-Werke Records. Business Report for the Year 1941, November 9, 1942 (FW 0000119-0000121; for English translation, see FW 0000126-0000127) At the same meeting. Alfons Strelchead engineer, and Hans Lockmann,assistant to the chief executive, were appointed deputy members.see NARA.RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File Ford-Werke AG, German Economic Department Report on German industrial Complexes - Ford-Werke. February 1946. hereafter GED Report (NARA 0001567), and BA-L. R 87/6205, Schmidt and Albert to Reich Commissioner. June 18. 194] (BAL 1182, for English translation, see BAL 12929) The June 17. 1941, general meeting was the last one until December 16.1947.see FMC.AR98-213S41. Box 131, File Cologne Organization and Management, list of Board Members 1925-1943. 1947 (FMC 0000679-0000680), and Ford-Werke Records, Business Report for theYears 1944.1945 and 1946 (FW 0003729-0003764, for English translation, see FW 0005403-0005405) See Section 10 6 regarding the first postwar meeting 71 Ford-Werke Records, Resolution of the Superior Court Cologne. May 15,1942 (FW 0008375) For English translation, see FMC. AR 75-63-430.Box 207, File Germany AG Minutes of Meetings 1929-1952 (FMC 0003361) For more discussion about Schmidt's appointment as custodian, see Section 5 4 n FMC. AR-75-62-616. Box 79. Cologne 1939-1945 Reports Custodian, no date, hereafter Custodian Report (FMC 0001017), WNRC, Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536. FUeWl 7536, Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1. 1945 (DO] 0011133-0011152 for English translation, see DO] 0011204-0011217). BA-L, R 87/6205, Reich Commissioner to Schmidt and Albert. May 9,1942 (BAL 1246) and Albert to Reich Commissioner, May 14, 1942 (BAL 1247-1248) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Germid subsidiary." In a 193S letter to Sorensen operatious to foreigners, even to members of the board regarding a change in the German tax law, Albert or shareholders As a result, Ford-Werke was unable to warned that if foreigners took "an active part in the call a full meeting of the board." management of the business," Ford-Werke would be subject to full taxation. He suggested that Sorensen should refrain from ordering changes to management salaries and that "in the future such things are exclusively done through the intermediary ofa German member." Furthermore, he observed that the cax code allowed Germany to tax German-domiciled companies that were "subject to a possible decrease ofthe profit on account ofits direct or indirect economic relations to a foreign company." In light of these restrictions,Albert stated, "We have always advised FMC Dearborn not to give instructions but only advice."'* (See Section 3 2. for more information on the status of Ford-Werke in Nazi Germany.) A 1943 U.S Department of Justice report stated that even before the outbreak of war tn Germany, Ford's control over policy at Ford-Werke was sometimes interfered with by the German authorities through pressure on the Ford-Werke management The report suggested that Schmidt, Vitger and Albert remained loyal to the policies of Ford Motor Company only to the extent that these policies did not conflict too heavily with those of the German government According to the report, these three individuals were initially committed to Ford's desire not to be involved in military mobilization, and they had enough influence with the authorities to be able to hold their ground But as the preparations for war reached a fever pitch in The Ford-Werke board meeting held in Cologne an April 20, 1938, was the last time an American (Sorensen) or a British (Ferry) board member attended a meeting until after the war." Valentine TUlberg, chief engineer; was the last American Ford employee to leave the late 1930s, the management ofFord-Werke seemed more inclined to carry out the wishes of the German government and less inchned to uphold Ford policies that might conflict, according to the Department of Justice report" Germany. He left Germany at the direction of the American Consul a few days before the war broke out 2.6. Ford's Response to the in September 1939, taking with him threelitmus" cars Threat of War / to work on while in Dearborn " In a letter to Sorensen dated November 27,1939,Albert advised him that new government rules and regulations limited the amount of information he could provide about the company's Ford Motor Company's response yS political and^#"*6/y4 military developments in Europe y&$ influenced by f Henry Ford's long-held aversion to war except in the direct defense of the United States Before America's entry into World War I, Henry Ford had chartered a n Simon Reich, the Fnutt of Redan, hmnr Prosperity in Historical Rtnpeahe (Ithaca Caradl University Press, 1990), p. 115 See Section* 3 2 and 3 3 for more information on standardization "Peace Ship" in an attempt to end the conflict His personal secretary. Ernest Iiebold, recalled in a 1953 Interview that Henry Ford was willing to spend his '* HFM, Atx. 507. Bax 98. File Cologne 1934-1935, Albert to Sorensen, February 8, 1935 (HFM 0004042-0004061) '* NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032. Schneider Report, Exhibit I46A, Meeting Minutes, April 20, 1938 (KARA 0000368-0000369) money and do anything he could, as long as there was a possibility of ending the war. But when the Peace Ship venture failed, and the United States entered the war two years later, Ford Motor Company contributed r* The Timms marque was developed for the German market, the Ikunus Mountains are near the Rhine River See FMC, AR-98213S42, File Ora) Reminiscence Conducted by Mira Wilkins. Interview with CWHaussJuly 21,1960 (FMC 0017377) helmets, tanks and naval vessels for the American military This sequence of events was consistent with w HFM, Acc. 65. Box 72, File- Tallberg (214) Final 72-1, Reminiscences of VY TkUberg, July 1956 (HFM 0004862 0004864). lillberg returned to Germany briefly for additional work on May 15. 1940. but departed again an September 9, 1940, see FMC. AR-65-1500, Box 6, File. Germany 1939-1945 (CB Sorensen), Ikllberg to Gnau. July 6, 1940 (FMC 0003139 0003140). " FMC, AR-65-1500. Box 6. File Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen). Albert to Sorensen. Novemba 27. 1939 (FMC 00003161-00003163) '> MARA. RG 226, Microfilm M1499. Reel 263, Department of Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG. May 10, 1943 (NARA 0004262) Historical Background of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Wake Henry Ford's conviction that Americans should avoid any conflict except to defend the nation " In the late 1930s, Henry Ford refused to believe that another war was imminent. Even after World War II broke out in Europe, he did not think that America needed to become involved, hi 1940, he joined the America First Committee in campaigning against US military involvement abroad." (This was one of several Isolationist groups committed to preventing the United States from becoming direcdy involved in the war, reflecting the widespread isolationism in America prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 ") In the spring of 1940, theU-S. government asked Ford Motor Company to build Rolls-Royce aircraft engines. Edsel Ford and Charles Sorensen went to Washington, DC., to look at the engine and discuss the proposal, and Sorensen returned enthusiastic about the project In May 1940, Henry Ford surprised Sorensen by agreeing to the engine contract, which called for the British to get 60 percent of the engines. However, in June 1940, after a British press report mentioned the engines for England, Henry Ford told the American press that he was willing to produce war materials for the U.S. government only, and "for defensive purposes only" On June 25, Ford Motor Company announced it would not build the engines11 Following a storm of protest in the Bntish House of Commons and the press. WR. Campbell, the head of Ford of Canada, quickly persuaded Henry Ford to authorize a statement declaring that the decision applied only to the US company and did not affect Ford subsidiaries in Canada, England and elsewhere in the Bntish Empire Issued by Campbell on behalf of Henry Ford, the statement said that Ford subsidiaries throughout the Empire "are using their facilities to the utmost for the production ofmilitary equipment for the defense of the British Empire. . They are serving their people as they should do and as I would do if permitted and if occasion required "** In August 1940, Ford Motor Company accepted a US government contract to manufacture Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines, and Ford engineers assisted in developing a final design for the jeep " In March 1941, < HFM.Acc. 6S, Box 41 .File Llcbold (1 tS) 41-S Final - Folder 9. Reminiscences of EG lieboid, January 1953 (HFM 0004889 0004894); Time, March 23,1942,Nevins and Hill, Fmd-Dedlsc ad Rebirth,1933-1962, p 169 Describing (hu period in My Lit ad HM, Henry Ford wrote in part. "It is entirely out of keeping with die principles ofour business to disturb the routine of our production unless in an emergency It is at variance with our human principles to aid either side in a war in which our country was not involved. These principles had no application, once the United States entered the wax' See Henry Ford, with Samuel Crowther. My Ilk and Wtak (Garden City, New York Doubleday, Page & Company, 1924), p 246 Nevlns and HU. Rxd.Dtdlnr sal Bebiirh, 1933-I96Z, pp 168-181 As Charles Sorensen put it. * [A]ny mendon of the war in Europe and the likelihood of this country's involvement upset him almost to incoherence" See Sorensen, My FdrtyTianWldi Fori pp 274-275. i For example, in May and June 1940, public opinion polls indicated that nearly two-thirds ofAmericans wanted to stay out of war, and preferred to avoid aiding Great Britain, if such aid would risk involvement in the contact After Pearl Harbor, a majority of Americans favored dedaring war on the Axis countries. See Oils L. Graham and Meghan Robinson Winder Franklin D Rrxaevdt.Hu life and Times. An EncydopedicView (NewYork, N.Y.. Da Capo Press, 1990), p 212, WayneS. Cole, Roosevelt A the fmfatianlm 1932-1945 (Lincoln and London University of Nebraska Prtss,1983), pp 364-365 n Sorensen,My FartyfeoWith Fori pp 273-276.FRQ AVIA 38/724. Wynne to Self June 19,1940 (FRO 000017 7), Wilkins and HU. America Businas Abroad, pp 316-317, Nevins and HU. Find Decline odRebirth, 1933-1962, pp.174-177 Sorensen was surprised by Henry Ford's approval of die Rolls-Royce project because of his earlier dedaradons against making war supplies for any foreign nation He said Henry Ford's reversal was triggered by a "tactless'' Bntish press statement to the effect that Ford Motor Company was now supporting the British Stunned British Air Ministry officials concluded, "Edsel is prevented from executing the scheme by the paoflsbc and isolationist outlook of his father, who sees no inconsistency in allowing his English organizations to make Merlins [Rolls-Royce engines] as they will be used for the defense of the country m which the works are located." See Wynne to Self (PRO 0000178) and Self to Rowlands (PRO 0000179) In Germany, Henry Ford's denial of the engines to the Bntish "gready helped' Ford-Werke avoid having to manufacture war material for the German government. See FMG AR-65-1500, Box 6, File Germany 1939-1945 (GE Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, ]uly II, 1940 (FMC 0003146), and FMG Acc. 6, Box 321, File Briefing Binder Section R, Albert to Edsel Ford, July 11, 1940 (FMC 0004512) S HFM.Acc 38,Box 127,FUe Folder F, 1940, Campbell to Perry, June 27, 1940 (HFM 0007289), Nevins and Hill, Ford Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933 (New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p 566. * Nevins and Hill. FoldDedust and Rebirth 1933-1962, pp 177-180. In his memoirs, Sorensen recalled that at first, Henry Ford was also opposed to the Pratt Be Whitney engine program But Edsel Ford was "all for it," and so was Sorensen. Sorensen said he convinced Henry Ford to change his mind by suggesting that the company could set a new standard in the manufacture ofaircraft engines. "In all my years with him I never put so much pressure on him as to persuade him to take pan in (he government's military aviation program " See Sorensen, My Fortyfan With Ford, p 276. Referring to Henry Ford's decision not to build the Rolls-Royce aircraft engines earlier in 1940,a 1942 Tune arude Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Ford workers began to dear the ground for the Willow Run bomber plant near Ypsiland, Michigan. By early 1944, Willow Run was the leading producer of heavy bombers for the U.S. military, proving that Ford's mass production know-how could be used to manufacture bombers. In 1945,Willow Run produced 70 percent of all B-24 bombers built that year for the U.S. military** The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, mobilized the entire country behind the war effort Ford played a strategically important role in the U.S. contribution to the Allied victory By March 1942, Ford had become such an integral part of the "arsenal of dpmnrrary" tw Time magazine's front cover featured an image of Henry Ford before a huge factory from which streams of tanks and bombers flowed "A Mass Producer," the cover stated ``Out of enormous rooms, armies will roll and fleets will By"" A list of Ford's contributions to the Allied war effort is attached as Appendix C. r puljL % credited him with having a "good mechanic's reason lata; grief and headaches in other plants making English-designed munitions proved whai he knew at had guessed - that the British blueprints were informal to the point of helter-skelte; had to be completely worked over, canting costly rejections, delays, waste." See Tint, March 23.1942 * Nevinsand HU1, Fori. Decline and BcMrth. 1933-1962, pp 223-226, Irving Brinton Holley, Jr. Buying Aircraft.Mnldrid Pracumnou hr the Ansel fonts (Washington, DC. Center of Military History, 1964), p 526 sr Civilian Production Agency, Industrie! Mokiliatloa for Wtr (Washington,DC Civilian Production Agency. 1947), p 3IS, Kevins and Hill, fori Dedtoe nod Rdiiith,1933-1962, pp 199 and 225-222; Thus. March 23, 1942. Section 3 Nazi Economic Policies and Controls Over the Automotive Industry 3.1. Nazi Regulation of Econom y With the Nazi party's assumption of power in January 1933, Adolf Hitler's regime instituted a variety of measures designed to extend its influence across all aspects of German society As the Nazi party consolidated its hold on Germany, the legality of its activity was sanctioned with the passing of the Enabling Law of March 24, 1933, an all-encompassing statute giving Hitler extensive emergency powers ** From the outset, Hitler's policies demanded the imposition of extensive controls over the German economy During the early years of the regime, Germany faced senous social problems caused by the worldwide depression, problems which had played a significant role in Hitler's nse to power. In an effort to spark an economic recovery, the Nazi government embarked on a number of ambitious pubhc works programs aimed at developing the country's industrial infrastructure. Nazi authorities also carefully regulated foreign trade in order to promote German self sufficiency in critical raw materials and military production By the late 1930s, Nazi authorities had implemented additional rearmament programs designed to begin the industrial mobilization needed to build up Germany's military strength " The Nazi government's policies led to an uneasy relationship with the German business community On the one hand, the regime quickly set out to win the close cooperation of Germany's business leaders, most of whom were generally supportive of the Nazi party's overall economic goals. However, the expansion of government controls during the mid-1930s and the increased emphasis on military mobilization and economic self-sufficiency created frictions with some groups.*0 This was especially true in the case of companies that had strong imemauonal ties, particularly foreign subsidiaries operating in Germany Foreign-owned companies that depended on imports and capital investments from their home countries were particularly affected by government decrees regulating foreign trade and foreign currency transactions. In August 1936, for example, the German government implemented measures that strictly regulated financial transactions with the Umted States and required all American companies doing business in Germany to be represented by a German export firm or bank01 ** jtrany Noakes and Geoffrey Piidbam. Documtnu on Noiism, 1919 1945 (NewYmk. 197S>.pp 188-195 19 R.J Overy, Mr sad Economy In the Third Koch (Oxford Clarendon Press. 1994).pp. 1-3 >* Overy. Wfa and Economy In the ThirJ Erich. pp 11-1891 * * 91 RriehinruaWmt, Vbl. 42 (August 4. 1936), p. 840 (BAL 12934), RckhatuaMatt. Nr 32 (May 3,1937). pp 546-S47 (BAL 12932 12933) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under (be Nazi Regime 3.2. Nazi Controls Over the German Automoti ve Industry The Hitler regime identified the automotive industry as playing an essential role in the government's efforts to revive the German economy The German state invested heavily in developing the country's highway system. The National Socialist Motor Corps, a Nazi paramilitary organization, sought to associate the Nazi movement with German society's burgeoning interest in automotive culture. The Nazi government cook steps to encourage self-sufficiency in German automobile production by offering consumer tax incentives aimed at increasing domestic demand for German-made vehicles." At the 1934 Berlin Automobile Show, Hitler personally ordered the industry to standardize production so that "all the chief parts of any manufacturer's car should be Interchangeable with those of all other makes."" Furthermore, in 1935, the German automotive trade association ordered that all automobile pans sold in Germany be made in Germany, that all parts come from German raw materials and that all parts be fully standardized.M As pan of a broader effort to regulate the German economy, die Nazi regime formed an Automotive Industry Economic Group [Winschaftsgruppe Overy Whr and Economy In tb Third Reich, pp 77-79, Snydec Encyclopedia of thcTUtd Reich, p 24S. Fahrzeugindustne. WiGruFa] m May 1935 Like similar groups created for other industries, the WiGruFa acted as a liaison between the German government and automobile manufacturers, including Ford-Werke " In addition to overseeing efforts to standardize and rationalize the automotive industry, the WiGruFa requested raw materials from the German government and distributed allocations to its members based on the contracts each had received ** Ford-Werke was represented on the WiGruFa board of advisors " In the 1920s and early 1930s, the German automobile industry consisted of approximately 150 small producers, and it grew steadily in manufacturing and output throughout the 1930s Partially as a result of Nazi government initiatives, total vehicle production climbed from 52,000 units in 1932 to 342,000 in 1938." By the late 1930s, Germany was the thirdlargest automobile producer in the world, behind the United States and Great Britain Until 1938, the largest sector of the German automobile industry was passenger vehicle production, although several automobile manufacturers in Germany were producing vehicles for the German military pnor to 1939 " From 1932 until 1937. Ford-Werke manufactured between 4 and 9 percent of Germany's total yearly motor vehicle production.100 During this period,Adam Opel AG, a subsidiary of the U S -based General Motors Corporation, was the largest automobile manufacturer m Germany101 * *In* * *1*93* 8, the peak year of German automobile production until after the war, Opel sold a Wilkins and Hill, dmcricon Businas Abroad. p 172 *e Reich. The Fruits of Emdsn, p 112. 11 VDA.Pressfarclilv. Flic 20, Wlitschaftsgruppe Fahrzcugindustrie Meeting Minutes, 1935-1938 (GER 01721-01920). All 950 member* of the association. formally known as die Reich Association of the German Automotive Industry [Reiduverband der deutsefaen Autornnhillndigtrle. RDA], as well as companies such as Ford-Werkr, which had not formerly been members of the RDA were joined together In the WiGruFa. **VDA,Pressearehlv, File- 22, WiGruFa quarterly progress reports, February - July 1942 (GBR 0001199-0001262) n In 1937, Ford-Wake General Manager Erich Diestel represented Ford-Werke on the WiGruFa board of advisors, see VDA, Pressearchiv, File 20, WiGruFa Board of Advisors Meeting Minutes. June 29, 1937 (GER 01779-01791) In September 1940, [Ki|] Meyer represented Ford-Wake at the WiGruFa board of advisors meeting, seeBA-L. R 3101/9087. Minutes of the WiGruFa Board of Advisors Meeting, September 4, 1940 (BAL 6257-6261) Reich. The Fruits of Fudsm, p 107, RelnhoM Blllsteln, Karola Fings,Anita Kugla and Nicholas Levis, Woiking lor the Enemy Ford, Gaenl Motors, and Fond Labor in Germany doing the Second Wirid Wor (NewYork-Baghihn Books. 2000). p 23. ** Overy Hhr and Economy in tic Third Reich, pp 81-82 100 FMC, AR-98-213S41, Box 131, Mumbo. Survey of German MotorVehicle industry, April 15.1948 (FMC 0000906) 101 For more on Opel during dlls period, see Reich, Tlx Frails of Racism, pp 110-111 Also, in a letter to Charles Sorensen in early 1936, Albert discussed the competitive issues faced by Ford-Wake partly because of Opcl's influence in Germany Opel had always been on good terms with (he German government and die party organizations, Albert wrote. `As a result, they succeeded in developing into the largest German motor car factory Nearly one half of the entire production of Germany is manufactured by them alone." See HFMAcc 38, Bax 33, File 168-F-l Jan-Jun.Albert to Sorensen, January 20, 1936 (HFM 0000459 and 0000461). IS Non Economic Policies ond Controls Over the Automotive Industry total of 136,450 automobiles, almost 40 percent of the German automobile market. Behind Opel was a German-owned firm, DKW, with 50,340 units sold, or approximately 15 percent of the market. Ford-Werke was the third-largest automobile firm in 1938 with a total of 36,582 vehicles sold, representing just under 11 percent of the German market. German-owned Daimler-Benz was the fourth-largest producer, capturing approximately 7 percent of the market with total sales of 25,338 vehicles.102 Numerous smaller firms, including Hanomag, Adler and Audi, shared the remainder of the German automobile market.'01 (See Appendix A for a table listing 59 U.S. firms according to each company's percentage of the total of American investment in Germany. Opel ranked second, with 12.18 percent of the total. Ford-Werke was 16th, with 1.90 percent. The list was compiled in 1943. See also Section 2.2.) 3.3. Status ofFord-Wer ke Plant According to a postwar report by Great Britain's Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Ford-Werke plant in Cologne was, with the exception of the Opel plant in Busselsheim, ***h- r~~-jt Impr"--* ---2 '-- *T*trr`'1 single motor vehicle nlant in Continental Europe."`* Political scientist Simon Reich argues that Ford Motor Company's status as a multinanonal corporate entity initially made it suspect to Nazi government officials, who viewed Ford-Werke as a "foreign" company subject to direction from outside Germany. Given the racial and ethnic xenophobia of Nazi ideology, this affected Ford-Werke's performance m the first years of the Hitler regime,os Tensions with the government arose on a variety of issues One of the first and most contentious was Ford-Werke's decision not to construct a new facility in Hamburg as desired by Nazi economic officials.104 By 1934, Ford-Werke's production had fallen to ninth place among German automobile producers."' According to Reich, the company faced hostility from its competitors and suffered nearostradsm at the hands of other German automobile manufacturers, although Ford-Werke's highly modem production techniques made it the focus of competition In the mid- 1930s, the Nazi regime's standardization program highlighted the conflict between Ford-Werke, on one hand, and the German government and the automotive industry groups on the other. While most German firms cooperated with government initiatives to standardize the automotive industry, Ford-Werkeresisted, since Ford policies called for the interchangeability of parts with foreign suppliers and other Ford subsidiaries beyond Germany's borders.,0 During 1935 and 1936, Ford-Werke came under increasing pressure from the German government and the German automotive trade association to conform to German automobile manufacturing standards, despite Ford policy'00 For example, when a 193S business report from the trade association enumerated the >t Wilkins and Hill, Anatom Business Abroad, p. 272 ><NARA. KG 226. MI499, Red ISO, Report by Bdlberg an German Motor Vehlde Industry. August 26, 1942 (NARA -~aq04118) i NiRA, RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032. File Ford-Wale AG. flED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001562) ioi Raich, The Fruits of Fascism, ppi 107-46 ,MIn 1934, Ford-Wake considered a plan to erect a new manufacturing facility In Hamburg Government officials fanned the new location,u it would keep the facility out of the so-called "dinger zone" of vulnerability to foreign powers and would provide badly needed Jobs in Hamburg However. Dearborn officials decided against the proposal inAugust 1934, telling Hamburg proponents of the plan that Ford considered the Cologne factory "ideal " For more on the proposal, see HFM, Ace. 6, Box 287, File* 134-Dagenham. Keppler to Ferdinand, August 9. 1934 (HFM 0000597-0000598). Negotiations on Ford Factory In Hamburg. September 3. 1934 (HFM 0000588-0000589) and Memo on conference with representatives of Hamburg, September 4, 1934 (HFM 0000590-0000596) See also HFM. Act 572, Box 16. File Germany 1930s, Sorensen to Albert, August 2, 1934 (HFM 0006212) .Sorensen to Wtrtz. August 2,1934 (HFM 0006180 0006181), Sorensen to Ferry, August 22, 1934 (HFM 0006165),Alben to Perry, September 1,1934 (HFM 0006168 0006169) and Perry to Albert. September 11. 1934 (HFM 0006223-0006224) For more on the issues that developed between Ford-Werke and the Nazi regime, see FMC. AR-982I3S41, Box 131, File Supplemental Excerpt Grom Ford Cologne - 1930s, Diefenbach to Roberge, September 12, 1935 (FMC 0006541-0006544) tor Reich. The Fruits of Fascism, p. 110 ios Reich, The Fruits of focion, pp. 107-46 For more on this subject, see Carl HA Dassbach, Global Enterprises and the World Economy (New York Garland, 1989), p 271 On Ford-Werke's reluctance to cooperate wuh efforts to standardize the German auto industry, see, in particular, Reich, The Fruits of focism, p 110109 109 Reich, The Fruits of Fascism, p. 112 UM I Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime characteristics of a non-German company, the list was anxiety among Ford-Werke execunves that the included, among other factors, noncompliance with government's attitude toward the firm would affect German rules concerning the standardization of sales in the private sector. In a letter to Edsel Ford, automotive parts. In a letter to the Reich Economic Albert voiced this concern, predicting that in light of Minister; Albert commented on the inequity of the government restrictions cm nonstandardized vehicles, situation, describing the linking of the German "private persons may soon largely insist on character of Ford-Werke vehicles with full standardization and refuse to buy a car which is not standardization of parts as a "vicious circle." standardized."111 In December 1935, Albert warned Discrimination against Ford-Werke based on the firm's Sorensen of the likelihood of mandatory standards, a nonconformity to German standards caused sales to development he argued would make Ford-Werke's suffer Poor sales, in turn, made it impossible to opposition to German standards untenable."1 In May generate the large outlay of capital necessary to achieve 1936, Albert's fears were realized, when the German standardization. He suggested, however, that a firm government issued orders compelling German promise of automobile orders by the German automobile manufacturers to standardize certain government would enable Ford-Werke to consider the component designs and sizes "* large investment necessary for standardization Ford-Werke made several attempts to alleviate some Despite efforts by Albert and others to find an of the difficulties encountered due to the firm's acceptable solution, Ford-Weikes difficulties with `'foreign" status Early in 1936, Ford-Werke began to standardization continued to affect sales to the German make concessions to German standards. In a letter to government and private citizens, as well In a meeting the Tkade Group Vehicles Industry, Ford-Werke General with various Ford-Werke and Ford Motor Company Manager Erich Diestel voiced Ford-Werke's agreement personnel in 1935, Albert discussed the connection "on principle" with German standards and said that between government contracts and standardization, Ford-Werke would be able to adopt two-thirds of the using Opel as an example of the benefits ofcompliance. mandatory standards imposed by the German He made it clear that the granting of government government."1 By May 1936, work had begun on the contracts was largely dependent on Ford-Werke's standardization of Ford-Werke's V-8 engine."* Ford- willingness to standardize1,1 Decrees from the Ministry Werke also considered acquiring a German of Interior had already forbidden sales of manufacturing firm. Stoewer-Werke AG, in an effort "to nonstandardized vehicles to public officials such as profit from a possibility offered to remove the well- court bailiffs and post office personnel By 1936, there known discrimination" ofFord-Werke and its products. Initially proposed to Albert by Stoewer-Werke management m the summer of 1935, the merger ns Ford-Wake Records, Albert to Retch Economic Minister, September 3,1935 (FW 0004315-0004354) in HEM, Acc. 507, Bos 98, File; Cologne 1934-1935, Board Meeting Minutes, April 13, 1935 (HFM 0004116-0004120) For more Information on Ford-Werke's reluctance to cooperate with efforts to Standardize the German auco industry see Reich, Tfct Fruiti of Fascism, p 110 garnered important governmental advocates such as Keppler, Hitler's economic adviser, who claimed the Fuhrer himself had taken an interest in the matter Sorensen advised against the merger on financial HFMAcc. 6,Box 297,FUe Subject File - 1935 - Ford Motor Co - Subsidiaries - Cologne. Albeit to Edsel Ford, August 17. 1936 (HFM O000S42-0000551) Also. Erhard Vuger said In a postwar interview that Ford-Werke was "persona non grata"in Germany during the 1930s. "Apparently there existed some ruling - official or unofficial, I would not know - that it was nos permitted to park a Ford car in a public place." See FMC, AR-98-213541, Box V, Oral History of Erhard Vltger by DB. ThminApiil 1987 (FMC 0000567) " HFM,Act 38. Box 33,File Jan-Jun.Item F, Briefoutline of the German Norms for Passenger and Thick Engines.May 13, 1936 (HFM 0000499),Reich, The Fruits of Fasosm. p. 115 u HFM.Acc 38. Box 33, File,168 F-l Jan-Jun, Item G. Diestel to Vehicles Industry Ttade Group. January 13. 1936 (HFM 0002803-000280S) Ford-Werke applied for exceptions from the remaining mandatory standards, see Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes. February 26.1936 (FW 0002812-0002816)114 "> HFM.Acc 38, Box 28, File. Cologne list F, Albert to Sorensen, December 6, 1935 (HFM 0001950-00019S1). 114 HFM.Acc. 38,Bax 33.File.Item D, Albert to Sorensen, May 20. 1936 (HFM 0002034-0002036) 20 Nan Economic Policies and Controls Over the Automotive Industry grounds, and the plan was abandoned in August 1936 In addition to the legal, political and practical problems stemming from its status as a foreign firm, Ford-Werke ran into difficulties with the German government due to its choice of managers In the 1930s, Nazi officials were openly hostile to Ford-Werke in part because of the backgrounds and conduct of two ofthe company's general managers during the decade -- Edmund Heine, a German-bom, naturalized American citizen who was seen by the Germans as overbearing and insincere, and Diestel, who was of Jewish ancestry and had no experience in the automotive business (See Section 2.4. for more information on the sequence of events.) In some other respects, Ford-Werke's relations with the German government improved in 1936 and 1937 In 1936, Adolf Hitler chose the Ford exhibit at the International Automobile Exhibition m Berlin to highlight Henry Fbrd's assembly line methods as a model for German industry. A few days later, Hermann Gormg, a high-profile Nazi official, bought a German Ford Eifel model"* Although the demise of the Stoewer-Wezke deal temporarily increased tensions with the German government, the government authorized Ford-Werke to increase its domestic production to 24,000 vehicles m 1937.'" That same year, Nazi authorities formally certified Ford-Werke products as being of German origin, despite die fact that the company continued to import rubber and tires from Ford subsidiaries abroad The long sought-after cemflcanon was an important step, with it, Ford-Werke became eligible to receive government contracts.'11 111 Ford-Werke Records, Board Meeting Minutes. May 13, 1936 (FW 00002822-0002823) and Board Meeting Minutes August 10,1936 (FW 000282S),HFM,Acc. 38,Bca 33.Fde I68-F-1 Jan-JunAlbeit to Sorensen, January 20, 1936 Berry informed Sorensen dial information presented at the directors' meeting [in June], which initially influenced Sorensen to proceed with die merger plan while Vltger investigated, apparently was inamwit. The business had not operated at a profit for yean, and substantial losses had been lncurred;see HFM,Acc. 38, Boot 33.FUe.Item #3 - Germany - 1936, Perry to Sorensenjuly 14, 1936 (HFM 0002861-0002864). ' HFM.Acc 38,Box 33.FUc Jan-Jun,Item F, Diesel lo Sorensen, March 2, 1936 (HFM 0001890-0001891) FMC. AR-98-213541. Box 131, File Supplemental-Excerpt Ford-Cologne- 1930s,Diestel to Sorenjen.March 3,1937 (FMC 0006536-0006537) On the Stoewer-Werke proposal, see Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes, August 10, 1936 (FW 0002825), and HFM, Acc 6, Box 97, File 1935 - Cologne, Albert to Edsel Ford, August 17, 1936 (HFM 0000542 0000551)________________ PMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File- Supplemental-Excerpt Ford-Cologne-1930s, Diefenbach to Roberge, September 12, 1935 (FMC 0006541-0006544) > Ford-Werke Records. Business Report for 1937April 1938, pi5 (FW 0005331-0005338) See also Reich, The Fruits of fascism, pp. 115-117 a Research Findings Aboul Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime I Section 4 German Industrial Mobilization and Preparations for War, 1936-1939 i i i 4.1. Four-Year Plan severely handicapping Germany's ability to export and exacerbating the economic crisis during the early In October 1936, the Nazi government announced 1930s.m While the Four-Year Plan was publicly i the creation of an economic Four-Year Plan under described as an effort to bring the German economy Hermann Goring The plan entailed a series of wide- out of depression, historians argue that the underlying ranging measures to regulate core elements of the motivation was to begin preparing for Germany's German economy. Its principal goals were to promote military mobilization l!* the development of key heavy industries needed for military rearmament and to encourage increased Recognizing the particular importance of the domestic production of strategic materials such as automotive industry, the Nazi government imposed a rubber; petroleum and iron ore."! In line with these special set ofcontrols for automobile manufacturers. In aims, Nazi officials Imposed extensive controls over November 1938, Adolph von Schell was designated foreign trade both to protea domestic producers and to Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs under the Four- regulate the use of Germany's dwindling reserve of Year Plan. In this capacity, von Schell headed the newly foreign exchange. Despite control measures dating created Automotive Office Group, which was charged back to before the Nazi era, the country's foreign with accelerating efforts to rationalize domestic exchange reserves had largely been depleted by 1934, production to meet the demands of Germany's military mobilization 1,5 Shortly after von Schell's appointment, 111 Overy Wn aal Ecaaany la the Third Erich, pp I8S-188 ill Gusuv Stopler, Gaum Economy (NewYork Harcourt Brace and Wforid, Inc,, 1967), p 143; Overy, Wir and Economy in (he Third Kcfch, pp. 3-4 he and Goring invited representatives from leading automotive firms to attend a general meeting in Berlin, where they explained the task of harnessing Germany's automobile industry to military needs "* The central 'YR. Berghahn, Modem Germany. Society Economy and Edidcr in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge Cambridge University Press. 1987),pp 148-149 In the buildup to the war, the government took further steps to improve Germany's military readiness, culminating in a new National Service Law, enacted on September 1, 1939. The law allowed the government to take control of plants and raw materials to increase the capacity of war industries and convert factories for war materia] production, see Maxine Y Woolston, The Structure of the Nad tommy (NewYork Russell It Russell. 196B). p 52 '** Overy, Wtr sod Economy Is the Third Rdcb, p 196, BA-F, KW 19/66), Organizational Chan for the General Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs, August 1941 (BAF 0133-0137). '"The meeting was held on November 24. 1938, and included representatives from Ford-Werke. see FMC. AR-98-213S41, Box 131. File Supplemental - Excerpt Ford-Cologne - 1930s. Memo from Diestel. November 25. 1938 (FMC 0006546) li Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime goal of von Schell's program was to increase domestic output by reducing the number of models and standardizing automobile production in close cooperation with automobile manufacturers.'" While these efforts were not fully realized before the outbreak of the war, von Schell's office continued to hare general oversight in coordinating automobile production with military requirements until it was eventually subsumed into the Ministry for Armaments and War Production under Albert Speer; one of die most powerful officials in Nazi Germanyll* 4.2. Ford-Wer ke and German Military Mobilization government receiving 30 percent of the tires that were manufactured using these suppliesA broader agreement was signed in late 1936 to cover the supply of pig iron, nonfenous metals and rubber for the following yeaz. Under this new agreement. Ford Motor Company shipped raw materials to Germany m exchange for parts from Ford-Werke. These shipments totaled 1 9 million pounds of rubber and 130,000 pounds of copper during the early pan of 1937 ,M The 1937 agreement also included a provision, as did similar agreements signed in 1938 and 1939, that a portion of the raw materials delivered by Ford Motor Company had to be provided for use by other German firms Like other companies in Germany, Ford-Werke was affected by the economic programs Implemented during the mid- and late 1930s In line with the general provisions of the Four-Year Plan, Nazi authorities used German firms with foreign connections as a means of procuring raw materials in a complex barter system, without strapung Germany's dwindling foreign reserves. In June 1936, Ford-Werke, Ford Motor Company and the German government entered into an agreement whereby Ford-Werke exported parts and vehicles in exchange for German government-issued foreign exchange licenses allowing it to buy crude rubber from other Ford subsidiaries. Once acquired, the crude rubber was then sold to German tire manufacturers, with the German " HFM.Acc. 38.Box 40, FUeGennany 1938,Albert to Sorensen, December IS. 1938 (HFM 0000294), FMC, AR-6S-1S00, Box 6, Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, February 2, 1939 (FMC 0003177-0003178) See also Peter Klrchberg, "Typlslerung In der deutschen Kraftfahrnmglnduiole und der GeneralbevoOmachtigie fur das Kraftfahrwesen Bin Beltrag zur Probtanatlk suaumonopoUsOscher Krlegsvorberettung," in Johrfmch fur WUstbefagstUclitc (1969/U), pi 132 u'PRQFO 1078/S2Arldsh Field Information Agency, Technical Economic Bondi (FIAT) Report on the German Motor Vehicle Industry during World Wu n, J 946 (PRO 0000085), Peter Lessmann, "Ford Paris un Zugrtff von Ford Koln 1943* Das Scbeilem des Projcckts ernes europSischen AutaonobUKonzerns imter deutscher Leitung, in Zdtschrllt fur Urtttmthttxugschldtt, vol 38, no. 4 (December 1993), pp, 218 219 '"NARA. KG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 54, Memo by Schmidt on rubber and raw material agreement, August 3, 194S (KARA 00001S7) and Exhibit 65, Memo by Sdimtdl on rubber deal dosed In June 1936, August 3,1945 (NARA 0000194) The amounts of raw materials allocated to FordWerke by government officials under the Four-Year Plan were tied to the firm's ability to expand its exports. In 1937, for example, Ford-Werke received a production quota of 32,000 vehicles on the condition that 8,000 vehicles were exported. Some of the foreign exchange earned from these exports was then used to purchase raw materials from abroad to make up shortfalls in (he amounts allocated to Ford-Werke by the German governmentAs Robert Schmidt noted in a postwar report, "The government invented all sorts of means to push export, both financially and otherwise" and the automobile industry. Including Ford-Werke, was one of the first targets for these efforts. In a statement to military investigators after the wax Heinnch Albeit said that the German government told Ford-Werke and other companies that if they wanted to stay in business in Germany, they must "facilitate Germany by exports and imports" Since Ford-Werke's foreign sales territory was confined to areas of Europe not already 110 HFM.Acc 285. Box 2025,File Subjects Mr C.E. Sorensen May Wish to Discuss at Asnlires and Cologne. Departmental Correspondence with attachments, February 16,1937-May 10, 1937 (HFM 0007454-0007478), < NARA.RG 407.Entry 368B,Box 1032,Scbneider Report,Exhibit 74, Memo from Schmidt - raw material agreement, August 6, 1945 (NARA 0000208-0000210), Exhibit 78,Translation, 1937 raw materials agreement (NARA 0000216-0000217) 1,1 See HFM, Acc. 285, Box 2025. File Germany 1937. Board Meeting June 11, 1937 (HFM 0007489-0007490), HFM.Acc 285, Box 2025, File Subjects Mr. C E. Sorensen May Wish to discuss at Asnitres and Cologne, Departmental Correspondence with attachments, February 16, 1937-May 10, 1937 (HFM 0007454-0007478). German Industrial Mobilization and Preparations for War, 1936-193 9 assigned to other European Ford subsidiaries, Ford- Werke turned to Ford Motor Company for help. Despite objections from Ford of Britain and Ford of France, Ford eventually decided to open other sales territories to competition from Ford-Werke In 1937 In a letter to Albert, Perry commented on the situation, pointing out that "The whole world-wide Ford organization .. has been trying to help the problems of Ford Motor Co A/G [Ford-Werke]; by buying and by assisting in the disposal of Ford products into territories which, in the ordinary course of business, are closed to Germany"'* Hie Four-Year Plan's emphasis on expanding Germany's military output also had an impact on Ford- Werke, which was seeking to do business with the government. The proposed merger with Stoewer- Wu-ke had been pan of die strategy to get onto the German Wu Office's list of government suppliers. When the merger fell apart in the summer of 193 6 (See Section 3.3.), the chances of gening government work appeared doomed, but Ford-Werke enlisted die help of NAHA, RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 54, Memo from Schmidt on rubber and raw material agreement, August 3, 1945 (NARA 00001S6), NARA, RG S6, Acc S6-69A-4707. Box Bl. Hie Interrogations - Misc., Report on discussion with Albert. September 18, 1945 (NARA 0007154) In commenting on the need to expand exports, Encb Diestel, the Ford-Werke manager; noted. According to present German ideas, an enterprise in Germany is only justified to exist in so far as it submits to the general political and economical requirements of the State.'* See HFM. Bex 2025, File Ford Motor Ca - Germany 1937, Board Meeting 6/11.1937,Dfcstel to Sorensen with attached agenda.May 12, 1937 (HFM 0007752) u< NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 60C, Perry to AlbertMarch 10,1937 (NARA 0000171 0000172). 111 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 95, Letter to Sorensen. September 1, 1937 (NARA 0000273) and Exhibit 99A.Memo by Bu&sien on army truck of the Reich Wu Ministry Weapons Office, June 15, 1937 (NARA 0000284, for English translations, see NARA 0000283 and NARA 0005877-000S878).114 114 NARA, RG 407, Entry 348B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 95, Draft letter from Diestd to Sorensen, September 1. 1937 (NARA 0000273), Exhibit 10SA. Bosekd to Schmidt. August 12,1937 (NARA 0000300, for English translations, see NARA 0000298-0000299 and NARA OOOS933-0005934). Exhibit 101, Mono by Schmidt on command car; August 2, 194S (NARA 0000285) hi this August 2, 194S, memo. Schmidt wrote; 'From the file it Is evldem.that Diestd pnor to July Ik 1937 had negotiated with the army and had gone rather far to commit Ford , much farther than we thought possible to go." an employee who was a former army officer, and reopened government negotiations. As a result, m the spring of 1937, the War Ministry office asked Albert and then-manager Erich Diestel if Ford-Werke could build a special army truck Following a board meeting attended by Charles Sorensen, the War Ministry sent prints of the truck to Ford-Werke and indicated that the vehicle must be built near Berlin.1" Negotiations continued through the summer, and government representatives toured Ford-Werke in August Diestel authorized a Ford-Werke commitment to the government Weapon Office to do the work and to procure a plant in central Germany, a step that Schmidt later characterized as premature and done without the knowledge of the Ford-Werke board chairman Schmidt, Vitger and a visiting Ford manager convinced Diestel to discuss the subject in person with Dearborn before proceeding further Diestel was already scheduled to go to Dearborn,Albert decided to follow him*" Before the Dearborn trip, Albert, Diestel, Vitger and Schmidt drafted a proposal for Albert to submit to the German military'" The Dearborn tnp was in November Vitger and Schmidt cabled Albert and 1,1 NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 114A. Schmidt to Diestel, September 2, 1937 (NARA 0000318, for English translations, see NARA 0000272 and NARA 000S947) DteKel drafted a leuer to Sorensen to report on the 'remarkable progress' made in the effort to obtain orders from theWar Ministry But the letter was never sent The head of Ford's purchasing department, who was visiting from Dearborn, agreed with Schmidt and Vitger that Dearborn should be fully Involved in the decision. To U.S military investigators after the war; it was obvious why Diestel's draft was not sent 'Although mentioning the possibility that Albeit or he could go to the United States to submit details, Diestel boldly expressed the belief chat a meeting at Dearborn was unnecessary and suggested that he be given discretion ' See Schneider Report, pi 24. September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000026) and Exhibit 96. draft tetter from Diestel to Sorensen.September 1,1937 (NARA 0000273) In a postwar memo, Schmidt said that Albert decided to travel to Dearborn for the discussions on account of Diestel's 'shortcomings ' "The whole thing seemed far fetched and proved that Diestel had gone too far regardless of Ford's ideas and tradition Now we had to try to swing the pendulum bade far enough to secure the approval of Detroit Former experience - the StOwer case, to name one instance - had taught us.how difficult it was to get a consent from Dearborn.' See Schneider Report, Exhibit 101. Memo by Schmidt on command car. August 2,1945 (NARA 0000286) i* NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Bax 1032. Schneider Report. Exhibit 110A. Memo by Schmidt September 14. 1937 (NARA 0000310, for English transIaUons, see NARA 0000309 and NARA 00005940-00005941). Exhibit 11IA. Ford-Werke to Army High Command, September 20,1937 (NARA 0000313, WM Research Findings atboul Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Diestel in Dearborn, saying that it was essential to get the program under way because the Ministry of Economics had advised the police not to buy Ford- Werke vehicles.In the Dearborn discussions, Sorensen indicated that he wanted Ford-Werke to work with a German company that would provide technical expertise. Albert returned to Germany and discussed the possibility of joining forces with Ambi-Budd Presswerk GmbH, a Ford supplier already doing work for the government140 Sorensen responded that Dearborn had no objection but wanted a definite plan discussed because it was "not clear to us what is the product they plan on making'' However. Sorensen Ford-Werke could count on Dearborn for help a program lor me goverhmfeM.1*1 " materiel arose in telephone conversations between Wibel and Albert. Albert cabled Wibel to assure him that, "Governmental orders do not concern war material but chassis suitable for ambulances passenger platform van bodies [sic] these vehicles differing from ordinary trucks only in that they are specially built for cross country purposes. .. They will not be used for military purposes more than any other private car or truck requisitioned by the government in case of war"1,1 In January 1938, Sorensen told Albert that "in principle" Dearborn had no objections, but the truck project was complicated and the details were vague He wanted to discuss the plan m person with the authorities.14* Meanwhile, while Schmidt was in Dearborn on other matters, the truck project came up By early December 193 7, Ford-Werke had developed a plan to manufacture military vehicles at a facility in Berlin in a joint venture with Ambi-Budd, and requested Ford's approval.1,1 Albert's later and an > NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 119A,Report by Posekel on discussion with Zucltertort, outline of the plan came to the attention of another Ford executive, A.M Wibel, and the subject of war November 25, 1937 (NARA 0000324. for English translations, see NARA 0000322-0000323 and NARA 0005948-COOS849). Exhibit 97, Memo on assembly of military trucks, November 25. 1937 (NARA 0000278) and Exhibit 118, Albeit to Sorensen, December 1, 1937 (NARA 0000321) In a postwar for English translation. see NARA 00003) 1-0000312 and memo, Schmidt wrote, `After Alberts [sic] return we were I KARA 0005942-0005943), Exhibit 112A. Memo by Diestel, informed that the proposal had met with approval Ambl Budd I September 24, 1937 (NARA 0000317, for English translation, was to furnish engeneering [sic] help, to make a number of I sec NARA 0000314) According to Schmidt.Albert had much part [sic], help with the lay out. and of course furnish the Influence with the Army, see Schneider Report, Exhibit 2, complete body' See Schneider Report, Exhibit 101, Memo by Memo by Schmidt on Albert, June 22,1945 (NARA 0000049) Schmidt on command car, August 2, 1945 (NARA 0000287). When an Interrogator wanted to clarify after the war whether Albert had tried to "play balTwith the NariVAr Ministry, Albert 141 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report. responded,"Bat I did not say the Nazi Ministry, the Ministry of Exhibit 122, Sorensen to Albert, December 2. 1937 (NARA Economics .. the people were in hopes of getting nd of the 0000331)._______________ Nazi machine by the War Ministry' See NARA, Report of Discussions with Mr Albert on ftiesday September 18, 1945 (NARA 0007158)_________ 141 FMC, AR-98-213S41. Box 131, File Supplemental-Excerpts Cologne 1930s, Memo covering (be orders from the government, December 7, 1937 (FMC 0006549-0006552) i> Hie cable indicated that "heavy attacks' had been launched cm Ford-Werke by the RDA [Relchiverband der deutschen Automobilindustrle], the German automotive trade associadon, and had seemingly influenced the Reich Ministry of Economics. The attacks were part of a longstanding legal dispute (beginning in October 1932) between the RDA and Ford-Werke over Ford-Werke's right to claim that its products were German: see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 117, Vltger/Schmldt to Alben/Dtestel, November 11. 1937 (NARA 0000321), FordWerke Records, Ford Motor Company A/G Board of Directors Meeting Minutes. September 4, 1933 (FW 0002763 0002765), and FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 92, File. Manager's Monthly Reports, Cologne 1931-1938, Manager's Report to Directors, August 1933 (FMC 0006501-0006502) See also Section 2.4. Postwar US military investigators reported dial "This may well have been a step taken by the German government to press Dearborn for a favorable decision " See Schneider Report, p. 25, September S, 1945 (NARA 0000027) >4> NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 124. Albert to Wibel, December 23, 1937 (NARA 0000333) The US Military Government, noting the telephone and cable communications between Albert and Wibel on this subject, concluded after the war that Wibel's involvement may have been due to Sorensen's absence. See Schneider Report, p, 27, September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000029)* 38 144 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Bax 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 127, Sorensen to Albert, January 5, 1938.HFM.Acc 38. Boot 40, File Germany 1938, Sorensen to Albert, January 17, 1938 (HFM 0006810) Sorensen also wrote to Sir Perry asking for his help because it was now dear that Albert had to go along with the authorides on the government project, see HFM, Acc. 38, Box 85, File European Purchase 1938 - Group 2. Sorensen to Perry, January 14, 1938 (HFM 0006792) After Sorensen's approval "in principle' cable was recoved, Albert cabled Schmidt, who was aboard ship en route to Dearborn,stating chat 'any attempt to make our product understood would result only in Immediate restriction of principle approval . Suggest German Industrial Mobilization and Preparations for War, 1936-1939 for discussion. Sorensen drew a rough sketch for Schmidt to take back to Cologne."1 In February 1938,Albeit was advised by the military that Ford-Werke was to assemble a troop earner rather than a truck Details were to remain confidential and technical information was not to be sent to the United States. Albert decided that it was Ford-Werke's duty to take on the project, but that the final decision could wait until Sorensen's visit."* Ford-Werke's board meeting was scheduled around Sorensen's meeting with the War Ministry1,7 On April 16, 1938, Sorensen cabled from Berlin to Dearborn with die message that the "German plans are turning out very satisfactory [sic] for known reasons care on your pan concerning technical questions and to avoid generally everything which might cause restrictions on principle approval" See Schneider Report. Exhibit 132A, Albert to Schmidt, January 20. 1938 (NARA 0000346, for English translations, see NARA 0000347 and NARA 0005961) 141 In a postwar memo, Schmidt said Sorensen's idea was to build a military body around a standard truck chassis with slight amendment!. He sketched it and promised to convince die German high command of his idea during his upcoming visit [April 1938]; see KARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report,Exhibll 101,Memo by Schmidt on command car, August 2. 194S (NARA 0000287-0000288) In February 1938, chief engineer Valentine Tallbcrg, who was working in Cologne cm assignment from Dearborn, urged Albert to tell Sorensen that a prototype along the lines of his sketch had already been developed, see Schneider Report, Exhibit 13SA, TtHberg to Albeit. February 16. 1938 (NARA 0000354, for English translations, see NARA 0000353 and NARA 0005965 0005966)________________ >*<NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032. Schneider Report. Exhibit I37A. Memo by Albert on discussion with Captain Schmledel, February 19. 1938 (NARA 0000357, for English translation, see NARA 0000358). In a memo to Sorensen, Albeit explained that all German manufacturers were obligated to execute government orders A refusal to do so would mean forfeiting the claim of being a German company, with the additional problem of being seen as having made the claim only to get the advantages but refusing to shoulder the obligations, see Schneider Report,Exhlblt 107.Albert to Sorensen, February 28,1938 (NARA 0000303). NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 139A, Dlestel to Albert, March 4, 1938 (NARA 0000359; far English translations, see NARA 0000361 and NARA 0005970)__________ In the cable, Sorensen said to the recipient (Gnau) "Tell EB that German plans are turning out very satisfactory [sic] " The words "Mr Edsd Ford" were handwritten across the top margin, see HFM. Acc. 38, Box 85, File European Purchase 1938 - Group 5. Sorensen to Dearborn.April 16, 1938 (HFM 0006808). Ford-Werke and Ambi-Budd executed an agreement on September 23, 1938 Ford-Werke would lease manufacturing facilities from Ambi-Budd at its plant in BerUn-Johannisthal and would supply equipment, while Ambi-Budd would supply labor and technical support. The agreement called for the lease of 17.S62 square meters (189,036 square feet) of space at the Berlin plant until October 1941."' Access by American representatives of Ford was heavily restricted, and Ford management was not informed of the factory's activities.110 According to some reports, production began with passenger cars, but with the outbreak of war, the plant began manufacturing military vehicles, including an SPKW [Schwerer Personenkraftwagen] heavy personnel carrier111 The Berlin-Johannisthal plant produced 1,072 troop carriers in 1940 After making 765 SPKW vehicles during the first half of 1941, the Berlin assembly plant ceased operations on June 7,1941 The agreement between Ford-Werke and Ambi-Budd expired later that year, and most of the 144 Ford-Werke Records, lease Agreement, September 23, 1938 (FW 0004104-0004107), FMC, AR-9'8-21354I, Box 131, Office of lord Perry report on Germany Historical Data, September 19, 1946. hereafter Perry Report, (FMC 0000935), FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File Supplemental-Excerpts Cologne 1930s. Memo covering the orders from the government, December 7. 1937 (FMC 0006549-00065S2) A US. government official in Berlin reported receiving confidential information that Ford of Germany (Ford-Werke) had been given a voluntary German government contract for 3,550 trucks to be built near Berlin Other confidential information indicated that the governments new metric standardization regulation, which had been aimed at FordWerke, was lifted for Ford-Werke, allowing Ford-Werke to retain its export advantage due to American standards See NARA.RG 151, Entry !4,Box 26, File Foreign Service - Berlin 1938 September, Economic 8tTrade Notes tt 46,September 10, 1938 (NARA 0004988) u> NARA. RG 226. Microfilm M1499, Reel 263, Department of Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG. May 10, 1943 (NARA 0004264-0004265) In a postwar Interview, Russell Roberge, a Ford executive who handled foreign business matters, recalled visiting the Berlin plant. "1 remember attempting to visit the plant to find out what it was doing This was shortly before the war started 1 had a good deal of trouble in getting into the place When I did get ln.I was not allowed to find out Just what they were doing there. Ufe bad no supervision over that operation because apparently it was something they were making for the German Army and it was restricted " See HFM, Acc. 65,Box 56,File Roberge - Draft,Reminiscences of Russell Roberge. 1954-I9S5 (HFM 0005177) 1,1 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report. September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000935). NARA.RG 226,Microfilm M1499.Reel 263 .Department of Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG, May 10, 1943 (NARA 0004264-0004266) See also NARA.RG 407, B Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime machinery at the Berlin-Johannlsthal plant was returned to Cologne.111 * * According to a Ford-Werke manager's report to directors, Ford-Werke s business with the German authorities "developed extraordinarily" during the third quarter of 1938According to Albert, "thedemand could only be satisfied by importing a cansiakraUe number of American trucks."'" Following a cable exchange with Dearborn, and negodadons between Ford-Werke s Berlin office and the government purchasing agency. Ford-Werke placed an order with Ford Motor Company for 1,000 truck cabs and platformsDelivery took place between September 19 and October 20, 1938 The trucks were assembled in Cologne and delivered to Wirtschafdiche Forschungs GmbH [Economic Research Company] for the German government and military.114 The trucks were used in the invasion and occupation ofCzechoslovakia, according to IAlbert and Schmidt, in a 1941 letter to thee torch j Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Proper] Entry 368B, Bax 1032, File: Foid-Werfe AG, GED Report, February 1946 (NARA OOQIS62) < FMC, AR-98-213S41, Box 131, Ferry Report. September 19, 1944 (FMC 000093S), BA-F. KW 21/1, War Diary FebniaryNovember 1941 (BAF 0790-0794). According to lord Perrys report, RM 2 million worth of tool dies were left ai the AmbiBudd facility and these dies were still at the Ambi-Budd facility as of September 1946 111 FMC, AR-98-213S4I, Box 92, File Reports - Internal, Manager's Report to Directors - Third Quarter 193B.November 11, 1938 (FMC 0007780) 1,4 NARA, RG S6.Acc. S6-69A-4707, Box 81, File Interrogations, Mlsc.. Report on Discussion with Albert, September 18, 1945 (NARA 0007156) Albert said that the German military wanted 1,500 trucks rather quickly, without saying bow they would be used. The only way Ford-Werke could comply was to get trucks nfroumn uthe United States '"Vara.]RG 260.Economics Divtslon.I.G Rarben Control Office, \^>6ax 244,uniabeled file. Memo on conversation with Vitger, June 11, 194S (NARA 0006981) and Memo on conversation with CK (Counter Intelligence Corps) - Cologne, June 11. 1945 (NARA 0006985),FMC, AR-98-213546,Box 2,File History of Plant - AD Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0001965) After (he war, Schmidt recalled that in September 1938 another deal was made with Dearborn for shipment of up to 1,000 additional trucks to Hungary, see NARA. RG 407,Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 1S8. Memo by Schmidt on Import of trucks. June 26, 1945 (NARA 0000396) >* NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit I60A, Memo from Dlestel on trucks for Germany, September 14, no year (NARA 0000400, for English translation, see NARA 0000398-0000399). Exhibit IS9, Supplementary memo by Schmidt on trucks, August 12,1945 nsfNARA 0000397) 1-L. R 87/6205, Schmidt and Albert to Reich Commissioner; Jime 18, 1941 (BAL 1183, for English translation, see BAL 12930) In the letter, Albert and Schmidt attempted to make the case far appointing either Albert or Schmidt [rather than an outsider] as the Nan governments wardme trustee, or custodian, for Ford-Werke in the event of a possible war between the United States and Germany (See Section S 4 for more information on the appointment of a custodian ) In detailing bow Ford-Werke bad developed into a purely German company, they took credit after the fact for procuring US -built trucks for the German army "Already before the war it [Ford-Wetke] helped the army through a bottleneck during the march into Czechoslovakia with large shipments from abroad." After the wan Albert said that he had not known In advance how the imported trucks were to be used He told US.military investigators (bat he "felt doubtecrossed" when he learned they were used in Czechoslovakia, see NARA, RG 56,Acc S6-69A-4707.BOX 81, File Interrogations. Misc , Report on Discussion with Albert, September 18. 1945 (NARA 0007156) 28 S e c tio n 5 i Ford-Werke in the German Wartime Economy, 1 9 3 9 - 1 945 5.1. Outbreak of War During the Nazi military buildup, industrial factories became subject to oversight through a system of With the outbreak of war in 1939, the German Defense Inspectorates first put into operation in government exercised much tighter control over the 1934."' Ford-Werke fell under the jurisdiction of the activity of firms owned by neutrals. With a few Cologne Armaments Command of the Reich Ministry i ii exceptions, commercial transactions between the United States and Germany became increasingly for Rearmament and Wkr Production, which in turn reported to the Defense Inspector VI based in the aty of difficult, and Ford-Werke had great trouble MunsterThese local commands and inspectorates communicating with Ford Motor Company."' In June reported to the army offices and Nazi government 1941, die United States froze all German assets m agencies that oversaw military production contracts i America, hi response, the Reich Commissioner of An Array Inspection Office was established at the FordEconomics issued a general order freezing all American Werke facility,M property in GermanyAccording to a postwar investigation by U.S military authorities, American Ford-Werke's dependence on foreign capital was a influence over the Ford-Werke plant decreased after the matter of contention between the German government outbreak of war to September 1939 and altogether to 1941.^^ and Ford-Werke during the early part of the wax'" In 1939, Ford Motor Company owned a total of 81 & percent of Ford-Werke, 75 percent directly and 6 "NARA. RG 56, Acc S6-69A-4707. Boa 81, File GermanyIndustrial and Economic Development, Memo from Albeit, September 16,1945 (KARA 0007174-0007175) "* NARA. RG 131, Entry 247, Box 171. File General Germany, Reich Commissioner for Economics Decree, June 28, 1941, In Board of "Dade for Gamin-American Commerce, Inc., News letter, July 31,1941 (NARA 0002471-0002472). ( IWNARA, RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032. File- Ford-Werl* AG. v^AjED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001562) 1,1 Berenice A. Carroll, Design bf Btal Wir-Armr and Economta in the Third Rdch (The Hague Mouton, 1968), pp 111-113 141 For an example of reports from these offices referring to activities ac Ford-Werke, see BA-F, RW 19/10, Monthly Report of the Defense Inspection Office VI. January 21, 1936 (BAF 0296-0297), and BA-F. KW 21/1, War Diary of the Cologne Munitions Command, August 29,1939 (BAF 0764) ,4* Carroll, Design hi TbtaJ Whr, pp 111-121 144 WNRC. Acc. 299-68A-0243. Box 537. Book 29-D A-1944 (I). Streit to Armaments Ministry, January 24,1944 (DOJ 00034840QQ348S)144 144 HFM,Acc 712,Box 9,File Correspondence 1939 No 1 .Memo from Roberge. July 26, 1945 (HFM 0003837-0003841) 2^ i Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Non Regime percent indirectly.1" In December 1940, Ford-Vferke executives began discussing a plan to increase the company's stock capitalization.1" Initially Inspired by Ford-Werke's need for capita] (which Albert later attributed to delays by the German government in paying for goods and services), the plan also was intended to benefit Ford-Werke's position with the German government by reducing Ford Motor Company's stake in the firm.1" The proposal called for the Issuance of KM 12 million in new stock to be sold through German banks, raising Ford-Werke's total stock capitalization to RM 32 million and decreasing Ford's ownership stake in Ford-Werke to 55 75 percent (52 percent direct and 3.75 percent indirect),M Ford approved the plan.1" In February 1941, Schmidt and Vltger presented the plan to the Reich Economic Minister. They dted the problems encountered by FordWerke due to the predominance of foreign capital and emphasized the potential reduction of foreign ownership in the proposed recapitalization plan.1'1 The 144 HFM. Acc 713, Box li, File Corporate Structure-European Operations, Preliminary Report. February 20, 1948 (HFM 0002640-0002642), Coopers & Lybrand Records, Lybrand, Ross Bros b Montgomery to Henry Ford D, March 19, 1948 (0.1 0000316-0000318) German government authorities approved Ford's continued role as majority shareholder, with the reduced share of ownership. The recapitalization proceeded as planned and became effective on March 24, 1941.'" In late November 1941, just before the United States entered the war, Albert drafted a confidential memo about the advisability of a "complete Germanization," whereby German investors would own aD or most of the shares of Ford-Werke. In the memo. Albert outlined how he had persuaded the German authorities that an American majority, even if only a small one, was essential for access to Ford's excellent worldwide sales organization and production methods, and for raw materials and exports. He also argued that American majority control would enable Ford-Werke to exercise influence over the other European Ford companies. Albert noted that after he had discussed these issues with the German authorities prior to FordWerke's share capital restructuring in March, the authorities had rejected "Germanization" in favor of continued American majority ownership of 52 percent1,1 5.2. Robert Schmidt* s Appointment as Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer 147 BA-LJl 8119F/P3334Secret memo. December 12,1940 (BAL 9128-9129)______________ ** NARA, RG 56. Acc. 56-69A-4707. Box 81. File Germany: Industrial and Economic Development. Memo from Albeit. September 16,1945 (NARA 0007174-000717S) 1M Coopers & Lybrand Records. Lybrand. Ross Bros b Montgomery to Henry Ford ILMarch 19,1948 (<3.1 0000316 0000318)._______________ >' NARA. RG 56, Acc 56-69A-4707. Box 8), File. Germany Industrial and Economic Development, Memo from Albert, September 16. 1945 (NARA 0007174-000717$). In this postwar memu Albeit discussed his strategy in persuading Ford to increase the share of German-owned capital, while decreasing the U S. share Albert reasoned that by retaining a smaller majority share, the Americans would still be able to maintain a firm grip on the control of Ford-Werke, while somewhat alleviating the German animosity against foreignowned companies and gaining some goodwill for Ford-Werke in Germany " BA-L.R 8119F/P3334 Letts from Vltger and Schmidt to Reich Economic Minister, February 4. 1941 (BAL 9150-9153) "WNRC.Acc299-68A-0243.Box S36.FUe W17536Ahmidt to Reich Commissioner August 31, 1942 (DOJ 0011030 0011031, for English translation, see DOJ 0011035), BA-L. R 87/6205, Memo from Reich Commissioner, April 22, 1941 (BAL 1178) On April 20, 1941, Ford-Werke co-manager Robert Schmidt was appointed Defense Economic Leader [Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer] for the Cologne facility and for Ford's subsidiaries in occupied Europe.'" Originally established in 1936, the ^^fehrwlrtschaftsfuhrer were a special group of economic leaders throughout Germany charged with coordinating communication 1,1 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Bax 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit IA, Albert, copy to Schmidt. November 25, 1941 (NARA 0000047-0000048. for English translations, see NARA 0000046-0000047 and NARA 0005816-0005817). NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File Germany Industrial and Economic Development. Memo from Albert, September 16,1945 (NARA0007174-000717S) According to a postwar memo by Ford Motor Company executive Russell Roberge, Albert, by menuomng these advantages, was using "logical reasoning which would appear advantageous to the German government" to safeguard Ford Motor Company's majority Interest in Ford-Werke. See HFM Acc 712, Box 9, File Correspondence 1939 Noi 1. Memo from Roboge, July 26, 1945 (HFM 0003837-0003841) 1,4 BA-F, RW 20/3. Entry in Wir Diary, Muenster. Apnl 22-28, 1941 (BAP 1168) After the German defeat in 194S,Allied Ford-Werke in the German Wartime Economy, 1939-1945 between the anny and the Industrial facilities,especially for strategic, war-related manufacturing. These officials, selected from leading businessmen, were required to take the same oath as army officers and were "held responsible for speeding up work not only in their own enterprises but in their districts generally''1'* * 5.3. Government Oversight of Production Overall planning for production at Ford-Werke during the first years of the war fell under the control of Adolph von Schell in his role as the Plenipotentiary forAutomotive Affairs, though von Schell often worked m dose cooperation with the Automodve Industry Economic Group [WiGruFa] For example, von Schell created Change Commissions that were charged with visiting the companies and trying to assess how to conserve scarce materials and produce more effidently. Such a commission visited Ford-Werke in Apnl 1942, and was particularly interested in Ford-Werke's three- ton-truck production.1'4 - After von Schell was dismissed in 1942, the functions of his office were transferred to the Reich Ministry of Armament and War Production under the authority of Albert Speet1" In line with steps taken with other industries, Speer treated a Main Committee for Automobiles to oversee vehide production and serve as an intermediary between the automotive industry and the armed forces1,4 Although the automotive Industry developed its own procedures to standardize operations and rationalize production, the Main Committee for Automobiles established production projections for each firm and kept track of the production numbers ,'4 The Mam Committee also compiled labor statistics from reports generated by the companies and collected information on plant capacity, dispersal of equipment, machine tools and other related questions.1"1 The Main Committee operated through numerous special subcommittees that planned and organized armament programs, and also were charged with keeping raw materials use to a minimum.1" FordVferke was represented on several of these special committees, especially in areas directly affecting the company's manufacturing activities. These included the Special Committee on Three-ton Thicks, the Special Committee on Automobile Structures, the Special Committee on Spare Parts and several other similar groups. Ford-Werke employees AlfonsStreit and Alfons von Gusmann led the Special Maultier [Mule] Committee.'" Also known as a "half-track," the mlUtiry official] included all those who held the position of Vfchrwirtschaftsfuhrer among those Nazi officials who were to be arrested See NARA, RG 260. Economics Division, Derartrliratton Branch, Box 92, File Industrialists, Leading Industrialists, Financiers and Economic Figures in Nazi Germany Who May Be Subject to Prosecution Under Control Council Law No. 10, August 1, 1946 (NARA 0002984 0002997) See ilso PRQ FO 1013/1686, Allied Control Authority Directive No. 24, January 12,1946 (FRO 0000001 0000018)_______________ usvfoolston. The Structure of the Nod Economy, p. SI See also Du Crane Lcrikan do Dritto Rddm (Beduetfhg/Zentner Suedwest, 1985), jx 62S,BA-F.I6V 19/183S.C3urter for the Organization of the Military Economic Leader Corps, pp. 182-190. June 22, 1936 (BAF 0056-0070) in ba-LR 3/282,Note cm Discussion at Ford on April 10 and 11, 1942 (BAL 0456-0470) Present were representatives of the plenipotentiary fox Automotive Affaire, the High Command of the Amy, the Reich Finance Ministry theWiGruFa,the Cologne Armaments Command, an inspector stationed at Ford-Werke, and Faber, LBdtmann. Grandi, Blister and Severe from Fcnd- Wntx.________________ in Lessmann, "Ford Paris im Zugriff von Ford Xoln 1943," pp 218-219, BA-L, R 3/289, Advisory Council Members of the Automotive Industry Economic Group, March 24, 1943 (BAL 0885-0887) The Automotive Industry Economic Group (WiGruFa) was also under Speer Robot Schmidt of FordWerke was a member of the WiGruFa advisory council The coundl was headed by the "Dhtktar" of BMW Members included representatives from Ambi-Budd, Auto Union, Volkswagen, Adam Opel and Daimler-Benz, in addition to Ford-Werke. <rs BA-K.AU Proz. 2/FC 1818, Interrogation of Schaaf, September 21. I94S (BAK 0001-0009) lh November 1942, Wilhelm Schaaf of BMW (who in 1943 also took the helm of the WiGruFa) was appointed head of the Mam Committee for Automobiles. BA-1, R 3/287A. Ford-Werke to Main Committee for Automobiles, January S. 1943 (BAL 0441) See also PRO, FO I078/S2, British FJ A T Report on the German Motor Vehicle Industry (FRO 0000036) >* PRQ FO 1078/52,British FI A.T Report on the German Motor Vehide Industry (FRO 0000036). BA-L, R 3/289. Berlin Representatives of the MotorWhlde Main Committee, April 1S, 1944 (BAL 0889) Alfons von Gusmann of Ford-Werke was on the Main Committee m BA-L, R 3101/9088, Board of Advisors Meeting Minutes, November 18. 1942 (BAL 6208-6222) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Maultier was a truck with wheels on the front end and war economy Nazi officials also noted chat these Anns a track on the back end.lu could be ransomed back to their owners at the end of the wax'" However, foreign companies were not to be S.4. German Go vermnent Custodianship ofFord-Wer ke When the United States entered the war in December 1941, Ford-Werke fell under the direct authority of die Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property in Berlin. Established In January "treated like domestic companies in every respect,'* especially in areas relating to special taxation, the assignment of public contracts, the allocation of supplies.etc. German nationals were to be appointed as official custodians of these firms for the duration of the war.1*1 1940, this office was responsible for securing and As German-American relations worsened during maintaining the assets of firms that were indirectly or 1941, Schmidt and Albert were pushing for Albert to be directly under majority enemy influence. At a meeting appointed as custodian of Ford-Werke in the event of In February 1940, government officials decided that, in war between the two countries They broached the general, foreign-owned companies were to be subject with the Reich Commissioner for Enemy protected and allowed to continue manufacturing Property in a letter written in June 1941 .shortly before operations since they could contribute to the German the Nazi regime froze all American assets m Germany If a trustee should be needed, they wrote, Albert would be the logical choice, primarily because he had been 1,1 BA-L, R 13/11, list of company representatives on speda] comminees.no date (BAt 3004-3005),BA-L. R 3/281, List of Members of Sub-Committees of the Main Committee for Automobiles (BAL 0443) 1,1 Relnhard Frank, Pori atWit In German 7hKks aCnsinWiiiWun, Wol. VIH. (Algloi, Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, ltd., 1993), pp 2S-3I See Section 6 5 of this report for information about production of Maultiers at Ford-Werke * BA-L, R 2/30038, Memo by BSnfor an meeting, February 20, 1940 (BAL 3S48). `BA-L, R 2/30038. Memo on the treatment of enemy buslnessesjune 5, 1940 (BAL 3564-3566) For more general information, see Kail Krleger, Do Rmchskommlssar fuer die B#hamilnog feindildim ygmoegena," Book-Archive. March IS, 1940,p 1._______________ IM BA-L, R 87/620S, Schmidt and Albert to Reich Commissioner, June 18, 1941 (BAL 1181-1184, for English translation, see BAL 12928-12931). In mid-December 1941. during a Nazi government discussion about appointing custodians for enemy property, the German Undersecretary ofState expressed doubts about appointing the managing director of Standard Oil in Germany as the wartime custodian because he was seen as too closely connected with the American parent company See WNRC. Acc 299-68A-0243. Box $36, File W17S36. Journal Na D by Warocke. December IS, 1941 (DQJ 0011053 0011054. for English tramlatlon,seeDC>J 00110SS-0011056) Later that month, in a letter to Schmidt discussing the appointment of a custodianAlbert mentioned his concern that "a third party" might suddenly step In at Ford-Werke, a prospect that would not be welcomed by Ford-Werke. Albert indicated that was a real danger because such possibilities had been discussed for German automobile companies. See NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit l91AAlbert to SdunldtJDecember 30. 1941 (NARA0000455 and NARA 0000462; for English translations, see NARA 0000451-0000453 and NARA 0005917-0005918) "the moving force behind the limitation of Amencan influence" over Ford-Werke since 1934, but also because he had been a trustee for enemy property under the imperial government during World War I The letter also mentioned Schmidt as a possible candidate for custodian."1 (See Section 8.3 for a description of a similar letter from Albert to the Reich Commissioner one year earlier.) Albert was especially interested in being appointed, and followed up with a visit to the Reich Commissioner'" The Reich Economic Minister and the Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs endorsed Albert's appointment In July 1941. But in January 1942, the head of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD) raised I" WNRC, Acc 299-68A-0243. Box 536. File W17536, Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August I, 1945, (DOJ 0011138. for English translation, see DOJ 0011208), In an August 1945 memo, Schmidt wrote 1 had not the slightest objection when he [Albert] proposed to let him have priority for the custodianship of Ford Cologne I knew he considered Cologne as his baby grown up under his thorough care Small surprise that he wanted to retain the leadership I was not offended by his numerous efforts to obtain the post as custodian and to me It would not have meant any difference then if he had got it Wt agreed that 1 would come in quesdon only if he failed." See NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 3. Memo by Schmidt on relauous between Albert and himself August 13, 1945 (NARA 0000051-0000052) B Ford-Werke id the Genu an Wartime Economy, 1939-1945 political objections [polidsche Bedenken]."* In a letter to the Nazi party leadership m February 1942, the party's regional economic adviser recommended Schmidt, explaining that in light of the German character of Ford-Werke and his "confidence'' in Schmidt, it was unnecessary to name an outside custodianBy March 1942, it was apparent that Albert had been passed over in favor of Schmidt. The Reich Economic Ministry now had strong objections [starke Bedenken] to Albert's appointment. However, he approved ofSchmidt, and so did the Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs. The head of the Security Police and the SD did not object"0 On May 9, 1942, the Reich Commissioner requested that the plant be put into trusteeship and authorized the appointment of Schmidt as custodian."1 On May 15, 1942, the Superior Court in Cologne declared Ford-Werke to be an "enterprise under authoritative enemy influence" and appointed Schmidt as custodian1,1 He was required to submit reports to the Reich Commissioner every three months and had to seek approval for such decisions as planned profit margins and bookkeeping practices.1" Nazi government regulations also required that Ford-Werke management obtain permission from the Reich Commissioner before deciding to- iWNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536. File- W17536, Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG. August 1, 1945. (DOJ 0011138. for English translation, see DOJ 0011208. Note:The Allied military translation uses the words "political doubts.") The SD [Sicherheitsdienst] was responsible for the entire security of die Third Reich. It functioned as the intelligence branch of the SS [Schuostaffel, Hite Guard], the political police of the Nazi regime. The SD and die Security Bailee, which included the Gesupo [Gehebne Suatspollzei, Seem State Police], were closely related and under the same command. See Snydee Eafydopedla of dx Third Sddi, pp. 317-318 and 329-330 In a postwar memo, Schmidt wrote that Albert ran into considerable difficulty `on account of his political past The SS was after him especially when they detected that he had helped Czechoslowahan [sic] Jews to save some of their property* See NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032. Schneider Report, Exhibit 2. Memo by Schmidt on AlbertJune 22, 194S Schmidt said la a later oral history interview that Albert's political influence gradually declined as the Nazis' power grew See HFM, Acc. 880. Bax 7. File Germany, Interview with Robert Schmidt No. 2, July 22, 1960 (HFM 0000907) Albert was arrested In September 1944 and held by the Gestapo for six months because the Nazis suspected him of having known about or having participated in an attack an Hitler on July 20,1944 In a postwar interview Albert said (hat when he was arrested regarding the plot, he also was accused of violating the racial decrees against Jews because to many of his Mends were Jewish. See NARAJIG 56Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File Interrogations. Misc Report of Discussions with Albezticptembcr 18.1945 (NARA 0007161),HFMAcc 880, Box 7,File Germany, Notes on Interview with Heinrich Albert, July 26. 1960 (HFM 0000880), WNRCAcc. 299-68A-0243. Box 540, File: 96/4, Memo from Albert, July 16. 1945 (DOJ 0010430),and Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Until Stick, pp 184-186 See Section 2 4 for more an Albert's background. iWNRC. Acc. 299-68A-0243, Boot 536. File W17536, Regional Economic Advisor to Lammen. February 7, 1942 (DOJ 0011043-0011044, for English translation, see 001104S0011046). The letter said that Schmidt "bong a party member, enjoys my confidence . In my opinion, three powers can be conferred on Me Schmidt." (After the war. Schmidt was cleared of the allegation that he was a party member See Section 10 7) The letter concluded, "In the interest of the German stockholders, as wen as to ensure undisturbed further development of this works which may already be regarded as purchase, dispose of or mongage any teal estate or similar property, purchase or dispose of any interest in other enterprises. German, I must emphatically refuse to have an outsider, who might well have his eye on other interests, put in there as custodian " The Nazi party Chancellery forwarded this letter to the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Propcicy and asked If he agreed chat `in view of the German character of these Works,the appointment of a special [outside] custodial! is superfluous." See same source, NSDAP Chancellery to Reich Commissioner; February 13, 1942 (DOJ 0011047, for English translation, see DOJ 0011048) ' ivoBA-L. R 87/6205, Unsigned memo. March 30, 1942 (BAL 1228), WNRC, Act 299-68A-0243, Box 536. File W17S36. Report Regarding the Administration ofFord-Werke AG, August 1, 1945, (DOJ 0011138-0011139, for English translation, see DOJ 0011208)____________ 101 BA-L. R 87/6205, Notarized declaration by Schmidt. May 15, 1942 (BAL 6707) In an August 1945 memo, Schmidt wrote that his selection over Albert did not cause a breach between the two- "When I was appointed, and as he told me, he was really offended and angry, not because I had got (he Job but he felt denounced by the government. As it turned out . he overcame his bother and things went quite smoothly Concluding I might be permitted to say that our cooperation was extremly [sic] good and I am sure he would state the same " See NARA. RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 3, Memo by Schmidt on relations between Albert and himself, August 13. 1945 (NARA 0000051) 1,1 Ford-Werke Records, Resolution of the Superior Court Cologne, May 15,1942 (FW 0008375). for English translation, seeFMC.AR 75-63-430,Box 207,FileGermany AG Minutes of Meetings 1929-1952 (FMC 0003361),WNRC, Act 299-68A0243, Box 536, File W17S36, Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG August 1, 1945 (DOJ 0011139, for English translation, see DOJ 0011208)101 101 BA-L, R 87/6205, Notarized declaration by Schmidt.May 15, 1942 (BAL 6707) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime begin or end any product lines or types of business, establish or dissolve branches, build or extensively remodel any facilities; change the company statutes; or sell, liquidate or close any part of the enterprise m Schmidt was forbidden to have any contact with "enemy stockholders or their intermediaries'' without the express permission of the Reich Commissioner Also on May 15, 1942, the Ford-Werke Board of Directors was relieved of its duties and replaced by a board of advisors whose duty it was to assist the custodian in the administration of the company.1'* In brief messages to Schmidt and Albert, the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property indicated that his choice for chairman of this new body was Albert.'" Albert accepted and recommended that the three other Germans who had been members of the board of directors - Carl Krauch, Hans Hunemeyer and Wilhelm Bdtzkes -- be appointed to the new board of advisors. Ford-Werke Records, Resolution of the Superior Court Cologne, May 1S, 1942 (FW 0008375), for English translation, tee FMC, AR 75-63-430.Bos 207,FUe:Gennsny AG Minutes of Meetings 1929-1952 (FMC 0003361),WNRC, Acc. 299-68A0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August I, 1945 (DOJ 0011139, for English translation, see DOJ 0011209) See ilso NARA, RG407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 196, Memo by Schmidt on custodianship, June 25,1945 (KARA 0000464). 1,1 WNRC, Act Z99-68A-0243, Box 536, File Wl 7536, Letter to SchmldUMay 23.1942 (DOJ 0011040, for English translation. set DOJ 0011042). 1,4 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79. Custodian Report (FMC 0001017)._______________ 'RA-L. R 87/6205, Memos to Schmidt and Albeit from Reich Commissioner May 9. 1942 (BAL 1246); WNRC. Acc. 29968A-0243. Box S36. File- WI7S36. Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1, 194S (DO) 0011139, for English translation, sec DOJ 0011208)* 4 <'i BA-L, R 87/6205. letter from Albeit to Reich Commissioner. May 14, 1942 (BAL 1247-1248) S4 Section 6 Military Production at Ford-Werke 6.1. Production. Overvie w use by German military forces and provided repair and overhaul services. From September 1939 until At the outbreak of the war, Ford-Werke was one of beginning of March 1945, when Cologne the four largest automobile firms in Germany and occupied by Allied troops, Ford-Werke produce ii manufactured a variety of cars, vans, trucks, tractors between 87,000 and 92,000 vehicles, including trucks and other vehicles It ranked fourth in passenger car and passenger cars.100 Ford-Werke's output represented sales and second in commercial vehicle sales, and was about one-third of Germany's military truck die second largest producer of trucks m Germany production during the war*!! Other major truck behind the General Motors subsidiary Opel.*1" In manufacturers included Opel, which produced about addition to a limited number of passenger cars. Foid- 92,000 three-ton trucks between 1940 and 1944, as Wferke produced two different military vehicles during well as Daimler-Benz, Klockner and Borgward."" the war a standard three-ton truck (which came in several models) and the Maultier half-trick personnel Most of Ford-Werke's military production was sent carrier. Ford-Werke also manufactured spare parts for to the German army, although the plant also supplied vehicles to SS [Schutzstaffel, Elite Guard] units and to the Romanian and Hungarian governments.ra> The >* NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B. Boot 1032. File: Ford-Werke AG, GED Report. Rbruaiy 1940 (NARA 0001S62), Schneider Report, p. 22, September 5,1945 (NARA 0000024). following table summarizes the range of Ford-Werke uo Estimates on the local number of vehicles produced at Ford- NARA.RG 260. Entry 108, Box 183. FileAdam Opel, German Werke during the war vary The most authoritative sources Economic Report on Adam Opel,August 1945, NARA.RG 243, indicate that wartime vehicle production levels were between Entry 6, Box 684. File 77a2, Automobile Manufacturers 87,000 and 92,000, see FMC.AR-98-213541, Box 131, Ferry Planned and Actual Production, 1943 and 1944 (NARA Report, September 19. 1944 (FMC 0000917-0000918): and 00003658-0003659). FMC.AR-98-213541 .Box 40.FUe. Ford of Europe Chronology. Information on Ford-Werke AG. circa 1986 (FMC 0005940) 101 FMC.AR-98-213546,Box 2, File History of Plant AH Aspects, 1925-1946, Vuger Report. September 24, 1946 (FMC ' According to postwar Investigations conducted by the U.S 0001995) Regarding Hungarian and Romanian sales, see BA- i Strategic Bombing Survey total production of three-ton trucks 1, R 3101/3561. Memo to Reich Economic Ministry, and half-track trucks by all manufacturers In Germany during September 27, 1939 (BAL 0005), regarding sales to the SS.see the war amounted to just over 250.000 vehicles See U S R 13 IV Wirtsdiaftsgruppe Fahrzeugindusirie/21, Memo to Strategic Bombing Survey, Munitions Division, German Motor Automotive Industry Economic Group, October 9, 1941 (BAL tthklcs bduitry Report, British intelligence Objectives 2989). Originally established as (filler's personal guard,the SS Subcommittee (hereafter B LO.S.) Mlsc Report No. 69.Exhlbits expanded to become a major branch of the German military C and D (FMC 0006013-0006015) dining die war, see Snyder, Encyclopedic of the Third Reich, p 329 SS Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime production figures from September 1939 through early March 1945, and provides estimated totals. Tfcar Number of Vehicles 1939 Sep 1-Dec 31 11.309 est.- 11,788 est 1940 16,537- 17,557 1941 14,330-16,243 1942 14,762-14,992 1943 17,202-17,472 1944 12,915-13,015 1945 Jan 1-Mar6 170-507 est. Ibtal 87,225-91,574 ^Ultional production: la 1942. M-Wait prodsad RM 45,000,000 worth of spat parti. la 1943, ftrd-Wnir produced 3,551 C28TC motes, Also a 1943,tppmdn>ady 40 penest of the pkmti output was dented to spot para production. production of passenger cars to military trucks.m Consequently, there was an initial slowdown in plant operations, and Ford-Werke released more than 600 personnel for use by other industrial facilities in the Cologne area"* In October 1939, however, FordWerke received a large order for several hundred trucks from the German government And in December, the company received an order for 1,000 trucks from the Romanian War Ministry20' In total, Ford-Werke produced approximately 34,000 to 35,400 vehicles during 1939, including both passenger cars and trucks >a 6.3. 1940 Production As had been the case since the late 1930s, every automobile manufacturer in Germany was told what models to produce in 1940."* In February 1940, the Plenlpotenuary for Automotive Affairs, acting on behalf of the army, announced plans to requisition 4,100 vehicles slated for export, including 1.830 produced by Ford-Werke, although the government authorities promised that the companies would be reallocated raw kxNARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 204, Schmidt lo Perry, May 28, 1945 (NARA 0000477) In an earlier letter 10 Sorensen,Albert wrote, "In this country it would not do to counter-act governmental requests. They are less requests than orders.' SeeHFMAcc 38, File. Germany - Cologne list Seibert to Sorensen, August 5, 1935____________________ 101 FMC.AR-75-63-430, Box 90,File- Ford-Werke Annual Reports 1938-1939, Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017062), see also FMC AR-98-213S41, Box 40, File Ford of Europe Chronology Information an Ford-Werke AG. circa 1986 (FMC 0005940)_______________ >" BA-F, KW 21/1. Wir Diary, September 25-October 7. 1939 (BAF 0767-0789)________ tor BA-U R 3101/3446, Monthly report on export situation, October 1939, November 22. 1939 (BAL 0419), Ba-L. R 3101/3446, Monthly report on export situation December 1939, January 19. 1940 (BAL 0423-0424) 6.2. Start of Tfruck Production, 1939 Early in 1939, the German army asked Ford-Werke to prepare plans to produce 2,500 trucks per month in case of war*** In September 1939,with the outbreak of World War H, there was a gradual conversion from io FMC. AR-98-213541, Bax 131, Perry Report. September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000917), FMC AR-98-213S41. Box 40, File Ford of Europe Chronology, Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986 (FMC 0005940) ** FMC, AR-65-IS00, Box 6, File Geimany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Schmidt to Sorensen. April 4, 1940 (FMC 0003155-0003157) and Albert to Sorensen. February 2. 1939 (FMC 0003177-0003178). HFM, Acc 38, Box 40. File Germany Jul-Dec 1938, Albert to Sorensen, December IS. 1938 (HFM 0000294) id Military Production at Ford-Werke materials needed to make up this output.110 Although began work on a contract with the Junkers aircraft firm the Ford-Werke facility continued to manufacture some in Magdeburg to produce gears to be used m the passenger cars during the year to use up available parts, transmission systems ofmachine tools11' Also in 1940, the production ofnew cars was prohibited by the Nazi regime, and the plant increasingly switched over to military truck production 1,1 The change to production of larger military vehicles decreased the number of vehicles the plant could seD.1'1 The company's Initial production goal was set at 1,300 trucks per month, although in September the plant was only operating at approximately 50 percent capacity.11* The company exported some cars to Hungary, although rubber shortages forced delivery of the vehicles without tires In May 1940, the company applied for additional steel allocations to build 400 trucks for the Hungarian army110 Ford-Werke also supplied trucks to the Ford-Werke entered into a contract with the German air force to manufacture motors for barges Ford-Werke brought the matter of the contract before the local Economic Group, and material and labor were assigned According to a postwar interview with Robert Schmidt, Hermann Goring planned to use the barge motors for the invasion of England, an initiative for which Goring had assumed responsibility. A September 1940 U S military intelligence report indicated that Ford-Werke was employed full time in the production of "motors with long driving shats [sic] for use on barges." Over the next few years, Ford-Werkedelivered approximately 1,000 such motors 1,1 (See Section 7 2) Romanian armed forces.11* According to postwar 6.4. 1941 Production reports, total production for the year amounted to approximately 16,500 to 17.S00 vehicles, including On January 1, 1941, a Ford-Werke advertisement approximately 4,750 to 4,850 passenger cars."* The Cologne plant produced parts for other types of machinery and transport In early 1940, the company was published in the Frankfurter Zeitung [Frankfurt Newspaper] proclaiming that German Ford vehicles were presentydurmg German army campaigns in Poland, Norway, Holland. Belgium and France110 In February 1941, Ford-Werke manufactured its last 1,0 BA-L, R 3101/3556. Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs to WiGniFi ud Rddi Eronnmlr Ministry February 17, 1940 (RAL 0121), BA-L, R 3101/3556 Unsigned memo, February 12. 1940 (BAL 0122-0123 ) In March 1940, 400 Ford vehicles originally slated for export were conscripted by the plenipotentiary on behalf of the army " FMC. AR-98-213541. Box 131. Ferry Report. September 19. 1946 (FMC 000093S). Humus passenger car, and all remaining production at the plant for the duration of the war was limited to military vehicles.110 Ford-Werke continued to manufacture three-ton trucks in 1941, although production was hindered as increasing numbers of company personnel were drafted into the German l,lWNRC. Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File. W17S36, Report Regarding die Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1, 1945. (DOJ 0011149, for English translation, see DO) 0011215)._______________ " FMC AR-98-213541, Box 131. Ferry Report. September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000917). NARA. RG 407,Entry 368B.Box 1032, File- Fatd-Werle AC GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001565) 1,4 BA-L, R 3101/3561, Memo to Reich Economic hbnlxoy, September 27, 1939 (RAL 0005), BA-L. R 3101/3556, FordVfate toWlGmFa, May 6,1940 (RAL 0114) 111 BA-L, R 3101/3554, Rdch Economic Ministry to von Schell (RAL 0436) 1,1 NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032. Schneider Report, Exhibit 178, Memo from Grandl, August 27, 1945 (NARA 0000431)________________ NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 172.Memo by Schmidt on L.C 8 motorxjuly 20,1945 (NARA 0000418). NARA, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 483, File 350 05, Military Attache Report No 59, September 25, 1940 pa^NARA 0005677) > pAniforur Zoning. No 1-2, p. 6, January 1. 1941. The Covertlsement also said "Goman Ford vehicles were the dependable servants of the brave soldier. Also for the peace time build-up for the Greater Germany, we will be there " 1,4 FMC AR-98-213541, Box 131, Ferry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000917).FMC.AR-98-213541,Box 40,File Ford of Europe Chronology, Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986 (FMC O0OS94O), Ford-WerkeRecords, Summary of Ford of Germany Production 1926-1977, February 9, 1978 (FW 0003910) UFMC, AR-75-63-301. Box 32, File Ford-Werke Sales, Production 8c Assembly 1945-1953. Production for Civil Purposes, 1945 (FMC 0000029) Other documents Indicate that 41 cars were actually manufactured in 1942, see FordWerke Records, Summary of Ford of Germany Production 1926-1977. February 9, 1978 (FW 0003910) 57 Research Findings .About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime military."1 Also, plant operations were baited briefly after a series of British air raids on Cologne in August 1941."' According to iron and steel rationing reports prepared by the German government, in May 1941 Ford-Werke entered a new contract with the German military In October 1941, the company received a contract to produce 600 trucks for the WafFen-SS m Ford-Werke exported trucks to Romania, Hungary and Slovakia "* Reports an total production for the year range from 14,330 to 16,243 vehicles.1" Production of spare parts was a significant part of the business. During 1941 and 1942, Ford-Werke switched from obtaining its supplies from outside producers to obtaining them largely from Ford subsidiaries in Amsterdam,Antwerp and, to a limited extent, Paris.114 6.5. 1942 Production Shortly after the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment ofEnemy Property assumed custodianship of Ford-Werke in May 1942, Robert Schmidt noted that the firm's industrial activity was "under the influence and control" of the Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs and the Speer armaments ministry And by the end of the year. Ford-Werke officials reported that the plant was "working wholly for the war economy" In the production of trucks and spare parts.11' In February 1942, the Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs ordered steps to streamline three-ton-tmek production in Germany since five different companies, including Ford-Werke, were manufacturing the vehicles. However, at a later meeting of automotive industry leaders, representatives from Ford-Werke. Opel and Daimler-Benz agreed that industry-wide standardization was not possible and that Ford-Werke should continue using its own production methods."' In mid-1942, as a war-induced gasoline shortage worsened, a German decree demanded that Ford-Werke switch Its production line to make four-cylinder trucks with generators rather than eight-cylinder vehicles with gasoline engines. However, this order was rescinded in the autumn, and the Cologne plant again began manufacturing the eight-cylinder gasoline-powered models.u In the last quarter of 1942, Ford-Werke also began `'production of Maultier half-track vehicles According to Ford-Werke internal financial documents. i FMC AR-98-213541, Box 131, Ferry Report, September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000935) > BA-L, R 3901/195, Report of bombing impact on labor distribution. Cologne Labor Office, August IS, 1941 (BAL 0622-064S). ,u M L. R 13IV Wirtschaftsgrappe Fahrzeuglndustrle/21, Memo from Army High Command, May 26, 1941 (ML 2984-2988) and Memo ro Automotive Industry Economic Group, October 9, 1941 (ML 2989). The Waffen-SS [Armed SS] was the tnihtaiy atm and the largest of the main branches of the SS,sce Snydex Encyclopedia of thelUni Rdcb, pi 366 n* M-L, R 3101/3449, Monthly report cm export situation June 1941July 19, 1941 (ML 0488). m Rostwar documents report either 14,330 vehicles (see FMC, AR98-213541.Box I31,hrry Report^eptember 19, 1946 [FMC 0000917]), or 16,243 vehicles (see Ford-Werke Records, Summary ofFord ofGermany Production 1926-1977, February 9,1978 [FW 0003910]) Ha WNRC Act 299-6M-0243. Box 536, Flle Wl 7S36.Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, August 17, 1942 (DQJ 0011160 0011161, for English translation, see DOJ 0011167), Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August I, 1945, (DOJ 0011149, for English translations, see DOJ 0011179 and DOJ 0011215) HI WNRC Rcc 299-68A-0243. Box 536, File W-l 7536, Schmidt to Reich Commissioner, July 24, 1942 (DOJ 0011015: for English translation, see DOJ 0011016) n*WNRC, Acc 299-68A-0243, Box S36, File WI7536, FordWerke to Regierungspracstdent Cologne. December 16, 1942 (DOJ 0011023. for English translation, see DOJ 0011234) n* Ford-Werke Records, Memo on meeting with Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affaire, February 20, 1942 (FW 0001792 0001795), Report on meeting with representatives of the automobile industry, June 6,1942 (FW 0001927-0001930) ho WNRC Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536. Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1, 1945 (DOJ 0011149-0011150. for English translation.see DOJ 0011215-0011216) Hi Sources provide varying Maultier production figures for 1942 Ford-Werke management, discussing production, reported that the company delivered 755 Maulders in December 1942, see M-L, R 3/287a. Ford-Werke to Main Committee for Automobiles, January S. 1943 (BAL 0441) After the war, Schmidt's recollection was that Ford-Werke had not begun Maultier production until January 1943,when 500 "halftracks" were produced, see NARA. RG 407, Entry 36BB, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 91. Memo by Schmidt on halftracks, July 10. 1945 (NARA 0000266) Minutes of a Ford-Werke Board of Advisors meeting mention the production line for Mules and their limitations in the Geld The minutes Indicate that the German automotive industry's Special Committee on Maultiers (of which Alfons Screit was chairman) had produced 2,500 of the vehicles by December 31, 1942, see WNRC, Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536. Tile W17536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes. January 13. 1943 (DOJ 0011115-0011116. for English translations, see DOJ 0011129 and DOJ 0011220) See also Section S 3 .58 average monthly production at the facility was 1,230 vehicles, with total 1942 production amounting to 14,762. Other reports indicated that the company manufactured approximately 16,000 vehicles during 1942."1 A postwar military government report estimated that Ford-Werke produced about 35 percent of the total German medium-truck output during 1942.u' In addidan, Ford-Werke produced RM 45 million worth of spare parts during the year, representing about one-third of the plant's output.1" 6.6. 1943 Production Ford-Werke's production of military vehicles peaked in 1943. According to internal financial documents, the plant produced an average of 1,350 trucks and Maultiers per month during the year In May 1943, Ford-Werke manufactured 1,738 vehicles, its highest monthly total during the wan Reports on total production for the year range between about 16,200 and 17,500 vehicles."* In March 1943, Schmidt was delegated by the Speer armaments 'ministry to "coordinate the production of all Ford vehicles for the whole of Axis Europe"1" This effort included streamlining vehicle manufacturing operations at Ford subsidiaries in occupied France, Belgium and Holland Schmidt also established a foundry near liege in Belgium to make spare parts."' The monthly production schedules set by German authorities for all Ford subsidiaries, including Ford-Werke and the plants in die occupied territories, increased steadily during die year and in December reached a high point of 2,950 three-ton trucks and 1,000 Maultlers However actual monthly production levels from the combined Ford facilities in Europe generally were between 30 percent and 50 percent lower than the schedules set by the German authorities, with the total for the year filling 32 percent below the targets.1" Although FordWerke met its production goals during the first quarter of 1943, by the middle of the year, the advisory board reported "mounting difficulties" in obtaining materials from suppliers and in the use of labor at Ford-Werke. Another factor was the production switch to include Maultiers. But the chief reasons for the production problem were the "effects of enemy action," which had been on the increase, significantly impacting the capacity of subcontractors and undermining worker morale. In addition to vehicles, Ford-Werke carried out other military production and repair operations during 1943. The Cologne plant manufactured 3,551 motors between January and September 1943.'" According to minutes from the January i 943 meeting of the FordWerke Board of Advisors, the company oversaw operations at a repair facility in Athens1,1 And m July 1943, Schmidt reported that because of the German army's continuing repair problems with Ford-Werke engines, the company would "organize the repair" itself and, if necessary, replace the damaged engines m Internal Ford-Werke records report 16,236 vehicles, see Financial Ledger, January 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011-0007890) Postwar reports range from 17.202 vehicles to FMC, AR-98-213S41, Box 131, Ferry Report, September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000918) to 17.472 vehicles in FMC.AR-98-213S41. Box 40,File Ford ofEurope Chronology Information on Ford-WerkAG. circa 19B6 (FMC 0005940) u` NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032. File Ford-Werk AG. GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001562). in See Ford-Wake Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942September 1944 (FW 0007011-0007890). Another postwar report indicates Ford-Werke's 1942 production was 14,992 vehicles, see Ford-Werke Records. Summary of Ford of Germany Production 1926-1977, February 9. 1978 (FW 0003910) The figure of 16,000 vehicles is reported In WNRC, Acc 299h68A-0243,Box 336Jile.WI7S36Jteport Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1, 194S (DOJ 001 ] ISO, far English translation,tec DOJ 0011216) ru NARA. RG 407. Entry 368B, Bax 1032, File Fard-Werk AG. GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001366) <WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 336, File W17S36, Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1. 1943 (DOJ 0011150, for English translation, see DOJ 0011216) FMC, AR-98-213S41, Box 131. Perry Report, September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000918-0000919) * NARA. RG 243. Entry 6, Box 684, File 77a2, Automobile Manufacturers Planned and Actual Production. 1943 (NARA 000365 8),______________ " WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box S36, File W17536. Advisory Board Meeting Minutes. July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011103, for English translation, see DOJ 0011230) The board minutes Indicate that one-third of Ford-Werke production was changed over to Maulder vehicles 140 Ford-Werke Records, Memo on G2BTG motors, October 29. 1943 (FW 0001424)141 141 WNRC, Acc 299-68A-0243. Box S36, File W17536. Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011114. far English translation, see DOJ 0011219) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime with new ones. Schmidt also noted that production of spare pans had increased to the point that spare parts constituted about 40 percent of the Cologne plant's sales.*** 6.7. 1944 and Early 1945 Production Foid-Werke's production levels dropped in 1944, falling to less than 1,000 vehicles per month, and total production for the year amounted to approximately 13,000 trucks.*** In July 1944, German authorities ordered changes in the production schedules for FordWerke and other Ford subsidiaries in the occupied territories, phasing out the manufacture of the Maultier in favor of additional "S" type three-ton trucks.*** By October 1944, the Maultier program had been eliminated and production diverted into truck production.*** (See Section 6.10. for information about a repair shop and reassembly program in eastern Germany in 1944) Overall production at the plant was severely hampered during the last months of 1944, primarily due to air raids on Cologne and increased difficulty of obtaining adequate supplies.*** In August 1944, the plant was shghdy damaged during a British air raid, and soon afterwards, Ford-Werke began dispersing pans of its manufacturing assemblies to a number of outlying areas away from Cologne, including Mullrose. where the repair shop was located *** Additional attacks on Cologne in the autumn of 1944 caused power outages that interrupted plant operations.1*1 Ford-Werke was directly targeted on October 15 and 18,1944 *** As a result, production at the facility came almost to a standstill, and only a few hundred vehicles were made during the last three months of the year1*0 Production during the first months of 1945 remained limited Ford-Werke reported difficulty in delivering vehicles because of continued air raids.**1 From January until US. forces occupied Cologne in early March, the Cologne facility manufactured 403 vehicles *** MlWNRC Acc 299-68A-0243. Box S36, File W17536. Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, July >. 1943 (DO] 0011103, far English translation, see DOJ 0011230) In a postwar report. Schmidt indicated that in 1944 one Ford-Werke engineer had been sent to provide help at a military truck repair facility being erected near Dneprpetrowski in Russia, see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Bax 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 181, Mono by Sdunidt an MBfirose, June 22, 1945 (NARA 0000435) i*1 FMC AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Repent, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000918), NARA. RG 243, Entry 6, Box 684,Flle: 77a2, Automobile Manufacturers Planned and Actual Production. 1944 (NARA 0003659) Both list the 1944 production figure as 12,915 vehicles. Other sources list the figure as 13,015;see Ford-Werke Recordi,Summary of Ford of Germany Production 1926-1977. February 9, 1978 (FW 0003910). and FMC, AR-98-213541. Box 40. FUe Ford of Europe Chronology Information on Ford-WerkeAG, circa 1986 (FMC 0005940)._________ ms BA-L, R 3/3181, Memo from Main Committee far Automobiles, July 27,1944 (BAL 2512) BA-L, R 3/516. Memo, October 2, 1944 (BAL 2588). >'i NARA 0003634 Factory Brief - Cologne Area,October 5,1944, NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, FUe Foid-Worfc AG, GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001572), FMC, FUe Briefing Binder Part F. Interview with WL, July 27,1987 (FMC 0004309 and 0004337) Ford-Werke Records, Vitger to Albert, August 19. 1944 (FW 0002370), NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 204, Schmidt to Perry, May 28, 1945 (NARA 0000483) ,FMC AR-98-213546.Box 2. FUe History of Plant All Aspects, 1925-1946, VUger Report. September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002129) 6.8. Relocation ofPlant Equipment, 1944-1945 In the fall of 1944, Ford-Werke began relocating some of its production facilities and storage sites to the Agger RiverValley towns on the east side of the Rhine '*' In September 1944, Ford-Werke received governmental directions to begin dispersing its machine tools and parts manufacturing processes to Bergisch-Gladbach, m* NARA. RG 243. Entry 36. Box 178, FUe 423. Preliminary Report on Ford-Werke AG. March 22, 194S (NARA 0006932) m* NARA, RG 243. Entry 6, Box 687, FUe. Ford-Cologne, Report on Air Raid History, no date (NARA 0003249) IS Ford-Werke internal financial documents report 296 vehicles made between October and December 1944, see Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger. December 1944-December 1946 (FW OOO7924-O00B282). German government reports Indicate 540 vehicles were made during (his period,see NARA. RG 243, Entry 6, Box 684, Hie 77a2, AutomobUe Manufacturers Planned and Actual Production. 1944 (NARA 0003659)_______________ 1 BA-L, R 3/290E,Telegram. February 20. 1945 (BAL 2147) in Ford-Werke Records,Affidavit ofGuckel. January 30,1967 (FW 0005956). J>* NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 204,Schmldt to Perry, May 28.1945 (NARA 0000483) 40 Military Production at Ford-Werke Osbaghausai and Friedrichstha]*** Hie dispersal was made official by the German Army High Command in lace December 1944, followed in January 1945 by the move of stocks ofmaterial and finished parts to Sloster and Duemmlinghauscn.'" These facilities were intended to "feed the military reconditioning and assembly plant already in opaation at Mullrose.""* (See Section 6.10.) The main Ford-Wake engineering and drawing offices were relocated to nearby Derschlag in February 1945."' According to Erhard Vitger, the entire cost of the dispersal (including the rental of relocation sites) was covered in advance by a RM 8,000,000 pre-payment by the German government early in 1945.1" (See Section 11.3 for more information on use of dispersal funds.) Local Nazi party leaders suspected that Schmidt deliberately slowed the process of relocanan by keeping key personnel in Cologne until the Americans could arrive to take the city1" In early 1945, the Allied advance cut off communications with Cologne, and the Ford-Wake Board of Advisors heard rumors that Schmidt had been killed or captured. It requested that Ford-Wake executive Alfons von Gusmann be appointed as custodian for the Ford-Wake assembly equipment that had been dispersed across the Rhine. The Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Biemy Property agreed, although it is not dear whether this ever formally took place. In March 1945, however, the Gestapo appointed Karl Buse, one of Ford-Wake's executives, as "property administrator" of the dispersed facilities. With the liberanon of Cologne, Ford-Wake fell under the control ofAllied military authorities.2" 6.9. Arendt Plant In late 1939, German authorities approached Schmidt and requested that he establish a new firm to manufacture war materiel According to postwar reports, Schmidt and Albert entered an agreement with a local Ford-Wake supplier, Walter Arendt, to form a new company, Walter Arendt GmbH, without the knowledge or approval of Ford Motor Company According to some sources, Arendt provided 24 percent of the initial capital, with the remainda supplied by bank loans secured with the cooperation of Schmidt acting in Ford-Wakes name In other sources, Schmidt is identified as owning the remaining 7 6 percent oi the new company himself, although he claimed to have received a promise from Albert that Ford-Weike would reimburse him for any losses1*1 No definitive information regarding the company's balance sheets could be located However, in a postwar statement to "* FMC.AR-98-213544.Box 2. File.Hbtory ofRam - All Aspects. 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002129). See also, FROi FO 837/21, Ministry of Economic \aSjfire [hereafter MEW] IntelligenceWfcekly Report No 156, February 1. 1945 (FRO 0000148) This MEW weekly report contains a second reference to a camouflaged plant to the southwest of Cologne, allegedly affiliated with Ford-Werke, producing 36 trucks dally Tills Is the only report of such a plant,and is not confirmed by any other documents. UI FMC.AR-98-213S46, Box 2, FUeJUstory ofPlant - AD Aspects. 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002129) See also NARA.RG 169,Bry S00B.Box 396.File 180455, FLAT Report on German Automobile Industry, November 7. 1945 (NARA 0007047) u* NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File. Fotd-Weike AG, GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001565) NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Brandi, Box 37. Red 39 3, Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee [hereafter C.T.QlS.] Tkrget Report 19/8 on visit to FordGologne-Nlehl Much 10, 1945, document date March 23, I945,(NARA 0005653).* 0000246 *" FMC, AR-tS-71. Box 25, File. International 1947 Na 1. Vitger to Roberge. June 26. 1947 (FMC 0000103), HP. Acc. 61 000417, Box 1, German War Recovery Study 1950 (HP 0000246) UV HStAQ NW 1049/76620. Mono from Pieck, March 12, 1945 (HSAD083S) In a postwar memci Schmidt talked of dragging out the evacuation (in the expectation that the Allies would amve lister than they did) to the point that the authorities' , threats to hurry up became constant.see NARA.RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 11, Memo by Schmidt. June 22, 194S (NARA 0000066). In a letter in Schmidt's postwar denazification file. Max Ueber, Ford-Werkei head of exports, wrote that Schmidt would sit at the west window muttering to himself "Why are the Americans so slow in arriving I cannot go any slower with evacuation, or someone may still hang me" See HSAD, NW 1049/76620, Ueber to Schmidt, November 15, 1945 ((BAD 0860-0861) lMWNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243. Box 536. File' WI7S36. Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August I, 1945 (DOJ 0011141-0011142. for English transUoon^ee DOJ 0011210-0011211). Albert to Reich Commissioner, April 3, 1945 (DOJ 0011094) In his letter Albert reports that be heard Schmidt had died The report of Schmidt's death turned out to be erroneous. 241 FMC, AR-98-213541. Box 131, Perry Report, September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000935), HFM.Acc 880, Box 7. File Germany, Interview with Robert Schmidtjuly 18,1960 (HFM 0000902 000903). FMC. AR-98-213541, Box 52. File Audit Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nan Regime Investigators.Albert said that Schmidt and Arendt shared aD profits from the undertaking.1*1 In a postwar memorandum, Schmidt described the venture as a secret compromise with the military that would allow Ford-Werke to continue manufacturing trucks. The condition was that Ford-Wake would find a supplier to manufacture whatever the military wanted After the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939, Schmidt said there was growing pressure on Ford-Werke to reduce or abandon truck production in favor of "ammunition and whatever enjoyed higher priority" than trucks: "Everybody concerned at Fords [FordWerke] thought that this arrangement was the best to be obtained ... [B]y a comparatively small concession .. Ford could stay out ofbeing turned into a plant for real armament." According to Schmidt, one of the factors that prompted the arrangement with Arendt was the forced conversion of a substantial amount of OpeTs capacity to armaments manufacturing.1*1 Walter Arendt GmbH set up operations in a separate Report - July 28, 1949, Confidential Supplement to Cooper with Report to Ford-Werke Board ofDirectors tom Hlbberaon and Flaojuly 28,1949,and August 1949,hereafter HibbersonPlatt Report (FMC 0000830): NARA. KG 407,Entry 368B. Bax 1032, Schneider Report, Exhlhit 163, Memo by Schmidt on Arendt, June IS.194S (NARA 0000406). m NARA. RG 56,Acc 56-69A-4707.Bax 81. File, faiterrogatlom. Mire., Report on Discussion with Albert, September 18, 1945 (NARA0007154) Ford engineer Valentine TkUberg had spent several yean at Ford-Werke and returned for four months in 1940 In a 1956 Interview, he recalled that during that vislt.he noticed a new building on the grounds that was surrounded by a tall fence. He asked the director of purchasing for an explanation but was given no information. lUlberg ran Into a former Ford-Werke employee who worked at the new building and. over coffee, learned that some Ford-Werke milling machinery was being used there He again approached the purchasing director who relented and told him that the building and In operations were to remain a secret, but that Schmidt and Albeit were using Ford-Werke equipment In their own business of machining parts for airplanes. "I'm sure that ifMr Ford found out that one of his managers had put up a business ofhis ownjnaUng war material for the German Army he wouldn't hive liked It," Ddlberg said in the 1956 interview See HFM, Act 65. Box 72. File: Tillberg (214) Final 72-1, Reminiscences of VC IkQbetg. July 1956 (HFM 0004867 0004868) NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 163, Memo by Schmidt on Arendt, June IS, 1945 (NARA 0000404-0000405) Opel had gone further than FordWfcrke In that it had redesigned Us trucks to the German standard,which Ford had not done But when Opel insisted facility in Cologne using some machinery and equipment supplied by Ford-Werke. In mid-1940, the plant began producing military equipment. Some sources identify the primary product as a 15mm turbine; others suggest that the plant made parts for flame-throwers In a 1960 interview, Schmidt suggested that the facility was manufacturing a rocket engine piece. Sources also indicate that by 1943, the Arendt plant was manufacturing truck parts as well. After the war, Arendt was taken over by the military government and at one time was on a list oflactones to be dismantled under Allied demilitarization plans.1** 6.10. Repair Facilities After the German invasion of the Soviet Union m June 1941, the German Army High Command began developing plans for the establishment of specialized repair facilities [Kraftfahrzeugswerkstatten or Kriegswerkstatten, often abbreviated in the plural as KWerke] m the East1,1 Although these repair shops were quasi-military facilities set up by the atmy, the F^WerRe were operated by German comjwuiies under the aegis o' the Reich Professional Orgamzauon of Mechanics.1*' Typically, the German army contracted with a company on sucking to Its product line, some of its management was forced out and the plant was immediately convened to armaments production. According to another postwar memo by Schmidt, Albert had considerable influence with die older military authoriUes because of his status as a former state secretary "In my estimation It was thanks to him [Albert],that we had'nt [sic] to go Into armament In 1939 and condudcd what b now known as the Arendt deal " See Schneider Report, Exhibit 2, Memo by Schmidt on Albert, June 22, 194S (NARA 0000049) "FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Ferry Report, September 19. 1946 (FMC 000093S), FMC AR-98-213541. Box 52, File Audit Report - July 28. 1949, Hlbberson-Platt Report, July 28, 1949, and August 1949 (FMC 0000830); HFM.Acc 880, Box 7,File Germany. Interview with Robert SchmidtJuly 18,1960 (HFM 0000902-000903). NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 163, Memo by Schmidt on ArendtJune 15, 1945 (NARA 0000406) " BA-L. R 97D/S3 Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics to Reich Economic Ministry, June S, 1941 (BAL 9797-9802). After the fall of France, such repair shops had been established in Wfestem Europe, and the army asked several of the French repair shops to move their operations and skilled employees to Eastern Europe. " For a set of K-Weike regulations applicable In France and Belglum.see BA-L.R 97Il/70,Report on transfer of automobile repair shops to the occupied Western tetrltonesjuly 1940 (BAL 9938-9943) 9 Military Production at Ford-Weike for the establishment of an Eastern repair facility The Army paid for the transfer of the facilities to the place of operation and back, while die firm provided the machinery The personnel at the K-Werke included Germans,Western civilian workers, Poles,civilians from the occupied areas of the Soviet Umon, Soviet POWs and "sometimes Jews."2" In November 1941, Ford-Werke indicated an interest in operating repair shops in Riga,Warsaw and Lemberg At Lemberg, Ford-Werke proposed that it assume direct control over a facility run by a Mr Eberl, who had served as a Ford-Werke dealer in Salzburg. Ford-Werke intended to utilize the facility as a garage for the "fabrication of exchange engines."2" Before any arrangements could be made, however, the facility was assigned to another company after Eberl was removed by the army in late 1941."' In a letter to the Reich 147 BA-L, R 97II/6, Blank contract, no date (BAL 11172-11183); BA-1,.B 9711/53, Note on discussion at the Quartermaster General, February 21, 1944 (BAL 9820-9826) smba-L, R 9711/95, Ford-Wake to Army High Command, November 35. 1941 (BAL 9794). w BA-L* 97II/9SJldch Professional Organization of Mechanics to Army High Command, December 1. 1941 (BAL 9795 9796) For complaints against Eberi. see BA-L. R 9711/95, letter to Reich Professional Organization ofMedsanlcs,Miy 28, 1941 (BAL 9770-9771) and Eberi to Reich Professional Organization ofMechanics, November 1,1941 (BAL 9772) tr#WNRC,Acc. 299-68A-0243Jcx 536JUe Wl7536JSdumdl to Reich Commisstenei; July 24.1942 (DO] 001101S, for English translation, see DOJ 0011016) Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property in July 1942, Schmidt mentioned discussions "of fundamental importance" taking place between the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production and Ford-Werke regarding Eastern repair shops.1'0 In a December 1942 war damages claim filed with the city ofCologne, Ford-Werke cited its effoits on behalfofthe German military, including the construction of repair facilities and production facilities for replacement engines."1 Several independent Ford-Werke dealers established their own repair shops on the Eastern Front during the war at sites in Latvia, Estonia and the Soviet Union 2,1 These facilities employed a variety of workers, including Germans, Foies,2" Soviet POWs, Estonians, and, in at least one repair shop, Jewish laborers.2" Ford-Werke assisted in repair and reconditioning efforts for the German army on the Eastern Front and in Germany. In 1943, a review of the vehicle situation at the Eastern Front had revealed that Ford trucks did not fare well under wartime circumstances. Ford-Werke disputed these findings, stressing that the alleged unreliability of Ford-Werke trucks at the Eastern Front was primarily due to the unprofessional repair of the vehicles by soldiers. As a response, Ford-Werke, in agreement with the military, created "Easc-TraimngActions" [Ostschulungsaktion] Ford-Werke sent trained mechanics and skilled workers to all front lines in order to tram the soldiers to properly repair Ford 7'i WNRC, Acc 299-68A-0Z43, Box 536. File W17S36. Ford\Aferke to Regierungsprisident - Cologne, December 16, 1942 (DO) 0011024, for English translations, see DOJ 0011028 and DCJ 0011236). 7,7 Ford-Weike Records, Letters from T.F to Ford-Werke, October 1988 and April 1989 (PW 0005960-O0OS967) In these postwar letters, T F, a Polish citizen, described his experiences wocking for such a facility, operated by Ford-Werke dealer 777 See. for example. BA-L, R 9711/34, Schneider to the Reich Maletz, in Charkow* 180 Professional Organization of Mechanics, July 28, 1943 (BAL 11082), BA-L, R 9711/34, Heinscn to the Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics.May 4,1943 (BAL 11089),BA-L, R 97U/43b Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics to Males, May $.1942 (BAL U3S6), BA-U R97U/121. Jtogens to Reich Profesttonal Orgamzanon of MechanicsJune 25,1942 (BAL 9827), and BA-L, R 970/42 Daily Older from Major Gum, March 9, 1943 (BAL 11406) With the Soviet Army advancing in 1944, most of the Ford dealer-operated K-Werke were evacuated westward For more information, see BA-L, R 970/42, Witte to Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics, March 21. 1944 (BAL 11400). BA-L, R 97fl/43a, Junge to Belch Professional Organization of Mechanics, March 21,1944 (BAL 12335-12336), and BA-L. R 970/120. Si-hneUer to Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics, BA-L, R 9711/95, Note to flies, October 7, 1941 (BAL 9774 9777). BA-L. R 97H/43b, Maletz to Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics, July 27, 1942 (BAL 11343 11349), BA-L. R 9711/42, Witte to Reich Professional Organization of Mechamcs.March 17,1943 (BAL II373),BAL, R 9711/121, Jdrgens to Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics, June 25. 1942 (BAL 9827) BA-L, R 970/120. Reich Professional Organization ofMechanics to Military High Command, September 4. 1944, (BAL 9691-9692) reports that 180 Jews were working in Ford-Werke dealer Heinncb Schneider's Riga facility Beginning in the fall of 1941,German Jews had been deported to the Riga ghetto in large numbers, thus creating a huge German-speaking pool of workers for German industrial organizations September 9,1944 (BAL 9684-968S). nr Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime vehiclesFord-Werke ledgers indicated that mechanics,engineers and skilled workers worked in the East, in the Balkans and in Italy."* The "TransportGruppe Nagel" (a government institution to handle transports) made plans for a large Ford repair shop in Ukraine. After those plans were thwarted by the Russian advance, Ford-Werke established a truck repair facility within the Reich itself, at Mullrose in Eastern Germany"' According to a postwar affidavit from Schmidt, the company sent seven employees to set up the project, which called for the creation ofan assembly line operation to dismantle, recondition and reassemble damaged trades"* In a meeting of the Spedal Committee - Vehide Repair on September 12, 1944, with Ford-Werke s Alfons von Gusmann in attendance, the Mullrose facility was praised as an example of an excellent and efficient reconditioning shop Beginning in January 1945, Ford-Werke provided consultants for the repair and reuse of Ford parts in support of the German army under the "Reconditioning Plan of the Ford-Werke." Under the plan, two of the facilities devoted to the reconditioning of aggregates and parts were the Klosdorf and Freudenberg facilities of the Ford-Werke dealer Eduard Maletz.1*0 *"WNRC. Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536. File W17S36,Advlsary Board Meeting Minnies, January 13, 1943 (DQJ 0011118 0011119, for English translation, see DOJ 0011221) v Ford-Werke R*conij.Finanda] ledger; January 1942-September 1944.Balance Sheet.May 31.1944 (FW 0007113) Hie ledger also contains invoices from Ford-Werke to die Array High Command for the Ost Akuon, see Balance Sheet. December 31, 1944 (FW 0008277) vr NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 181. Memo by Sdrnudl on MOOrase, June 22, 1945 (KARA 000043$). PRO; FO 837/21, M.BW Intelligence Ufcekly Report Ntx 156, February 1, 1945 There Is some indinrinn that Ford-Werke personnel may have been Involved In operations at the site in late 1943, see Ford-Werke Records, fcnonnel File forJ-H. (FW 0023159-002319$) NARA. RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 181, Memo by Schmidt on Mullrose, June 22, 1945 (NARA 0000435), BA-L, R 3/290a. Note to files re Meeting Minutes ofSeptember 12, 1944 (BAL 2616). ns BA-L.R 3/290aote to flies re-Meeting Minutes ofSeptember 12.1944 (BAL 2615-2621) ,,c BA-L. R 97n/43h Wbrk Committee for Reconditioning to K-Werk Maletz, et a], January 20. 1945 (BAL 11308) When Maletz moved his facility to Biieg, he requested to take 14 auxiliaries with him who had been with the company since Charkow but the request was denied, see BA-L, R 97Il/43h. Maletz to OT Main Technical Office. August 18. 1944 (BAL 11314) 4+ Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford -W erke Jl " fit\A S'&vz 7.1. Overview of Foreign and Forced Labor in German y Between 1939 and 1945, millions of non-Germans were registered to work (usually forcibly) in factories, firms, mines and construction sites throughout the German Reich. Almost every industrial company operating in Germany duringWjrld Vfar n used foreign and forced workers. Their overall treatment was determined by Nazi ideology and practice that placed workers on a scale according to race, nationality and gender.ul These workers were drawn from several different sources. One such group included workers recruited from German allies. These workers generally were treated better and paid better than other foreign workers In the wake of Germany's initial military victories, many enemy prisoners of war (POWs) were put to work for only token wages In addition, Germany transported large numbers of civilian forced wgrkers from occupied territory in Western and Eastern m Michael Burleigh and Wblfgang Wippermann, The Redd Starr Germany 1933 - IMS (Cambridge, England University Press, 1991), pp. 44-74 and 296 lai He exact number of foreign workers sent to Germany is very difficult to determine. According to historian Ulrich Herbert, there were 7 8 million foreign workers registered in Germany at die peak in August 1944 Herbert estimates that, in total, more than 12 million foreign laborers were put to work In the Reich for varying periods See Ulrich Herbert, Hltlcrk Foreign Woken EnbaalfarignLabarliiGcrmaiyiinderthenjrdRoch, translated Europe. Western workers generally received better pay and treatment than workers from Eastern Europe Following Italy's surrender to the Allies In September 1943, German forces occupied northern Italy and forced into tabor several hundred thousand captured Italian soldiers, who were often treated as poorly as Eastern workers Finally, concentradon tamp Inmates were made to work without pay, as slave laborers. Initially, their use by German iirms was restricted to industrial sites established by the firms at the concentration camps However, toward the end of the war, many German companies used concentration camp slave laborers at their own facilities, as well (See Section 7 7. for more on concentration camp labor) In 1939, before the war broke out, there was already a shortage of labor in Germany. On June 23, 1939, civilian and military officials were notified that Hitler planned to draft 7 million men into the military Hitler was preparing to launch a "total war" against Poland1,1 The large-scale use of foreign workers commenced by William Ifanpler (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1997), Preface and p 1 Another historian, Edward Horaze, suggests dm the total number of workers brought to Germany was well over 8 million, see Edward L Horrae. ftreijp Ictor a Narf Germany (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1967), p vii r Overy, Mbr and Economy in (be Third Reich, p. 191, William L Shirec The Rise and Fall of theThird Reich (New York Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp 497-498. 45 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nozi Regime immediately after the conflict began. By the end of put to work In construction projects, in some cases in September 1939.less than one month after the German violation of regulations set forth in the 1929 Geneva invasion of Boland, approximately 100,000 Palish Convention TM The German firms that used FOW labor POWs were deployed in Germany, working in paid 60 to 80 percffit ot Ult HflHlial ItKal wages directly agriculture. German authorities began recruiting to the POW camp fStammlager. usually abbreviated as civilian workers in Poland. In addition to agriculture, a Stalag] that supplied the prisoners. Employers were to few of these civilian Polish workers were used in pmvfgp fond anH housing for the POWs working for construction, industry and mining.TM rfiMw tty rif* i 040 pr^ich POWs were the single largest ffroup offoreigners working in Germany.TM In order to regulate the use of Polish labor more carefully, in February 1940, the Nazi government In the fall of 1941, civilian and military authorities in reclassified all Polish POWs as civilian workers. Between Germany began easing restrictions placed on Western March and September 1940, the government POWs and improving their living and working introduced a set of decrees relating to the treatment of conditions, in part to encourage the recruitment of all Polish workers in Germany. The decrees governed the transport of Poles into the Reich and their working hours, wages and tax rates, including a special `social compensation tax." The regulations also governed their social activities and contacts with the German population, as well as die policing ofthe Polish workers by the Gestapo. Polish workers were required to wear a special identification badge According to Ulrich Herbert, one ofGermany's leading experts on the use of forced labor in Nazi Germany, these decrees legitimized racially discriminatory policies and legalized the Nazi "master race" theory.TM civilian laborers from the occupied Wfestem territories. In 1942, under the direction of the Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment, German authorities embarked on a massive campaign to attract additional workers from occupied Western Europe, especially France. In May 1942, new regulations called for the improved treatment of Wfestern workers, who were officially granted the same rights as German workers when it came to wages, working conditions, separation compensation, working hours, overtime and taxes. Increasingly, however, foreign workers from the West were not allowed to return home after their work contracts had endedTM Likewise, in April 1943, Following the German invasion of the Netherlands, approximately 250,000 French POWs were released Belgium, Luxembourg and France in May 1940, from their POW status and reclassified as foreign civilian German authorities also began employing French and workers But despite this change, most had to remain in Belgian POWs in GermanyTM In the earliest years ofthe Germany and continued to work at the same frailties war, POWs were mostly used as agricultural workers, under conditions consistent with Nazi ideology for although many were salt to industrial facilities that were other French workers TM manufacturing military materiel, or sent to mines, or t,r Homze, Foreign labor In Nail Camay, p 48, Klaus P Fischer, Nazi Germany A New History (New York Continuum Publishing Company, 1995), pp. 487-488 According to Homze, the u* Herbert, Hit/n'j ftintigaWhiten, pp. 61-63 and 85-89 According German army closely followed the Geneva Convention to Herbert, the number of Polish POWs put to work grew proscriptions against using POWs in war industries until the rapidly and reached 300,000 by the end of 1939 Another latter pan of 1941, in 1942. British intelligence reported that estimate places the number at 300,000 In the autumn, and POWs were known to be used In armaments manufacturing and Indicates that by May 1940, mote than ] million Polish POWs transportation, contrary to the terms of the treaty See also wore working ferdliy in Germany. See Barbara Hillman,Volrad NARA, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 463, File 004 Labor. Military Kluge and Erdwlg Kramer, Lvr2/M - Mune LSUentedt ZtvaagsaAeit ^AttacheReport, August 18, 1942 (NARA 0007141). tfir da Irieg, (Bremen,Germany: EditionTtmmen. 1996), p 70 i" Habbeern, Hititr's Foreign Woken, pp 96-97, MacfCenzic, The I|s Herbert. Hitler's Foreign Waiters, pp. 70-79 for information an V_*Tkeaunent of Prisoners ofWar in World VAr 11." p 497 racism as a state policy in Germany, see Burleigh and Wlppermann, The Dedal StstcGeaway 1933-1945, pp 44-74. 1,9 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, pp 194-195* 293 in S B MacKenzle, "TheTreatment ofPrisoners ofWr InWortdW&r ti." Ae Journal of Modem Histoiy, Volume 66, Issue 3 (September 1994),pp 497-498.Heibert, Hider'i ForeignUfaikas. pp 95-96 in Barbara Hillman, et al Lw 2/XI - Mine LQUestcdi 2mngsaibdt fir daKriag, p 59.Herbert,Hitter's foreign Wbtkai, pp 273-274.292 293 and 314-315, BekbuheitsUatt, No 22 (August 5, 1943),p 1404 (BAL 12936) 46 Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 did The lives of civilian workers from the East were not lead to another quick victory, contrary to Hitler's governed by a set of Decrees on Eastern Wbrkers expectations, and it soon became apparent that German [Ostarbeitererlasse], the first draft of which was signed soldiers would not be able to return to their workplaces by Reinhard Heydnch of die Reich Mam Security Office anytime soon. The vast number of Soviet POWs did not in February 1942. Every Soviet civilian worker had to present a remedy for die German economy's pressing wear a badge labeled *'Ost" (`'East'') They received poor labor shortage, as most had been deliberately allowed to food rations, particularly in the early months of 1942, starve to death within a few months of their capture by and were required to live in separate camps surrounded the German army"' German officials now turned to the by barbed wire. They also were subjected to many newly occupied territories in Eastern Europe for regulations governing their behavior While minor replacement labor. In October 1941, Hitler ordered the infractions were under the jurisdiction of plant guards, extensive utilization ofRussian civilian workers in order the Gestapo administered harsher punishments, which to remedy serious labor shortages in agriculture, metals, could include transfer to concentration camps or construction and mining Initially, German authorities execution Eastern workers received low wages and, envisioned that Russian workers would be used in large as was the case with Polish workers, had to pay special groups under the strictest surveillance and without any taxes. The low wages also effectively prevented workers contact with the German populace, while Vifestern from transferring any money back to their families, foreigners would be transferred to more skilled especially since postal communication was largely industrial positions. As this restricted use of Russian prohibited."* workers ran counter to the needs of the war economy, it was eventually modified, and Russians began to be deployed in war-related industries, too.TM In September 1943, another group joined the ranks of people forcibly employed in Nazi Germany Italian POWs, or Italian Military Internees (IMIs). Italians had Extensive recruitment in the occupied territories of worked in Germany before the war and had been the Soviet Union began m early 1942, under the recruited in the early 1940s As allies, Italian workers supervision ofFritz Sauckel. the German Plenipotentiary were officially treated well, although they were often for Labor Deployment. While Russians, Ukrainians and affected by raasm despite ideological links between Belorussians were first recruited voluntarily, German Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.'" However, after Italy's troops in the occupied territories soon began to use surrender to the Allies in September 1943, and the more coercive methods, as civilians were rounded up German military occupation of the northern part of and transported west to facilities in Germany Once they Italy, large numbers of Italian POWs fell into German had arrived, the forced workers were distributed to hands. Commonly regarded as "traitors" and "cowards" Industries that had requested workers through local by the Germans, Italian POWs sent to Germany were government labor offices.'" According to Sauckel's often treated as poorly as Russian workers As a gesture figures, 1,480,000 civilian workers were brought to toward the Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, Germany from the Soviet Union in 1942, most of them German authoriues reclassified Italian POWs as civilian after April 1, 1942, when an average of 40,000 were workers in September 1944, although, as was the case sent to Germany every week. These transports included men and women in approximately equal numbers "* 2,` Christian Streit. tore tomato DteWbraMdri aid die sowjetischai Ktfegsgcfmgaa (Stuugan Deutsche Vferlagsanstalt 1978), pp 9 25, Burleigh and Wlppennann, lhe Redd State 6001117 1933 1945, p. 296____________ Herbert, Hitlers firdp Wnirr* pp 145-149, MacKenzle. "The TVeatment of ftisonen ofWbr in Vforid Wit U," p 499 1,1 BA-K. All. Proz. 2/FC 6124 P. Interrogation of Michael Schrieber, August 28. 1946 (BAK 0074-0106), Herbert. Hitler's Foreign Workers, pp 167-182 1.4 Herben. Hitler's ForeignVSferkers, p 170,Hcrben, A History of Foreign labor in Germany, 1880-1980 (Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press. 1990), p. 149 ws Hillman,et al ,Lw 2/XI -- Mime Libbcntcdt ZmngMrbcil fur den Erleg, pp 72-73. Burleigh and Wippennann. The Rood Stole Germany 1933-1945. pp 298-302,Herbert. Hitlers ForeignWorkers, p 74 2.4 Herbert, Hitfui Fbitign Writers, p. 91 2,2 Ricdotti Lazzero, Cli Schiavi di Hitter (Milan Amoldo Mondadorl Edltore S pA, 1996), pp 6-32, Herbert, Hitlers Foreign Writers, pp 100-106 47 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime with French POWs, this official designation did not greatly alter conditions for the Italian workers."* Another group of forced workers in Nazi Germany consisted of slave laborers taken from concentration camps. Ever since the establishment of the first German campTin 1933, inmates had been forced to work while imprisoned, though mostly in facilities established at the camps themselves. Beginning in mid-1943, however, the SS began to send groups of prisoners to work on-site at companies within Germany. While some of the prisoners were Jewish, a great many were non-Jewish political prisoners and other people labeled "asocial" by the Nazis. The prisoners were first used m construction projects and in the most critical war industries As the war went on, however; more and more companies became eligible for the use of concentration camp labor Groups of inmates with their SS guards were dispatched to work at numerous firms, where they were kept in satellite camps, or subcamps, maintained by the main concentration camps. For these services, the companies paid the SS Economic Administrative Main Office a daily fee per worker based on the worker's skill level"* (See Section 7.7. for more on concentration camp labor.) Jews who were held in concentration camps and ghettos also were used as workers. After the pogrom of t*1 Luigi Cajanl, "Die ltallenUchen MUliir-Inteniieiteii im nartonalvxrialtstlschm Deutschland," In Ulrich Herbert, ed, Europe ad da 'Kdchsdnsan.' AuEnforiie ZMIarldtcr, KritgsgtCuigae ad XZ-H3ftHngc In Datsdhnd 1938-1945 (Euen KUrtexl.1991), pp 295-316_____________ Martin Broszal, "Nirionaltorlalltrttrhe Konzentradazulagcr 1933-1945," In Hans Burhheim et a!.. Amman da SS Suata. vol. I (Munchen DTB.1989), pp 108-20. For an overview on Jewish slave labor in Nazi Germany from 1938 to 1943, see Wolf Gntner. Der GtscUossme Artdtsrinsau ilmtirhcr JwJax Zur Zmmgsaikat air Elanat daVaUgwg 1938-1942 (Berlin Metropol Verlag, 1997) mi for a description of the death marches, see Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. Hitkrfc Wttng Esecutlons: Ordinary Camas and the Hdomnt (NewYork: Knopf 1996). pp 327-75 On the use af Jewish workers in industries in the Heidi, see Hans Mommsen and Manfred Gxieger, DosWbwqgcawak and sdne ArMtcr to Driao Bdch (Eoan-Darmstadt, I997),pp 859-867 mi NAHA. RG 226, Microfllm Ml499. Heel 263, Department of Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG. May 10, 1943 (NAHA 0004270) Simon Reich suggests that Ford-Werke's status as a foreign firm may have contributed to the company's labor shortage, see Reids, The Fruits of ftsdrnt, p 117. 193 8,in which steadily worsening intimidation ofJews erupted Into the violence of Krlstallnacht [The Night of Broken Glass], and before their deportation to the ghettos and extermination centers in the East in the early 1940s, some German Jews were used as slave workers in the Reich *" However; the vast majority of Jewish slave laborers worked at facilities established in the occupied Eastern territories. With the German retreat from the East, Jewish prisoners were inarched westward and, for a few months toward the end of the war, were used at some facilities within Germany"1 7.2. Overview of Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Wer ke In the late 1930s, Ford-Werke experienced a serious shortage of skilled labor.'" Military conscription, coupled with the Nazi social policy of keeping women out ofthe work force, contributed to a shortage oflabor throughout Germany The 1936 Ford-Werke Business Report noted that Ford-Werke had been able to increase the number of employees on))'by training a large number of unskilled laborers and the long-term unemployed "* Some had been out of work for years."* In February 1939, Ford-Werke co-manager Robert Schmidt wrote to Ford executive Charles Sorensen to emphasize that the lack ofskilled labor in Germany was "tremendous." Schmidt asked if there were German speaking men in Dearborn who might be willing to > Burleigh and Wippermann, The Karla) Stale, p 264 See also NAHA. RG 46. Entry 43. Box 670, Hie. Untitled. Civil Affairs Handbook an Germany, no date (NARA 0005099) Historian Edward Homze addresses the Impact of the Nazi social policy on the wartime economy in Germany "None of the early Nazi labor actions had as serious after effects as this campaign to remove women from all gainful employment The social policy ofthe Nazis regarding German women and their role In society had a direct bearing an the decision to mobilize foreign labor during the war. Radio chan attempting to intensify the mobilization of native, especially female, labor, the Nazis followed a seemingly easier course and recruited millions of foreigners." See Homze. brags labor la Nat) Germany, pp 4-10 Ford-Wake Records.Business Report for 1936 (FW OOOS317) In a letter to Charles Sorensen in 1936. Albert noted that conscription had been introduced in Germany, putting the country "under the rule ofprinciples ofmilitary economy" See HFM. Acc 38. Box 33. File 168-F-l Jan-Jun, Albert to Sorensen, January 20.1936 (HFM 0000463) mi For example, the man who eventually became head ofthe FordWferlce camp for Eastern workers was a former police officer who Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke come to Germany to work and become dozens."* A few months later, Schmidt asked Sorensen for a loan of six tool designers for a maximum of six months because Ford-Werke s engineering department was working 60 hours per week due to the labor shortage. Sorensen replied that it was impossible. Schmidt explained that not only was there a shortage of engineers and draftsmen, but new regulations prohibited hiring workers away from competitors. He added that many people who under normal conditions never would have been put to work in an automobile factory were being trained to work at Ford-Werke The use of foreign and forced labor at Ford-Werke began in 1940,and generally followed the same pauera as at other industrial facilities in Germany. Foreigners from Eastern and Western Europe, as well as Italian and French POWs were put to work at Ford-Werke. These men and women lived in barracks constructed by FordWerke adjacent to its plant site, in what became known in Cologne as the "Ford camp"10* After the Reirhshahn [the German railways], Ford-Werke was the next largest employer of forced workers in Cologne.1" Late in the war, men from the concentration camp Buchenwald worked at Ford-Werke as slave laborers. (See Section 7.7.) Until 1940, only German laborers were employed at the Cologne plant, according to a postwar report by Ford-Werke manager Erhard Vitgec110 In September 1940, the plant was working at 100 percent capacity in spare parts manufacturing, while assembly operations were at approximately SO percent capacity. The chief obstacle to increased production was an acute shortage of skilled labor1" During that summer, Ford-Werke's Berlin office had been contacted by a representative of Reich Minister Hermann Goring and asked about supplying up to 10,000 specially equipped V-8 motors within three months or sooner Schmidt recalled that, "material and labor were assigned to us`` for the production ofwhat turned out to be motors for landing barges1,1 By the end of September 1940, an American (See Section 6 3) lost his Job because he belonged to the wrong political party 109 HASlE, Acc. 100. Mice Chief Reports, June 2 1944 to He was imprisoned and remained unemployed for three years .December 30, 1944 (MASK0286-0316) before being hired by Ford-Werke In 1934. See Section 7.6.3 and FMC Interview with Friedrich Wlenchcim, December 8, I 1999 (FMC 0018603) A machine designer hired at FotdWfcrke had been out of work for two yean, see HStADl NW nvriinhtiold Billsteln and Eberhard Illner, "You as new in Cologne, .flfttnippliliaats* Koln in dm Augm der Sitga Hundcrt Tngr enter Anrrikanlscber Kontrollr (Kiln Eroons, 1995), p. 164 1049/39287. Military Government questionnaire of J.W, September 16,1946 An accountant who was active against the rise of the Nazi regime remained unemployed for four years. no FMC, AR-75-62-616. Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001023)_______________ He Joined the Nazi party for the sake of his family and began NARA. RG 226. Microfilm Ml499, Red 263. Department of wtniliig under Vitger in the statistical analysis division ofFord- Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG, May 10, 1943 (NARA Vferke, see KStAD, NW 1049/39230. GH. Military 0004260-0004261 and 0004264-0004265) Government questionnaire, February 24, 1947 (HSAD 1401 1419) tit NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 172,Memo by Schmidt on LC 8 motoisjuly 20,1945 `FMC. AR-65-1500, Box 6. File Germany 1939-194$ (NARA 0000418) Schmidt said that after Holland, Belgium (Sorensen), Schmidt to Sorensen, February 22, 1939 (FMC and France had fallen so fast.with Gdring's Luftwaffe [German 0003176). Air Force] receiving much of (he credit, Gflring commuted himself to bringing England to its knees within six weeks. 'FMC AR-65-1500, Box 6. File Germany 1939-1945 Because of Ford-Werke's "conviction to stay on standard (Sorensen), Schmidt to Sorensen, June 22, 1939 (FMC products," Ford-Werke managers brought the matter before 0003166-0003168) and Schmidt to Sorensen. June 7, 1939 che Automotive Industry Economic Group to establish the (FMC0003I69). For example, a former Judge who presided priority and address the issues of labor and materials. The over the trial ofone ofHitler's fiiends Joined Ford-Werke as "an Luftwaffe finally ordered 2,000 motors and a special ordinary workingman" after being imprisoned and labeled transmission, but there were problems with the design and politically unrrliahle^ee HStAD, NW 1048/34/272,Translated other delays. About 1,000 motors were delivered over two affidavit of HS, no date (HSAD 30S1-3053, for English years, with a great deal of materia] left over For mare on translation, see HSAD 3047-3048). A lawyer who Joined the Gdring, see Snyder, Encydopalio of tbc Thin! Raci, pp 122-123. Nazi party to protect the identity of her Jewish mother became a secretary at Ford-Werke after the Nazis barred women from (J^RaRA. RG 319, Entry 47C Box 483. FUe 3S0 05 Germany, positions in the judicial arena, see HStAD NW 1048/11/6S, V^Miliuuriy Attache Report. Current Erents No, 59. September 25. Military Government questionnaire of M3., November 27, 1940 (NARA 0005677) 1947 (HSAD 0470-0506) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Hie first POWs, totaling "between 100 and 200," included Dutch, French and Belgian laborers.11' There started working at Ford-Werke in September 1940.*" is no dear indication when the first Western workers According to one source, these POWs were French m In a postwar letter to Lord Perdval Perry of Ford of Britain, Schmidt reported that 200 French POWs were employed at Ford-Werke in 1941 Schmidt added that most of these POWs were men picked for the tool and machine shop.114 A 1949 investigation by a police officer in the city ofCologne reported that a POW camp existed at Ford-Werke from 1942 to 1945, housing "on average eighty to ninety prisoners" who were French Over the course of the war, Ford-Werke employed arrived at the plant Postwar reports indicate that the first civilians from Eastern Europe began working at Ford-Werke in the spring of 1942 An internal Ford-Werke memorandum written in June 1945 stated, "As far as we can remember, the first Russian men and women came to us in March 1942.""' Other postwar documents reported that the Eastern" workers arrived in April 1942.111 In oral history interviews conducted during the 1990s, several Russian and Ukrainian former workers recalled workers from Western European countries under arriving between April and June 1942.*" Wartime German occupation. These "Western workers" financial records from Ford-Werke reported 320 Eastern workers in May 1942, with the numbers increasing each month to a maximum of 900 workers in October 1943. 'SMC, AR-75-62-616, Bax 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001023). In a postwar letter to Lord Perry, Schmidt wrote, 'In September 1940, many of our employees were called to the colours and had to be replaced by whatever was available." See KARA. RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 204,Schmldt to Perry, May 28,1945 (NARA 0000481 0000485).______________ Between November 1943 and August 1944, the number of Eastern workers indicated in these records varied between 777 and 882 "* Italian Military Internees (IMIs) arrived at the plant in the fall of 1943, shortly after Italy's surrender to the ,,s Ford-Wake Records, Letter to Vitger July 8, 1946 (FW 0022372-0022377). According to historian Ulrich Herbert, half of the 2 million foreigners working In Germany in 1940 woe French POWs. and in September 1940 Rod POWs constituted nearly 10 percent of the total German work force Also according to Herbert, the presence of the French dunged German attitudes toward foreign labor. They were dispersed in small groups throughout the country as farmhands and industrial skilled labor. Others were deployed in platoons of roofers and glaziers who went from dty to dry repairing bomb damage Consequently, these POWs had contact with the German populace, and enjoyed increasing freedom of movement. See Herbert. Hitler's FmdpVMta, ppt 96, 108 and 124-125________________ "'The terms "Russian" and "Eastern" often were used Interchangeably In Germany throughout the war to describe writers from all parts of the Soviet Union. From February 1943. Ford-Werke's monthly financial statements began classifying aE civilian workers from the East, including Russians, as Eastern workers m Ford-Werke Records. Grass to Vltgcr, July 8. 1946 (FW 0022372-0022377) See also HStAD. NW 1048/34/272. Translation of Report by Wlerschelm, December 26. 1945 (HSAD 3089-3093) 116 NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 204,Schmidt to Perry. May 28.194S (NARA 0000481 0000485)_______________ IlrHAStKAcc 606/1, Report of the Cologne 17* Police Prednct, June 18, 1949 (HASR 0111) si* NARA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76. Memo on visit to Portugal of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne, Germany, June 9.1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832) For more Information onWhaemwurkere at Ford-Werke, see HStAD NW 1048/34/272, Affidavit of Kaj Meyer; July 23. 1945 (HSAD 3073); HAStK.Acc. 606/1, International Dicing Service List of Camps - Cologne. July 1949 (HASK 0082-0118), and HStAD, Rep 118/1179Jnvestlgadon ofVdOteret al for Murder, 194619S2 (HSAD 0152-0176). S'* NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B. Bax 1032, Schneider Rqmrt, Exhibit I83A. Brath to Schmidt, June 12, 194S (NARA 0000437 and 0000455, for English translation, see NARA 0000438) m ELDE.Z10 639,Oral history of LS .September 10,1996 (ELDE 0000459-0000473, for English translation, see ELDE 0000906), ELDE. ZI0 615, Oral history ofS S. September 13. 1995 (ELDE 00002S6-0000274, for English translation, see ELDE 0000632); ELDE. ZI0 633, Oral history ofTN, September 12. 1996 (ELDE 0000233-0000255, for English translation,see ELDE 0000S32) Ford Motor Company was not involved in these interviews They were conducted through EL DE House, museum, research and educational facility in Cologne. Former forced workers who had labored in Cologne during the war were invited to return to the dty for oral history Interviews conducted through EL-DE House during the 1990s. The building houses the National Socialist Documentation Center and a permanent exhibit on Cologne under National Socialism as well as a memorial to prisoners of the Cologne Gestapo; which had been located in the building EL-DE. or ELDE. is from the initials (L.D.) ofthe building's first owner "* Ford-Werke Records.Finanda) Ledger, January 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011-0007890) 50 Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke Western Allies. A November 1943 letter from Ford- time period However, according to the wartime Werke to the Gestapo indicated that a further allotment of 100 Eastern workers had been received, "within our need, reported and approved," and that 600 Italian POWs had been assigned to the plant.11' Ford-Wake's wartime ledgers recorded the population of Italian POWs as ranging from 486 to 568 between November 1943 and August 1944, when the Italian POWs were redasslfied as civilian foreign workers.111 In an oral history interview in 1998, one of the Italian workers employed by Ford-Werke during the war maintained that the number ofDvfls at Ford-Werke remained stable at approximately 500 men through August 1944.*" Postwar reports by Fotd-Werke's management stated that 400 Italian POWs worked at the plant117 7.3. Number of Fbreign and Forced Workers at Ford-Wer ke monthly ledgers and balance sheets from Ford-Werke, the highest number of foreign and forced workers at any point dunno the war was annroximatdy~%,000. This peak occurred in August 1944 111 In some other records, there are references to numbers of workers, including foreign and forced workers, during 1942 and 1943. In August 1942, the Ford-Werke Board of Advisors discussed the need to employ soil more "prisoners," in particular Russians 111 In October 1942, Schmidt reported to die Reich Commissioner for the IVeatment of Enemy Property that as of September 30, Ford-Werke's work force numbered 4,172 people, including 570 Russian civilian workers and 89 French POWs.110 In July 1943, Schmidt's quarterly report to the Reich Commissioner indicated the total work force as of June 1943 was 4,985, including 749 Eastern workers and 79 POWs.111 The total number of foreign and forced laborers who worked at Ford-Werke over the course of the war is difficult to determine for several reasons. Some sources provide general approximations, others give precise numbers, but only for selected groups or for a narrow NAHA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Boot 1033, Schneider Report, Exhibit 18A, Letter from Bucbwild to the Gestapo Cologne. November 8. 1943 (NARA 0000076) 115 Ford-Werke RecordsJhunaal Ledger, January 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011 -0007890) See also FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001023), SIDE. Oral history of M.M.. September 8, 1998. (ELDE 000016Z-0000186: for English translation, see ELDE 0000201), and IWM, FD 4369/45, Folder A. Staff report summary. September 1, 1944 (IWM 0000471) AU these sources Indicate chat Italian Military Internees, or POWs, were classified as ordinary workers beginning in September 1944 However, one source suggests this may have occurred in the spring of 1944, see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 183A, Memo from Brach to SchmidtJune 12,1945 (NARA 0000437 and 0000455, for English translation, see NARA 0000438) ir* ELBE. Oral history of M.M, September 8. 1998 (ELDE 0000162-0000186, far English translation.see ELDE 0000198 0000203). 'Our group had 500 men.and they sent us to Ford How do you know there were exactly 500? They give us work numbers that went from 1S.00I through IS 500 " MM. also sald.Tes.there were five hundred . anyone who got sick was replaced by someone newt' ' NARA. RG 407. Bury 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit I83A, Memo from Brach to Schmidt, June 12. 1945 (NARA 0000437 and 0000455, for English transladon, see NARA 0000438), FMC. AR-75-62-616. Box 79. Custodian Report, (FMC 0001023) ,1* Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger. January 1942 September <944 (FW 0007011-0007890) Providing an accurate number of forced and foreign workers is further compliested^-by the fact that different categories of workers were not always referred to in the same way The term "prisoner," for example, was not restneted to POWs but sometimer was used synonymously with "people working at the plant not of their own free will" In the postwar period, some Ford-Werke employees referred to forced laborers as "displaced persons" The available documentation does not allow for the tracking of individual workers, making an evaluation of work force turnover difficult Sec FMC. AR-98 213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000917-0000918); NARA, RG 260, Property Division. Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 546, File' Ford-Werle, Memo to files by Rams, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0000582-0000583): HStADt NW 1048/34/272. Testimony of Dr Iftfenzel, December 16, 1945 (HSAD 3060), and Herbert. Hitler's FntigiilMnfctn, pp. 105-116 M'WNRC. Act 299-68A-0243, Box 536. File W17536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, August 17, 1942 (DOJ 0011161. for English translatlon.see DOJ 0011167) In the English version, the German Gefangenen [prisoners] Is translated incorrectly as "prisoners of war" [Kriegsgcfangenen] While the term "Gefangenen" is usually translated as "prisoners" or "captives," it might be used here to refer to foreign workers. Although both the German and English versions are unclear; they appear to indicate that foreign workers made up more than one-fourth ofthe work force at this point ,,0WNRC.Acc. 299-68A-0243.Box 536,Fde W17536.Schimdt to the Reich Commissioner, October 13,1942 (DOJ 0011012. for English translation, see DOJ 0011013), Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942 - September 1944, Statudk, September 30, 1942 (FW 0007697) >'> WNRCAcc. 299-68A-0243.BOX 536,File W17536.Schmidt to the Reich Commissioner, July 15. 1943. (DOJ 0010990, for English translatlon.see DOJ 0010991) D Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Also as ofJune 1943, Schmidt reported that half of the employees at Ford-Werke were female."* In July J 943, RrHmirit reported to the board of advisors that about half the work force was made up of foreigners, Including i ,200 Russians, and that most of the Russian workers were female."* Internal Ford-Werke financial records -- the wartime monthly ledgers and balance sheets - included some m NARA, RG 84, Bidy 3126, Box 76, Memo re Visit to Portugal of the manager of the Ftad Motor Company plant at Cologne. o>nmny, June 9. 194S (MARA 00003830-00003832) This Inforrrutinn was provided by Schmidt during a visit with the management ofFood ofPortugal. Schmidt also reported that of die remaining men in the Ford-Werke work force, most were Russians. Belgian men were next In numbers, followed by various other nationalities. ass WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File WI7S36, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes. July 1. 1943 (DOJ 0011103. for English translation, see DOJ 0011230). breakdowns on categories of foreign workers at the plant Internal Ford-Werke staff reports also included some informauon on the work force. However; the information for the different categories of workers was not always reported or described systematically m these sources.*'* Also, they provide scant information on numbers of foreign workers. Including POWs, at the plant prior to Apnl 1942, or after August 1944. The bar chart, Labor Trends at Ford-Werke, shows the makeup of the work force from January 1941 through August 1944. (See Appendix D for a table showing the monthby-month statistical breakdowns that were available for the period from January 1941 through December 1944.) iThe monthly financial recoids sometimes refer to Russian civilian workers and sometimes to workers from the East References to POWs sometimes refer specifically to French POWs and sometimes not. Also, the numbers of other foreign workers were not always recorded. Si Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke Postwar reports cm the numbers of foreigners working at the plant provide even less precise figures than the wartime ledgers.**" In March 1945, immediately after the capture of Cologne, Schmidt described the work force at the plant to American military investigators. He stated that in the third quarter of 1944, the work force was composed of a "total of 5,000, consisting of 800 on salary roll, [the] balance ofpayroll [cansistedoi] 2,000 Germans, 2,200 foreigners of which 800 were Russians, 400 Italians and [the] balance Dutch, French and Belgian.""* ErhardVitger also was questioned about the numbers of foreign workers, and during his Interview, he showed the Americans some documents. A memorandum prepared by U.S military investigators reported that one of those documents indicated that approximately 40 percent of the total workers in the plant during 1943 and 1944 were foreigners. About one-third of the foreign workers were POWs (primarily Russians), while another one-third were Russian civilians, according to that document."7 7.4. Obtaining Foreign and Forced Workers Companies went throughjaapphatfoii^iiQQES&io employ foreign labor A detailed form describing the conditions of employment and the reasons for needing the foreign labor was submitted to the local labor office [Arbeitsamt]. The application was then forwarded for approval by other government labor offices before workers were assigned.'" Similarly, to retain and maintain their work forces, companies reported their needs - based on the orders they had received -- to the labor office. This was standard procedure not only for forced and foreign workers, but also for German personnel "* When asked in a postwar interrogation how foreign workers and POWs were obtained at FordWferke, Robert Schmidt explained that the government asked the combine of automobile firms how much it could produce if it were "given a certam number of DPs [displaced persons] for laborers After consultation the combine informed the Speer ministry and the laborers were ultimately sent" io the plants. "* In oral history interviews conducted in the 1990s, some former Eastern workers recalled being sent to Germany via train and initially arriving at transit camps.where Ford- us one ofthe fiat postwar camraunlcatioiu from Ford-Werke to Lord Perry of Ford of Britain Indicates that 800 Russians were employed in 1942 The report further stales that by 1943.400 Italian men worked for Ford-Werke Cologne, see NARA, KG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 204, Schmidt to Perry. May 28.1945 (NARA 0000481-0000485) A report prepared by Lord Perry's office and dated September 19, 1944, provides some of the same numbers as the report died above, however, it provides no information on the number of French prisoners, see FMC, AR-98-213541. Box 131, Perry Report, September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000917-0000918) Vttger'e 1946 report to Ford Motor Company breaks down the information for the yean 1943 and 1944 Vitger states that in the fall of 1943. more than 1.000 forced workers were employed at the plant, and by 1944, at least 2.000 of the average number of 4,500 workers on the payroll were foreigners. The report further stales "that SO percent of these [were] Russian dvilflan] workers, the rest consisting of 25 percent war-prisoners and other foreign workers " See FMC AR-75-62-6t6.Box 79,Custodian Repon,(FMC 0001023). In 1946, Ford-Wake's wartime food purchaser claimed that *1,800 German workers received lunch, while 3,600 foreign workers received all three meals." See Ford-Werke Records, Gran to VUger. July 8, 1946 (FW 0022372-0022377) In testimony on behalf of the former plant physlcun.the leader of the Russian camp wrote in 194S, 'During the time more and more east-workers were placed at the disposal of the Ford Vfarks, Cologne, up to the average ofabout 800 persona (about 270 to 300 males and the balance females) during the last IX years." SeeHScADNW 1048/34/272.Translation ofReport by Wlerschelm,December 26. 1945 (HSAD 3089-3093) Werke employees selected them for work at the "* NARA, RG 338. Entry 42389,Box 3. File 15th Daily Reports 9 Mu-12 May `45, Detachment EIK2 Daily Report No 3, March 12, 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881) M' NARA.RG 260,Economics Division,! G. Farben Control Office, Bax 24, unlabeled file, Memo to files on conversauon with Vitger, June 11.1945 (NARA 0006980-0006982) 1>a IWM, Germany Basic Handbook (Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1944), Part D, Section R. p 12 (IWM 0000036) From (he Arbeitsamt, the foreign labor appllcauons went to a department of the German Labor Front known as the Office for Labor Deployment. Those that were approved went to the regional labor office. If the requirements of any given request could be met from within the region, arrangements were made for the transfer of labor to the requesting company If (here was insufficient foreign labor available, the application was sent to the Reich Ministry of Labor, where it was handled by an office that kept a cud index showing work force data on all the firms employing foreign labor ,M Herbert. Hitkr's Fordgo Wilkin, pp 167-87 See also the explanations given at the Nuremberg trials, BA-K. All Proz. 2/FC 6126 P. Interrogation of Michael Sdirieber, August 28, 1946 (BAX 0074-0106) 1,0 NARA, RG 260, Property Division, Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 546. File Ford-Werke, Memo from Runs, June 13. 1945 (NARA 0000582) _ S3 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under tbe Nazi Regime facility.1,1 (A different process was required for the use from Western Europe received the highest pay (in line of concentration camp labor. See Section 7.7.) with male workers from Germany), while female workers from Eastern Europe received the lowest pay144 An internal Ford-Werke document from 1942 repented that the company made efforts to recruit An Internal Ford-Werke memorandum dated June Belgian workers from the Ford of Belgium facility in 12, 1945, and addressed to Schmidt states that French Antwerp, which was administered by Ford-Werke. POWs received RM 0 80 per hour In wages, with 60 These efforts included a plan to establish a training percent p^d rn Staby Bonn in program for Ford-Werke at Ford of Belgium, although accordance with German POW regulations and the Ford-Werke officials expressed concerns that the balance paid to the French workers in POW money*45 Belgian workers might be assigned to other companies These figures are consistent with Visit's postwar by the local Labor Office once they had completed the reports to Ford Motor Company. Vitger's reports also training program.*" state that as of September 1943, French POWs were classified and paid as "ordinary workmen." This 7.5. Compensation for Foreign and occurred as a result of a decision by German officials in Forced Workers at Ford-Wer ke Few records are available regarding compensation for foreign and forced labor at Ford-Werke. Fay ledgers consultation with the Vichy regime in Germanoccupied France.*44 Postwar reports are in general agreement about the woe included in the financial documents taken from initial pay rates for Italian POWs and the subsequent the plant by the U.S. military invesuganve team, but the change in their status and pay in 1944 The June 1945 ledgers that survived the ensuing years do not provide memorandum to Schmidt states that the Italian POWs t i enough information to calculate wage rates for foreign initially received RM 0 60 to RM 0 70 per hour, with workers.141 Postwar reports and interrogations ofFord- 60 percent of the wages paid to Stalag Bonn in Werke managers do provide some information, accordance with the POW regulations and the although the picture is incomplete. The best available remaining 40 percent paid in POW money The memo information regarding foreign workers' wages and indicates, however, that "as far as we can recall," in the other Ford-Werke pay rates is shown in a table, Ford- spring of 1944, the Italian POWs began to be regarded VferkeWipe Schedule During WorldWar n,on page 56. as civilians and were paid RM 0 80 to RM 1 00 per In accordance with compulsory Nazi regulations hour, depending on age and efficiency Their governing pay scales for foreign workers, male workers deductions were the same as for the German workers mi See BIOS, Z10 617, Oral history of IJL, September 16, 1995 (EIDS 0000065-0000087, for BngLuh translation, see ELDE 0000661); ELDE.Z10.66S, Oral history of N.S, September 8, 1998 (ELDE 0000391-0000401, for English translation, see ELDE 0000615-0000621) A 1942 Ford-Werke financial audit reported that the company paid RM 30,925 for the transport of Russian civilian workers to Cologne; see BA-L, R 87/6210, Audit by Knipprath for BusinessYear 1942, (BAL 7555 and BAL 7559),__________________ mi IWM.FD 4369/45, Bolder Btoecker to Schnudtjuly 4.1942 (1WM 0000183-0000184). mi NASA, BG 260, Property Division, Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 546, File. Ford-Werte, memo to flies by Rains, June 13. 1945 (NARA 0000582-0000583); Rard-Werkt Records.Financial Ledger;January 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011-0007890) mv For a discussion of Nazi racial hierarchy ideology and regulattons.see Herbert, HltlrrsForeignWaken. pp. 202-204,and Burleigh and Wlpperraann, Ike Kochi State, pp 44-74 Ml NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032. Schneider Report. Exhibit 183, Memo From Brach to Schmidt, June 12, 1945 (NARA 0000437 and 0000455, for English translation, see NARA 0000438) Some companies adopted tbe policy of paying their Eastern workers with camp money that could be used only for purchases on the plant site, see Herbert, Hitler's foreign Waken, p. 185 M` FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report. (PMC 0001023) Beginning m January 1943, several agreements wre readied between the Vichy regime's leader. Pierre Laval, and the German Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment, Fritz Saudtel. regarding French POWs These include a `'liberalized statute" whereby some POWs were immediately reclassified as civilian workers, and a recruitment exchange program stipulating that (he German government released two POWs and reclassified a third for every three new French civilian workers sent to Germany See Herbert. Hitler's foreign Workers, pp 273-274,and Mackenzie. "TheTteatment of Prisoners ofWar in WsrldWhr II," pp 500-S01 Available documentation does not Indicate under which program the Ford-Werke POWs were reclassified 54 Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke (25 percent.)14' VItger's reports indicate the Italian POWs were initiaDy paid RM 0 65 per hour, although he indicated that they were reclassified as civilian workers in September 1944. '** These postwar records suggest Western workers at Ford-Werke received roughly the same wages as the German workers,M* whose pay ranged from RM 1.00 per hour to RM 1 70 per hour. The Wfestera workers who lived on the grounds had RM 1.50 per day deducted for living expenses."0 In a November 1943 report to Albert regarding Ford-Werke business matters for October 1943, Vitger wrote that the hourly wage rate for manufacturing labor at Ford-Werke had decreased from RM 1.28 per hour in January 1943 to RM 1 22 per hour in October The hourly wage rate far all labor at Ford-Werke declined from RM 1 23 to RM 1.17 during the same period, he wrote. Vitger attributed the decline in these rates to the increased use of women and foreigners Government regulations required that Eastern workers be paid at the lowest rates of all nationalities working in Germany during the war During an interrogation by American military inspectors in June 1945, Schmidt said that the system for paying the workers changed gradually for the better after they were first brought to the plant. A Russian worker under the first pay plan received about a third of the total pay that was due, with the rest going for taxes (50 percent) and food and lodging, which were provided by Ford-Werke. Men were paid more than women. Schmidt also said that the pay for Eastern workers eventually approached that of the German workers>n Other postwar documents indicate that Eastern workers' wages were paid monthly, with about half of the amount deducted for taxes and an additional RM 45 taken out for food and lodging, leaving approximately RM 30 to RM 40 per month left over after deductions. These documents also indicate that a new pay schedule for Eastern workers was implemented in the autumn of 1943, under which workers received higher wages, health insurance and a reduced level of deductions amounting to 50 percent of earnings."1 In August 1943, Eastern workers complained that they were not receiving all of their pay An internal investigation revealed that in nearly 30 cases reviewed up to that point, not enough hours had been recorded and some people were not mentioned at all in the reports recording time worked. Werner Buchwald, a Ford-Werke employee and the plant counterintelligence liaison, asked the plant wage office to dear up the matter and prepare payment immediately *" NARA, KG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 183. Memo from Bncb to Schmidt, June 12, 1945 (NARA 0000437 and 00004SS, for English translation, see NARA 0000438), Exhibit 20, Memo from Schmidt, fuiy 18, 194S (NARA 0000083-000008S). M* FMC, AR-7S-62-616, Box 79. Custodian Report (FMC 0001023). M'NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 20, Memo from Schmidt. July 18. 194S (NARA 0000085), Exhibit 183A, Bncb to Srhrnldt. June 12, 1945 (NARA 0000437 and 0000455, for English translation, see NARA 0000438), FMC AR-75-62-616. Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001023) ua FMC AR-98-213544.Box 2. FileJiistory ofPlant -AH Aspects. 1925-1944, Vitger Report, September 24, 1944 (FMC 0002046-0002047) m Ford-WerkeRecords.Vitger to Albert,November 19,1943 (PW 0002445). NARA. RG 260. Property Division, Property Control and External Assets Branch, Ben 546, Hie, Ford-Werte. memo to flies by Rains. June 13. 1945 (NARA 0000582) Postwar financial records from Ford-Werke indude references to monies owed to former foreign workers. The December 1945 balance sheet identified items not under the control of the business. This category lnduded unclaimed wages and salaries of foreign workers employed at Ford-Werke durinp the war. The entry indicates that RM 63,419 in "[s]avmgs deposits of foreign workers employed during the war at Ford; Werke AG" had been credited to a blocked irmimt at the Deutsche Bank. Cologne, by order of the military 111 NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032. Schneider Repoit, Exhibit 183A, Memo from Brxch to Schmidt, June 12, 1945 (NARA 0000437 and 0000455, for English translation, see NARA 0000438), FMC. AR-75-62-616, Box 79. Custodian Report (FMC 0001023) n* NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 184,Memo from Buchwald to Grand/, August 20,1943 (NARA 0000438-0000439) 1 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime i | Wages far Germans (per hour) | Non-productive*11 labor | Non-productive departments | Productive departments Wags Rate (RM) Low High 100 1.20 1.00 1.50 1.20 170 Sdurce: FMC, AR-98-213S46. Bax 2, File: History of Plant - All Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002042-000205S). | Rfagaa for other laborers (pw here) 1 Western workmen I French P0We" I Italian POWs*" 1 East wcrkmsnfRusalan civilian 1 workers (men) (pre-autumn 1943) j Eastffiussfan civilian wotkers i (women)** (pre-autumn 1943) I East wwkmen/Russtan civilian 8 workers (autumn 1943 and afterward)"* 1.00 1.70 0.80 0.80 0.65 0.65 032 0.78 024 0.59 0.60 1.20 [ Salaries of Gorman employaes (monthly RM) 1 Group 1: Non-skillod employees 1 Z. Skilled emptoyaes-dependantjobs Group 3: Skilled employees-tndependent lobs Group 4Assistant department heads Group 5: Department heatte Low 125 130 150 600 8004 t !c '_Hr- > High 325 475 575 750 . government.1*0 During 1947, these and other funds, displaced persons," were shown as having been totaling RM 109,292.66 and described as "Savings of transferred to a special account at the Deutsche Bank > FMCAR-98-Z13S46.BOX 2, Hie History ofPlant - AH Aspects. 192S-I946, Vitger Report. September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002047). Under Whge and Salary Levels In the Vitger report, "Non-Productive labor" was described as "cleaning, car washing, etc." "Non-Productive departments* were considered to be such as "Stock-Oept, Chauffeurs, Factory-Service, etc." "Productive departments* were considered to be "machine-] hall, tool-joh, assembly-line, etc" See Section 7 6 1 far more\ details on work assignments at Ford-Werke during the war u< French POWs were riassiflvd and paid as "ordinary workmen" beginning in September 1943. according to FMC, AR-75-62 616, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001023) 447 These were the initial pay rates. In 1944, Italian POWs were redassifled and paid as "ordinary workmen" See FMC. AR-98213S46,Box 2,FUc History of Plant - All Aspects, 192S-1946. Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002046)* 2 * Rates ranged according to age; see FMC AR-98-213S46, Bax 2. File History of riant - All Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002046) u* From this time onward. Eastern/Russian workers were paid "according to sex, age and efficiency RM 0 60 to RM 1 20 per hour" See NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 183A, Memo from Brach to Schmidt, June 12, 1945 (NARA 0000437 and 0000455. for English translation. -Sjee NARA 0000438) 460 FMC, AR 75-62-616. Box 79, Custodian Report, Separate Sdledule ofall Assets and UablUiies of Balance Sheet.December ^xOl.1945 (FMC 00060S6-00060S7) The amount was listed as an asset. Vltger's postwar report confirmed that the savings of displaced persons in the amount ofRM63.419 were being held at the Deutsche Bank, see FMC AR-7S-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0000989) See also Ford-Werke Records,Unclaimed Wages and Salaries ofForeign and Migrant Worken.no date (FW 0006052-0006061) for a breakdown of the RM63.419 into the amounts owed to individual workers by nationality According to historian Edward Kornze, German authorities during the war encouraged foreign workers to place some of their wages in savings accounts to be transferred to their families abroad The Germans were hoping to prevent the foreign workers' wages from entering the already heavily S6 Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke These funds do not appear in Ford-Werke's financial records after 1947."' 7.6. Conditions for Foreign and Forced Workers at Foid-Wer ke The average workweek at Ford-Werke for all workers grew tonga as the war continued. In his postwar report, Vltger wrote that before the wan Ford-Werke was working five days, or 40 hours, per week. In 1940, working hours in the factory were set at 48 hours per week; they were raised to 54 hours per week at the depleted consumer market In the case of Eastern workers, however, Herbert notes that their low wages effectively prevented them from saving any substantial amounts. See Homzc Furdgn Labor In Nad Gammy, pp 245-246,aitd Herbert, Hitleri FcjdgnWtiknj, p. 91. *`l Ford-Werke Records, Main Account Book 1947, Deutsche Bank Kiln - Savings ofDisplaced Persons (FW 00151S6) The funds woe transferred In three stages: RM 69,419 31 was sent an January 1, 1947, RM 49,402 35 was transferred on May 31, 1947, and a final transfer of RM 471 occurred on September 30,1947 In May l952,theAlliedffighCommission asked the Wst German gcwemment to accelerate the collection of back pay owed to former POWs and foreign workers. (The commission, consisting ofrepresentatives from Britain, France and the United States, was created In 1949 with the establishment of the German Federal Republic, also known as West Germany The commission replaced the former postwar Allied military government In Germany) Back pay sums collected in response to the commission's request woe to be transferred to accounts or representatives in Germany to be nominated by the entitled persons. hi September 1952. the West German government reported to the commission that the question ofpayment of back pay for farmer POWs and foreign workers had been settled at the London Debt Conference Former workers were entitled to receive the amounts owed to them In five equal yearly installments starting in January 1953. Under terms of the agreement, the amounts that had been placed in financial institutions on behalf ofthe former workers could be applied for and Included in the settlement. See PRQ FO 1036/932. Slater to Blankenhom, May 5. 1952 (PRO 0000165-0000168) and FRO.FO 1036/932, von Tkutzschler to i, September 18, 1952 (PRO 0000171). 1C, AR-75-62-616, Boa 79, Custodian Report (PMC 101023).______________ , RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76. Memo on visit to Portugal manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne, June 9,1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832). Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536. File W17S36, Advisoty Meeting MinutesJuly 3,1943 (DOJ 0011103-0011104; English translation.sec DOJ 0011230) Schmidt said that it was necessary to have people work long hours to (void losing more workers to the military draft beginning of 1943. In 1944, work hours were raised again, this time to 57.5 hours. The last increase took effect in August 1944. From this time on, 60 hours were worked per week.'" During his visit to Portugal in June 1943, Robert Schmidt emphasized that, "all' Ford plants in Europe are working 24 hours a Hay"1*1. Tn~ July 1943, Schmidt reported to the board of advisors that everyone at the Cologne plant was working 54 to 60 hours a week.'* In interviews conducted in the 1990s, former forced workers remembered working between 10 and 12 hours a day1*1 Most former forced workers describe their tasks as manual labor in production "* Postwar documentation, mostly denazification and personnel files, reported that Germans and foreigners worked together in all aspects of the work.14' Internal Ford-Werke documents provide further details. Monthly employment reports from 1942 indicate that Eastern workers were assigned to a variety of different departments at the faahty These include "productive" work on the rear axle, transmission and other assembly lines, as well as "unproductive" work in warehouses, machine repair, tool making, vehicle inspection, kitchen work and general maintenance.111 An October 1943 memo reported that Ford-Werke planned to use some Italian POWs for inspection and quality control work 165 One of the Italian Military Internees. MM. remembers working nine hours dally in the fust few months and 10 hours daily toward the aid ofthe war. see ElDE.Oral history of M M., September 8. 1998 (ELDS 0000162-0000186, for English Translation, see ELDE 0000201) Others, mostly Russians or Poles, recall 12-hour workdays, see, for example, ELDE, Z10 569, Oral history of LA, October 15, 1992 (ELDE 0000275-0000297, for English transUdoasee ELDE 000051S) and ELDE, Z)0 672, Oral history of IX, September 16, 1995 (ELDE 0000065-0000087, for English translation, see ELDE 0000662) ms All former foreign workers recall being pan of the production process. See, for example. ELDE. Oral history of LA, October 15,1992 (ELDE 0000275-0000297, for English translation,see ELDE 0000512) and ELDE. Oral history of K F, September 12 1995 (ELDE 0000127-0000143. for English translation, see ELDE 0000759)__________ See, for example, BA-XZ 42 V/3843,Coun documents for trial of F.V. (BAK 011S-0177), Ford-Werke Records, Personnel File of RW (FW 0021964-0021987) and Personnel File ofWH (PW 0023145-0023158) i" rWM. FD 4369/45, Folder B.Eastem workers stafT report.April to August 1942 (JWM 0000289-0000290) IWM.FD 4369/45, Folder B.Streit to Brach.October 14,1943 (IWM 0000185) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Toward the end of the war, in September 1944, Italians and Germans were put to work sorting through rubble at a Ford-Werke part warehouse in Stolberg to salvage repairable items.'" Italian POWs were sent to work at companies affiliated with Ford-Werke. A staff report from November 1943 shows that 44 Italian workers were delegated to the Krupp factory, and therefore were not listed an the report. In January 1944, approximately 70 Italian POWs originally assigned to Ford-Werke began working for Ford-Werke supplier companies, although they continued to be listed on the Ford-Werke staff reports. By March 1944, approximately 80 Italians were listed as working for supplier firms. In May 1944, the number was about 70 Italians, with 10 Eastern workers also listed as working at supplier companies 7.6.2. Housing Conditions Most foreign and forced workers employed at FordWerke were housed in barracks built on land "WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243.BOX S38.Book 38-IU-1944 (2) locations other than Cologne. Invoice No. 802379, December 31.1944 (DOJ 0006024-0004026, for English translation, see DOJ 0006031-0006032) In the English translation, Gfm Is recognized as Gefangencn (prisoners) and translated as such. It seems more likely, though, that Gfm means Gefolgsduftsmitglieder (work force) >i' See IWM, FD 4369/45, Folder A, Staff report summary, November 19. 1943 (IWM 0000367). Staff labor report. January 7,1944 (IWM 0000390),Staff labor report,March 24, 1944 (IWM 0000423) and Staff labor report. May 18, 1944 (IWM 0000440)_________ sn in 1940, RM 28,969 was spent to erect wooden barracks for a "Foreign Workers' Camp An additional Investment of RM 24,242 was made in 1941, and a considerable extension was necessitated in 1942, amounting to RM 831.S30 The camp was equipped with in air raid shelter and a special kitchen. In 1943,additional air raid protection was provided at a cost of RM 216,275, and roads at RM 10,255 After Its completion In 1944,the camp comprised 45 wooden buildings of different sizes totaling 749,972 square feet. SeeHRAcc.61000417,Box 1, German Wu-Recovery Study !9S0,pp 25, 28, 31-32 and 34-35 (HP 0000212,0000215,0000218-0000219 and 0000221-0000222), Ford-Werke Records, Scheuffgcn to Stadtvcxwaltung Uh, September 17, 1946 (FW 0003919), Policy with Regard to Depreciation of Fixed Assets (FW 0006220), ELDE, ZI0 61S, Oral history ofS.S , September 13, 199S (ELDE 0000256-0000274. for English translation, see ELDE 0000633), RA-L. R 87/6208, Audit Repent by Kntpprath for 1943, (BAL 7602); HStAQ KW 54/104. Building Prefect Correspondence, January-August, 1944 (HSAD 0032-0043), andWNRQAcc Z99-68A-0243, Box 537. Book 13-Ib-1946 (2). Repair Invoice, May 16. 1946 (DOJ 0001S09-0001S22) immediately to the northwest of the plant Ford-Werke rented the land from the city of Cologne and began construction of the barracks in 1940. Additional construction was done in 1941, and a more significant expansion occurred m 1942, when additional barracks were erected for the Russian workers. One of the former forced workers remembered building the barracks Multiple sources indicate the barracks were built of wood In October 1944, repairs were made to the foreign workers' camp after it was damaged during Allied bombing raids. There are several indications that air raid shelters were available for forced and foreign workers in the camp 1,1 Ford-Werke, like most other companies employing foreign workers, had a camp with separate sections for the different nationalities employed at the plant, following Nazi guidelines."1 In a postwar memo, Schmidt wrote that when foreign workers arrived at German plants,the Gestapo stepped m and took over all "political ends," which Schmidt defined as including the housing and feeding of all workers, foreigners as well as Germans."1 In a separate postwar memo, he wrote that under the Gestapo rules, Russian camps had to be fenced and dosed, but Western European camps were open andWestern Europeans could live in town if they wanted to 171 According to a British wartime summary ofNazi procedures for employing foreign labor; a was a frequent practice for companies to establish separate groups of huts for each nation represented In their foreign worker camps. "The two groups of workers most often housed in special national camps are Italians - originally privileged as important allies - and 'Eastern Vferkers'-- always segregated as mudi as possible as dangerous and inferior elements." See IWM. Gammy Basle Handbook (Ministry ofEconomic Warfare, 1944),Rut II, Section R, pt 12 (IWM 0000036). AtFord-Weiix. repair invoices distinguished between a "Ruslan Camp." a "Camp for Foreigners* and an "Italian Camp" See WNRC, Act 299-68A-0243. Box 537, Book 13-Lb-1946 (2), Repair Invoice. May 16. 1946 (DOJ 0001509-0001522) Also, postwar testimony reported that there were different work camps for civilian foreigners. POWs and EasternWorkers, see HStAD, NW 1048/34/272,Ifestunany of HH.July 30,1946 (HSAD 3056) NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 17, Memo by Schmidt on Buchwald, June 22, 1945 (NARA 0000074)________ its Schmidt said that most Western Europeans preferred to live in the camp because the food was better and the bousing was cheap. In particular, he said, they felt safer in the event of bomb attacks, see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032. Schneider Report, Exhibit 20, Memo from Schmidt. July 18, 1945 (NARA 0000083-0000085) BV I Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke I Scant Information could be found regarding the bombed-out employees, although the company's furnishing of the camps. Ford-Werke financial Welfare Section was trying to find "more suitable documents show purchases of metal beds and lockers accommodations for the foreign workers' camps in 1943."* However, former forced workers interviewed in the 1990s 7.6.3. Supervision and Control of Foreign and recalled that the barracks were furnished with wooden Forced Workers far plank beds; some mentioned additional items, including lockers and heating stoves.'" There are conflicting reports on the sanitary conditions of the The supervision of foreign and forced workers at Ford-Werke was the responsibility of both the plant camps. In a postwar interview, the son of the head of guards and the Gestapo Plant guards controlled all the Russian camp emphasized that the hygienic foreign workers However, as dictated by Nazi decrees, situation in the barracks was good."* However, several special guards were assigned to Eastern workers "* In farmer forced workers as well as a German former an oral history interview conducted in the 1990s, one ,, jL k employee interviewed in the 1990s described the former worker recalled that the Eastern, or Russian, |0l( Pu^Wacks as infested with bugs." workers' camp had some Russian guards1,1 The German authorities promoted the practice of I By the end of the war, the camp for all of Ford- supplementing German guards with select Russian Werke's forced workers consisted of some 37 to 45 forced workers as a means of improving productivity."* barracks or huts"* According to Vltger's postwar According to a postwar American military i. 1 report, the total floor space available in the camp investigation, the Eastern worker camp at Ford-Werke . buildings amounted to 10,500 square meters (113,021 was surrounded by barbed wire."' In his July 1945 II * Ay^square feet) Schmidt's report to the board of statements to American military authorities, Schmidt /BF'' advisors an July 1, 1943, described the cluster of said. "The camps for the Russians were to be fenced in residences as a specifically built barrack town In and kept dosed all the time A June 1943 letter from 1949, the barracks were still being used as housing for Ford-Werke Plant Security Chief Lieutenant K. Scheben "`Ford-Werke Records. Financial Ledger, January 1942 September 1944 (FW 0007344 and 0007457). ; ELDB.Z10 639,Ora] history of LS .September 10,1996 (ELDS 0000459-0000473, for English translation, see ELDB 0000906). SLOE. Z10 615. Oral history ofS&, September 13. 1995 (ELDB 00002S6-0000274. for English translation, tee ELDB 0000635), ELDB. Z10 633. Oral history of TN. September 12, 1996 (ELDB 0000233-0000255. for English translation,lee ELDE 0000896),ELDE.Z10 672,Oral history of I.K, September 16, 1995 (ELDE 0000065-0000087. for English transtarton.se* ELDE 0000662) " FMC Interview with Friedrich Wlerscheim. December 8,1999 (FMC 0018603)._________ "* ELDE.ZI0 633,Oral history ofT.N .September 12.1996 (EIDE 0000233-0000255, for English translation, see HIDE 0000896)JUDE, translated oral history ofK N .September 13, 1995. (DDE 0000698), FMC Interview with Anna-Lulse Ho&ltter. December 13, 1999 (FMC 0018305). im US. bombing survey reports mention 37 huts, see NARA. RG 243Jhury 6,Boz 687,FUe.77al7,IuterpretaCian Report No K. 300 (R)July 18,1945 (NARA 0004500) PtostwarFord-Werke documents describe 45 buildings,see HP, Ace 61-000417, Bax 1 .German War Recovery Study, 1950, p 31 (HP 0000218) FMCAR-75-62-616Jtn 79. Custodian Report (FMC 0000992) As a comparison. Vitger quotes a figure of 12,136 square meters (130,631 square feet) for Ford-Werkes assembly hall "> WNRC, Acc Z99-68A-0243, Box 536. File W17536.Advisory Board Meeting Minutes. July I. 1943 (DOJ 0011104, for English translation, see DOJ 0011230) ** FMC AR-98-213541, Box S2. File Audit Report - July 28, 1949. Hibbetson-Watt Reportjuly 28, 1949.and August 1949 (FMC 0000773) In 1946. the Foreign Workers' Camp was reconditioned and equipped with sanitary and beating facilities for employees who lost their homes during the war See HP, Acc 61-0004)7, Box 1, German WSr Recovery Study 1950. p 103 (HP 0000292) JM NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032. Schneider Report. Exhibit 185D, Bucbwald to Gestapo Cologne, July 13, 1942 (NARA 0000441, for English translation, see NARA 0005907) Werner Bucbwald was a Ford-Werke employee whose duties included plant counterintelligence to German military intelligence and the Gestapo 111 ELDE, Z10616, Oral history of A.N, September 12. 1995 (ELDE 0000088-0000110, for English translation, see ELDE 0000078)_______________ Herbert, Hitler's ftrdpi Winters, pp 177-179 u> NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Bax 1032, Report on preliminary investigation ofFord-Werke, AG (External Assets - Germany) by Rains and Nalden, June 21, 1945 (NARA 0001173). "NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 20. Memo from Schmidt, July 18, 1945 (NARA 0000083-0000085) El Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime to the Gestapo reported that one Russian forced worker was shot and wounded by Ford-Werke plant guards when trying to leave the camp without permission.1'5 In interviews conducted in the 1990s, some former FordWerke forced workers from Russia and Ukraine remembered being allowed to leave the camp in groups, usually an Sundays, after having worked there for some time.150 There is some indication that the camp for Italian POWs also was fenced in and specially guarded.1,1 Under Nazi regulations, Vifestero European workas were treated differently;"1 Some Western workers were allowed vacation time and were able to return to their homeland for a specified period. Staffing reports from Ford-Werke in early 1944 indicate that several hundred Wfestem workers left for vacation and never returned1,1 These "breaches ofcontract" were addressed in a memo from the armaments ministry dated July 22, 1943, informing companies that they could apply for a ban on vacation time for their Western workers ifthey were not able to secure the punctual return of the workers by other means."* A few months later, Labor Minister Fritz Sauckel established a system whereby every member of a group offoreign workers would have to return before the next group could leave.The new regulations did permit leniency in the case of family emergencies."* Officially, the supervisor of the Eastern worker camp was to be joindy determined by the Gestapo and the DAF (German Labor Front). However, m a July 13, 1942, letter to the Gestapo, Ford-Werke employee and counterintelligence liaison Werner Buchwald indicated that Josef Wierscheim was Ford-Werke's choice to oversee the Eastern workers* camp under Plant Security Chief Scheben, if the Gestapo approved.1" Schmidt confirmed in 1945 that Wierscheim had been in charge of the Russians at Ford-Werke."' A 1947 report from Fard-Werke's Denazification Committee indicated that Wierscheim physically disciplined foreign workers at the plant,1" In an oral history interview in the 1990s, ** KARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Boa 1031, Schneider Report. Exhibit 185H, Scheben to Gestapo Cologne, June I, 1943 (NARA 0000443, far EngUsh translation, see NARA OO0S910). IWM, FD 4369/45, Folder E, Scheid to Armaments Ministry, July 22, 1943 (IWM 0000759-0000760) The letter says (hat around 6 45 pan. on May 31, 1943, two > IWM. FD 4369/45, Folder E, Order No 12. Fntz Sauckel. Eastern workers left the Ford-Wake camp without permission. October 2. 1943 (IWM 0000627-0000628) Outside the fence they were told three dmes to stand soil One did, but the other kept running The officer gave offi warning shot and once again the worker to stand still ]M IWM, FD 4369/45. Folder E, Scheid to Armaments Ministry, September 30.1943 (IWM 0000640-0000641) When this was ignored,the officer followed orders and shot the man through the left arm with a pistol. Rant security reported W'NARA. RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 18SQ Buchwald to Gestapo Cologne, July 13. 1942 the man wu in medical care, and that the wound was not serious and would not disable him from working The letter stated that Easton workers knew security personnel would shoot at anyone attempting to flee. 1,0 See. for example. ELBE, Z10 633. Oral history of T.N.. September 12, 1996 (ELDE 0000233-0000255. for English translation, see ELDE 0000542); and SIDE, Z10 6I6, Ora] history ofA.N. and NS..September 12. 1995 (ELDS 0000088 0000110, for English translation, see ELDE 0000769* (NARA 0000441, for English translauon, see NARA 0005907). NARA, RG 260. Property Division. Property Control and External Assets Branch. Box S46, File Ford-WerlE. Memo from Rains, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0000582) For information on Josef Wierscheim. see HStAD. NW 1048/41/1615. Denazification File J. Wierscheim (HSAD 0190-0196) Before the Nazi patty took paver In 1933, Wierscheim had been a police officer m Frankfurt/Main. He had been a member ofthe Sooal Democrauc Party and other organrzauons supportive of 0000770).______________ the Weimar Republic, and was therefore terminated from his m BA-K, Z 42 V 3843, Court documents for trial of F V (BAX 0128)__________________ |ob by the Naas. In 1936, Wierscheim Joined Ford-Wake's plant security On April 8, 194S, the Allied Military Government recommended him "for position as police chief* NARA, RG 407, Bury 368B. Bax 1032, Schneider Report. In a December 1999 interview, his son, Friedrich, said that bis Exhibit 20, Mono from Schmidt, July 18, 1945 (NARA father remained on the postwar police force until he retired. 0000083-000085), HAStK, Ace. 606/2, Report on Foreigner Friedrich Wierscheim also said that his lather had been Camps, June 13. 1949 (HASK01 17-0118) Mention is nude imprisoned for two weeks after his dismissal by the Nazis and ofcivilian workers' camps at Kalker-Hauptstraise 216, 272 and 296. Tlie Inhabitants, who included several Belgian laborers that the only thing that saved him from a concentration camp was his military service In World Wir L See FMC. Interview working at Ford-Werke, "were allowed to move around freely with FriedrichWierscheim.December 8.1999 (FMC 0018603. They were only under surveillance of the foreigner police" See FMC 0018615 and FMC 0018621-001B622) also HStAU Rep 118/1179. 0161)__________________ Rapport Deflnldv No. 79 (HSAD0161in HStAQ, NW 1048/34/272.Deniziftcaiion Subcommittee 98 to Maui Committee, September 19, 1947 (HSAD 29B9-299S) TM IWMJD 4369/45, Folder A,ScafFreport summaries January 21 The report states that Wierscheim treated foreign workers with and 28,1944 (IWM 0000394 and 0000399) an "an open hand" [lockere Hand] (>0 *? Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke \ one former Eastern worker recalled that the plant is. We cannot tolerate, however, that the mistreating of commandant "wasn't strict. He punished, but he forgave as well ... He was sympathetic.""0 Another worker remembered the head of the camp as being "a noisy guy. He was always shouting. But you could say he was a good person ... He often punished me for this East-workers becomes a rule." Buchwald noted that this treatment was feared more by the Russians than "officially pronounced, severer punishment " In the interest of improving the working atmosphere, Buchwald asked Grandi to inform foremen that in the and that-""1 According to wartime reports and postwar documents, Ford-Werke plant guards disciplined workers physically and put them under house arrest.w> Former workers recalled during interviews in the 1990s that plant foremen occasionally slapped or hit workers when they left their posts or made mistakes an the job m An October 1943 in-house communication from Buchwald to Ford-Werke Production Manager Hans Grand! noted that there had been "more and more future he would prosecute each case of mistreatment brought to his attention1M The issue of foremen mistreating foreigners is mentioned m postwar reports by American military authorities Similar accusations are found in Ford-Werke personnel files. In one case, there are indications that a particular foreman treated neither Germans nor foreigners well Schmidt told US military officials that Buchwald supervised the plant guards Schmidt said that Buchwald trained the guards to handle guns and taught cases ofEast-workers being beaten, mostly by foremen, for some faults in the plant." Buchwald wrote that he had "no objections against a master or foreman them how and when to make arrests. Schmidt also recalled that Germans, Russians and Western workers alike were watched closely for "Anti Nazi grabbing a Russian to show him bodily where his place 00 ELDE.Z10 633,Oral history ofTN .September 11,1996 (ELDE 0000233-0000255; for English translation, see ELDE 0000542 and 0000S48) The fanner worker said punishment for stealing food, for instance; might be confinement to a detention cell for three or four days, or not being allowed to go into the city for three weeks. movements.""' A July 1944 letter marked "secret" from Ford-Werke to the local Gestapo Indicates the use of a net of informants in Ford-Werke's camp"^ Because of his position, Buchwald was involved in the Gestapo's oversight of foreign workers at Ford-Werke Schmidt told the Americans that Buchwald had been ELDH.Z10 66S, Oral history of NX. September 8.1998 (ELDE 0000391-0000401, for English translation, see ELDE 0000621) MS. agreed with TN, another former forced worker that the plant commandant did not send anyone from Ford-Werke to a concentration camp. In a 1999 interview, Wierscheim's son. Friedrich, said that twice in early I94S, his father Was called In for interrogation by (he Gestapo, presumably because he was treating the workers too well. Friedrich Wlerccheim also recalled that two Ukrainians, the camp elders, had helped JosefWlerscheim and his wife move Into an apartment created from pm of the camp medical barracks after their home was destroyed In a bombing raid.see FMC interview with Friedrich Wierachetei.December 8,1999 (FMC 0018657. 0018664 and 0018686-0018687) NARA, KG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 185E. Buchwald to Gestapo Cologne, February 25, 1943 (NARA 0000442. for English translation, see NARA 0005908). " ELDE.Z10 617.Oral history of IXSeptember 16.1995 (ELDE 0000065-0000087, for English translation, see ELDE 0000665), SIDE. Oral history of M.M, September 8. 1998 (ELDB 0000162-0000186, for English translation, see ELDE 0000206).QDE.Z10.605, On) history of MX.September 19. 1994 (HDB 0000440-0000458, for English translation, see ELDE 0000869), ELDE Z10 569, Oral history of IA , October 15.1992 (ELDE 0000275-0000297, for English tnmlation.see ELDE 0000513-0000515) "NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032. Schneider Report. Exhibit I8SA, Buchwald to Grandi, October 14, 1943 (NARA 0000439-0000440) Starting in mrd-1943. German officials began relaxing regulations governing the administration of Eastern workers and bringing their treatment more in line with that ofWestem workers, see Herbert, Hitier's fiueign VVbrken, pp. 261-273________________ "* NARA. RG 260, Properry Division Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 546, File Ford-Werte. memo from Rains. July 25,1945 (NARA 0000S81) Ford-Werke Records, hnomd File ofWH . March 31. 1948 (FW 0023149). The postwar denazification subcommittee opposed this man's re-employment NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 20, Memo from Schmidt, July 18, 1945 (NARA 0000083-0000085) A May 1944 letter from Ford-Werke to the local Gestapo office describes rifles supplied to the [dam guards as old, rusty and without safety catches, and asks for new weapons that would be less likely to go off accidentally. See Exhibit 185G.Fard-WexketoGestapoCologne.May 3,1944 (NARA 0000443) "'NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit I85J, Ford-Werke to Gestapo Cologne, July 10. 1944 (NARA 0000445, for English translation, see NARA 000S916) Research Findings About Fo/d-Werke Under the Non Regime I appointed to the position of plant counterintelligence In November 1944, the Cologne Gestapo reported officer [Abwehrbeauftragter] at the beginning of the the arrest of Ukrainian workers from Ford-Werke on war by the Counter Intelligence Office of German charges of looting The arrests were followed by a raid military intelligence Schmidt said that when foreign on the camp by German army personnel that resulted in workers were transferred into Germany's industrial a "shoot-out."414 Other Gestapo reports contain plants, the Gestapo stepped in and took aver all pohucal additional references to forced workers from Ford- matters, "Now die Abwehrbeauftragter had two bosses, Werke, including reports of workers arrested for stealing the High Command and the Gestapo and received orders money, a bicycle, milk and clothes.4" In February 1945, and regulations from both."*" hi his denazification file, plant guards turned over a Ukrainian worker to the Buchwald said, "From 1942 cm, I had to send copies of Cologne Gestapo after he was arrested for possessing the monthly reports to the Gestapo, too."41' Other food assumed to have been stolen4,4 Messages scrawled postwar testimonies indicated that the Gestapo was on the cell walls of the former Gestapo prison in II directly involved in the administration of the foreign Cologne indicate that forced workers, including workers' camp According to Schmidt, the Gestapo women, from Ford-Werke were imprisoned there.41' supervised "[f]ood, housing, clothing, wages for foreign workers" and frequently searched the Russian camp, 7.6.4.Living Conditions often behaving rudely4" In a 1996 interview, a former forced worker recalled a police raid on the camp to search for weapons *" Additional postwar reports indicate the presence of employees with Gestapo and SS connections.411 There is htde available contemporaneous information on the living conditions of forced workers at Ford-Werke beyond scattered references in a few documents. The earliest information is found in statements made by Schmidt during his 1943 trip":o Portugal According to Ford of Portugal Manager NARA. RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032. Schneider Report, Exhibit 17. Memo by Schmidt on Buchwald, June 22. 1945 (NARA 0000074)________ 410 HStAD NW 1049746784, Interview statement by Buchwald, November 30. 1946 (HSAD 0214). For examples of his reports, see NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032. Schneider Report. Exhibit ISA, Buchwald to Che Gestapo Cologne. November 8, 1943 (NARA 0000076) and Exhibit 185). FordWferke to Gestapo Cologne, July 10.1944 (NARA 000044S) Guilherme Nadal. Schmidt said that "French, English and German was bemg taught when the men axe off dut/"41* Curing the board of advisors meetings in July 19r6aunidt said that "[m]atermty wards, homes for infants, and such like are being set up"414 Wartime financial documents include a reference to "Christinas Bonuses for Eastern Workers" in December 1943, and 411 NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B. Bax 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 17. Memo by Schmidt an Buchwald, June 22, 194S (NARA 0000074), Exhibit 20. Memo from Schmidt, July 18. 1945 (NARA 0000083) 41 ELDE. ZI0 623. Oral history of A.O, September 13. 1996 (HLDE 0000474-0000497. for English translation, see ELDE 0000586)_______________ 411 Buchwald said In a postwar statement that staffrepresentative B. had been with the Gestapo before coming to Ford-Werke. Another Ford-Werke employee, EtH, was a member of the SD See HStAD. NW 1049/46784. Interview Statement by Bachwald.Novemher 30.1946 (HSAD 0214) .and HStAD. NW 1049/76620, Hirsch to Frau Schmidt, November 15, 1945 (HSAD 0864-0865) 414 HStAD RW 34/8, VAeUy Report of the State Security Police of November 19-26. November 28. 1944 (HSAD 0084-0085) f The German authorities suspected Eastern workers In Cologne I of Joining together in gangs. According to historian Ulrich' Herbert, from the end of November 1944, there were almost daily armed clashes in Cologne between gangs and the Gestapo, "some reaching the scale of pitched battles.* See Hitlers foreign WbtkosL p 367. 4,1 HASiX Acc. 606/8, Cologne Police Reports on Foreigners, November 1949 (HASK 0050-0053), HStAD. BR 2034/VH1/I295-1296 Cologne Police Arrest Reports. 1945, HStAD NW 174/485 l-VI Police Reports. October 4. 1943 (These documents could not be copied because of German archival privacy restrictions.) The worker arrested for stealing milk was sent to Buchenwald, the workers arrested for stealing dothes were executed 414 HStAD BR 2034/1327, Scheben to Gestapo, February 11, 1945, (HSAD 2259) The worker claimed that he had exchanged a suit for the food. He was sentenced to eight weeks In a labor education camp 417 Manfred Huiskes et at, Die WenduEckriilm da Sober GatqpoCrfingmssa in EJ-DE Hsus 1943-1945 (Kdln Bdhlau-Verlag, 983), pp 19S.200-202 and 204 <> NARA. RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76, Memo on visit to Portugal !the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne. Germany June 9,1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832) 41WNRC. Acc. 299-68A-0243. Box 536, File W17536.Advisory Board Meeting Minutes. July 1. 1943 (DOJ 0011104, for English translation, see DOJ 0011231) 62 I I Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werite describe vacation time for Western workers *! (See sporting clothes, equipment and a playing field. In Section 7.6.3.) order to raise the sportive interest, I gathered prizes Postwar reports prepared for American military investigators or during denazification hearings contain more details. When interrogated by American military personnel, Schmidt stated that "entertainment by cinema, theater, orchestra was granted under Gestapo supervision. Church service was permitted "*" I also facilitated matches with German teams." H L also said that he had helped foreign workers from "France. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy" to get vacation permits to return home, and he produced letters from two Belgian workers he had helped*" The plant physician. Dr Carl Wenzel, stated that he had improved living conditions for the foreign workers: "[I]t was Most records that appear in the postwar denazification files ofFord-Werfce employees daim that the foreign workers were relatively well treated*" Schmidt stated, "It is obvious that towards displaced persons working at Ford I took the same basic attitude as towards our Fordmen [sic]. They were treated and reasonably clothed and fed as well as possible under the rather severe regulations. Quite often have I violated upon my suggestion and with my assistance that the barracks were built, the workers were accommodated In small numbers in different rooms, even in single rooms; theater performances took place and also sports meetings "*" (See Section 7.6 6 for information about Dr. Vifenzel's role m providing medical treatment at the plant during the war, and postwar concerns about wartime abortions ) the law in order to help these persons and ease their fete Other denazification files report that people from I as much as possible"*" AnotherFord-Werke employee, Ford subsidiaries in other pans of occupied Europe H.L, who had been a clerk at the plant from 1936 to donated food, clothes, shoes, soccer equipment and 194S and a member of the Nazi party from 1933 to' special foods for Christmas celebrations to the foreign 1945, said during his hearing that he had treated the workers, including their countrymen and women, at foreigners well. "[I] was always working to make their Ford-Werke *" In postwar reports, Ford-Werke lives as bearable as possible. Thus, I took care of employees occasionally refereed to the camps as "model camps" frowned upon by local and regional Nazi RA-L, R 87/6208, Audit Report by Knlpprath for 1943 (BAL 7632) The report lists RM 10,000 for "Christmas Bonus for Eastern Workers." For monthly reports on expenditures for foreign workers In 1944, see Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011 0007890). and IWM.FD 4369/45, Folder B, Stoecker to FordWfcrke foremen, March 11, 1942 (TWM 0000182) NARA, RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 20. Memo from Schmidt, July 18, 1945 (NARA 0000083). KStAEt NW 1049/76620, Ober to Schmidt. November IS. 194S (HSAD 0860-0861) u HStAD; NW 1049/76620, Schmidt Appeal to Review Board, September 10,1946 (HSAD 0836-0841) HStAD NW 1049/23409, Affidavit from H L, June 6. 1948 (HSAD 2*15-2418). L. to Mam Committee Denazification. September 30, 1948 (HSAD 2433), Letter by Belgian National to l, March 28, 1947 (HSAD 242S-2426). Letter by Belgian NationakDecember 2B, 1948 (HSAD 2428) n HStAD NW 1048/34/272,Testimony ofWenzekDecember 16. 1945 (HSAD 3063) HStADt NW I057/BII1-00843, Testimony of FJL, no dace (HSAD 0742-0743), Ellscheid to Court of Appeals, December 22. 1947 (HSAD 0763-0767), Affidavit of Buchwald. November 23,1947 (HSAD 0771) officials.*" Both Dr Wenzel and Buchwald said they were criticized by Nazi officials based on the good conditions in the camps *" A former worker who was transferred to another company after working at Ford- Werke described the second workplace as bettei; in part because better food was provided *'* *lr CE, an assistant to Dr Wfenzel, said that Dr Wenzel took the Initiative and "established the Russian and foreigner camp as a model camp for the entire Gau [party district] CologneAachen." See HStAD. NW 1048/34/272, Affidavit of CE no date (HSAD 2999-3000) HH, a member of the German socialist party, said that foe Ford-Werke Eastern workers* camp was known as a "model camp beyond foe city ofCologne" See HStAD. NW 1048/34/272. Testimony of H H. July 30, 1946 (HSAD 3056)____________ via HStAD; NW 1049/467B4, Denazification File of Buchwald, 1946-1947 (HSAD 0211-0239) See also HStAD NW 1048/34/272,Letter from V&nzel,December 16,1945 (HSAD 3064) and Denazification Main Committee. Interrogation of Vfenzel, October 28, 1947 (HSAD 2987-2988) ELDE, Z10 569, Oral history of ] A. October 15. 1992 (ELDE 0000275-0000297, for English translation, see ELDE 0000527) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime 7.6.5. food Foreign workers living in the camp had RM t 50 a day deducted from their wages for food and lodging410 During his June 1943 trip to Portugal, Robert Schmidt I reported that the mess room at the plant distributed three types of food rations depending on the physical demands of the work performed by the employees. Schmidt also mentioned that "overtime is partially paid by increased food A month later, Schmidt told the board of advisors that the plant had five different kitchens preparing food for the foreign workers, according to their different nationalities Schmidt also reported to the board that "food was especially prepared for the foreign workers."*11 The personnel file of a Ford-Werke cook, who was in charge of the workers* camp food after January 1943, also distinguishes between the "foreigner and Russian kitchen"4" According to a 1990s interview with a former worker, conditions in the Western workers' camn^sKere far better chan m the Eastern workers' After the war, in discussing the food operations for foreign workers and others at the plant, Vltger said that the canteen had always operated at a loss. He said the canteen lost slightly more than RM 4,000 per month in PMC.AR-98-2l3S46.Box 2. File History ofPlant - All Aspects, 1925-1946. Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 002046)_______________ I AuiA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76. Memo on visit to Portugal V if the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne, Germany, June 9. 1943 (KARA 0003830-0003832). 1938, and that the monthly losses increased considerably during the war, amounting to nearly RM 25,000 per month The canteen was providing food for approximately 2,000 foreign laborers in 1944.*" Records from postwar personnel and denazification files often refer to the rations received by foreign workers. In 1946, the Ford-Werke employee responsible for wartime food purchasing wrote a letter to Vitger claiming that he had provided approximately 3,600 foreign workers with entire days' meals. (See Section 7 3 and Appendix D for documentation on the numbers of foreign workers at Ford-Werke during the war) The employee went on to complain that the company counterintelligence officer was taking credit for this accomplishment4,4 During his own denazification procedures. Dr Wenzel claimed "food supplies were constantly controlled by me also that the quantities destined for the plant were actually received."417 Vitger told the American military investigators that Dr Wenzel had complained about the diet and hygienic conditions for the foreign workers, and as a result, conditions were changed for the better.*14 Statements from denazification files rejwrt that Russians -- children as well as adults - received poor food rations414 hi an interview conducted in the 1990s, one former Eastern worker recalled that her rations typically consisted of three slices of bread and unsweetened coffee for breakfast, soup made from turnips and flour siftings for lunch, and bread and coffee again for dinner.44* Another former worker 0o^ WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Bos $36, FlleWl 7536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, July I. 1943 (DOJ 0011104, for English translation, see DOJ 0011230-0011231) Food availability was regulated to some extent by the German government's food rationing system, which historian Edward Homze describes as "overburdened by a fantastic array of minute regulations dealing with every conceivable occupation and racial group" See Homze, Foidgn lobar io Nad Germany, p 247 <u Ford-Werke Records. Personnel File ofR. Z.(FW 0022190) /imTSeEL'DE, 210 613, Oral History of KJ. September 12. 1995 l (ODE 0000216-0000232, for English translation, see ELDE V*^roo0o07751-0000763). In 199$, K.F, a former forced worker who lived in both the Russian and the French camps at Ford\Wrke. described the difference as a contrast between "heaven and earth," the French camp bong far better Because the French received Red Cross packages, there was coffee there and the food was better, she recalled. FMC.AR-7S-62-616.Bax 79,Custodun Report (FMC 0001023 and 0001033)___________ ,J` Ford-Werke Records, Grass to Vitger, July 8, 1946 (FW 0022372-0022378) HStADi NW 1048/34/272.Testimony ofVfcnzeUJeccmber 16. 1945 (HSAD3063). 3* NARA. RG 260, Property Division, Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 546, File Ford-Wert. Memo to files by Rams. June 13. 1945 (NARA 0000583) HStAD. NW 1048/34/272, Report by Kom and Wtamelsklrchen. December 14. 1947 (HSAD 3009-3010), Denazification Subcommittee 98 to Main Committee September 19,1947 (HSAD 2989-2995) MELDB.Z10 633.Oral history ofTN.September 12,1996 (HIDE 0000233-0000255. for English transladon^ee ELDE 000054200005S3) Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Weikt reported that he received about 300 grams (10 6 class dental station equipped with the most modem ounces, about X pound) of bread per day but was never apparatuses" and a dentist Wierscheim credited Dr given butter, meat or sugar441 Several foreign workers Wenzel with the establishment of a "modem nursery remembered that food was in short supply for them ... equipped with everything necessary for this purpose while working at the plant441 and which was an ornament of the camp" Wierscheim said the camp's sanitary facilities were dean, separated 7.6.6. Medical Treatment The medical treatment offorced and foreign workers received particular attention after the war Dr. Wenzel oversaw Ford-Werke's health department and was responsible for the foreign and forced workers, supported by Drs. Alwin Kresse and Paul Grouven.441 Dr Wenzel employed several nurses in the different for men and women, and equipped with hot and cold running water "[EJvery inmate of the camp could take a bath as often as he liked to do so.. . It must be said to the honour of Dr Wenzel that he strictly insisted upon the fact that the medical treatment for the eastworkers in no way deviated from that for sick German members ofthe staff"441 camps.444 Josef Wierscheim, who had been the supervisor of the Eastern workers' camp, described the medical facilities in a December 194S affidavit for Dr. Wenzel's denazification hearings. He said the medical barracks induded an operating room, separate infirmaries for men and women, a maternity area, sufficient quanddes of medical instruments and a "first Two years after the war. Dr Wenzel was accused of having performed unnecessary abordons on Russian forced workers The allegations arose after a review of his denazification dassification deared him to resume employment at Ford-Werke In response to Dr Wenzd's return on September IS. 1947, the workers' council called for a general strike 144 Concurrently, the local Denazification Committee initiated a _ further 441 ELDE, Z10 569. Oral history of IA.. October IS. 1992 (ELDE 0000275-0000297, for English translation, see ELDE 0000508) 441 QDE.ZI0 617,Oral history of LK .September 16.1995 (ELDE 0000065-0000087, for English translation, see ELDE 0000662). BIDS, Z10 665, Oral history of NS, September 8. 1998 (ELDE 0000391-0000401, for English translation, see HDE 0000618)._________ *4i HStAD, NW 1048/34/272, Translation of report by Wlenchdm.December 26. 1945 (HSAD 3089-3092). investigation dl Dr Wenzd's wartime activities The committee's efforts uncovered a statement by K.S, a former nurse at Ford-Werke, alleging that Wenzel ~ , r L performed abortions on Russian forced workers441 In a kJJaJ'A'** meeting with members of the Denazification Committee, the Ford-Werke workers' council further asserted that the abortions were performed to maintain productivity and that DrWenzd was more interested in 444 aFord-Werke employee stated that in May 1944 she becameDr WfcnxcTs medical technical assistant, responsible for "X-raying and lab work." See Ford-Werke Records, Personnel File ofIR (FW 0022270-0022272) Another employee stated,"As of 15 June 19431 was hired by Ford-Werke as a muse and here I have worked in the foreigners' camp, the dental station and in First Aid." See Personnel File of MB (FW 0023266-0023271) the welfare of the company than the wdfare of its work force.44* Dr Wfenzel adamantly disputed this allegation, claiming in a letter to the Denazification Committee that he had performed abortions on Eastern workers only when there was a medical Justification444 4s HStAD, NW 1048/34/272, ivnsltioa of report by According to testimony in Dr Wenzd's denazification Wierscheim, December 26, 1945 (HSAD 3089-3093) In hearings, 10 abortions were performed at the camp Dr. 1947, three former farced workers from the Eastern camp at Ford-Werke testified in a German affidavit about the care given by Dr Wenzel. They wrote that he had been their physician^'--J since the establishment of the camp and had cared for them 4;BtAD, NW 1048/34/272. Public Notice from Vnger. well "He always gave us notifications of ilium (sick leave] ! eptember 15, 1947 (HSAD 3013). when necessary He always cared for our food and accommodation and for every single one of us He even took with him some Russian women who had been injured by 44i] [StADi NW 1048/34/272. Transcript of meeting with ICS. ! tptember 14. 1947 (HSAD 3009-3010) bombs and left them with a farmer so they could recover there He cured some of our campmatcs who had been shot by the Gestapo and saved them from being persecuted " Sec HStAD, NW 1048/34/272Affidavit of JM. K.Z.andN.W, November 5,1947 (HSAD 2964) I StAR NW 1048/34/272, Memo from Wfcrkera' Council, ober 30. 1947 (HSAD 2949) NW 1048/34/272. Wenzel to Denazification mmlttee, November 1,1947 (HSAD 2955-2958) 65 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Wenzel was said to have performed two or three and his This notion was supported by a 1947 affidavit from assistant, Dr. Kresse, the remainder.'" Dr Wenzel rhrpp former Pattern workers. Responding to the insisted that the procedures were not imposed on the criticism of Dr. Vfcnzei, they wrote that it was a "great foreign female workers, and that it was the women lie" to say that he had performed abortions on Russian who wanted abortions Dr Wenzel stated that he women so that pregnancy would not keep them from worked to improve the facilities for mothers and working, or that he had performed abortions because children, including the more than 70 healthy babies the Nazis ordered him to do so According to the who were born in the camp."1 An assistant to Dr affidavit, many pregnant women applied for abortions Wenzel, C E.. and a former nurse, J L., fully supported because of their situation- Despite the facility his statements in various testimonies. They testified Improvements made by Dr Wenzel, there were still that the abortions were performed for medical reasons many women who did not want to give birth in the only, in response to signed applications from the camp. The affidavit by the former workers said that female workers. Both said that Dr. Wenzel provided Dr Wenzel performed abortions only for the few dean facilities and treatments, and that he provided women who were very sick and would not survive superior care for pregnant and nursing women.'" childbirth The former workers said that they never saw any signs of orientation to Nazi policy in his HStAB, NW 1048/34/272, Cologne Doctors Chamber to \fonetaen.November 8, 1947 (HSAD 2953) si HStAA NW 1048/34/272, Wenzel to Denazification Committee, November 1, 1947 (HSAD 2955*2958) For Information on attitudes regarding abortion In Germany during dlls period, see Arina Grossman, Rdbiming Set He Genua Mortmmt fer Birth Control and Aierd Wbnn,1920-1950 (Oiford* Oxford University Press. 1995), pp.70-77 and 153-156 approach.'1* The invesngauon into Dr Wenzels wartime activities continued through the end of 1947 and into 1948 In a November 1947 letter to the local health office, the Cologne Doctors' Chamber questioned Dr. Wenzel's claim that the abortions were medically `"HSlAft NW 1048/34/272, Affidavit of C.E.. September 26, 1947 (HSAD 2997-2998), Statement by C.E.. no date (HSAD 2999-3000), testimony by J.L on behalf of Ufcnze). 1947 (HSAD 1960)____________ necessary It suggested that the large number of abortions was due to either racial motives and efforts to keep up productivity, or to a desire to alleviate the 4,1 HStAQ NW 1048/34/272. Affidavit of JM. S.Z. and N W, difficult position of the pregnant women "* After November 5, 1947 (HSAD 2964). According to historian Ulncb Herbert,on March 11.1943.the Retch Surgeon General reviewing the evidence presented, the Cologne issued an order giving pregnant Eastern workers die right to ask Employment Committee issued a statement on April for an abortion ifthey so wished,so long as they had sought an expert opinion from the local General Medical Council See 13, 1948, reaffirming Dr Wfenzel's denazification Herbert, Hitler's FortJgn Wtnizn, p. 270 In the former workers' status and his right to reinstatement at Ford-Werke'" 1947 affidavlUhe women said that they learned of this on their own "When we were In the camp we found out that we could file a Haim for an abortion what we got pregnant" In a separate statement in support of Dr. Wmzel, Dt Kresse wrote Regarding deaths at the plant during the war, the names of about 15 foreigners from Ford-Werke that neither he nor Dr Wenzel informed the Eastern workers that Nazi regulations permitted abortions. `On the contrary, the Russian women learnt this possibility very quickly from other appear on the Cologne wartime death lists that still exist, but without any indication as to the cause of camps and .. implored us with teats to perform the death. Five were children who died during the period Interruptions in our camp hospital, sating that we are allowed to do dlls . * Dr Kresse also described bow Eastern workers obtained approval for abortions Applications were filled out by from July through September 1944. Among the five were three babies who died in September In the women, acting on their own, and were then passed on by November 1944, four foreigners of unknown age. Dr. Wenzel to the Chamber ofPhysicians The applications were returned to the camp with the chamber's decision The normal procedure, established by the Nazis for Eastern women, was that they would be treated by a doctor in town who performed abortions without any anesthetic, so all the women wanted to be treated by Do Ufenzel See same source, Declaration by Dz Alwln Kresse to German Denazification Review Board, September 26. 1947 (HSAD 3001-3002, for English translation, see HSAD 3005-3006). * HSlAD NW 1048/34/272, Cologne Doctors Chamber to Vonessen. November 8. 1947 (HSAD 2953) s> HStAD NW 1048/34/272,Memo front van dc Sandt.April 15. 1948 (HSAD 3100-3103) 66 Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke induding twin sisters, died at Ford-Werke *'* Wierscheim, the security chief for the Eastern workers' camp, said, "As hr as I know, during the whole time in which the camp existed, about 18-20 persons only died, 8 of them for unnatural reasons, i.e , one of them was killed by his own compatriots, 4 were killed by air-raid attacks (2 of them on account of their own fault, because they handled with [sic] explosives). Three others drunk [sic] denatured spirits [alcoholic substances unfit for drinking, but usable as antifreeze or solvents] as a consequence of which they died"4" During die air attack in October 1944, the plant was targeted, and the foreign workers' amp sustained most of the damage.'5* German reports Indicate that an HASlK,Acc S/184, List of Ruslans Buried in West Cemetery. October IS. 1945 (HASH 0125-0136), HAStK. Acc. 1231/1, List ofRussians Buned in Wen Cemetery, no date (HASK 0163 0171). HAStK,Acc 606/26. Death Certificates, August 31 and September 14.1949 (HASK 0182-0183) .HAStKAcc 606/21. ns Documentation of Russians Burled In Wot Cemetery, April 10 - May 2, 19S1 (HASK 0186-0192). HAStK. Acc 606/17. Alphabetical List of Foreigners buried in Cologne no date (HASK 0205-0278),HAStK^cc 100. List offoreigners buried in Cologne, no date (HASK 0292-0299). It is difficult to determine die exact number of foreigners who died at FordVfaie because the lists did not always Indicate where the foreigners lived and often misspelled their names. Also, after September of 1944, ages were not specified on the death lists. According to a 1996 oral history Interview with a forms Eastern worker, a woman died of tuberculosis and two boys were killed by shrapnel The former worker also recalled that a girl who died In die camp seemed to be homesick, she sat around,didn't eat and was always sad. See ELDE.Z10 633,Oral history ofTN .September 12,1996 (ODE 0000233-0000255. for English translation, see ELDE OOQ0562-OOOOS64). A 1996 interview with another former worker indicated that a Russian boy about 18 months old died of meningitis in the camp See ELDB.Z10 623,Oral history of A O .September 13.1996 (ELDE 0000474-0000497, for English translation, see ELDE 0000592)_______________ 41/HStAQ, NW 1048/34/272, ftanslated report by Wierscheim, December 26, 1945 (HSAD 3091) According to a 1999 Interview with a former Ford-Werke employee who had been assigned to work with the Italians, an Italian worker died of tuberculosis on Christmas Day 1944, and a Russian died of drinking printing alcohoL See FMC, Interview with Emilia MOllec December 9, 1999 (FMC 001840$. FMC 0018427 and FMC 0018440) Another fanner forced laborer recalled that a young girl was lulled when a bomb was dropped on the Russian camp See ELDE, Z10 618. oral history of KNP. September 13. 1995 (ELDE 0000411-0000439, for English ovulation, see ELDE 0000697) NARA RG 243. Entry 27. Box 34. File- Iff a (600) 1. Interpretation Report S.A. 2847. October 19, 1944 (NARA 0005233) unexploded bomb landed In one of the sites, and 30 people had to be evacuated from a barracks.*" According to one former forced laborer, same foreign laborers were killed during air raids**0 (See Section 7.6 2 for information about air raid shelters at the camp.) 7.7. Slave labor from the Buchenwald Concentration Camp In addition to Eastern workers, Western workers and Italian POWs, Ford-Werke utilized slave labor from the Buchenwald concentration camp. The camp was established in 1937 for political prisoners, dergy, homosexuals, handicapped persons, "criminals" and people deemed "asocial" by the Nazis Buchenwald labor was employed to support the German war economy, both in and around the camp in Thuringia and In satellite camps, or subcamps, scattered all over Nazi Germany **' The first Cologne Buchenwald satellite camp was established on the jdt^Jalrgrofljrids m September 1942 The prisoners were deployed for construction and dearance work.*** Oral histories suggest that a few men from one of the construction brigades may have worked at Ford-Werke before a satellite camp was established at the plant in August 1944 **1 s HStAD. BR 1131 /] I $,Air Raid Safety Daily Report,October 23 24. 1944 (HSAD 1990-1993) o ELDE, ZI0 623, Oral history of AO, September 13, 1996 (ELDE 0000474-0000497, for English translation see ELDE 0000594) <> Christian Zentner and Friedemann Bedurfog, eds, Tb( Encydojmiia of the Thud Rack, vol I (NewYork Macmillan, 1991), pp 118-19._____________ <oi HStAD Rep. 118/1174, Memo from Central Authority for the handling of Nazi mass crimes In concentration camps.May 29, 1968 (HSAD 2562), NARA. RG 238. Entry 174. Box 33. NO1S78, Affidavit of Karl Sommer, February 27. 1947 (NARA 0007433-0007435, for English translation, see NARA 0007440-0007442). Originally, concentration camp labor was made available only for enterprises run by the SS After August or September 1942. a construction unit was created to repair bomb damage Of the five commandos with the deslgnauon "Construction Brigades." one was stationed in Cologne Construction brigades included about 1,000 men < ELSE Z20 530. Oral history of VL. October 2. 1990 (ELDE 0000942). ELDE. Z10 614, Oral history of K T .September 13. 199S (ELDE 0000111-0000126, for English translation, see ELDE 0000795), ELDE. Z10SS9. Oral history of FW, September 25. 1990 (ELDE 000036S-0000390, for English translauon, see ELDE 0000917), ELDE, Oral history of M G , August 28. 1993 (ELDE 0000961-0000963) 67 Research Finding; About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime The automotive industry did not become eligible for the use of concentration camp inmates until late in the wan In a meeting of the armaments ministry staff on August 1, 1944, Minister Albert Speer emphasized the importance of the automobile industry to the war effort and announced that due to the labor shortage, 12,000 concentration camp prisoners would be sent to work at automobile plants over the next several weeks*4*4I *On August 10,1944, Wilhelm Schaaf, head of the Automotive Industry Economic Group, chaired a meeting of the Main Automobile Committee where there was further discussion about the use of concentration camp prisoners by the various automobile manufacturers and suppliers Schaaf said that recent bombing raids had added to the difficulties of the German automotive industry Due to the seriousness of the situation, he said, production levels at automotive companies, includingFord-Werke, "must be maximized" Schaaf stated, "The most acute problem, namely labor acquisidon, has been solved for the time being by the provision of concentranon camp inmates."4*' Robert Schmidt and Alfons von Gusmann of Ford-Werke were among the automotive Industry representatives in attendance at that meenng -- On the same day that Schmidt and von Gusmann attended the Schaaf meeting, the mam Buchenwald concentration camp prepared a list of 50 prisoners to send to Ford-Werke.**' Included in the group of prisoners deployed to Ford-Werke were Russian and Czech political prisoners, Poles, and two Germans, one of whom was described as a "criminal" and the other as "work shy" Among them were carpenters, bricklayers, a painter, a tailor, a cabinet maker, plumbers, electricians, agricultural workers,shoemakers, a barber and a nurse *** Their first day of work was August 13,19444*4 Buchenwald transfer lists show that at 1< different men were assigned to the Ford-Werke satellite camp at one time or another, and that several were transported elsewhere or fled from Ford-Werke and * HStAD, Rep. 118/1179.Tkansport K61n (Ford).August 10,1944 (HSAD 0175-0176), ThHStAW, List of Buchenwald concentration camp ptisoners.no date (HSTH 0017-0034) *** BA-F, RL 3/9.Report on Armaments Staff Conference, August 1, I >44 (BAF 1356)________ 4`* BA-L R 3/288, Main Committee Meeting Minutes, August 21, 1944 (BAL 0896) The minutes indicate that special committee leaden were responsible "for making sure that firms are not assigned all bad workers.' 444 RA-L, R 3/288, Main Committee Meeting Attendance and Distribution Lists. August 10, 1944 (BAL 0898) "'NARA. RG 238. Entry 174, Box 17. NO-718. Circular from -Inspectorate of Concentration Camps, November 28, 1941 /(NARA 0007378*0007380; for English translation, tee NARA /0007381-0007383) Although no records were found to Ifdocument Ford-Wake's application for concentration camp labor, companies wishing to employ concentration camp V prisoners woe to apply to the Inspectorate of Concentration I Camps. The S5 ChiefofProtective Custody then would examine I the workplace, determine how many guards would be needed I and discuss with the firm the numbers and professions of inmates required, pay rates, whether one warm meal per day would be provided, transportation and duration of employment. If the Inspectorate approved, the inmates were sent to (he workplace. In April 1942, the Inspectorate was annexed to the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office. SS officials later confirmed that concentration camps were told to supply Inmates requested by private companies, provided that Albert Speer's Ministry ofArmaments and War Production had approved,see, for example, NARA.RG 238,Entry 174,Box 52, NO-2739, Affidavit of Kail Sommer. April 8, 1947 (NARA 0007389, for English translation.see NARA 0007393) and Box 33, NO-1578, Affidavit of Karl Sommer. February 7, 1947 (NARA 0007445) B-AK.IV 406 AR 85/67,Gcrgel to the Labor Deployment Office at Buchenwald (BAK 0359) In a report to die main concenirauon camp at Buchenwald, Ford-Wake camp commandant Gergel recounted the work assignments of FordWkrke's Buchenwald workers between August 13 their first day of work, and August 19, 1944 Entries for the first three days indicate that all 50 inmates were involved in concrete and transportation work. From that point, the men were divided into groups according to skill There were 10 skilled workers, including masons and carpenters, and 40 unskilled workers. Hie men apparently arrived in Cologne on August 12, 1944 Beginning on that date, according to the Gergel report, the Cologne dry kitchen allotted all 50 workers the standard concentration camp inmate meal radon plus a heavy-labor bonus Anotha wartime document, ThHStAW, KZuHaftA/9. List of Satellite Camps (HSTH 0074), contains Information about the camp known as K61n-Ford in August 1944 See also BA-L.NS 4/268, Wfork Assignment lists forAugust 20-29,1944 (BAL 12529-12530). and Martin Weinman, ed. Dos nationohotlolinlithe Lcgenystem (Frankfurt Zwcitausendeins, 1990), p 146 4,0 ThHStAW, NS 4/134, Writ Statistics for KL. Buchenwald, November 3, 1944 (HSTH 0002-0004),ThHStAW. NS 4/136a & 136b Inmate Transfer Lisa, no date (HSTH 0012-0016), ThHStAW. NS 4/ 136b, Inmate Transfer List, no date (HSTH 0083).ThHStAW, NS 4/136a Inmate Transfer Lists. September 4, 1944 (HSTH 0086), October 14. 1944 (HSTH 0087). November 1944 (HSTH 0090) and January 6, 1945 (HSTH 0093) Among the prisoners transported from Buchenwald to the Ford-Werke camp on November 3, 1944, were a French mechanic, an Italian mechanic and a Belgian student See ThHStAW, KZuHafta/2 List of Buchenwald concentration camp prisonos.no date (HSTH 0026.HSTH 0028 and HSTH 0034) 68 Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Weike new prisoners brought in to replace them.*470SS.Most documentation from the period indicates that there were 50 or fewer Buchenwald inmates at Ford-Werke at any given time from August 1944 through the end of February 1945.471 * A* 1944 list of Buchenwald satellite camps designates "Ford-Koln" with a capacity of 50 prisoners4,1 The SS Economic and Administrative Main Office controlled the use ofconcentration camp prisoner labor and fixed their wages. The company that employed the prisoners was responsible for their working conditions, lodging, food and hygiene. According to a postwar affidavit of Karl Sommer; a Nazi official who worked in the office responsible for concentration camp labor.the prisoners did not receive any wages The various plants paid the WOIICy tu -die concentration camp inspectorate's administrative office, from where it was ji During a 1946 Interrogation, the Nazi government offidal charged with the allocation of concentration camp labor listed Ford-Werke as having "approximately 500" prisoners from Buchenwald. See NARA.RG 238>UaofilmT-301,RoIl 10.NI- 1065, Affidavit of Karl Sommer. October 4, 1946 (NARA 0006934}. No other source was found Indicating such a high number However, S00 Is the number of civilian workers transferred from Ford-Werke to a dispersal camp estilished by Ford-Werke at Duemltnghausen In March 1945, see Wrfnman, IVw iwtmiwWaBdcrlw p 407. 47*ThHStAW NS 4/31.Ust of Satellite camp capacity! 1944 (HSTH 0095). According to Dally Work Assignment sheets for November 1944, the work detail consisted of between 43 and 50 men, see AGB, NS 4/29 Microfilm 32, Labor Assignment Cards,November 1944 (BW 0001-0064) NARA. KG 238. Entry 174, Bax S2. NO-2739Affidavit of Karl Sommer, April 8. 1947 (NARA 0007390, for English translation, see NARA 0007394), Box 33, NO-1S78, Affidavit of Karl Sommer, February 27. 1947 (NARA 0007438 0007439, fin English translation, see NARA 000744S). NARA. RG 238, Microfilm T-301, Roll 5, Nl-382, Affidavit ofOswald Kohl, August 5, 1946 (NARA 0007410, for English translation, lee NARA 0007422) According to flnanqal reports from the SS. in December 1944. the Buchenwald camp requested an Invoice to be sent to Ford-Werke for RM 5,220 for the month of November based an 1,305 unskilled workdays billed at a daily rate of RM 4. see NARA. RG 238. Microfilm T-301, Roll 31. NI-4181, Buchenwald Concentration Camp Commandant Office; Bills for November 1944, December 8, 1944 (NARA 0007294 and 0007300. for English translations, see NARA 0007303 and 0007307). A total of RM 6.352.137 was requested to be billed to 95 companies as their cost of Buchenwald prisoner libor for November 1944 See NARA.RG 238,Bmry 171. MlcrofflmT301. Roll 31. Nt-4181, Bills from Buchenwald Commandant to SS Chief Economics Administrative Office (NARA 0007295 and 0007300. for English translatlons.see NARA 0007303 and 0007307) collected for the Reich treasury. Beginning in spring 1943, companies paid wages of RM 4 per day for unskilled workers and RM 6 per day for skilled labor.47' In addition, companies were expected to hand directly to the prisoners "a so-called 'achievement bonus'" for work in excess of the prescribed wages.474 Companies were allowed to deduct food and housing expenses from their wage payments to the Reich Treasurer475 The SS rules stipulated that the prisoners' working hours were not to exceed those of civilian workers. Sommer said in his affidavit that this was only in theory and was decided upon locally by the employing companies 474 The satellite camps provided the mam concentration camps with daily, weekly and monthly information on the deployment of the work details477 Prisoners worked in various areas ofFord-Werke and offsite, guarded by 16 SS men4" Buchenwald records for Ford-Werke show that in November 1944, unskilled laborers were assigned to work for two construction 474 NARA.BG 238. Entry 174. Box 33. NO-1578.Affidavit of Kail Sommer, February 27, 1947 (NARA 0007435, for English translation, see NARA 0007442-0007443) 477 NARA. RG 238. Microfilm T-301. Roll $, Nl-382. Affidavit of Oswald Pohl, August 5. 1946 (NARA 0007422) Private industry generally deducted two-fifths of the wages due to the Reich to cover "payment In kind." i c. food, lodging, etc. Pohl said that In light of the Inadequate payment In kind, the deduction of two-fifths must be regarded as much too high, and the labor provided by the concentration camp prisoners for private industry was very cheap 474 NARA.RG 238, Entry 174. Box 33, NO-l578.Affidavlt of Karl Sommer, February 27, 1947 (NARA 000743S, for English translation, see NARA 0007442-0007443) 477 For examples from Ford-Werke. see AGB. NS 4/29 Microfilm 32, Labor Assignment Cards, November 1944 (BW 0001 0064) According to Buchenwald records. Ford-Werke and some other satellite camps did not file all the required reports. Ford-Werke was listed as having failed to file reports for the month ofDecember 1944 and the first three weeks offcbniary 1945 The daily reports contained the numbers of workers.the type of work, the start and the end of the workday and the lunch break given to the prisoners They were signed by the commander of the satellite camp and co-signed by a representative of the firm. See ThHStAW, NS 4/229, Labor assignment lists, October 1944-February 21, 194S (HSTH 0007-0011), and NARA.RG 238,Entry 174. Box 42,File NO2125, Affidavit of Albert Schwartz. February 19, 1947 (NARA 0007397-0007398, for English translation, see NARA 0007403)_______________ 471 Zmugrsrkcit M Ford Elat Dokiunaicotjon. Projektgruppe "Messelager" lm MereIn EL-DE Haus e V Koln. eds. (Koln Betrieb Rode-Stankowsld. 1996), p 32 69 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime companies in Cologne and that prisoners were also used by the city for clearing bombs. The prisoners built concrete air raid shelters and did transport work at Ford-Wake *" In a 1990 interview, F W, a Buchenwald prisoner who worked at Ford-Werke in the fall of 1944, remembered using cranes to unload barges and load Crains.*" Another Buchenwald prisoner at Ford*Wake, K.T., recalled in 1995 that a few inmates worked inside the plant, welding or painting vehicles K.T. said that he and most of die others in his Buchenwald group performed outside labor, including packing and dockside loading, at Ford-Wake **' Reports differ concerning the number of hours worked by Buchenwald inmates at Ford-Wake. According to the Buchenwald work assignment records for Novemba 1944, the prisoners worked for five days, from 7 ami. to 5 p.m, with a break from 12.30 pm. to 1 pm On the sixth day, the tom worked for six hours, from 7 a m. to 1 pm., without any break. The following day, the men worked from 7 a.m. to 3:30 pm , with a break from 12.30 pm. to l pm. After the seventh day, another cycle would begin, starting with five 10-hour days.*" MG., a forma inmate at the Buchenwald jS&elhte camp at Ford-Werke. recalled a different work schedule. In an interview conducted m the 1990s, M G. remembered working 12-hour days in production at Ford-Werke, from 6 a.m. to 6 pm. He also said the break was 15 minutes long, during which time the Buchenwald laborers did not receive any food. However, K.Ts recollection was that "[t]he people from Ford were very good to us We got a lot of soup there, bread too. but not so much ",,1 The prisoners from Buchenwald lived in barracks some 70 to 100 meters (77 to 109 yards) away from the plant M.G remembered the barracks as being dean, green in color and fenced in The guardroom, the kitchen, the toilet and the washroom were at the center. The men slept m three-tiered bunk beds. He did not recall the SS guards as brutal but as "very precise and strict." According to M G .the food for the inmates at Ford-Wake~ was even worse than what he had received at Buchenwald Breakfast consisted of coffee and 200 prams (about 7 rmnrpsjuaf hread while dinner was .either spinach with three potatoes or soup of white-beet leaves.4** Records show that five concentration camp inmates assigned to the Ford-Wake satellite camp fled the camp in 1944.*" Prisona Numba 51506 died at age 43 in October 1944, while working at Ford-Werke. He was a bricklayer of Czech nationality. He had arrived at Buchenwald on July 21 and was brought to Ford-Werke with the first group of Buchenwald prisoners on or about August 13 *** During Novemba 1944, one of the men was reported sick during the entire period. One to three others were always listed as "in need of rest" [schonungskiank] during that period *' AGB. NS 4/29, Microfilm 32, Labor Assignment Cards. November 1944 (BW 0001-0064) ELDE.Z10 5S9,Oral history of F W .September 25.1990 (ELDE 0000365-0000390; for English translation, see ELDE 0000917).______________ 4ii ELDE,Zl0.614,Oral history of JLT .September 13,1995 (ELDE 0000111-0000126. for English translation, see ELDE 0000795).______________ 4*> AGB, NS 4/29 Microfilm 32. Labor Assignment Cards. November 1944 (BW 0001-0064). 4*1 ELDE, Oral history of M.G, August 28, 1993 (ELDE 0000966 0000970). M.G. provided some precise information about the Buchenwald satellite camp at Ford-Werke, including the names of the SS commander and certain foremen at Foid-Werke. However, he stated dial he and a contingent of 50 workers arrived at Ford-Werke In September 1943. while the Buchenwald transportation lists indicate that he arrived in August 1944 See also ELDE, Z10 614, Oral history of K.T, September 13, 1995 (ELDE 0000111-0000126, for English translation, see ELDE 0000795) 4 HDE, Oral history of M G . August 28. 1993 (ELDE 0000936 0000970)_______________ *,sThHSlAW, NS 4/36a. Inmate Transfer Lists, September 14, 1944,November 14. 1944, November 28,1944 (HSTH 0085. HSTH 0091.HSTH 0093) The lists show that one inmate from Ford-Werke was among three Buchenwald prisoners who fled from Cologne camps on September 14, 1944,the origin of the other two prisoners could not be determined from (he lists. Another Ford-Werke Buchenwald inmate fled on November 14, 1944,three more fled on November 28 "`ThHStAW. NS 4/136a, Inmate Transfer List, October 1944 (HSTH 0087). HStAD, Rep 118/1179, TVansport K61n (Ford) August 10. 1944 (HSAD 0175). ThHSiAW. KzuHafrA/2. Buchenwald Prisoner Number Registry, p 418, no date (HSTH 0027) The October 1944Transfer List shows the date ofdeath of prisoner S1S06 as October 13, 1944, while Buchenwald Registry shows bis date of death as October 6.1944 Both are Buchenwald records but were maintained separately The records do not Indicate the cause of death *I7AGB, NS 4/29 Microfilm 32, Labor Assignment Cards. November 1944 (BW 0001-0064) 70 Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke On February 27, 1945, shortly before the American army liberated Cologne, 48 concentration camp inmates were transferred elsewhere from the Ford-Werke satellite camp. Buchenwald transfer lists show that one prisoner fled from Ford-Werke on March 6, 194S, the day the American army took Cologne *" A memo from the Labor Statistics Office of the Concentration Camp Buchenwald to the Pnson Bureau, dated March 8,1945, indicated that a group of men was being assembled at Buchenwald to be sent to Cologne Thirty-six of the men had been part of the original Ford-Werke work detail However, the memo specified that the men were to remain at Buchenwald "until further notice"'" There is no indication that the transport ever left for Cologne On April 10, 1945, Buchenwald was liberated 7.8. Liberation at End of War When American army units arrived at the FordWerke plant in March 1945, they found foreigners living on the factory grounds, although it is not dear bow many had worked at Ford-Werke and how many had just taken shelter at the plant during the fighting One of the earliest U.S Army reports, based on a visit MThH5tAVY NS 4/136a Si 136h InmateTramfer Lists. 1944-1945 (H5TH 0012 and 0014) *'*ThHStAVV N5 4, 135, Wfark Statistics at Buchenwald. March 8. 1945 (HSTH 0005-0006) Snyder Encydopcdfo of the Tbiri Rrki, ja 44* 22 NARA. KG 160,Ecooomici Division. Industry Branch, Box 37, Bed 39.3, Cl O.S.Target Report 19/8 on visit to Fbrd-CologneNieH March 10,1945,document date March 23.1945,(NARA OOOS6S2-OOOS656) Regarding reports of typhus outbreaks and other health ami sanitary problems In Cologne during this period, see NARA. RG 331, Entry 54, Bax 151, FUe 17 11. Historical Report, First U.S Army, March 1945 (NARA 0005265-0005270), RG 338. Entry 42389, Bax 3, File. I5` Daily Repots 9 Mar-12 May `4S. B1H2 Dally Report No 3, March 12. 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881), RG 407. Entry 427, Box 1780, File 99/12-5 March 1945, 12 Army Group Civil Afiain and Military Government Summary Na 289,March 22. 1945 (NARA 0004566), RG407, Entry 427, Box 15063, FUe- 603-2 1, IPW Report. March 6, 1945 (NARA 0005325). and RG 331 .Entry 54,Box 151.File 17 U.G-5 Summary No. 281, March 14. 1945 (NARA 0004929-0004930) Another allegation from the March 10 visit was that foreign workers were responsible for the destruction and disorder thatAmerican troops found cm their airival However, reports from later visits conduded that Ford employees. Germans as well is foreigners, had been locked in the basement and were allowed out only under supervision According to these rcpons.papen and spare parts had been strewn about the plant by the shelling and by unsupervised collection activities ofthe troops. SeeWNRC.Acc. on March 10, 1945, estimated that "500 foreign workers were living in the factory, mainly in the large air-raid shelter . Living conditions were foul in the^ extreme and most of the Russian women were reported'' to be suffering from VP." This report is the only one to mention a reported outbreak of venereal disease. Others referred to the typhus that was rampant In Cologne."' Military accounts written over the next few days reported between 300 and 400 foreigners at the plant, most of whom were Italians. On March 22, 1945, Maj. FN Amoidy filed a plant report with the US. Strategic Bombing Survey stating- "I found presence of foreign workers such as Russians, Roles, Belgians, French, Czech and Dutch. Several hundred workers of both sexes were gathered in a large room of the air-raid shelter."*" C E, an assistant to plant physician Dt VWnzel, claimed that Dr Wenzel had established a refuge in the air raid shelter; "During the fighting for Cologne Dr Wenzel gathered his orderlies around him and in a nwer-tiring effort he cared for the remaining foreigners, app 60 in number, as well as approximately 400 Italians." She also claimed that Dr Wmzel performed operations during this time*" Porelgn workers found in Cologne were sent to nearby "displaced-persons" camps operated by the US. Army"* 299-68A-0243.Box S40,FUe File 43.Roebuck to North Rhine Military Government, December 15, 1945 (DOJ 0010199 0010200), NARA. RG 331. Entry 54. Box 151. FUe 17.11, Historical Report. First US Army. March 1945 (NARA 0005287), and NARA, RG 338, Entry 41919, Box S3. FUe 12 April-29 April 194S, E1H2 Daily Summary, April 30, 1945 (NARA 0004660) Reporting on later visits to the plant. US. military investigators wrote tint the Eastern Europeans "were astonishingly well behaved while German farmers said the Eastern workers were stealing their chickens,breaking into their homes and helping themselves to necessities, and German middle-class people said that the Russians were animals, German complaints were a mixture of hypocrisy, impudence and subtle propaganda* See Historical Report, (NARA 0005266-0005267) < NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389. Box 3, FUe 15* Daily Reports 9 Mar-12 May *45, Detachment E1H2 DaUy Report No 3. March 12, 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881). NARA. RG 331, Entry 54, Box 151, File 17 11, Historical Report, First US Army, March 1945, p. 393 (NARA 0004930), NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, FUe 77a)9 2 of 3, Preliminary Investigation of German Industries West of the Rhine, March 23, 1945 (NARA 0004498) " HStAU NW 1048/34/272. Affidavit by CE. no date (HSAD 2999-3000) ** Billsteln and Oner, *ftu me now is CotogK Cunplimmts.' pp 161 174 n Research Findings About Ford-Wetke Under the Nazi Regime Section 8 Ford-Werke's Relationship with Other Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe When German forces overran the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France in a six-week campaign in May and June 1940, their victory gave them control of all the strategic industrial productive capacity of Vfestem Europe Soon afterward, Robert Schmidt was appointed the commissioner for all Ford properties in the occupied countries ofBelgium, France and Holland After the U S entry Into the war, all of these subsidiaries were placed under the control of the Reich Commissioner for the "Treatment of Enemy Property, who appointed Ford-Werke personnel as custodians to oversee operations.*** Ford-Werke also had ties to Ford subsidiaries in other occupied countries, including Denmark and Greece, as well as those in countries that were German allies during the early pan of the war, such as Hungary, Romania, Italy and Finland. According to wartime intelligence reports and postwar investigations of the firm, Ford-Werke coordinated the production of Ford vehicles throughout occupied Europe *" 8.1. Ford of Ranee When France declared war on Germany in September 1939, Ford Motor Company held majority ownership m Ford S A.F (Ford of France) Ford of France's operations, located at sites in Poissy, Asmeres, Bourdeaux and Bourges, involved truck assembly and engine manufacture, and its faahues included assembly plants, foundries and machine shops.**' After the collapse of France in June 1940, the country was divided into a military occupation zone in the north and a quasi-independent French civilian government m the south with its capital at Vichy u *** FMC AR-65-1S00, Box 6. File- Germany 1939-1945 (C.E Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, July 11, 1940 (FMC 0003146 0003148). For an overview, see Lesunann, "Ford Fans im Zugriffvon Ford K61n 1943 " *`NARA. RG 169, Entry S00B. Box 1381, Document 155921, Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13, March 18. 1945 (NARA 0007104) A postwar summary ofaettvitier at Ford's European subsidiaries during the war Indicated that by January 1942,the Ford plants In Cologne. France, Holland and Belgium were working interchangeably under the Reich Commissioner, but that "passive resistance in the occupied countries accounted in some Instances for a reduction in the total estimated production." See FMC AR-98-213541, Box 201, European Company Histories, 1940-1946, June 18. 1946 (FMC 0007443). ri'NARA. RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File- 80648. Ministry of Economic Warfare, Report on Ford Organisation in Continental Europe, June 1944, hereafter MEW Report (NARA 0004396), NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032. Schneider Report, pp. 10-11. September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000012-0000013) *H NARA, RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 1381, Document 155921. Intelligence Report No. EW-XO 13, March 18. 1945 (NARA 0007104)_______________ NARA, RG 226, Entry 16. Box 946. File 80648, MEW Report, June 1944 (NARA 0004399) The Poissy plant was still under construction when the Gomans occupied Frants mo Ian Ousby, Occupation, the Ordeal of Fiance 1940-1944 (New York St Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 67-68 73 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Immediately following the occupation of France, German military occupation authorities appointed Robert Schmidt commissioner of Ford of France facilities. Alfons Strelt, Ford-Werke technical director, wait to Ford of France to retrieve spare parts for Ford of Belgium. According to Ford of France Managing Director Maurice Dollfus, Schmidt and his assistant, the son ofFord-Werke's chairman, Heinrich Albert, went to the Asni&res plant between June 17 and July 5, 1940, and took "the best parts of Its valuable stock" for Ford of Belgium and Ford of Holland. During this period, Ford of France began producing three-ton trucks for the German military and was supplying parts to Ford of Belgium and Ford of Holland501 After June 1940, Ford of France could no longer import American or English pans or cars Accordingly. Ford-Werke developed a "united program" for die exchange of goods and machines between Cologne. Antwerp, Amsterdam and Paris."1 However, Schmidt reponed difficulties in his reladons with Ford of France management Although Schmidt had been appointed commissioner of the facilities, Dollfus convinced the German authorities in Pans to grant him the authonty to manage the French plants independently"1 In August 1940, Dollfus sent a letter to Ford Motor Company indicating that he had gone to Berlin to meet with Adolph von Schell (Plenipotentiary forAutomotive Affairs) concerning Ford of France's position. Dollfus stated that he was working well with SchmidtSM Dollfus later reponed that despite Schmidt's plans to reorganize Ford European subsidiaries mto a single economic unit under German leadership, Dollfus had been successful in keeping Ford oi France separate. In a postwar interview, DUflfus said SUlUiUll Had actecT "like a pig" in his relauons with Ford of France "* In January 1941, Schmidt resigned his posmon as Ford of France commissioner. He later attributed the resignation to his frustrations with the "passive resistance" of the French management Under orders of the German military government in France, a Ford- NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 203, Memo by Schmidt on custodian of Ford Enterprises France. June 25.194S (NARA 0000475-0000476). NARA. RG 169. Bury 500B, Bax 1381, Document 155921, Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13, March 18. 1945 (NARA 0007104), HFM,Acc. 6, Bax 321, File 1940 Correspondence. Dollfus to Edict Ford, November 27, 1940 (HFM 00014S7) "> HFM, Acc. 6, Bax 321, File. 1940 Correspondence, Albert to Edsel Ford,September 18.1940 (HFM 0001470-0001471) *** WNR.C, Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536, FUeW 17536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes. January 13. 1943 (DOJ 0011119 0011120, for English translation, see DOJ 0011222) HFM,Acc 6, Box 321, File 1940 - Cologne, Dollfus to Edsel Ford, August 31, 1940 (HFM 0000124) HFM, Acc 6, Box 321, File 1940 Correqjondence, DoDfus to Edsel Ford. November 27, 1940 (HFM 0001457- 0001459) In a 1960 Interview with historian Mira Wilkins, a former employee of Ford ofFrance said char a person In DoDfus- shoes had to be careful "As a French dozen Dollfus was obligated to oppose the Genruns,as a Ford man he was under obligation to cooperate with Cologne to protea the assets. After the war Dollfus was in Jail a week or two. Feelings were running high gainst anyone who had worked with the Germans, but Dollfus was just as good a Frenchman as anyone else " Another former Ford of France employee, also Interviewed by Mira Wilkins In 1960, said that DoDfus was released without a trial and later received an award from the French government for his work during the wax See FMC, AR-98-213542, File- Oral Reminiscence conducted by Mira Wilkins. Jules Gutzeit Interview. July 20,1960 (FMC 0017366-0017367) and Marcel Cola Interview July 13. 1960 (FMC 0017359-0017360) 504 HFM, Acc 880, Box 6, File France, Interview with Maurice Dollfus, September 13, 1960 (HFM 000868) In a 1947 letter to Ford executive Russell Roberge, Dollfus wrote that Schmidt Died and sometimes succeeded in taking away machinery, parts and even whole vehicles, sometimes without providing receipts. Dollfus called Schmidt tactless and said that he acted with "a total disdain of both normal standards and Ford routine.' DoDfus also recounted an attempt by Schmidt to nd the French company of Dollfus in 1943, a move that Dollfus believed would have endangered, at the very least, Dollfusfreedom See HFM, Acc 713, Box 4, File. Correspondence Foreign - Cologne - Personnel 1946-1948, Dollfus to Roberge. December 16,1947 (HFM 0003128) *0WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File WI7S36. Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011119, for English translation, see DOJ 0011222) Dollfus and Ford of France came under the scrutiny of the U.S government In a 1943 report summarizing an invesdgauon by the Treasury Department, DoDfus was described as having "worked with the German Authorities so successful [sic] that he substantially superseded his colleagues of the Ford Motor Company of Germany [Schmidt] " Primarily during the period after Schmidt's resignation, Dollfus built the production of Ford of France "higher than It ever bad been in peacetime, supplying trucks and parts to the German Army," according to the report See NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Ford - Confidential. Report of Investigation of Ford, Sodete Anonyme Francalse, Machinery SuppUers.Inc., Matford S A , Fordair S A , by J John Lawler hereafter Lawler Report, pp. 63-64, circa 1943 (NARA 0001460-0001461), and NARA, Franklin D Roosevelt Presidential Library,Morgenthau Diaries, vol 637.pp 212-223, Randolph Paul to Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, May 25, 1943 (NARA 0004944) See Sections 9 2.93 and 9 5 for more about this investigation. Foti-Wetke's Relationship with Other Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe Werke employee remained at Ford of France,n Later in Belgium and Holland. Under Albert, Ford of France that summer, Ford of France sold the facility at was made responsible for the production of parts for Asmeres.'" In March 1942, George Lesto, assistant 2,000 trucks per month for the German army, with manager of Ford of France, reported that the Poissy, Ford of France, Belgium and Holland each responsible plant ypf pmHnrinp mirVc for the German army.110 In for assembly of one-third of the total. To accomplish March and April ) 942, the Poissy iaolity was bombed this and to connect Ford of France with other Ford by the British Royal Air Force.111 entities m Europe, Albert saw to it that men and After the U S entry into the war, Fend of France became administered as an enemy-controlled company, materials from Ford-Weike, and labor from Ford facilities in Belgium and Holland, were sent to France111 and on May 26, 1942, Albert was appointed custodian In March 1944, German military authorities of the firm, supplanting the French firm's board of reported that Ford of France was supplying Ford of directors The French board of directors attributed Belgium and Ford of Holland with engines and Albert's appointment to the consolidation of the Speer transmission units, in addition to producing trucks and armaments ministry in Germany and Speer's attempts motors British intelligence reports from the same year to coordinate French and German production for the indicated Ford of France was manufacturing between war.111 Maj. Tannen of the German army acted as 400 and 500 vehicles each month along with 1,000 Albert's assistant in administering the plant.111 engines.11* According to a September 1945 report, the However; because of continuing difficulties at Ford of highest production figure attained by Ford of France France, including an attempt at sabotage, in January during the war was 900 trucks per month ,l' The 1943 the Speer ministry took the first step toward hberauon of Paris on August 28, 1944, ended Albert's granting Schmidt the "necessary authority" to include custodianship of Ford of France By October 1944, the French subsidiary in the "general Ford plan."1" This Ford S A.F was operating under its U.S. pareiur"\ called for coordinating parts production and assembly of military trucks and Maultiers between Ford-Werke and the Ford subsidiary in France as well as subsidiaries >NAKA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 203, Memo by Schmidt on custodian of Ford Enterprises France, June 25,1945 (NARA 0000475-0000476). see also NARA. RG 59, Central Decimal File. 1940-44, Box U74.FUe:3Sl 115.Leahy to Secretary of State.March 17,1942 (NARA 0005411-0005414) HFM, Ace. 6, Box 329, File Asnlhes, DoOfiis to Edsel Ford, August 21. 1941 (HFM 0001285) m RG 59. Central Decimal File, 1940-44, Box 1174. File 's! 115, Leahy to Secretary of State, March 17,1942 (NARA 0005411-0005414). HFM, Acc. 6, Box 329, Hie Amibtr, Broz to Edsd Ford and Sorensen, March 11, 1942 (HFM 0000156). BA-F. KW 24/4, Report of Events. March 8. 1942 (BAF 1307), NARA. RG 84, Entry 2490, Bax 10, File: 7)1, American Embassy. Vichy to Secretary ofState, April 4, 1942 (NARA 0006908) i<> FMC, AR 75-63-430. Box 207, File France Meeting Minutes 1935-1948, Ford SAF Board Meeting Minutes for June 12, 1942 (FMC 0003419-0003421) and October 19. 1944 (FMC 0003383) For German regulations regarding the definition of enemy-controlled assets, see BA-L, R 22/2815, Rdrlugetablatt Nr 37April 14,1942 (BAL 2706) 5,4WNRC Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536Advl*ory Board Meeting Minutes. January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011113 and 0011120-0011121, for English translations, see DOJ 0011218 and 0011222-0011223) The Speer ministry's goal, as expressly ordered by the Fuhrer, was to ensure the Rill utilization of the French automotive industry for the German war effort For reports ofsabotage at Ford ofFrance, see FordWerke Records, Note to files, September 24, 1942 (FW 0001908-0001909), FMC. AR-98-213542. File Oral reminiscence conducted by Mira Willems, Marcel Cola Interview; July 13, 1960 (FMC 0017359-0017360), and HP, AR-61-000418, Box 1, File 1941, Translation of Report from Ford S.A.F French Recovery Study (HP 0000418) *'* WNRC Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011106, for English translation, see DOJ 0011232). NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, pi 39, September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000040-0000041), Schmidt to Perry. May 28. 194S (NARA 0000485) Beginning in 1944. Ford-Werkeproduction reports include information on both the Cologne facility and the "Ford-West" program, see NARA. RG 243. Entry 6, Box 684, Hie. 77a2. Automobile Manufacturers Planned and Actual Production. 1944 (NARA 0003659). 1,1 BA-F, KvV 24/33.Mid-month Report,April 4,1944 (BAF 1417 1420), NARA. RG 226. Entry 16, Box 946. File 80684, MEW Report, June 1944 (NARA 0004399) *> NARA.RG 407,Entry 368B.Box 1032,Schneider Report, p. 39, ^September 5. 1945 (NARA 0000041) sis NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, / s, IMC, AR 75-63-430, Bax 207, File France Meeting Minutes Bihlbli 203. Memo by Schmidt on custodian of Ford [ {935-1948, Ford SAF Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1944 Buopriscs France, June 25,1945 (NARA 0000475-0000476). I /FMC 0003382-0003383 and 0003388) 7S I I i I I I Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime 8.2. Ford ofBelgium Ford Motor Company (Belgium) S.A (Ford of Belgium) was a direct subsidiary of Ford Motor Company before the outbreak of war in 1939."* 1944.TM Alfons Streit, Ford-Werke's technical director and a deputy member of the management board, supervised production at Ford of Belgium and Ford of Holland Following the German invasion of Belgium in May At a meeting of the advisory board of Ford-Werke in 1940, the country was administered by German January 1943, Robert Schmidt announced the military authorities, and Allied-owned Belgian expansion of the "unified plan" for European industrial facilities came under the jurisdiction of the production that included contributions from the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Cologne, Amsterdam,Antwerp and Lutuch facilities. To Property. From the time of the invasion in 1940, until relieve a raw material botdeneck, he ordered the the liberation of Belgium in September 1944, Ford of establishment of two new facilities in Belgium, a Belgium was treated as part of a pan-European Ford foundry in Rocour and a forge in Blerset, a suburb of organization headed by Ford-Werke."1 Antwerp.'" Although these facilities were legally In June 1940, the German military administration appointed Robot Schmidt as special commissioner for Ford of Belgium during the occupation, with instructions to get the utmost out of the Belgian facilities in terms of German war potential Soon after his appointment, Schmidt changed the purpose of the Antwerp facility, ordering the conversion of Ford of Belgium from an assembly-only facility for cars to a considered part ofFord of Belgium, Ford-Werkeowned the machineryTM Ford-Werke also had its own personnel managing the new facilities Werner Prutz, a high-ranking Ford-Werke employee, oversaw operations at the Bierset forge until the Allied occupationAt the Rocour foundry, Streit directed most operations, assisted by M Bohl, another FordWerke employee."' full-scale production plant.1" hi accordance with During the war, Ford-Werke used Ford of Belgium's German military requests. Ford of Belgium built trucks contacts with Switzerland, which had been pan of Ford and manufactured Ford parts, especially those of Belgium's sales territory during the 1930s. Since bottlenecked in Germany.1" Since Schmidt spent only a 1931, Ford-Werke had purchased items and sold limited amount of time in Belgium, he delegated some of his authority. For example, Hans Schmidt represented Ford-Werke's management board in Antwerp and oversaw operations there from 1940 to vehicles and spare parts in Switzerland^ therefore paying commissions to Ford of Belgium Schmidt developed the idea of buying Ford spare parts in Switzerland for-Ford-Werke and for other European __________________ *> HA-L, R 87/8292.Albezt to Reich Commissioner; June 8,1940 NARA. RG 407. Entry 368B, Box 1032, File Ford-Werke AG, I (UAL 5749-5750)________ GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001567) I il HFM.Acc. 6, Bo* 321. File 1940 Correspondence. Dollfus to Ethel Fold, November 27. 1940 (HFM 0001456-0001460). `WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243. Box 536, File Wl 7536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, January 13. 1943 (DOJ 0011113 I 0011114. for English transbUon.see DOJ 00112)8-0011219), I >n BA-L.R 87/8292,Albert to Reich Commissioner, June 8,1940 see also NARA. RG 226, Entry 16. Box 946, File 80684. MEW (RAL 5749-S750),WNRC. Acc 299-68A-0243. Box 536, File. Report, June 1944 (NARA 0004399) W17S3&Schmldt to Reich Commissioner, May 15,1944 (DOJ 0011169, for English translation, see DOJ 0011171). NARA, *i*FMC, AR-7S-62-6I6, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC RG 407,Entry 368B,Box 1032,Sdindder Report,Exhibit 196. 0001046) Ford of Belgium paid the ma)omy of the expenses Memo by 5dimldl on custodianship. June 25, 1945 (NARA for the additional investments and, after the war, submitted a 0000464). Prior to the occupation of Belgium by German number ofinvoices related to the investments to Ford-Werke for troops in 1940. Ford of Belgium received materials and parts reimbursement Ford-Werke took the position that the from Fold of Britain (Dagenham) and Ftad Motor Company, activities were the responsibility of Ford of Belgium Available and assembled finished can, see FMC, AR-7S-62-616, Box 79, documentation does not confirm whether Ford-Werke Custodian Report (FMC 0001044) eventually paid the involces.totallng Bfrs 71,813,653 67 111 NARA, RG 407,Entry 368B.Box 1032,Schneider Report, page 38September 5.1945. (NARA 0000040) sir HStAD; NW 1049/47910, Denazification File ofWerner Priitz. 1945-1947 (HSAD 0322-0364) s>> Ford-Werke Records, tesonne) file of Hans Schmidt, no date (FW 0020974). " Ford-Werke Records, Kurscheid to Neuss, January 5,1944 (FW 0003148),Bohl to Streit. February 3, 1944 (FW 0003175). 76 Ford-Werke's Relationship wilh Other Ford Facilities id Occupied Europe t Ford companies, and the German government the factory that was expressed in subtle sabotage of the A( *gguoavrearnntmeeednpt apymroegnrat.mFowrdi-tWh eSrkweisaslsodeaaidleerds a German through (ffr which the dealers agreed to repair Ij army trucks and convert them into gas generator] trucks being built for the German army The sabotage would prevent the trucks from working properly, yet was not noticeable until they were in use.5" According to a postwar account from another employee, the work In 1939, Ford of Belgium had a stock capital ofBfrs (Belgian francs) 90,000,000, of which a large amount was owned direcdy by Henry Ford.5" In 1944, Ford of Belgium, under pressure from Schmidt, issued an additional Bfrs 60,000,000 in Ford of Belgium stock to force labored "very hard, but slowly" and built fewer than 60 percent of the truck quota established by the Germans for the Belgian operation between June 1940 and August 1944 The comparison was made between 35,501 units assembled by Ford of Belgium (with U S be retained directly by Ford-Werke. A postwar report components) for the U.S Army between December said that the stock was given in exchange for Ford- 1944 and May 1945, and 11,025 units assembled Werke's assistance with expenses for the new foundry and forge operations.5,1 Schmidt justified this plan to the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property in part by claiming that such a move would "secure German influence over the Antwerp company fin the future." With permission from the Reich Commissioner, the stocks woe issued to Ford-Werke, making the German company Ford ofBelgium's second largest shareholder.11' These shares were nullified by previously for the Germans over a five-year period of the occupation 05 The Antwerp facility was heavily damaged by the Allies during the war. The first attack occurred in October 1941, when five bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the factory and caused a fire to break out in the factory halL,M The Antwerp facility was attacked twice in May 1943, causing extensive damage to the plant's machine shop Ford of Belgium after the war, since they had been issued under pressure.111 Direct links between Ford-Werke and Ford of Belgium were severed in September 1944, after the An account provided in the 1980s by an employee of Ford ofBelgium describes "a kind ofresistance" within Allied liberation of Belgium. Ford of Britain assumed control of the firm and installed its own directors111 Ford of Belgium employee O La Meir, head of the MARA.RG *07,Entry 368B.BOX 1032.Schneider Report, p. 41. . September 5, 19*5 (NAKA 00000*3). Gas generators, or gas producers, were alternative fueling devices that used carbon or wood to fttel a vehicle no ba-L, R 87/8292,AIbeit to Reich Commissioner, June 8,19*0 (HAL 57*9-5750) Ul BA-L. R 87/620S. Military Commando fat Belgium and Northern France to Ford of Belgium. March 25. 19** (BAL 0S30), Reich Commissioner to Schmidt, July 7. 19** (BAL 0535-0536),Flnance President ofCologne to Ford-Werhe, June 13. 19** (BAL 053*), FMQ AR-98-213541, Box 131, Peny Report. September 19,1940 (FMC 0000918) 111 BA-1, R 87/6205, Srhmlth to Reich Commissionec May 15. 19*4 (BAL 0527-0528; for partial English translation, see WNRC RG 299, Acc. 299-68A-0243. W-17536 Part 1 of 1 [DOJ 0011171-0011172]), Reich Commissioner to Schmidt, July 7, 19*4 (BAL 0S3S-0536). Service Department, was said to haye been a member of a pro-German, Belgian SS paramilitary group, and left a few days before liberation, presumably for Germany. Belgian authoriues later arrested James van Luppen, Ford of Belgium's assistant manager during the war. and charged him with 17 counts of industrial *** HFM. AR-98-2135*11. Box *9, Oral history of Nestor Caiteteyn.March 26. 1987 (HFM 0001500-0001501) 111 HFM,Acc. 880, Box 2, File Belgium, Notes on interview with Desire Dejonghe, August 5. 1960 (HFM 0000770-0000771) NARA. RG 2*3, Entry 6. Box 687, FUe Ford Antwerp. Ford (Belgium) war damage no. 2, October 7, 19*1 (NARA 0003*11-0003421) ui Ensign Rains, a U.S military Investigator with the Allied occupation government in Germany, confiscated the shares from Ford-Werke on June 14, 19*5 See NARA, RG 260, Property Division,Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 5*6JFUe. Ford-Wcrk, Rose to Kagan,September 10,19*8 (NARA 0000549-0000550) and Bennett to Property Division. November 2*. 19*8 (NARA 00005*8). see also FMC AR-98 213541, Box 131. Perry Report, September 19, 19*6 (FMC 0000918) " NARA, RG 243, Entry 6. Box 687, File 77al9 3 of 3, Motor Vehide Survey of Ford and General Motors Plants at Antweip, Belgium. February 26.194S (NARA 000326*-0003266).Hans Schmidt to Armaments Commando - Brussels, June 1, 19*3 (NARA 0003298-0003301) NARA. RG 56, Acc. 56-68A-2809, Box *0, File (500) Rep in Belgium, Ford Motor Co (Belgium) S A, Form TFR-500, October 31. 1947 (NARA 0004*71-0004472) 77 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime collaboration'** In November 1947, military authorities in Antwerp ended an investigation of economic collaboration with the enemy against Ford of Belgium by dismissing the matter**0 According to one postwar account, van Luppen was at first pushed out from his position, but returned in October 1948.MI the manager of Ford of Holland, CGJ Stengei; about the appointment ofSchmidt as custodian Their strategy was to have the individual be a "Ford man," since the Germans had made it known that a custodian would be appointed in any case *** Schmidt was selected on June 13. 1940*** 8.3. Ford ofHolland N V Nederlandsche Ford Automobiel Fabriek (Ford of Holland) was an independent subsidiary of Ford of Bntain before the outbreak of war. Ford of Britain held a 60 percent ownership stake In die company, with the remaining 40 percent in die hands of Dutch private citizens.w Unlike Belgium, Holland was not subjected to a military government after die German invasion in May 1940. Instead, German officials established a civilian government under the control of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied DutchTferrltorles.which directly regulated Dutch industry*** Despite arguments by Heinrich Albert that only 24 percent of Ford of Hollands capital was actually enemycontrolled {owned by the English], the Reich Commissioner decided to appoint a custodian for Fold of Holland.*** As a courtesy, Albert and Schmidt consulted NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-49. Box 1741. FUe 356 115, Robesgc to Foreign Service Administration, October 13, 1944 (NARA OOOS333), Fuller to Secretary of State. April 24, 1945 (NARA 0007375), Keeley to Secretary of State. April 18. 1945 (NARA 0007373) Eeeiey, the American consul general in Antwerp, Belgium,noted that van Luppen had not yet been brought to trial, and that the charges might be dropped, although Belgian authorities insisted that there had been collaboration at the Antwerp facility A U.S Treasury Department "Sl"`l attached a note to the Kedey letter, Indicating that the Information In die letter should not (emphasis in the original) be passed on to Find Motor Company.see Memo from Davids, May 9,1945 (NARA 0007372). 1FMC. AR-98-213S41, Box 131. File Antwerp Visit 1948. HinsUtum of Notification from Audueur Mthuire to the BurgomasterofAntwerpi November 10,1947 (FMC 0007221) mi HFM.Acc 880, Box 2, File; Belgium, Notes an interview with DesireDelonghe.August 5, I960 (HFM 0000770-0000771). *> NARA, RG 226, Microfilm M1499, Roll 270, report on NV Nederlandsche FordAntomobld Fabriekjime 10,1943 (NARA 0004126). mi Hans Werner Neulen. "Deutsche Besatzungspolitlk in VAsteuropa - zwischcn Unterdnlckung tied Kollaboradon* in Karl Dietrich Bracher et al. eds., Dcutxbloid 1933-1945 Ntue Stuita Hcnschaft (Bonn Droste Veriig, 1992), ppi 404-425 As custodian, Schmidt immediately began to change the nature of Ford of Holland's operations To compensate for the loss of imported parts from the United States and Great Britain (Ford of Holland's primary prewar suppliers), Schmidt converted the Amsterdam facility from an assembly shop to a full production plant in 1940 **' Ford-Werke obtained the necessary machines from other Ford subsidiaries and transported them to Amsterdam as part of a plan to exert a "decisive influence" over non-German Ford companies *** According to Schmidt, however, Ford of Holland's decision to invest approximately Dutch Guilder 1.000,000 in expanding the Amsterdam facility to increase German war potential was entirely voluntary**' BA-L. R 87/8292,Albeit to Reich Commissl-nci; June 8,1940 (RAL 5749-5750) Albeit wrote that as long as the United States did not enter the wit an administrator was not necessary If the United States did enter the war. Albeit asked to be considered for the position of custodian, not only for Ford of Holland, hue also foT Ford ofBelgium and Ford-Werke See also Section 5 4 for more on custodianship. M* FMC,AR-95-213541 .Box 131 .File Schmidt - Nazi Accusauon, Memo by Stenger on Schmidt. November 28. 1947 (FMC 0004433)_______________ 141 BA-L.R 177/1251 .Report on Testing at the N V Nederlandsche Fard-Automobiel Fabnek in Amsterdam, November 30. 1943 (BAL 5391-5474), Bcstallungsurkimde, June 13, 1940 (RAL 5585),__________________ NARA, RG 226, Microfilm Ml499, RoU 270, Report on N V Nederlandsche FordAutomobiel Fabnek,June 10.1943 (NARA 0004125-0004126) sta BA-L.R 177/1251,Schmidt to the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories, December 11, 1940 (BAL S5685569, for English translation, see BAL 12344-12345) In October 1942, Ford of Holland was required to begin assembling a German army caterpillar truck, using material from Ford-Werke and other German sources. By eariy December "not one unit had been completed * In response, Ford-Werke sent 753 trucks for conversion into caterpillar vehicles and dispatched more than 100 employees "to make the best of a bad Job" See FMC AR-98-213S41. Box 201. European Company Histones.1940-1946,June 18,1946 (FMC 0007446)_______________ 1,9 NARARG 260,Economics Division.] G. Farben Control Office, Box 24, unlabeled file. Sdurndt to Albert, December 4, 1941 (NARA 0006997) El Foid-Wei&e`j Relationship with Oih ci Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe Between managing Ford-Werke and his other European duties, Schmidt was able to spend only approximately one week per month concentrating on Ford of Holland operations. As a result, he delegated much of his authority on day-to-day issues to other Ford-Werke personnel.,w Alfons Streit supervised production at Amsterdam throughout the war.*11 After the Allies liberated the Netherlands in the fall of 1944, Stenger, the Ford of Holland manager, and three other Dutch management employees - the assistant manager; the works manager and the chief clerk - were arrested on the suspicion of collaboration with the Nazis. With the German custodianship invalidated and the former Dutch managers arrested, Ford of Britain reasserted control over Ford of Holland. Lord Peraval Perry sent G.S. Hibberson, a Ford of Britain employee, to act as manager and re-establish contact with its subsidiary.1*1 In April 1946,the charges against the four Dutch employees were dropped, and on April 8, Stenger was reinstated as manager *** 8.4. Other Feud Facilities Several Ford subsidiaries in Europe did business with Ford-Werke during the war These included smaller firms in other occupied countries. In addition, there were several subsidiaries located in countries that were German allies. Some Ford ^ihdrUarjes in neutral countries also had business contacts with Ford-Werke. the end of the war.*** The first subsidiary, Ford-Werke AG Wien GmbH, was founded in September 1944 in Vienna with RM 2,000,000 in capital Shareholders included Ford-Werke, Robert Schmidt, Erhard Vitger and Hans Schneider, a Ford of Austria dealer111 The subsidiary began construction of a facility that was never completed, although the firm continued to exist as a corporate entity into the postwar period.ss< On March 19, 1945, Ford-Werke founded a second subsidiary, known as Ford Motor Handels- und Werkstitten Gesellschaft, with RM 499,000 in capital111 To circumvent the German corporate laws that had hampered Ford-Werke's previous attempt at founding a subsidiary in Austria, the stock in the new company, to be located in Salzburg, was initially distributed to Schneider (RM 100,000) and a man named Hans Stock (RM 399,000) However, FordWerke obtained control over Stock's shares though a trustee agreement After the Allied occupation. Stock's shares were officially transferred to Ford-Werke. Directors of the Salzburg subsidiary were listed as Schmidt, Vitger and Anton ScheufTgen (all of whom were Ford-Werke managers) *" The Ford Handels- und Vferkstatten Gesellschaft branch owned no real estate A large portion of its equipment was obtained after the equipment was evacuated from Ford of Hungary in the last months of the war In late 1945, Ford Handelsund Werkstitten Gesellschaft began repair operations at Ford oAnstrio.To develop its export territories, FordWerke established two subsidiaries in Austria toward ""BA-UL 177/1251,Repart on Testing at the N V Nederlandsche Ford-Autamoblc! Fabrlek in Amsterdam, November 30. 1943 (BAL S 392-5474). Ford-Werke Records, fenonnel file ofWS (FW 0021713-002171S) > NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, File' Ford-Werb: AG. GBP Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001567) NARA, RG 59. Central Decimal File 1945-49, Box 1741, File356.115. Roberge to Foreign Service Administration, October 13,1944 (NARA 0005333), Hibbenon to Haupc. October 17, 1945 (NARA 0005342) issWUldns and Hill. American Burincs Abroad, p. 348 ** FMC, AR 65-71, Box 2S. File Rird International '48 #1. Summary ofForeign Operations - January 12.1948, Report an Fard-Werie, October 15, 1947 (FMC 0000135) Austria had been united with Germany in 1938 and formed pan of the German Reich until the end of the wan sis Ford-Werke Records, ScheufTgen to the Vienna Gauwutsdiaftskammer, September 18, 1944 (FW 0001757), FMC, AR-7S-63-430, Box 90, File Ford-Werke Audit Reports 1946-1947, Audit Report by Knippreth for 1946 (FMC 00169S3-0016954) 554 Ford-WerkeRecords. ScheufTgen to Vitger, September 17,1944 (FW 00017S5),BA-L,R 87/6206,Reich Economic Minister to Ford-Werke. November 10. 1944 (BAL 0832). WNRC. Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17S36, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Proposed Decision No W-18SS9, November 23. 1966 (DOJ 0010737-0010753)* 0000135 sss FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90. File Ford-Werk Audit Reports 1946-1947, Audit Report by Kmpprath for 1946. November 1947 (FMC 0016953), FMC. AR-65-71. Box 25. File Ford International `48 # 1 .Summary of Foreign Operations - January 12. 1948, Report on Ford-Werke. October IS. 1947 (FMC 0000135) A U-S-mihtary government postwar report indicates that Ford Salzburg wax founded with 499,000 shillings In capital, see NARA, RG 260. Entry 107. Box 78.Report on Ford Handels- und Wferkstitten GmbH, pi 1, July 8, 1948 (NARA 0007185) 7^ Research Findings About Ford-Wierke Under the Nazi Regime a facility In Linz under the control of US. military Ford-Werke's main contact person with the Danish occupation government officials. The company manager. reconditioned Ford automobiles, handling Ford motors of all types and. to a limited extent, manufactured Ford spare parts and traded in Ford products, including overseas exports. Before the German occupation. Ford of Denmark, located in Copenhagen, had been an assembly plant dependent on Ford Motor Company, Ford of Britain, Ford of France and, increasingly, Ford-Werke for parts. In November 1947,Vitger was assigned the postwar After the occupation, Ford-Werke became the main custodianship of Ford-Werke's Austrian interests supplier of parts to Ford of Denmark, with assistance But as of October IS, 1947, the Vienna subsidiary was from Ford of Holland and Ford of Belgium Under inactive and was to be liquidated.5" Ford-Werke wrote orders from the occupying Germans to begin down its investment in Ford Salzburg to DM 1 (after manufacturing. Ford of Denmark obtained the the postwar conversion of the German currency to necessary machinery from Germany and Deutsche Marks) in its June 21, 1948, balance sheet, Czechoslovakia1** Beginning in 1940, Ford of effectively abandoning the operation.5*1 Denmark manufactured gas generators, including 4,000 units initially intended for Ford-Werke but i y Ford of DcnmarDespite the fact that 60 percent of ultimately delivered to Imbert Generatoren GmbH (a *T*v.^#*A<T'Ford of Denmark's shares were owned by Ford of Britain. H.C. Mallei, Ford of Denmark's prewar manager; retained his position throughout the war, generator specialist) of Cologne, for use in Denmark and Germany In addition to manufacturing gas 3*- without the imposition ofa Ford-Werke custodian after the Germans occupied Denmark in 1940."' Likewise, Ford of Denmark continued to elect its own board members.141 This was the case because Germany treated Denmark differently from most other occupied Neuien. `'Deutsche Besatzungspolidk in Wfesteuropa," pp. 404 425 In a postwar report to the military authorities and in a later Interview, Schmidt described the different treatment that German-occupied Denmark received For example, its government remained in place and there were no confiscations or custodians, including at Ford of Denmark "The Germans territories and administered the country indirectly until the later stages of the war'** Vltgez as a Dane, became had a friendly arrangement with the Danish company" See NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032. Schneider Report. Exhibit 212, Memo by Schmidt on Denmark, August 12, 1945 Ji* NARA, RG 260, Entry 107, Box 78, Report on Ford Handelsund Werkftlrten GmbH, Exhibit 3, thuulanon of affidavit, July 26, 1945 (NARA 0007208-0007209), Exhibit 7. Memo from Gray. October 29. 1947 (NARA 0007214) (NARA 0000500), and HFM, Acc 880, Box 7. File Germany, Interview with Robert Schmidt, July 18, 1960 (HFM 0000904) tat NARA.RG 407,Entry 36BB.Box 1032,Schneider Report, p 40. September 5,1945 (NARA 0000042) ' NARA. RG 260. Entry 107, Box 78, Report on Fold Handelsund VArkstitten GmbH, p. 1, July 8, 1948 (NARA 0007185), Exhibit 17, Extract from statanent of Mayer. July 20, 1946 (NARA 0007226)^xbibit 21. Patrick to Ford Motor Company Sal2burg, November 11,1947 (NARA 0007232). Although the Salzburg facility leased the equipment from the Hungarian subsidiary, no direct payments were made due to unsettled political and economic conditions. Instead, money was paid regularly into a resene fund for eventual compensation to Ford of Hungary ** FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File. Ford International '48 #1. Summary ofForeign Operations - January 12,1948, Report on Ford-Wert. October IS. 1947 (FMC 0000135) its NARA,RG 407,Entry 368B,Box 1032,Schneider Report, p 40, September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000042), Exhibit 212, Memo by Schmidt on Denmark, August 12, 1945 (NARA 0000500) Mailer successfully resisted initial Nazi pressure to begin manufacturing to meet German needs, pointing out that the facility assembled automobiles for export and that it bad a stockpile ofcomponents When parts ran low and the pressure to begjn manufacturing for the Germans could not be put off, the Danish company decided to avoid producing "real war supplies." such as arms and ammunition See FMC. AR-65 1500. Bax 2, File Corporate Records - Foreign Corporations, Memo by Metier attached to Ford Motor Company A/S Meeting Minutes,December 11,1944 (FMC 0014791),and Wilkins and Hill. American Business Abroad, pp 318-19 >4< FMC, AR-65-1S00, Box 6, File Ford-Werke No 3, Business Report for 1948/49 (FMC 0003S96) > NARA, RG I6S, Entry 463, Bax 138, File CAD 383 (6-23-43) (l)Jqxat by Knight, June 26. 1945 (NARA 0005223) "* FMC, AR-6S-1S00, Box 2, File. Corporate Record-Foreign Corporations, Metier to Edsel Ford. December I. 1941 (FMC 0014797-0014798) **> FMC, AR-6S-IS00. Box 2, File Corporate Records - Foreign Corporations. Memo by Mailer attached to Ford Motor Company A/S Meeting Minutes. December 11, 1944 (FMC 0014791-0014792), NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,Exhibit 212,Memo by Schmidt on Denmark, August 12,1945 (NARA 0000500), NARA.RG l6S,Entry 463, Box 138,File CAD 383 (6-23-43) (1),Report by Knightjune 26,1945 (NARA 0005223) XI) I i Ford-Werkc'j Relationship with Other Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe generators. In 1941 Ford of Denmark began exhaustive several years as secretary of the management board at testing of various types of gas generators for Ford- Ford-Werke."1 Werke, which supplied both the generators and the vehicles.1" Other wartime manufacturing at Ford of Denmark Included a limited amount of parts for FordWerke; Alters and coolers for Imbert; and disinfecting equipment used by the German army for delousing purposes."' German military officials occupied the Ford of Denmark plant on November 23, 1944, essentially ending independent Danish production.''0 As an ally of Germaiy, Hungary was not occupied by German forces until mid-1944,when Germany invaded to prevent Hungary from seeking peace with the Soviet Union"* During 1942 and 1943, Ford of Hungary plant faahnes were expanded to accommodate parts production and truck assembly Approximately 5,000 trucks were delivered to the Hungarian army"* Ford of Hungary's management arrangement did not change Ford of HungorjBord Motor R.T Budapest (Ford of substantially until November 1944 When ordered to Hungary) was a subsidiary of Ford-Werke that was leave Budapest by German authorities, Schefller founded in 1938 m an agreement with the Hungarian selected Edwin Mantz, a Swiss citizen, as director, m government that granted taxation relief. Ford of hopes of keeping Ford of Hungary from being Hungary was established to improve sales and service in classified as a German corporation by the invading Hungary, to better service the trucks supplied to the Soviets."' When the siege of Budapest began in early Hungarian Wur Ministry, and "probably at a later date," 1945, communication with Mantz was cut off, and to assemble units that would be supplied to Ford of Ford of Hungary's chief clerk, Ulaszlo Nikollts, Hungary by Ford-Werke Ford of Hungary was entirely assumed control without Ford-Werke's knowledge or owned by Ford-Werke and its management, including Albert, Schmidt and Vltger"1 Ford-Werke was responsible for selecting the corporate officers and the board of directors of Ford of Hungary, and both Albert 1,0 FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 2, Hie Corporate Records - Foreign Corporations', Ford Motor Company A/S Meeting Minutes, December 11. 1944 (FMC 0014789-0014793) and Schmidt were board members. Walter Schefller joined Ford of Hungary as its director in 1938 after NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 212.Memo by Schmidt on Denmark, August 12. 1945 (NARA 0000500),WNRQ Acc 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17S36. Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, Angus 17, 1942 (DOJ 0011143; for English translation, see DOJ 0011168). Although one postwar military report said that Ford-Werke "directed'the Danish company to do the testing, a 1944 memo by Mailer describes the testing as one of several agreements with Fard-Werla See NARA. RG 407, Entry 36BB, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 40,September 5,1945 (NARA 0000042). and FMC, AR-65-1500,Box 2.Hle Corporate Records - Foreign Corporations, Memo by Mailer attached to Ford Motor Company A/S Meeting Minutes. December II, 1944 (FMC 0014791-0014792), see also NARA, RG 165. Entry 463, Box 138, Flle-CAD 383 (6-23-43) (1). Report by Knight. June 26, 1945 (NARA 0005223) After the war. Meller testified to a generally cardial relationship with Ford-Werke, swing that Robert Schmidt "never endeavored to overstep his authority versus us " See FMC. AR-98-213541, Box 131, File Schmidt Nazi Accusation, Mailer to Cooper, December 10, 1947 (FMC 0006513)_______________ M' FMC. AR-65-1500, Box 2. File. Corporate Records - Foreign Corporations, Memo by Meller attached to Ford Motor Company A/S Meeting Minutes, December 11, 1944 (FMC 0014792-0014793), NARA.RG 165, Entry 463,Box 138, File CAD 383 (6-23-43) (1). Report by Knight, June 26, 1945 (NARA 0005223), NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, Schneider Report, p 40, September 5,1945 (NARA 0000042) NARA RG 59, Central Dedmal File 194549, Box 1829, File 364 115. Report on Activity of Ford Motor RT until the 30th September l945.November 5.194S (NARA 0005422). NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 40, September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000042). FMC, AR-98-213541. Box 92, File. Reporu - Internal, Ford-Werke Managers Report, Third Quarter 1938, November 11. 1938 (FMC 0007786) FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Ferry Report. September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000931-0000934). Hungarian law did not permit establishment of companies with only one shareholder Ford-Werke's share of the company (total value Pengo 800.000) was Pengo 78S.OOO, with the remaining Pengo IS,000 worth owned equally by Albert, Schmidt and Vitger. The Initial stock issue to Ford-Werke was worth Pengo 13S.OOO,while the original issues to the three men wen worth Pengo 5,000 each (total lmnal capital value Pengo 150,000), see Report on Activity of Ford Motor RT unul the 30th September 194S (NARA 0005422) NARA. RG 59. Central Decimal File 1945-49. Box 1829. File 364 115, Report on Activity of Ford Motor RT until the 30th September 1945, November S, 1945 (NARA 0005423), FordWerke Records, Personnel file of Walter Schefller (FW 0021029-0021032) sr> Klaus P Fischer, Nad Ctimany A Nnv Histary (New York Continuum, 199S), p. 511 >'* NARAJIG 407,Entry 368B.Box 1032,Schneider Report, p. 40, September S. 1945 (NARA 0000042) s'1 NARA, RG 226. Entry 19A. Box 142, Scbeffler to Vuger. November 14. 1944 (NARA 0004392-0004394). Scbeffler to Vltger; November 27.1944 (NARA 000439S) 81 Research Findings About Ford-Wetke Under the Nazi Regime approval."* Ford-Werke never regained control over Ford of Hungary after the Soviet invasion. In January 1946, the Hungarian Ministry of Industry took provisional control of the company.1" After a long debate over the status of Ford of Hungary shares and the role of the Soviet government in managing the company,"' Ford-Werke decided to divest itself of its Hungarian holdings In 1948"' The Hungarian government nationalized the firm in 1949." Ford of omuiike Hungary, Romania was allied with the Axis powers. Because Ford of Britain held majority shares in Ford of Romania, the Romanian government placed the firm under "compulsory administrationand an Austrian named Wachner was installed as manager in November 1940."1 Ford of Romania, located in Bucharest, was a small plant that assembled and repaired automobiles and trucks and distributed Ford products in Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Throughout 1940 and 1941, Ford of Romania procured most of its manufacturing materials from the Romanian government and Ford-Werke, which supplied spare parts as well as truck, car and tractor components."' In 1940, the plant's capacity was 15 cars or 10 trucks per day"1 A later intelligence report indicates that Ford of Romania's operations also produced 250 tractors per month in 1940 "* Automobiles supplied to the Romanian government by Ford of Romania were used by the country's military"1 Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, Ford of Romania operated repair facilities on behalf of the Romanian army in the Eastern occupied territories The largest was in Odessa The company also operated firms used to supply food to these repair shops and the mam plant in Bucharest The repair facility m Odessa was taken over by the Romanian military in early 1943. The farms were handed over to the occupation government later in the year Ford ofRomania was scheduled to deliver 1,200 road tractors between May and December 1944 *" In late August, however; Romania agreed to armistice terms dictated by the Allies, and the Russians occupied Romania on August 31, 1944"* After the war ended, the Romanian government used the Bucharest plant to assemble vehicles that went to the Russians to help meet "`NARA. RG 59, Central Decimal FUe 1945-1949. Box 3. File 12 3, Squires to Secretary of State, April 20, 1945 (NARA 0005499-0005500). >" HARA.RG 59,Central Decimal File 194S-l949,Bax I829JUe 344 115. Folsom to Secretary of State, May 13. 1946 (NARA 00053S1-0005352) "Wilkins and HID. American Baiuns Alrooi, p 348 After the war. the Soviets seized the stock ofthe Hungarian company and gave Ford a 57 percent interest (a rounded figure based on Ford's ownership share of Ford-Werke), while the Soviet government held 43 percent Ford could not liquidate its interest because a stockholders'meeting could be held only In Hungary, and Ford was not in a position to send representatives there Ford-Werke Records, Excerpts from Board Meeting Minutes, March 2-3,1948 (FW 000325I-00032S2).FMC. AR-65-1SOO. Box 6, File. Ford-Werke Na 3, Business Repost far 1948/49 (FMC 0003596)_________ "`FMC, AR-75-63-301, Box 31, Particulars for Preparation of Report to Foreign Operalions Committee, September 8, 1949 (FMC 0000032), FMQ AR-7S-62-616. Box 57, File Investments 1949-1951, Schedules tracing Ford Motor Company Investment in overseas locations, August 21, 1951 (FMC 0003334)_________ UI Ford of Britain Records, Ford Motor Company. Ltd.,to Ministry of Economic Warfare. May 17, 1940 (FMCL 0000051). Ford Motor Company, Ltd, to McCombe, May 25. 1940 (FMCL 0000059-0000063). Memo on Interview at Hading with the Enemy Branch, April 25, 1940 (FMCL 0000053-0000055). NARA. RG 226. Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684. MEW Report, June 1944 (NARA 0004396-0004403). In 1940, Ford of Romania obtained some of its parts from the United States and England as well as Germany, see NARA.RG 226,Entry M1499, Roll 239, Report on Ford Motor Company Installations In Denmark, Romania, Sweden and Finland, May 1. 1943 (NARA 0004087) >> NARA.RG 226,Entry Ml499. Roll 239,Report on Ford Motor Company Installations in Denmark, Romania. Sweden and Finland.May 1,1943 (NARA 0004087) NARA. RG 226, Entry 16. Box 946. FUe 80684, MEW Report, June 1944,(NARA 0004399) ** Ford ofBritain Reoords.Memo on Interview atTrading with the Enemy Brandi.April 25,1940 (FMCL 0000053-0000055) ms HFM,Acc. 320. Box I. File Fold Motor Company - Romania 1942-47. Meeting Minutes for October 27. 1941 (HFM 0007441-0007442), September 23. 1942 (HFM 0007443 0007449), January 18. 1943 (HFM 0007450-0007451) and June 1,1943 (HFM 0007452-00074S3) mi NARA, RG 169. Entry 500B, Box 1381, Document 155921, Intelligence Report Ntx EW-KO 13, March 18, 1945 (NARA 0007101-0007106), HFM. Acc 320, Box 1, Flic. Ford Motor i*' NARA, RG 226, Entry 16. Box 946, File 80684, MEW Report. June 1944 (NARA 0004397) Compaay-Roroanla 1932-1941, Memo from Cooper, ,ra William L Langer, ed, An Enqrdcpolia of Wfcrid History (Boston December 24.1940 (HFM 0007438-0007440) Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972). p. 1213 a Ford-Werise's Relationship with Other Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe Romanian reparations. In the fall of 1946, Lord Perry a British intelligence report from June 1944, Ford of dedded to liquidate Ford of Romania. But in June 1948, before his decision could be implemented, the Romanian government nationalized the company's assets, ending Ford's connection with the company'" Fod of It9fc Ford ofItaly dealt in tractors, which were primarily for agricultural use in Italy, although it did export some vehicles to Romania.'"* Ford-Wake was not greatly involved in Ford of Italy's operations, since its production did not "quite fit" into Ford-Werke's production scheme"1 In 1948, the business sold 83 tractors, 15 cars (to theVatican and diplomats) and spare parts. The company was wholly owned by Ford Investment Ca, Ltd '" Fed of Finlan n June 1941, Finland joined Germany in declaring war against the Soviet Union, and later that year also declared war on Great Britain"' Ford of Finland was a subsidiary of Ford of Denmark, which was majority-owned by Ford of Bntain."* Ford of Finland did not have a German custodian, and its management structure remained the same as before the was*" In January 1943, Ford-Wake's board ofadvisors noted that the German firm had dose ties to Ford of Finland through shipments ofvehides and spare parts."* Allied intelligence reports varied somewhat in describing activities at Ford of Finland."' According to in wUktru and Hill, America Bostons Aimed, pp 348-349 no Ford ofBritain Records,Memo on Interview atHading with the Enemy Brandi,April 25,1940 (FMCL 0000053-0000055) ' WNRC, Aec. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, Fite WI7S36.Adviiory Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011114. far English translation, see DOJ 0011219) FMCAR-84-63-1217. Box 6, File Policy Committee MeetlngDecember 15, 1948, Howard to Brand, November 8, 1948 (FMC 0014707)_________ 1,1 Langer, ed., Aa Encyclopedia oftVbrld History, p. 1188, Finland, as ofJuly 1942, was assembling 645 trucks per month, repairing tractors and manufacturing gas generators. The report said that Ford of Finland was to have received 2/5 trucks from Germany in the spring of 1944. During the spring of 1944, the report said, Ford of Finland recorded a 62.11 percent increase in the sale of spare parts, with imports from Germany being the mam reason that Ford of Finland was able to meet the demand'" On March 3, 1945, however, Finland declared war on Germany.'" Fad of GoeccFord Motor Company Greece S.A was a wholly owned subsidiary of Ford of Britain, with a service plant established m Athens in 1936 M Ford of Greece had a German manager Ford and Ford ofBntain shipped cars and trucks to Ford of Greece in 1939 and 1940; Ford-Werke also exported trucks to Ford of Greece during those years"' Greece surrendered to Germany in April 1941 In January 1943, Schmidt reported that the Athens repair facility had been "placed under the commission of Ford-Werke," and he noted there had been difficulties in obtaining food for the 5,1 According to a U.S intelligence report. Ford of Finland only serviced can imported for sale in Finland, see NARA, RG 226, Entry M1499. Roll 239, Report on Ford Motor Company Installations in Denmark,Romama.Sweden and Finland,May 1, 1943 (NARA 0004089) According to a Bniish intelligence report. Ford of Finland obtained its spare parts primarily from Ford-Werke and some from Ford of Italy in Bologna, see PRO, FO 837/19,MEW Intelligence Weekly Report No 118.May 11, 1944 (PRO 0000162) American diplomats reported that Ford of Finland was suspected to have traded extensively with the enemy, see NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, File Ford Motor Company, Memo from Hull to American Legation. June 17. 1944 (NARA 0001825-0001826) NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684. MEW Report. June 1944, (NARA 0004397 and 0004399) Ford of Finland may have sold spare parts and gas generator motors to the Finnish government See NARA, RG 226, Entry M1499, Roll 336, Financial Report of the Skandinavtan Ford Companies for 1941,April 9, 1942 (NARA 0004071) n Ford of Denmark owned 60 percent of Ford ofSweden, which held 60 percent interest ofFord ofFinland.see FMC AR-75-62 616, Box 57, File. Investments 1949-1951. Schedule (racing Ford Motor Company investments in overseas locations, August 21,1951 (FMC 0003337). JM NARA, RG 169, Entry 500ft. Box 1381, Document 155921, Intelligence Report No EW-KO 13. Match 18. 1945. (NARA 0007104)_______________ *** WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243. Boot 536. Me Wl 7536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011114, fin English translation, see DOJ 0011219) in Langer, Ao Encyclopedia ofWorid Hislory. p. 1224 w> NARA.RG 60,Entry 285B,Box 79,File Genera] Motors.Report Ford Motor Company (Greece) SA, June 24, 1943 (NARA 0003932) ' NARA. RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 1381. Document 155921. Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13. March 18, 1945 (NARA 0007101-0007106), NARA. RG 60, Entry 285B. Box 79. File General Motors. Report- Ford Motor Company (Greece) S-A, June 24. 1943 (NARA 0003937) 601 langer, An Encyclopedia ofWbrld History, p 1210 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime plant's 60 workers."1 According to Allied intelligence reports, the Athens facility did some partial assembly "* The Allies occupied Athens on October 3, 1944, effectively ending German control over Ford of Greece."1 of Spain frior to the war, Ford-Werke did some business with Ford of Spain, located in Barcelona, but transport difficulties limited the transactions."* In 1943, Schmidt tried to develop the sale of spare parts and establish repair operations m Spain. But the Spanish Ford dealers refused to buy the German products because they did not want to be put on the American Black List that would cut offAmerican supplies that were vital to Spain Jbri of Brtugal: Incorporated in January 1932, this company was located in Lisbon and was a subsidiary of Ford of Spain (Barcelona)."* In 1938, Ford of Ibrtugal ordered 10 Eifel units from Ford-Werke (introducing the model to Portugal) to liquidate credit accrued from commissions for Ford-Werke deliveries to Spam " Between 1942 and 1945, Ford of Portugal could not receive sufficient material due to the war and blocked currency regulations. As a result, dunng those years Ford of Portugal suffered losses on operations amounting to Escudos 4,737,525." Ford-Werke made several efforts to persuade Ford ofPortugal's management to buy parts, trucks and small cars from the German company and other European plants under Ford-Werke s control during the war, but to no avail Ford of Portugal's manager told Schmidt in 1943 that he fully shared the concerns of the Spanish company regarding the potential consequences of doing business with Ford-Werke He was so concerned, in fact, thjCbe had not even replied to messages from Ford-Werka"1 J i WJ WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box S36. File WI7536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011114; for English translation, see DO] 00112193 ** NARAJtG 226,Entry Ml499Jteel 348. US Office ofStrategic Sendees (OSS) Report na 8S87. October 30, 1943 (NARA 0004067). NARA. RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684, MEW Report, June 1944 (NARA 0004398). tot Linger. Ad Encyclopedia o(WH History, pi 1210. FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 92. File Reports - Internal, Internal Reports, November 11, 1938. Manager's Report to Directors Third Quarter 1938. November 11. 1938 (FMC 0007784) <l0 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 27. File. Condensed Balance Sheets and Statements of Income ofNon-Consolldated Affiliates - Oct 1947, Palumbo to Breech. December 31, 1947 (FMC to* FMC AR-98-213541. Box 92, File. Reports - Internal. Internal syV0V00V2t2t2t 0) Reports, Manager's Report to Directors Third Quarter 1938, /" rac, aAR-98-213541, Box 3, File Lord Perry - Lisbon - November 11, 1938 (FMC 0007784) ( Janbary./June 1943. Nadal to Cooper, June 11, 1943 (FMC NARA.RG 407,Entry 368B.Box 1032,Schneider Report, p. 41. V^-90008822330-0008232) Nadal was reporting to Ford of Britain September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000043) The "Black list" was following the visit to Lisbon by Schmidt in June 1943 In known officially as the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked 1937, Sir Perdval Perry of Ford of Britain had ordered all Nationals. It was a list of persons and Arms, often in neutral associated companies to Immediately refer any contacts from countries, who were working with or for Axis nations or Ford-Werke to England, see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Bax individuals whose receipt of U.S exports was considered 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 60C. Perry to Albert, March detrimental to national defense. Those luted were prohibited 10. 1937 (NARA 0000171-0000172) Overtures to sell Ford- from trading with US interests. For more information about Wferite vehicles and pans were made to Ford ofPortugal in 1941 the Proclaimed list, see Greg Bradsher, Holocaust-Era Aaca. o and In August and October 1942, but were rejected See FMC, Hading Aid to Brands at the National Archive at Ccflcgt ftiHi.Maryland AR-98-213541, Box 15. File Misc, Nadal to Hampson, (College Park, Maryland: National Archives and Records October 23. 1941 (FMC 0011381), and NARA. RG 84. Entry Administration. ]999),pp. 1044-1045 and 1057-1058 3126,Box 62,Ftle 866 16,Nadal to Hibbard, February 6,1942 (SARA 0005657) In January 1943, Schmidt reported to the M*NARA,RG 407,Entry 368B,Box 1032,Schneider Report, pi 41, Ford-Werke board that Portugal was totally under US September 5. 1945 (NARA 0000043), FMC, AR-75-62-616, influence, and that Spain depended on England,see WNRC Acc Bax 57. File Investments 1949-1951, Schedule tracing Ford 299-68A-0243. Boot 536, File WI7536 Advisory Board Motor Company Investments In overseas locations, August 21, Meeting Minutes. January 13.1943 (DOJ 0011114, for English 1951 (FMC 0003331). translation, see DOJ 0011219) 81 Section 9 I Impact of the War on Communications 9.1. U.S. Government Regulations had relations with countries under Axis control Governing Communications In July 1942, the American Consulate in Algiers With the rise of International tensions in the late 1930s, the U.S. government began examining the economic activities of U.S. firms and their European subsidiaries Following the German occupation of Western Europe in 1940, U.S. government monitoring increased dramatically in conjunction with efforts to freeze French, Belgian and Dutch assets to prevent them from falling into German hands After Germany declared war cm the United States on December 11, 1941, government officials from the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice and Commerce conducted numerous investigations of U.S companies suspected to notified the U S State Department that the head office of Ford-Afrique, a subsidiary ofFord of France, recently had been transferred from France to Algeria, creating a new Ford subsidiary m Africa. The transfer had taken place with the approval of the authorities in occupied France. This dispatch led the Treasury Department to invesugate Ford Motor Company files to determine the extent of Ford's relationship and control over its French subsidiary. Among the records examined in Dearborn were the^personal files of Edsel Ford and Charles Sorensen.*" )(See Section 9.S for more about this matter.) '--^ have violated the 1917 TVading with the Enemy Act through foreign trade or overseas communications. The 9.2. Direct Communications Between Riding with the Enemy Act was intended to prevent Ford and Ford-Wer ke, 1939-1941 any economic activity that could benefit enemy powers. Accordingly, it prohibited U.S. firms from havin/any} Ford Motor Company corresponded periodically contact with enterprises in occupied Europe, as weH"Ss those located in neutral countries but known to have with its German subsidiary throughout the late 1930s and up to the U.S. entry into the war m December 1941. Research to date has located more than 180 letters exchanged between Ford and Ford-Werke US. government Investigations into possible violations aiding trading with the toon/, see TieAha Property Custodian. pertaining to a variety of business matters in the period 'A Lqpdatln Cbrcaalogiml History and Bibliography of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 US. Code App. 1-40. and the Office of the Alien Property 0SCustodian, 1917-1952, US. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, ,. RG 131. Entry 247, Box 131, Lawler Report, pp 1-3, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, and Bradsher. Holocaust-Era Assets, a 1943 (NARA 0001397-0001399), Exhibit 13. Cole to Finding Aid to Beronb at the Notional Archives at College huh,Maryland, Secretary of State, July 11,1942 (NARA 0001485-0001487) ppi 1044-1045 and IOS7-IOS8 8S Research Findings .About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime between 1938 and 1941."* In April 1938, Charles Sorensen and Six Perdval Perry traveled to Germany to attend the Ford-Werke board meeting of April 20, 1938. It was the last prewar Ford-Werke board meeting with an American or British member present.*" Heinrich Albeit and Alfons Streit, Ford-Werke technical director, traveled to the United States in early 1939 to meet with Henry and Edsel Ford and Sorensen *'* The last American working at Ford-Werke, Valentine Thllberg, the Cologne plant's chief engineer at the time was strongly advised to leave Germany by American diplomatic officials shortly before the German invasion of Poland in September 1939."' =7 Correspondence between Ford and Ford-Werke y^St-A became more restricted once the war began in Europe. >vHv Tfcn days after the German invasion of Poland, Erhard \A rf Vitger visited Ford of Denmark to discuss exports, raw materials agreements and other matters, and advised that "it would not be possible to mall any more reports to Dearborn, nor to England.""* Likewise, Albert wrote to Sorensen on November 27, 1939, explaining that new government rules and regulations had been issued which limited "giving information to foreigners, even if and when they belong to the organisation of the company as members of the board or as shareholders. The essence of these rules is that we practically have to confine ourselves to the most Important items of the balance sheet Everything else cannot be mentioned in the reports "*'* In spite of these restrictions, representatives of Ford and Ford-Werke communicated on issues relating to the European occupation in the wake of German military successes in spring 1940 Ford received several reports concerning the conditions of Ford plants in the occupied countries of Holland, Belgium and France In addidon.Albert wrote to Sorensen on September 18, 1940, regarding the appointment of Carl Krauch, I.G Farben chairman,to the Ford-Werke Board ofDirectors, replacing IG Farben general manager Carl Bosch, who had died earlier that yeat"1 `"These Indude reports on controls over the automotive Industry imposed by the Nul government, see HFMAcc 38, Box 50, File: Germany 1938, Albert to Sorensen, December 15, 1938 (HFM 0000294), requests far the loan ofskilled draftsmen for the Cologne planMee FMC, AR-6S-1 SOO.Bcx 6,Fllc:Gemuny 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Schmidt to Sorensen, June 22, 1939 (FMC 00031 <8-0003168), correspondence relating to parts shipments, see HFM, Ace. 712, Box 12, File Speedometer. Purchasing Department to Stahlberg, July 27, 1938 (HFM 0005328), and quarterly reports on business operations, see FMC. AR-75-62-616. Bax 2. File Germany-Cologne 19381948,Manager's Report to Directors,2nd Quarter 1939, August 1,1939 (FMC 0015443-0015452) "NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibu I46A. Meeting Minutes, April 20, 1938 (NARA 0000368-0000369, for English translaUons. see NARA 0005881-0005884) `"NARAJIG 260,Economks Division.! G. Farben Control Office, Box 24, unlabeled file, Memo an conversation with CIC Cologne, June 11. 1945 (NARA 0006985), FMC, AR-65-1500. Box 6.File Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen).Schmidt to Gnau, May 4. 1939 (FMC 0003170) Albert came to New York to discuss a proposal to build a foundry at Ford-Werke. The proposal was not approved. Albeit concluded that Henry Ford had received advice, possibly from the government, not to get involved in the expansion at that time because of Germany's situation. See NARA, RG S6,Aec 56-69A-4707. Box 81. File Interrogations, Misc, Report on Discussion with Albert, September 18,1945 (NARA 0007154) `7 At the request of Schmidt, Tillberg returned to Germany from May to September 1940. tee HFM, Acc 65, Box 72. Hie: Udlberg (214) Final 72-1, Reminiscences ofVY Tallberg, July 19S6 (HFM 0004862-0004865). The number of communications between Ford and Ford-Werke diminished significandy in 1941, although regular correspondence between the two entities continued until the U S entry Into the war. Robert Schmidt wrote to Edsel Ford on January 10, 1941, in regard to the situation in the occupied areas. At the end S11 HFM.Acc 41S,Box 1 .File Ford-Werke Audit Reports. Power to Moekle, Loughran and Roberge, October 12, 1939 (HFM 0003846) Vitger said that he would attempt to maintain communications with Ford Motor Company via Ford of Denmark `"FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File Germany 1939-194S (Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen. November 27, 1939 (FMC 0003161-0003163) See also Albert to Sorensenjuly 11,1940 (FMC 0003146-0003148),in which Albeit wrote that he could report only on Ford-Werke s "most pressing problems." since there were "restrictions imposed on communicating with foreign countries." `"See. for example, FMC AR-65-1500, Box 6, File Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Tallberg to Gnau. July 6. 1940 (FMC 0003139-0003140), HFM. Acc. 6. Box 321, File 1940 Correspondence, Albert to Edsel Ford, July 11. 1940 (HFM 000147S-0001477),Albert to Edsel Fordeptember 18. 1940 (HFM0001470-0001471). HFM. Acc 6. Box 329. File 1941 Ford-Werke, Schmidt to Edsel Ford, September 19.1940 (HFM 00005S3-000055S) `"FMC. AR-65-1500, Box 6, File Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, September 18, 1940 (FMC 0003144-0003145)  Impact of tiie Wat on Communications of the correspondence. Schmidt assured Edsel Fgrd that he would keep him "posted of development^'*^/Edsel JJpfeci** Ford replied to Schmidt on January 30, 1941, to express his appreciation of Schmidt's "good work on HI**'' behalf of coordination of Ford plants" and his effort to reinstate Ford of France managers.*" Albert wrote to Edsel Ford, and Vltger wrote to B.J Craig, secretary- l treasurer of Ford Motor Company, concerning the increase in Ford-Werke's capital approved at the shareholders meeting of March 24, 1941 On November 12, 1941, Sorensen sent a telegram to ARA.RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Lawler Report, Exhibit 5. | / ^ >^dunldt to Edsel Ford, January 10. 1941 (NARA 0001472) tu HFM. Acc 6, Bax 344, File Telegrams 1941, Edsel Ford to Schmidt, January 30,1941 (HFM 0000026). Schmidt asking if Cologne and the associated plants were operating, and if all were well Schmidt and Albert sent a reply live days later reporting that all Ford plants were operating and all managers and executives were well.*11 In the autumn of 1941, Schmidt exchanged a series of cables with WR Loughran of Ford's purchasing department and A M Wlbel of Ford Motor Company in New York about licensed use of gears in Holland, Belgium and Germany."* A message from Wibel about the gears on November 28, 1941, was the last knovya Ainrt mmmunicauon between Ford and Ford-Werke until after the war*'7 9.3. Communications Between For d and Ford of Ranee, 1939-1941 *'* NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report. Exhibit 46. Vltger to Craig. May 13, 1941 (NARA 0000141), HFM/tcc 6,Bax 329.Flle5ubJect Tile - 1941 - Ford Motor Co - Cologne Albert to Edsel For^Apnl 1,1941 (HFM 0000581) , `!l HFM,Acc, 1, Bax 173.File.FMC - Brandi - Foreign - Germany - 1914-1945 and Undated (173-27), Sorensen to Schmidt. November 12, 1941. Schmidt and Albert to Sorensen, November 17.1941 (HFM 0006820-0006821) Ford-Wake Records, Wlbel to Schmidt, November 28, 1941 (FW 0001820). Schmidt to Wlbel. November 25. 1941 (FW 0001821), Schmidt to Wlbel. October 16. 1941 (FW 0001822), lotighnn to Schmidt, October 30,1941 (FW 0001829), Schmidt to Loughnn. October 20. 1941 (FW 0001830), Schmidt to lougbran, September 13, 1941 (FW 0001832-0001833) or Ford-Werle Records, Wibd to Schmidt. November 28, 1941 (FW 0001820) An internal Ford Motor Company Patent Department memo In 1944 indicated that there had been no communications with Ford-Weike since 1941 "Since die war, we have had no contact whatever with the German Ford company and no Information has been transmitted by us to the German Ford company or persons acting for them" See NARA. RG 60, Entry 2BSB, Box 67, File. Find - Yokohama, McRae to Roberge. May 20. 1944 (NARA 0003873). After the war, Schmidt wrote to Lord Perry, confirming that contact by cable and letter was nHe with Edsel Ford and Charles Sorensen only until the 'outbreak of war with the USA prevented further negotiations" See NARA. RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,Exhibit 204.Schmidt to Perry, May 28,1945 (NARA 0000481-0000482) In an Interview with U Snulitary authorities, Oscar Bornheim, a funner employee of Ford- Vteike. dalmed dut Erhard Vitger was a confidant of Henry Ford and had "been in communication via radio-telephone ^4 with [Ford Motor Company] subsequent to 1942 " Bornheim stated further that Vltger had Informed him that Ford of Hungary had also been in contact with Ford Motor Company. Vs**' However, there la no direct evidence of this, and US. Department of Justice officials concluded that oo further investigation was warranted, see KARA, RG 60, Entry 114, Classification 146-39,Box 4,Hle. 146-39-24,Hoover to dark, December 16, 1944 (NARA 0003163) and Clark to Hoover, January 22. 1945 (NARA 000316S) Maurice Dollfus. managing director of Ford of France, kept up a constant flow of correspondence with Edsel Ford and Charles Sorensen, from whom he received assistance and advice."1 In March 1939, while Dollfus was a guest at Edsel Ford's home in Florida, the three executives met on Edsel Ford's boat to discuss manufacturing aircraft engines for the French government."' Dollfus continued to refer to those "happy days"*" in communications with Edsel Ford after the fall of France in June 1940 Other topics of correspondence included production and the status of machinery as well as matters of business NARA. RG 60. Entry 114. Classification 146-39. Box 4. File 146-39-24, Bookstaver to Mclnemey, August S, 1943 (NARA 0003159). In a postwar Interview. Dollful called Edsel Ford "a remarkable man I became one of his friends. I lilted him and I think he liked me. Edsel was open to the French mind " See FMC Aoc. 880, Box 6. File- Prance Interviews, Interview with Maurice Dollfus. September 13, I960 (HFM 0000864) See also HFM.Ace. 6.Box 3 21 .FUe.Asnl6res.Edse] Ford to Dollfus. September 12, 1938 (HFM 0001268) and Dollfus' to Edsel Ford, September 23.1938 (HFM 0001267) HFM,Acc 6. Box 314. File Subject File 1939 - Ford Motor Co - Subsidiary Asniires, Memo by Moekle on conferences with DoDfos,March 17.1939 (HFM 00072S6-00072S7) Dollfus to Edsel Ford. May 9. 1939 (HFM 0007266). Dollfus to Edsel Ford, May 15.1939 (HFM 0007259) HFM.Acc. 6,Box 314, File Subject Hie 1939 Ford Motor Co. - SubsidiaryAsmires,Dollfus to Edsel Ford,Apnl 6,1939 (HFM 0007262) *>' HFM. Acc 6. Box 321. File 1940 Correspondence, Dollfus to Edsel Ford. November 30. 1940 (HFM 00014S5). Box 329. File- Asniires. Dollfus to Edsel Ford. March 10, 1941 (HFM 0001311) 87 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime administration, such as company organization, mergers Ford ofSpain in 1939 in an attempt to redirect business and pricing.1" DoIIfus wrote to Edsel Ford on July 18, toward England and the United States and away from 1940, to inform him that Ford of France had delivered Ford-Weike "* Furthermore, Ford of Britain, which a large number of spare parts as well as trucks and remained in contact with Ford of Spain throughout the passenger vehicles to the German authorities, who had war, instruaed Ford of Spain in 1940 not to pursue "shown dearly their wish to protea the Ford interest as trade relations in enemy territory*" In 1941, von much as they can."ul Sorensen replied on August 19, Gusmann visited Ford of Spam and Ford of Portugal for 1940, stating that Fordjaasjlcased to know that Fojd- v the purpose of selling components from Ford-Werke. ofFrance could stUKonduct busines^iespite the w/u' /However, he reported that he had found the Ford of DoIIfus sent a letteTto tdsel FOrST dated August VtT" Spain representatives "extremely unforthcoming in 1940, informing him that Ford of France's entire respect to business-related information " In his report production had gone to the German authorities. of the visit with Guilherme Nadal, manager of Ford of DoUfiis also advised Edsel Ford that he had met with Portugal, von Gusmann noted ``Even though it wasn't Adolph von Schell, the German official responsible for openly admitted, it may well be the case that they had fl \ tJ%a the motor industry, and that Henry and Edsel Ford's been instructed by Britain to refrain from doing ~0f strjcf neutrality [had] been an invaluable business with Cologne SaD, Ford-Werke continued i asset fr protection of [their] companies in to try to generate business with Ford of Portugal In a W*ir,tarop"'", letter to Ford of Britain, Nadal reported that Ford of Portugal executives had been invited to an automouve 9.4. Communications with For d Subsidiaries in Neutral Countries, 1939-1941 exhibition in Vienna When the Portuguese managers declined, Ford-Werke had the German legauon m Lisbon forward a communication to Ford of Portugal Indicating that the German company was in a position Both Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke to supply Taunus cars."' nrwirtmied to have ewnrare wrfrb o.hciHlarfiw Tjeiirra) countries during the war years ahhmiph there is no Q , vindication of commimirarion with each other through /fUr Sfjrth&z subsidiaries. According to a travel report by > Alfons von Gusmann, head of Ford-Werke's government liaison office, three Ford officials visited 9.5. Communications Between For d and Ford ofFrance, 1942-1944 From December 1941 through October 1942, the U S. State Department faalitated communication Kgfwepn Kmd Mutur Company anil Fuid uf FfJJiOC by For in overview of communication between Ford Motor Company and Ford of France, see NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Bos 131, Lawler Report, circa 1943 (NARA 0001394 000146S) **> HFM.Acc 6,Box 321 .FlIeAsniires, DoIIfus to Edsel Ford.July J8.I940 (HFM 0000103-0000104) ran RG 60, Entry 114, Classification 146-39, Box 4, File 6-39-24, Foreign Funds Control memo. May 25, 1943 Vw^W'(NAARRAA 0003168-0003169) "5 HFM. Acc. 6, Box 321, File Asnlires, DoIIfus to Edsel Ford, August 31.1940 (HFM 0000123-0000125). > Ford-Werke Records, Havel Report by von Gusmann on Spain/Portugal, August 23. 1941 (FW 00OI80S), see also NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File. Fonf-Werke AG. GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001564) NARA.RG 131.Entry 247,Box 131,File Ford Motor Company, American Embassy London.to Secretary ofState, September 21, 1943 (NARA 0002022-0002023) a Ford-Werke Records Havel Report by von Gusmann on Spain/Portugal, August 23, 1941 (FW 0001805) For information about Ford of Britain's role, see Ford of Britain Records.Memo attached to letter from secretary of Ford Motor Company Ltd to McCombe, May 23. 1940 (FMCL 0000060 0000063, especially 0000061) The memo indicated that letters were sent to the management of Ford ofSpain, Ford of Portugal and Ford of Italy to inform them that no business involving trading with the enemy should take place except In special circumstances, which in ail cases should be referred to the chairman of Ford of Bntain before any contracts were negotiated u'FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 15. File Miscellaneous, Nadal to Hampson. October 23, 1941 (FMC 0011381) After the wan the British government noted that Ford-Werke's attempts to use diplomatic channels to do business with Ford of Portugal had been unsuccessful See NARA. RG 407 Entry 368B, Box 1032, File- Ford-Werke AG. GED Report. February 1946 (NARA 0001564) Impact of the War on Communications delivering letters via the American Embassy at Vichy.*" to send a letter after the first bombing, but doubted that Research to date has located a total of 13 messages sent it had been received Everyone was in good health and from Ford of France to Ford between January and good spirits. Communication had been difficult, he October 1942. and five messages from Ford to Ford of wrote, but he had been able to disperse the machinery France during this same period Dollfus wrote to Edsel and equipment throughout the country, and he hoped Ford on January 28,1942, and reported,"I had and still have difficulties arising from the state of war; I am doing my best and I obtained a [sic] support from the French government in order to preserve the hjmcst&of the American tFiarv-holdyr*"441 On March 17, 1942, an that when peacetime came, the organization would be able to carry on as well or better than it had previously Dollfus said he had a letter from the French government promising that money and material would be advanced In addiuon to full payment for damages. official at the American Embassy in Vichy wrote to the Secretary of State to convey a message to Edsel Ford from Georges Lesco, assistant manager of Ford of France, about a Royal Air Force (RAF) attack on the Poissy plant, which was producing trucks for the German army*41 In a memorandum dispatched via the U.S. Embassy in Vichy on June 9, 1942, Lesto informed Edsel Ford that the French government had guaranteed payment of war damages and that the future of the French company was secure.*" Because correspondence was limited, Dollfus hoped that Edsel Ford would show the letter to his father and to Charles Sorensen *** Edsel Ford wrote back to Dollfus on July 17, 1942. .and stated-that he was pleased to know that the organizanon was in "good health" and that Dollfus was "carrying on the best way possible under the circumstances " Edsel Ford added, "I have shown vour letter to my father and to Mr Sorensen, and they both join me in sending best wishes to you and~ your staff, and the hope that you will coigjn^e to carry on the good work that you ary iliiirig"*^/ The U.S (ttH) Dollfus wrote to Edsel Ford on June 6, 1942, Treasury Department, in an investigaH5n begun after t thanking him for a cable asking about the health and Ford of France set up a new African subsidiary (See i status of the company in the aftermath ofthe bombings Section 9.1.), cited this sentence as proofof Edsel Ford's that had damaged the plant on March 8 and April 2 and approval of Dollfus' actions to increase the activity of 3, (He mentioned that one more bomb since then had Ford of France on behalf of the Germans.*** However, caused little damage.) Dollfus wrote that he had tried the U.S Justice Department found that the TVeasury report contained "a good deal in the way of opinion, 440 See, for example, NARA.RG 59, Central Decimal File 1940-44. Box 1174, FQe 351.1 15, Hick to Secretary of State, September 21. 1942 (NARA 0005407), HFM.Acc. 6. Box 335, File Ford Motor Company - Amlira, Long to Edsel Ford. June 3, 1942 (HFM 0001350), Long to Edsel Ford, September 19. 1942 (HFM 0001341) and Edsel Ford to Long. October 8, 1940 (HFM 0001340) 441 NARA.RG lSl^ntry 247,Box 131 .Lawler Report,Exhibit 15, Dollfus to Edsel Ford. January 28. 1942 (NARA 0001492 0001493). See also Exhibit 13. Cole to Secretary of State, July I, 1942 (NARA 0001485-0001487). and HFM, Acc 6. Box 329, File. Amities, Dollfus to Edsel Ford. March 10, 1941 (HFM 0001308-0001311) ** NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal Hie 1940-44, Box 1174, File 351 115, Leahy to Secretary of Stale, March 17, 1942 (NARA 0005411-0005414) In the spring of 1942,Ford of France also communicated with Ford Motor Company through the U.S Embassy in an attempt to acquire a visa far Lesto to travel to the United Sates to meet with company executives However, In a communication to the U.S.Embassy inVichy on May 19,1942, Secretary of Sure Cordell Hull wrote that Ford Motor Company "questions desirability ofLesto visit at this time Issuance ofvisa is not (repeat not) authorized " See NARA.RG 84, Entry 2490, Box 10, Hie 711. Hull to U S Embassy, Vichy, May 19, 1942 (NARA 0006916) argument and conjecture .. " The Justice Department determined that the language of Edsel Ford's letter was 444 HFM, Acc 6, Box 335, File Asmires. "TVanslated memo from Lesto, June 9, 1942 (HFM 0000154) In a postwar interview; Lesto described himself as the liaison man between the Ford French company [Ford of France] and the German authorities. Lesto said that he had gone to Dearborn to meet with Edsel Ford early in the war and was moved by Edsel Ford's insistence that the French company remain independent The words "independent operations" in a letter from Edsel Ford were "a Bible" for lesto and others at the French company during wartime Lesto said those words were invoked to counter some of die actions that Robert Schmidt wanted to take after he had been given centred over Ford operations in occupied Europe. See FMC.AR-98-213542,interview with Georges Lesto, June 9. 1960 (FMC 0017372-0017373) 444 HFM.Acc 6.Box 33 S.File AsnifaesJDoUfus to Edsel FordJune 6. 1942 (HFM 0000152-0000153) Acc 6.Box 33S,FUe Asm&res.Edsel Ford to DolEusJuly 1942 (HFM 00001SI) 444 NARA, RG 131 .Entry 247,Box 131,Lawler Report, drea 1943 (NARA 0001454) 89 I /,Jr 'fCt- 0- i/J wL*k ,14- ^.TjL 5 A'**4 't*^~ y'*v if*' Reseorci* Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Non Regime IpDM&A* . "so general as to constitute nothing more than a polite France alter Edsel Ford's July 17, 1942, letter to" expression of appreciation from a superior to one who Dollfus has acted as a loyal subordinate " (See Section 9.3 for more detail on the relationship between Dollfus and 9.6. Ford-Wer ke Communications with Edsel Ford.) Moreover, the Justice Department noted, the death of Edsel Ford [in May 1943] made any discussion as to criminal liability purely academic.**' Hie assistant attorney general assigned to the case vi>Ubf concluded that while the 1942 letters tua appear to have beenTviolation of tfufftadfaig with the Enemy Act Neutral Countries, 1942-1944 Throughout the later years of the war, Ford-Werke continued to have contact with Ford representatives in neutral countries Ford-Werke representatives visited Ford of Spain several times m 1942 and again In 1943 (See Secdon 9 1. regarding this law), criminal to discuss the possibility of selling parts to the Spanish proceedings would not beyjdifl;sable, and further subsidiary.*" Robert Schmidt and his assistant, Carl <A investigation was not lustlfiWl Paul, visited Portugal in June 1943 and met with Ford of Portugal managers to offer narts huilt at Ford-Werke After November 11, 1942, when the Germans Hie Portuguese managers, however, explained that "all completed their occupation of France and the U.S their requirements were met by the United States and Embassy at Vichy dosed, incidences of communication England." During that visit, Schmidt stated that Ford- between Ford Motor Company and Ford of France Werke had set up an export branch m Switzerland for became increasingly rare On December 23,1942, WK. Edmunds of Ford Motor Company in Edgewater, New Jersey, forwarded an unsigned note for Edsel Ford from Ford of France. The letter; forwarded to A.J. Lepine, Edsel Ford's assistant, Indicated that Dollfus had I the purpose of trading with neutrals. As soon as Schmidt and Paul departed, the Ffljri ftf jnanagE^repozted the visit to theA^gfcanXegatiooin Llsbopy Ford-Werke also had contact with Ford able to keep Ford assets intact, despite difficulties1 "agents in Switzerland and TUrkey relating to business The research has uncovered only one message sent dealings "* from Ford of France to Ford from that point in 1942. until the liberation of France in August! 944 On June 1, 1943, Dollfus sent a condolence letter to Henry Ford 9.7. Ford Communications with Neutral Countries, 1942-1944 via Portugal after learning about the death of Edsel Ford. At the end of his message, Dollfus stated that he was uncertain whether or not the letter would reach Dearborn. In fact,it was not received in Dearborn until November 10, 1943.*** No wartime communication has been found from Ford Motor Company to Ford of Ford and Ford of Britain also maintained contact with subsidiaries located in neutral countries. In early 1943, Edsel Ford had the State Department forward a message to Ford of Sweden stating that Ford of Sweden should not pay any dividends to Ford of Denmark (which owned 60 percent of Ford of Sweden) until > NAHA, KG 60, Entry 114. OasslAcadan 146-39. Box 4. File- 146-39-24, Bookstaver to Mclnemey. August 5, 1943 (NAHA ui FMC. AR-98-213541, Box 14. File Misc, Ubach to Cooper; . 00031S9-00003162) ^November 12, 1943 (FMC 0008243-0008246) CMRG 60. Entry 114, Class 146-39. Box 12. File. 146-39- C 6jAiaRA, RG 84. Entry 3126. Box 76. Memo on visit to Portugal ,Clark to Hooves; January 22. 1945 (NARA 0003165). O' of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne, Acc. 6.Box 33S,FUe Asni&res.Unsigned.undated note to Germany, June 9,1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832) Faid. translated January 2, 1943 (HFM 0001336) and telegram from Edmunds to Lepine, December 23, 1942 (HFM NARA. RG 84. Entry 3223, File- Fi-Fo, Altafler to Reagan, June 1. 1942 (NARA 0000886-0000888), Shotes to Harrison. June 0001337) 1. 1942 (NARA 0000891-0000892), NARA. RG 260, 410 HFM. Acc. 285, Box 2661, File. Edsel Ford Sympathy Letters 363-10 F, Dollfus to Henry Fordjune 1,1943 (HFM 0004091 0004092). Economic; Division, IG. Farben Control Office. Box 24, unlabeled file, Translated memo from Buchwald to Gestapo, February 25. 1943 (NARA 0006991-0006994), RA-L. R 87/6208 Audit Report by Xnipprath for 1943 (BAL 7623), U> NARA. RG 60. Entry 114. Classification 146-39. Box 4, File NARA.RG 13 ],Entry 247,Box 131 .File Ford Motor Compaiy, 146-39-24. Bookstaver to Mclnemey. August 5, 1943 (NARA Anglo-Egyptian censorship report, January 17, 1944 (NARA 0003160) 0002013-0002014). 90 I Impact of the War on Communications conditions In that German-occupied country -were fugj^rjxlaiiflel" he also had a cable sent to Ford of Britain's Lord Fendval Perry to request that Ford of Britain, which owned 60 percent of Ford of Denmark, send the same instructions to Ford of Sweden via the Bndsh Foreign Offl< from Ford of Belgium, requested payment from Ford of Britain, which answered that it would not be able to honor the request.*** 9.8. Restoration of Communications with. Europe As pan of an effort to construct an economic blockade against German-occupied Europe, the US. government's Foreign Funds Control European Enforcement Division appealed to Ford Motor Company In spnny 1944 Ml send a rpqnpq rn Tnrd of Sweden m reaif Importing automobiles from Ford of Denmark. Ford of Britain was asked to send the same message to Ford of Sweden In addidon, Ford was instructed to send a request to ford of Finland, a subsidiary of Ford of Sweden, to discontinue trading wirii the enemy*?* Ford of Britain and Ford sent the messages as requested.**' Ford agents in Switzerland contacted Ford of Britain in 1944 about a plan to manufacture or import parts, but Ford of Britain responded that it did not wish to take part in this scheme, nor did it approve of the Swiss agents' using the Ford brand name. Also m 1944, the manager of Ford of Belgium's Zurich office, which had been placed on the Proclaimed List for not severing relations with Germany, contacted Ford of Britain. The manager who had not received salary or travel expenses The Allied forces liberated France in late August 1944 In October 1944, Russell Roberge, the Ford executive who managed the company's foreign business, wrote to the U.S. Foreign Service Administration to ask about the status of subsidiaries in formerly occupied territories. The State Department, on behalf of Ford, wrote to various American diplomatic offices abroad seeking information on Ford's operations in areas formerly under Axis control.*'* Maurice Dollfus visited Ford in Dearborn in DecemberJ944, and provided information about Ford of France.J Also in December 1944, James van Luppen, RJrd of Belgium's assistant manager, visited Ford of Britain, bringing with him a diary of wartime events affecting Ford of Belgian/ "'N In late Decembei 1944, Henry Ford II requested that Dollfus report on conditions at Ford-Werke. since no information had been received about the Cologne plant since 1941 H* Responding to Henry Ford n's request, on March IS, 1945, Dollfus sent a telegram to Dearborn about the Ford-Werke plant and machinery, and promised a more detailed survey at a later date RG59. Central Decimal File 1940-44. Bo* Cl 31, File: 51, Roberge to Cunningham, March 3. 1943 (NARA 0005486). For a summary of the subsidiary relationships, see FMC, AR-75-62-6I6, Box 57. File. Investments 1949-1951, Schedule tracing Ford Motor Company investments m overseas locations.August 21, 1951 (FMC 0003337) RG 131. Entry 247, Box 473, File. European Activity. Foreign Funds Control Monthly Reports on European Enforcement Activities, May 27, 1944 (NARA 0004960) and July 1. 1944 (NARA 0004961), see also NARA, RG 131. Entry 247. Box 131, File: Ford Motor Company, Hull to American Legation in Stockholm, June 17. 1944 (NARA . 0iw00v1iD62t:5-0001826) IteRAJtlG 131.Entry 247Jox 131 File. Ford Motor Compaqr. I Hnll ttoo /American Legation - Stockholmjune 24, 1944 (NARA V-/D000118822J7). American legation - London to Secretary of State, September 19, 1944 (NARA 0001799-0001801). " NARA. RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, File Ford Motor Company. Winant to Secretary of State, August 22, 1944 (NARA 0001760-0001761), Winant to Secretary of State. September 14. 1944 (NARA 0001755-0001757). Winant to Secretary of State, September 21. 1944 (NARA 0001754) See "Ford of Spain" in Section B 4 for more on the Proclaimed List. " NARA.RG S9.Central Decimal File 1945-1949^0* 1741 .File 356 IIS, Roberge to Foreign Service Administration, October 13, 1944 (NARA 0005330), Letter to American Mission, Bucharest, February 23, 1945 (NARA 0005337), Letter to American Mission, Helsinki, September 18, 1945 (NARA 0005338), Letter to American Mission, Florence, Italy, September 18. 194$ (NARA 000S339), Letter to American Mission, Amsterdam, Holland, September 18, 1945 (NARA 0005340)._______________ l woVjARA, rg 84, Entry 2452A, Box 276, File Correspondence, V^Jesto to Wbod, January 18, 1945 (NARA 0005174). 1C AR-75-62-616, Box 26, File Belgium stock. Cooper to iberge, July 8, 1947 (FMC 0002249) M> FMC AR-6S-66, Box 1, unlabeled file, Roberge to Dollfus, December 26, 1944 (FMC 0000664-0000665) > HFM. Acc 285, Box 2828, File 363-78 France 1945-1946, DolUbs to Ford Motor Company, March IS, 1945 (HFM 0005852) <> I Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime US. Army officials asked Ford to send a manager from Ford of Britain to Cologne. This resulted in the visit of three Ford of Britain representadves.led by sales manager Charles Thacker, who remained in Cologne for approximately 10 days in May 1945 U S Army officials accompanied the Ford of Britain delegation in inspecting the Ford-Werke Cologne plantM4 Around the same time, U.S military authorities requested permission from Gen. Dwight Eisenhower to allow American corporate and industrial representatives, including Roberge, to travel to Europe to assess the motor vehicle situadon there "J On May 28, 1945, Robert Schmidt sent a report to Lord Perry of Ford of Britain informing him of the history of the Cologne plant during the war.*** Beginning in June 1945.Thacker, as a representative of Ford of Britain, began managing Ford-Werke, under the supervision of the Allied military government The first known direct communication between Ford-Werke and Ford after the war was a letter written by Erhard Vitger to Roberge on November IB| I94fi explaining that Sir Stanford Cooper and Sir Patrick Hennessy ofFord of Britain had visited Ford-Werke and that Vitger hoped to visit Ford of Britain at Dagenham "* NARA, RC 338, Entry 42389, Box 3. File. 15 Army G-5 MG Sumnurics^ummary No 96. May 11,1945 (NARA 0004887 0004888), NARA, RG 331, Bony 34, Box 142, File: 353 02, Gorow lo Out, May 13. 1945 (NARA 0005259), NARA. RG 260, Property Division, Property Cootrol and External Assets Branch, Box 546, File Fard-Werfe. Rains to File, July 25,1945 (NARA 0003557-00035S8) ms NARA. RG 331. Entry 34. Bax 142. File: 353 02. Marshall to Eisenhower. May 15.1945 (NARA 0005260) 444 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 204.Schmidt to Perry, May 28,1945 (NARA 0000477 0000488) tu Ford-Werke Records, Personnel File ofTK. (FW 0021510 0021511), see also NARA. RG 260, Economics Division, IG Farben Control Office, Box 24, Unlabeled file, Rains to FEBCO Branch, July 25.I94S (NARA 0006947) M> HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File Cologne Food Situation 1947, Vitger to Roberge November 18, 1946 (HFM 0003515 0003518) ar Section 10 End-of-War and Postwar Military Government Supervision Ford-Werke and other Industrial facilities in Cologne were initially administered by American military authorities after U.S. forces captured the city in March 1945 Following the creation of the Allied Control Council, established later that year, Germany was divided into four occupation zones administered by French. American, British and Russian military governments. North Rhine-Westphalia, including Cologne, became pan of the British Zone, and FordWerke became the responsibility of British officials, who began regulating operations at the plant in the summer and fall of 1945 ^ The Allied military occupation of West Germany ended with the establishment of the German Federal Republic in May 1949 " 10.1. Initial Period ofU.S. Military Control, March-June 1945 Army units pushed into Cologne on March 5 As the troops moved forward, they exchanged artillery with the Germans on the opposite bank of the Rhine, in the process shelling the Ford-Werke plant On March 6, the Americans took possession of the plant6,1 During the first few weeks after the fighting ended, officers from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Civil Affairs Division, responsible for administering Cologne, inspected the plant several times"1 On March 25, 1945, Maj Skinner, a military government property control officer, met with Robert Schmidt to discuss possible production at the plant "* By the end of the month, U.S military officials reported that the Ford-Werke facility had been requisitioned to service Army vehicles."* In February 1945, American troops began advancing into the western regions of Germany, toward Cologne. " Nevins and HID, Fori. Dedine mi Birth 1933-1962, p 290 Linger, da Encyclopedic otWidi History, p 1194 n Nevms and Hill, font: Decline mi Bebirth. 1933-1962, p 289, Blllsteln and Diner, *Tou ore new in Cologne Ompliments* pp. 181 188, HFM, Acc 880, Box 7, Hie* Germany, Interview with ErhardVitgen July 15. I960 (HFM 0000887) 4,1 NARA. RG 331. Entry 54. Box 151. File 17 11. Fust U S-Army Report, March 1945. p 158, E1H2 Report 1, March 10, 1945 (NARA 000491S).NARA.RG 338,Entry 42389,Box 3.FUelS US Army MG Attachments, E1H2 Report 3, March 12, 1945 , (NARA 0004880-0004881).E1H2 Report 13,March 22,1945 (NARA 0004879) See also Billstein and Diner, 'You An Now In Cologne. Complnnmts.' p 173 NARA. RG 338. Entry 42389 Box 3. File 15 U.S Army MG Attachments, E1H2 Report 16. March 25, 1945 (NARA 0004882) 474 NARA. RG 331. Entry 54. Box 284, File 223 32 1st US.Army Field Reports, G-5 Summary Report. March 23. 1945 (NARA 0004906-0004907) yA* 7 Research Findings .About Ford-Werke Under (he Nazi Regime From April to June 1945, Ford-Werke operated under the authority of military government property control officers attached to the SHAEF Civil Affairs Division *" According to U.S. military reports, the plant was "being operated by or for the army"*7' Army ordnance officers were assigned to supervise production activities, and all requisitions for parts and materials had to be approved by the 15" Army Property _ Control Officer.*" American officials established ( ) regulations governing employment at the plant, arranged for skilled laborers to be allocated to FordJbf Werke and helped relocate workers from elsewhere in the Cologne region. Army officers also hdpe^ salvage parts and machinery for use at the fac,,<"'*" 10.2. British Military Go vemment Control ofFoiri-Wer he With the creation of the Allied Control Council, Cologne was occupied by units ofthe British 21 "Army Group, and British officials from the Finance Division Property Control Branch took over responsibility for mi NARA.RG 260.Economics Division4 G ftrben Control Office Box 24, Unlabcled file, Memo from Rains and Naldcn, June 9, 194S (NARA 0006986). KARA, RG 165. Entry 96.Box 2. File. Vbhune V, Memo to Hatcher. July 1945 (NARA 0005076000S082) Ford-Werke operations*" In August 194S, the British Property Control Branch outlined a formal program to take control of all foreign-owned property in the British Zone The program's principal aim was to protea these properties until the owners could resume control In the case of manufacturing plants such as Ford-Werke, the plan called for the appointment of a custodian, who would protea the assets and report to the Property Control Branch.*" The legal basis for these measures stemmed from Military Law No 52, which granted the military government wide-ranging powers to seize and control German industrial facilities **' On September 26. 1945, Ford-Werke employees were told that the plant was being placed under military government controlM> Heinrich Albert had asked to be appointed custodian, but the occupation government refused, and instead appointed Erhard Vltger."* Nonethelcss.Albert was permitted to become custodian of Ford-Werke's assets in Berlin "* In November 1945, the British Military Government Headquarters for North Rhineland announced that Ford-Werke had begun operating under its supervision According to Vitger, directors and shareholders had no official authority under British military government control Additionally, Ford Motor Company needed *>* KARA, RG 60,Entry 285B. Bos 74.TIDC Project 12. p. 2 3.July 14. 1945 (NARA 0003116). NARA. RG 60, Entry 285B. Boot 72, Pile 1ND-30, Report cm Reparations from the German Automotive Industry, May 1945 (NARA 0003065) NARA. RG 338. Entry 42868. Bat A905. File 004. Memo on operation of Ford Motor plant,May 12,1945 (NARA 0004875- 338, Entry 42389. Bax 3, File IS Army MG , E1H2 RepanAprU 25.1945 (NARA 0004885). Summary No. 96, May 11, 1945 (NARA 0004888). Summary No 97. May 12.1945 (NARA 0004891) "* NARA. RG 260. Property Division, Property Control and External Assets Branch. Box 546. File Ford-Wert, Memo horn Rainsjuly 25.1945 (NARA 0000580-0000581) * FRCl FO 1046/86.Propeny Control Instruction No. 13, August 27,1945 (PRO 0000125-0000126)* 5 wl PRO, FO1046/526, Memo from Property Control Branch to chairman, Control Board Economic Sub-Commission. October 5. 1946 (PRO 0000127-0000129). NARA. RG 260. Executive Office, Box 635. Military Uw No S2,April 19. I94S (NARA OOOS524-OOOSS27), NARA. RG 260. Property Division. Directors Office. Box 6, File Ford-Werk, Clay to Beckworth. April 7. 1948 (NARA 0002469) ** Ford-Werke Records. Rolfe to Vitger. September 26.1945 (FW 0020376-0020380) Wilkins and Hill. American Buslneu Abroad, p. 345 Despite Albert's implication in the July 1944 uprising against Hitler and Albert s subsequent arrest by the Germans, the Allied occupation government was suspicious of his wartime record, especially his association with the Arendt plant. (See Section 6 9. regarding Arendt) Vitger said In a postwar interview that the American officers (old him [Vitger] "[W]e must have somebody who does what we want, and who is responsible only to us. We know you very well, and we believe that you would be the right man for this " See FMC.AR-98-213541 .Box V, Oral History of ErhardVltger by D.B.Tuinln,April 1987 (FMC 0000575)_______________ Ford-Werke Records. Rolfe to Vitger, September 26, 1945 (FW 0020376-0020380) See also FMC. AR-98-213541. Box 131, Itary Report, September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000940) .and FordVferke Records,Buslness Report for 1944,1945 and 1946 (FW 0003689).______________ ul PRO, FO 1013/2 359.North Rhine Province Finance Report for November 1945 (PRO 0000138) " FMC.AR-98-213S41, Box 131. Ftary Report. September 19. 9+ Ead-of-War and Postwar Military Government Supervision the permission of the military government to transfer without approval of military authorities **1 The British title of company stock.**' British military government regulations also placed tight restrictions on travel within Germany. In November 1945, shortly after the plant was placed under control, military authorities refused permission for Alfons von Gusmann and Albert to visit from Berhn, noting that Vltger seemed to be doing well managing the plant *** Ford-Werke's postwar production activities also were closely regulated by British military authorities. While the military government restricted any further investment in the properties under their control In 1946, FordWerke had to obtain approval before it could purchase roofing materials for plant repairs **' And,in November 1947, the Property Control Branch denied a request frotnVitger to purchase 312,655 square meters (3 37 million square feet) of land adjoining the Cologne facility for construction of a spare parts assembly plant *** plant continued to repair and service military vehicles, it also began producing new trucks under contract with the British occupation government, which had the authority to determine who received the trucks.*** As the American military had done, British authorities arranged for the transfer of parts and machinery from other Goman factories to Ford-Werke to increase the plant's production ** The British military government determined steel quota allocations for Ford-Werke and regulated prices charged for spare parts manufactured at the plant **' British officials closely regulated trade with other occupied zones within Germany. Foreign currency accounts were frozen and foreign trade was prohibited 1946 (FMC 0000914) See also Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes, December 16,1947 (FW 0003967-0003971). which notes that under the cams ofMilitary Law NO $2.shareholders could not meet without the approval ofmilitary authorities 4,7 See correspondence In NASA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1950-1954, Boot 1064, File. 262 1141 (NARA 0005594 0005611)_______________ 10.3. Production During the Military Occupation Ford-Werke resumed limited operations shortly after Cologne was occupied by U S troops following a visit to the plant by U.S property control officers on March 25, 1945, Ford-Werke began servicing and repairing U.S. military vehicles Ford-Werke also began overhauling captured German trucks for use by Allied forces.**' After Bnnsh occupation troops arrived in Cologne, Ford-Werke also provided repair services for the British military*** According to author Hanns-Peter 651 NARAJIG 260,Executive Office. Box 635.Military Liw No S3, August 1, 1945 (NARA 0005528-0005531). NARA. RG260. Economics Division, Box 101, File 451-2 Folder #2, Machinery and Optics Section to Industry Branth. January 14. 1946 (NARA 0004484) See alio FMC Briefing Binder K. Interview with Malcolm McDonald, no date (FMC 0004379 0004380) He stated that production orders from Ford of Bntain for Ford-Werke had to be placed through the Allied Control Coundt.and that trucks produced at the plant could be distributed only to certain apprewed dealers in Germany "* FRQ, FO 1013/2364, North Khine-Westphalia Finance Report, September 30. 1946 (PRO 0000132);WNRC, Acc 299-68A0243, Box 540, File 43 - Ford-Werke Kohl - FMC (18/3) (516/g), Letter from Chief of Financial Division, Property Control Branch, November 15, 194$ (DOJ 0010335) FMC. AR-98-213541, Bax 131, Ferry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000924-0000927), Ford-Wake Records. Business Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 (FW 00036890OOJ69O),FMCAR 65-71,Box 25,File- Ford International `48 #1 .Summary of Foreign Operations - January 12,1948,Report onFord-Wake, October 15.1947 (FMC 0000135) " NARA, RC 84, Entry 2527X, Boot I, File: Dade and Industry, Industry and Ikadc Committee Meeting Minutes for August 28 andAugust 31,1945 (NARA 0004813-0004817)* 31 > FMC, AR-98-213541. Box 131. Perry Report, September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000924), Ford-Werke Records. Financial Ledger. December 1944-December 1946. Memo from VUger, October 31. 1946 (FW 0008008); PRQ FO 1039/808, Memo from King, July 18,1947 (PRO 0000027) ,J WNRC.AcC. 299-68A-0243.Box 537,Book 12 - lb 1946 (1). Invoice No 2883/5840, February 13.1946 (DOJ 0001445) ,M Approval for the purchase was obtained in June 1948. after Vltger filed an appeal and the military government relaxed Its investment restrictions, see correspondence In NARA, RG 260, Property Division, Director's Office. Box 6 File- Ford-Werke (NARA 00024S7-0002469), andHFM, Acc 713, Box S, File. Correspondence - Vltger - 1948. Vitger to Roberge, June 24, 1948 (HFM 0003466-0003467) * NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3. File 15 US Army MG Attachments, E1H2 Report 16, March 25, 1945 (NARA 0004882), NARA, RG 338, Entry 42868, Box A905. File 004, Memo on operation of Fold Motor plant,May 12.1945 (NARA 0004875-0004876), File AG File; Flanigan to Commanding General, XXE Corps,April 2, 1945 (NARA 0004874) *WNRC.Acc 299-68A-0243, Box540, Book 62 - He - 1945, Invoice No RA 1545, June 29, 1945 (DOJ 0009553), Invoice No. RA 1571, July 6. 1945 (DOJ 0009567), Invoice No. 789590.August IS, 1945 (DOJ 0009545) 1>S Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime RosdlenrAmeiican and British authorities regarded the Ford-Werke plant as their own and demanded that Ford-Werke repair military vehicles for free.*" FordHferke eventually submitted war damage claims totaling RM 148,956 for repair work undertaken on behalf of the British and American military, and for trucks and tools requisitioned from the plant *" (See Section 11.4. for more information on war damage claims ) On April 27, 1945, the US military command headquarters for the Cologne region authorized the plant to begin assembling trucks from existing spare parts.*" On V-B Day, May 8, 1945, Ford-Werke produced its first postwar vehicle, a truck for the US. Army. Ford-Werke's truck production remained limited g the next months because of damage to the plant a shortage ofraw materials and parts.'00 As it began truck production, Ford-Werke management estimated that around 500 trucks could be assembled from existing supplies."1 In June 1945, U S. Civil Affairs Division officials in Cologne reported that the plant had made about 250 trucks but was quickly running out of necessary parts The military officers proposed to procure the needed supplies from stocks stored elsewhere m Germany and from Ford facilities in France and Belgium."1 At the beginning of July 1945, U5. military officials noted that the facility was more active than it had been a month earlier, and that production levels had reached more than 60 vehicles per month."1 However, after visiting the plant two weeks later, a US War Department committee investigating the European automotive industry reported that Ford-Werke's current production was only 12 vehicles per month, though it was planning to Increase to 100 ,M In addition to manufacturing spare parts and continuing to service and repair British military vehicles, the facility produced 2,443 vehicles by the end of 1945."* Under general plans for German industry developed by the Allied Control Council in 1946, Ford-Werkewas scheduled to be the only automobile manufacturer in the British Zone with an anticipated annual producuon quota as high as 20,000 autos and 18,000 trucks'0* Although the plant's full production capacity was an esumated 1,750 trucks per month, Ford-Werke's monthly production rate in mid-1946 was 550-600 vehicles because of "the acute shortage of steel, tyres, and wood""' Ford-Werke produced 4,649 trucks dunng 1946, in addition to reconditioning nr.otois for the British occupation government "* Despite encountering difficulties due to shortages of materials and power to operate the plant, Ford-Werke was able to generate a profit in 1946. Ford of Britain employee Cyril B. Lonsdale, who was assigned to Cologne during this period, attributed much of Ford-Werke's 1946 <" Hum*-Peter KoseQen, Ford-Scfcrittc DkWitimtttaieg in hni-Wakt toh nm 1945 bis 1970 (Frankfurt: ZykUm-VerUg, 1987/88), p 16.__________________ *WNRC Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 540. Book 62 - ILc - 1945, Summary of war damage claims. 1945-1946 (DOJ 0009511) The summary lists a total of RM 190,718 91, of which RM 41.763 was for hours not worked due to air raids. Initially, the claims were submitted directly to the U.S and British occupation forces, liter, the claims were submitted to the Occupation Office Is Cologne. Several ofthe claims apparently were disapproved for lack of sufficient proof or other reasons related to the filing requirements " NARA, RG 338. Entry 42868, Box A90S. File: 004, Memo on operation ofFord Motor plant,May 12,194$ (NARA 0004875 0004876)_______________ ' BiHstein and Diner,"Kw Are Nm in Cologne. Compliments.* pp. 181 188, HFM, Acc 713, Bax 4, File Cologne 1946, Thumbnail Sketch of Activities at Ford-Wake, June 12, 1946 (HFM 0003503). FMC AR-98-213541. Box 131. Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000918) NARA. RG 338. Entry 42868. Bax A90S. File 004, Memo on operation of Ford Motor plant. May 12, 194S (NARA 0004875) 701 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division. Industry Branch. Box 37, Reel 39 3, E1H2 report on FMC in France. Belgium and Germany, June IS, 1945 (NARA 000S636) 101 NARA, RG 260, Property Division. Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 546, File Ford-Wale, Memo from Rains, July 25, 1945 (NARA 0000580) nt NARA, RG 165, Entry 96, Box 2, Ifolume V, Report from Committee to Reappraise the Automouve Situation in ETO and MTO, July 1945 (NARA 0005082) ,os Ford-Werke Records, Business Report for 1944, 194S, 1946 (FW 0003690).__________ ' NARA. RG $9, Central Decimal File 1945-49, Box 6820, File862 6S9. Murphy to Lyon. April 19. 1946 (NARA 0005506), PRO, FO 1039/808. Memo from Portas. December 31. 1946 (FRO 0000023),_________ FMC AR-98-213541, Box 131. Perry Report. September 19. 1946 (FMC 0000919) 708 FMC AR 65-71, Box 25, File Ford International `48 #1, Summary of Foreign Operations - January 12,1948,Thornton to Crusoe, October 22. 1947 (FMC 0000129), Ford-Werke Records, Business Report for 1944, 194S, 1946 (FW 0003690) 96 4- /?y 4. ^-- (t-eui S1 End-of-War ood Postwar Mihtary Government Supervision 1 Y ,0 uir. May-Dec 1945 /< 1946 I 1947 1948 3h m1 1 1949 Total production I May 1945-1949 ,, Three-ton Trucks 2,443 4,649 2,600 5,731 3,823 Taunus Cara - - 182 11,109 Half-ton Vans 144 2,425 Yearly Total 2,443 4,649 2,600 6,057 17,357 19,246 11,291 2,569 33,106 , - - - - ep^fejKVW^' 1945. "1946 (FW 0003689-0003691), Summary of Ford of Germany success to the goodwill of British military authorities. He dted a 1945 arrangement whereby Ford of Britain representatives were allowed Into the Cologne operations to facilitate the early rehabilitation of the factory. Also, he noted, Ford-Werie benefited from the cooperation of military authorities m obtaining materials TM* According to political scientist Simon Reich. Ford-Werke's "good relationship with~the military government" was an advantage for the firm and led to Ford-Werte's receiving machinery confiscated by the military authonties from the Krupp concern.'1" Production levels dropped in 1947 because of continued "difficulties in obtaining an adequate flow of supplies."'11 Steel allocations to the plant dropped sharply during the first three quarters of the year; to an average of 710 tons per month, compared with 1,280 7#* HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File Cologne - Dagenham File Re: Germany 1947, Memo from Lonsdale, May 28, 1947 (HFM 0004209) Lonsdale indicated that Ford of Britain's ability to insert British personnel into Cologne at such an early date enabled Ford-Werke to restart operations at Cologne "before any other factory in the Motor Industry in Germany" ,lc Reich, Tie Fruits of Rodim, p. 133 711 FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File Ford international '48 #1, Summary of Foreign Operations - January 12, 1948.Thornton to Qrusoe, October 22. 1947 (FMC 0000)29), HR Acc. 61 000417. Box 1, GermanV6r Recovery Study 1950, pp 136 139 (HP 0000324-0000327). 711 NARA.RG 260.Property Dlvislon.Directar`s Office. Box 6,FileFord-Werke, VUger to Property Control Brandi, November 29, 1947 (NARA 0002459-0002464) tons per month in 1946 In November 1947, Erhard Vitger submitted a request to the British military government for the purchase of land from the city of Cologne to be used as the site of a foundry and forge needed to manufacture parts that were m short supply and therefore were limiting Ford-Werke's output'" Total truck production for the year amounted to about 2,600 vehicles."1 In addition, the plant reconditioned more than 26,000 motors for German, British and Canadian vehicles m During 1947, Ford-Werke faced increased competition from other automobile manufacturers in Germany In the British zone, the Volkswagen facility in Vfolfsburg was operating with a monthly production rate of approximately 1,000 passenger cars. Opel's plant at Brandenburg m the Russian zone was producing 1,500 to 2,000 trucks per month, while the Opel plant at Russelsheun in the American zone was manufacturing about 200 trucks per month. By the end of the year, the Russelsheim plant had begun passenger car production.'11 Ford-Werke production levels climbed in 1948 and 1949, the last two years of the military occupation. In 7<> Ford-WerkeRecords, Summary ofFord ofGermany Production 1926-1977, February 9, 1978 (FW 0003910), Historical Developments 1925-1969 (FW 0002877) 714 Ford-Werke Records. Chronology of Ford-Werke, 194S-1948 (FW 0020401) 7,1 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Palumbo, Survey of German Motor Vehicle Industry, April 15, 1948 (FMC 0000863 0000864) See also Reich, Tht Fnuts of Fascism, pp 144-146 ')/ Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime March 1948, Henry Ford II visited the plant for a board meeting and drove the 10,000th vehicle to come ofF the assembly line since the end of the war'" That autumn, the plant began manufacturing the Humus, the first passenger car produced there since the war In US Strategic Bombing Survey visited Ford-Werke to survey the effects of the US bombing campaign in Cologne. Amoldy also interviewed Robert Schmidt at his home and gathered information about plant open the machinery dispersal and Ford-Werke supplier addition to the Thumis. Ford-Werke began manufacturing a half-ton van A total of 326 passenger vehicles were manufactured by the end of the year During 1948, Ford-Werke also produced 5,731 trucks'1' In 1949, Ford-Werke introduced a new, smaller IK- to two-ton truck to complement its production of three-ton vehicles.'" In general, however, plant production largely shifted toward passenger vehicles rather than trucks. Total production at the plant in 1949 amounted to 3,823 trucks, 11,109 Humus cars and 2,425 half-ton vans.'1' 10.4.Military Go vermnent Investigations of die Plant US. military forces began their first investigations of the Ford-Werke facility shortly after occupying Cologne. On March 10, 1945, a combined British and American intelligence team investigated the plant and reported on its oandidan, the dispersal of factory equipment before the U.S. arrival, and the foreign workers and "displaced persons" wfro remained encamped in the Ford-Werke air raid shell*"0 Ydilitary intelligence officers interrogated worlers and refugees who had worked at the In addition to these intelligence-gathering efforts, the factory was visited several times between March and May 1945 by representatives of the E1H2 Civil Affairs Unit responsible for administering Cologne. The military officials interviewed Ford-Werke management and reported on conditions at the plant, induding<t^e health of foreign workers and refugees found theref"1 Officials also investigated a report by Schmidt that US/Coops had taken RM 1,000,000 from a Ford-Werke office soon after the occupation ofCologne.'" Finally, CivilAffairs officers surveyed the plant to determine what was needed to bring the Ford-Wake facility into production to service Allied military vehicles.''1 la mid-June 1945, Lt. Neil Naiden and Ensign Edwin Rains, who were assigned to the U S Military Government Finance Division, began a larger investigation of Ford-Werke The officers traveled to Cologne, and after consulting with local US military government officials, interviewed Erhard Vitger and Schmidt regarding Ford-Wakes activities during the war Naiden and Rains reviewed Ford-Werke internal documents and took several files away with theiqJ'^U.S. i March 15. 1945, Maj. F.N. Amoldy of the n` Ford-Werke Records, Chronology of Ford-Werke, 1945-1948 (FW 0020403-0020405) 7,7 Ford-WerkeRecords, Historical Developments 1925-1969 (FW 0002878), Summary of Ford of Germany Production 1926 1977, February 9, 1978 (FW 0003910) 7|> Ford-Werke Records,"Our Production Program Ford Cologne" 1949 (FW 0005591) 7>*FMC, AR-98-2I3541, Bax 52, Hie Audit Report - July 28, 1949.Hibbercan-Platt Report, July 28. 1949.and August 1949 (FMC 0000813), Ford-Werke Records, Summary of Ford of Germany Production 1926-1977, February 9, 1978 (FW .0003910) I 7kara, RG 243. Enoy 6. Box 687, File 77x19 2 of 3.Amoldy '''to Hogglund.March 22,1945 (NARA 0004497-0004499) The US. Strategic Bombing Survey also investigated other Ford plants in Belgium, see reports in NARA, RG 243, Entry 6. Box 687, File. 77al9 3 of 3. March 1945 (NARA 0003257 0003335 IARA, RG 331, Entry 54, Box 151, File 17 11, First U.S Army RReport, March 1945, p. 158, E1H2 Report I. March 10. 1945 (NARA 0004915).NARA.RG 338,Entry 42389.BOX 3,FUe,15 US. Army MG Attachments, E1H2 Report 3, March 12, 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881),E1H2 Report 13,March 22,194$ (NARA 0004879) 'NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File IS US Army MG Attachments, E1H2 Repan 16, March 2$, 1945 (NARA 0004882) V/ioWaRA, RG 260, Economics Division. Industry Brandi, Box 37, V-ReeM3S9.3, CLO-STirget Report 19/8 on vun to Fard-Cologne- Nlehl March 10,1945.document date March 23,194$,(NARA 0005651 -0005656). fry ,G 407, Entry 427, Bax 15071, File- 603-2 13 Civilian tercogatlon on Ford factory. March 11, 1945 (NARA 0005309). 7 NARA. RG 331, Entry 54. Box 284, File-223 32 1st USMmy Field Reports, G-5 Summary Report, March 23, 1945 (NARA 0004906-0004907), NARA.RG 338,Entry 42389,Box 3 File 15 Army G-S MG Summaries, Summary No. 96,May 11,1945 (NARA 0004887-0004888) JIG 260,Economics Division,IG Farben Control Office, unlabeled file. Memo from Naiden and Rains, June 9, End-of-War and Postwar Military Government Supervision military officials Inspected Ford-Weike's safe deposit box occupied Europe. The report also included a large at the Deutsche Bank branch in Cologne and retrieved collection of Ford-Werke internal documents attached as Ford of Belgium share certificates worth Bfrs exhibits.'11 60,000,000.,u On June 19. 1945, US. military authorities deaded to arrest Schmidt, and he was taken 10.5. Denazification at Ford-Wer be to Frankfurt to be "held for questioning in connection with the I.G. Farben investigation'' and not released until September 8, 1945. Rains requisitioned Schmidt's car for his own use.'u Military government authorities conducted several investigations at Ford-Werke as part ofa broader effort to remove prominent individuals who had been active Nazi party members or supporters. The general aims of the On June 21, 1945, Rains produced a report summarizing the "Preliminary Investigation of FordWake." The report provided an overview ofFord-Werke denazification program for Germany were established in February 1945 at the Yalta Conference, which called for the eradication of all vestiges of National Socialism from history during the Nazi era and included references to prewar activities, the use of forced labor and Schmidt's role in overseeing Ford plants in occupied Europe.In German life. Shortly after the occupation of Cologne, US military officials began dismissing civil servants and other public officials who had served during the Nazi July andAugust 1945,US. military authorities contilfued era."' At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, theAlhes their investigation of Ford-Werke. Rains interrogated agreed to allow each zone to develop its own Schmidt, and Schmidt prepared memos describing FordWferke activities. US. military investigators collected further documents from Ford-Werke.'" On September 5, 1945, Henry Schneider, US. Forces European Theater denazification procedures. After the creation of the British Zone in the summer of 1945, officials from the Public Safety Special Branch took over responsibility for administering the denazification program in Cologne Finance Branch, submitted a longer report on the investigation of Ford-Werke. Schneiders report described Fard-Wake's wartime activities in greater detail, describing prewar raw materials agreements, wartime production, use of forced labor and FordVtferke's relationship with other Ford subsidiaries in During the first months of the Allied occupation.both US. and British military officials collected information about high-ranking members of Ford-Werke management In June 1945, Counter Intelligence Corps (C3C) officers provided reports on Erhard Vitgen Robert Schmidt, Werner Buchwald, Alfbns Streit and Hans L&ckmann. (Streit and Lockmann were deputy members 194S (NARA 0006986-0006988)Xemo on convention with Vltgcr, June 11, 194S (NARA 0006980-0006981). Memo on conversation with Schmidt. June 13, 194S (NARA 0006983 0006984). 717 He Ford ofBelgium shares were not relumed to Ford-Werke. see correspondence relidng to these shares in WNRC, Acc 29968A-0243,Box S40Jlle 43 - Ford-Werke - K61n FMC (18/3) (S16/g) (DOJ 0010256-0010291) See also Section 8 2 ,!l NARA.RG 260.Economics Dinsion.LG Farben Control Office; Box 24. unlahclcd file. Memo from Gosling, June 19. 1945 (NARA 0006973), Handwritten memo to Cleary, circa 1945 (NARA 0006979), NARA, RG 260. Economics Division, DecarteUzatlon Enoch, Bax 92, File- Industrialists. List of German civilian prisoners, November 19, 1946 (NARA r 8^02443)________ nAra, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Report on preliminary s_^lnvestigition ofthe Ford-Werke,AG (External Assets - Germany) by Rains and Naiden. June 21, 1945 (NARA 0001173) 770 NARAJtG 260,Economics DlvWon.I G Farben Control Office; Bax 24,unlabeled file. Handwritten statemenu by SchmidtJuly 1945 (NARA 0007012-0007024) and from Ford-Werke to Schneider. August 27, 1945 (NARA 0006958) of the Ford-Werke management board [Vorstand]). (See Section 10 2 for information on the military government's appointment of Vitger as postwar custodian of the plant later in 1945 ) On June 11, the QC officials reported that they had not yet been able to prove that Schmidt was an "ardent Nazi," but were working toward his arrest, which occurred about a week 711 NARA. RG 407. Entry 368B. Box 1032, RG 407. Schnelder Repaart. September 5. 1945 (NARA 0000001-0000540) See also NARA RG 260, Economics Division, LG Farben Control Office, Box 24,unlabekd file. Ford section omitied from repoit submitted, circa July-Sepcember 1945 (NARA 0006956 0006957) 711 Relnhold Billstein, Noikglnn obne Neonbmig Dokumaicc mJ Moterieliai zur pciilisrbcn WticboBTtUiuig in dm Vtfaonnr Dark 1945 (Cologne PahlRugenstein. 1984),pp 36-88 7,1 Irmgard Lange, ed , Enuamfiztening in Nonfrhdn-Wetiaioi Rfduiwiai, Amtasungai, Oigasijation (Seiburg Respublica-Verlag, Selburg. 1976), pp. 11-23 yy Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under tbe Non Regime Uta'" In July 1945, die newly appointed British Included Buchwald and Streit."' Other key employees resident officer at the plant, Maj. Fyfe, indicated that he who were removed held the following positions the was "trying to do a house-deaning job at Ford" to heads of the laboratory and cosung department, the remove Nazi supporters.'11 Alter Schmidt's release from assistant works manager, the assistant head of the prison in September 1945, he was specifically forbidden construction department, a sales clerk, a buyer, a to have further connection with Ford-Werke foreman, the chief clerk and the assistant chief management by order of the military government."4 (See Section 10.7. for information on Robert Schmidts rehuing) At the request of the military government, several Ford-Werke employees were removed from their positions in 1945. In addition to Schmidt, the list insJ)ectoI;", Lockmann left Ford-Werke of his own accord in October 1945 "* Alfons von Gusmann, FordWferke's government liaison representative in Berlin, was removed at the instigation of US military authorities in April 1946.'" The British military government implemented a more formal denazification program in 1946 On January 12, 1946, the Allied Control Council issued 7,4 NARAJtG 260,EconomiC3 Divlslon.LG Farben Control Office Bax 24, unlabeled file. Memo on conversation with QC Cologne, June It, 194S (NARA 0006985). Memo from Gosling, June 19, 1945 (NARA 0006973). Directive No, 24, which identified the Nazi officials and supporters who were to be removed from their posmons. The directive specifically included all r NARA, RG 260, Property Division, Property Control and External Asset! bench. Box 546, Pile. Ford-Werie, Memo from Rains, July 25, 1945 (NARA 0000581) There is a possibility that Schmidt may have been arrested briefly In April 1945 Arrest ledgers from the U S 15th Army Indicate that a "Robert Schmidt" was detained between April 11 and April 17,however, the documents give no ocher Information, and there are no other references Co Robert H. Schmidt's being arrested in April 1945 See NARA.RG 338,15th Army records_Ba*A923,Book MP/MTC Blotter 25, arrest ledger entry, April 1945 (NARA 0004901). business leaders who had been appointed Military Economic Leaders [Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer] during the wan'41 On January 17, 1946, the British military government issued General Directive Nc. 1, which established denazification juries made up of politically reliable Germans to review individual cases, although the military government retained veto control over the proceedings. In August 1946, British military officials HStAD, NW 1049/76620. Memo from Property Control Officer of Military Government to Ford-Wetke; September 14, I94S (HSAD 0802)Appeal to Cologne Regional Government. September 10.1946 (HSAD 0836-084t)* 11 * * V. 777 PMC.AR-75-62-6l6.Box 79,Custodlan Report (FMC 0001018 and 0001020). FMC. AR-98-213541, Box 131, File Cologne Organization and Management. Management - 1925-1946 (FMC 0000682). Buchwald. the wartime counterintelligence officer and an employee of Pord-Werte, was removed by the Military Government in June 1945, arrested and held for nine months. Ford-Werke canceled his contract After he was released from military internment, he went through the denazification process for approval to work as an Independent economic adviser, and was cleared. See NARA, RG 260. Economics Division, LG Farben Control Office, Bax 24, tmlzbelcd fife Memo on conversation with QC - Cologne, June 11. 1945 (NARA 0006985), HStAIXNW 1049/46784, Report of Chief Investigator; Headquarters Military Government. December 3, 1946 (HSAD 0212; far English translation, see HSAD 0215). Translation of Notice from Ford-Wake to Buchwald, June 26, 1945 (HSAD 0217), Buchwald to Burgermelster da Gemdnde Runderoth. May 3, 1946 (HSAD 0223, far English translation, see HSAD 022S) and Questionnaire Work Sheet, Novemba 6, 1946 (HSAD 0216). Streit, who held the title of "works manager" at Ford-Werke in 1945, was lata re-employed by Ford-Wake,as of l9S3,he was engineering assistant to the technical director. See HFMAcc. 505, Bax I, Hie; Ford International Executive News Letter; Vol V. No. 2,May 1953 (HFM 0003369) issued further mstrucuons relating to the denazification procedure All Germans with jobs or seeking employment were required to complete a quesaonnaire [Fragebogen] summarizing their personal history and poliucal affiliations for the denazification committee The committees assigned individuals to one of the following categories I) \ferbrecher (war criminals), 2) Ubeltiter (major WTongdoers/high-rankmg Nazi party members), 3) weniger bedeutende Ubeltater ">FMC. AR-75-62-616, Box 79. Custodian Report (FMC 0001019-0001020) Tbe names of the people who held the positions listed above are Dieter Peionann, E. Eackenberg, Wfemer PriUz. Emil Pfiilla. Georg Zahn, Ernst Schulten, Hubert Pick, GF. Rledt and Rudolf Lang 717 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131,File Cologne Organization and Management, Management - 1925-1946 (FMC 0000682) WNRCAcc 299-68A-0243, Box S40. File 96/4 - Ford-Werke AG 160015, Letter from AlbertAprU 4,1946 (DOJ 0010395)74 74> PRO, FO 1013/1686,Allied Control Authority Directive No 24, January 12, 1946 (PRO 0000001-0000018) Robert Schmidt had been appointed Wfchrwirtschafcsfuhrer In 1941, seeBA-F, RW 20/3, Entry in Vhr Diary, Muenster, April 22-28, 1941 (RAF 1168) See also Section 5 2 I 00 End-of-War and Postwar Military Government Supervision (minor wrongdoexs/mid-level party members), 4) Parteiganger (party supporters/low-level party members); and S) endastete Personen (cleared persons). In 1947, the British government revised the program to grant more responsibility to the Germanled denazification committees. Most proceedings in the Cologne area were completed by the end of 1948, although some appeal cases continued until the early 1950s.'41 The denazification committee established at FordWerke by the British military authorities operated for four hours dally and reported its findings to a central German panel in Cologne that advised the military government. About 40 plant and administrative staff workers were arrested by the Allies, although some of the employeeppss-a^reerre released and lata re-employed by XJthe company 10.6. Decontrol ofFord-Wer ke Military government controls over Ford-Werke were gradually removed beginning in 1947. In March 1947, following a request from Erhard Vitger, who was the appointed custodian, the British Property Control Office granted permission for Ford-Werke to hold a general shareholders meeting in order to elect a board of directors and resume "conducting its internal affairs on more normal lines." The British military authorities noted, however, that under the law, Ford-Werke remained subject to military government control, and new board members had to be appr0wa/4MSo, with permission granted and the conditions reTforth, FordWerke began making plans to hold its first postwar general shareholders meeting The meeting was held on December 16, 1947. A decision had been made by Dearborn executives not to retain Albert as a member of the Board of Directors of Ford-Werke '** _The other remaining members all resigned before the December 16 meetm^<,'^rord Motor Company executives Henry 7*1 Lange, Bntranflitemaj b Ncrdrhetn-Wbtfalm. pp> 25-59 and 223 ns241. 1C, All-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report. September 19, 946 (FMC 0000938-0000941),see also FMC.AR 98-213S41, Oral History of Erhard Vitger by D B. Tmnln^pnl 1987 (FMC 2- 0nn0n00582-0000584) f1 Ford-Werke Records, Rolfe to Vitger; March I, 1947 (FW f J0003893), root FO 1044/4, North Rhlne-Westphalla Finance Report. Refaroary 28. 1948 (FRO 0000130-0000131) '"WhileVitger was In Dearborn In June 1947.he summarized the wartime and postwar controls ever Ford-Werke andpointed out that at present,"the Company has no Board." See FMC.AR 6571,Bck 25JileInternational 1947 #l,Vitger to Roberge June 25.1947 (FMC 0000100-0000102), and Fard-WeikeReoords, Vltgtx to Roberge, August 22,1947 (FW 0003871) '"Vitger attended a July 1947 meeting of the Ford Motor Company Foreign Operations Committee in Dearborn, where It was decided thatAlbert would not be re-elected to the board, and that he would be offered a retirement fee of RM 100.000 In recognition of his service to the company, should he agree to retire. Upon his return to Germany, Vitger told Albert ofthe principle that members ofthe organization should retire at the age of 65. Albeit, who was then 73. agreed to step down and wrote a letter to that effect See HFM. Act. 713. Box 4, File Meeting with Vitger, Meeting Minutes July 1, 1947 (HFM 0001123), Ford-Werlte Records. Vitger to Roberge, August 22, 1947 (FW 0003871) and Albert to Vitger, August 22, 1947 (FW 0003874) Sorensen said that he received a few letters from Albeit after the war; and chat he was a "ruined man." although Sorensen considered him "one of the forgotten greats' of Ford Motor Company See HFM. Acc 67, diaries Sorensen Oral Reminiscences (Excerpts), no date, (HFM 0001376-0001377). In a 1960 interview conducted with the assistance of Ms niece, Albert explained that one of Ms sons was killed by the Russians on the last day ofdie war, Ms home Ford H, EmeSt Breech and Russell Roberge were among the new members elected to the board of directors Carl W Hauss, a law partner of Albert and one of the new members of the board, was elected as its chairman '4* In June 1947, the British military government had instituted a program to allow foreign owners of industrial facilities in Germany to regain control over their property by peunoning the local Property Control Boards.'4* The question of applying for decontrol was was bombed, and he lost everything In Berlin After the war, he had regrouped and resumed his law practice. At the time of the interview, Ms memory was falling and he had virtually forgotten his English He was 86 years old and living In Wiesbaden See HFM, Acc 680,Boi 7. FlleCermany, Notes on interview with Heinrich Albert, July 26. 1960 (HFM r 0000880) '"^letters of resignation were received from or on behalf of Carl Krauch. Hans Flunemeyer and Wilhelm Botzkes in the period Between the July 1947 meeting in Dearborn and the December 6,1947 .meeting See Ford-Werke Records, Boucher toVitger [for Krauch], September 4, 1947 (FW 0003875). Hflnemeyer to Vitger, November 7, 1947 (FW 0003873) and Botzkes to Vltget November 15. 1947 (FW 0003876) r Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes. December 16, 1947 (FW 0003967-0003971). Wilkins and Hill. Amman Btufncs Abroad, p 347 "WNRC, Acc 299-68A-0243. Box 540, File 43 - Ford-Werke Koln - FMC (18/3) (516/g). Clay to Beckworth, no date (DO) mi Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime discussed during (he December 16,1947, meeting The decision was left to Ford Motor Company, as the majority shareholder in Ford-Werke."4 At the outset. Ford executives were divided over the advisability of petitioning the British military authorities to regain control of Ford-Werke In November 1947, Roberge, general manager of the Ford International Division, had complained to the US. State Department that FordWerke was still managed by the postwar plant custodian,Vitger, who was ultimately responsible to the military authorities."' In January 1948, however, Charles Thornton, Ford's director of planning, noted there were tax implications to be considered, since conrfZny had written off Ford-Werke as a war loss in 194i.,1'/[See Section 12.4. for more information on this matter) At a Ford-Werke board meeting held in March 1948 and attended by Henry Ford II, the board of directors decided to apply for decontrol ofthe Cologne fadlity.n> In May 1948, Vitger was granted power of attorney to represent Ford's interests in Ford-Werke. His authority to do this was accepted by British officials m Cologne. Vitger traveled to the United States in May 1948, and remained there until August to receive further instructions from Ford. He returned to Cologne on August 8, 1948, to assume the position of general manager at Ford-Werke. According to a 1954 memo 001021S), FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File- Ford InienuUonal '48 #1, Summary of Foreign Operations - January 12, 1948, Thornton to Crusoe, January 6, 1948 (FMC 0000125) The initial deadline for application was December 51, 1947, although this was later extended to March 31,1948 from the Ford Motor Company Office ofTax Affairs, the date of Vitgers return to Cologne marked. Ford's "recovery" of its investment m Ford-Wer( In October 1948, it was agreed that all future legal actions involving Ford-Werke were to be setded in German courts, rather than in military government courts.'1* In December 1949, the Superior Court in Cologne formally ended the custody order that had placed Ford-Werke under control of a designated, official Nazi government representative as of May 15, 1942f" J 10.7. Rehiiing of Robert Schmidt When Robert Schmidt was released by military authorities on September 8, 1945, a memo from the military government informed Ford-Werke that Schmidt should "take no part in the management of Ford Motor Company" until an investigation into his wartime activities was complete, effectively removing Schmidt from his position as a member of the FordWarke management board On November 8, 1945, the military government officially ordered the termination ofSchmidt's employment at Ford-Werke One of the issues raised during the course of the investigation was whether Schmidt was a member of the Nazi party A statement by one individual to the effect that Schmidt was a party member spurred the Investigation. U.S.milnary authonnes examined files as well as photographs taken at the plant when high-level Nazi officials were visiting, and interrogated several mo Ford-Wake Reandi, Meeting Minutes, December 16, 1947 (FW 0003967-0003971) /fy*C, AR-61 -416,Box 4, File XVII Germany War Loss Recovery mi FMC, AR AR-75-62-616. Boa 72. File- Ford-Werke 1945-1947 Decontrol, Roberge to Secretary of State, November 1947 V(FMC 000S579-0005580). AC. AR 6S-71, Bax 25, File Ford International `48 #1. r ofForeign Operations - January 12,1948.Thomton fto Cruioe. January 6, 1948 (FMC 0000125). See also FMCAR 68-899, Boa 8, File: Germany War Damage Claim Book (1964), Ladd to Duncan. June 30. 1964 (FMC 0010256 0010259), and FMCAR 75-63-430, Box 91. File Ford-Wake I ySStutuidies. Loraw to Goulden. December 22. 1954 (FMC ^ A00A11 6708-00016711) Within Ford Motor Company, there was some disagreement with this assessment of when the company resumed control of its Germany facility, see FMC. AR 7S-63430, Box 91, File Ford-Werke Finance - Hxts 1927-1953, Gomick to Bogdan, August 25, 1948 (FMC 0001129 0001134). ms HStAEt NW 189/1071, Famborough to Justizministerium. October 14. 1948 (HSAD 2138-2139) Finance Hums 1927-1953, Goralck to Bogdan, August 25. (m3mC. AR-98-213541, Box 131. Official Register of TVading 1948 (FMC 0001129-0001134) Among the tax Implications to be considered were the year of the recovery of the Associations, March 7.1950 (FMC 0004308) investment and the fair market value of the property on the ms HStADi NW 1049/76620, Property Control Officer to Ford- dare ofrecovery Wferke, September 14. I94S (HSAD 0802) ,u Ford-Werke Records, Excerpts from Board Meeting, March 2 3, 1948 (FW 0003251-0003252) m* HStAD, NW 1049/76620. Appeal to Cologne Regional Government, September 10.1946 (HSAD 0836-0841) I 02 End-of-Wor and Postwar Military Government Supervision witnesses. They tn the conclusion on Tune 8. 1945, that "[ajhhough not a Nazi-Party member; his position has fceppfaim in constant touck with leading Nazt-members.^As denazification proceedings continued to looFat the question of Schmidt's alleged party membership, a number of individuals, including Heinrich Albeit and a group ofFord-Werke employees, submitted written statements affirming that he was not a member of the party, and in fact had anti-Nazi sentiments.'** Hie question was investigated again by Brinsh miliary authorities, who concluded on February II, 1947, "It would appear the accusation against Schmidt [sic] confined later to die allegation that he wore the Nazi party badge but photographs are available at this office showing him on events of official character without such badge It is felt there is litde probability that Schmidt was actually a Party member, and unless adverse information comes from Document Center US Army Berlin, it is feared that such allegation cannot forthwith be maintained. Hie initial finding of the Denazification Committee investigating Schmidt in July 1946 placed him in Category 3 (minor wrongdoer or mid-level party member), denying him the right to return to a position at Ford-Werke.m He immediately filed an appeal, which was rejected. On September 10, 1946, Schmidt filed a second appeal/" Hie Denazification Review Board recommended that Schmidt's appeal be upheld, and investigator CG. Reinhard reported that if no concrete reason could be dted for Schmidt's dismissal. it would be overturnedOn October 17, 1947, Schmidt's appeal was approved, and he was re categorized as Category 5 (cleared person) In a letter to Henry Ford m October 1947, Schmidt asked to be reinstated at Ford-Werke. Erhard Vitger raised an objection to Schmidt's reinstatement, claiming, "Though there is no doubt that Mr. Schmidt is a very able businessman,! am afraid he is lacking that spirit of absolute loyalty and trustworthiness."'" CharlesThacker, manager ofFord of Belgium, andC G.F Stenger. manager of Ford of Holland, both submitted Statements regarding Schmidt's efforts on behalf of Ford employees during the war However, Thacker, who had been one of the first Ford of Britain managers to arrive at Ford-Werke after the fall of Cologne (before he was assigned to Belgium), noted potential practical problems involved in bringing Schmidt back "I do not believe that Vitger and Schmidt would ever work together as a team Vitger harbours a very strong feeling of resentment against Schmidt because of his treatment of him during the war and even after liberation I am of the opinion that the bad feeling between them has existed tor a long time "w No action was taken immediately after Schmidt's 1947 request for reinstatement. However, Ford officials started to consider the possibility of rehinng him as they struggled with strategies for addressing what they perceived as weak management at Ford-Werke, especially on the part of Vitger An undated and NW 1049/76620, Investigation Repot, June 8. 1945 0800) A letter from the Regional Economic Advisor to 'the Nazi Regional Leader refers to Schmidt as a "Party member" See WNKC, Acc. 299-68A-OZ43, Box 536, File: W17S36, Regional Economic Advisor to Lammen, February 7, 1942 (DOJ 0011043-0011044, for English translation, see DOJ 0011045-0011046) However, further research, Including a search of Nazi party membership records, produced no other documentation to support this statement. 7M HFM, Acc 713, Box 4, File: Cologne Personnel 1946-1948, Memo from Albert on denazification of Schmidt, August 23, 1946 (HFM 0003132-0003133): FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File Schmidt - Nazi Accusation, Mailer to Cooper. December 10. 1947 (FMC 0004430). HStAD, NW 1049/76620, Letter from Machting, Hermanns and Hbschmann, October 3. 1945 (HSAD 0846-0847). Ueberto Schmidt. November IS. 1945 (HSAD 0860-0861) 74i HStAD NW 1049/76620, Investigation of Schmidt by CO Reinhard. Febmaiy 11. 1947 (HSAD 0817). HStAD NW 1049/76620, Fragebogen - Arbelublatt, July 23, 1946 (HSAD 0788). 7 HStAD. NW 1049/76620, Appeal to Cologne Regional Government, September 10, 1946 (HSAD 0836-0841) HStAD NW 1049/76620, Denazification Review Board for Cologne, November 7,1946 (HSAD 0806-0807),Invesugabon ofSchmldtbyCG Reinhard, February 11, 1947 (HSAD 0816 0820).__________________ 7* HStAD NW 1049/76620 Statement of Panel.Oaober 17.1947 (HSAD 0789) 7<4 HFM, Acc 713, Box 4, File Cologne Personnel 1946-1948, Schmidt to Henry Ford D, October 6, 1947 (HFM 0003104 00003105), Vitger to Roberge, December 14, 1947 (HFM 0003126-0003127) 7`7 FMCAR-98-2l3S41.Box 131.File:Schmidt - Nazi Accusation. Thacker to Cooper, December 8. 1947 (FMC 0006514 00006515), Memo from Stenger on Schmidt's role during Occupation, November 28, 1947 (FMC 0006516-0006517) 10 5 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime unsigned report dded "Notes on Germany" states, "Everybody, including Dr. Hauss [the new chairman of Ford-Wake's board of directors, as of December 1947], still thinks that Robert Schmidt is the most capable man that has ever been associated with the German Ford organization. While he was widely criticized for having been pro-Nazi, our Managers in Holland and Belgium state categorically that this was not so and that on the contrary his attitude during the war had been extremely correct.. The main obstacle to his return to the company seems to be that Vltger is flatly opposed to his coming back and has categorically declared his unwillingness to work with him" A handwritten comment an the report says,"Why not see him," with a notation of his address and phone number.'** In January 1950, Schmidt returned to Ford-Werke as technical adviser.'*' The move had Dearborn's support: In a report prepared on January 24, 1950, Ford International executive A.J. Wieland heralded Schmidt's return as an expedient solution to some of FordWerke's most pressing problems, including the need to improve quality, decrease cost and bring down material handling expenses. Wieland concluded, "I would say that the organization is not very strong but that with R.H. Schmidt carrying the technical direction of the plant we have time for a further study to determine how to increase the effectiveness of the organization generally""0 Schmidt and Vitger retired from their positions on the management board at Ford-Werke in 195 8 They were each given a generous compensation package, including a two-year consulting agreement, a pension, an expense allowance and annuity payments In addition, both Vitger"' and Schmidt were elected as members of the board of directors"1 Schmidt continued to serve on the board of directors and as a consultant until his death in a car accident on October 24. 1962."* PMC AR 67-13, Box 2. File Cologne 1949-1954. Notts on Germany, no date (PMC 0010782-0010783) HFM, Aoc. 880. Box 7, Pile: Germany, Interview with Robert Schmidt No. 2. July 22, 1960 (HFM 0000909), Ford-Werte Recordt^cheuflfgcn to Vitger, March 6,1950 (FW 0004361) "FMC, AR-98-213541. Box 131, File Cologne Postwar Development, Wieland to Howard, January 24, 1950 (PMC 0000701).______________ it< Rud-Weitte Records, Campbell to Andrews, February 20,1958 (FW 0004428-0004442) In an oral history interview In 1987, Vitger said that In the mld-1950s Ford Motor Company began to experience problems that It attributed to the policy of haring Ford companies around the world headed by foreign nationals. "(TJhe American parent company felt they and their aims and objectives were not always fully undentood And It bad therefore been decided that every Ford Company around the world should be headed by an American.'* See FMC, AR-98 213541. Box V, Oral History of Erhard Vitger by D.B. Tinnln, April 1987 (FMC 0000605) m After retirement. Vitger settled in Switzerland, using his title of "Danish Consul." and lived into his 90s. See FMC, AR-98 213542, Bax Go, Oral History of Zella Goad. June 5 and 9, 1990 (FMC 0017088-0017090) FMC. AR-85-26299. Box 10. File Ford-Werke I9S4 - 1958, Minutes of Extraordinary General Meeting, March 27, 19S8 (FMC 0013294) ,7< Ford-Werke Records, Summary of Payments In favor of Schmidt. November 15.1962 (FW 0004275) I 04 Section 11 War Damage to Ford-Werke 11.1. Damage Between 1939 and Autumn 1944 Between 1939 and the autumn of 1944, the FordWerke facility in Cologne received only superficial damage, even though Allied bombing raids destroyed much of the rest of the city According to a postwar report, Ford-Werke suffered its first air raid damage during the night ofMay 30-31,1942.'" Damages from that night were included in an itemized war damages claim Ford-Werke submitted to the highest official of the Administrative District in Cologne on December 16, 1942, listing RM 419,622.09 m repair costs and damage to vehicles, pans, material and buildings from April through September 1942, with most of the damage listed as having occurred on May 31. The list included repairs for damage to the tarred roofs ofoffice huts and to the glass roof and steel structure of the new assembly shop from the fallback ofGerman anti-aircraft "splinters" (most likely a term for shrapnel) However, most of the damage suffered by Ford-Werke in the early years of the war was to spare parts stored in warehouses outside the main plant and to materials in transit from suppliers, according to a draft inventory of damages prepared sometime after March 1945."' During a visit to Ford's Portuguese operations in June 1943, Robert Schmidt reported that despite the serious devastation m Cologne caused by Allied bombings, the Ford-Wefke-plant had not been direcdy hit or otherwise damage."*/ 11.2. Damage Between Autumn 1944 and March 194S According to a letter from Erhard Vitger to Heinrich Albert, the main plant was damaged by two bombs on August 19, 1944, with damage mostly limited to broken glass "* US. Army Air Forces records indicate that Ford-Werke was specifically targeted several weeks rt* Ford-Werke Records, Claim for Loss of or Damage to Property! Sustained by Ford-Werke During Wartime, no date (FW 0004744)_______________ r`WNRC, Act 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17S36 FordWfcrke to Reglerungsprisidenl Cologne. December 16. 1942, (DOJ 0010980-0010981, for English translation, see DOJ 0010982) >" FMC.AR 75-62-616,Box 72,File Ford-WerkeDecontrol 1945 1947, Draft Inventory ofWar Damages to Ford-Werke, no date (FMC 0005797). 5, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76 Memo on visit to Portugal fof the manager of die Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne. Germany. lune 9. 1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832) This document is a US Department of State - Foreign Service debriefing of Schmidt's Portuguese contacts, G. Nadal and Q Margues, who were co-managers of Ford Lusltana, Lisbon Schmidt said he wondered whether the plant was purposely left undamaged Ford-Werke Records, Vitger to Albert. August 19, 1944 (FW 0002370) Research Findings .About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime later; cm October 2 and 18. 1944According to the records of the U S Strategic Bombing Survey, damage from the October 18 raid centered on the proving grounds and labor camp area/" A postwar Ford-Werke departmental communication mentions the destruction of six "accommodation huts" in 1943 or 1944. A report prepared sometime after March 194S estimates the amount of damage done by the October raids to be approximately RM 1,175,000/" (See Section 7 6.6.for information on worker casualties.) In early March 1945, the plant became part of the front lines. Artillery shells destroyed die plants recreation hall and some shed buildings, while wooden office buildings and the garage caught fire/" Some equipment and records had been moved out of the plant '** Ford-Werke established a camp of 500 people at a former spinning mill site in another town and evacuated some workers, including foreign laborers, by truck at mghtAs the fighting intensified, American troops on the west bank of the Rhine exchanged fire with the recreating German troops on the east bank.TM The 82nd Airborne Division reported that the plant was "plastered with artillery fire" and that a German flak wagon fired 15 rounds of shells on the plant, setting it on fire/" However, when representatives of the U.S military government visited Ford-Werke on March 10 and II, 1945, they found that despite considerable superficial damage from the bombs and shells,draphnt was structurally sound - in "excellent condition/"*/ 11.3. Postwar Assessment of Damages '* Air Force Historical Office, Bolling Air Force Bue, Microfilm R8808.Air Force Huge* Documentation Forms. September 27, 1944-October 18,1944 (HAI 0000005-0000012) w NARA.RG 243,Entry 6.Box 687,File Ford CdogntReport on Air Raid History, no date (NARA 0003249) Author Karola Flogs writes that bombs largely missed the main plant, falling on the fenced labor camp and killing an unknown number of people. See Karola Fings, Mcetlagcr Sh tin Q-Aufakpr im Zeurum 4er Stab (K61n 1996),p. 1S4 >WNRC.Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box S36, Book S -Lae. Tiuchert and Koenig to Scheuffgcn, October 5. 19S1 (DOJ 000318), FMC.AR 75-62-616,Bos 72,File Ford-WerkeDecontrol 1945 1947, Draft Inventory ofWar Damages to Ford-Werke, no date (FMC 0005798)._________ 7J WWRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243,Box 536, File Reports - Financial, Campbell to Monaghan and Attachment 2a-2. June 10, 1965 (DOJ 0010832 and 0010850), FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79. Custodian Report (FMC 0000992-0000994); FMC. AR 75-62 617, Box 11, FOe-Cologne 1936-1947, Balance Sheet for June 30, 1946 (FMC 0008398). '< NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box 37, Reel 39.3. Cl 0-S.lkrgei Report 19/8 on vial to Ford-CologneNiehl March 10,l945,document date March 23,1945,(NARA 00056S1-0005653), NARA. RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File; 77al9 2 of 3, Amoldy to Hoglund, March 23. 1945 (NARA 0004498); RG 407, Entry 427. Box 15071, File; 603-2 13 Civilian Interrogation of Ford factory; March 11. 1945 (NARA / 000S309) ntvfeinman. Dos aallmabnaalittbcle Lqenyrtem, p 407, FMC AR98-213546, Box 2, Hie: History of Plant - AD Aspects, 1925 1946. VUger Report, September 24. 1946 (FMC 0002129 0002131), NARA. RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File 77al7, Intelligence Rqiort No. EW-KO 12, March 18 and 19, 1945 (NARA 0004549-0004550); FMC AR-75-62-616, Box 79. Custodian Report (FMC 0001036-0001038), ELDE, Z10 633, Oral history ofXN, September 12, 1996 (ODE 000023300002SS, for English translation, see ELDE 000055300005S4);ELDE, Z10 623,Oral history of A O .September 13, 1996 (EUDH 0000474-0000497, for English translation, see ELDE 0000602-0000604) The initial impression of the US military was that Ford-Werke had been abandoned and was "badly shattered."'" An American who had served as a technical adviser to Ford of France had a similar reaction when he arrived at Ford-Werke on a U S.Army mission' "My first visit left me with the impression that the plant was badly destroyed" But when he returned the following day and made an actual Investigation, he "found very little damage had been caused by actual bombing or shelling . The biggest damage was done by the rains and weather, because nearly all of the windows in both roof and sides were ' NARA, RG 243, Entry 6. Box 687, File 77a!9 2 or 3.Amoldy to Hoglund, Much 23, 1945 (NARA 0004497), Billstein and lOnei; "You are now is Cologne. Camphnuan.* p. J B6 See aho HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File. Germany, Interview with Erhard Vuger, July 15. I960 (HFM 0000887) '' NARA. RG 407, Entry 427, Box 123732, File 382-2 2. G-Z Daily Messages, April S and 10, 1945 (NARA 0005292Q05294) i, RG 260,Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box 37, 39 3, Cl O Target Report 19/8 on visit to Ford-CologneNlehl March 10. 1945 document date March 23, 1945 (NARA 0005651-0005656) Other reports agree, see. for example, NARAJtG 338. Entry 42389,Box 3,File: 15tb Daily Reports 9 Mar-12 May '45,Detachment EIH2 Daily Report No 3, March 12. 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881), and NARA. RG 243, Entry 6. Box 687. File. 77ai9 2 of 3, Amoldy to Hoglund, March 23, 194S (NARA 0004497) ''NARA, RG 407. Box 15063, File 603-2 1 Q2 Production Reports 2-4/194S.G-2 Periodic Report.March 6,1945 (NARA 0005322) War Damage to Ford-Wtike shattered.""0 When members of a combined U.S. and British intelligence team visited the plant, the/ discovered that the main building had suffered litde structural damage. The blast from bombs and shells caused extensive superficial damage, and hardly any glass remained intact. No gas, electricity or water was available, which made an invesdgadon difficult. One large building housing stores and offices had been gutted."' The postwar custodian, ErhardVitger, suggested in a report that most of the damage, which he attributed to artillery fire, was done to less crucial buildings -- sheds which housed the Receiving Department, the Experimental Department, the Laboratory and repair shops. Additionally, Vltger's report called for the replacement of the damaged "Garage." The recreation hall, wooden office buildings and 12,000 square meters (129,167 square feet) ofthe "wooden buildings (formerly used as foreigner camp)" were described as destroyed by artillery fire."1 According to a postwar inventory of the plant, the fighting around the plant during the push through Cologne "caused damage to buildings, factory equipment, fixtures, cables, and materials, etc., stored in the factory in the amount of about RM 3,000,000.",n This figure is supported by an inventory report prepared for Ford Motor Company by ,n HFM, Acc. S07, Box 17, FUe: Cologne. Visli id Cologne Plant around April 20ch by Frank Con (HFM 0001033) See also Wilkins and Hill, American Butinas Abroad, p. 341, 7,1 NARA, RG 240, Economics Division,industry Branch, Box 37, Reel 39.3.0.0.S.'Iiiget Report 19/8 on visit to Ford-CologneNlehl March IO,194S,document dale March 23,194$ (NARA 000S651-0Q056S6) 7,1 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0000992).______________ 777 FMC.AR 7S-62-6l6.Box 72,File Ford-Werke Decontrol 1945 1947, Draft Inventory ofWar Damages to Ford-Werke, no date (FMC 0005797-0005798), 777 FMC. AR-98-2I3S41. Box 131, Perry Report, September 19. 1944 (FMC 0000915) [C, AR-98-213541, Boot 131, Perry Report. September 19. (FMC 0000914-0000918) the report points out that the dispersal ofail the equipment was not finished due to the *Intensification of the war' 777 Roselkn, ftrd-Scbritte, pp> 17-18 the Office of Lord Perdval Perry, who had served on Ford-Werke's board of directors before the war Lord Perry's report, written in September 1946, stressed that "damage to the main factory by artillery and mortar fire towards the end of the war, proved to be extensive but superfidal.""* Since much of the plant equipment had been dispersed before the air raids in October 1944, little of the factory machinery was destroyed during the fighting The initial dispersal costs were covered by RM 8,000,000 Ford-Werke received from the German government (See Section 6 8 for more information on dispersal.) According to Lord Perry's 1946 report, this payment also was used to finance the rdnstallation of the machinerysafter the cessation of hostilities in the Cologne are/ "* yiitical production parts were stored on river barg^rnost of which sank during the Allied advance. After the war; US forces helped to raise the barges and salvage some of the materials "` 11.4. War Damage Claims During the early years of the war, the German government allowed firms to claim compensation for damage inflicted during Allied bombing raids. Like many other firms damaged during the war, Ford-Werle chose to submit claims to the local war damages offices."' Postwar reports differ slightly as to the exact total of the wartime claims made by Ford-Werke, but most sources place the figure at approximately RM 12 millionAccording to records from the city of 777 Ford-Werke Records. Ianfer to Ford-Werke, January 2, 1947 (FW 0005951-0005952),HP, Acc 41-000417, Box 1 .German Wkr Recovery Study, I950.pp 78-81 (HP 0000244-0000249). WNRC, Acc 299-48A-0243, Box S40. Affidavit of Guckel. January 7. 1947 (DOJ 0010651-0010655), FMC, AR-98213541,Box 52,Flle Audit Report - July 28,1949,HibbersonPlatt Report. July 28, 1949, and August 1949 (FMC 0000830 0000831) In November 1940, the German government enacted a law permitting companies to file claims for reimbursement of direct losses suffered In Germany as a result the war. 1946 financial records report a figure of 11,929,802 78, see Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, :ember 1944-December 1946, Monthly Statement, December 31, 1946 (FW 0007939) A 1947 audit reports a figure ofRM 12,154,982 41 .see FMC.AR-75-63-430.Box 90, FUe Ford-Werke Finance 1946-1947, Audit Repon by Knipprath for 1947 (FMC 0016915) 10 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Non Regime Cologne, Ford-Werke received a total of RM 361,181 war damages claims submitted in 1941 and In 1942, the German government prohibited war damage claims by companies with 25 percent or greater foreign ownership*00 In order to preserve its right to war damage compensation, Ford-Werke entered into an agreement with the German government in March 1943. Under the terms of the agreement, the German government allowed FordWerke to continue filing claims for compensation, despite American majority ownership of the Ann's stock. In return, Ford-Werke offered its property as collateral in the form of a mortgage in the amount of RM 6.8 million However, Ford-Werke's agreement with the government stipulated that government funds were to be used only if Ford-Werke was unable to afford the repairs on its own There is no indication that Ford-Werke made use of any German government funding to repair damages during the last years of the war. By August 1944, Ford-Werke had repaid the loan"1 After the wag Ford Motor Company filed claims with Woke Records. Lanier to Ford-Werke, January 2. 1967 000S9S1-0005952), WNRC. Acc. 299-68A-0Z43. Box 540Affidavit ofPaul Guckel, January 7, 1967 (DOJ 001065100106SS) The 1946 financial records indicate (hat only RM 333,437 (approximately 3133,000) was received, see Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, December 1944December 1946,Monthly Statement, December 31,1946 (FW 0007940) and FMC. AR-83-69-883, Box 1. File. Correspondence 19S5-1960,Campbell to Frank.November 17, 19SS (FMC 0014471) Guckel explained the discrepancy as consisting of "other 1941 and 1942 amounts receipt of which has not been traced." See Ford-Werke Records, Guckel to Hammond, January 3, 1967 (FW 00O5948-0O0S949) "WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243. Box 540Affidavit of Paul Guckel. January 7, 1967 (DOJ 0010651-0010655) "'WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0Z43. Box 536, File WI7536Alben to Reich Commissioner, January 20, 1943 (DOJ 0010985, for partial English translation, see DOJ 0010986), Ford-Werke Records, Memo from Schmidt on Business Report. July 27. 1944 (FW 0000148-0000149), BA-L, R 87/6209, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1941 (BAL 7497) This mortgage was actually a refinanced version of a previous loan far RM 8 million from Deutsche Industriebank and Deutsche Bank that had appeared on Ford-Werke's balance sheets In 1941.To meet the government's demand for surety, the balance of RM 6 8 million was transformed from a loan on credit into a mortgage, or "land encumbrance," for which land owned by Ford-Werke was used as ooQaceral. the U S government for war damages at several of its European subsidises in accordance with the War Claims Act of 194ft "y On July 17, 1959, the Foreign Claims Settlement^Commission awarded Ford S377.S08 war_loc.t jnd damage to Ford of Hungary*84 On the same day, the commission awarded Ford S370r414 for war losses and damage to Ford of Romania, although it is unclear how much ofthe award was actually paid.*8* (These were separate from the earlier postwar claims made to the U S and British military governments and the British occupation forces In Germany See Secuon 10 3) hi the 1960s, the U.S government implemented a war damages claim program that allowed Ford to submit war damage claims to the U.S government on behalfofFord-Werke TheUS claims were not allowed to cover damages already compensated by the German "WNRC, Acc 299-68A-0243, Be* S36. File WI7S36. Advisory Board Meeting Mmutesjuly 1,1943 (DOJ 0C11105-0011106, for English translation, see DOJ 0011231-0011232), FordWerke Records. Financial Ledger, January 1942- September 1944, Balance Report. february 28, 1943 (FW 0007556) Neither wartime nor postwar financial records report that the company received any war damage funds from the German government after 1942, see Ford-Werke Records, Financial ledger. January 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011 0007890). and FMC, AR-75-63-430. Box 90. File Audit Reports 1946-1947,Audit Repan by Knipprath for 1946 (FMC 0016957) The loan appears on the July 1944 balance sheet but does not appear in August 1944, see Ford-Werke Records, Balance Report, July 31, 1944 (FW 0007068) and Balance ---toon, August 31,1944 (FW 0007020-0007049) Jamendment to theWar Claims Act of 1948 - Public Law 87Sfi, signed on October 22, 1962 - allowed claims to be Accepted for losses incurred by American Interests in Germany or other countries during the war See FMC. AR 68-899.Box 8. File Germany War Damage Claim Book (1969), Krause to Campbell, February 5, 1963 (FMC 0010381-0010385) " FMC. AR-83-69-883,Box 1 .File Hungary. Final Decision m the Matter of the Claim of Ford Motor Company Against the Government of Hungary, July 7, 1959 (FMC 0014242 0014243), Wilkins ami Kill, Antalcan Business Ahead, pp. 348 349 After the wan the Russians seized a 43 percent share of Ford of Hungary In 1948, the Hungarian government nationalized the company Ml FMC, AR-83-69-883, Box 1. War Damage Claims - Roumanla and Hungary, Duncan to Shalvoy, September 2, 1960 (FMC 0014477), Campbell to Shalvoy, October 6, 1960 (FMC 0014476) An October 1960 Internal memo from a Ford attorney regarding the Romanian claim stated' "Check ui the amount of 82.40S 49 may exhaust the funds now available in the claims fond " Research to date has not confirmed the dates or total amounts received I OK War Damage lo Ford-Werke government."0* la 1965, Ford subnutted a claim to the commission for $7,050,052 in war losses and damage to Ford-Werke and Ford-Werke subsidiaries in Austria. The damage amount listed on the daun form totaled $12,461,427. Of this amount, Ford asked to be reimbursed $7,050.0S2^jrhich represented 56 575 percent of the total and was based on Ford's ownership ofp*"-""* of Ford-Werke. (See Appendix ?)*" The coipm&iQnreviewed the Ford claim and reduced it tp^5522.526 3ker deducting tax benefits resulting from the losses) on grounds that some of the claims or claim amounts listed by Ford were not JPCmpensable under the terms and conditions of the law"j On April 5, 1967, after a lengthy evidentiary and appeals process.the commission agreed to increase the amount, and awarded $785,321 to Ford for its share of allowable losses sustained by Ford-Werke and Ford of Austria during the war*" The money was to be paid by the U S. Department of the TVeasury from the War Claims Fund. At the time the award was made, the commission estimated there was enough money in the fund to permit distribution of 80 to 90 percent of the money to claimants, although it was not determined whether payment would be made in 1967 or later110 Research to date has not confirmed when or how much of the award was paid *WNRC, Act 299-68A-0243, Box 536. File W17J36, Foreign! n,im. Settlement Commission Final Decision No. W-185S9, April 5, 1967 (DOJ 0010667-0010674). "WNRC, Ace. 299-68A-0243, Box 540, File: Claim of Fold Motor Company, Campbell to Foreign Cairns Settlement Commission, January 14,1965 (DOJ 0010550-0010554). The damage claim was broken down into individual categories, including destruction ofor damage to buildings (S1,006,4) 6), loss and/or damage to machinery and/or materials (inside Fard-Werir, $417,056, in outside storage areas, $3,479,971. and in transit from suppliers. $224,399), and claims for materials supplied to German military and dvil authannes for whichpaymeuwasiKxreceived($5,339.964). Ofthe amount riaimari far "buildings destroyed,'' about 45 percent was for Ford of Austria. Of the amount listed under "other losses about 17.6 percent was for Ford ofAustria. , Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536. Foreign !m Settlement Commission Proposed Dedsion No W8559, November 23. 1966 (DO) 0010741-0010753) The commission initially disallowed or reduced certain claims on grounds that the expenses did not conform to the requirements or time periods specified in the law Examples of disallowed or reduced claims indude wages paid during aid raids, firdght costs for merchandise destroyed in transit, and property losses based on postwar replacement costs, rather than value at the tune of the loss. oWNRC Acc 299-68A-0243, Box S36, File W17536, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Final Decision No W-18SS9, April 5, 1967 (DOJ 0010667-0010674). Memo from Monaghan to McGuire. March 23,1967 (DOJ 001067B) 'FMC AR-98-213541. Box 43. File VAi Claim, Germany. Executive Communication to Henry Ford II and Miller, April 21. 1967 (FMC 0006140). 109 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Section 12 Financial Overview of Ford-Werke I 12.1.BriefFinancial History along with foreign exchange limitations experienced in From the time of its incorporation in 1925, FordWerke experienced periods of prosperity as well as instability as a result of management decisions and the prevailing economic and political environments The period from 1933 to 1938 marked the beginning of the era in Germany when demand for cars increased Consumers demanded'smaller vehicles, prompted by the dire circumstances created by the Great Depression In 1933, Ford-Werke completed a major upgrade of its machinery to facilitate the manufacturing of a new line of vehicles to meet this demand During this same period. Ford-Werke's earnings deficit grew to almost RM 9,000,000, which forced Ford-Werke to reorganize and change its capital structure m 1934"1 By 1935, Germany at the time, made production difficult"* However, raw materials agreements beginning in 1936 allowed Ford-Werke to continue production by obtaining materials through Ford Motor Company."1 By the late 1930s, economic growth resulted in a rising demand for vehicles, and Ford-Werke expanded its capacity and increased its investment in machines and equipment, making the company the fourth leading vehicle manufacturer m terms of passenger car sales in Germany"* Total assets grew 69 percent in this period, from RM 25,805,407 in 1933 to RM 43,543,533 in 1938 (from $7,875,268 to $17,488,781) Net income was RM 1,698,690 ($518,405) in 1933, and RM 913,359 ($366,840) in 1938 " Ford-Werke had begun an aggressive exporting By 1940, government regulations prohibited new program around the world. Raw material shortages. "1 Ovary W4r ad Economy ia the Third Reich. p 6. 111 HFM.Acc S72, Box 16. File. Germany 1930s, Business Report fa 1933 (HFM 0006407) V'1 Coopers & Lybrand Records, Lybrand, Ross Bros b Montgomery to Henry Ford II.March 19,1948 (CLI 0000316 0000318), HFM.Acc 713. Box 11, File Corporate ScructureEuropean Operations, Preliminary Report, February 20, 1948 (HFM 0002645-0002647), FMC. AR-98-213546, Box 2, File History of Plant . AD Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24,1946 (FMC 0001966) >* HFM.Acc 572, Boat 16, Hie Germany 1930s, Business Report fa 1935 (HFM 0006295), Business Report fa 1936 (HFM 0006309) is MARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 54, Memo by Schmidt on rubber and raw material agreement, August 3, 1945 (NARA 0000157), Exhibit 65, Memo by Schmidt on rubber deal dosed In June 1936, August 3, 1945, (NARA 0000194) "* FMC, AR-75-63-430. Box 90. Hie Ford-Werke Finance 1938 1948, Business Report for 1938 (FMC 0017016-0017017). NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B. Box 1032, File Ford-Wert AG. GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001566) 117 HFM.Acc. 572, Box 16, File- Germany 1930s, Business Report for 1933 -Balance Sheet, December 31. 1933 (HFM 0006411 and HFM 0006415). FMC AR-75-63-430. Box 90. FUe FbrdWerlte Finance 1938-1948,Buslness Report for 1938 - Balance Sheet,Deceraber 31,1938 (FMC 0017024 and FMC 0017027) i Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime passenger car production, and Ford-Werke converted to truck production to supply vehicles to the German government. Sales rose every year from 1940 through 1943, but fell in 1944 and 194S in the turmoil that accompanied the end of the war In addition to taxes imposed by the Nazi regime, and a wide array of government controls on production and prices both before and during the wax balance sheets and results of operations also were affected by war damages and other costs associated with the conflict. Ford-Werke's total assets grew from RM 60,470,956 in 1939 to RM 68,859,397 in 1945. Net Income was RM 1,287,876 in 1939, and net loss was RM 3,433,091 in 1945.*" (See Section 12.2 formore detail on impact on assets, and see Section 12.3. for more information on the effect on income) Immediately after the war, each of the occupied zones was allotted production quotas by the military occupation governments Ford-Werke was granted the largest quota of steel in German industry in 1946 and the largest production quota in the German automotive industry at that time. Ford-Werke was given preference in quota assignments due to its speedy reorganization. Despite the favorable allocations, sales and production in 1946 were constrained by shortages of supplies.*1' In the early 1950s, postwar consumer demand was exceeding capacity, and significant investments were made to Increase the productive capability of the facility and reduce per-vehide costs. Within two years, Ford- Werke was experiencing increases m production and lower per-vehide costs Ford-Werke's total assets were RM 70,092,054 in 1946, and DM 102,575,719 m 1953 (In 1948, the currency was converted from Reichsmarks to Deutsche Marks. See Section 12.2.) Net income was RM 650,935 in 1946, and DM 689.907 in I9S3 m 11.1. Balance Sheet Information Ford-Werke's assets and liabilities as reported m the financial statements for the periods ending 1939, 1945, June 20 and 21, 1948, (before and after the currency conversion from Reichsmarks to Deutsche Marks) and 1953 are presented in Appendix F, FordWerke Balance Sheets. Assets generally increase when capital is invested in a company, either through loans or invested earnings, in order to meet production demands. In Ford-Werke's case, assets increased in 1939 as a result of loans from banks In 1941, FordWerke received RM 12 million from a stock offering that was used to finance working capital needs and additional increases in property, plant and equipment. These assets were depreciated at accelerated rates during the war. reducing income accordingly.*11 The currency devaluation that took place after the war is of significance and is an issue to be considered in reviewing Ford-Werke balance sheets Shortly before and during the war, German financial authorities printed a large number of bank notes to ease payments for supplies. As a result, paper money in circulation PMC, AR-75-63-430. Box 90, Pile. Ford-Werke Finance 193819-48.Business Report for 1939 Balance Sheet,December 31, 1939 (PMC 00l7070).Profit and Loss Account for 1939 (FMC 0017073). PMC, AR-6S-1500. Box 6. Pile Ford-Werke No 3. Business Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 -Balance Sheet, December 31, 1945 (PMC 0003800), FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000917 0000918).______________ 'FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (PMC 0000921-0000924). Production had peaked ui 1938 at 33.730 vehicles, according to FMC AR-98-213541, Box 131, Palumbo, Survey of German Motor vehicle Industry. April 15,1948 (FMC 0000906) ** FMC, AR-6S-1500, Boot 6, Pile Ford-Werke No 3. Business Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 - Balance Sheet, December 31. 1945 (PMC 0003808). PMC, AR-75-62-616. Box 55. File. Ford-Werke Business Report for Annual Report - l953,Balance Sheet for 1953 (PMC 0016021), Profit and Loss Account for 1953 (PMC 0016022). FMC AR-75-63-430, Box 90. File. Ford-Werke Finance 1949-1953, Business Report for 1951 (FMC 0016886-0016887) I' FMC, AR-75-63-430. Box 90. File FordUfcrke Finance 1938 1948. Business Report for 1938 (FMC 0017023). Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017069).FMC. AR-98-213S46,Box 2, File: History of Plant - All Aspects. 1925-1946, Vicger Report, September 24,1946 (FMC 0001974) 111 FMC. AR-98-213 546.Bax 2. File History of Plant - All Aspects. 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0001966). FMC. AR-7S-62-617. Box 11. File Cologne 1936 1947/Copenhagen 1919-192S.Depredauon 1940-1941 (FMC 0008436), FMC AR-75-63-430, Box 90. File Ford-Werle Finance 1938-1948,Buslness Report for 1939 (FMC 0017068 0017074), Business Report for 1940 (FMC 0017008 0017014). Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Statement for 1941 (FMC 0017039). Balance Sheets for 1942 (FMC 0017041). 1943 (FMC 0017030) and 1945 (FMC 0017036 0017037). FMC.AR-6S-I500. Box 6. File. Ford-Werke No 3, Business Report for 1944. 1945. 1946 (FMC 0003790 0003801). BA-L.R 87/6209, File Ford-Werke Cologne\bl 5, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1941 (RAL 7481). BA-L, R 813S/7393,File Report of the Economic Auditor Department. Audit Report by Knipprath for 1942 (BAL 3281). ID Financial Overview of Ford-VVerke increased 18 times the normally required amount. Additionally, nearly all financial institutions (i.e.. banks and insurance companies) were required to invest their money in government bonds and/or securities. With the collapse of the Nazi regime, these bonds and securities were rendered essentially worthless, as opposed to securities whose value was backed by assets such as land, buildings or machinery111 In response to these difficulties. Allied military authorities instituted a currency reform and related devaluation in June 1948. Under the Law ofMonetary Reform, the German currency was converted from Reichsmarks (RM) to Deutsche Marks (DM) German companies had to devalue their monetary assets and liabilities, but were allowed to revalue their Inventories, property, plants and equipment As a result. FordWerke's cash balances, accounts receivable from customers and amounts payable to suppliers, all of which had Increased significantly during the war; were devalued by 90 percent or more, based on the amounts at the time (June 1948).m Most buildings, machinery, equipment and inventory balances were revalued at highs- amounts estimated to be their fair value at the time, as allowed by the Law of Monetary Reform The net result of adjusting these accounts was a reduction in reserves and other stockholder equity accounts.111 In 1950, capital investments were made for the purpose of expansion, modernization and reconstruction There was an increase of DM 477,509 in the buildings account for expansions to the factory building, the administration building, and the assembly and storage halls. Also in 1950, repairs and reconstruction from war damage were completed Additions to machinery and equipment were also attributable to factory modernization and equipment upgrades11* In 1951, demand for Ford-Werke's products exceeded plant capacity lo accommodate the need for greater producnon capability, an assembly facility, a machine hall, a store and distributing depot were constructed ,u In 1953, additions and transfers totaling approximately DM 12 million were made in property, plant and equipment to modernize the FordWerke plant and to improve the buildings, machinery and equipment to meet consumer demands. Due to the expansion of the facility, the production of passenger cars increased by 11 percent in 1953, and the total production increased from 40,334 vehicles in 1952 to 44,009 vehicles m 1953 111 12.3.Results of Operadons/Net Income Presentation of the results of operanons (i e., profit and loss, or income statement) in the published financial statements that were found regarding FordWerke varies significantly from current U.S. or German standards. Many accounts were combined to report only a "net" amount in the financial statements Sales (referred to as "turnover") were not always included in the audited income statements of Ford-Werke "Trading income" was a more prominent performance measurement and was defined as sales less the cost of operations The cost of operations included materials, manufacturing overhead and miscellaneous other charges that were associated with producnon, excluding salaries and wages.1" Net income (sales minus all expenses) was affected by a wide array of taxes levied on corporations by the FMC, AR-65-71, Box Z5, Hie- International I94?#l, Vitger to Roberge; June 19. 1947 (FMC 0000069-0000071). " FMC, AR-65-71. Box 25. File- International 1947 #1. Vitger to Roberge; June 19, 1947 (FMC 0000069-0000071). FMC AR98-213541, Box 52. Hie; Audit Rejnrt - July 28. 1949. Hibberson-Han Report, July 28, 1949, and August 1949 (FMC 0000796-0000798) it FMC AR-7S-63-430, Box 90, File. Germany Audit Reports 1948-1949.Audit Report by Knipprath for 1948 as ofJune 20. 1948 (FMC 0006720-0006721).Audit Report by Knipprath on Deutsche Mark Opening Balance Sheet, June 21, 1948 (FMC 0001228-0001229) "FMC AR-75-63-430. Bex 90, File: Germany Audit Reports 1950, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1950 (FMC 0001284), Hie. Ford-Werke Finance 1938-1948.Btislness Report for 1950 (FMC 0017048)JMC,AR-98-213S46,Small Accessions Box 2, File Report ]9S0s (A-K), Vitger to Andrews. April 30, 19S7 (FMC 0002375)__________ 117 FMC AR-98-213546, Small Accessions Box 2, File Report 1950s (A-K), Vitger to Andrews, April 30, 1957 (FMC 0002375), FMC, AR-75-63-430. Box 90. File Ford-Werke Finance 1949-1953,Business Report for 1951 (FMC 0016886 0016887) " FMC.AR-75-62-616.Bax 55.File Ford-Werke Business Report far Annual Report - 1953, Business Report for 1953 (FMC 0016001, for English translation, see FMC 0016015) FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File Ford-Werke Finance 1946 1947, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1947 (FMC 0016927) II5 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime German Reich between 1939 and 1945 In order to reduce some of the tax burden, Ford-Werke set aside allowable reserves, reducing income subject to taxes. Government-imposed price and sales controls began in 1936 and were adjusted at various times thereafter The combination of taxes and controls affected sales, trading Income and production levels in the late 1930s and throughout the war*" Between 1933 and 1935, trading income rose from 21 percent of sales to 29 percent of sales as a result of increased sales and production."1 After price controls were enacted m 1936, trading income fell to 15 percent of sales in 1937 and 1938, and reached 16 percent of sales in 1939. Net income was approximately 1 percent ofsales during all four years. In 1938, Ford-Werke ranked second in die production of trucks in Germany, and third in passenger car production and exports. While sales were at their highest levels, trading income and net income as a percentage of sales were flat - again, reflecting the effect of price controls Subsequent changes in taxes and controls, combined with adjustments in production and other changes at Ford-Werke, resulted in generally increased trading income as a percentage of sales after 1939. Net income reported by Ford-Werke grew every year from 1938, uo FMC.AR-98-213546, Box I,Flle:Hlstory of Bant - AD Aspects. 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002030-0002031 and 0002038) when it was RM 913,359, until 1943, when it reached RM 2,169,386 *" The work force was increasing during much of this time period, while salaries and wages as a percentage of sales remained relatively flat In a monthly balance sheet report to Heinrich Albert m March 1943, Erhard Vitger noted that the ratio of operating overhead to manufacturing wages could no longer be compared with earlier figures because the large proportion of foreigners m the wort force had changed the average hourly rate from approximately RM 1.50 earlier to approximately RM 1.30(See Section 7 5. for information on wages paid to foreign and forced workers at Ford-Werke ) In 1945, trading income rose to 51 percent of sales However, a 2 percent of sales (approximate) net loss was recorded for ] 944, and a 10 percent of sales (approximate) net loss for 1945 The net loss amounts were RM 2,731,689 in 1944, and RM 3,433,091 in 1945 ul These losses were the result of extraordinary charges that included losses from war damages, and amounts that were deemed not collectible from the German government and from other Ford subsidiaries Income fluctuation during the years 1933 through 1953 is shown on the following chart, Net Income and leading Income as a Percentage of Sales, Ford-Werke, 1933-1953*" (See Appendix G, Ford-Werke Results of Operations, 1933-1953, for detailed income statements for the period) 1,1 HFM.Acc S72. Box 16, Tile. Germany 1930s, Business Report for 1933 (HPM 000641S), Business Repon for 1935 (HFM 0006304). FMC. AR-98-213541, Box 131. Palumbo, Survey of German Motor Vehicle Industry, April IS, 1948 (FMC 0000900)_______________ *n HFM.Acc 572. Box 16, Pile Germany 1930s, Business Report for 1937 (HFM 0006330), FMC. AR-7S-63-430, Box 90. Hie. Ford-Werke Finance 1938-1948. Business Report for 1938 (FMC 0017028), Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017074). FMC AR-98-213541, Box 131, Palumbo. Survey of German MotorVehicle Industry April IS. 1948 (PMC 0000900), FMC. AR-98-213541, Box 40, Pile Ford of Europe Chronology, information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986 (FMC 0005940) M1 These numbers represent net Income' after the subtraction of reserves. Net Income including the reserves was RM 1.213.359 in 1938 and RM 3,169,386 in 1943. See FMC AR-75-63-430. Box 90. File. Ford-Wake Finance 1938-1948, Business Report for 1938 (FMC 0017027-0017028), Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017073-0017074). Business Report for 1940 (FMC 0017011-0017012), Balance Sheet as at December 31, 1941 (FMC 0017039).Balance Sheet as at December 31,1942 (FMC 0017041) and Balance 5heet and Profit and loss Statement for 1943 (FMC 0017030). B1* Ford-Werke Records, Vitger to Albert, March 22. 1943 (FW 0002492) U FMC AR 65-1500. Box 6. File: Ford-Werke No 3, Business Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 - Balance Sheet for 1944 (FMC 000379S-0003796), FMC. AR-75-63-430. Box 90. File FordVfcrke Finance 1938-1948. Balance Sheet for 1945 (FMC 0017033),FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131. Palumbo, Survey of German Motor Vehicle Industry, April 15, 1948 (FMC 0000883-0000909) HFM.Acc 572. Box 16, File. Germany 1930s, Business Report for 1933 (HFM 0006414-0006415),Business Report for 1934 (HFM 0006428-0006429), Business Report for 1935 (HFM 0006303-0006304). Business Report for 1936 (HFM 0006316-0006317), Business Report for 1937 (HFM 0006329-0006330), FMC AR-75-63-430. Box 90, File FordWfcrke Finance 1938-1948, Business Repon for 1938 (FMC 0017028), Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017073 0017074), Business Repon fen 1940 (FMC 0017011 0017012), Balance Sheet for 1941 (FMC 0017039). Balance Sheet for 1942 (FMC 0017041), Balance Sheet for 1943 (FMC 0017029-0017030). Balance Sheet for 1945 (FMC 0017036DO 17037), Business Repon for 1948 at June 20 1948 - Profit and Loss Account for 1948/1 (FMC 0006723-0006724),BA-L, Financial Overview of Ford-Werkc lfejirwTSSteiaaift1 isisa Percentage of Sales "1953 1 sMcw ^itasisa WSH - * "'n * \ V ' .. J - - *' *\ s ^ ' -- 40* - \ 0K 1M 108 1B7 IBM 1081 1048 *s\ 1M7 IBM 1BB1 180S ---- Mlmaa%arM - - - BadhotoManaKgfMN ( JhSjiFss1 l`"J'i^ r y* >. i 'i '' 12.4. Capital Structure and Dividend Analysis Ford Motor Company's ownership in Ford-Werke evolved from nearly 100 percent of the stock at the outset to varying proportions of direct and/or Indirect ownership over the years, based on various international structures that were m place.*" After the United States entered the war in December 1941, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1942, permitting companies with property or investments in enemy countries to write off their investments as of the date the United States declared war on that country (The R 87/6209, File Ford-Werke CologneVol S, Balance Sheet for 1941 (BAL 75IS). BA-L. R 8135/7393, FUe Report of (he Economic Auditor Department. Balance Sheet for 1942 (BAL 3309), FMC AR-6S-1500. Box 6. Me Ford-Werke No 3. Business Report for 1944.1945,1946 - Balance Sheets for 1944 and 1946 (FMC 0003795-0003796 and FMC 0003812 0003813), Business Report for 1947 - Balance Sheet for 1947 (FMC 0003574-0003575). Business Report for 1948/49 Balance Sheet for 1948/49 (FMC 0003601-0003602). FMC AR-75-63-430. Box 90. File Ford-Werke Finance 1938-1948. Business Report for 1950 (FMC 001705S), File Ford-Werte Finance 1949-1953,Business Repon for 1951 (FMC00168940016895), Translation of Business Report for 1952 (FMC 0016881). FMC AR-75-62-616, Box 55. File Ford-Werke Business Repon for Annual Report - 1953. Profit and Loss Account for 19S3 (FMC 0016022) law provided for the recovery of the fair market value of the property after it was recovered.)'" In 1943, in accordance with the an. Ford recorded its investment in Ford-Werke as a total loss by establishing a reserve account equal to its investment balance (approximately $8 million) retroactive to fiscal year 1941 earnings *" In 1954, Ford restored its investment in Ford-Werke to the company books in the amount of approximately *37 FMC AR-75-62-616, Box 57, File. Investments 1951-52, Melierru u> Edwards, January 25. 1952 (FMC 0003293 0003306). FMC. AR-75-62-616. Box 23. File. European Countries Investment Ledger. Ford-Werke AG. no date (FMC 0000346-0000350), Coopen 8c Lybrand Records, Lybrand, Ross Bros b Montgomery to Henry Ford II, March 19. 1948 (CL1 0000311-0000321). HFM, Acc 713, Box II. File. Corporate Structure - European Operations,Preliminary Repon, February 20. 1948 (HFM 0002639-0002647). FMC AR-75 63-430. Box 91. File Ford-Werke Finance Shares 1941-1949. Repon and Supplement on Development and Composition of Ford-Werke Share Capital. Report circa December 1945, Supplement January 30, 1950 (FMC 0001502-0001524) sis public Laws.Ch 619.October 12.1942.Sec 156,FMC. AR-98 213541, Box 131. File' Ford Germany Finance and Quotas, Mono from Gomick to Bogdan, August 25. 1948 (FMC 0011573-0011574) 119 FMC, AR-65-92, Box I, FUe Annual Reports, Ford Motor Company Annual Repon for 1946 (FMC 0013463 and FMC 0013479-0013480) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime $557,000, estimated to be the fair value.*44 This was through 1943 also were block^dj4'1 No further done after a determination that for tax purposes, the dividends were declared until 1950 *4* date ofrecovery of the property was August 8. 1948.**' In 1951, the blocked dividends from the years 1938 Ford-Werke's first dividends to shareholders were through 1943 were devalued by 90 percent m the declared for 1929, and were payable in March 1930.*41 currency conversion from Reichsmarks to Deutsche At the time, Luxembourg was the only Ford entity with Marks *4* In the same year, Ford used those previously a direct interest in Ford-Werke.*41 Although the Mocked dividends (amounting to about $60,000 in dividends were declared, payments were delayed or 1951 dollars, after the conversion) to underwrite pan incomplete because Ford-Werke had to request special of the cost of acquiring all ofthe Ford-Werke stock held permission from the German government to make the by the German corporation IG Farbemndustne AG payments.*44 (1G Farben) ,M IG- Farben owned about 5 3 percent of The next dividends were not declared until 1938 **' At that time, Ford controlled, through a combination of direct and infect ownership, 81 percent of the FordWerke ttoc^yhit 1938 dividends were held by Ford- Wferke in a blocked account and were not paid because Ford-Werke's stock in 1951, having acquired a 15 percent share in 1929, when Ford-Werke was recapitalized and Carl Bosch, IG Farben's genera] manager and chairman of the board, was elected to Ford-Werke's board ofdirectors.Ml After the war, when the German government prohibited their distribution 5outside Germany Dividends declared from 1939 [C. AR-75-63-430, Box 91. File. Ford-Werke . Dividends, vidend Particulars, August IS. 1939 (FMC 0002981 0002982), FMC, AR-75-63-430. Box 91. File Fozd-Werle ** FMC.AR-61-416.Bax 4,FI]e-XVn Germany V\4r Loss Recovery Finance Shares 1941-1949, Report and Supplement on Studies, Lorrw to Goulden. December 11, 1954 (FMC Development and Composition of Ford-Werke Share Capital, 0014708-0016711) Report drea December 194S. Supplement January 30, 1950 141 On August 8, 1948, Vitger took over the active management of 1C 0001502-0001524). FordWeike under "Power of Attorney'' approved on or about M' HvlC AR-75-63-430, Box 91. File. Ford-Werke - Dividends May 26.1948, by the British control authorities. From May 26, 939-1954, Memo on restncuon of dividends, circa 1948 1948, to August 8, 1948, Vitger was in the United States -"^(FMC 0002973-0002974),Vitger to Roberge. August 15,1947 receiving instructions from Ford Motor Company on how to (FMC 0002977-0002979) conduct the affairs ofFord-Werke. See FMC AR-61-416,Box 4, File: XVn Germany War Loss Recovery Studies, Loraw to GouldenJDccembcr 22,1954 (FMC 0016708-0016711) "FMC. AR-65-92, Box 1, File Annual Reports, Ford Motor Company Annual Report for 1950 (FMC 0013868), FMC AR75-63-430. Box 91. File Ford-Werke - Dividends 1939-1954. 141 HFM.Acc. 6, Box 262, File. 1930 BerIin,Shareholden Meeting Memo from OUC. December 6, i9S 1 (FMC 0002942) Minutes. March 27, 1930 (HFM 0006SS2-00065SS) See also FMC, AR-7S-63-430, Box 91. Tile- Ford-Werke - Dividends. Vitger to Roberge, August 15,1947 (FMC 0002977) "FMC AR-75-63-430 Box 90. File Audit Reports 1948-49, Audit Report by Knlppralh for 1948 as of June 20,1948 (FMC 0001230), FMC AR-75-63-430. Box 91. File. Ford-Werlc * FMC AR-7S-63-430, Box 91, File Ford-Werke - Dividend!, Dividends - 1939-1954, Memo from CAR. December 6, 1951 Dividend Particulars, August IS, 1939 (FMC 0002981). See (FMC 0002942) also HFM, Ace 713, Bax II, File Corporate Structure European Operations, Preliminary Report, February 20, 1948 (HFM 0002641-000264S) Sodftf d'lnvesdssements, Ford Luxembourg, was a holding company formed in 1930 to hold Ford ofBritain's shares ofFord-Werke. M FMC AR-75-63-430. Bax 91. File Ford-Werke - IG Farben 1948. Winter to Prance, October 17, I9SI (FMC 0001405), File Ford-Werke - Dividends 1939-1954, Memo from CRK, December 6, 1951 (FMC 0002942) The exchange rates are from Banking and Monetary Simmies, 1914-1941 (Washington- 444 Board Minutes far Soaili dlnvesnssements, Ford Luxembourg, Federal Reserve Banks and the Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal show that RM 810,000 In dividends for 1930 was due from Reserve System), p 1038 (CLI 0001070-0001072) Ford-Werke to the Luxembourg compare with RM 430,931 of that amount having been paid by late 1931 See HFM.Acc. 313, Box I, File Rod Luxembourg, Meeting Minutes for September 17, 1931 (HFM 0003143). December 21, 1931 (HFM 000314S) and March 2,1932 (HFM 0003148) in In an interview with historians Allan Kevins and Frank Ernest Hill In 1952, Lord Perdval Perry described the decision to sell a large block of shares to IG Farben in 1929 Perry was head of Fold of Britain.which in 1929 had recently assumed a larger role In ownership and oversight of Ford-Werke "When you "FMC, AR-7S-63-430, Box 91. File. Ford-Werke - Dividends cotne to Germany, you do it very differently The best way to get 1939-1954, Dividend Particulars, August IS, 1939 (FMC in to the German public, as a public; is to issue not all the shares 0002981), Vitger to Roberge, August 15, 1947 (FMC but a big block of them [to] LG. Farben . the biggest 0002977). Industrial undertaking in Germany We did issue a big block I I (i Financial Overview of Ford-Werke IG Farben was placed In liquidation proceedings. Ford decided to purchase IG. Farben's shares ofFord-Werke to avoid having the shares sold to the public or remain with IG Farben in the event of reorganization instead of liquidationThe shares were purchased by Ford from IG. Farben's liquidators'" of shares to IG. Farben. That mi the shortest way I knew of getting into the German public. The German public were very heavy shareholders in LG Farben " See HFM,Acc 65,box 52jlle 6S,Intenriew with lord Perdval Peny, March 28.19S2 (HFM 0004805-0004806) LG Farben's ownership share of Ford-Werit, while never greater than 15 percent, fluctuated somewhat during the period from 1929 to 1951 SecFMCAR75-63-430, Box 91, File. Ford-Werke Finance Shares 19*1- 1949, Report and Supplement on Development and Composition of Ford-Werke Share Capital, Report circa December 1945. Supplement January 30, 1950 (FMC 0001502-0001524), File Germany Cologne - Ford-Werke Finance Shares - Dividends 1939-1954, McKee to Wieland, January 4. 1951 (FMC 0002960A). FMC. AR-68-624. Box 18, File Cologne Permanent Shares and Equity (I), Ford Motor Company Ownership ofFord-Werke Stock.Norember 17,1959 (FMC 0012641) Carl Bosch was elected to die Ford-Werke Board of Directors on May 17, 1929. and remained a board member until his death In April 1940.when he was replaced by Carl Krauch. the new LG Farben chairman, see Appendix & *si FMC, AR-75-63-430-88, File Blocked Accounts, Bogdan to Wieland, August 21, 1950 (FMC 0017856) FMC, AR-75-63-430. Box 91. File Ford-Werke Finance Shares 1951-1953, Winter to Prance. October 17. 1951 (FMC 0002750) Research Findings About Ford-VVerke Under the Nazi Regime Section 13 Disposition of Research Findings The findings in this report are the result of an exhaustive search for pertinent records in the possession of Ford Motor Company and of numerous public archives in the United States, Germany and Great Britain. Descriptions of the 98,000 pages of source material have been entered into a searchable database that reflects the material's date and source, subject matter, content and other relevant data. The database and document collection are being donated, except where prohibited by privacy laws or regulations of the original repositories, to Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield Village, an independent, nonprofit educational institution unaffiliated with Ford Motor Company. At the museum, the donated collection and database will be made available to the public through the Benson Ford Rp^parrh renter an archival repository In addition to the materials located through the document search, the research team relied extensively on published sources A bibliography of the most relevant published sources is attached in Appendix I. Ford Motor Company's goal in instituting this research project was to conduct a deep search for additional facts to supplement the historical record Every effort was made to perform a thorough and comprehensive search As additional information comes to hght, lord Motor Company will update the document collection and the database at the Benson Ford Research Center The material collected as a result of this research project will provide a significant resource for understanding the history of this period and of Ford-Werte under the Nazi regime. Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nan Regime Appendix A Investment Of U. S. Companies in Germany, 1943 Primary German Subsidiary 1 Deutsch-AmerfKanische Petroleum-Gesellschaft 2 Adam OpelAktienaesellschaft 3 FW. Woolworth Co GmbH 4 Singer Nahmaschlnen Aktlengeseilschaft 5 Telephonefabrik Berliner AG 6 Singer Nahmaschlnen AG 7 Kohlen Import & Fbseldon AG 8 Aktien-Malsfabrik Landsburg AG 9 Nationals Radiator GmbH 10 international Harvester Company GmbH 11 Deutsche Vacuum Oel AG 12 KodakAktlengeseUschaft 13 Aktlengeseilschaft fuer Anlagewerte 14 Roth-Buchnar GmbH 15 Deutsche HoHerith Maschlnen GmbH 16 Ford-WerkeAG 17 Ebano Asphalt'Werfce Aktlengeseilschaft 18 Deutsche Veretnlgte Schuhmaschlnen Gesedschaft 19 Mercedes Buromaschlnen Werke AG 20 Osram GmbH 21 National Krupp Reglster-Kassen GmbH 22 Damm & Ladwig Kommandit Gesedschaft and Duly Aktlengeseilschaft 23 BcrvtskKunstseidenAG 24 Mergenthaler Setzmaschtnen-Fabrik GmbH 25 Allgemelne Erdo! GmbH 26 Allgemelne Oel-Handels GmbH 27 Rowers GmbH 28 RKer AG 29 Internationale Presskrft und Elektridtats GmbH American Parent Company Standard Oil Co (New Jersey) General Motors Corp F.W Woolworth Co International Securities Co International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. Singer Mfg Co Hugo Sttnnea Industries. Inc. Com Products Refining Co. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Co. International Harvester Co Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. he Eastman Kodak Co New Jersey Industries, Inc. Gillette Safety Razor Co International Business Machines Corp Ford Motor Co Pan Foreign Coro United Shoe Machinery Corp Underwood Elliott Fisher Co International General Bectrlc Co., Inc. National Gash Register Co. Yale & Towns Manufacturing Co. Continental "Bonrtsk" Co. Mergenthaler linotype Co. JadevCorp Atlantic Refining Co. Remington Rand, Inc. Ritter Co., Inc. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. Ytar Established 1890 1905 1927 1895 1900 1895 1920 1871 1901 1908 1900 1927 1898 1925 1934 1925 1928 1900 not Mated 1919 1896 1928 not stated 1896 1921 1920 1914 1927 1905 Amount of Investment $ 64,990,446 $ 54,852.486 $ 25,727,087 S 20.531.679 $ 19,369,932 $18,661,180 $ 16,062,153 $ 14.434.541 $ 14,393.923 $ 14.183.273 S 12.623.510 S 12.200.789 $ 11,497.238 $ 9,641,011 $ 9.000.128 $ 8.549.061 $ 8,377,970 $ 8,375,714 $ 7.058.547 $ 6,655,334 $ 6,623,235 $ 5,297.653 Percent of Total u.a Investment 1443% 1218% 5.71% 456% 430% 4.14% 3.57% 3.21% 3.20% 3.15% 2 80% 271% 2.55% 214% 2.00% 190% 1.87% 1.86% 1.57% 1.48% 1.47% 1.18% $ 5,160,025 $ 3.687.116 $ 2.641.659 $ 2.602.778 $ 593,143 $ 2.459.946 $ 2,432,625 1.15% 0.82% 059% 059% 058% 0.55% 0 54% Appendix A Investment Of U.S. Companies in Germany, 1943 Primary German Subsidiary 30 Steinway & Sons 31 Deutsche Norton GmbH 32 Coca-Cola GmbH 33 Glucksktee Michgeselfschaft GmbH 34 Ambl-Budd Presswerk. GmbH 35 OhsAufzugswerfce GmbH 36 Gustav lohse AG 37 Deutsche Hersktlth AG 38 Deutsche Ubbv GmbH 39 Holzwarth Gasturblrten GmbH 40 Union Soectal Maschlnenfabrik GmbH 41 ZmnwerteWUhelmsburg GmbH 42 Maschinenfabrtken Wagner Aktlengesellschaft 43 American Express GmbH 44 Kraft Kaese Werke GmbH 45 Oetwerke Julius Schindler GmbH 46 Westlnghaus Bremsen GmbH 47 Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society 48 Quaker Nahrmittel GmbH 49 Pfaudler-WerkeAG 50 Intertype Sszmaschlnen GmbH 51 Standard Bektrtzttats Ges AG 52 Ota Schleslsche Schurwerke Ottmuth AG 53 Unkta SChlffstreuhand GmbH 54 Addressograoh-Multlgraoh GmbH 55 Verkehrs & HandelsAktianaesellschaft 56 Almco Waschereimaschlnen GmbH 57 Deutsche Wcrthtngton Geseltschaft mbH 58 Ahr, Krsth and Co 59 Warner. W.R. and Co. GmbH American Parent Company Steinway & Sons Norton Co Coca-Cola Co International France Co Edward 6. Budd Manufacturing Co Otis Elevator Co International Affiliated Com. Amertcan-Austrbn Magnesite Coro. Ubbv. McNeill & Ubby Schilling Estate Co Union Special Machine Corn of America National lead Co New England Industries. Inc American Express Co. Inc. Kraft Cheese Co. Pure Oil Co WestinghouseAlr Brake Co Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society Quaker Oats Co. Pfaudler Co. tntsitweGorp. htemstionat Standard Electric Corn. WesthotdCoro United Fruit Co Addressograoh-Multkranh Coro. United Continental Com. American Laundry Machinery Co Worthington Pump & Machinery Com. Delta France Co. Wm.R. Warner & Co. tnc. Yo&r Established 1889 1909 1930 1925 1926 1931 1922 1928 1926 1927 1901 net Stated 1890 1907 1927 1920 1919 1903 1922 1907 1926 1930 1930 1936 1928 1898 1903 1893 not Stated 1904 Amount of Investment Percent of Total U5. investment $ 2.159.152 0 48% 3 2.081.690 0 46% 3 2.071.661 0.45% S 1.847.527 0.41% 3 1.673.962 0.37% S 1.619.955 0 36% $ .403.188 031% $ .400.147 $ 1.365.489 0.31% 0.30% $ 1.115,563 $ 1.092.047 0 25% 0.24% $ 947.104 3 855,577 021% 019% $ 845.749 019% S 759,462 0.17% * 698.849 3 606.870 1 016% 013% $ 597.595 3 586.767 0.13% 0.13% 3 577.247 3 575.198 3 465.884 013% 0.13% 0.10% 3 441.100 3 327.639 3 305.688 3 266770 3 253.460 3 188.751 3 142.628 3 52,671, 0.10% 0.07% 0.07% 0.06% 0.06% 0.04% 003% 001% Source: NARA, RG 56, Aoc. 56-68A-209, Box 38, Rte. TFR-500, Business Holdings In Germany of United States Rrms, cfrca 1943 (NARA 0005992-0006838). Appendix B Board Of Directors - Ford-Werke, 1925-1953 Name________________________________ AlbertHetnrich F.-Germany Bftzke3,WBh8lm (German Industrial Bank)- Germany Bosch,Cari (I.G. Fatten chairman) - Germany Bneehfinasl R.- US. Cartscn.Gaotge Cooper, Sir Stanford-UX Craig,B.J -US. Davle^SIr John Thomas - UX Ford,Ed88l B.- US. FontHeray - U.S. Fdtd ILHenry - US. Grain, Bank GrassardAtari - Germany Han1ngton.Jam6S J.- US. . Hauss,C.W-Germany Hopp8,Emst HQnemeyer. Harts - Germany Kalveram,Wilhelm Kanzler, Ernest C.- US. KraudiCari (LG. Fatten chairman)-Germany------- Lettdeux, Francois- France Meyer, Kaj Peny, Sr Perdval - UX RotorgeJU.- US. SctmridLGeorg - Garmaiy Schurlg/lwln - Germany Sjobarg.Sydney iter Sorensen, Charles E.- US. Wartermarm.Hetmann - Germany WWanUArttiur J.- US. tenure____________________________ 1930-1947; chairman 1937-1947 1940-1947 1929-1939; died April 27,1940 1947-1952 1925 1947,1951-1952 1925-1927 1929-1938 1925-1941, chairman 1925-1929; died May 1943 1926-1927 1947-1952 1951-1953 1953 1925 1947-1953, chairman 1947-1953 1951-1953 1940-1947 1951 1926 1940-1947 1951-1952 1953 (manager) 1929-1939; chairman 1929-1937 1947 1939-1940; died February 26,1940 1929-1939; died August 31,1940 1926 1930-1941 1953 1951-1952 Sources and Notes: FMC, AR-9B-213541, Box 131, File Cologne Organization and Management. List of Board Members 1925-1943. 1947 (FMC 0000679-0000680),FMC,AR-9&-2135+6,Boa 2 .File History of Plant - All Aspects.1925-1946, Vitger Report.September 24. 1946 (FMC 0001967-0001968), FMC AR-6S-1SOO. Box 6, File Ford-Werke No 3, Business Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 (FMC 0003778-0003813).Business Reports for 1947.1948 (FMC 000356$ and 0003S79).FMCAR-75-63-430.Box 60, Ford-Werke Annual Reports, 1949-1953, Business Report for 1951 (FMC 0016884).Business Report for 1952 (FMC 00l6871),FMC.AR-7S-63-430, Boot 90. File: Ford-Werke Finance Reports 1953, Business Report for 1953 (FMC 0001138) On May IS, 1942, the German government abolished the authority ofthe board ofdirectors and appointed a board ofadvisors consisting ofthe German members ofthe old board These members - Albeit, Bdtzkes, Hfinemcycr and Krauch - resigned before the first postwar meeting on December 16, 1947 (Sorensen,the other surviving board member from before the war, left the company in early 1944) See FMC. AR 65-71 .Box 25. File. International 1947 #1, Vltger to Roberge. June 25, 1947 (FMC 0000100-0000102), Ford-Werke Records,Albert to Vitger. August 22. 1947 (FW 0003874),B6ttcher to Vitger, September 4,1947 (FW 000387S),Htlnemeyer toVitger, November 7.1947 (FW 0003873), BStzkes toVitger, November 11, 1947 (FW 0003876),and Nevins and Hill. Ford Decline and Rebirth. 1933-1962, pp 259-260 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Non Regime Appendix C Ford's Contributions to the Allied War Effort, 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 45 Corporate Entity Ford Motor Company Quantity and Product 4.400 gliders 8.700 B-24 bombers 57.900 Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines 2.400 MX engine assemblies 87.400 generators 52,300 superchargers 17.000 jettison fuel tanks 1.700 M-4 tanks 1.000 M-10 tanks 27.000 tank engines 12.500 armored cars 10.500 Fodors (military automobiles) 13.900 universal carriers 12.800 amphibian jeeps 282.400 jeeps 128.800 trucks Ford ofBriuin 13,900 tracked vehicles 184,600 wheeled vehicles 262,000 V-8 engines 137,500 tractors Ford of Canada 380,000 military vehicles Including universal carriers, trucks, artillery tractors, transport units and scout cars Ford of India 122,400 military vehicles Ford ofSouth Africa 34,900 military vehides including cars, trucks and delivery wagons Ford of New Zealand 5.200 military vehides indudlng trucks, staff cars and tractors 5.720.500 grenades 2.370.500 mortar shells 1.448.200 ordnance fuses Note-All figures rounded to nearest hundred Sources: Hilary St. George Saunders, led stMfar (London- Harrison & Sons, circa 1947), p. 90 and Brief Statistics, FMC, Vertical File, File- Vforid Wir n Production, Ford Motor Company's U S. Wu Production Effort, 1941-1945, December 3. 1998 (FMC 0018716 0018717), Report on Ford Motor Company ofCanada, January 26,1999 (FMC 0018718) Research Findings About Ford-Wcrke Under the Nan Regime Research Findings About Ford-Wtrke Under the Nazi Regime Ap p e;i d i x D Numbers o f Workers at Ford - W ERKE January 1941 - December 1944 The following table presents a breakdown of the data used to create the bar chart, LaborTYends at Foid-Werke, in Section 7.3. Ibis table was compiled from two sources' production departments These staff reports were located in a collection of British Royal Air Force bombing survey recSbds at the Imperial War Museum in Landoi^2**"7/ 1. Financial Ledger : The first is a financial ledger from Ford-Werke internal records. The ledger contains monthly balance sheets reporting employment statistics for the period from 1941 to 1944. In some cases these statistics are broken into different categories of foreign workers at the plant; In other cases, there are no breakdowns.*** 2. Staff Reports: In a few instances, the ledger figures were supplemented by numbers from periodic staff reports prepared by Ford-Werke These sources generally agree on the numbers of foreign workers reported each month. Where the reported numbers differ widely, only the figures from the ledger have been included in this table. (For a fuller discussion of the inconsistencies between the ledger figures and the staff reports, and a description of the methodology used to calculate each worker category in this table, see the explanatory material that follows the table ) * Fprd-Wcrke Records, Financial Ledger, January 19*1itember 19*4 (FW 0007011-0007890) These figures Alio appear in a later report prepared by the postwar custodian, Erhard Vltger; see FMC. AR-7S-62-616, Box 79. Custodian Report. (FMC 0001022-0001026) :e figures for Russian workers In April 19*2 come from FD *369/45, Folder B, handwritten staff report,April 7 and May *. 19*2 (IWM 0000297) The figures for "Other Foreign Wforker*"from May through July 19*2 come from IWM, FD 4369/4S, Folder B.suff reports from May IS to July 17. 19*2 (IWM 0000283-0000292) II iPlV Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regji I Note; The entry "a.a* indicates that there was not enough infotmabao available to provide meaningful statistics Date Russian Italian Other rows Total Total Percentage or POWa Foreign Foreign Work Force (%)of Eastern Workers Workers Foreign Workers Workers Jan 1941 - na na. na 3863 n.a Feb 1941 - na na. na 3810 n.a. Mar 1941 - na. na. na 3724 na. Apr 1941 - n.a. na. na 3732 na. May 1941 - n.a. na. na. 3651 na Jun 1941 I JU11941 - n.a. na. n.a - na na. na 3647 3663 na na Aua 1941 - na. n.a. n.a 3581 na Sep 1941 - na. na. n.a 3605 na OCt 1941 na. na. na 3609 na Nov 1941 - na na na 3506 n.a Dec 1941 - na. na. na. 3476 na Jan 1942 na. na na. 3335 n.a. Feb 1942 - na. na na. 3471 n.a Mar 1942 - na na n.a 3566 na Apr 1942 314 - na. na na. 3593 na May 1942 320 - 94 94 508 3978 12.8 Jun IMS 621 - 101 92 614 3182 195 Jul 1942 610 - 103 90 803 4143 19.4 Aug 1942 567 - na. 31 n.a 3163 n.a ~ Sep 1942 676 1 - na. 89 na 4172 na. OCt 1942 7l5 - na. 89 na 4512 n.a NOV 1942 673 - na. 63 na 46l3 n.a. DOC 1942 677 - na. 85 na 4646 na Jan 1943 "677 - 448 66 1211 4525 282 Feb 1943 676 - 575 63" 1329 4579 29.0 Mar 1943 7ll - 488 81 1286 4816 - 2'6.6 " Apr 1943 671 - 516 " 80 12 4855 26.1 May 1943 751 - 526 73 1351 4998 27.1 Jun 1843 743 - na. 73 n a 4985 na. Jul 1943 753 - na 73 n.a 5TT5 na Aug 1343 743 - 698 - 1439 5137 28.0 Sep 1943 749 - 570 - 1319 5108 253 det 1943 969 489 - 1389 5306 263 "Nov 1943 777 "*565 478 - 1823 5783 3T5 Dec 1943 715 559 458 - 1808 57Ti 31.6 Jan 1944 788 552 485 - 1805 5600 32 2 Feb 1944 785 654 420 - 1763 5598 333 Mar 1944 730 533 420 - 1733 5198 331 Apr 1944 786 "565 386 - 1891 5175 327 May 1944 70s 486 527 - T888 5138 551 Jun 1944 678 437 536 - 1903 5223 36.4 JUl 1944 881 430 549 * 1926 5199 ------- 361--------- Aug 1944 662 436 564 - 1952 5208 37.1 Sep 1344 n.a. - na. na. na. na OCt 1944 n.a. na - na na na NOV 1944 na - na. - na na. na. Dec 1944 885 - na. - na na n.a. Note Regarding December 1944 figures on the table; the ledger docs not speedy the nationality ofthese workers, referring to them only as "foreign civil workers" The placement of the line item,the term "civil"and the actual number of workers,however; are all consistent with their identification as Russian civilian workers. Litde other information could be found on the work force during the period from October through December 1944, when Ford-Werke was dispersing equipment and some workers to other locations See Ford-Wcrke Records, Financial Ledger, December 1944-Decembcr 1946.Balance Sheet, December 31,1944 (FW 0008273) 28 .Appendix D Additional Notes and Methodology Regarding Appendix D The numbers in the Cable primarily reflea data from Ford-Werke's financial ledger However, the categories of workers in the table are not Identical to those in the ledger Therefore, the following explanation will be helpful in understanding die method used to tabulate die information in the table. Financial Ledger Ca tegorles The ledger divides Ford-Werke employees Into four broad categories based on function and mode of compensation. These categories are: Salaried technical workers Salaried business executives Vtbrkers paid hourly wages (Beginning m January 1943, the monthly balance sheets showed a footnote for this category, indicating that this figure included a repented number of "foreign workers." This most likely refers to Western workers, although die ledger does not say this explicitly.) Outers (Beginning in May 1942, this last category included a separate line item for Eastern workers and POWs A line item for Italian POWs appeared in November 1943.) The figures reported in "Other Foreign Workers" were taken from the footnoted figure reported in the financial ledger monthly balance sheets under the "Workers paid hourly wages" category described above (Where the footnote was absent - from January 1941 through December 1942, and for June and July 1943 - no figures for "Other Foreign Workers" are provided in this table because the ledger does not provide enough information to differentiate between Western foreign workers and German workers The numbers m the "Total Foreign Workers" column were computed by adding the numbers reported under Russian or Eastern Workers, Italian POWs, POWs and Other Foreign Workers, as described above (Again, no figures for "Total Foreign Workers" are provided In the table when the available data does not Include precise information for that month.) "Percentage ofForeignWorkers" was calculated by comparing "Total Foreign Workers" and 'Total Work Force" figures, when available. Values were rounded to the nearest 0.1 percent Appendix P Columns; The figures in the columns for Russian or Eastern Workers,'" Italian POWs*" and POWs1" were taken directly from the figures reported under the "Other" category m the financial ledger's monthly balance sheets.1" The figures reported in the "Total Work Force" column of the table were calculated by adding monthly figures from all four categories in the monthly balance sheets. Comparing die Figures in the Financial Ledger and the Staff Reports There is a notable inconsistency m the employment figures for "Other Foreign Wbrkers" in the financial ledger and in the production department staff reports. In particular, from late 1943 to early 1944, the staff reports indicate an additional 250 to 350 workers categorized as "Other Foreign Workers," compared with the financial ledger. ,s`The temu "Russian" and "Eastern'* often were used interchangeably in Germany throughout the war to describe weaken from all parts of the Soviet Union. From February 1943, Ford-Wcrke's monthly financial statements began classifying all civilian workers from the East, Including Russians, as Eastern workers. tsr Although the Italian workers who arrived In November 1943 were technically POWs.they were treated differently from the Vfcstem POWs and accounted for separately. In August 1944. Italian POWs wereredassified as ordinary foreign (Western) workers and accounted for in the monthly balance sheets as such. See FMC. AR-75-62-616, Boat 79, Custodian Report (PMC 0001023). I Ford-Werke Records. Financial ledger, January 1942September 1944 (FW 0007011-0007890) ,i9 Note that the figure for Russian workers in April 1942 comes from IWM, FD 4369/4$, Folder B handwritten staff report. April 27 and May 4, 1942 (IWM 0000297) M0 The figures for May through July 1942, however, came from IWM, FD 4369/4S. Folder B, staff reports from May 1 $ to July 17. 1942 (IWM 0000283-0000292) Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Several personnel department staff reports indicate that these extra workers appear to be "absentee" foreign workers who are formally listed as being assigned to Ford-Werke but who have not reported to work This group includes Western workers who failed to return from vacation.*' In the financial ledger, however; these absent foreign workers appear not to have been included in the footnoted number of "Other ForeignWorkers." According to personnel department staff reports from early 1944, Ford-Werke began removing the unexcused workers from the rolls in January 1944.*1 By May 1944, foreign worker figures in the staffreports are consistent with the numbers in the financial ledger. However, due to uncertainty regarding the departure dates of the missing foreign workers, no attempt was made to correct numbers from the financial ledger using the numbers from the staff reports. As a result, the table's "Total Wfork Force" statistics from late 1943 and early 1944 may include a number of foreign workers who were no longer employed at Ford-Werke. See IWM. FD 4369/45, Folder E. Scheid to Armaments Ministry July 22. 1943 (IWM 0000759-0000760) 111 See, for example, IWM, FD 4369/4S, Folder A, staff report ruramanes, January 21, January 28 and February 4. 1944 (IWM 0000394JWM 0000397 and IWM 0000400) I 50 I Appendix War Damage Claims Form 848 (Form submitted by claimants to the IIS. government) Description of Damages Buildings destroyed Damage to buildings Total &illdings Loss and/or damage to machinery and material in outside storage areas Materials lost In transit from suppliers Machinery and material damaged In the Ford-Werto plant Claims for materials supplied to German authorities without payment Other losses Less adjustments: Items that are Included In the above totals but are Ineligible underthe War Claims Act Total Other Property Total amount of claim Ford Motor Company's stock ownership percentage Hi Ford-Werto (56.575%), rounded Total amount claimed Amount of Claim RM DM 1,232,139 1,301,279 23,512 111,392 2,533,418 134,904 8,699,926 580,997 1,078,614 1,205 13,349,909 5,043,117 (59,063) 28,673,501 31,206,919 1,205 136,109 Claim In U&Dollare $ 495,319 511,097 1,006,416 3,479,971 224,399 417,056 5,339,964 2,017,247 (23,625) 11,455,011 12,461,427 56 58% $ 7,050,052 Source: DOJ 0010550; 299 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Claim of Ford Motor Company under Tide n of die Wbr Claims Act oil948, as amended by Public Law 87-846. Notes The amount listed for "Buildlngidescroyed,'lnc]udes RM5S9.211 16 (1223,684.47) for buddings in Austria The amount listed for 'Other losses'lncludes RM 885.881 SO ($35+,352 60) for lasses ofequipment and materials in Austria See WNRC Act 299-68A0243, Bos 540,Ftte r*l<ni ofFord Motor Company, last of Damages and Losses (DOJ 0010S51 and DOJ 0010554) I iI Research Findings .About Ford-Wetke Under ibe Nazi Regime Appendix F Ford-W erke Balance Sheets S' \iT,"-`sy^ n.-tyuit'ns'-sa&p.&,ui.i..iLA>vi*i *iru 1945 RM 06/20/48 RM TotodCash Inventory Other Current Assets Fixed Assets, Net Other Assets Investments totalAssets ispfswyp 22,625,941 15302.737 21,462,787 9.073369 1 694,662 68,859,397 24,251,449 9^486/455 7362,101 11,728,423 1 500,003 53328,432 LMBiunes Current UabfflSes Unclaimed Dividends Accrued LlaMBttes Reserve for Uncertain UaMIfles-Tu Reserve for Uncertain Liabilities-Special Reserve for Uncertain Uabiflfles-Other total Uabmss KW^rrgF ix > -Z&A rig JliSlHi S'! II I H-J< ij l fi~fc Jll (26,031,783) (3380,418) (568,264) " (7,742383) (711390) - (671,896) (1,072.151) irU .-.tfeavrfilmra'.siAMM.P . iigfrfulfuirfaaBTHiBnBrjvnM'ifaj (4,767,038) (34345.499) ' (432,008) (14,400326) SHARStOUraS'EQUITY Capital Stock Statutory (Legal) Reserve Free Resenm Retained Eamtoes totalUabmea andEquity (32300300) (3,600300) (3,000,000) 4386,102 (6839,397) (32,000,000) ' (3,600,000) (3300309 028,106) (5338,432) 08/21/48 DM Converted 1351.869 13,747,007 1366,927 21341307 1 50,003 38357,614 1953 DM 6*490,669 39349304 14384,244 41,700,898 1 50,003 102,575,719 (1.8 (71,169) (715,516) (130,602) (244,318) (3,057,614) (26,404,111) (441,049) (516,646) (103,367) (8,600,000) (2230.826) (58365,999) (32300,000) (1300.000) (1.400.000) (38357,614) (32300,000) (5.200.000) (4.500.000) (2309,720) (102,575,719) SftlTrrft TVnnH-Ww4^ A(HinH Financial Srarwngntg and RurinsReports. tpcelflcally FMC 0017068-0017070.FMC 0003798-0003801, FMC 0006720-0006721, FMC 0001229, FMC 0016021. Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Appendix G - Page 1 of 3 Ford-Werke Results of Operations, 19 33-195 3 Sates Trailing Income (a) Discounts Returns On Investment With Credit Compmy interest Income Other Inc. /Extraordinary Rat Extraordinary Income Subtotal Wages & Salaries Social Expenses Depredation Expense Subscriptions To TradeAssociations Other Expenses Other Taxes (c) Subtotal Interest Extraordinary Changes Total Costs Pretax Income bicome Taxes (c) Net Income Before Reserves Mscdlaneous Reserves Free Reserve Statutny Reserve Legd Reserve 1833 RM 17,738,528 3,656,242 8,971,483 10,627,725 653,888 209,257 2,367,238 3,216,426 8,448,789 123300 8370,589 2,057,136 358,447 1,698390 % 100% 21% 1934 RM 30317384 8,124,639 % 100% 27% 1935 RM 42,568062 12,520,289 30,000 1938 % RM 100% 29% 0% 64,993336 17,541,126 155398 30,000 1937 % RM 100% 27% 0% 0% 94317.228 14,468,568 338,153 30,000 39% 7,107,149 1,116,252 80% 16348,040 19% 3.880392 1% 306,560 13% 7351,774 22379 24% 4% 757316 54% 13329.984 13% 5.623,768 1% 402,131 24% 657,737 18% 4,362307 15% 6,000324 0% 82,827 2% 287,415 31% 18,096,764 13% 7397.748 1% 542,775 2% 867344 41.761 14% 7,981.717 0% 28336 0% 156,074 28% 15319331 12% 10377,192 1% 744,726 1% 1,294,714 0% 51,628 12% 19.012 48% 15301,033 53% 12383360 30% 17,131335 26% 12,967,272 1% 63,434 0% 48% 15394,487 12% 353,573 2% 349,747 10% 3,825 53% 12,883360 1% 446,124 1% 383345 0% 62J79 30% 17.131335 1% 964,929 1% 596,029 0% 368,900 28% 12,987,272 1% 2332389 1% 1,017,754 1% 1314304 300300 1938 % RM 100% 15% 0% 0% 120,974,483 17,944342 382,712 30300 0% 0% 359,796 16% 18,717350 12% 13314,899 1% 1,221,287 1% 828,759 0% 0% 71,427 14% 15.438372 138384 234,515 14% 15307,751 2% 2309,599 1% 1398,242 1% 1313359 0% 300300 % 100% 15% 0% 0% 0% 15% 11% 1% 1% 0% 13% 0% 0% 13% 2% 1% 1% 0% Met Income (Loss) After Reserves 1398390 10% 3325 0% 62779 0% 368,900 1% 714304 1% 913359 1% unuorasuwnreo 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1300300 1% Sources Ford-Werke Audited Financial Statements and Business Reporti. specifically HFM 000&414-000641S, HFM 0006428-000(129, HFM 0006303-0006304, HFM 0006316 0006317. HFM 0006329-0006330. FMC 0017027-0017028 See notes (a) and (e) oo page 3 Appendix C - Page 2 of 3 Ford-Werke Results of Operations, 1 933- 1 953 Sales Tradng Income (a) Dccounts Returns On Investment With Credit Company Interest Inorane Other Income Extraordinary Income Subtotal Wages & Salaries Social Expenses Depredation Expense Sdscrtptkme To Trade Associations Other Expenses Other Taxes (c) Subtotal Interest EXtramflnary Charges Total Costs Pretax Income tnoome Taxes (c) Net Income Before RBsarves MteceOaneoue Reserves Free Reserve Statutoiy Reserve legal Reserve Net Income (Loss)After nmw nUtMitoiieiniioifcBi *D-e-c*ora] 1030 RM % 1040 Ml 140,264,671 100% 118,834,624 21,776,397 16% 24,221,726 418,277 0% 93,224 1M1 % RM 100% 127,911,196 20% 28,349,536 0% 349333 1942 % RM 100% 132,774,560 22% 31,543,658 0% 620,780 % 100% 24% 0% 1913 RM 181,425,534 38,024365 540333 % 100% 21% 0% 1944 RM 151,491,332 37,174,565 359,596 % 100% 25% 0% 1946 RM 3S33S.708 17366,195 40348 % 100% 51% 0% 30,000 0% 1,714,007 1% 11313 0% 688,750 1% 22,026 0% 732,626 1% 22326 872273 0% 1% 111,496 108326 0% 64200 0% 22,219 0% 1% 1,039343 1% 3,085,765 9% 23,038,771 17% 25,214,724 21% 29,453,421 23% 33,058,737 25% 40,677216 22% 38.746230 26% 21318.02S 60% 15,745,117 11% 14,735,118 12% 15,420,955 12% 15,542385 12% (b) 17,574,921 12% 8338,663 25% 1,749,685 1% 2,164,100 2% 935,510 1% 002,450 1% W 3,515369 2% 1,783,065 S% 1,716,211 1% 2,230,232 2% 3.567334 3% 3,875300 3% (b) 4,235,557 3% 1363,741 S% 82,128 0% 73358 4,103 0% 60,578 0% 1339322 3,795,464 0% 82319 2% 2,628373 3% 6,625,186 0% 2% 9% (b) 04 04 111362 0% 564375 2% 60,785 0% 550.991 2% 19,293,141 14% 19,206309 637379 0% 1223341 102222 0% 16% 25,759,164 1% 657394 227379 20% 29,656,515 1% 173342 0% 1,145,911 22% 35,627310 0% 144377 1% 1.735343 20% 28,00404 0% 1% 1 855,969 18% 1 897,245 37% 8% 8350347 26% 20,033242 14% 20.430350 17% 26,644237 21% 30,076268 23% 37.507330 21% 40.858373 27% 21348,092 62% 3,905,529 3% 4,783374 2,217352 2% 3.067271 4% 2309,184 3% (0 2% 2,082,469 ft 2% 3,169386 4 2% (112,143) -1% (833367) -2% 619,545 0% 2300,024 7% 1,687376 1% 1,716304 1% 2309,184 2% 2,082,469 2% 3.169386 2% (2.731368) -2% (3.433391) -10% 400300 0% 1.287376 1% 1,716,604 1300300 1% 1.000300 1,000300 1% 1309,1B4 1% 1300,000 1% 1% 2382.469 1% 1,600300 1,000300 1% 0 0% 2% 2.169386 1% (2.731389) -2% (3,433391) -10% 1% 1.600300 1% 0 0% 0 0% Soviets Pord-Vfale Audited Financial Statement! and Butinas Reports, specifically FMC 0017073-0017074, FMC 0017011-0017012, FMC 0017039, FMC 0017041. FMC 0017030, FMC 0003795-0003796, FMC 0017036-0017037, BAL 7515, BAl 3309 See notes (a). <b) and (c) on page 3 Appendix G - Page 3 of 3 Ford-Werke Results of Operations, 19 33- 1 95 3 Sales Trading tocome (a) Discounts Returns On investment Wffli CtedH Company tntaiest Income Other Inoome Extraordinary tncoma Subtotal Wag8S&Salaries Sodal Expenses Depredation Expense SutecrtpacswTe trade Associations Otter Expens** Othertaxes(4 Subtotal Merest Extraordinary Chaigss Total Costa Pretax taaxne tnannetansM Nat Income Before Reserves Mkcetaros Rroorw Fw nuervs Sbtukxy Reserve Legal Resene Net kxxxne (Loss) ARar Reserves OMdendeOectand 1646 RM % 87,535307 100% 28,625,478 43% 160,552 0% 1947 RM % 48.309,174 100% 19,178,382 40% 102,776 6 Muffin warn RM % 30,048,479 100% 11,340,154 36% 72,908 0% IBMentbs 1949 DM % 1960 1961 DM % DM % 1962 DM K 1663 DM % 208,426,531 100% 1703623H 100% 235,112035 100% 306,911,000 100% 301,367,000 100% 58,016,794 28% 44.099,092 26% 42235,108 19% 60,159,459 20% 69,717,968 23% 580,676 0% 928354 1322849 1% 1,838,804 1% 1,622193 1% 12,071 0% 2203397 3% 5,106,846 11% 4,681,115 16% 31289,127 48% 24.400,075 51% 16,094,177 54% 10,542324 16% 10.008.672 21% 5,315,638 18% 2,137389 3% 2.397.298 5% 1,041,525 3% 1.414.738 2% 1,411.710 3% 510.101 2% 59,073 0% 113,780 0% 671,577 0% 59,470,880 29% 24,905,969 12% 6,432287 3% 5,588,877 3% 383,748 0% 87304 0% 1,089343 1% 42562241 27% 20.992771 12% 2749.417 3% 3,658,477 2% 251359 110355 97,235 47221.906 22213,933 2764.778 4272335 0% 112049 0% 0% 0% 1,592,110 1% 20% 62702422 11% 31,300,010 2% 7.493249 2% 4,014262 21% 10% 2% 1% 2,087,004 372674 73302827 34,157,451 8214,403 4.663390 1% 0% 24% 11% 2% 2% 21,438 0% 21,438 0% 22483*1 3% 1,250,295 3% 10,622 0% 810,111 3% 12364,578 24% 15,089,411 31% 8215 0% 15,130 0% 10,133330 15% 2,403,370 5% 7,688267 26% 6322 0% 3384,921 13% 26308.121 39% 17,507,911 36% 11.579340 39% 4,783306 7% 6,892,184 14% 4,514337 15% 4.132371 6% 5,222,403 11% 1,521,126 5% 650.635 1% 1,689,782 3% 2,993311 10% 45,394 0% 5304,627 3% 42379,354 20% 97,910 0% 2809.140 2% 34.307.415 29% 2323,320 3% 42802874 23% 12862208 5% 2434,008 5% 1,434,189 1% 572515 0% 34.882830 20% 11,703311 7% 2265,107 5% 2432204 1% 41,168 2512949 40.815,183 516365 41331248 5390,358 4.529,842 1389,516 0% 76,900 0% 2% 7,872716 3% 17% 50,752137 17% 0% 1,701,778 18% 52459,915 3% 11242507 2% 2322675 1% 1,912631 1% 17% 4% 3% 1% 42467 6,782475 51382196 34,949 157,756 52381391 21,747,938 14352030 7382807 0% 2% 17% 0% 0% 17% 7% 5% 2% 2002000 1% 1,702000 1% 662935 1% 1,689,782 3% 2993311 10% 1.002000 0% 434,199 0% 380,737 0% 2067,487 1% 1382516 1% 1.912631 1% 2.002000 1% 982907 0% 0% 00% 00% 0 0% 1300300 i% 0 0* 660,000 0% 960000 0% 5ouim. Foid-VVbte Audited Financial Statements and Brines Repots (FMC 0003611-0003812. FMC0003S74-000357S. FMC 0006723-0006724. FMC 0003601-0003601. FMC 00I70SS.FMC 0016694001689S.FMC 0016681, FMC 0001156). Saks amounts Id tbe yean 1933 through 1943 wot obtained from the ^Surrey ofGerman Motor Industry* April IS, 1946, SJ Palumbo, Ford Imcniatlaoa] Division GotttroQer (FMC 00008SO-0000909). Sales for 1946 through 1950 vrerc from Foid-Yferbc Antht Reports, and sales for 1951 through 1953 were obtained from the Fold International Handbook 1946-1953. and converted to Deutsche Marts 6otn US DoBus (FMC 0009155). Tbe amounts woe Kited In US doltus and converted to DM using conversion rata prodded In the document (FMC 0008181-0003181) Salts oonvenion calculations for 1951-1953 1951- 655,979,000/.ll09S= DM135,111,000, 1951 S73.074.000/ 138095=DM306.911,000. 19S3 S71.754.000/ 1309$=DM30I,367,MO Notes, (a) Hading tnooroe was generally equal to Sain lessMmxtal Cote and Overhead. but potludmSng ways and salaries. (^TbcFoid-Vtake Audited Financial Sutemmtsfor 1943 were available. however, they were difBcuS to read. Hit Expense Subtotal in 1943 Includes wages and salaries, sodal expense, oepredrtioo. Inoome tax and contributions, (e) Income taxs fiom 1933 to 1937 weee labeled as Property thus. Incometaxes tot 1941-1943 were Included In tbe "OtherHies" category Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Rejime Research Findings About Ford-Wlerke Under the Nazi Regime Appendix H Glossary of Repository Sources Every page of every document collected in this research effort has had a unique number affixed to it Each number has a prefix that indicates the archival repository or research file from which it originated The following list explains the prefixes and lists the names of the original repositories. AGB or BW - Archiv der Gedenkstaette Buchenwald BA-F - Bundesarchiv/Militararchiv - Freiburg (branch of the German federal archives in Freiburg) BA-K - Bundesarchiv - Koblenz (branch of the German federal archives m Koblenz) BA-L - Bundesarchiv - Lichterfelde (German federal archives in Berlin) CL] - Coopers & Lybrand (predecessor to PncewaterhouseCoopers) DOJ - [U.S.] Department of Justice Foreign Claims Setdement Commission files (See also WNRC, where files are stored) ELDE -- NS-Dokumentadonszentrum der Stadt Koln (also known as the ELDE House or EL-DE House, a documentation center holding records relating to Cologne's experiences during the Nazi era) FMC - Ford Motor Company FMCL - Ford Motor Company Ltd. (Ford ofBritain) FW - Ford-Werfe, Cologne GER - Published sources in Germany, as well as primary materials from several smaller German archives HAI -- Primary source material from smaller repositories in the Washington, DlC , area HAStK or HASK - Historisches Archiv der Stadt Koln (Cologne city archives) HFM - Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield Village Research Center HP - Highland Park Records Storage, Ford Motor Company HStAD or HSAD -- Nordrhein-westfalisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Dfisseldorf (central state archives branch for the Cologne region) IWM - Imperial War Museum LOC - [U.S.] Library of Congress NARA - [U.S.] National Archives and Records Administration 1 19 Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime PRO - Public Record Office (national archives ofGreat Britain) ThHSlAW or HSTH -Thuringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv,Vfeimar (central state archives branch for cheWfeurar region in Germany) VDA --Verband der Automobilindustne (Automobile Industry Association in Germany) WNRC - [U.S.] Washington [D.C.] National Records Center (See also DOJ, where files originated) ----~----------:----------------------------------------------------- jatipHS mtricting J&Hability of documents ..7 " "documents neinj donated to jHenr r JpPfl^^rpuMic from the source ers^;l^)raiid(CIl3^ep artm en t of Justic^ Company (FMfi)d Motor |frie (F!V);and Highland Part materials frodTSbfe are mildde Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Appendix I Bibliography Beduritig, Friedemann Thschnikxikon Dritts Rdch. Hamburg' Carlsen Verlag GmbH, 1997. Berghahn, VR. Modem Germany: Sodety, Economy, and Pobucs in the Twentieth Camiry. Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1987. lI BiQstein, Reinhold. Neubegiim oime Neoidntog. Dokumaite and Mntenabm rur poJitisdien Wbdiemteihmg m dm Westzane nach 1945. Cologne: Ibhl-Rugenstein, 1984. Blllstein, Reinhold, and Eberhard Bluer. "You are now in Cologne. Compliments* Robin den Augender Sieger Hundert Ibge unter AsierlknnischerRantnille. Cologne: Emons, 1995. Blllstein, Reinhold et al. Wbifang (or the Enemy: Ford.Gmeral Motors and Forced Labor in Germany During the Second World Wir New York. Berghahn Books. 2000. Bradsher, Gregory. Holocaast-Era Assets, a Finding Aid to Records at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. College Park, Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration, 1999. Braszat, Martin. "Natianalsozialistische Konzentrationslager 1933-1945 " In Anatomic des SS Staates, vol 1, ed Hans Buchheim. Munich: DIB, 1989 Burleigh, Michael and Wolfgang Wippermann. He Racial State: Germany 1933-1945 Cambridge, Massachusetts Cambridge University Press, 1991. Cajani, Luigi. "Die itailedschen MilitSr-Intemierten im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland " In Europa und der `Rachseinsatz.* Audandische Zmlarbdter, Kriegsgefangenc und KZ-Haftlinge in Deutschland 1938-1945, ed. Ulnch Herbert Essen Qartext, 1991. Carroll, Berenice A. Design forlbtalWin Aims and Economics in the Third Reich The Hague Mouton, 1968 Civilian Production Agency Industrial Mobilization forWu Washington, D.C Civilian Production Agency, 1947. I41 Research Findings About Ford-Werkt Under the Nazi Regime Costigliola, Frank. Awkward Daminian: American PolidcaJJcasomic.and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984. Dahlmann, Ditmaz, and Gerhard Hirschfeld. Lager, Zwangsarbeit,Vertabung und Deportation: Duneasiona in Massenvezbrechen in der Sowjetimion and in Deutschland 1933 bis 1945 Essen QartextVerlag, 1999 Dassbach, Carl HA. Global Enterprises and the Worii Economy: fori. General Motors, and IBM, the Emergence of the flunswtionnl Enterprise NewYork: Garland, 1989 Felinska, Kamila, et al. Zwangsorbeit bri Ford: Dakumentatian der Projectgruppe Messdqger* un Verdn EL-DE Haus eVitger Koln Cologne* Betrieb Rode-Stankowsld, 1996 Fings, Karola. Messdqger Koln. Ein KZ-Au8enhiger im Zmtnun der Stadt. Cologne EmonsVerlag, 1996 Fischer, Klaus P. Nazi Germany, a New History. NewYork: Continuum, 1995. Frank. Reinbard Ford at Wo. In German Trucks ft. Cars in WorldWir II. Vol VUI. Atglen, Pennsylvania SchxIFer Mihtary History. 1993. -------- ------------- ------------ " ' Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. NewYork. Knopf, 1996 Graham, Otis Land Meghan Robinson Wander: Franklin Q. Roosevelt,His Life and Times. An EncydopedicView NewYork Da Capo Press, 1990 Gruner, Waif. Der Geschlnssene Arbatseinsatz deutscher Judm: Zur Zwangsaibat als Element der Vtrfolgung 1938-1942. Berlin MetropolVerlag, 1997. Herbert, Ulrich. A History of Foreign labor in Germany, 1880-1980. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press, 1990 Hitler's ForeignWinkers: Enforced Foreign labor in Germany ander the Third Reich, translated by William Templer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Hillman, Barbara. Iw. 2/XI -- Mune luebbemedt: Zwangsorbeit fuer da Krieg. Bremen: Edition Tfemmen, 1996. Hohrmann, Johannes and Edgar Lenski. Die Koiposcbaltsteuer. Berlin. Industrieverlag Spaeth 8t Linde, 1941 HolleyJr, Irving. Buying Aircraft: Materid Procurement for the Armed Forces. Washington. D.C * Center of Military History, 1964. Homze, Edward L. Foreign Labor in Nan Germany Princeton- Princeton University Press, 1967. Huiskes, Manfred, et al DieWfandinschrifta dcs Kiilner Gestapo-Gefangzusses lm EL-DE Haus 1943-1945. Cologne* BohlauVerlag, 1983 Kirchberg, Peter. "Typisierung in der deutschen Kraftfahrzeugmdustne und der Generalbevollmachtigte fur das Kraftfahrwesen. Ein Beitrag zur Prohlemabk staatsmonopolistlscher Kriegsvorbereitung " In Johrbuch fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1969/n Klein, Burton H. Germany's Economic Prepositions for Wu. Cambridge, Massachusetts- Harvard University Press, 1959. Krieger, Karl "Der Reichskommissar fuer die Behandlung feindlichen Vermoegens." Bank-Archive, March 15,1940 I 42 Appendix I Lange, Irmgard, ed. Bnnwnfinmnig in WimHirin-iBwtfeVn: Rlchtlinlo,AnwciJunga,OJi)anisation. Seiburg Respublica-Veiiag, Seiburg, 1976. Lazzero, Rlodotti. Gli schiovi it Hidtr I deported italiam io Germania ndJa seconda guerra mondiole. Milan: Mondadon, 1996. Lessmann, Peter. "Ford Paris im Zugriff von Ford Koln 1943* Das Scheitem des Projeckts eines europaischen Automobil-Konzems timer deutscher Leitung" Zatschrift fur Unumehmasgachichu, vol 38, no. 4 Lewis, David L, Mike McCarviHe and Lonn Sorensen. Paid- 1903 to 1984 New York. Beekman House, 1983 MacKmde, S.P. "The Treatment of Prisoners ofW&r in World War n." The Journal of Modem History, Volume 66, Issue 3 (September. 1994), 487-520 Meuschel, Hans. Die GewlmuMuhruity fir 1943. Berlin* Industneverlag Spaeth 8e Unde, 1944 Milward.Alan S. Whr, Economy and Society Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Mommsen, Hans and Manfred Grieger Daslfclkswngmweik usd seine Arbater im Dritten Reich. Darmstadt* Econ, 1997 Neukn, Hans Werner. "Deutsche Besatzungspolitik inWesteuropa - zwischen Unterdruckung und Kollaboranon " In Karl Dietrich Bracher et al., eds., Deutschland 1933-1945: Nate Stadia zumadonakuiialisUschen Hanchaft Bonn* Droste Verlag, 1992. Nevins.Allan and Frank Ernest Hill. Ford. Dedine and Rebirth, 1933-1962 NewYork Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962. Noakes, Jeremy and Geoffrey Pridham Documents on Nazism. 1919-1945 NewYork: Viking Press, 1975 Overy, R.J. War and Economy in the Third Reich. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1994. The Nazi Economic Recovery. London. Macmillan Press. 1982. Reich, Simon. The Frails ofFascism: Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective. Ithaca* Cornell University Press, 1990 Belling, Johannes. Deutschland: Safe for Democracy? Deutsch-amenkanixhe Bafehunga aus dan Tatigkeitsbereich Heinrich E Alberts, kaiseriicher Gehdmmt in Amerika.ester Stootssefcretor der Rachskanzlet derWeunarer Repubhk,Rachsmmister, Betrcnrer der Foid-Gesellschaftm im HaTsrfiaft^gduet da Dritten Bachs 1914 bis 1945 Stuttgart Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997 Rosellen, Hanns-Peter. UndlhrtzdemVbrwSrts: ford in Deutschkmd 1903-1945 Frankfurt* Zyklam-Verlag, 1986 1987/88. Fbnf-Schnttr Die Wlederaufiticg da Ford-Wdie Kah von 1945 bis 1970 Frankfurt Zyklam-Verlag. Shiren William L The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1960 Snyder; Louis L Encyclopedia of the Third Retch. NewYork: Marlowe 8c Co , 1976. Sorensen, Charles , with Samuel T. Williamson. My FortyThais with Ford. NewYork* WW Norton 8c Company, Inc., 1956. Spanjer, Rimco, Diete Oudesluijs, and Johan Meijer eds Zur Arbat Gezwungm Zwangsarbat in Deutschland 1940-1945. Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1999. Stolper, Gustav, Karl HSuser, and Knut Borchardt. The Goman Economy, 1870 to the Presat London* Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967. It i Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Streit, Christian. Kdne Kameraden: DieVVehnnocbt usd die sov^etiseiun Knegsgefangena Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1978. Weinman, Martin, ed, Dos nationalsKlalistuche Lagenyjtan Frankfurt Zweittusendems, 1990 Wilkins. Mira and Frank Ernest Hill .American Business abroad: Ford an Six Continents. Detroit Wayne State University Press, 1964 Wnolston, MaxineY. The Structure of the Nad Economy. NewYork Russell & Russell, 1968. Zentner, Christian, and Bedurftig, eds. Dos Grose Lexikoa des Drittcn 8dcbes. Beduerfdg/Zentner Suedwest, 1985 An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Compony Reseorch Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Table of Contents Bxecndve Summary................................................................................................................. L .. L Hie Ford Archives Research Project......................................................................................3. Challenge to Ford and the Company's Response................................................................ 3 Ford's Unprecedented Response............................... ................................. 3 Separate Processes............................................................................ ................... 4 Revealing the Project's Scope............................. .................................................... 4 Public Access to the Collection................................................................ .. . .5 Creating the Collection*An Overview of the Process............................... ... .5 IL Motivation and ImpHcatiom for Undertaking the Ford Archives Research Project ................................................................................... 9.. Motivation.............................................................................................. . . .10 Practical and Social Implications of the Project.......................... .. ... 11 IIL Assessing the System ofAccess................................................................................................. 13 Description of the System of Access................................................................................... 13 The Database .................................................................................................................. 13 Chronology of Events.............................................................................. . . .14 White Papers: Topical Guides to the Collection................. ................... 14 Report on the Research Findings......................................................... 15 IV. Assessing the For d Archives Research Project .................................................................... 17 Managing and Staffing the Project............ ....................................................... 17 Decisions for Success................. 18 Expanding the Scope of the Project and Delays Along the Way ....................................19 V Assessing the Collection .............................................................................................................23 The Collection.......................................................................................................................23 Gaps in the Collection.................................... 23 An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Research Opportunities....................................................................... ............ 24 VI Conclusion ............................................................................. ...................... .................. 27 Appendix A: Monitoring die Research Project .............................................................. .. . .19 Appendix B: Procedures for Processing Documents from German Archives and Preparing Information for Entering into the Project Database ..........................31 I I Executive Summary i Introduction This assessment is the culmination of an independent three-year analysis of the objectives, methods, and results ofFord Motor Company's 3X-year project to assemble copies of documents about the use of forced labor by Ford Motor Company's plant in Cologne, Germany during World War n. I have evaluated the thoroughness and objectivity of Fords attempt to document these events and I have examined in some detail the process and methods employed by the Ford Archives Research Project to "find the facts" about this and related issues. Appendix A provides a summary of how I monitored the work of the Ford Archives Research Project over the past three years. In my review of this process. I have been guided by the following questions: Is the research plan and process consistent with Ford's announced objective, which is to find out what happened at Ford-Werke during the war? * Has the effort to locate documents been uncompromising and made without regard to any adverse consequences to Ford Motor Company7 < \re the proposed procedures for making tfils. evidence available to anyone who wishes to studyJ .it adequate to this purpose7 How will people gain access to the collection and be able to use it? What does the collection contain, what is its potential for research, and what items of Significance are missing from the collection7 This report is divided into five mam parts, which are supplemented by a conclusion and appendices L Tbe Ford Archives Research Reject examines the work of the Project and how it has attempted to fulfill Ford Motor Company's initial promise to find the facts about what actually happened at Ford-Werke during World Wir II. Two topics are examined in this section of the report: first, the challenge to Ford Motor Company and the company's response, second, the methods and procedures for locating documents and the critical factors involved In assembling the collection JL Motivation and Implications for Undertaking the Ford Archives Research Project explores Ford's motives for undertaking this project and examines its potential implications for other institutions, including corporations, and for general society as well i An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime m. Assessing the System ofAccess discusses how claim that it intended to find out what really die collection will be made accessible to the happened. public and what tools have been created for using it The Ford Archives Research Project has created an unparalleled system of access that offers a variety IV. Assessing the For d Archives Research Project of paths into the collection, providing both item- examines the critical factors affecting the level access and the historical context for the project, including those that expanded its documents in the collection. The database -- scope, delayed its completion, and enabled the which is key to usinj> the collection -- follows a project to be successful legal model, resulting in a database that is a marvel V. Assessing die Collection discusses the scope for retrieving information and content of the collection -- what is in the * The Ford Archives Research Project developed a collection, what is not, and what is the report on research findings that maps the major collection's potential for research? themes covered by the collection and indicates the collection's strengths and a few gaps in the Findings documentation, it also permits the facts to speak I have seen everything I requested and met freely with everyone from project staffto corporate executives and I am personally convinced that Ford Motor Company has not only fulfilled its original promise "to find out what happened," but has traveled an extra mile in doing so Ford developed and implemented a plan for themselves, even when the evidence is ambiguous or contradictory It is possible that additional evidence will be discovered in the future, but it is unlikely that the basic story told by this collection will change appreciably as a result ofany future discoveries and committed to a process that was consistent with its Ford decided at the outset to give the collection to announced objective offinding the facts. The following an independent institution -- before it was even five findings are particularly revealing about the known what "facts" might be uncovered -- and conduct of the entire project and the company's make the data available, without restriction, to determination to learn the truth about a difficult and anyone who wished to see it Moreover, I believe painful period in its history: Ford's initial decision to find the facts, whatever The effort to locate documents has been made without compromise and without regard to possible adverse consequences to the company The resulting collection was assembled not only from Ford's own archives but also from multiple sources on two continents. Few, ifany, American they were, and its ongoing commitment to open access were critical to the dedication of the independent historians and archivists who worked on this project This dedication is reflected in the richness of the collection these historians and archivists have created. u companies have ever conducted an archival Ford's decision to "find the facts" about what ] i I I research project of this magnitude. happened at Ford-Werke duringWorld V&r n and make At the very beginning of the project, the company made the critical decision to separate the legal and fact-finding processes. Thus, the fret-finding process was not driven or tightly connected to the legal arguments of the company, as it generally is when corporations are involved in litigation. Putting the fact-finding process on a separate track gives additional credence to the company's initial the results of this search accessible to everyone sets a high standard for how corporations, especially global corporations, will now have to respond to inquiries about past policies and practices. Ford's thorough and uncompromising response to questions about the use offorced labor at Ford-Werke during World War II will make it more difficult for corporations to avoid public scrutiny on the grounds that they do not have an archive Section I The Ford Archives Research Project I Challenge to Ford and the Company's Response In February 1998, the British Broadcasting Corporation aired a program charging Ford Motor Company with using forced labor at Its Ford-Werie plant in Cologne, Germany during World War II. On March 4,1998, a class-action suit was filed against Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke. The suit claimed that Ford's senior management during World Whr n had some control over its German plant and that Ford profited substantially from the use offorced labor. Although Ford moved to have the suit dismissed. Ford also announced that it had "instituted an active and deeper search of Ford archives in the United States to see if there are additional facts available than those used by earlier historians. We are also instituting a similar search in Germany. .When we receive the results of this effort, we will proceed from there."1 With this announcement, Ford publicly committed to an aggressive effort to gather documentary evidence about this period -- regardless of potential adverse consequences to the company Ford management made several additional decisions to ensure the integrity and thoroughness of the "fact-finding" effort, these decisions were uncommon, perhaps unique, for any organization or insutution, especially an international corporation. Some of these decisions may have far- reaching implications for ocher institutions that go well beyond the initial charges and response of Ford Motor Company ' Ford's Unprecedented Response As part of its stated mission to search its archives, Ford decided to find the facts, regardless of how they reflected on the company, instead of commissioning a history. r -T/ZEy <vVe</ *3 r-W. uV Ford's response is unusual because its management ' chose not only to find the facts and create a collection 1 ofdocuments, but also because the company decided to open the colleenon to the public Generally, companies confronted with questions about their past hire a consultant to investigate the matter or write a history, but rarely is the public invited to consider the evidence upon which the report is based Authorized histones or reports, the standard response of both Amencan and German automobile manufacturers, are nearly always based on pnvileged access to the archives. No matter how many assurances are given as to the independence oi^the scholar; or bow brilliant the resulting oooX or 1 Statement by John Rmumaki, March +, 1998 At the time. he was Ford Motor Company secretary He has since been named chiefof staff. Ford Motor Company 3 An Independent .Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fbrd-Werke Under the Nazi Regime report, ineviuhly, there is suspicion that something has liability is limited Certainly, aggressively looking for been withheld or that the Interpretation lus^been records from half a century ago is, from (his altered to the benefit of the employee* This is not to say perspective, inadvisable. The truth, however, is that the that an institution, be it a university, a corporation, or ability of any institution to destroy records in the hope even a church, does not have good reasons for wanting of avoiding responsibility for past actions is extremely a history reflecting its own perspective and self-image. problematic; die complex web of evidence supporting This type of biased approach, however, casts suspicion corporate memory is almost impossible to eliminate. on even the most innocent of organizations. To avoid Someone, often when it is least expected, will uncover this taint, it is especially important for the evidence the evidence, incriminating or not, at another agency or documenting these activities and events to be open to government office The long life of evidence even after public scrutiny * " 31 SO years and a world war is amply demonstrated by the mass of materials unearthed by this project Separate Processes Ford also committed to a dual process that would Revealing die Project's Scope maintain separate tracks,one for any litigation resulting In the beginning of the project, when Ford from the class-action suit and the other for the "fact announced Its intennon to find the facts, nearly finding" research project that, Ford stated, would everyone assumed that few documents could have continue regardless of the outcome of the dass-acnon survived the war Moreover, It was presumed two fires suit. Again,this decision was unusual. Ordinarily, legal at the Cologne plant -- one during and one after the prerogatives govern a company's response to a legal war -- had destroyed most of the documents covering action. Certainly, the meriflc evidentiary needs of the the operation of Ford-Werke during this period In the legal team did, as we shall see have a significant impact end, however, the Ford Archives Research Project has on the Ford Archives ReseaKfl fTfljto s ract-nndlng "created a collection of more than 98,000 jaages of work and, even more, on the design of the system for documents, more than 25,000 are from Ford-Werke retrigying documents from the growing raiut-pott--But To be sure, there are gaps in the record, but it is, by any the dual process did indeed remain separate and measure, a major collection that thoroughly documents distinct throughout the project, and at no time was the operation of Ford-Werke both during the war and evidence put aside or discounted because it might raise under postwar military government supervision questions or create difficulties for Ford's lawyers. Evidence turned up by an aggressive research effort might be helpful to Ford lawyers, but it might also have been subject to discovery by lawyers litigating against Ford if these actions had gone to trial. In fact, historical research continued long after all of the legal charges against Ford had been dismissed. Although more documents survived than the Ford Archives Research Project team had initially anticipated, finding them was not easy. After six weeks of intensive searching in the Ford Archives in Dearborn, it became apparent that the facts of the case would be difficult to determine and a more thorough investigation would be required Although adverse publicity and the Traditionally, it is a matter of policy that corporations allegations of the dass-acnon suits created pressure on do not keep their records any longer than is legally the company to find the facts quickly, the Ford Archives required. The assumption is that without evidence. Research Project team decided to explore any lead that might shed light on the use of forced labor by Ford- Wferke during the war This was an important decision for example, (he charges ofMichael Burleigh In `Beetles in Shim?" Riitojr Ibday, 42 (November 1992). pp. 11-13 Michael Pinto-Duichlnsky. "Selling the Past," Tlmo Utoorjr Soppimau (October 2J. 1998), pp. 14-17, also often a altlca] commentary of historians working for companies accused of complicity In the Holocaust, It spawned a heated series of charges and countercharges In "letters to die Editor"ofthe TLS for November 6, 1998, November 27. 1998. December 18, 1998. and January 8.1999 that had far-reaching implicauons for the project because it not only made the project more complicated and cosdy, but it also increased substantially the nme it took to locate documents. In the end, more than 30 archival repositories in Germany, England, and the United States were consulted, several quite extensively. I I The Ford Archives Research Project to produce the 98,000 pages of documents that now comprise this collection. I Public Access to the Collection Military production at Ford-Werke. Ford-Werke's role in the wartime econony The finances of Ford-Werke during the war Ford decided to give the resulting collection to an independent repository and make it available to anyone who wishes to study these documents for themselves. A Nazi economic policies and controls over the auto industry and Ford-Werke comprehensive database and other kinds ol nnauig aids Communications between Ford and Ford-Werke were created to facilitate the use ofthe collection These during the war will be described in greater detail later in this report. What is important and really notable, however, was the company's decision to provide open access to the German industrial mobilization and preparation for the war collection -- this decision was made even before the collection was assembled and without regard to its Working conditions at the plant during the war implications for the company This may have been a Damage suffered by the plant during the war smart response to critical media, but it is also a response that carries the risk of revealing Information that any institution in these same circumstances might Information relating to assaults, injuries, or deaths at the plant during the war very well wish to keep confidential Postwar military government supervision of Ford- Creating the Collection: An Overview of the Process ' Werke Initially, two teams were assembled in Dearborn, one to search the Ford Archives and also the company's This section discusses the methods and the process central records depository, and the second to examine employed by the Ford Archives Research Project to create a collection of photocopied documents about Ford Motor Company's activities during the period of the Third Reich and the Allied Occupation. the records that had been given to Henry Ford Museum's Research Center in 1964. Additional workers were employed to supplement the Archives staff, and as many as 45 workers were hired by the On March 10, 1998, Elizabeth Adkins, manager of Ford's Archives Services, was appointed to lead an investigation into Ford-Werke during World War II As project manager, she was charged with developing a work plan to carry out this investigation In addition to the company's internal records, she was instructed to examine records held by Ford's German and English subsidiaries and relevant records held by repositories in England, Germany, the United States, or anywhere else that might shed light on what actually happened during the wax It was an enormous undertaking that went well beyond an examination of Ford's own records. Archives during the most intensive periods of research In addition to the materials in the Archives, Records Center,1 and Henry Ford Museum.there were 300 cubic feet of unorganized records with no finding aid, called the European Corporate History Project, which had to be sorted and analyzed. These were records that had been assembled for a history of Ford's European operations -- a project that was never completed The records were sent to Dearborn from England when the European Corporate History Project office was closed Archives staff and 10 paraprofessionals launched a crash effort to go through these European records and create an inventory lb keep track of this growing body During the course of the project a number of Issues of evidence and also make it available at the end of the have been Investigated, but the following are the project, original documents were photocopied From principal lines of inquiry: The use offoreign and forced labor at Ford-Werke. 5 1 Staff of the Ford Archives selects the records that have permanent historical value from the inactive files and records stored at Ford's centra] records depository An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime these inauspicious beginnings in March 1998, this issue or event.often involving litigation The historians enormous project to "find out what happened" was hired for this team included individuals fluent in launched. Hie basic methodology for the undertaking was developed during the first four months of the project Errors inevitably occurred and had to be corrected, but German and experienced m Holocaust-era research and economic history Perhaps most important was the hiring of historians experienced in using public records and conducting research at the National Archives the basic methodology and the accompanying database Because the National Archives uses a different were in place by the end of April 1998; a substantially organizing and numbering system than that used by the refined version was completed two months later Three Ford Archives, the Ford Archives Research Project staff sweeps through the Archives' holdings enabled staff to made some modifications to the Ford database, and create a list of records that might be relevant The goal some changes were Incorporated into the research was to distinguish what was known from what they methods employed for the project. needed to know, and identify where this missing information might reside As a result of this Process.22 categories, or themes, were identified initially to help guide the"search through the records in the Ford Archives and the Henry Ford Museum. The number of categories was refined and modified over time to Incorporate nearly 100 subcategories under the 22 primary themes. Thw subject headings altn lyramp the basis for developing a database to keep track of the The need to coordinate the work of the Dearborn and Washington teams also created an opportunity to evaluate and improve research methods and the database of document descriptions. One result of this evaluation was that the teams created a quality control review system for every document description entered into the database See Appendix B for a detailed description of this system ongoing work; the database is tne key to using the collection and will bti invaluable 16 researchers as well. What emerged was a metnoa tor tracking work and assigning a unique number to identify each page of a document,a system that became increasingly important as the number of documents increased, as well as the number of locations where the documents existed The methodology and database were refined over time as part of an ongoing process, engaging staff in Dearborn, Washington, DC, England, and Germany, which, as we shall see, has contributed to the quality of the entire project One of the most vexing problems in this entire project has been the investigation of the financial operation ofFord-Werke during the war. Although two fires had destroyed many records at the Cologne plant, the Ford Archives Research Project did locate many financial records when the plant was thoroughly searched In 1999 and early in 2000 Once located, however. Interpreting these financial records was a problem. First, the accounting and tax systems used m Germany were different from those used in the United States. Second, these systems were not rigorously adhered to during the war Finally, there were In April 1998, after the basic research methods and database, including subject categories, were established, a third research team was assembled In Wkshington.The focus of this team was the vast holding of the U.S. National Archives, including captured German war records that were microfilmed after the wat Ford contracted with The Winthrop Group, a business archives consulting firm, to hire a team leaden Ford also contracted with History Associates Inc, a business history consulting firm with substantial experience in searching federal records and "applied" history projects -- research aimed at tracking records about a public numerous issues concerning depreciation schedules, monetary exchange rates, and a host of regulations governing the use of assets m Germany during the war In short, the entire issue of wages, profits, and other financial matters is extremely complex For this reason, Ford hired PricewaterhouseCoopers to assist in understanding the financial records of the period uncovered by the Ford Archives Research Project The PricewaterhouseCoopers team worked closely with the other teams in interpreting evidence as it was discovered, a collaboration that has been important to the research teams' understanding of the organization (< The Ford Archives Research Project and operations of Ford in Germany as well as in additional researchers were later added to the German Dearborn. team. In August 1998, preliminary surveys were made of The search of German records has been critical to the records storage areas at Ford offices In Dagenham and success of the project, but it has also been difficult Worley in England and in Cologne, Germany. Members because of the substantial challenges of working in of the research team also visited the Public Record German repositories Generally, one must apply well in Office in England and the EL-DE House in Cologne, a advance to receive permission to use the archives and documentation center dedicated to Cologne's history be assigned space to do research. Photocopying is also during the wan A second visit to Cologne occurred in much more difficult in Germany than in the United September These visits produced only a small number States; the task must be performed by repository staff of records, but in November a member of the and can take many months to complete Additionally, Washington team returned to England and conducted privacy laws in Germany are quite stringent and differ searches at Ford's offices in Warley, the Public Record from those in the Umted States, further complicating Office in Richmond, and the Imperial War Museum in and slowing the pace of research. In short, although a London. Ford-Werke in Cologne was visited again in thorough search of German archives was essential, December and a number of files, including financial coordinating this effort was complicated and it records, were located. substannally increased the time it took to complete the Even as all of this work was going on in Dearborn, Washington, England and Germany, it was dear that the search of German archives would be critical to the success of die entire project. After contacting a number of institutions and individuals, The Winthrop Group identified a team of historians in Germany to do archival research. In April 1998, Ford contracted with research In addition, the process of coding, translating, and preparing the worksheets and information to enter into the database was, as one can see from Appendix 8, both complex and tune consuming It took nearly 18 months, from January 1999 until mid-summer 2000, to complete this phase of the work. a German firm, the Lower Saxony Institute for Regional Another reason for the time taken to complete the Historical Research, to assemble a team of historians German part of the project was the finding of and archivists to survey selected German repositories additional materials at Ford-Werke In my Interim The Institute is a new organization affiliated with the Report of December 1998, I proposed making a University of Hanover, and provides project-based or thorough search of the Cologne plant even though it applied historical research for institutions for both non seemed unlikely that much had survived two fires and profit and corporate organizations After two meetings the ravages of war In August 1999, members of the in Hanover, which induded members of the U S teams, research teams from Dearborn and Washington a German historian from die Lower Saxony Institute, conducted extensive interviews with plant managers with extensive experience in archival research and and staff, which proved to be important for Nazi-era history, conducted an initial survey ofGerman understanding how the plant's records were organized repositories He wrote summaries of his findings for and where any surviving records from the war years each repository he visited and issued a report in might be located A careful survey of the extensive October 1998. As part of this report and in records stored at the plant turned up more than 25,000 consultation with another historian who is a specialist pages of documents, including financial records, In forced labor, he proposed a phut for the second phase personnel records, and production files, but very little of the project This report provided the basis for a information about forced labor Perhaps even more meeting in Hanover m early December with members important, the survey and subsequent searches ruled of the U.S. teams to discuss the proposed plan. While out the likelihood that any materials at Ford-Werke had these two German historians were initially the principal been missed researchers in this pan of the research project, four 7 An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Section II Motivation and Implications for Undertaking the Ford Archives Research Project The distinguished archivist Herman Kahn once observed that "one way of defining historical research is to say that it consists m considerable measure of reading other people's mail."' Justice Hugo Black destroyed all his "bench notes" rather than let them be used too soon by insensitive historians. A journalist's publication of excerpts from minutes of U S Cabinet meetings in the Eisenhower Administration so enraged members of Congress, who were denied access to the minutes on the grounds that such access would be a violation of "executive privilege;" that keeping minutes of Cabinet meetings was discontinued1 And more than one president has no doubt wished he had never taperecorded conversations and meetings for the sake of posterity. What is true for individuals, even Cabinet members, is also true for that legal personage, the corporation Lawyers who worry about liability and even more about the effect of adverse publicity on corporate profits often take a dun view of open access to archives. The recent hdgadon involving tobacco companies Is only the most recent ofmany examples of the danger of archives. All companies have records, which they must retain for legal and financial reasons and to document business transactions, protect proprietary claims, meet government requirements on a variety of personnel matters, and record decision-making activities Relatively few companies, however, maintain archives they are willing to make available to outsiders. Corporations sell more than products, they also sell an image or identity that directly affects public perceptions of their products and services It is not surprising, therefore, that many corporations do not make their records or archives accessible to the public and those that do carefully control and limit access to them. Just as members of the Cabinet objected to seeing their candid comments in pnnt, so, too, and for the same reasons, the deliberauons of officers of universities and corporations are generally dosed for a period of tune, ranging from 25 to 75 years At Harvard University, for example, records of the corporation -- the governing body of the university -- are dosed for 50 years and other files, for example, student files, are not accessible without the permission of a student. The issue of restrictions is not about the right of any institution -- a corporation, university, church, or an individual -- to place certain restrictions on their archives.the real issue is the type of restriction and how long it should apply. On this issue, honest people often disagree Institutions, induding universities, governments and corporations, have used various methods to protect the privacy of individuals and the free and open exchange * Herman Kahn."Who Shall Have Access'" Yale AlimmJ magazine, 3$. No 6 (March 1972), pp 6-11 i Ibid. An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime of opinions in management forums. While some Thirteen years later, Ford gave much of its historical groups limit access based on the time restrictions archives to Henry Ford Museum's Research Center described previously, others opt for review of a (generally known to the pubhc as Henry Ford Museum researcher's notes or photocopies of original & Greenfield Village). Remarkably, these archives were documents. Corporations such as Ford have used all of given to the museum (which, despite its name, is these techniques. Until recently, the Ford Archives, for independent from Ford Motor Company) with no example, dosed for 75 years any "records of such conditions placed on their use. nature chat their disclosure...might reasonably be expected to prove harmful to Ford Motor Company."' Business leaders often argue that decisions made for This makes it all the more noteworthy that in creating financial or business reasons cannot be bound by social the research collection on Ford duringWorldWir n this or moral strictures. The rules of the marketplace, as policy was not only waived, but the company has now George Soros puts it. are essentially amoral and not the changed the Archives Access Policy and eliminated the same as those we may choose to act ujion in our ' ' estrictions." ^ .- personal lives.* Companies must behave as businesses t and cannot be expected to act from humanitarian o m( i^y ^jnotlves; to do so Is to allow an advantage to one's competitors. This is hard rhetoric and an even harder Why has Ford gone to the trouble and expense of reality, for as the historian Peter Hayes has observed trying to find out what happened at Ford-Werke during about a German company during the war, "when die war? The class-action suit against Ford claimed that political changes condition profit making in ways that Ford was in contact with Ford-Werke throughout the tend to have immoral results, a capitalist system will war and was therefore aware of what was going on. prove strikingly malleable."' But if this'is so. then the The charge, however, seems to contradict the account of capitalist system might also be malleable for moral this period in Nevins and Hill's authorized history of purposes. Such corporate accountability, however, the company' What did become clear to me was that requires a degree of public scrutiny and the honing of no one at Ford now knows in detail what actually collective memory to guide the acuons ofcorporations, happened during the wan So, at one level, die answer governments, and individual citizens. In short, to the question of why bother uncovering the truth is corporate accountability requires open stress m_ that senior management wanted to get to the bottom of archives. Ford has chosen to provide such open access this discrepancy and determine what actually happened. Indeed, these managers believed they had a responsibility to do so Still, to confront the uncertainty of its past with the enormous emotional burden implicit in the term "forced labor" is highly unusual for any institution, but Moreover; it is dear that Ford Is committed to its especially a corporation concerned about corporate own history. The senior managers with whom I spoke image and, of course, legal liability I asked the seemed to be remarkably aware ofFord's role in history quesnon many times -- why did you go looking for and committed to preserving it. In 1951, Ford evidence that might not reflect well on Ford? I heard established the Ford Archives, one of the first all of the reasons I have already descnbed, but, In (he corporations in America to establish such a collection. end, perhaps the most compelling reason is that "Acoess Policy. Ford Motor CompanyArchives." ' Allan Nevins and Prank E. Hill, Red. Decline end Btbfith, 1933 1962 (NewYork* Charles Scribner's Sons.l 963) See also. Mira Wilkins and Prank & Hill, Amedeo Burfnm Ahead; Red en Six Continent! (Detroit. Wayne Suit University Press, 1964) ' George Soros, The Crisis of Giotxil Capitalism. Open Society Endangered (NewYork Public Affairs, 1998).pp.xv-xvll.43-46 Although Sotos acknowledges the unsentimental rules that guide money making, he is not an apostle of the marketplace as the ultimate arbiter of sodal values. In fact, his book is an impassioned appeal far collective action to preserve what he calls an "Open Society" * Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology IG Forben in the Karr En (Cambridge, England Cambridge University Press. 1987). p. 381 Motivation and Implications for Undertaking the Ford Archives Research Project management says it must stand behind the Ford name. Whatever did or did not happen more than SO years ago during a war must not be the excuse that prevents current management from doing the right thing, the integrity and image of Ford or; for that matter, individuals or governments, must not forever be held hostage to its past In effect. Ford seems to have decided that it is not only a business, but also a citizen of the world, a decision with implications that go far beyond Ford's immediate objective of finding the facts about what happened at Ford-Werke during the war Practical and Social Implications later rule books and manuals were attempts to establish control through communication, these were the tools for establishing orgartizauonal authority, registering decisions and poliaes, and providing the grounds for coiporate memory" If, however, corporate records are forever exempt from public access, then a significant segment of society's collective memory is lost. Responsible practice depends on public scrutiny of corporate decision-making, access to coiporate records is essential for this purpose. If, as many corporations insist, they have no archives, then both public scrutiny and corporate citizenship are denied. of die Project The implications of denied access may not be A December 6, 1998, editorial in the New Tbrk Tims, although hardly friendly to Ford, did raise the level of public discourse about corporate responsibility by looking beyond the claims made against American companies in Germany during World War n. The editorial, while arguing for corporate responsibility for Immediately apparent and go far beyond an assessment of an unpleasant era many would like to forget. Corporations, especially multinational corporations, exert enormous influence in the world today The decisions they make, even with the best of intentions, affect the lives of people everywhere. The traditional past actions, also recognizes that corporate responsibility is an ongoing problem and acknowledges the complexity of relationships between international corporations and dictatorial regimes. `It is unrealistic," according to the Tims, "to expea that corporations will refrain from trade or investment with bad governments. But they should hold themselves to some guidelines. Their own practices should not be abusive, even if local laws allow it."10 Fair enough But the guidelines are not always so easy to see; the complexity of operating in different cultures, with different political, economic, and legal systems, does not always translate seamlessly into responsible rules imposed by nation-states are no longer sufficient ' to regulate the actions of international organizations. In an age when in the course of a few months 40 percent of the population of Asia can suddenly be reduced to poverty by economic forces that no one truly understands, we may well wonder how humanity can avoid making unwise decisions, let alone informed or moral ones." Now more than ever, multinational corporations, some with wealth exceeding all but a handful of nations, make decisions that affect us all Collective memory, not laws or the legal system.sets the guidelines for responsible corporate behavior in an international setting corporate practice. This is not meant to excuse the abuses by American and foreign corporations described in the editorial, but it is an acknowledgement that historical reality is often complex and information at the time may be less than perfect. We tend to portray memory as a retrieval or representation of the world and conventionalize the past to make it fit our own experience. More recently, however, some researchers have begun to look at memory as an act that we participate in together, To understand decisions of the past, one must enabling a community to preserve a version of the examine the evidence contained in archives. It is perhaps worth remembering that one of the primary reasons corporations adopted systematic or scientific management procedures in the 19th century was to replace individual memory with organizational memory. The development of the circular letter and11 10 Editorial. "Corporations and Conscience," New York Tima (December 6,1998). p. 16 11 Joanne Yates, Control Through Comnumicaiion. The Rue of Spurn u AmaStea Monggemenl (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1989).pp 10-12,66-71. 11 Soros, ppL 13S-146 yin Independent Assessment of tile Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-WVrke Under the Nazi Regime past. And what we as a society choose to remember is preserved in archives, libraries, museums, and cultural artifacts. The act of remembering is captured in families and institutions, inducting corporations, and in the evidence contained in archives and libraries.11 It is no accident that after the collapse of Eastern Europe, the first thing people did was to seize the archives; it was an attempt to reclaim their identity Archives are essential to our collective memory; they represent who we are. The loss of archives, that is, the loss ofthe evidence that records the past, is not just a loss to scholars who try to interpret history and, to the extent that the past has any bearing on the present, help us to understand ourselves. Hie loss of that part of corporate memory embedded in archives is the loss also of what historian David Lowenthal calls "heritage," that is, the attempt to look at history with some purpose in mind. In the words of Lowenthal, "AD of us -- as individuals, as nations, as ethnic and other entities" induding corporations -- "adapt the past to our presumed advantage. Such acts undeniably deform history for heritage aims; and heritage is further corrupted by being popularized, commoditized, and politicized."'4 The existence of archives and the very idea of collective memory are not just academic exercises. What is saved and not saved in archives has real consequences for society. One of the defining questions of our time is how soda] institutions and values, induding economic institutions and organizations, can adapt in a period of increased globalization and accelerating change? How do we understand the consequences of our actions without a viable record of those institutions that are principal agents in these changes? Archives -- the evidence of our collective memory -- is the part of our experience we must examine as we attempt to adapt our institutions to these new conditions. As I have indicated, corporations have good reasons to be cautious about granting unconditional access to their records, which is why so many companies do not maintain archives. They have much to lose and, in the short run, little to gain But can any institution in a civilized society be exempt from public scrutiny? Individuals, in the United States at least, have recourse for recovering from the government informauon that has been limited or denied to them, no such right appears to exist in the case of individuals seeking information from corporations Yet the influence of corporations on our lives is equal or greater than that of government itself Ford Motor Company's response to the current inquiry about forced labor during the war is remarkable for bang the right decision at this time, and quite possibly the Tight decision for any time. Ford's decision suggests that it wants to be more than just a business, the creature of competitive interests alone It aspires also to be a citizen of the world Ford's decision to create a collection and make it accessible may make it untenable m the future for corporations to be excused from public scrutiny because they do not have an archive > David Middleton and Dexek Edwards, cds.. Collective ftenanhahy (London* Sage Publication!, 1990) David Lowenthal, foxed by the foL The Hedtqjc Crasode ad the S^dls of Hlstuy (NewYork. The Free Press. 1996), jx87 Section III Assessing the System of Access { Ford chose to make any evidence it discovered as a result of its investigation available to the public It was decided, therefore, to turn over this archive -- technically, a collection, since it comprises copies of materials drawn from a number of sources -- to an independent repository. The new collectioq, ''Erard. Werke TTp.W UaTt_&i.ginn> " will hp hftiised at the Research Center at Henry Ford Museum The collection will be accessible to anyone who wishes to examine it. Description of die System of Access The value ofany collection depends not only on the quality of its contents and occasionally its proximity to the researcher, but also on the quality and reliability of the finding aids and tools for using it. At one time, it was believed that archives might save money by reducing the space needed to store records; microfilm was the new technology that would provide a solution to this age-old problem Microfilm, like other forms of miniaturization, could of course save space (assuming one could discard die originals). It soon became dear, however, that the greatest cost was not storing a collection, but describing, or cataloging, it to enable readers with varied backgrounds asking unexpected questions to search it. With this in mind. Ford spared no expense and expended great effort to create a system of access that offers multiple paths into the Ford-Werke collection. The "system of access" prepared by the Ford Archives Research Project indudes an exceptionally nch database that Is searchable in a variety of ways, and a set of eight topical papers, referred to by the Ford Archives Research Project as white papers, that draw on and ate specific documents in the collection Additionally, a chronology provides summaries of the documents in chronological order, it is a tune line of the history oi "Ford-Werke. A report on the research findings, drawing on the white papers, provides an overview of the entire collection. Finally, an independent report by PncewaterhouseCoopers analyzes in considerable depth the financial issues concerning Ford-Werke during World War II; these findings nchly inform the report on the research findings The database, the report on the research findings, the white papers, and the chronology constitute a system of access for navigating the collecnon; they are an extraordinary set of tools for locating individual items and, at the same time, for viewing each item within its historical context. Each part of the system of access is described below Hie Database To manage and improve access to the collection of documents assembled by the Ford Archives Research Project, a database was created that will make it possible to locate specific documents in a variety of ways The I5 An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime database is the key to the collection. It is a guide, not it also provides unparalleled access to the collection for only to what is in the collection, but also to what has any researcher been evaluated and is not included in the collection. For each item in the collection, the database includes Chronology of Events information about the repository where it was found, as well as die item's record group, file folder and The approximately 600 jges of the chronology document number: The database is randiable by the document the history of Ford-Werke from 1907. the tide of the document. Bates numbtVsubject, date, date of Ford's first imjwrts to Germany, to ] 967. The repository, genre, and also by date and genre, for chronology is based on the documents in the collection example, "1938 report." In addition, one can conduct and Includes overviews of activities and events drawn a fiee-text search on any ofthe descriptions in the note from the summaries prepared for the database A few field. Equally important, and perhaps uniquely so, one historical gaps have been filled in from secondary can see which sources the research teams examined sources, for example, the entry under January 30, without finding information. By showing these 1933, states. "The radio interrupts us regular "failed" sources, the database will help a researcher programming shortly after noon to break the news that avoid spending time on fruitless searches On the other Adolf Hitler has been appointed Chancellor" This hand, a skeptical reader will be able to retrace the steps information was not included in any of the of the research teams to verify their accuracy or reveal repositories, but it is pertinent to the Ford-Werke their biases in selecting and rejecting materials for the context Thus, the chronology provides a time line of collection. Files that cannot be included in the the activities and events concerning Ford-Werke keyed collection for reasons ol privacy and German _ to the documents in the collection; it provides a useful enpgrim Hemal law have surrogate records wirir outline of the events of the period and will be summary description* and thp location of the originals, _ particularly useful to anyone interested only m events they ran /-Lr.,k,, ---------- --lirflfTT occurring at a particular time. It also provides a they are housed. The database may not eliminate the unifying framework for both the collection in general need to visit German archives, but it will be the starting and the report on research findings, discussed on the place far any inquiry even remotely related to the topics next page, which are organized around topics that covered in the collection. overlap one another chronologically. The database is unusual in providing a level ofdetail in a surrogate record that permits one to retrieve information without having to look at the original documents, many of which are in German. Also, instead of the traditional archival approach of ordering information by provenance or function, the database created by the Ford Archives Research Project is structured in a way that permits one to retrieve everything on, say, Belgium, or a coded subject or keyword in the note field. The process of translating and summarizing documents and coding them for subjects (described in Appendix B) provides a level of detail rarely found in archival inventories or guides The level ofdetail added significantly to the complexity ofthe project and the time required to complete it, but 11A Bites number Is i control number tbit uniquely identifies each page of every document in (be collection. White P apers: Topical Guides to the Collection A series of white papers, or topical papers, based on the documents in the collection, were prepared by members ofthe Ford Archives Research Project as a way of focusing on the central themes of the project The white papers provide a historical context and framework for integrating the documents drawn from multiple sources for each topic They also provide a way for slicing a large and complex mass of documents into manageable pieces Eight white papers were produced over the course of the project They are. 1 Historical Research on the Activities of FordWerke AG During the Second World War This report discusses all of the repositories visited during the project and includes a list of the collections that were examined Assessing the System of Access 2. Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke AG Communications During the Second World War 3. Key People in the History of Ford-Werke, Cologne. 4. War Damage to Ford Facilities In Europe 5. Postwar Military Government Supervision of Ford-Werke. 6. Ford-Werke in the Nazi Era. 1933-1945. This paper incorporates several themes, military production and its role during the war. Nazi economic polities and controls over the auto industry, and Ford-Werke's relations with other Ford facilities in occupied Europe 7. Ford's Contribution to the Allied Wir Effort During WorldWar II. 8 Foreign and Forced labor at Ford-Werke AG During World Whr D. In addition, PricewaterhouseCoopers has prepared a report that provides in-depth coverage of finances of Ford-Werke before, during, and just after the war. Report on the Research Findings A report cm the research findings titled Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime provides an overview of the activities and events of the period documented by the collection. Although the report consciously tries to avoid interpretation or conclusions, it does provide historical background for the activities and events documented by the collection. In this sense, the report, like (he white papers, aims to be objective and tries to avoid any interpretation of the evidence The goal is to let the facts speak for themselves, as it were, even when documents occasionally contradict one another. This objective has largely been achieved, although one might argue that "objectivity" is negated oy the very selection ofthe1 documents to be included In the report in any case, the report, like the collection itself, does not flinch from presenting conflicting evidence, and includes those documents that do not reflect favorably on FordWferke For example, the report contains conflicting testimony about conditions of foreign and forced workers at Ford-Werke, especially regarding medical treatment The evidence on some topics is scarce and can be quite ambiguous. To Ford's credit.the ambiguity and complexity has been preserved and is reflected both m the collection and in this report on the research findings The report follows the archival tradition of providing a context for understanding the documents within the collection The report includes extensive citations to specific documents that greatly assist readers wanting to know more or examine in detail a particular topic Reading through the entire report provides an overall sense of the content and the scope of the collection; browsing the table of contents or selected portions of the report lets the reader determine whether there are materials in the collection that are worth further investigation. The report is an important and useful contribution to the system of access to the collection. An Independent Assessment of tbe Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Section IV Assessing the Ford Archives Research Project I Managing such a complex project was an ongoing implementing the project, has extensive experience in challenge for the Ford Archives Research Project The managing corporate archives. Because this was sheer size and scope of the project, with five research essentially an archival project, her experience has been teams on two continents, dealing in two languages, crucial to the project's success She has a small, different cultures, and multiple archival repositories -- competent staff at the Ford Archives in Dearborn, each with their own procedures and rules -- required which was supplemented by a number of leadership, flexibility, and good communication. paraprofessionals in the early stages of the project and i Delays prevented the project from being completed as professional historians, who were hired over the course quickly as expected or hoped Intense press scrutiny of the project created periodic demands on Ford Archives Research Project staff members to search for documents to support a public response by Ford to one allegation or another. Ford's legal department developed requirements for the project (discussed later in this report) that resulted in the creation of a remarkable database. However; the development of the database added significantly to the cost and time it took to complete die project. Pressure to make the collection available quickly, especially during the first year, was perhaps Inevitable, but Ford did not permit the exigencies of legal issues or public relations to undermine its primary objectives of being thorough and finding the facts. lb quickly put together teams in Washington and Germany, Ms. Adkins turned to The Winthrop Group and History Associates Inc Winthrop provided the team leader, an archivist with extensive experience in corporate archives and knowledge of federal records, to manage the Washington team History Associates provided the historians for the Washington team, including an economic historian, a historian who has worked extensively with federal records on a number of research projects, and a native German specialist in the history of Nazi Germany This was a highly skilled group, with historical knowledge, research experience, professionalism, and independent judgment that contributed enormously to the thoroughness of the Managing and Raffing die Project entire project Ford assembled a highly professional staff to conduct this project Elizabeth Adkins, Ford's manager of Archives Services,who planned and was responsible for The German team was under the direction of a Ph.D m modem history who has worked on many research projects on Nazi-era history Another historian, a I7 An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime specialist in forced labor and compensation issues, Staff went through the boxes of material that looked served as an adviser on the initial survey and jomed the promising and photocopied any relevant content for project in January 1999. The German team also had the inclusion in the collection. In all, more than 5,000 advice of an archivist who is a member of a long-term boxes of material were examined -- not including the project to research the Nazi era. She has investigated German archives, where documents are retrieved by forced labor and provided advice about the nature of folder, not by carton. archival materials on forced labor As project manager, Elizabeth Adkins had to balance Although the manager of Ford's Archives Services the varied and sometimes conflicting expectations of was responsible for leading die Ford Archives Research several professions, some within the company, with the Project, Ford also relied on outside historians and muldple needs of five research teams scattered across archivists to staff the project. PrlcewaterhouseCoopeis two continents. She responded to these pressures by assigned an experienced accountant to lead its effort to creating a remarkably open environment that fostered assist the Ford Archives Research Project in identifying communication and engaged a very diverse staff m an and understanding the financial records of this period. iterative process that contributed enormously to the To provide historical advice. Ford hired Dr Simon success of the entire project Reich, a political scientist who has conducted extensive research on the automotive industry in Germany The sheer volume of archives that the Ford Archives during and after Vfarld War n'and is narticularly "Rescarch had to examine and the quantity of knowledgeable about Ford Motor Company He advised the Ford Archives Research Project about potential German sources and has helped to ensure that no important archival sources were overlooked Finally, as indicated in the beginning of this report, I was hired to provide an independent assessment of the archival methods and procedures for creating die collection and how the public would be able to retrieve information from it. I have a PhD. in history and more than 25 yean of experience administering archives and libraries at Harvard and Hie universities. I was also asked to validate die independence of the enure project. Appendix A outlines the steps I followed in monitoring the project. documents that had 10 ^ PhotocoPled' descnbedcategorized, and entered into the database required a flexible process that could evolve over tune. The research team's flexibility and willingness to adapt methods to the particular circumstances of each situation have been critical to the success of the project. Fear of losing control over the process and inordinate expectations for completing the project in a few months might easily have resulted in the adoption of prescriptive procedures. If the Ford Archives Research Project had resorted to a less flexible process, the result would have been a disaster Staff excessively devoted to following a blueprint is unlikely to take risks or follow their hunches in seeking evidence The more open and iterative process adopted by the Ford Archives Research Decisions for Success Project ensured that the principal focus was on collecting the evidence and not on obsessively I cannot emphasize enough the tremendous scope scrutinizing the methodology and adhering to a plan and size of this project and how much work the Ford Archives Research Project has done in a very short period of time. This was an enormous undertaking During the past 3 'A years, 45 people have, at various times, been employed on the project. More than 8,000 cubic feet of materials were reviewed at the Ford Archives and records facilities, Henry Ford Museum's Research Center, and the National Archives The guides and indexes to these materials were analyzed first to determine whether they contained relevant materials With five teams turning up documents, it was essential to track what was being discovered and where each piece fit into the collection. To this end, weekly conference calls to compare notes and offer leads were conducted among members of the Dearborn and Washington teams with the occasional participation of the PrlcewaterhouseCoopers team. AH of the team members with whom I spoke agreed that these exchanges were essential to the ongoing work of the Assessing (be Ford Archives Research Project project Because the Dearborn teams began work two to research that aims to document a particular issue, months before the Washington team, they could direct often stemming from litigation, that has become the Washington team to look for certain materials. This increasingly common in the United States. The helped the Washington team to alert staff working at difference in the two approaches is illustrated by the the National Archives to be on the lookout for certain fact that the new National Archives facility in College kinds of information, this assistance proved invaluable Park, Maryland (Archives II) has an entire area devoted in locating important documents. These ongoing to servicing the requests of lawyers, reporters, and discussions were also important in helping to refine the others for large quantities of documents about a database, prepare the research reports, and develop specific issue or event. There is simply nothing effective subject categories and quality control comparable to the National Archives' service in German procedures, which are described in Appendix B. archives, where a "qualified" scholar must write -- It soon became apparent to the research teams that to locate and photocopy the most important documents from a huge quantity of records meant that they could not try to identify every last shred of evidence. Thus, the teams, especially those working on the vast holdings of die National Archives and the microfilm of sometimes with an introduction -- to reserve a place for doing research in each archive. These differences in culture, archival practices, and notions of the l*v, along with more stringent requirements for confidentiality and privacy in Germany, increased the time it took to complete the project rLwnjjjT. adopted rim 80/20 rule, the idea that Perhaps the most noteworthy impact of Ford's 20 percent ofthe archives would produce 80 percent of decision to open the collection to the public has been the evidence. This Is an archival approach to gathering its positive influence on the way members of the five evidence. In contrast, scholars typically wish to teams approached their work. The level of involvement evaluate and interpret each document. For the and commitment to the project by historians and archivist, the aim is to copy any relevant document, archivists who contracted with Ford was substantially rather than read and evaluate each piece of evidence greater than one might have expected if there had not For example, one would photocopy a statement by been a commitment to make the evidence available to Robert Schmidt, Custodian of Ford-Werke, about a the public The highly emotional nature of the issues in meeting he attended in Portugal during the war; rather this research was bound to raise fears about Ford's than try to determine whether the statement is true or commitment to reveal evidence that might not reflect an embellishment. This practical accommodation for well on the company What I discovered, however, was managing the project was qualified by the desire of that the team members all demonstrated a level of Ford's legal team to be more exhaustive in the pursuit commitment to, and engagement in, the research that of all potential sources of evidence. Nevertheless, the equaled the importance of the issues under 80/20 rule proved to be an essential strategy for investigation At no time during the course of my dealing with an enormous quantity of records. If the investigation has anyone at Ford or anyone involved in Ford Archives Research Project has done its job well,the the Ford Archives Research Project suggested or given basic story of Ford-Werke during the war will not be any indication that they would avoid evidence or appreciably altered by the discovery of new documents certain issues because the disclosure might be in the future. embarrassing to Ford In sum, I believe Ford's The inevitable tension between the archival -- just the facts -- approach and the historians' desire to pursue every lead and interpret the evidence required commitment to open access has been critical to the quality of work and personal involvement of project staffand, ultimately, to die quality of the collection. members of both professions to adjust their principles and resist some inclinations of their respective fields. The German historians, for example, who were very Expanding the Scope of the Project and Delays Along the Way disciplined in their approach to documentary evidence, The scope of the research project expanded over the were less familiar with the kind of wholesale approach course of time, and inevitable delays were encountered Aa Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Searching was refined over time as researchers learned Archives Research Project. Counsel nude no requests more about Ford-Werke and Germany during the was to verify or deny specific facts about issues of forced The team conducted selective oral history interviews to labor or communications between Ford and Ford- supplement the documentary evidence or enrich Werke during the war. Legal concerns did have an knowledge about issues for which there was little impact on the project in setting a tone or general documentation. When die researchers examined the direction for thoroughness' Legal teams requested that Ford-Werke plant, turning up more documents than researchers look for documents that historians would they expected to find, they decided to copy everything consider less valuable. For example, research staff pertaining to Ford during die war and not just examined all of the files of the U S Embassy in Great documents that fit the primary criteria of the research Britain, not just the files that mentioned Ford. project. Their rationale was that information about the Voluminous embassy files in the records of the State operation of Ford-Werke during this period was scarce, Department for several countries -- France, Portugal, hence any and all documents ought to be preserved. Spain, and Sweden -- were searched, even though it Actually, although the personnel and other seemed unlikely they would provide much information (administrative files discovered during the search of aboutFord-Werke; and. in fact, they did not. The value Ford-Werke contained little information about forced of conducting such a thorough search was that there labor, they were, nevertheless, quite helpful for would be no surprises in the future Consequently, the understanding the operation and condinons of the legal influence on the search was driven less by the " plant during the war. expectation of finding useful documents and more by Not only was the scope of the project and the volume of documents that woe copied and processed daunting, butlfae Ford Archives Research Project had to consider different perspectives within Ford Motor Company and balance these against the primary fact finding mission of the project The company's legal team was obviously Interested to know about any documents or evidence that might have a bearing on pending legal matters. The legal team therefore the intention of ensuring that the records of certain agencies and offices had been thoroughly searched, even if the search revealed nothing new The legal goal was to ''get everything" in certain quarterr in contrast to the 80/20 rule; the result was to lengthen the time spent looking for documents that seemed unlikely, from an historian's perspective, to produce new information But it also ensured nothing was missed that might later alter the story told by the collection promoted searches in certain record groups that Throughout the course of the project, but especially historians on die research teams deemed a lower during the first 18 months, media reports put priority. Ford's Public Affairs staff had to respond to enormous pressure on Ford to respond to accounts and media charges that were often sweeping and inaccurate. allegations, diverting Ford Archives Research Project The work of collecting and photocopying documents stafffrom their work News stories about Ford's use of cm two continents and, even more, creating a system to forced labor, descriptions of conditions of workers provide access to It, clearly committed the archivists during the war, reiteration of old charges about Henry and historians to a slower pace than their colleagues in Ford, especially charges of anti-Semitism and his the company might expect Balancing the needs of acceptance of the Grand Cross (the highest honor the each group was an ongoing challenge, to its credit, the German government could bestow upon a non-German company and the Ford Archives Research Project never citizen during the Nazi regime), and other sensational lost sight of its primary objective to find out what charges had Public Affairs personnel working overtime happened in Germany during the war. Often they had to check with the Archives to verify facts The legal challenges to Ford did extend the time it took the Ford Archives Research Project to complete its work. However, Ford's lawyers never changed the direction of the search for documents by the Ford or look up documents to correct misinterpretations or charges that simply had no basis in fact. A few examples will Illustrate the way media stones diverted the Ford Archives Research Project from its principal mission. 10 fini Assessing tbe Ford Archives Research Project Ifi " One story claimed that Ford-Werke plant manager immediately dispatched to Auschwitz, where it was Robot Schmidt, who was later named custodian by the learned that the only mention of Ford contained m a Supreme Court of Cologne, was a member of the Nazi newly released index of documents at Auschwitz was a party. This statement was based on a letter in the files letter ordering a part for a truck This fact was hardly of the United States Department ofJustice and was well worthy of a headline, but this kind of media attention known to project staff, but they had never been able to buffeted and diverted Archives staffthroughout the first confirm it with other sources, such as the official 18 months or so of the project and further delayed its membership files of the Nazi party in Cologne. completion. Moreover; a thorough search for this evidence after the war by Allied military authorities was also unable to verify Schmidt's membership in die Nazi party It is unlikely Schmidt could have been appointed custodian II in May 1942 without the approval of the Nazi party, II even if he never officially became a member. II Nevertheless, the sensational nature of the accusation, | especially after Schmidt was rehired by Ford after the war, required Ford Archives Research Project staff to devote time once again to a search for anything that might shed light on this claim. While research to support legal and public relations requirements contributed to the complexity and length of the project, the aspect of the project most responsible for complicating and expanding it was the `-`*`*""1 pf - ,4,,,,, IoqjI ra,l.^r archival, principles. The system of access to the collecdon, described previously, is a hybrid system derived from legal practice, historical methods, and archival principles. The database follows a legal model that summarizes documents and provides access to each item in the collection The model enables busy lawyers On another occasion there were reports that 40 to quickly locate specific documents during litigation babies died at Ford-Werke during the war. But because histon?ns, instead of paralegal staff wrote ' Investigation revealed that this was the number of the notes and summaries, the descriptions tend to be infants who died in Cologne and not the number of briefer than the more detailed summaries a lawyer infant deaths at the Ford plant. Again, staffhad to spend might expect from their paralegal staff For archivists, time looking for information to respond to and correct such a system is an unimaginable luxury Despite the these public allegations by the press. cost in time and effort of developing such a database, Another sensauonal story reported that Ford Motor Company was implicated in the horrors ofAuschwitz. A member of the German research team was this system of access will provide both scholars and casual users with unparalleled access, by a variety of criteria, to individual items in a large and complex collecuon. 11 An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nan Regime Assessing the Collection The collection created by the Ford Archives Research Project represents an exhaustive effort to find the facts about the operation ofFord-Werke during the war and postwar military control, the use of forced labor at the Cologne plant, and Ford-Werke s relations with Dearborn during the war As stated previously, it is entirely possible that additional documents eventually will be discovered in Germany or elsewhere, but it is unlikely that any new evidence will change significantly the basic story told by this collection Scholars may interpret the evidence by the light of their own experiences, convictions, and historical understanding, but any future study must beffin with the collection of Ford in Germany in World War n The Collection The evidence assembled in this collection is indispensable for a study ofFord-Werke for this penod. The collection's contents include materials on the history of Ford-Werke, Nazi economic policies and their control over the automotive Industry, German industrial mobilization and preparations for war; Ford and the wartime economy, and military production at Ford-Werke. Also included is significant information about foreign and forced labor in Germany dunng the war, Ford-Werke's relationship with other Ford facilities in occupied Europe, and communications between Ford-Werke and Ford Motor Company headquarters in Dearborn Finally, significant material on the end of the war and postwar military occupauon, war damage to Ford-Werke, and the finances ofFord-Werke during the war and the postwar period rounds out the collection Gaps In the Collection The collection has some gaps in its content In spite of an exhaustive search of the records m Dearborn, the US National Archives. Ford-Werke, and numerous archives in Germany, there are several topics for which the lack of documentation is disappointing One of the key issues for the Ford Archives Research Project was to find out what happened to foreign workers at FordVvferke. The collection provides good data about the number of workers, but information about individuals is very limited Some personnel files for German employees were found at Ford-Werke. but no file exists on. forced workers, and little information on them appears to have survived the war Much of what is known about the workers has come from oral history interviews, long after the war, and, as one might expea, there is confliamg testimony about local The Ford Archives Research Project might have found information about forced labor, including information about Ford-Werke`s application for workers, at the Cologne labor Office. However, me II An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime office was bombed during the war and the records were apparently destroyed. Following the path that had previously been pursued by Allied military government investigators immediately after the war. the Ford Archives Research Project tried to find some remnant of these records in Cologne, but found very little. economic and industrial policies and their effect on companies. During the war. foreign companies such as Ford operated under the management of a custodian appointed by the Nazi party. This and other aspects of the company's experience of operating during the war are amply represented in this collection. Research at Ford-Werke also revealed conflicting Although documentation about individual forced reports about the number of workers at the end of the workers at Ford-Werke is limited and the collection says war. Allied farces reported numbers that are higher little about how workers were recruited or forced to go than those dted by official Ford accounts It is possible to Germany, the collection contains important diat the U.S. Army's numbers are only rough estimates information about the policies and actual use of forced of the number ofpeople they found as they entered the labor in Germany during the war. Working and hving Cologne plant. In the confusion of the last days of the conditions could vary from one plant to another and war people simply found shelter where they could, from one region of Germany to another, but the which may explain why the Army's numbers were collection does provide a good picture of the role of higher than the company's records suggested forced labor in German industry in general, and Ford- Unfortunately, there appears to be no way of knowing Wake in particular, during this period how many ofthe people the Army found at Ford-Werke were actually forced workers and how many were refugees or even ifthe company's figures were accurate. American attitudes toward the use of forced labor is another tonic on which this mllemnn is quite illuminating The complexity of the entire issue of Research Opportunities forced labor and the ambiguous relationship of a foreign company, such as Ford, to the German With the exception of someone writing a history of government is evident in the collection So, too, is the Ford-Werke during the war; having die collection at plight of German managers and workers who had to Henry Ford Museum's Research Center may not save a negotiate between the demands of the Nazi regime and researcher a trip to Germany.1* However, the scope of their own survival. Based on the evidence in this the collection and the power of the database and other collection, the experiences of both companies and finding aids make it the starting place for researching a individuals appear to have been more complex than number of topics concerning Germany during the war their critics assume. In addition to serving as a comprehensive resource for die study of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke during the war years, this collection constitutes a very significant and important historical resource for several other topics, as outlined in the following paragraphs. The history of emerging international corporations is also complex, and is well documented in this collection The early history of globalization and all of its attendant complications is one of the more interesting strengths of the collection Ford began Anyone interested in the question of how industry producing automobiles in Germany in 1925 and in (not Just Ford) operated under the Nazi regime will Cologne in 1931; it also had a number of plants and find a gold mine of information in this collection. operations throughout Europe At the time. Ford was Although there may have been unique aspects about becoming a global corporation and had to negouate Ford's relationship to the Nazi regime, principally among different governments, legal practices, and tax because it was a foreign company, the collection codes, as well as a variety of customs and employment provides substantial documentation about Nazi general practices for labor and management The collection documents the struggle of one company to find a niche it^hbough farced labor ii thoroughly documented In the , because of Genus privacy lawi.tome documents 'relating to inHtwAnU ran be examined only In the German in an important industry that was rapidly becoming a global enterprise, a development that was further complicated by a world at war The evidence points to I Assessing the Collection a far more complex history than many have assumed. Instead of a monolithic corporation with each foreign plant tightly controlled by Dearborn, the documents reveal an organizational structure in which the parent company had to accommodate itself to local and sometimes hostile conditions. The relationship of parent and local companies was complicated by the parent company's relationships with its other production facilities, which were operating in neighboring and often competing countries within the same regional market. Many of the early issues of globalization and international competition faced by Ford and others of this period resonate even more today lS An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Section VI Conclusion I As I began to write this report, I became increasingly aware that Ford Motor Company's effort to document these events and make diem public could have major implications for the way all corporations and institutions win have to conduct themselves in the future Public reaction to the revelation of forced labor and the atrocities of die Nazi regime has led some observers to rush to judgment -- even when the evidence is less than compelling. But in trying to find documents that might reveal what actually happened during the war. Ford has done more than just find the facts. By acknowledging Its own history during a complex and ambiguous period of history, Ford has set a standard that could influence other companies to open their records to public scrutiny in the future. Few companies m the United States have created archives that are accessible to the public. This lack of access is a serious deficiency, made worse in an increasingly global economy Corporate history is not just a matter of academic curiosity, but a matter of public policy with implications for people in environments where national policies and laws are often less binding than the forces of global competition. Perhaps an understanding of the complex events concerning the use of forced labor at Ford-Werke during World War n will help us all -- governments, corporations, and individuals -- negotiate the difficult path between economic opportunity and social justice. n An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime Appendix A Monitoring the Research Project 1 carefully monitored the work of the Ford Archives Research Project from September 1998 to the end of July 2001. During that time, I had full access to all the documentation that was produced by the Ford Archives Research Project. I had numerous opportunities to meet with research team staff in Dearborn, Washington, and Germany, and I visited all three sites on two or more occasions. Moreover, 1 had ongoing, open communication with Elizabeth Adkins, the manager of the project and manager of the Ford Archives Services, and the manager of the Washington team, as well as several of the principal historians from History Associates who worked in the Washington office. I visited Ford Motor Company in September 1998 and met with Ford senior management. Public Affairs personnel, and attorneys from the Office of General Counsel I visited the archives, met with the research teams, reviewed the research reports, and examined various categories and samples of records. I visited Henry Ford Museum's Research Cenja, which will house and service the collection, and also spent time examining the database that was created for the collection and had an opportunity to examine at random die documents that were assembled. I met twice with the Washington team and visited the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, where so much of the Washington team's work was conducted. 1 thoroughly reviewed the methods and procedures used by the Washington team in coordination with the Dearborn team, and reviewed research plans and progress reports of these teams, as well as those of the German team. In November 1998, after several telephone conversations, I met with Dr Simon Reich, a polmcal scientist at the University of Pittsburgh, who made extensive use of the Ford Archives as pan of his study of the World War II-era automobile industry in Germany. Because of his knowledge of the German automobile Industry during the war and especially because he had done extensive research in the Ford Archives, I believed that Dz Reich might be very helpful in identifying potential sources to search, especially in Germany. He agreed to become a consultant to the Ford Archives Research Project. In December 1998,1 spent a week in Germany and attended joint meetings of the German and American teams to discuss the plans and procedures for the search of the German archives. On the basis of this review and in my interim report, completed in December 1998,1 recommended a thorough search of Ford-Werke Preliminary searches of the plant did not reveal much information, and the prospect of finding additional materials did not seem particularly promising, but I thought it was important to determine this through a careful inspection of the plant The project manager An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nozt Regime agreed with this opinion and in August 1999, die project manager, several members of the Ford Archives Research Project, and I returned to Germany and interviewed senior managers at the plant In an effort to locate any records that might have survived the war. I witnessed the preliminary examination of several record storage areas at the Cologne plant. This set the stage for a thorough review of the Ford-Werke files by Ford Archives Research Project staff, the result of which was the uncovering of a significant number of documents, including financial documents from the war years and records about the operation of the plant. In the course ofmy inrestigation, I read a number of books and articles pertaining toWorld Wu n, especially regarding the use of forced labor in Germany, and I also discussed the project with several historians. La addition, I visited the U.S. Department of Commerce library in Wuhingtan and the Harvard University and Yale University libraries to examine resources that I thought might be fruitful for the project. At Harvard, I checked guides to the Harvard University Archives and visited the Houghton library, which did have one potentially relevant collection At Yale University's Manuscripts and Archives department, I checked two collections that I thought might have materials -- they did not -- and also looked at the catalog and met with the archivist of the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies. In pan, this effort aimed to discover potential sources among the personal papers of people who were involved in the war, especially the Allied Occupation, and to determine whether any of these people were in possession of useful collections For this purpose. I also checked the Research Libraries Network (RUN), a national database of collections held by repositories throughout the country. None of these efforts produced any new evidence, but I was able to eliminate these potential sources from further consideration. I Appendix B Procedures for Processing Documents from German Archives and Preparing I Information for Entering into I the Project Database I I The following is an outline ofthe procedures used to second copy is retained in Hanover and is filed by process documents retrieved and copied from a record group and file number for each repository number of German repositories and to track and enter information into the master file database. The procedures evolved over time as personnel changed and procedures were refined This outline will give the reader a sense of the complexity of this entire project -- especially the practical and logistical difficulty in assembling documents from multiple repositories, each with its own policies and conditions for using and photocopying documents in its coDecnons Working in two languages was an ongoing problem. Finally, document summary and subject coding methods changed as new information became available and new questions affected what Information was highlighted or summarized. This was an iterative process that required ongoing revisions. In Washington, the copied German documents are checked by a researcher fluent in German,to ensure the worksheet matches the copies and includes the correct record group number, file number, name of repository, title of record, etc The German files are usually subdivided into multiple documents and additional worksheets are prepared At the beginning of the research effort, the German worksheet was not the same as die one used in Washington (because of language differences), so information had to be reentered and the information translated into English. By the time of the meeting in Dusseldorf, Germany at the end of 1998, however, the German team included bilingual staff and they could use the same work form used in Washington. However, the German team Following the research plan, researchers in Germany continued to take their notes in German, which then mark for copying the relevant documents. After the had to be translated into English for the master file orders are completed, researchers check the order to be database. A key part of this process was ensuring that sure the right materials have been copied. the translations were consistent, especially references to Photocopied materials are sent to the German Project Office in Hanover, where the office's research notes database is updated. One copy of each document is made. The original copy and a worksheet with the essential information about the document and where it came from are sent to the Washington office. The the document provenance information, eg, title of record group, official name of German government offices, etc. Working at the document level was complicated by the fact that a file of several documents might all belong together but at other times they might all be separate and distinct, as would be the case with correspondence .51 An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime A Bates number is assigned to each page of a to be reviewed by the project manager, Elizabeth document. This is a control number that uniquely Adkins. The reviewed materials and suggested changes identifies each page of the documents in the collection are sent back to Washington For the most part, The Bates number is recorded on the worksheets. changes involved supplying additional information for Documents and worksheets are copied in the Washington Project Office. The original copy is sent to document summaries to help users who might need more explanation for some references Dearborn. A file folder is prepared for the Washington Corrections/additions suggested by the project office and the documents are filed first by repository, manager are made by the Washington Project Office. then by Bates number. Database entries are printed and filed with original In theWashington office, the German documents are copies m Dearborn and the Washington entries are reviewed for a second time and a summary of each merged with the Dearborn database Until the very end document is prepared in English. There are three parts of the project, two databases, with slightly different to this critical process. First, establish the date of the formats, are maintained, one in Dearborn and one in document Second, describe the document type, for Washington example, memo, letter, report, etc. and other information, for example, author/recipient of a letter Third, prepare a summary of the content for entry into the database. Also, direct quotes and other specific information are given specific reference by ating the Bates number. Lastly, the Washington project manager and an historian from History Associates conduct a quality control review of database entries Quality control was an ongoing process conducted after research was completed in Washington and again after research was completed in Germany. The purpose of this final review The Washington project manager reviews the was to check for consistence in collection tides, worksheets and the content summary, notes, etc The translated names, etc. and also to cross-check the document is revised if necessary master file database with research notes to ensure that all the research was recorded. The Washington project manager also does the subject coding For documents relating to financial The entire process for building the database, matters, additional coding is provided. Coding for checking and cross checking entries was,as this outline financial materials has been provided by suggests, a painstaking procedure, made more so by the PricewaterhouseCoopers, the consulting organization detailed structure ofthe database. In large measure, this on financial records of the project detailed database followed a legal model that was At this point, the information is keyed into the database in Wishington from the worksheets. further complicated by the need to create the collection from multiple sources on two comments and in two languages. The resulting computer-accessible database, Information entered into the database is checked again by the Washington project manager to ensure the accuracy of the information. which will be available at Henry Ford Museums Research Center, will provide a powerful search engine that will be enormously beneficial to scholars Additions to the database are e-mailed to Dearborn (initially done weety, this later became a periodic task) r _ v 7y/y1(' (>'/'// <y?vr/~)i/e //*e /(Z./ie/tc/e.') e//i r/ur/Z