Document 44kVO68EOpe1ZwMmwpjGv1wMV

FILE NAME: Visible Dust (VDT) DATE: 2005 DOC#: VDT022 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Journal Article - The Navy and Asbestos Thermal Insulation A bstract Asbestos was once used in U. S. Navy shipboard pipe and machin ery thermal insulation and in many other shipboard products. It was also used throughout the coun try in thousands o f commercial products and in some products it remains in use today. The health hazards o fasbestos have resulted in an increasing number o f lawsuits that involve, among many others, manufacturers o fNavy hardware. The plaintiffs in these lawsuits include many who were exposed to asbestos while sewing in Navy ships built during and following WWII. Because the materials are dry, friable, and easily accessible, the most likely source o f their Navy shipboard exposures was thermal insulation. In this article the evolu tion o fthermal insulation systems in WWII and post-WWII ships is described, Navy and national asbestos consumption patterns are compared, the asbestos industrial hygiene environment o fthe times are described, and a perspective on asbestos concerns from a hard ware manufacturers'standpoint is provided. The liability situation regarding asbestos may be seen as a pattern causing Navy manufactur ers to seek some form o fwaiver o f liability or other relieffrom the Government for all hazards arising from their Navy work. Naval engineers have a responsibil ity to understand the background surrounding the use o fasbestos, particularly as they continue to deal tvith new systems and materials that could potentially impact die future health o f those who come in contact with them. NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL The Navy and Asbestos Thermal Insulation a Den is H. Ru sh w o rth Introduction Asbestos was once an industrial material widely,used through much of the 20th century in thousands of products including thermal insulation in Navy ships. During the past thirty years, there has been a great deal of litigation regarding such products. The health hazards of asbestos as used in certain industries were first reported as early as the 1930's and were more gener ally established by the early 1970's. At about the same time, a large number of lawsuits were initiated to seek compensation for those injured. These cases first focused on the manufactur ers of asbestos products such as thermal insulation and textiles. The cases were supported by documents dating from as early as the 1930's reporting asbestos-related fibrosis hazards to the professional occupational health community. Other documents suggested that some manufacturers of asbestos products might have concealed information about the dangers of the asbestos fiber from their customers and the public. Many if not all of these manufacturers were bankrupted as a result of perceived or litigation-enforced liability. In recent years, the legal focus of Navy-related asbestos litiga tion has shifted to manufacturers of hardware such as pumps and valves that used small amounts of asbestos packing or gaskets and which may have carried thermal insulation once installed. The Navy, usually exercising its right to immunity to liability because of its status as a sovereign agency, has avoided liability claimed against it. A recent New York case promises to take asbestos liability a step further. The case involved a sailor who served aboard a WW11 ship during the 1960's who asserted that his work near insulated pumps in his ship caused his injuries. The court suggested that the pump whose manufacturer was subject to potential liability because it failed to warn of the dangers of asbestos insulation that the shipyard, not the pump manufacture^ applied to the pumps. Asbestos was once so widely used that under this judicial SPRING 2005 IS 35 The Nayyand Asbestos Thermal Insulation 3 6 B SPRING ZOOS ruling, manufacturers of nearly anything that went into a Navy ship during and following WWII could be held liable for asbestos injuries. Should the rational of the New York decision spread; the Navy may be confronted with a whole new series of demands from its equipment manufacturers for legal pro tections such as full indemnity for damages paid to plaintiffs. In this paper; the industrial environment sur rounding the past use of asbestos thermal insulation in the Navy is explained, and how the court's requirement that the defendant warn users of its products could not reasonably have been implemented is explored. The article is written so that naval engineers can understand what equip ment manufacturers and other contractors facing asbestos-related liability may need or demand in the future from the Navy. It is also written as an object lesson teaching that materials, however benign they may appear; can be problematic in the future in wholly unexpected ways. Background During WWIL, large numbers of Navy ships were built which served through the next four decades. Some sailors and maintenance workers who served aboard these ships during their life times have become the source of much current Navy-related asbestos litigation. Therefore, it is useful to review the situation regarding thermal insulation in these ships. Asbestos Was Once a Common But Not Universal Insulator in Nauy Ships It is likely that the most abundant asbestos prod uct used in Navy ships was thermal insulation. Asbestos consumption data from WWii sug gests that there may be more asbestos in a ship's electric cable than in her thermal insulation. The U.S. Navy ceased using asbestos thermal insulation in the 1970's and in cables about the same time. Asbestos, however; contrary to a popular belief, was not the universal insulator Even during WWii, many asbestos-free products such as fibrous glass and mineral wool were used, particularly for hull and bulkhead insula tion. But asbestos products dominated as piping and machinery insulation simply because they were the best insulators then available. Among eleven different classes of WWII era ships which we have evaluated, including the prewar Fletcher and wartime Sumner and Gearing class destroy ers and the wartime Essex class aircraft carriers, up to 88% by weight of the thermal insulation products used on pipes and machinery in these ships contained asbestos. Thermal Insulation Systems Built from Four Types o fProducts Thermal insulation systems were constructed from four general kinds of products: 1) flexible thick felt pads, 2) rigid preformed shapes in a wide variety of sizes and dimensions, 3) cloth, tape, and thread and 4} troweling cement to fill cracks and form smooth surfaces and adhesives. Felts were used in concert with cloth and thread to form pads to fit around irregular components such as steam turbines or pipe flanges. Rigid preformed shapes were fitted around pipes and regularly shaped objects and then covered with cloth and adhesive. Troweling cement filled cracks and provided smooth damage-resistant surfaces. A coat or two of paint on the outer surface finished an installation. Each Ship Carried Many Tons of Insulation Each WWII USS Fletcher class destroyer bore nearly 30 long tons of thermal insulation on her pipes and machinery. The next-generation, USS Gearing class, carried just over 24 long tons per ship despite having the identical power plant as Fletcher because more efficient and lighter mate rials became available. At the extreme, the USS Iowa class battleships carried nearly 465 long tons of thermal insulation. Ships intermediate in size between destroyers and battleships carried intermediate amounts of the material. [Insula tion weights come from ship weight reports and insulation schedules]. Some Nauy Specifications Required Asbestos, Some Did Not In 1945, there were 13 insulation product line specifications for shipboard thermal insulation and lagging. (BSTM Chapter 39 1945). Lagging NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL correctly describes only the outer covering of an insulation system but the word is sometimes used to refer to the entire system. Each specifica tion included several variations such as differ ent grades of asbestos cloth or different service temperatures for pipe insulation. Seven of these specifications required, or at least permitted, asbestos as an ingredient and six called specifi cally for asbestos-free materials such as fibrous glass or cotton. Some of the seven asbestos specifications called for "materials suitable to the intended service," or words to that effect and indeed, some of the products provided under such specifications contained no asbestos. Thus, even as early as 1945, the Navy's door was open to non-asbestos products as long as they met the required performance standards. Amosite Was The Dominant Asbestos Fiber in Navy Insulation There are six fibrous minerals commonly called asbestos, five in the amphibole mineral family and one in the serpentine mineral family. Two of the six were used in Navy insulation. These are: Navy ships. Because of asbestos shortages, insula tion engineers sought ways to stretch the sup plies. Cotton fiber was included in some grades of asbestos cloth so as to facilitate weaving of fabrics with the more readily available short-fiber chrysotile. Fibrous glass, a truly modem material at the time (having been first formed as an insula tion material in 1938 ) had many uses during the wan [interestingly, workers often complained of skin irritation from fibrous glass and m ineral wool products and from that standpoint, they often preferred working with asbestos.] As with cotton, it was used as an asbestos fiber extender in some grades of asbestos cloth and used alone as glass-cloth lagging and felt. Mineral wool was also used as a n insulator Fibrous glass insulation board, commonly called "Navy board" was used almost exclusively during and after the war as bulkhead, deck, and hull insulation in most US Navy ships. Similar products are still widely used. Canvas was often specified as a lagging material on lower temperature surfaces where the high temperature capabilities of asbestos or fiberglass were not needed. 1. Amosite, a trade name for an amphibole fibrous mineral (Cummingtonite-Grunerite) came from South Africa. It was the dominant Navy insulation fiber amounting to approxi mately 86% of all the asbestos fiber in the insulation systems of an average ship if the schedules were followed exacdy. Amosite was used in nearly pure form as a felt and as pre-molded insulation, and as a reinforcing fiber in matrix insulation materials. Amosite asbestos was favored because of its very long water-resistant and matting-resistant fibers. 2. Chrysotile, the mineral name for the only serpentine asbestiform mineral, was largely imported from Canada. Chrysotile asbestos fi bers, while sometimes shorter than amosite's, are soft and flexible unlike amosite fibers and could be made into thread and cloth. Other Materials WereAlso Used During WWU, asbestos was scarce but asbestos products still comprised most of the insulation in NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL Shipboard Insulation Systems Varied Insulation used in a ship depended on technical matters such as the system and component op erating temperature, the effect of the insulation on system performance, and the availability of materials. Some hot components, such as steam traps, were not insulated because to do so would interfere with their functions. These and other concerns were all ultimately expressed in the ship's insulation schedules and implemented dur ing construction in accordance with the building yard practices of the time and the availability of the materials listed on the schedule. Substitution of schedule materials with approved alterna tives, including asbestos-free alternatives, was common and was expressly authorized on many schedules. Boiler feed system piping, for exam ple, may have required preformed 85% magne sia insulation conforming to Navy Department Specification 32P8. Because feed water is not very hot, it may have been insulated with min eral wool under Navy Department Specification 3212 instead. Of course, the opposite could also SPRING 2005 K 37 The N avy and Ashestas Thprm al Insulation happen -- a schedule requirement for fibrous glass cloth lagging to meet Specification 32C15 could have been implemented at the yard using asbestos cloth to Navy Department Specification 32C11. Schedule Requirements VariedAmong Ship Classes The insulation materials required by the sched ules varied substantially among ship classes. The differences reflected design or building yard practices, the local availability of materials, and the importance the Navy or the Maritime Commission assigned to a specific ship type. The ships that needed the greatest staying power for the war effort received the best quality materials. Ships that could fulfill their mission with only a few sailings were built with the materials at hand. Among insulation materials, asbestos products were usually viewed as best-quality. FIGURE 1 shows the relative percentage by weight of the asbestos-containing thermal insulation materials used in 16 WWil ship classes including Liberty Ships, LSTs, Fletcher and Gearing class DDs and Essex class aircraft carriers (determined by sum ming the weight of the materials listed on insula tion schedules or from ship weight reports). F ig u re X: PercentaseAsbestos By Weijht In LeadShips Except for the lowest value in Figure 1 (1943, 59%) the weight percent of asbestos or asbes- ' . tos-containing insulation varied between 80% and 99%. Note that it was never 100% because, for some insulation systems even in the most vital ships, asbestos free products worked well. The lowest value on the chart (59%) is the USS Buckley class of destroyer escorts. These ships were for few-mission escort duty and were there fore insulated with the most readily available and inexpensive materials -- many of which were not asbestos. Some Ships Were Asbestos-Free Even During WWil There were many special cases. The USS In dianapolis (CA35), built in 1931 and lost in 1945, was originally insulated with 'mineral wool products. These materials were also tried in other Navy and commercial ships of the time and worked poorly. The WWli-era mineral wool products were easily crushed to dust during oper ation causing them to loose their insulating qual ity and release abrasive rock dust to the ship's air that fouled machinery (Cox memo 1933) Others reported that the chemicals in some mineral wool attacked pipes when wet (U.S. Naval Experiment Station 1935) Modem improvements have made mineral wool products entirely satisfactory in many services, but the early experiences may be a reason mineral wool products were not used more frequently during WWil. Maritime Commission Ships Used a Wide Variety of Materials U.S. Maritime Commission ships were merchant ships for commercial or naval logistics service. Their merchant crews varied from about 30 to several hundred depending on the ships function and they typically carried a complement of 20 to 30 Navy men, the so-called Armed Guard, to man defensive guns. But despite their wartime features, Maritime Commission ships were much ! less stricdy specified than Navy warships. The Commission's ships were insulated from what I was available -- asbestos, mineral wool, hair felt I ! ! or fibrous glass. In the case of the EC-2 Liberty I class, the ships and their insulation systems were Construction Year for Lead Ship designed with a lifetime of five years but a single voyage was considered success given the rate of ship losses early in the war Liberty class ships also 3 8 K: SPRING 2005 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL used sprayed-on insulation for the fire protection of magazines. No other use of sprayed insulation has been found although War Production Board records indicate that some was also used in Navy ships. (Office of Procurement and Material 1943) Insulation Materials Changed Over Time Insulation practices changed as engineering knowledge advanced along with the technology. For example, fresh water and cold seawater pip ing in nearly all early Navy ships was insulated with hair felt until about 1943 when the Navy changed to water-repellent amosite felt in order to eliminate hair felt's fire, vermin, and disease hazards. (BUSHEPS letters 1942,1943) Hair felt continued to be used in auxiliary and merchant ships and in smaller warships throughout the war because of the shortage of amosite. Amosite felt continued in service in Navy ships as fresh-water system insulation until 1958 when foam rubber was specified to save money and weight. (BUSHDPSNote 1958) The wisdom of this choice can be questioned because it reintroduced the fire hazard of the old hair felt, introduced a new hazard of highly toxic combustion products and, as we now know, increased the asbestos hazard. But naval engineers, as with all engineers, are often faced with imperfect solutions and inadequate budgets for resolving competing requirements. Thermal Insulation is Dry and Can Be Dusty Regardless of the fibers involved, installa tion and removal of thermal insulation creates airborne dust exposing anyone in the vicinity to health consequences. For asbestos those conse quences are substantial. Vibrations and tempera ture changes during normal operation of a ship may also release dust as can bodily contact by the ship's force. Many reports of dust measure ments aboard Navy ships have been reviewed and frequent reference to loose dust on surfaces and in the aiq particularly during repairs, but also during operation have been reviewed. While for the most part dust levels were controlled to within the standards of the time, there is no question that many Navy sailors and workers breathed some of this dust and in some it may cause or have caused disease. Incentives foi Production of Asbestos-Free Insulation Throughout and following WWII there were many incentives for the Navy and for Navy equipment manufacturers to offer asbestos-free insulation alternatives. Health effects were not among those incentives until the early 1970's but up to then there were many others. The Needfor ImportedAsbestos Encouraged the Search for Alternatives Most chrysotile and ail amosite asbestos fibers were imported. (Virta Undated) U.S. production of asbestos fiber never supplied more than about 20% of the nation's total asbestos demands and the best grades needed for fabrication of most insulation products came from elsewhere. AJ1 amosite was imported from the Union of South Africa. Indeed the name "amosite" is not the fiber's proper mineral name but comes from the principal source in South Africa, the Amosa Mine. [Amosite's proper mineral name is Grunerite or in some manifestations, a com plex mixture of Grunerite and Cummingtonite in a fibrous habit]. During WWII, asbestos of most insulation grades and types was a "critical material" with the Government's Metals Reserve Company (MRC) handling much of the purchas ing and distribution of the critical grades. The Kriegsmarine and the wolfpacks were keenly aware of this fact and acted accordingly. During 1943 and 1944, for example, all amosite asbes tos used in the U.S. was purchased and imported by MRC and provided under strict quotas to producers of asbestos-containing products almost entirely for the Navy. (War Production Board 1944) The expense and limited avail ability of imports provided the "asbestos-free" elements of American industry to continually offer insulation products to the Navy. Over the ensuing years many were adopted. Throughout and after the waq the Buy America Act provid ing encouragement to domestic firms to develop insulation materials made entirely from domestic materials 9War Production Board Asbestos Insulation Was Technically Mature Typical asbestos-containing insulation in use NAVAL ENGINEERSJOURNAL SPRING 2005 E 39 The Navy and Asbestos Thermal Insulation 4 0 3 SPRING 2005 during WWH weighed from 12 to 27 pounds per cubic foot and had adequate thermal insulation capabilities. (Various WWII Navy Specs) While these products-were good for the times, mineral wool and fibrous glass systems offered the prom ise of much lower weight and better insulation properties that would reduce each ship's total weight by many tons. Perhaps most importantly, at the end of WWII, asbestos insulation was at its performance limit. Asbestos products dated from 1866 and had been used and perfected for nearly 80 years by the end of the wan The most common product "85% magnesia" (the 15% being mostly amosite asbestos in Navy insulation) had been in use since 1882 and had gone through many technical itera tions and improvements. (Vhta undated) Naval engineers had to look elsewhere if lighter; more heat-resistant insulation were to be found. Asbestos Fiber Was Expensive High quality long-fiber asbestos used for insulation was expensive. Such fiber cost over a thousand dollars per ton during WWII in current dollars and constituted most of the cost of many asbestos insulation products. The long-fiber amosite grades needed for most Navy insulation services were particularly expensive and in scarce supply during WWH as it had to be shipped from Africa. Non-Asbestos Products Became More Popular With Time Over the years, many new insulation products were developed. A Bureau of Ships report from 1955 summarizes the development of four new non-asbestos materials. (BUSHIPS ltr 1955) The material DC-61 was an "aerojel" developed by Johns Manville for USS Nautilus (SSN 571). The material was much lighter than the common in sulation materials of the time but it dissolved in waten While it was tested in Nautilus, it was not ultimately approved for widespread use. Three other firms developed aluminum silicate refrac tory fiber materials for very high temperature service that were ultimately approved for use. (Thermoflex, 1200 John's Manville; Kaowool, Babcock and Wilcox; and Fiberfax, The Carbo rundum Company) The Nauy Searchedfor New and Better Insulation In 1959, the Bureau of Ships began an active search for more new products that weighed less, cost less, and were better insulators than their predecessors. (BUSHIPS memo 1959) This work slowly bore fruit. By 1960, many new products were in use and half were asbestos-free mate rials. By 1967, the Navy continued to move towards non-asbestos products with the number of asbestos insulation products having been reduced to less than half of all. (NSTM 1967)) Up to about 1970, these changes were being made because of engineering goals, not because of health concerns. Elim inating Asbestos Insulation Naval Engineers Became Aware of the Health Conseqenes About 1970 About 1970, the U. S. Navy engineering community was alerted to the urgency of the asbestos health problem by a letter from Brit ish sources advising of the serious disease rate among workers in British "dockyards." The sources advised that because of the problem, the Royal Navy was eliminating the use of asbestos insulation products in their shipbuilding and repair programs, a process it had essentially completed by 1971. (Harries 1971) In about 1971, the U. S. Navy initiated its own "Asbes tos Elimination Program" . Almost immediately, Navy acquisition of amosite felt and the pure amosite grades of preformed pipe insulation ceased. Work then began to qualify asbestos free substitutes for the remaining materials. By 1972 six asbestos-containing products remained on the approved list (NSTM 1972) and byl974 there were none. MEL-STD 769E 1974) The Navy asbestos elimination program continued on for many years to find and approve substi tutes for the myriad of other asbestos-contain ing products used in Navy ships such as electric cable insulation, gaskets, packing, adhesives, caulks, and others. TABLE 1 summarizes these developments. Asbestos-containing product lines are highlighted in red for clarity. NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL Navy Insulation Product Development Prohibiting Asbestos in Specifications Did Not Solve All of the Problem By the end of 1974 the Navy was neither specifying nor purchasing asbestos or asbestoscontaining thermal insulation materials either for new construction or for the repair of ships. (MIL-STD-769E 1974) But at that time there were still supplies of asbestos-bearing materials that had been acquired earlier For some ships under construction or repaid money was found to dispose of the asbestos products purchased for them and to buy new asbestos-free products. For others, existing asbestos insulation products were consumed to exhaustion. Several materials "purges" were also conducted to rid the Navy of residual stores of asbestos materials. By the end of 1979, all asbestos insulation materials had been disposed of and ships delivered after then were free of asbestos insulation products. (NSTM 1986) There were, howeveq still hun dreds of ships built in the earlier years that were still in service with asbestos insulation products. While Navy safety procedures were instituted in the early 1970's and improved over the years, there remained potential for asbestos-caused harm to workers and sailors aboard these ships until the insulation was replaced or the ship retired and recycled. National Safety and Consumption Patterns Recent court decisions suggest that manufactur ers of Navy hardware such as pumps and valves knew or should have known about the dangers of asbestos as far back as the 1940's and should have taken action to eliminate the material or at least warn their customers of the dangers. (Berkowitz v. A.C. and S., Inc. 2001)The available records concerning the regulation and consump tion of asbestos do not support this expectation. TABLE 1: Specification 32PB 32P11 32B 32F1 32F3 3211 3212 32B 32T1 32C14 32P10 32C11 32C15 24D6 ML-P-2781 H+l-551 M .-R876 ML-1-2819 ML-F-20077 ML-F-15091 MM-15475 ML-1-2818 ML-M6022 ML-T-15340 ML-C-2861 ML-C-2908 ML-P-152B0 ML-P-52350 ML-M6411 ML-K22Q23 SS-C-468 ML-G-20079 ML-C-788 ML-P-150D6 HH-M-351 ML-t-23128 ML-i-24172 UU-B-790 SS-C-160 Material Molded pipe 1945 Not Asb Asb + Molded cod! 4 Molded block Thin felt Thick fet Thick batt 4 4 + + Thick batt Molded pipe Tape Cement R aster 4 + + 4 Cloth Cloth Cloth 4 + + Molded pipe Molded pipe &block Molded cork Molded block Thin fe t Thick felt Thick batt Thick batt Thin felt Tape Dement R aster Molded sheet &tube Riper Thick felt Thinfe* Cloth Cloth Cloth Riper Board Thin felt Molded sheet &tube Riper R aster 76 Total 13 1960 Not Asb Asb + 4 4 4 + + 4 4 4 + + 4 4 + 4 4 4 4 99 18 1967 Not Asb Asb 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 9 11 20 1972 Not Asb Asb 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 12 18 safety standards as this knowledge spread and a corresponding decline in consumption as asbes tos became progressively more difficult to use. As we will show, there were neither improved asbestos safety standards nor a decline in its con sumption for nearly 30 years following the war. Consumption Continued to Climb and Asbestos Limits Stayed High The Navy was not the only consumer of asbes tos and was not the only party that may have been concerned with asbestos safety issues. If the larger community of asbestos users knew of asbestos hazards, one would expect improved NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL Industrial Hygiene Standards Did Not Suggest Serious Danger (FISHER 1998) In 1938, the National Bureau of Standards set an American Standard Safety Code for mineral dusts, of which asbestos was only one, of five million particles per cubic foot (5 mppcf) for continuous exposure of workers. This is equiva- SPRING Z005 S H I D io fJrnry nn/i A sh rstn g T h e rm a l Tn-illation lent to about 177 particles per cubic centimeter microscope only those particles defined as fibers, The threshold of visibility for airborne dust is i.e., having a length to diameter ratio of at least about 10 particles per cubic centimeter so a limit three, and counting only those fibers that were of nearly eighteen times higher easily permitted greater than 5 microns in length - the limit of visible airborne dust. In 1943, the U. S. Navy visibility in the prescribed microscope. A sample and the U. S. Maritime Commission jointly I issued minimum safety and health standards drawn in an atmosphere containing 5 mppcf of asbestos dust would appear as roughly 30 fibers for "contract shipyards', i.e., private shipyards >5 microns under the new method. [The factor building ships for the government. (U.S. Navy for conversion of mppcf to f/cc is contentious and Maritime Commission 1943) This docu because asbestos mineral is originally a fibrous ment established minimum requirements for mass that is broken down into individual fibers several safety and health matters with a major by mechanical action. What is a non-fibrous focus on industrial safety, welding safety and particle in one setting such as asbestos mining fumes from welding and painting. Asbestos can become a large number of fibers in another was mentioned briefly as a material that could such as asbestos textile production. The conver be handled safely with proper ventilation and sion factor used in this paper (5mppcf =30 f/cc respiratory protection. This document neither is taken from textile production] The balance of changed the existing mineral dust standard nor the dust in the sample (177 less 30 particles per imposed a separate asbestos standard. cubic centimeter) might be asbestos "chunks" Post WarStudies Affirmed the Wartime Standard that could break down to fibers after being inhaled. Thus the new method might be non In 1946, a study of the health of workers build conservative, but it is hard to tell in an industrial ing Navy ships found that asbestos insula environment just from what visible chunks are tion work was "relatively safe." (Fleisher and made. In later discussions, 30 fibers per cubic Drinker 1946) About that time, the American centimeter (f/cc) are used as the reference basis Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygien for comparing old and new standards. I ists (ACGIH), previously the National Confer i ence of Governmental Industrial Hygienists Asbestos Dust Standards promulgated its limit for asbestos dust and made Stayed High Through the 1970's it equal to the existing 5 mppcf mineral dust The 3OfIcc limit as supplemented by ventilation limit. The ACGIH limit was the federal stan and respirators was reviewed by the ACGIH in dard of the time for military contracts under the 1951,1956,1958,1960, and beyond. (Fischer Walsh-Healy Act (1936) and remained so for Maritime 1998) In 1965, a paper published by some 34 years until the Occupational Safety and the New York Academy of Science first ques Health Administration (OSHA) was created in tioned the suitability of the old limit and sug 1970. (Williams-Steiger 1970) OSHA issued an gested that something lower is needed. (Schall asbestos standard (5 ilex] under its own author 1965) At about that time the work of Dr. ity in December of 1971. Irving Selikoff of New York City's Mount Sinai The Measurement Method Changed Hospital and-many others began to make clear the nature of the asbestos hazard. But even I The 5 mppcf limit was measured by a so-called then there was conflicting evidence. In 1968, "impinger" method involving collection of dust the Industrial Hygiene Foundation of America in a water bath and then counting all particles reported that asbestos disease among workers in a measured volume of water When new was significantly reduced in industries that ef asbestos dust standards were later developed, fectively used ventilation and respirators under the measurement method was changed to a so- the old 30 f/cc standard. (Goodman 1968) called "membrane filter" method. This involved That same year, the U.S. Department of Labor collecting dust on a filter and counting under a declined to regulate asbestos dust as a hazard- H2 SPRING 2005 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL ous agent in new shipbuilding labor standards. ( U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Labor Standards Administration 1968). National Airborne Asbestos Standards ACGIH Began Tightening It's Standards in 1967 In 1967, the ACHIH began a rapid-fire reduc tion in the allowable dust levels. In that year, it proposed 12 f/cc; a limit that while lower still than the old 30 f/cc limit, still allowed visible dust in the workplace. In 1969, ACGIH pro posed 5 f/cc and in 1978, it proposed separate limits for chrysotile, amosite, and crocidolite asbestos of 2, 0.5, and 0.2 f/cc respectively. The split limits came from a then-new understand ing among some experts that amosite and cro cidolite are substantially more hazardous than chrysotile. In 1991 ACGIH proposed a single standard of 0.2 f/cc for all asbestos because there was no good field method to discriminate between the three major fibers at that level. In 1997, it proposed a further reduction to 0.1 f/cc. (ACGIH 2001) While the ACGIH adopted the standards somewhat later than they were proposed and while OSHA began adopting sometimes different standards in late 1971, the trend of ACGIH actions illustrates that it was not until about 1970 that the industrial hygiene community began reacting to the new infor mation about the health hazards of asbestos. FIGURE 1 illustrates this progression. In later years, the Government tried unsuccess fully to ban asbestos entirely -- it still remains usable in the US. Thus from 1938 when airborne mineral dust limits were first established, the limits for asbestos dust remained very high and were not made truly restrictive until the 1990's. Yet recent court decisions are essentially holding manufacturers of equipment delivered during the "dusty" years to the standard that has been only recently established. o o o N ^ c D O N 'i ' c o o N ^ oe oe o c M ^ - oe m o N ' i p c o o N i a>a>o>a>a>o>a>o>0>cc&a>O3a>cna>a>a)a>a>aa>a>o>a>aao>G9o>cD r - t - r - T - r - T - t - r - T - r - T - r - ' r r ' r ' t - T --v - t - T T " i - r ' i - v v v T - ' r r * T - f ------ Acbeslos Ai Forma -- Amosite &Tremofite Chrysotle ------- CrocboRo Fiju r e 2: National Asbestos Dusl Standards Stayed Hh Untll The 1970`s 6000 O SODO Tj 8 4000 IU) 3000 na < 2000 a 3= I 1000 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 Fij u r e 3: W orld Asbestos Production 19H0 to 2000 1980 1990 2000 World Asbestos Production Continued to Grou) Until 1980 Throughout the 1940's and well beyond, the world production of asbestos fiber continued to increase rapidly. It is apparent from the con sumption data that consumers of the fiber were NAVAL ENGINEERSJOURNAL not aware of concerns regarding health or safety or any other issue that might restrict the use of the mineral. (Virta) FIGURE 2 shows the fiber production trends and also indicates the time of the Navy's final effort to eliminate the last uses of asbestos thermal insulation. SPRING 2005 El 4 3 The Navyand Asbestos Thermal Insulation 900 soo 700 r 600 ! ; 500 ! 400 : 300 200 100 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 F igure 4 ; U.S. Asbestos Consumption 1910 to 2000 supply as seen in FIGURE 3 . [This is not the same as production. Very little native asbestos fiber was produced in the United States.] American asbestos consumption continued to increase until 1974 even during the main thrust of the Navy's asbestos elimination program. Until about 1975, asbestos consumers were apparendy not aware of any growing recognition of an asbestos safety problem and the Navy's gradual move towards asbestos-free insulation products, culminating in 1974, had no appar ent effect on national asbestos consumption. Indeed, consumption dropped and then rose again during the mid 1970's business downturn and stayed high until about 1979 when, despite a good business environment, it began to decline rapidly. This is perhaps due to the growing understanding among consumers of the fiber's dangers and the legal actions arising from that understanding. Even in the year 2000, however 15,000 metric tons were consumed, despite some publicized health concerns. Amosite Consumption Declined Earlier Than Overall Asbestos Consumption FIGURE H shows the U.S. amosite consumption pattern since 1956. Data prior to 1956 are not available. 1955 1960 1965 F ig u re 5 : US Amosite Consum ption 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 * S SPRING 7005 World consumption of asbestos fiber steadily increased to just over 5,000,000 metric tons of asbestos fiber per year in 1980, leveled off, and stayed above 4,000,000 metric tons until 1990 when it began to drop rapidly as the truly serious nature of the asbestos problem became well known. U.S. TotalAsbestos Remained High Until 1979 American demand and consumption shows a pattern comparable to world production and Amosite consumption was a fraction of total asbestos consumption, peaking at about 20,000 tons per year compared to about 800,000 tons per year for all asbestos as seen in Figure 3. The Navy Was a Small Consumer Figure 4 suggests that the Navy's asbestos elimination program may have been responsible for the sudden' decline in U.S. amosite consump tion. This is not confirmed by examination of the insulation quantities demanded by Navy ships. The quantity of insulation in Navy ships of the 1970's ranged from about three long tons in a tugboat, about long 39 tons in a new DDG, and about 55 long tons in a nuclear powered cruiser.(VAdm.T.J. Bigley 1979)Aircraft car riers of course, carried much more. The U.S. Navy shipbuilding rate in the 1960's and 1970's NAVAL ENGINEERSJOURNAL averaged about 14 ships per year totaling about 100.000 long tons light ship weight. (Colton Co.) If we assume that the full weight of all insulation in Navy ships of the time was amosite asbestos (and by far it was not) and we assume that the average ship was equivalent to a DDG in terms of its insulation burden, about 550 long tons of amosite would be needed to insulate 14 ships per year Further assuming that an equal amount is needed for fleet maintenance, our estimated annual Navy consumption of 1,100 long tons still leaves us well short of the 700,000 to 800,000 metric tons of total asbestos or the 10.000 to 20,000 metric tons of amosite con sumed annually at the time. Navy Actions Were Consistent with National Patterns While the Navy was a major consumer of asbes tos during WWil, thereafter as other consump tion increased and Navy shipbuilding programs declined, it became one of many asbestos-using industries in the U.S. and, if anything, began to eliminate asbestos use much sooner than any other industrial sector The national industrial hygiene community did not begin to treat asbes tos as a special problem until about 1970 and even then, took about 20 years to develop truly restrictive regulations. It was conclude that: N avy equipment manufacturers could not be expected to have known from the 1940's to the 1970's that asbestos was a unique hazard and even if a manufacturer did know, a recommenda tion to warn the Navy would have been inconsis tent with the national consumption patterns and industrial hygiene regulations o f the time. The Hardware M anufacturer's Perspective Manufacturers Products had to Meet Navy Department Specifications Equipment for Navy ships was manufactured in accordance with a large number of Navy De partment Specifications promulgated by various Navy offices. Beginning about 1950, these speci fications were reissued as Military Specifications. There were many thousands of these specifica tions that detailed the design, construction and pre-delivery testing of ships, the equipment that goes in them and the materials from which they were made. Particular attention was paid to those features involving interfaces with systems or other manufacturer's equipment or affecting how the ship was operated. Even the content, or ganization and format of operating manuals (if any were required) was exactly defined by speci fication to ensure the crew could find the same type of information in the same place in each of the many manuals a ship carried. Similarly, the content, organization, and format of label plates -- and even the material from which they were made -- was strictly specified so the crew could easily determine a machines identity and key operating parameters. Small items such as some small valves had no label plates -- the neces sary information was cast into the bodies of the valves. Larger and complex items such as pumps and motors had specific label plates defined by the equipment specifications. Conformance to Specifications Was Mandatory The basic requirements of Navy contracting are made clear in a variety of ways. Standard "Changes" clauses, the "Extras" clause, the "Guarantee" clause and other clauses have been used for ship and material acquisitions in vari ous forms during and following WWII. These and other standard clauses demanded strict con formance with the specifications -- no more and no less -- and required prior Navy approval for any changes (NAVEXOS P -1995 1959) Addi tionally, Article 4 of the Special Provisions used for shipbuilding contracts states in part: "No changes shall be made in the contract, ex clusive o f the plans and specifications, except on written order o f the Secretary o f the Navy, and no changes shall be made in the plans and specifica tions unless approved in writing by die Secretary o f the Navy or by the Chief o f the Bureau o f ships, as his duly authorized representative...." See for example, the contract for construction o ffive Fletcher class destroyers (DD 498-502) executed in September 1940 with Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. o f Kearny, New Jersey NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL SPRING 2005 VS The N avy and Asbestos Therm al Insulation 4 6 H SPRING ZOOS Occasionally, equipment specifications them selves expressly required prior approval of any deviations from requirements. For example, Navy Department Specification 45V18(INT) of 1946 states: "Specific approval shall be obtained where depar tures are made from the referenced specifications. " (Specification 4SV18(INT) 1938) would be insulated in service was specifically relieved of any additional responsibility to his workers regarding asbestos through compliance with the then-current safety standards. Given the Government's contractual statement that all one needed to do regarding health hazards was to comply with Walsh-Healey standards in the workplace, it is not at all surprising that no manufacturer took the matter further. Such a practice appears to be rare in Navy De partment specifications, likely because the issues of specification conformance and prior approval of changes were so well covered in standard con tract clauses. Regarding asbestos, we have found no requirements for warnings in any Navy specifications or documents of any kind prior to the early 1970's. Therefore it appears that addi tion of any warning about asbestos would have required prior written Navy approval. Contractual Safety and Health Obligations Arose from National Standards Navy contracts and specifications were not silent on the subject of personnel safety. A sample of the hundreds of specifications and manuals we have reviewed contain warnings or prohibitions on some subjects, most commonly warnings concerning dry cleaning solvents used for cleaning oily components. Most safety and health issues were addressed, however through national policies. General Provision (GP) 17 of Navy shipbuilding contracts and the standard contract clause invoking the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act were the vehicles. Such clauses re quired shipbuilders and equipment manufactur ers to comply with the relevant safety, sanitary and factory inspection regulations of the time. Until 1967 as we have previously explained, the national asbestos dust standard was 30 f/cc. GP 17 specifically stated in part: "Compliance with [these laws) shall be prima-fade evidence o f compliance with this subsection." Thus a machinery manufacturer who may have dealt with small amounts of asbestos gaskets or packing or might have known that his product Safety and Health Warnings are Common Now, but Were Not Earlier Modem machinery comes with operating instruc tions replete with safety warnings and cautions for operators. Reference to the reader's automo bile operator's manual makes that clean It was not always so. Dozens of Bureau of Ships and Naval Ships Technical Manuals from the WWIl years through the 1960's covering piping systems, pumps, main propulsion equipment, electrical equipment, and others have been reviewed as have several equipment technical manuals pro vided by the equipment manufacturers. It is rare to find any personnel safety warnings, cautions, or instructions whatsoever in these documents. Those that are present deal with major system considerations such as turning off the steam to a machine before opening it. The focus of these manuals was ship, system, and machinery safety. Personnel safety was covered in separate safety manuals such as "Safety Precautions for Shore Activities" and others. (NAVSO P-2455 1965) The Navy Was Unlikely to Approve An Asbestos Warning A request from an equipment manufacturer to add an asbestos warning to his equipment would have been referred to the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) for action. Up to the late 1960's or early 1970's, BUMED would have noted that the national asbestos dust standard was very high, that work on the equip ment was unlikely to release dust approaching this level, asbestos was widely used in Navy ships and in worldwide industry and the prod uct manufacturers had reported no problems. Therefore, it is not believed BUMED would have taken the matter forward. NAVAL ENGINEERSJOURNAL Equipment Labels or Manuals Were the Wrong Placefor Asbestos Warnings Furthermore, the proper place for warnings concerning asbestos insulation (or packing or gaskets) that were thought hazardous to the crew was not on an individual machine or item of equipment or in any of the hundreds of equipment technical manuals carried by a ship but in the long-established insulation or packing and gasket manuals covering the use of these products aboard ships, e.g., BUSHEPS Manual Chapter 39 (1938) The Navy did not see fit to include any warnings or cautions in any o f such documents until 1972. Summary and Condusions The Navy's thermal insulation practices from WWil on were consistent with national asbestos consumption patterns, health and safety regula tion, and the available materials of the times. The Navy developed more and more non-asbestos products in the years following WWH to meet performance goals. It did not act to eliminate asbestos insulation entirely until the early 1970's when the health hazards of asbestos fibers became apparent to it and the nation. Navy contractors were required to follow specifications exacdy and the Navy told them exacdy what to do about any health hazard (follow Walsh-Healy). In view of the abundant and continuing uses of asbestos throughout the country well into the 1970's and the acceptable dust levels permitted by Govern ment standards until then, we believe that the Navy would not have approved an asbestos warning recommended by a manufacturer before then nor would ship's equipment have been the proper location for such a warning. The legal environment for any Navy equipment manufacturer is increasingly perilous. Recent court decisions are holding manufacturers to health standards and legal standards that did not exist until decades (and sometimes a half a century) after the equipment was built. The legal environ ment for other toxins may follow the same path. Should equipment manufacturers begin to be affected by this trend, there can and will be un certainty and substantial confusion in the Navy's ship production and repair programs. Perhaps the Navy will be forced to recreate the pre-World War I practice of building everything itself and rely on its agency sovereign immunity for liability protec tion. Or perhaps military equipment manufac turers will demand some new form of complete indemnification from the Government. REFERENCES Bureau of Ships Technical Manual, Chapter 39, "Thermal Insulation," NAVSHIPS 250-000(39) August 29,1945 Cox, Captain memo Tuscaloosa CA 37 Specifications for covering and lagging submitted with I.M. letter CA37/S39 (14) of 7 April 1933 to Bu. Eng." Undated U.S. Naval Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, Report No. 7386, "Corrosion of Steel by Rock Wool Ce ment," September 9,1935 Navy Department Office of Procurement and Mate rial, "Current Status of Critical Materials, Volume #2,15 December 1943 Bureau of Ships letter Ser S39-1/EN 28/A2, October 13, 1942 and Bureau of Ships letter S39-1(648)EN 28/A2-11 of April 17,1943 BUSHIPS Notice 9390, Ser 548-198, "Anti-sweat pipe insu lation, procurement, and installation o f" 15 April 1958 Virta, Robert L , "Worldwide Asbestos Supply and Consumption Trends from 1900 to 2000." United States Geological Survey Open File Report03-83, Undated. Divisional Supply and Requirements Decision No. 11 on Asbestos for 1944, Requirements Committee, Cork, Asbestos, and Fibrous Glass Division, War Production Board, February 1,1944. Bureau of Ships letter Ser 446-23, Enclosure (2), "Excerpts for a presentation on the status o f piping insulation by Mr. Sirotta, Code 548" 27 May 1995. Bureau of Ships Memorandum Ser 648-M374, "Thermal Insulation for Piping Systems, request for Investigation of," 29 July 1959. Naval Ships Technical Manual, Chapter 9390, "Thermal Insulation," September 1967 and 1 July 1972. Harries, P.G, "Asbestos Dust Concentrations in Ship Repairing; A Practical Approach to Improving Asbestos Hygiene in Naval Dockyards," Annals of Occupational Hygiene, VoL 14, Pergamon Press, 1971 MIL-STD-769E (Ships), "Thermal Insulation Requirements for Machinery and Piping," 15 July 1974 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL SPRING 2005 E 4 7 The Na vy and Asbestos Therm al Insulation Naval Ships Technical Manual, Chapter 635, "Thermal, Fire and Acoustic Insulation," First Revision, 4 February 1986 Berkowitz v. A.C. and S., In c, 733 N.Y.S^d 412 {Sup. Ct. App. 2001) "Asbestos in Shipbuilding, United States Shipbuilding Practices, 1930s - 1970s," Fisher Maritime Transportation Counselors Inc, 1998 "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Industrial Health In Contract Shipyards,' Approved by the Navy on January 20,1943 and by the Maritime Commission on February 9,1943 Goodman, Joseph L, Fibrous Dust Seminar 1968, "Asbes tos Exposure in the U.S. Textile Industry-1930 to date," In dustrial Hygiene Foundation of America, In c, pub. 1970. U.S, Department of Labor, Wage and Labor Standards Administration, "Safety and Health Regulations for Shipbuilding," 1968. AGGIH, "Threshold Limit Values for Asbestos, All Forms," 2001. Bigley, VAdm. TJ.. VCNO (Logistics), Ltr Ser 454D/318571 dated 8 February 1979 to Robert F. Hughes, Acting Direc tor of the U.S. General Accounting Office. Fleisher, W.E. and P. Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Colton Company, Figure 4 data. Covering Operations in Construction of Naval Vessels," Journal of Industrial Hygiene a n d Toxology, January 1946. NAVEXOS P-1995, Nauy Contract Law, Second Edition, 1959. Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, Act of June 30,1936, ch.881,49 Stat2036, codified to 4 1 USCA 35 to 43,43a, 43b, 44,45. Specification 45V18(INT), Valves, High Pressure,Globe and Angle, Steel," 15 January 1938 and Amendment 2 dated 1 March 1946. Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of NAVSO P-2455, "Safety Precautions for Shore Activities," i 1970, P.L 91-596, D ec 29,1970,84 Slat. 1590, codified to April 1945. 29 USCA 651 to 675,677,678 and 42 USCA 3142-L Bureau of Ships Manual, Chapter 39, "Thermal Insula I Schall, E. L , "Present Threshold Limit Value in the USA tion" or Bureau of Ships Manual, Chapter 95, "Instruc for Asbeslos Dust A Critique," New York Academy of tions Relative to Gaskets and Packings," Revisions dated Science, 1965. variously from 1938 om 4 8 r. 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