Document 2jo76B4jKeGw5ZXbk1nmydLy7

PPG Industries, Inc. Chemical Divison - U.S. Lake Charles, Louisiana --c------6 i/f (--4- V --O'- Ljt~ . j^j2es* LD-1873 07-26-1978 ROBERT, G P Vapor Detection Grid Review (P-823) Distribution J. R. Farst - abstract O. L. Cromeans/T. G. Taylor J, E. Fike/J. B. Alleman G. K. Jordan/D. E. Wiley/R. P. Byars R. L. Holliday/J. M. Bowman/F. D. Woolard B. J. Young/W. F. Salter E. F. ftirsons/F. J. Kunt^/A. J. Hoffpauir M. C. Clary/j. D. Gustiry'S. P. Mayeux R. H. Miller/T. A. Propst/M. B, Guidry R. E. Sanders/j. W. Barton B. D. Reynolds Author Central Files (1) Technical Files (6) Key Words Vapor Detectors Vapor Clouds Explosive Plant B Safety SL 087351 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION DISCUSSION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS APPENDIX Table I - Flammable Compounds in Plant B Graph I - Calibration Curves Plot Plans Locating Vapor Detectors VDC Listing VDC Plant Per/Tri Listing Per/Tri Plant OHC Listing OHC Plant EC Listing EC Plant VC Listing VC Plant VC/EC Storage Listing VC/EC Storage Plant Report of Abnormal Operating Incidents Page 1 2 2 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 SL 087352 PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. PROCESS ENGINEERING G. P. ROBERT TECHNICAL REPORT LD-1873 July 26, 1978 ABSTRACT VAPOR DETECTION GRID REVIEW ---------------------F523)---------------------- The present vapor detector system in Plant B has not been reviewed for several years. There have been numerous plant changes which have hindered the operation of some of the vapor detectors, thereby decreasing the efficiency of the'entire vapor detection system. In accordance with PPG's program of improving safety, the entire Plant B vapor detection grid has been analyzed. Results are presented in this report on a unit-by-unit basis, with discussions of potential areas of concern. SL 087353 INTRODUCTION Because of the possible formation of explosive organic vapor clouds in the Plant B complex, vapor detectors have been installed in key locations to detect these vapor clouds and alert operating personnel to hazardous conditions. An automatic system exists to initiate, a water sprinkler network to.dissipate the cloud should a vapor detector indicate its presence. There have been numerous developments in Plant B which have hindered the operation of some of the vapor detectors, thereby decreasing the efficiency of the entire vapor detection system. This report discusses the present vapor detection system in Plant B. Results are presented here on a unit-by-unit basis, -with discussions of potential ar as of concern. DISCUSSION Because of the possible formation of explosive organic vapor clouds in the Plant B complex vapor detectors have been installed in key locations to detect these vapor clouds and alert operating personnel to existing hazards. The operating principle of the vapor detector units is as follows: The atmosphere sur rounding the remote detector unit circulates through the flame arrestor screen by' diffusion and convection and is brought in contact with the active platinum filament. The identical adjoining reference filament is shielded from the sample and compensates for changes in ambient temperature, voltage and resistance. The two filaments form two adjacent legs of a Wheatstone Bridge,w?th the other two legs located in the amplifierdemodulator assembly. The resistance increases in proportion to the temperature and to the amount of gas in the sample. This increase produces an imbalance in the bridge. This imbalance is converted into a signal which is amplifed, demodulated and tramsitted back to the analyzer module. Response is indicated on the meter, which reads percentage of the lower explosive limit. When the preset alarm levels are reached, internal electron! circuits are energized, which, in turn, trip the alarm relays. The relays then lock in and energize the panel alarm or warning lights, and also the terminals for external signals. The vapor detectors are referenced to a calibrated ethylene-air standard. When the detectors indicate that the monitored environment contains a mixture of organic vapors, which are 20% of the environment's lower explosive limit, a warning alarm will sound and an amber light will be displayed on the panel cabinet in the control room. When any vapor detector indicates that 40% of the lower explosive limit has been reached, it will sound an alarm and display a red light on the panel cabinet. At this alarm point, some of the vapor detectors can automatically activate water sprinkler systems, unless the associated water sprinkler system is bypassed from the vapor detectors. -2- SL 087354 The water acts to dissipate the vapor cloud to prevent an explosion. Vapor clouds can be detonated by any pumber of conditions, such as static charges or ignition sources. In the vinyl chloride plant there is a system which will shut down the vinyl furnaces if two detectors in the furnace area indicate that 40% of the lower explosive limit has been reached. However, these alarms must be two of the fourteen detectors which comprise the furnace shutdown system. There have been numerous developments in Plant B which have hindered the operation of some of the vapor detectors, thereby decreasing the efficiency of the entire vapor detection grid. This report discusses the potential areas of concern in each operating unit. EDC. Currently, there are no vapor detectors present in the EDC plant. How ver, locations exist in the plant where EDC and ethylene can form explosive vapor clouds. Ethylene has a high likelihood of forming an explosive vapor cloud, wh reas an EDC vapor cloud is much less Ikely to explode. Nearby hazardous areas which offer ignition sources are the main Plant B road to the south. Parish Road and the "Tri-Ethane" II expansion to the north, and to the east, Columbia-Southern Road and the air compressor station containing nonexplosive-proof devices. The ethylene metering station is not equipped with any vapor detectors. Ethylene has the potential of forming a highly explosive vapor cloud. The ethylene metering station is immediate to Parish Road to the north, which offers a nearby source of ignition. Th pre vailing winds from the south increase the probability that a vapor cloud formed here would cross Parish Road. Vapor detectors located here could help alert operating personnel to a hazardous condition. VDC. There are many vapor detectors which are not going to be necessary when the "Tri-Ethane'1 II plant starts up. At that time some of the vapor detectors could be relocated to monitor areas which are marginally protected. One location which is not protected by vapor detectors is the north VDCM day tank. Otherwise, the VDC plant appears to be well protected. The water sprinkler Systems are usually bypassed from the vapor detectors because of erroneous alarms which have sounded due to instrument maIfunction oT^ecause of detection of vapors from releases to the atmos phere during sampling. Standard operating procedure is to investigate vapor detector alarms when they sound and manually trip the water sprinkler system based on operator judgment. EC. Ethyl chloride is one of the most flammable chlorinated organics in Plant B. There have been occasions in the past where vapor clouds containing EC have formed which have not been indicated by the vapor detectors. (See appendix - Reports of Abnormal Operating Incidents.) Traffic on Parish Road, located on the north boundary of the EC unit, is a potential ignition source. The prevailing winds out of the south increase the probability that a vapor cloud could cross Parish Road undetected. A penmate/ vapor detection system would add protection to the EC unit from this hazardous condition. -3- SIj O81355 V * t * VC . The VC process area has'a large number of vinyl chloride monitoring devic s for personnel protection as well as vapor detectors for protection against unobserved vapor clouds. The only direction which appears not to be well monitored is the west side of the process area. The west side of the process area has traffic and a maintenance .shop as readily available Ignition sources. The three nearby vinyl furnaces are possible ignition sources- Any vapor cloud moving toward the furnaces could be drawn into the air intake section and would contact the direct fire from the burners or the high temperatures within the furnaces which are above the auto-ignition temperature of the vapor cloud. There is one unprotected entry to the furnaces. A vapor cloud could conceivably form at the segregated sewer sump from a process spill which is not detected elsewhere or not believed to have advanced to the segregated sewer sump. With the winds out of the east, a vapor cloud could reach the furnace from here without being detected. VC/EC Storage, There have been modifications in both the VC and EC storage areas. The area beneath the day tanks has been separated with concrete dividers to direct spills or burning EC or VC out of the area to limit fire or potential fire exposure to a minimum number of day tanks. Previously, the vapor detectors were located along the perimeter of the day tank storage area. Due to the present arrangement, a leak or spill of VC or EC could go undetected for some time. Due to the high specific gravities (SG = 2.2, air = i.O) of VC and EC, the vapors from an unprotected compartment would have to overflow into an adjacent equipped compartment in order to be detected. Vapor detectors should be located within the individual compartments or in the common drainage systems, /'? , tk ` \y ,r , t' EC/VCM Dock Storage . The two EC spheres and the No. 3 VCM sphere at the dock are protected by vapor detectors located at the bottom around the spheres and at the loading pump pads. Detection of flammables in the dock storage area causes an alarm to be sounded in the tank area and in the VCM control room. The a_larm_circuit to the control room has historically been very troublesome and is out of service much of the time. Even if the alarm does function in the control room, several minutes could lapse by the time the Jead operator could get to the dock to investigate the situation. In addition to improving the alarm circuit, consideration should be given to vapor detector activation of the water deluge systems at the dock. Per/Tri. The only vapor detectors in the Per/Tri plant are located by the Dowth rm h ater and Dowtherm circulating pumps. The Dowtherm heater is an ignition source for a vapor cloud. It is protected by a vapor detector only on the east side. A vapor detector located between the Dowtherm circulating pumps to the south of the Dowtherm heater offers some protection for the heater, in addition to monitoring the environment around the pumps. It is unlikely that a vapor cloud would approach the Dowtherm heater from the north or west. The present protection appears to be adequate, although not foolproof. For instance, there is no water sprinkler that exists near the Dowtherm heater. A vapor cloud approaching the heater would probably approach from the east, due to the location of process equipment. A water shield system on the east side of the Dowtherm heater could prevent an unnecessary explosion or fire from occurring. -4St> { There are compounds which exist in the Per/Tri plant, such as EDC and Dowtherm, which can form explosive organic vapor clouds. In some locations they could be re leased above their flash points. However, these compounds do not readily form vapor clouds and will dissipate before they can be detected. Vapor detectors would be able to discover only excessively large vapor clouds, unless an exorbitant number of vapor detectors were employed. OHC. The OHC plant is protected by several vapor detectors which are all located \8 inches above ground. EDC vapors (SG = 3.35, air = 1.00) would quickly sink to this elevation. However, ethylene (SG=. 0.975) would not sink since it is slightly light r than air. As such, an ethylene vapor cloud would mix with the air and be moved by c k/tftytP w'nc* currents toward an ignition source. Vapor clouds which are ethylene rich that occur at elevations above ground may not be detected at all. Ethylene can form one irJ M** of the more dangerous vapor clouds of all materials in Plant B. Tetra . Currently, there are no vapor detectors present in the Tetra plant. However, locations exist in the plant where EDC and ethylene can be released above their flash points, and an explosive EDC or ethylene vapor cloud could conceivably exist. The Tetra plant is next to a road which offers a nearby source of ignition. Bottoms. There are no vapor defectors located in the Bottoms plant. There are compounds, mainly EDC, which ean exist in the Bottoms plant above their flash points. However, the likelihood of forming an explosive vapor cloud in the Bottoms plant is relatively small due to low pressure operating conditions. Should a vapor cloud form, it would be difficult to discover without a multitude of vapor detectors. Incinerator. The incinerator is protected by two vapor detectors which are located to the northeast and northwest. It would be difficult for a vapor cloud to escape both of these detectors if they are operating properly. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TUulAtiVIA STAN'bIKVC- . ~- &WT 1V\ Sutt VT AiMKyS MAfPtus. 1. The vapor detectors in most units are serviced every six months. For more reliable performance, the manufacturer recommends that they be calibrated at least every three months with a standard calibration gas. 2. There are units whose is to bypass the automatic initiation of the water sprinkler system, thereby preventing unnecessary showers due to instrument malfunctions or detection of vapors released to the atmosphere during sampling. This prevents unwanted rapid cooling of the OHC reactors and keeps the is rue containers dry inside of the MC stabilizer storage shed. However, an unnec ssarv bTHt -VflOnr cloud explosion may occur without water dissipation. A recommended option to the system would be to operate these sprinkler systems similarly to the vinyl -5SL 087357 t furnace shutdown system. If two vapor detectors alarm, thereby indicating that 40% of the lower explosive limit has been reached, then the water sprinkler system would be activated. 3. Detection of ethylene vapor clouds away from direct sources of ethylene release would be more effective if the vapor detectors were located at least six feet above the ground. 4. From the information provided in this report, each individual unit should reassess their vapor detection system and modify it to afford adequate personnel protection from explosive organic vapor clouds. 5. Perimeter location of vapor detectors should be considered, especially in the EC and VCM units. The estimated cost of installing each vapor detector is $1700. Approximately $800 of the cost is for the equipment and its installation. The remaining $900 is for an average length of 200 feet of conduit necessary to run from the detector to the control room. Author; ^^i^Date: 7/^/W Approved: E.b. Approved: (j. [LJ . Date; 7f Date; jjz> ('i <T edh SL 087358 -6- APPENDIX SXj 087359 SL 087360 TABLE 1 FLAMMABLE COMPOUNDS IN PLANT B Compound Methane Ethylene Vinyl Chloride (VC) Ethyl Chloride (EC) Vinyfidene Chloride (VDC) Ethyiene Dichloride (EDC) i Dowtherm CO I Monochloroacetylene (MCA) Nifromethane (NRE) Methyl Ethyl Ketone (BTE) jsobutanol (IBL) 1,4 Dioxane (DOX) Tertiary Butyl Alcohol (T8L) Tolu ne Secondary Butyl Alcohol (SBL) Tertiary Amyl Alochoi (TAL) (F.) Boiling Point -259 -219 8 54 89 182 500 (F.) Flash Point (Open CuP) -108 - 45 50 65 255 <F.) Auto-Ignition Temperature 1000 1010 966 840 ' (Volume %) Explosive Limits (Lower-Upper) 5-3 - *4 2.75 - 28.6 4-22 3.6 - 12 7-16 6.2 - 15.9 OTHER FLAMMABLE COMPOUNDS Spontaneously flammable in air 214 112 175 226 95 214 180 60 231 212 215 75 800 7.3 1.8 - 11.5 1.68 2-22 2.4 - 8 1.27-6.75 li Vapor Density 0.55 0.975 2.15 2.22 3.35 ' 3.35 2.11 2.56 3.04 r-RAPH I - CALIBRATION CURVES TABLE OF CONVERSION FACTORS GAS : K methane 1 . 50 HYDROGEN 1 .47 PROPANE 1 .00 ETHYLENE 0.58 FtNYL CHLORIDE 0 - 66 BUTAPI&ME 0.77 acetylene 0.75 FrJJrylene 0.6B HEX An! " 0.61 HEPTANE 0.55 1/K_. C .67 0TT9 1 .00 . 1.04 n1.r1?/ 1.33 v: 47 ' 1 .64 : 1.82 ; SL 087361 CONVERSIONS : D IF THE INSTRUMENT IS CALIBRATED FOR PROPANE, MULTIPLY THE METER READING BY THE "K" FACTOR TO DETERMINE THE EQUIVALENT RESPONSE FOP. THE OTHER GAS. 3) IF THE INSTRUMENT IS CALIBRATED FOR ANOTHER GAS, MULTIPLY THE METER READING BY "1/K" FACTOR TO DETERMINE THE EQUIVALENT RESPONSE FOR PROPANE. EXAMPLE: To use a 501 LEL mixture of Propane to calibrate the instrument to read correctly on Hexane: a) Multiply the correct propane response (SOS) by the 1/K factor for Hexane (1,64) 50 X 1.64 = 82 b) Apply the 501 LEL Propane mixture to the detector and adjust the instrument to read 82t on the meter. VAPOR DETECTOR LOCATIONS VDC 1 VDC Vaporizer 2 VDC DH Phase Separator 3 VDC Reflux Pump 4 VDC Reactor 5 VDC DH Product Pump 6 Vaporizer Feed Pump 7 Southwest VDCM Storage 8 Northwest VDCM St orage 9 VDC Storage Tank 10 South End Stabilizer Dike 11 Scrubber Seal Pot 12 NRE Dike 13 Southwest DOL/IBL Dike 14 Control Room Sewer 15 VDCM Reactor Heater -10- OS'7 VAPOR DETECTOR LOCATIONS PEfr/TRl 1 Dowtherm Heater 2 Dowtherm Pump -12- Sb 087364 {*\3N )S .W V ~tct 3 HO t /asA/o w-jzzz.c \ -- Z no Q w 1 LJ e r^ c crv * o ! 0 C\ Kj o 1rc ooa po -o o i c to OGDC o ( " _) yvJi'TXt I ccwr jS^dc, / o ooo o o o V l J W-3Z3-0' A a ll . t COLUMBIA SOUTHERN ROAD PRINTSO A T C OBEFORE LAST R EV1 S 4- /. -13- SL 087365 VAPOR DETECTOR LOCATIONS OHC Recycle Compressor ^ 1 Recycle Compressor ^2 Recycle Compressor ^3 Recycle Compressor ^4 Recycle Compressor ^5 Gas Scrubber ^1 Gas Scrubber ^2 Reactor ^1 Reactor #2 Dowtherm Heater South Acid Pit North Acid Pit Northeast Incinerator Northwest Incinerator Northeast Reactor ^3 Southwest Reactor ^3 Fresh Air Duct -14- SL 087366 < VAPOR DETECTOR LOCATIONS EC South Reactor Pump North Reactor Pump North Catalyst Building North Process EC Product Pumps Scrubber Primary Stripper Feed Pump -16- SL 087368  VAPOR DETECTOR LOCATIONS VC Mid Furnace Northeast Furnace Southeast Furnace Southwest Furnace Northwest Dopp Neutralizer Northeast Process Southwest Process Northwest Process Southeast Process Mid Sewer Southeast Cracker Main Road Southeast Dopp South Process East Vent Compressor South Vent Compressor East Carbon Filters South Cracker Main Road Southwest Cracker Main Road * 19 4 I* VAPOR DETECTOR LOCATIONS VC/EC STORAGE 25 Northwest EC Day Tank 26 Southwest EC Day Tank 27 Southeast EC Day Tank 28 VDCM Transfer Pumps 29 EC Transfer Pumps 30 Northwest VC Day Tanks 31 Midwest VC Day Tanks 32 Southwest VC Day Tanks 33 Southeast VC Day Tanks 34 Mideast VC Day Tanks 35 Northeast VC Day Tanks 36 VC Transfer Pumps 37 Northeast Sphere 1 38 Southwest Sphere 1 39 Northeast Sphere 2 40 Southwest Sphere 2 41 Loading Pumps 42 Mid Loading Rack 43 North Loading Rack 44 South Loading Rack 45 Northwest VDCM Day Tanks 46 South VDCM Day Tanks -20- SL 087372 SL 087373  ~%j*uT'nC0~ If' /2-"7 */ REPORT OF ABNORMAL OPERATING INCIDENT /<D - ZZ- 7' LocaHon: a, h ltoj DEE C /QA.) T Describe the Incident: _fc A L- L UJ g>rO ZrCi- l/4w 7" CQR/Of/Ci-T&- h&Cd'JtEVw ~ fftrST. '- > .. a rA^ ciz^ F(?q/^ Ti^c' -- r,' - 1 H*l- \yp.Po/L- c.loop ' u/A^r . t, . i M* * , - feur /JOT il'Cr^crCC K-* \SF\PorZ_ E>(^TCr`cTc&. -7 ^-tpyjo OfS. MOTicCtf /g 'V Of&l^-rQ/L_ ZloOo te-ixcr-teo T*H (/C- - Pd*\0 SWT bauJrJ IS ^/Z ^ ' Describe the Hazard or Loss Potential: IM'Aa {/aPoki. bi^^rrcy Tb^AlA \/0 uftr'ftcg=S FP-tirA' C I^sLAnT. ~Th<- ' ' loc A-tv qaJ or TV o'} 'P)T6<To/^ E LrA c rjr<, ts That it is fioss/6i^ -no A I/Vj THfr C Pc/S^T C i/frAT gtfcw < *r S >rc S-r#. ffcfl-, 0X_ CoolRA-S ") A.RE... no ^ MAV,g Tw4 C.... _ R TrfrTC0 Ry T*/'.- l/APo/L. >cj ~<TOfi-$w "Xa >,/RpA P TWcr1 ACi?5 A/Aq jHOTHO^/O Q lO /lo"1' uloC't >A "rtrrvtT -- I^OoaA. Describe the Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: Q P^AA-rfr.^.^ 'X-v^-js t/ <! ^ ^ Tlt AA|H<-> ^ T JO y T^i> PP-r/Q To ic`Q fA Kto^T(o^ Q(" PpC7T/t~ DcrCdcT.;. o/:, t c^>TinAi^L i. <R "RTC Tq/,S 1-0 <f 0^55 A -^f Cp/X ppQT^cTlQ/^ t l?er< ( < qaJ 5 Ao/5. ALU . POtP<3 . * j ,' -' N-Jiv f- SEND TO LOSS PREVENTION ENGINEER! ~S^c'd B'v U.R'E.. ! I / l 3, / -74 -22SL 087374 REPORT OF ABNORMAL OPERATING INCIDENT Date: LocaHon: IB* E~Cl Describe the Incident: Sh(FT I T~ GMli?T Cl"' ex') Uf0i\(?/2- S, rC P/tr fioprogc fl ire' t-toicwt. '-' --_____ (V)f ; >t<?L A C.LOOD ;g?.fr _________ C^cafctflcT i/aEs/II AMft MC4- , A^ysuL \jJAS ^)at ^ccgp dp By "frfe btrrcTcToAj , Cuqoq \jc ONI. 1 Vt'J'-fuON(T iwdo AU&rfD <- T>^ c^atips ) iVf SPi^iL.ifflS > mo Describe the Hazard or Loss Potential: (Af $-5 6 UHiOd ^as Forr<rc By h 0(0/2. , , <= C>/*- Twy bFyg/L.* 5 Lts^J T//V" O o ArCflcSS fftgiSP &OAA . >Jf l<TAA KA^ <Ud7 CftiTTc'A AmO T/fcT ftoAC (Sfl7W CoUu6 WWC tUWO____ /feAHTfli ^ TT/f tyA^ CcoJj} f^S/Jcy 8v A ^Fr/Utir c*0 Describe the Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: (^tfrS . HAS -2e?t*Z\} WdWTL'd TO 5T0Qu| 7WC LocAruN O^c T7/C I//W/1 CYrr TO/z r To bcTTClU^/Of ^rTCl-cT AjM/T/orJAL. bT-lTe/? fiAt? M.-&t?A To pfepJtbr PJlU (oV<r*A6fc- CWlrtriodr flggu Tw4 T MOlT/QtOAL CpA/t ALwfU 'Dfr ujc^t/O flgTrCTQl* M<? -r?/<T NoLTrf h=t*JC S To /Wu* Lgao) ArtQ ALoaJ(S 7Wff AJtT Ptfitr-Mc<^ "7Hc' AwJtf V/CL u/KHTT , (p-CoO^) SEND TO LOSS PREVENTION ENGINEER! 08T^5 Sb -23- lit e-h7r *=i- -(?-. T* - S - ~7^ 'w k REPORT OF ABNORMAL OPERATING INCIDENT Date:_______November 8,, 1975 - a.m. Location: ETHYL CHLORIDE UNIT Describe the Incident: A crack 4 - 6" long developed in the head (process side) of the Freon Vent Condenser -SAC ^71 -786, releasing a large amount of HCI. The cloud was so thick that the Operators could not isolate the leak and the unit had to be shut completely down. No vapor detector alarms went off. The leak was spotted by an Instrument Mechanic in the VC unit who notified the control room via radio. Describe the Hazard or Loss Potential: The vent stream contains approximately 60% HCI/ 30% C? Hj and 10% EC. A large flammable vapor cloud could have resulted and been ignited if the Operators had not acted quickly to stop the release. The control room water curtain and the VC furnace hydroshield were tripped. A shift mechanic donned a Scott Air Pack and helped the lead operator and operator to shut the unit down. Describe the Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: A Kynar lined head was installed to replace the steel head. This, however, does not solve the corrosion problems which have plagued this section of the EC unit since its startup in 1966. A study will be made to locate the source of the problem and correct ?t. SEND TO SS PREVENTIO iNGINEER! Sli 087376 -24- t t t. 11-0-7* Rec'd by L. P. E. 11/18/75 REPORT OF ABNORMAL OPERATING INCIDENT Dale: LocaHon: 1 Z- ~ ft - 7ST______________V ' ?0 A N\____________ M * ~d _ _O^Lr__________________________ !_____________________________ Describe the Incident XAC-grur ZolTS n^i Iptto^ ' "FaAaJ A = ' ' ^ A I b~Q -g .FCQ* - 8 Belts' Of &Q. S' e-C.. Co/QA cTAJ/it^/S_ l/t^A-P fcA/f>___ g-T-Wyt- J E-c Le-fitK-t*JC~ A Q-toUb of 'HC.C, TX'VlfPVfc , " ^AiC____ _________ SPoTnsA____________ &___ S^P&l^\SeCL- . CoQj>fcA)rA^ wsfvj' liocATg/i____ C2.y.jCJ^.y-j----------------------------------------------------------- Describe the Hazard or Loss Potential: 'HZ' (VaJi t of A- ('Aftoft- CAoQ.fl COOLji HttuLT id C~Qa if^friT . S (CvO(fiCA*3T i A TO AJ~t= L_ Aa)^ Describe the Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: ^ aj} SoeTj1 ujill flc ^T-jdicA fee Sw7 f Okr Ho fc^J 0\ l *0 ftt ^oerr *-0" To lV A tx" Ark'- / /JA-tu/O Tb____ mf .______________ ...C./'Aus.t____ Or I^A-I U SEND TO LOSS PREVENTION ENGINEER! ---------------------------- -------- SL 087377 -25- I iU cr P