Document 28OLnN550pK2mq5nEYm5eznL

FILE NAME Household Contact HC DATE 1993 Dec 16 DOC HC040 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION Legal - Deposition of Jack Garrett { - t H 1 . blk i. L. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS - BEAUMONT DIVISION - PAUL MAJOR et ux VS. Plaintiffs ALCO STANDARD CORP et al Defendants ee ee e eer No. Set Neer Ne Net 315 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY TEXAS 136TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT RITA MAE SCHMIDT et al Plaintiffs vs. AC INC et al ) ) ee ee ) No. 145,280 ) Defendants ree Video Deposition of Witness JACK T. GARRETT On Behalf of the Plaintiffs December 16 1993 : Reported by JULIE E. STELFOX a Certificate of Merit Reporter METRO COURT REPORTING INC t. 20 South Central Avenue Suite 202 St. Louis Missouri 63105-1715 314 725-3333 800 829-6778 INDEX OF EXHIBITS Plaintiff's Exhibit GARR - Curriculum 230112 Vitae Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 Notice of Deposition Page Page Marked Identified 6 11 216 216 Original exhibits attached to original transcript 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 C 19 20 21 [ 22 23 24 25 ees VIDEO DEPOSITION OF JACK T. GARRETT produced sworn and examined on the part of the Plaintiffs pursuant to Notice and pursuant to the following stipulation between the hours of eight o'clock in the forenoon and six o'clock in the afternoon of Thursday December 16 1993 at the Stouffer's Concourse Hotel 9801 Natural Bridge in the County of St. Louis State of Missouri before me JULIE E. STELFOX Certificate of Merit of Reporter METRO COURT REPORTING INC Appea 10 11 12 13 14 For the Plaintiff For the Defendant Monsanto Co. Herschel L. Hobson Joseph Blanks Attorneys at Law 2190 Harrison Avenue Beaumont Texas 77701 Martin P. Zucker Inhouse Counsel 800 St. North Lindbergh Louis Missouri Blvd. 63167 15 For the Defendant G. Joseph Ellis Monsanto Co. Woodard Hall & Primm 16 7000 Texas Commerce Tower Houston Texas 77002 17 For the Defendant Paul Fogarty 18 North America Fulbright & Jaworski 1301 McKinney - 5100 19 Houston Texas 77010 20 For the Defendant David A. Oliver Goodyear & & Strong Pipkin 21 Nelson & Bissel 1400 San Jacinto Bldg 22 Beaumont Texas 77701 E 23 For the Defendant H. Tracy Richardson III Mallinckrodt Jenkins Grove & Martin 24 P.O. Box 26008 Beaumont Texas 77720-6008 ee Appearances Appearances Cont'd For the Ferro Defendant Corp. William B. Gaudet Adams and Reese 1100 Louisiana - 5100 Houston Texas 77002 For the ARCO Defendant Claude R. LeMasters Orgain Bell & Tucker 470 Orleans Street Beaumont Texas 77701 For the Defendant Steven M. Duble Shell & Texaco Hays McConn Rice & Pickering 400 Citicorp Center bata 1200 Smith Street Houston Texas 77002 10 [ [ For the Defendant John Hall 11 Met Life Liddell Sapp Zivley Hill & LaBoon ed 12 Texas Commerce Houston Texas Tower 77002 13 14 15 16 For the Defendant R.T. Vanderbilt James M. Corbett Giessel Stone Barker & 2700 Two Lyman Houston Center 909 Fannin Houston Texas 77010-1063 17 For the Defendant David K. Vallance Alco Standard McLeod Alexander 18 Powel & Apffel [ 19 Box 629 Galveston Texas 77553 20 21 22 23 24 25 For the Defendant Armstrong et al Rustin Polk DeHay & Elliston 1500 Maxus Energy 717 North Harwood Tower Street Dallas Texas 75201-6508 For the Defendant M.H. Detrick James E. Brown Jr. Johnson & Associates 4900 Woodway Houston Texas 77056 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Appearances Cont'd For the Defendant Dupont John Muir Mayor Day Caldwell & Keeton 700 Louisiana - 1900 Houston Texas 77002-2778 For the Flint Defendant Kote Co. Jan E. Dodd Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard One St. City Centre - 1500 Louis Missouri 63101-1880 For the Defendant Rebecca R. Jackson Bryan Cave One Metropolitan Square 211 North Broadway St. Louis Missouri 63102-2750 For the Defendant Fibreboard Corp. Jim Powers Roberts Markel Folger & Powers 24 Greenway Plaza - 2000 Houston Texas 77046 For the Defendant Monsanto Edward M. Carstarphen Woodard Hall & Primm 7000 Texas Commerce Tower Houston Texas 77002 Videographer Warriene Flatt Legal Images 105 Hunters Court Lumberton Texas 77656 19 20 21 22 E 23 24 1 1 25 pert i 6 oe [a a &: ra 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 stipulation Before the taking of the within deposition the parties by their counsel stipulate and agree that the same is being taken pursuant to Notice Counsel further stipulate same may be taken in stenotypy and thereafter typed signature of the witness being expressly waived by consent of counsel and the witness in his own behalf and regularly filed in the case Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 230112 GARR marked for identification JS JACK T. GARRETT being produced sworn and examined on behalf of the Plaintiff deposeth and saith MS FLATT The date is December 16 It is 9:25 We are on the record THE REPORTER And if everyone would please identify themselves and who they represent starting with the gentleman on my left MR BROWN Jim Brown M.H. Detrick Company MS JACKSON Rebecca Jackson Coltec Industries Inc. and Garlock Inc. MR FOGARTY Paul Fogerty Elf Atochem North American Inc. MR OLIVER David Oliver In the Major case it will be Goodyear In the Schmidt case it will be & MR LEMASTERS Claude LeMasters representing ARCO in the Schmidt case MR RICHARDSON Tracy Richardson representing Mallinckrodt in the Major case MR POWERS Jim Powers I represent Fibreboard in the Schmidt case Texaco MR DUBLE Steve Duble for Shell and =MAR MR ELLIS Joe Ellis representing 10 Monsanto and the witness [ 11 MR ZUCKER Marty Zucker Monsanto ~ aoe 12 + c MR HALL John Hall Met Life 13 MR MUIR John Muir Dupont 14 MR CORBETT Jim Corbett R.T. 15 Vanderbilt in the Major case 16 | MR GAUDET Billy Gaudet representing grenesen 17 Ferro Corporation in the Major case 18 Pa MR VALLANCE David Vallance 19 representing Alco Standard Corporation in the en 20 Major case 21 [ MR POLK Rustin Polk representing 22 the Armstrong World Industries A.P. Green GAF mae 23 Flexitallic Asbestos Claims Management 24 Corporation N and U.S. Gypsum in the Schmidt [ 25 case sta tace L. POR En ene C ... 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS DODD Jan Dodd representing the Flint Kote Company in the Schmidt case MR HOBSON I'm Herschel Hobson I represent the plaintiffs in these cases and in attendance with me is Mr. Joseph Blanks DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR HOBSON Q. Would you introduce yourself to the group please sir A. My name is Jack T. Garrett and I'm retired -- retiree from Monsanto and I'm a consultant at times Q. Mr. Garrett my name is Herschel Hobson and I represent some people who've brought a lawsuit One of the defendants in the case is Monsanto That's your old employer so you realize I'm on the other side of this lawsuit from your old employer A. Yes MR OLIVER were not serious -- Herschel if I may you MR HOBSON is good for all -- MR OLIVER I was not Thank you One objection MR HOBSON - and take the deposition pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure if that's -- MR ELLIS Agreed MR OLIVER Agreed Q. Also ask you Mr. Garrett would you like to read and sign your deposition so we have all the little formalities out of the way A. I haven't seen it yet 10 Q. Yes sir That's -- what happens is 11 this young lady that's taking everything down will 12 put it in a book send it to you and you can read 13 it and there will be an eratta sheet and any 14 changes that you would like to make you have the 15 privilege of writing on the eratta sheet and L 16 resubmitting 17 A. Okay 18 MR ELLIS Why don't we just handle rs 19 it this way If you would send his copy of the eS 20 deposition to me and I'll arrange having him read 21 and sign the original signature page and return rt 22 the signature page 23 A. If you send it to me he's going to 24 get it anyway ro 25 MR CORBETT Herschel if I could fl 10 ask as a housekeeping matter were you planning on splitting up this deposition according to these cases -- your questions in any particular way one case in the morning one in the afternoon anything like that MR HOBSON No. We're going right on through and getting done MR CORBETT Just every other question 10 MR HOBSON Something like that 11 THE REPORTER Sir what is your name 12 MR CORBETT Jim Corbett 13 THE REPORTER Okay 14 MR GAUDET One additional matter -- 15 oo 16 THE REPORTER What is your name sir MR GAUDET Billy Gaudet eT 17 representing Ferro We wanted to reserve our 18 right to object to the introduction of the video Fa 19 ultimately By not objecting to it earlier we fey 20 wouldn't want it to act as a waiver to our later 21 objection 22 MR HOBSON What's the basis of your 23 24 25 objection sir MR GAUDET I'm reserving my right to object to it I don't know what it will be until 1 | ana oremRGincnt dre 1 1 1 eagr ... 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 11 after you finish the -- the video There may be numerous objections to its introduction MR HOBSON You're not claiming you didn't get notice MR GAUDET No no Q. Mr. Garrett may I have the date that you first began working for Monsanto please sir A. It was 1950 I believe and I can't -- huh Well I graduated from the University of Tennessee in -- with my Master's and it had to have been in the end of the summer so it had to have been either August or September Q. You've provided me before we started here this morning a copy of a resume which I've now marked as Exhibit Number 230112 A and would it help you sir to look at your resume to get those dates A. October 1953 Q. October of '53 And may I ask when you left Monsanto's employment sir as an employee A. Thirty years after that Q. So somewhere around 1988 A. It was '88 -- I believe '89 but I'm not absolutely sure Wait a minute Let's look rae fi ' e 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 12 again see if I've got a better memory than my own Everything but the date I left out Q. '88 or '89 A. Yes Q. As I ask you questions Mr. Garrett I know that some of the things I'm going to be asking you about happened a long time ago and you may not have a exact recollection of everything or even precise dates so if you could just give me your best recollection and if you're estimating just tell me when you're estimating I'd appreciate that sir A. Okay Q. How did you get the job with Monsanto A. Well when I graduated from the University of Tennessee with my Master's I had a doctorate set up at the university -- at Oak Ridge to do a doctoral dissertation in rare earth materials with the -- what's known as the nuclear energy for the propulsion of aircraft Now that's a misnomer It's NEPA All of their unusual research went under that guise and during the latter part of my Master's degree work the whole system collapsed pres yO 1 [ [ [ . > Pa 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 13 The American first big post war recession hit The government was withdrawing their support The two people I worked with out there to get this job headed -- I had my Ph.D. thing agreed upon and everything They -- I couldn't even find them One of the -- the University promptly sent him back to his home university which happened to be the University of Illinois So had to go get a job I was married and had two kids so went off on foot Went over to my father's home in southeast Oklahoma Durant and went with him who was a salesman for fractional horsepower engines for lawn mower manufacturers Went with him on -- down on a trip to Houston because I didn't have the money and I stayed in his hotel room and his employer apparently paid for it used his car while he spent all day in his -- went around Houston all the way down to Texas City interviewed everybody along the line and -- and Monsanto offered me a job on the spot Q. And that must have been in October 1953 thereabouts Syatetete a ba ll er 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 14 A. That's right Q. When you walked in the gate did you have in mind what you wanted to do when you made your application A. I wanted to do research Q. Did you get to do research A. Damn little An inorganic physical chemist in a primarily organic laboratory is -- does all the spare parts work Q. And that's where you found yourself A. That's right Q. Is that what you did then is you started working in the laboratory there at the Texas City plant A. The research lab for the Texas Division of Monsanto at the time Q. What kinds of things did they have you doing when you began working at the research lab there A. I did a lot of explosion limit work physical chemistry Mixture work I finally ended up doing pilot -- a lot of pilot plant work for the processes that were being developed Q. Is my appreciation that ultimately you got into industrial hygiene with Monsanto is that 15 right A. Well everything I did at the beginning I guess was a mistake I was ordered by my boss to go out and find out -- I don't know why I don't have any idea -- but to go out and find out all the materials handled in the plant both as primary raw materials intermediates identifiable intermediates and final products and to write a treatise defining the safety and health 10 problems connected with each one of them So I wrote a famous research report 11 12 that had absolutely nothing to do with research 13 but it was the biggest one they ever had written 14 I guess and I -- and I'd research -- reports at 15 the time in Monsanto went to the plant manager or 16 to my boss the research director for the Texas . we 17 Division of Monsanto and copies went to St. 18 Louis both to the then president of research rg 19 and to the corporate research file ea 20 These research things are all double 21 signed Every page has to be double signed and ni And it was on health and 22 all that legal nonsense ..--: 23 safety and somebody sent a copy to Dr. Kelly who 24 was the medical director of Monsanto L L 25 And he wanted to know who in the hell iBYt3ENESes ES PS mn 2 ye 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16 was interfering in his business I guess so he came to Texas City talked me along with Elmer Wheeler who was then director of industrial hygiene or was the corporate industrial hygienist because there was nobody else working for him and a couple weeks later I got offered a transfer to St. Louis Q. About how long after you got to Monsanto in Texas City did you start your research report that led to this odyssey A. Gosh I don't know Maybe a year Q. And about how long did it take you to do the work for the research report A. I spent most of my time in the library in Houston at the University of Houston library and over at the hospital there which is now that big hospital center I think that was the old Baylor Medical -- Baylor Medical School branch and I spent a good deal in their library Q. Did you utilize the library down at the University of Texas medical branch in Galveston A. No I was over there I had been in that hospital many times but -- and had talked to 17 a couple people but their library was not nearly as extensive at -- in this subject Now you're talking toxicology now not really medicine Not nearly as good as the University of Houston at that time and the other -- the university there -- that university center which is now that big diagnostic center was then I believe attached to Baylor but I'm not sure and they had the best library 10 Q. There's a library there now called 11 Jessie Jones Memorial Library 12 A. That could very be -- very well be it L 13 or the beginning of it 14 Q. Had you had any training or experience 15 in the area of toxicology before you began this 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 research report A. I had training in respect to the -- to the methods of keeping yourself reasonably clean and alive in research and at that university believe it or not we had university safety people at the University of Tennessee Knoxville Campus and the research chemists on research jobs got lectured and given the documents necessary for their -- and the TLVS for their materials that they were handling and we stuck within that to - 4 18 the degree that we could do that for sampling TLV means threshold limit value Q. Did any of your course work that you took as a student before you came to Monsanto teach you about how to do scientific research A. Yeah I did a lot of sci- -- I produced the scientific -- researched my report _ myself cae 10 Q. So by the time -~- A. It was published -- published in the Cu] 11 Journal of Physical Chemistry It's on radiation 12 chemistry the measure of radioactive materials in 13 layers the differential effect of layers the 14 absorption effect of layers themselves 15 Q. So would it be accurate then Mr. 16 Garrett that by the time you got to Monsanto you Ee 17 were well trained and schooled in how to do 18 scientific research how to use a library how to ca 19 find really what was available in the -- in the at 20 scientific literature 21 A. or do it myself 22 23 24 25 Q. Yes sir A. Keep in mind I did some work on pollution control all along in this same issue so -- and that way we did it ourself We went to vhtagete, ... ... 1 ... EO ea 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 19 the State of Texas and with their laboratory facilities and their research biologists set up programs of testing chemicals in expected developments at the Texas City plant We did the -- the marine toxicology work on a number of them including a number of cyanide compounds Q. When you went to the University of Houston as you described earlier in doing the work for your research report would you recount for me as best you can recall how you found that facility from a toxicological research standpoint A. You track it through chemistry is the way I did it I was interested in a great many chemicals and if you track the chemicals back far enough you will find references to some kind of government documents or other documents and if you can look them up or have them shipped and we had a great many shipped on loan We could find out what the threshold limit values were how they were done who did the work and so forth So that was where we did it I had a great leader there by the way Monsanto had a consultant at the University of Houston named Sawin w known as Hod 20 I don't know what his first name was He was a tremendous biologist and he had knowledge in where you could find a great many things in a university web that I did not know although I had been through the same ruckus at Tennessee Our laboratory system at Tennessee is much different than the University of Houston's Our library system in Tennessee was centralized 10 Theirs was scattered within the individual 11 colleges at that time sir And did you have the 12 Q. Yes 13 feeling that you in fact through the University 14 of Houston and over at the Medical Center library 15 that you say could have been associated with 16 Baylor at the time that you really did have Ge 17 access to pretty much all the literature that you 18 needed 19 A. Yes I think I did and got put on oe 20 a bunch of committees that I didn't even know 21 existed by my boss in Texas and one of them was a ro 22 Manufacturing Chemists Association committee on and this was primarily at the time 23 pollution control standards was the -- was the 24 pollution 25 work of the day if you know what I mean 1 a cine 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 And I went to a number of those meetings and met some very good and efficient people from Dupont particularly from Dupont and from Standard oil of New Jersey and they helped me along as well Here I'm an inorganic physical chemist who didn't even know anybody cared and I'm now beginning to be a toxicologist Q. In the Houston area when you got there in the early 1950s did you encounter anyone else other than Dr. Sawin that you told us about who you found to be helpful or knowledgeable in doing this toxicological work A. There was a guy -- there was a man at Humble then which is then and even now fully a part of Standard of New Jersey but then it was -even then but it was called Humble & Refining Company It was headquartered in Houston and whose primary refinery was there I can't remember his name Q. A. What was his -He was their -- he was their industrial hygienist Q. James Hammon 22 A. Yes it was Jim Hammon and he led me through a great deal of the labryinth of where you there in this business and get and why you get where you get the data because the data on early -- in those days was pretty -- was there but it was -- you had to dig like the devil to find 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 it It was in reports Lots of it was in the hands of chemical companies and oil companies and if you had access through -- and Jim introduced me to that committee of the API which Monsanto later put me on was the support committee for the American Petroleum Institute Q. The medical advisory committee A. Yes only it was primarily meeting of loudmouth industrial hygiene and toxicology people We blew the M.D.s out of the place Q. I take it you mean that in constructive sense A. Well no they -- believe it or not they -- we organ- - they organized a committee that included all of us and then they went to play golf The doctors always play golf to do the serious work Q. Left you guys So we did all the work A. That's right AZI AZI $ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 23 in connection with toxicology and the work necessary guiding lights toward what kind of work needed to be done to produce adequate controls and this sort of thing and who was doing what and so forth And some of the research projects later put on by the API was largely due to the toxicology committee or whatever they want to call it It was the medicals anyway Q. Can you put a time period on that of course Mr. Garrett when you worked with the API 56 A. I was a member of the API committee probably for fifteen years in the late 50s had to be into the early 70s Okay Q. Yes sir A. And the meetings largely enough then were in Chicago I bet I went to twenty meetings in Chicago in Chicago or Fort Worth Why I don't know Don't ask me Q. Were there other people besides Jim Hammon that you recall working with on these activities A. Oh yes The best group that I knew was the -- was the Standard oil group That was 1 - U U U [ [ [ LS, oT ra E E E E 208 foesie 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 the -- in New Jersey and their people in Columbia and Venezuela which was also a subsidiary of theirs called Creole Production Company I believe And they had a great group down in South America and we got -- we worked with them along -- now we I'm talking about the chemical crowd This is the Dupont Monsanto and all the bunch of that group with the oil group but it really pretty well merged that throughout all the AP -- the committees including the committees on standards We probably -- I probably knew all these people personally and a great many of them I had been in their homes I knew their wives and kids and everything so it was that kind of relationship Q. Did you mention that Dupont was also part of this API work A. Oh yes Q. Were there other chemical companies involved with the petroleum industry through the API A. No. Dupont -- in the API group was a -- group of people representing in my opinion the pos es perce rs Ea [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 most forward and good companies -- represented a that the chemical industry group represented group together in -- with the American Industrial Hygiene Association in their committees on standards and that group was -- were friends I was a personal friend of the Dupont man as a matter of fact Been in his house Been in his home Q. Who was that sir A. oh God Don't ask me that question His name his name You'd have to look it up from the records I guess Dow Chemical would that be one of the Q. companies A. Dow was -- Dow was the best treater in the business in pollution control Now keep in mind we're working both sides of this street Now this is not true with everybody else but it was true with a great many people including Monsanto and Dupe and some of the others We treated this as a single issue Dow did not Dow had a strictly pollution engineering group and a toxicology industrial thinking group They knew each other Don't get me wrong I'm not -- and they frequently went to ay com CU 0 ca ~ ~ ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 the same meetings because of the crossing of information and need But Dow was the people that had done a lot of very difficult treatment studies and they were wide open to anybody in the industry They taught us a great deal about treatment of organic chemicals in treatment of plants which we -- some we didn't know Some we did know We turned over to them a lot of experience in connection with some products as well I also had been frequently in their plant in Freeport Texas Q. Down in the same area of Texas Union Carbide has a large facility Did you have any encounters with Union Carbide personnel A. Carbide is a funny company of the big chemicals They did a lot of work in this area but they did less coordinating with other companies than most big companies They did by zone We had a great group in Texas We had a good group in the Kanawha Valley of West Virginia with Dupont and Monsanto and Carbide and the like but as a corporate structure it was difficult to find 27 whoever was supposed to be the boss man of pollution or industrial hygiene in Carbide at the time They had people some very very good people They attended our API -- or our -- they attended our industrial hygiene meetings but it wasn't coordinated really Their companies were separate companies I guess legally a great deal more 10 separate than Monsanto's divisions were and [ 11 other companies 12 Q. Now this work that you were doing ine with the American Petroleum Institute and I think 13 14 you said also the Manufacturing Chemists 15 Association this was -- was this after you 16 transferred to the corporate offices of Monsanto 17 A. Well it was during the period -- and 18 I don't know I went to -- I made an API meeting 19 in Fort Worth before I went up there and was 20 talking with their -- largely with their 21 toxicology people and now you're talking 22 industrial hygiene not pollution okay 23 Q. How would you be able to tell us the 24 differentiation between industrial hygiene and 25 pollution as you use those terms iL 28 A. In some cases you couldn't because some companies grew up Like Monsanto grew up from Dr. Kelly into the -- into the industrial hygiene pollution and then the pollution thing finally fell over into engineering Same was true I know for example with Dupe because Dupont's people were engineering people and they were from Newark Delaware They were not in the main plant They 10 were down at the engineering offices in Newark 11 and when I wanted to visit them I had to go down C 12 there to that -- to the Newark operation 13 In the petroleum companies -- an 14 interesting thought who was -- their headquarters 15 people these were the kingpin people in what 16 would be considered the good good companies like 17 Standard Standard Oil of New Jersey had a 18 19 set where their people in New Jersey working 20 out of that New Jersey office and the labs there 21 represented all of their subsidiaries except that of their subsidiaries like Humble -- but 22 many 23 Humble grew up as a separate company that was 24 owned by them which is the same thing with their [ [ [ [ [ 25 set in South America BPI ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 29 And so they had the same kind of people therae nd how they merged them I don't know But we did deal with them very much They had Dupont -- I mean Standard probably had the best trained young physicians MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive Q. Would you tell us Mr. Garrett as best you recall how it was when you would go to meetings through these organizations or others in exchanging information between companies Was this something that was done not done How -- A. It was done wide open Wide open We -- I had a letter one time -- and I don't know who it was from -- to tell them anything they want to know because it's a business that has to be done and done right by one of our executives So we did -- we told them any data they want I've given them complete research pamphlets connected with that specific toxicology Q. Did you find that there were some -- companies that were just as open about Monsanto as Monsanto was and others at work or how did that work MR FOGARTY Objection calls for >fi >fi cons [ [ - - t co. Ts es 2 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 30 speculation THE REPORTER What's your name sir MR FOGARTY Paul Fogerty A. We had a group of people we worked with us in detail I don't remember anybody telling us we didn't -- they wouldn't give us their data or information Q. Was it your perception at the time that the folks that you have told us that you worked with at these other companies that these other companies were just as open as Monsanto was in sharing that A. Yes Q. You said that this initial research report that you -- that got you into the health and safety and later I guess pollution even area your charge was to go out and find all the materials used at the Texas City plant A. Nodding head Q. Can you tell me how you went about doing that A. I went from unit to unit and asked them got their engineer out and had him define and diagram his unit And where he actually peeked at or sniffed at any of the products we 31 took them down and checked them but the report's about -- hundreds of pages long Q. Did that report have a title to it so that we could identify it A. God no I don't think so I have no idea what the report title was I didn't even know that Kelly'd had a copy of the damn thing You know you do -- I'm a young e eFey chemist doing a job I'll do the job they tell me [os 10 to do I recognize that I was a spare part [ 11 because I was the inorganic physical chemist in a a ned 12 largely organic laboratory and I got all the 13 oddball jobs and that was one of them 14 Q. When you said you used all the -- you 15 inventoried all the materials used at the plant 16 were these process materials that we're talking 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 about A. Yes primarily purchased or modified If they purchased one product and modified it we did them both If there were known analyzed comtaminants we did those if we could find it If we didn't we did the work ourselves Q. And what about items that were used not in actually as raw material to make a product or as a finished product or intermediate but 32 things like catalysts or filter aids A. We did three catalysts and we did some of the spents where you get two of them and get them We did a lot of raw material or we gathered the data Now keep in mind we're gathering data for this thing You'd be surprised at the number of sources you can tap and surprised I think even more at how even then -- you're talking 1950s 10 now -- even how open they are We had no trouble for example in 11 12 respect to any of the dusts that we usually 13 handled asbestos cement that sort of stuff The people that -- they give you what 14 15 they knew and they'd give you any data they had eo 16 and in fact they'd give you probably literature 17 resources if those were available oe 18 Q. Asbestos was a material that was used Pe 19 at the Texas City plant 20 21 A. Yes Q. You use it in chlorine 22 manufacturing Tans 23 A. We didn't manufacture chlorine at 24 Texas City 25 Q. You didn't How did you use asbestos at the plant as you recall A. As an insulating material Q. oh But not in manufacturing products A. No. Q. You say that you were given information freely about things like asbestos dust A. That's right 10 Q. What did you get and how did you go 11 about doing it How did you get to this 12 impression 13 A. Well we got -- we got told -- and 14 I'll tell you the truth I can't tell you who 15 told me -- to look up the TLVs and the first time 16 I ever saw TLVs was during that setting I didn't - 17 even know they existed 18 Hell I'm a darn fool Come out of ora 19 the Army and -- with too many kids and needed a ope 20 job So I found out that they used asbestos 21 ~~ I got -- looked it up found out the tes 22 threshold limit value and all of those things 23 that we could find a TLV for or that any company 24 had established one for we used and was in the 25 report [ [ [ xt raene, [ i to ms 4 / 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 34 Q. When you say you found out they used asbestos who were you talking about A. Our maintenance people used it to maintain the pipe equipment Q. Were you aware that there was asbestos in insulation materials -- A. Yes Q. -- before you came to Texas City A. Yes Q. asbestos What do recall learning about A. Well as a matter of fact we were dealing -- we were making some reactor tubes at the University of Tennessee and we got lectured on that to use respirators or use it inside of hand glove compartments in a hood If we were going to do it before -- well we mixed it up in the mud because most research laboratories use a lot of it to cover heat sensitive equipment as a mud Q. And this occurred even before you went to Monsanto A. oh yes I used it before Yes I did Q. Do you remember what was told to you 35 when you were at the University of Tennessee about the reasons for handling asbestos this way A. Don't breathe it Q. I'm sorry A. Don't breathe it or use a mask Come to the head of this particular section the research of engineering section Go see him they get you a mask Q. Is there some point in your career 10 Mr. Garrett where you learned about the hazards 11 that were associated with asbestos exposure 12 A. Well if you're told to do a research 13 report on the toxicology and hazards and safety 14 features of all the products in a complicated L 15 plant you're going to learn about asbestos and 16 cement dust and catalysts spent catalyst dust FS 17 and about half a dozen other dusts and we're rs 18 going to check them out 19 And the primary test period was the aaa 20 surface toxicology what was retained on old 21 catalysts Believe it or not not much 22 Second what was the base catalyst 23 made of Is it -- was it made of some rock 24 25 substance or asbestos in pellets in little half moons God -- we've seen it in every shape you can ers TER , ,- , 11 Po [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 36 imagine -- upon which something is then laid or sprayed or cooked on which is subsequently the catalyst which much of the solid catalysts today or in those days were in catalyst beds and those beds were made up of some kind of rock or base with the material stuck to it somehow Generally by vapor and then that constituted the catalyst used Q. Are you saying that some of the catalysts that you used there at Monsanto the base material was made with asbestos A. Some of it had to have been I don't know I couldn't tell you that I've seen so many different kinds that you can shake a stick at They're made out of cement base Some of them are made out of -- with asbestos in a blender They're sort of solid The stuff is then absorbed to it and that constitutes catalyst and it's used in beds or trays in a vapor stream Q. In looking through your -- let me start over In doing your research report that you told us about at the Monsanto plant there at Texas City and going to the University of Houston and the other libraries can you still recall some 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 37 of the sources of information that you found A. The primary source was the Manufacturing Chemists Associations hazard data sheets I later found out that the American Petroleum Institute also had hazard data sheets but that was too late to help my report but it wasn't too late to help me find some of the things they used that we did not in the chemical industry normally used Q. You're talking about the toxicological reviews that the API had A. Yes tox reviews of theirs and the chemical safety data sheets that the old MCA had They still have them today under the Chemical Manufacturers Association CMA today Change of name doesn't change the organization much Q. Do you recall seeing any literature from the Industrial Hygiene Foundation A. Yes Q. Is that a source that you would have been able to -- A. Well when I got transferred to St. Louis and Dr. Kelly after he came down to look at my report and gave me hell for writing it 38 because I wasn't supposed to be qualified then he transferred me to St. Louis as an industrial hygienist which doesn't make a whole lot of sense but what the hell I went up there and then I ran into my -- the boss I had there was a certified [ hygienist named Elmer P. Wheeler Elmer is now dead He took me through the system and I 10 learned about toxic data sheets that were se 11 published by a great number of people including oes ine 12 many companies published them as well c 13 And if you stacked them all up even 14 available then -- this you're talking now in the 15 mid 50s -- it would crunch this table down with 16 the ones that are published by the API the MCA L 17 and a great number of organizations that are not 18 that very well known the organic Chemical rs 19 Manufacturing Company organization the drug eA 20 manufacturing people 21 There are thousands of them and then 22 there are all these great ones that are available 23 freely from most companies and we ended up with 24 piles of the darn things 25 There was no lack of safety 1 39 information on individual compounds even in the 50s It became a great deal more elegant and a great deal more staffed later MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive THE REPORTER Your name sir MR OLIVER David Oliver Discussion was held off the record MR ELLIS You can just ignore what they say They just have to say some things for 10 the record to get it on the record That's all 11 MR BLANKS They don't really have 12 to 13 MR HOBSON They do it 14 Q. What he's saying Mr. Wheeler -- 15 A. I forgot to bring my dugidgits I 16 hate the damn things and so I don't wear them if I oe 17 don't have to 18 ra Q. What he's saying he's objecting 19 saying that your answer is not responsive to my 3 20 question He thinks you're answering something I 21 didn't ask you I guess is what it means but -- 22 A. You asked me about data 23 Q. Yes sir 24 MR BLANKS I thought you did a good 25 job 40 A. And it reminded me of literature MR OLIVER Object to the side bar MR FOGARTY Object to the side bar Q. That's what it means A. Okay Q. You were moved from Texas City to Monsanto's corporate headquarters That's St. Louis right A. Yes sir 10 Q. And you started working for Mr. 11 Wheeler 12 A. I started working for Elmer P. 13 Wheeler yes 14 Q. And Mr. Wheeler was working for 15 Dr. Kelly 16 A. Dr. Kelly yes a : 17 Q. Was that the staff 18 A. That was the staff In 1954 that was f 19 the staff ki 20 Q. And would you have any recollection 21 Mr. Garrett as to how long Mr. Wheeler had been [ 22 with Monsanto in his capacities as an industrial 23 24 25 hygienist A. He came to Monsanto right after the war from the Chemical Warfare School He was a rao6hU& fees ' hs 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CWS officer 41 He was actually an artillary officer that came back from Africa and was in -- since he had trained a hygienist and had worked for the north -- for the New Hampshire Health Department they put him in their hygiene school where part of -- God knows what part of the military he was in and they had a school and they did a pretty good job By the way they also published documents that are way -- they're years old Some of them are excellent up to the date documents for literature research Q. They being who A. Being the Army's industrial hygiene laboratories which I believe was in the CWS Chemical Warfares set in Virginia and that's where Elmer came back to and Dr. Kelly hired him out of there as soon as the war stopped Q. Was it your impression Mr. Garrett that Mr. Wheeler worked in New Hampshire before the war after the war during the war A. No before the war He worked as a hygienist to the degree that they were defined as hygienists in the 1930s He graduated in chemistry as I did from the University of New te mak bs ae de D 1 f rene Li BEX2 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 42 Hampshire Q. Would you give us sir your best impression of how knowledgeable you felt Mr. Wheeler was when you joined the staff in 1954 as an industrial hygienist A. He was a very good manager His knowledge was very deep He expected me to gather a great deal of knowledge and become knowledgeable in things that he was not in We had -- we were three people running that show Dr. Kelly Mr. Wheeler and myself and later we got broke up and we had a great big -- lots of people and big files Big files So he -- he gave me the API meetings to go to He went to the AIH meetings We all went to the -- to our credited meetings I could have gone to the Chemical Society meetings I'm a member of the ACS have been for eighty hundred years but I did not because they -- until they began to get into -- to have some committee work on occupational health Q. Were there any other organizations that you found had information to share in industrial hygiene toxicology area such as the American Public Health Association aia wes . bancs-gndSundae Se ren the. U6 om [ ae ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 43 Did you ever go to any of their meetings A. Yes I've been to AHS meetings I would say the states -- this is one -- let's take this -- you people may not like this but there are some states whose records and files were excellent Texas was one of them They had an industrial hygiene group in their health department I can't remember that man's name He was a first class man He showed me their records and their -- and I used them too by the way I went up to Austin and they showed me their records The State of Missouri wasn't very wealthy in that area The State of Illinois had excellent facilities and records also in the area of toxicology Some of these belonged to their university some belonged to their state health department And when you work on pollution control and industrial hygiene as did I in those days you probably run into what's known as the Bureau of Sanitary Engineering of all the various health departments and that's what I did in Texas It was true in Illinois 44 It was true in Iowa true in California by districts by zone Six I believe zones in California or areas they call them They had individuals for each of these zones Q. Did you run into Dr. Carl Nau u at Texas A. huh I sure did Q. That might have been the man you were 10 trying to think of 11 A. Yeah Hey he was a great guy too ead wd 12 Se cr Q. I was asking you about organizations 13 where you might have attended meetings to be able 14 to share information I asked about the APHA Ul 15 Any others that come to mind 16 A. Well we did it on the ba- -- Dr. cer. 17 Kelly took the medical meetings and primarily 18 this was the MCA or the CMA's medical meeting and 19 he despised the American Medical Association for bi 20 some reason I can understand why but -- because 21 I had to go to the meetings to supernume sic 4 22 him and I can understand that in his -- they were 23 24 25 pretty much all out playing golf I mean the meeting wasn't very -- I mean me and two doctors talked to the guy that was iad - oe rs es r . ; ve 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 45 the chairman and he was waiting - he had his golf clubs around his shoulders So we -- Dr. Kelly didn't think much of that I'm not sure he was a golf player anyway but so I went to some of those meetings to cover him in committee meetings because those people would go astray if you weren't careful Q. And these were AMA meetings A. Yes Q. Was there a part of AMA that dealt with occupational health industrial medicine A. There's a great -- I'm teasing a lot about it but it's true They -- they got almost all the institutional doctors to go to it None of the people that practiced medicine went to those meetings The people that practiced medicine in corporations and for insurance company stuff went to those occupational health meetings It's much better today They've got some fine committees on just on toxicology and occupational health and the effects of various things upper respiratory effect All the individual colleges in surgery and everything probably have toxicology subgroups that work on materials that are -- that impinge on 46 their specific area So there are plenty of places -- and even then there were plenty of places you could get if you dug enough Now you could find the base of the information It was available You could find who was working on trying to increase or improve that information and that was -- to put it together was difficult 10 Today it's together in a vast number 11 of books and documents that contain -- that did ow 12 what we tried to do as a committee under the MCA r 13 We wrote MCA data sheets for example 14 MR FOGARTY Objection 15 nonresponsive pe s 16 MR BLANKS Wait stop here ee 17 A. MCA means Manufacturing Chemists 18 Association now CMA and they were one of the ora 19 groups along with the API who published group or 20 documents short terse six eight pages some of 21 them Some of them twenty pages some of them rt 22 five pages of the toxicology and hazards involved as 23 in handling individual materials 24 oes The API did likewise The Organic 25 Chemical Manufacturing Association did also 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 47 publish a bunch and these were largely on die chemicals because they're oddballs and they're also quite toxic because they're largely organic amine compounds So there are a lot of people -- and these were available but you had to participate to get ahold of them so we participated a lot Q. The impression I'm getting Mr. Garrett is that there wasn't a lot of this information out there being spoon fed to people but if you had someone that wanted to find it you could get it Is that accurate or not MR FOGARTY Objection leading A. If you ask for it within the realm of those materials you got it readily from the people or they would give you copies of the documents they helped make with one of these 18 organizations 19 I'll bet between the API and the MCA ey 20 put out thousands of copies of those things a -:- 21 year as did almost anybody that made those kind 22 of documents 23 Now some of them were pretty tight 24 within their organizational system because that's cy 25 the only one that knew who they were there 48 The Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association which is largely the die merchants you didn't realize they did a lot of work on a lot of raw chemicals that were used in dies And that turned out to be chemicals some of us manufactured so when we found that out we began to work with them as well and the document -- the information that had been done in the past was well documented in those ~- in those 10 particular issues -- publications that they f 11 issued and everybody had a different name for 12 them a 13 Q. You at Monsanto and working with Mr. 14 Wheeler and Dr. Kelly I take it in your 15 participation you began to gather together quite roan b. 16 an assembly of information naan 17 A. We sure did 18 Q. How did you handle that information 19 there at the company and the volume that you had 20 21 22 it to be able to use it A. We had files full and they had -- We had them -- we filed them by chemical compound 23 name 24 Q. And this was certainly in the age anae 25 before computers A. Yes 49 2 Did you have them indexed in some way A. Yes we had them indexed by -- by their best chemical name The chemical -- the American Chemical Society name is what we used Q. You mentioned American Chemical Society You've told me you're a chemist and that you're a member of that organization A. Yes 10 Q. I take it that Chemical Abstracts 11 something you learned how to use quite early then 12 A. Yes yes 13 Q. And would Chemical Abstracts have been 14 something that you continued to use after you got 15 to Monsanto 16 A. Oh yes sir That's the best way to 17 peruse a whole flock of chemical data out of the 18 American Chemical ACS documents In fact we 8 i 19 contributed to -- we were asked usually to E 20 contribute a summary to some of the stuff that -- 21 r Q. For those who might not be familiar bes 22 with Chemical Abstracts would you tell us what 23 24 25 those were in the 50s A. Chemical Abstracts is a document published by the American Chemical Society since 50 the turn of the century abstracting all -- their word not mine -- all of the known reputable chemical literature on a periodic basis And they do a good job because the Chemical Abstracts come out about ten times a year I don't think it comes out every month and it must be a thousand pages in the durn thing now Q. Were there other abstracting services that you became familiar with that were useful in 10 your work 11 A. Well some of the other societies 12 some of the other people did this did the 13 abstracting We saw a lot of company abstracts 14 that they used for their safety and health groups 15 in the handling of materials and in handling 16 chemicals particularly the very toxic ones es 17 You're talking now stuff that would 18 absorb through the skin and which is the most eso 19 hazardous thing people handle by far 20 Q. Can you give us some examples what you 21 mean by those company abstracts 22 A. Well we had a bunch of company 23 abstracts We made them for years I don't know 24 25 how many files full of the damn things A lot of those were those abstracts 10 11 12 13 14 15 51 abstracted a whole bunch of that we already -- we abstracts to get the data the best raw data that we could find and put together Would this information that Monsanto Q. put into abstracts would that be shared with customers of Monsanto A. If we put it out it would be shared with anybody that wanted it including most of the technical agencies We wrote many of the MCA data -~- sheets for them of Monsanto products that were manufacturer at our that we would consider primary request or theirs at Monsanto make it Q. How would you known to the general consuming public that you had this information available and that it could be 16 gotten t eR & 17 A. I never thought we really had to so many requests for it The 18 because we got [ we had a safety man 19 plants knew we had it because Lail a hygienist later on in the 20 in every plant and 21 day We had industrial hygienists in the 22 and in the divisions of Monsanto which 23 plants 24 later became the companies of Monsanto -- same ~~ had their own people i 25 damn thing different name Hert 52 and we worked then from inside with them in getting data back and forth There was a blossom time after World War II where there was enormous new compounds discovered and put into use I don't think -- I think it's a lot easier to track it today than it was then but we -- we had data in our data files on virtually every compound there had been produced and I might have -- I might say that 10 most of the other companies that I knew had the 11 same affair and we traded our own company 12 documents 13 We were told by our own company nothing is secret connected with health and 15 safety Nothing 16 MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive OE 17 Q. You mentioned earlier about asbestos 18 and how it was used in catalyst and insulation Pa 19 materials Was that something that would have ee 20 been included in your first research report even 21 A. I suspect it was but I'm not rt 22 absolutely sure We working in the pilot plant aa 23 of Monsanto dealt with asbestos insulation 24 materials and with asbestos muds and the asbestos 25 workers in the plant there 53 We had a crew called insulators and they did the insulation work -- mines Q. And that was -- A. -- in the pilot plant operations Q. That was about 1953 '54 time frame you're talking about A. Yes some time through there yes Q. Did you find that the insulators there at Monsanto were essentially following the same 10 kind of practice that you'd experienced in 11 Tennessee 12 13 14 15 16 A. They had been ordered to work on the standard established by the MCA or established by whoever established the standards I could -- to tell you the truth I don't know on any one of the individual materials because they had been running a 17 around so many times but the asbestos dust was on 18 the list for the -- of the toxicology materials ie 19 and from -- put out by the American Industrial 2 20 Hygiene Association TLV list and we always 21 stood -- we always maintained at least that level dys 22 as our standard 23 Q. Did you find that the insulators there 24 at Monsanto in the 50s when you first came were 25 wearing respirators like you had been taught at 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 54 the University of -- A. They had respirators Now I never saw them insulating so I don't know if they wore them They had them and they had them hanging around their neck okay Q. Yes sir Were the insulators to your knowledge were they given protective clothing of any kind or work clothing A. Well the company furnished work clothing to everybody Q. Why would that have been done at Monsanto if you know sir A. What you mean clothing Q. Yes sir A. Well there's a lot of reasons Some of which you may not like It's the best way to get a man to take a shower Q. How is that A. Give him clothes if he does to wear Q. Sort of a incentive to take a shower is that what you mean A. Yes we've got wet shower houses for all of them We had some objections that some of them didn't take showers and the enthusiasm for being up in close tight place on a hot day with | 25 omen 2 Ger ~ EF eq 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 55 them wasn't too hot so it encouraged them to take showers and to clean off And particularly people -- we made lots of people take showers We made the -- the insulation workers had to Q. Why is that sir A. What Q. Why would you do that A. Because they were -- all the dusty operations had to because the dust got inside their clothing They all had MSA approved dust respirators but they get it inside They get it in your hair I've been in too many places I know I didn't get any clothes issued Q. So you're saying that this was a way of decontaminating the insulators MR POWERS Objection A. In a way it was a way to encourage them to clean up We had rules where they had to in some places and particularly true organic manufacturing plants But it was hard to -- the unions were pretty tough I don't know why they fought that issue but they did Incidentally some of the unions had 56 some darn good data too available to them I don't know where they got it but they probably assembled it themselves I've worked with unions industrial hygienist late -- years ago Not early because they didn't know They didn't know but later on I worked with some union people Good people too Q. After you came to St. Louis and got 10 into -- I guess would you call it corporate 11 program ae sean, 12 r+ m 13 A. Yes Q. After you got to St. Louis and got 14 into the corporate program and began to see the 15 things that Dr. Kelly and Mr. Wheeler had been 16 doing would you describe for us what you recall 17 in the 50s about how the Monsanto employees were 18 being followed from an industrial hygienist's 19 20 21 22 23 24 standpoint A. Well all the plants had a safety director and so many of them had extra people They had a safety engineer and several called inspectors They had different names for them but they were their grunts They did the grunt 25 work 57 We worked with the inspectors and with the safety directors of each of the plants We did a survey of each of Monsanto's plants and we surveyed every individual job classification in plant In the East St. Louis plant there's over four hundred job classifications so our document was about that thick Covered each job what they were provided safety and health what 10 data they had been given their safety training 11 programs whether they had company clothing or 12 not and so forth 13 And these data were absolutely witched 14 again Took my hygiene crew damn near a year to 15 get a set of them and then we were ready to go ere 16 for another set and they turned out to be great aoe 17 Well the one on two of the plants 18 exceeded one volume and there were more than one 19 volume Had every -- now we were not interested 20 in the production We were interested in the job 21 classifications and what that job classification 22 required them to be exposed to what they were 23 provided with and the data and a number of times 24 at their safety meetings they mentioned their 25 material and went over the thing again ond eetatee ws [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 58 And I set up a lot of those things the short and abrupt and dirty explanations for these chemicals I used to take a bottle of very light oil and show them how much it would take for one of the amine compounds to kill them if they mopped it on their hand And we did it -- I did it in every plant I did every one of Monsanto's plants and there was sixty of them at the time in the U.S. By the way I did all the foreign plants in Britain and in Belgium MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive Q. In what time period are you talking about A. Q. A. Huh What time period are we talking about 60s 70s Q. The -- A. By the way the British had a pretty good deal themselves The European was a little different They're so darn competitive They didn't want anybody to do anything except Belgium ' a FS eee 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 59 Belgium was worse The Brits were pretty good They had also -- they had some darn good technical people in the British company and particularly in pollution control Q. Did you ever have any interface with the folks at the British Occupational Hygienist Society A. Yes yes Which by the way are good first class people Don't get me wrong I'm not arguing about that I ran into some of the best hygienists in this company working for the States and working for the federal government Q. The work that you just told us about a few moments ago looking at different jobs in plant as opposed to I guess the processes themselves you say you looked at each job Are you talking about like different operators A. That's right Q. Different -- A. Class A operators class B operator Class C operator department 22 Q. And you would profile the exposures of each one of those 60 A. Absolutely profiled each one Q. And would you do the same thing for maintenance workers A. Yes we went through the maintenance workers but here you can't set them up unless they're zoned and in the bigger plants they'll be zoned Those guys will live and die in zone 3 and if that's true zone 3 handles some 10 particular materials at zone 3 then they get 11 special type of clothing and helmets and 12 respirators 13 Q. When you were first relocated to the 14 corporate headquarters in St. Louis is that when 15 you first became aware of being able to take air L 16 samples and that sort of thing profile workers 17 exposures A. No. We knew it in Texas City and did 18 ea 19 some testing We didn't have very good equipment fea 20 We had to use the old bubblers dual bubblers and 21 that sort of stuff which are awfully -- awfully 9 22 cumbersome things to be handling around a busy 23 chemist manufacturing operation We did it 24 Later we began to use the better 25 portable equipment and then we did long term like 61 full switch -- I'm sorry full shift We did all three shifts by the way in certain areas wus! Full shifts had to be done when the hygienists 16 a very busy year for the hygienists in Texas City to go around through this processing unit because you're -- although they only manufactured two or three products they used some very very very dangerous intermediates and they had to go around and test every one of them 10 And we did it as much as we could 11 every year to see that changes had been made And 12 those were done probably by the chemist after I 13 left probably by the hygienists assigned to the 14 plant 15 Q. So even when you first arrived at 16 Monsanto Texas City in 1953 air sampling 17 capability already existed there -- 18 [ 19 20 21 A. That's right Q. -~ as well A. They had air sampling equipment there Q. And that would be for dusts and gasses 22 23 24 25 and both A. That's right Primarily for dust and for -- and bubblers which if you could analyze the results And those analyses were done . ce wennera) Pn ms er maegates Ue 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 62 elsewhere not at the plant at the time Now I'm sure all the plants can do their own Q. Once you got to St. Louis is that when you yourself first began to do air sampling A. No I did some in Texas City but not much I did it in St. Louis with the plant safety man We made him go along You have to have somebody in the plant tied down to it When I left we had in most of the large plants had professional industrial hygienists The plant staff by this time had broken down into three sections and I was the director of industrial hygiene section and had about fifteen employees in the central office and I had access to a laboratory and I had what I think was the best sound man in the country and that sort of stuff doing the work And we did this we put on shows for the individual plant safety and health people and their groups I did it for the organic division plants many times for their groups that handled this spread of chemical and we stuck to that spread of chemical They were making amine compounds at 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 63 the East St. Louis plant We did them a job on amine compounds and we had an awful fewer cases than I think we probably would have had if we hadn't been as alert as we were We also probably cost Monsanto a million dollars in uniforms Q. And that was probably a good investment in preventing disease A. I think you're absolutely correct It was a good investment because if you stained that uniform with some of the amines you could tell it in a minute Most of them are purple or that darn die in denim will turn the oddist colors you've ever seen That will give a man quick trip that he's been doused and then he goes through the scrub and down business whether he likes it or not So as near as I know we've in my tenure we never lost anybody in the organic operations Q. What do you remember Mr. Garrett about the first air sampling that you did in Texas City A. Well it was pretty crude but the 64 system was crude as it was defined in the literature at the time and we did -- you did insoluble sampling in water And it was a damn difficult thing to filter You had to triple filter then you had to dry that damn thing out and get rid of that filter material It's not an easy task I think the reason we did that was 10 11 12 13 14 15 because the results were probably higher than they would have been had you been able to get rid of some of the filter material We figured that it was higher and therefore it was safer Then the sampling and the analytical procedure began to improve vastly And in the 50s I believe they probably -- and the 60s the 16 analytical methods analytical hardware 17 analytical reagents improved enormously so that 18 it got to where we could do these -- we tested ke 19 squeeze tubes I'll bet you by the millions 20 I've tested those darn -- hundreds of 21 sulfide tubes and some of those things so that we [ 22 could test them against our sample If they didn't work we put out a note 23 24 through the company do not use so and so's 25 sampling tubes They are very good for very 65 excellent reasons because they're quick and their reasonably accurate and you could save somebody's life that's messing around with something they didn't need to be MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive Q. The sampling that you first did when you joined Monsanto some of that was insolubles 4oe You mean by that dust rs ve 10 A. That's right we collected in water 11 Collected in water median 12 Q. What kind of dust samples do you 13 remember doing 14 A. You could collect almost any dust 15 One of the biggest problems was separating the 16 dust 17 In other words what dust are you 18 talking about Texas City dust itself 19 particularly with a bunch of trucks around and two f 20 or three days with no rain The dust -- you've an 21 got much dust on the ground from the streets and 22 23 24 25 around You get a great deal of solid material from the ocean believe it or not You don't believe that but it's true You'd be surprised 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 66 So that you have to separate out of your solid sampling material and make some kind of judgment as to what was the product -- the targeted product I found that out early Q. Did you yourself do -- A. Some of it Q. Did you use a microscope to do your dust count A. I used a dust counter which is the old Bausch & Lomb microscope hook for dust counting and a plate Q. Yes sir A. We used it as a first step piece of equipment for dust sampling because it gave us a quick fix on what we had It is not a very good gravimetric sampling system It will give you a very good idea of your dispursion of particle sizes Q. This Bausch & Lomb dust counter would describe for us how that works and how long it you takes to take a sample with it A. Well you had a plate -- that you had these plates It looked like circular straight view plates for microscope and you took this machine and over a period of time you inspirated 67 into the material the atmosphere Then you took and you had a counting grid in the machine You never took the plate out You turn it on and you counted it with a microscope attached to the affair itself and made counts and there was a method published by Bausch & Lomb for the counts and we used their method of 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 counting Q. About how long from start to finish would it take someone experienced in this device to actually test it A. Well it wouldn't take long to take a sample It takes some time to do the counting Now a first class man could probably do it and count it in fifteen minutes Q. Pretty much know what's there and *** a 17 types of exposures 18 A. That's right Now he has to clean re"3 19 the plate off if he's going to use it again 1 20 because he has the stuff on it 21 We also used the old -- oh God what 22 is that darn blood counting thing The blood 23 24 25 counting affair for the regular upright microscope is a -- I can't recall what they call it but you have -- there's a gravical in there that you can pe) & ro [ eT eg od Fe [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 68 count a number of specific spaces and calculate the total dust load in particles and into a certain extent the size The same was true by the way at Bausch & Lomb You get a fair idea of the size distribution and when you're coming to inorganic -- to inert dust you're looking for size because it's the size that gets further down in the system and if you want stuff that gets into the pulmonary system you're going down to some small sizes And this is what we did called dust counting They're a pain in the neck to do but it's done -- it's still done to a lot -- to a great extent today by a classification of dust in sizes Q. Now the Bausch & Lomb device that's the device that you had A. It's long since went out of business yeah Q. But you had that in 1953 '54 A. Yes yes Q. I take it that there was already someone in Texas City there before you got there that was the safety in this kind of thing es ~ Fy 1 oo. a a 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 69 A. Yes safety director Q. Who was that Would you recall sir A. Mooney Stallings was the safety director Mooney Stallings Now in this case keep in mind that in the early days of the chemical industry at least in my experience and this has been in other companies as well is to get a safety -- there was no safety people to be trained Nobody trained anybody Texas M didn't start their safety engineering school until way after this So to get a safety man it was customary in our industry -- now this is maybe -- to take a first class not true in others foreman and make him the safety director and he ran it We had probably the best safety people we had some of them were those foremen We had one in Tennessee Even the foreman lost his arm in a car accident and he was such a bright guy they made him one of the deputy safety directors He graduated when the safety director head of safety -~ he was first class and his record -our record down there was first class for plant from ore was first that manufactured phosphorous class 70 Q. Would you know Mr. Garrett how these men that were made safety directors or in lines that led up to be safety directors how they were trained in areas of health concern A. They were trained believe it or not by the federal government during World War II in the manufacturing burst that occurred as you can imagine Those people were trained and they 10 trained a scad of people as safety people 11 Now this was the guy like Mooney 12 Stalling bright guy without a college education 13 that probably became a better safety man than a 14 hell of a lot of people with college degrees 15 because he did it through experience + 16 And a lot of Monsanto's foremen -- and 17 this was not Monsanto only I know this is from 18 Dallas through Dupont great many there their res 19 safety people started as foremen in their plants 20 Good first class alert foremen and 21 they went into -- then into the management group ee 22 and became poorer paid than they were when they 23 were in the early group but that's beside the 24 point 25 Mooney was a pretty good safety 71 director He later got a industrial hygienist assigned in there and then they got a trained safety director out of one of the graduate schools that graduated safety director -- safety engineering and they also had a full time hygienist when the plant was sold Q. The Monsanto plant in Texas City I guess then at some point in time did get a time industrial hygienist 10 A. Yes sir 11 Q. About when was that sir s ~. 12 A. Oh gosh I don't know I couldn't rm 13 even -- I might give you the -- I suspect it was 14 in the 60s late 60s but boy that could be 15 wrong 16 Q. Before they got a time industrial 17 hygienist at Monsanto Texas City plant whenever OT 18 it was - 19 A. They had a time engineer there Pee 20 then by that time -- 21 nage Bp 3 22 Q. If someone -- A. - and a safety director 23 Q. And those people the safety director 24 and the engineer they were doing the industrial 25 hygiene kind of work ae stat i PS wees I 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 72 A. They were doing the stuff that we in our staff was doing when I first came to St. Louis We had an excellent staff of people at the Kearny plant in East St. Louis They had generated them themselves because of lack of corporate involvement in that business until after World War II and then corporate involvement got in and started helping them and they ended up with professional industrial hygienists -- no professional safety man and my man assigned to the organic division The old organic division was over there any time that they needed and that safety director would have him any time he wanted him Q. I think you told me that there became a time when you started doing plant surveys yourself and going out and doing inspections A. Well we had to find out what the hell was going on in the plants Who would -- what were they doing How were they doing it What were they doing it with Three very very good questions that you have to ask yourself today and in today most companies do this on a routine basis You can go into a plant in Monsanto OE ev oa Coes amuet ee i [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 73 now and ask one of their supervisors even an area supervisor can tell you in detail what they do in each of their processes This wasn't very true -- I can remember one time a man told me in one of our plants you can tell the people working the acid department by the holes in their pants you know That may very well be great but by God that's not very good industrial hygiene MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive Q. The occasions when you would go out and do your survey work in the plants I take it you wrote reports of those visits A. We went -- Q. Wrote reports of those visits did you A. Oh I'm sure yes we did but those reports went into the -- I suspect the fire but I don't know Yes we wrote detail What we needed was the individual operating units and those processes That way when we built a plant making the same stuff somewhere else -- and this is where the Europeans got into it because we built plants over there to L. 12 12 12 i coe Os ee 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 74 make products that we made in the U.S. Their enthusiasm for our interference was zero We couldn't speak to them because they would not even if they knew English wouldn't speak to us in English particularly them damn Belgiums We shouldn't have fought the Belgiums We should have fought just with the Germans I guess there MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive Q. I've had the same experience Mr. Garrett with the Belgiums in spades A. We took them over to Great Britain and had the meeting Q. I should have thought of that A. Took them over to London and had the meeting Oh we had great luck with the British We provided them with the information They did a job of their own All you had to do with them was to get -- they had some of the best people They had one of the best pollution engineers I've ever seen working in one of our plants in great Britain 75 Well he worked at the plant but he worked for the whole British company First class man Q. If I understand what you're saying then your -- part of your job was to go out and do survey work learn about things that were either problems or potential problems and then if you built a new process doing the same kinds of things incorporate engineering controls 10 A. We tried to do that beforehand and we 11 got to the point where we had the last twelve 12 thirteen years I was at Monsanto we went to 13 process meetings where we went over the design of 14 every process in Monsanto unit by unit 15 We objected -- we made the co J 16 president madder than hell but we objected : 1 17 anyway and we stopped that crap of putting an on 18 arrow in the air that says To air and the one ornn 19 going this way says To water eh 20 What water To waste That's 21 another goody To waste Just arrow Here's a ey 22 long process designed with fifty arrows saying To reo-3-g 23 waste Where to waste 24 I mean are they going to go through 25 waste treatment somewhere or are they going to 76 just dump them on the ground or are we going to . put it in dumpsters a sews! So we went over that and made them and we had the vice -- the president ~-- the president of the operating -- executive president on our side too by God They'll approve it when you agree Show us something Show us a pollution treatment 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 operation or get off the stick And so it was a graduate system from the 19- - World War II return where a lot of safety was generated by the manufacturers of very hazardous materials to people who were not manufacturing that kind of material started the safety engineering business which graduated then in the 50s from the foreman type person to a graduate trained engineer or hygienist and to 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 today to a staff And the staff has the right at the plant for process to go to the corporate staff and say Hey help us with this thing and make damn sure that we don't put someone's head in a trap with this and so the corporate staff joined with the plant staff and they do anyway because they're working it from the other end of the syewe ria banctlies C D hn j eC ears ory com 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 77 stick and they finally get together and decide what's to be done and it's written out in the construction plans MR ELLIS We've been going about an hour and a half Can we take -- MR HOBSON It's up to Mr. Garrett I'm happy to if he is MR ELLIS Well I need to go to the restroom so THE WITNESS Good I'm glad you say So. Temporary recess was held MS FLATT We're on record Q. Mr. Garrett you mentioned the American Industrial Hygiene Association I take it that you've been a member of that organization for a good number of years A. Probably thirty forty years yeah Q. What kinds of activities have you done with that organization that you can tell us about sir in your career A. I've written a number of papers for their journal I've reviewed papers for them like most people that you get on review groups woe ae aid ll . c oo PS ra ' oe 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 78 from time to time and up through the time until I quit and even a couple years afterwards I went to their national meetings of the committees of Q. Were you on any the American Industrial Hygiene Association A. Many of them and to tell you the truth there's so many I don't know whether I could tell you what it represented even I was on the -- the development committee for a while in an effort to find out who was in hygiene regardless of what they claimed to be or accepted as their fate and I think they do pretty well today in getting those people in I've been on the -- one of the review committees for papers My boss for very many of the IHA and through all of years was president that persequential office system And when he was president I had to do his job too but I've been involved with them ever since I joined -- went to St. Louis Q. Do you recognize the publications of the American Industrial Hygiene Association to be authoritative A. I have run into no -- very few that were not 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 79 Q. You're aware of like the Hygienic Guide series that they published A. Yes I am Q. Have you written any of the Hygienic Guides A. Q. Yeah I take it you would find those to be authoritative A. Well they certainly - we had a hell of a time getting them approved by Monsanto but they finally let them go as is Kelly -- Dr. Kelly got them through actually We did most of the PCB's and that sort of stuff but we only made -- not every company did The stuff they only made or the stuff they were primarily -- not primarily but well known in we did that on our products or when we were asked By the way we did some for the Organic Manufacturing Association too I think but I'm not sure I didn't do it One of my troops did it Q. Had you had any occasion to work with the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists the ACGIH 80 A. Q. Yes What have you done with that organization sir A. Well I went to their meetings I stuff for their -- some editorials for wrote some their journals for journals they can put things in and they had a very good handle because they ran the show because they were the primary people that operated the state and federal agencies that 10 11 12 13 14 15 set the standards And ultimately they -- we set them voluntarily for years Nobody had any -- then suddenly they began to set them as a legal issue been washed and cleansed but by that time they'd to what they meant what pretty well in respect 16 they did I think their standards are probably 17 of standards there are available and 18 the best set esa much used world wide 19 they're pretty Q. The ACGIH threshold limit values that 20 find those to be even more current 21 I take it you 22 23 24 25 than OSHA's work A. Well I guess I have a very different view of OSHA than most I think the ACGIH represented a group of good professionals doing a [ en >fi >fi . H me rey pe [ 81 good professional job I cannot say the same about the 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 governmental agency Q. You still feel that way today A. Yes I still do Don't get me wrong There are a great many great people in the federal agencies involved in this business and God knows without some of them we wouldn't have got where we are today in respect to protecting people's lives that work for a living but they have too many political nit wits get in around that sort of thing there also and once in a while stir They try to stop them MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive A. I've been in that building in Washington D.C. many many times up and down the halls I was on one of their advisory committees the Water Advisory Committee drinking water Standards Advisory Committee Q. Did you ever have any input to threshold limit values through the establishing ACGIH TLV committees A. Yes we did We turned over to them any data we had in connection with anything they cs smite r ce rine [ . L L. _ Ta FN me 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 82 were working If you recall some of the processes they would come out and say we're going to do -- they would show a span of materials they were after and actually they looked up I guess in the blue book us and every other chemical and petroleum company and found out if they made it they sent us a note saying we're going to work on the aromatics So we said yes we'll do it too and participate and we'd participate with them and give them our data and our views We never gave our data away without a few views Neither did anybody else So we -- yes we participated with them We participated with them making up some of the standards We disagreed with some but not very many believe it or not Boy some of them were tough Q. The National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health is that an organization you recognize sir NIOSH A. Yeah Q. They have come out from time to time with a number of criteria documents various materials Are you familiar with those as well ~~ icdoe roy . eauneld e r [ [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. Yes I've seen some of their 83 criteria which kind of -- blue papers Q. Did you ever make any comments or contribute to any of the writing of this criteria documents A. Well at their request we did some work on organic chemicals that were manufactured in East St. Louis and we dittled with those people for fifteen years We finally went over there and made a survey of the people that lived over there and our results didn't jive with their predictions so they didn't publish our results MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive Q. From time to time did you have the opportunity to work with customers of Monsanto's regarding Monsanto products and their use A. Yes many times Q. Tell me how that worked Mr. Garrett when it came to dealing with your customers A. Well if I got a -- we were as you know a staff department of the corporate headquarters in St. Louis Someone in one of the sales groups or - ' a oe ? 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 84 product groups as they were called generally the sales section said to Emmet Kelly We need somebody to go help so and so in certain procedure connected with handling something Monsanto manufactured So I got told to go out and help somebody do something and I did that not as many times as you might -- as you might imagine We did get a -- we answered an awful lot of letters and we were -- we -- the president of Monsanto told us You tell them what you know period I don't give a damn if it's good or bad Tell them what you know So we did We never had anybody complain inside Monsanto to us either So we helped the customers any time Many of them were states I had more requests from states about this thing -- these things We got thus and so in our state You get involved now in maybe messing around with one of your customers but we did anyway Q. The products that you sold at Monsanto certainly some of those had health effects that they could cause if they were improperly handled or if exposures were excessive 7] ed T eroSaee Oe] ss wn, . oe F E 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 85 I take it Did you ever as a Monsanto employee go out to customers and sort of precheck them to see if they were capable of handling your materials that were particularly hazardous A. I went to many many of them connected with probably die chemicals more than anything else because the die makers are little companies Primarily small operations And we talked to them about some of the amine and nitro aromatic compounds we manufactured and I did this with many of them I did -- they have an organization by the way that I went to twice and talked to them Anybody that asks for help from Monsanto got it from us and we did the medical or industrial hygiene sort of stuff Kelly and I and Emmet and the rest of the doctors and the rest of the hygienists And about -- when I retired I had fourteen people working for me and I had I suspect a good 15 percent maybe even more of that was done from customer relations and that was direct And we weren't out to sell stuff We beck ae a CS aed : ss ony 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 86 were out to sell safety and health because it damaged our product name if somebody turned up purple And we just weren't going to have it So yes my whole staff probably spent 15 20 percent of their time with customers Q. Can you recall any circumstances where you would find people who either wanted to buy or were buying Monsanto products and you just said These people aren't capable of dealing with it and we're not going to sell to them A. Well we had some people companies that were pretty irresponsible in our opinion and we were very careful It's difficult to do what you're saying But it's not only difficult it's legally difficult so yes we did We worked with our own law department on some of those at their request or at ours Q. And actually ceased sales in some instances A. Indeed we did They wouldn't let us look at their operation They had a problem that we knew about We ceased Q. Can you give me some idea how far back in time these kinds of activities would have gone Kenabhieast Cw t U< ors es rs ae [ [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 87 at Monsanto A. I guess Kelly probably would -- was doing that for he and Elmer Wheeler before I came When I came we did some -- we did some work with -- we did most -- well a great portion of our work with customers connected with products and changes they wanted to make in the chemical composition We didn't want them to stick amine groups on everything and that sort of thing Arsenides or something like that PCB's We wanted a great deal less foolishness I did a great deal of work with PCB's in tunnels in transformer manufacturing places that sort of stuff Q. So at least by 1954 you had personal knowledge that Monsanto was working with its customers in trying to find problems with -~ customers in some cases A. When I came up to St. Louis I quickly found out that the customer in any -- like any other place that's pedaling was pretty much the king through our professional technical staff that did the selling Monsanto sales people I'm sure ~~ ot wet pre fie ee ics ee die 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 88 most big companies do the same Most of them are pretty well knowledgeable about the materials they're selling because they're probably chemists or chemical engineers to start with and we did a lot of work with them I did a lot of work with people that wanted to make preformed insulation and tunnel people and tunneling in some areas They wanted some help We did a lot of work with some of the electrical companies because of the transformers in tunnels You don't realize -- I mean a lot of people don't My -- like your wife probably doesn't realize that 90 percent of all the electricity in downtown whatever is in tunnels In fact so is the heat Nobody has a heating plant They buy steam from some guy way off over the boondocks somewhere that's making steam and you get into those tunnels and you start getting into crowded conditions and you get tunnel crews And I've spoken to the tunnel crews which by the way are separate in most electrical companies That's a separate gang of people you know It may be wierd but they're pretty good at ^' wen pwnee 90g7 ve Gel F&O rsa es [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 89 it They know their business And I've lectured many Union Electric's people TVA's people in connection with particularly in restricted use of transformer fluids Yes many times Q. The work that you would do as an industrial hygienist in talking to Monsanto employees or customer -- customers of Monsanto's products did that involve training people quite a bit A. Well we did -- we put on training programs and we did when we were using a product we felt was hazardous putting it in a new plant -- we put on a dog and pony show for them Kelly and I and Elmer or a whole crowd of us Later on we had a big staff We had staffs in there too and their staffs whoever they were going to have in whatever plant their safety and health staff and we had -- I know lots of people used contract physicians and we did too in some of our plants Some of them we had first -- in some of the early days some of the plants had time physicians even That was a leftover from World War II : eta ... ... ... OPS et re maa 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 by the way I suspect but we had -- we had to do 90 more training I suspect to those contract physicians than most Kelly did it but he'd bring the hygiene crew along and we'd scare hell out of them or something so they'd do what we had to do Q. So the intent was to make sure that these contract physicians that were servicing Monsanto employees they knew the hazards and knew what to look for A. Knew so they could diagnose rapidly if -- so we didn't lose somebody in transit Q. Did you become familiar Mr. Garrett with how the Monsanto medical records were basically kept I'm not talking about in person's folder but how in general they were reviewed A. The physician or the assigned physician at the individual plant and the physician assigned by Kelly if he had -- from his own staff or himself would handle that affair Now -- we talked to the physicians and I knew all of them personally but as far as messing with those medical records buddy it was no thanks because you're diddling with something that Dr. omen, ye ie rn 3 ens c 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 91 Kelly didn't have allowed We would look at it from a generalized standpoint If we got a couple people with us that showed symptoms okay but looking up a whole twenty or thirty people's medical records was no Kelly would do it or his physicians but our hygienists would not or did not And I was perfectly happy with that when I directed my own group -- when I directed the group Q. Was there a system within Monsanto that you can tell me about that allowed for you to know how many particular incidents of whatever medical condition occurred and how that -- how was that tracked A. Well we got all of that -- Kelly automatically got anything connected with what was considered an associated -- a sickness that you could directly prescribe or ascribe to one of the products we were making or one of the processes we were using And from that we tracked -- a lot of the work my crew did was on those -- plant would say We've got problems here We seem to have two or three guys that -- showing some kind of 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 92 symptoms connected our doctor says My hygiene crew -- I'd send my hygienist assigned to that division to that plant and work with the plant assigned hygienist find out what the hell was going on and if they needed one of the physicians Kelly would send one of his physicians along Yes we did We were never shown their names and I didn't want to see their names They marked them out We did not deal with -- directly with medical records of anybody by name unless it was a terrible mess Q. Did your job at all involve claims of occupational diseases that might arise by Monsanto employees A. To a degree I handled accidents Always did Don't know why I got mixed up in that mess and I've seen some messes Rail accidents wouldn't believe and truck accidents you you know fishing a truck out of the Ohio River loaded with chemicals and drums hoping to God the drums are still in the damn truck when you pull it out don't have to send a diver down to get each so you one of them individually We've been there I've been in wreck sites probably all | nne ",, Fs fa re ee 10 11 12 13 14 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 93 over the country particularly rail wrecks because if our tankers are sitting in that wreck we've got to know where they are on the wreck and whether they've been bashed or not If they've been bashed what the hell is in them and where that drainage is going And we had -- we tested some darn stuff over in Illinois where a railroad accident had occurred before I ever come on the site We tested water around there and that soil and found it was there Sure enough it was there We had a hell of a mess cleaning that and it was years after it occurred So we didn't want that to happen again and we tracked -- everybody in the business did that I don't suppose -- I met a American industrial -- American cyanide hygienist at a wreck in Atlanta at one time What are you doing here He said I'm trying to find my tank car You found anything I said No I don't think ours are here I think somebody must have shipped them off on the side somewhere Well we go back -- he and I worked it together etbuveitn Fo mm 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 94 So we -- I knew him personally and he Was trying to do the same thing I was Big mess We checked the wrecks We always tracked those wrecks I'll bet you I've been on some of the funniest airplanes you've ever seen in your life getting to some of the funniest places you ever saw in your life There ain't know road there Yeah How do you get there On the train How the hell you going to get there on the train if the damn train is wrecked I don't know Get on the horse Get down that damn track from Pensicola across to -- they ought to put that thing out of business Across the Panhandle in Florida Oh I think it's on floating on mud but that's beside the point MR ELLIS Jack why don't you let him ask another question here We can get on with something MR CORBETT nonresponsive Objection THE REPORTER Who said that MR CORBETT Me Jim Corbett wat ov ee 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 95 Q. Did you ever get involved in any of the Workers Compensation claims Mr. Garrett A. If it reflected on more than a single claim if it reflected a trend of any kind yes we got involved in it Tried to find out if it was indeed our problem and if it was get it stopped Get it put back to bed where it belonged Not very often oddly enough Q. But was there a system that you were aware of where the Workers Compensation claims that involved occupational diseases or claims of occupational diseases were made known to you in the medical department A. It went to Kelly or it went to Dr. Johnson when he was there and he came to us and I -- and if it was -- if it was one of my people -- if I had a person assigned directly to that operation I'd send him because he knew more about it than I did Oddly enough there wasn't a lot -- well I don't know It's hard to say Q. What about keeping up with people who were long time Monsanto employees and who would retire and then with the passage of time those eer PaSe) wes * __ __ MAX LXY [ } 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 folks would pass away would you have access to 96 their death certificates A. No. We did some and we did some purposely and we did some in cooperation with NIOSH in East St. Louis and somewhere else I can't remember the other place I can't remember but we would have and did operate with them connected with processes that might have occurred from a individual chemical or an area where there was a number of identified employees because Monsanto's system like every big company's insurance and so forth system handles wherever they are We've tracked some down I don't know why they all live in Florida and Texas but they do after they leave I don't blame them if they lived in Illinois for moving to Florida or Texas but that's beside the point Yes we've helped but it wasn't -- We got into it probably after everybody else had dug around in the mud so I don't know I worked on processes where have you seen any -- an unusual number of thus and so's and we went to the physicians of a community through their medical -- local medical association and asked them if they'd , L L ~ cre Pe ors ey t 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 help us 97 We've never had any turn downs They really - it really isn't easy to do You go look at the medical records and the insurance records are my personal opinion shouldn't exist but they do And what do you do -- what is a person in for if he's got a respiratory disease And he's eighty years old You know that sort of thing I don't know It may be they are significant and maybe it can be done We did the big OSHA study twice for -- with them Nothing ever came of it We were looking at that -- at really at age and we're looking through the medical records to find out what caused the cessation of age in some of these people and really never came to much of any conclusions Q. This OSHA project dealt with what sir A. What Q. What did the OSHA project deal with that you said you did twice A. There were -- really it was NIOSH that was after it a mo 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 98 Q. I'm sorry A. It was do you have -- do you have any residual And they looked into some magic ball and said that people in certain areas have a tendency to stay in those areas more than they do in most areas So we -- they'd pick one of our plants and they were working -- they wanted to know about some of the products that are made in the plant anyway but that particular -- they have to be -they have to be right because that particular area an awful lot of those people are still alive still living in that area I wouldn't think in the retirees from St. Louis - from Monsanto that retired from the main office I don't think nearly as many percent wise would have stayed in the St. Louis area but a lot of those people did over there It's a very clannish place I guess I don't know Just -- and they wanted some studies done and they -- and we did them provided the data Nothing ever came of it that I ever knew Q. Would it be accurate -- A. But we would have done it if they'd have wanted us to - ... oF rs es 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 99 Q. Would it be accurate to say Mr. Garrett that at least from your perspective of seeing things you learned more about any kinds of disease processes in Monsanto employees that were in the current work force as opposed to anything that would have existed in retirees or people who left Monsanto's employment A. I don't know That's a difficult question to answer I'd probably from point of view of incident -- of incidences yes From a point of view of studies and desire to know whether things are happening no we probably looked at it I didn't I didn't have access to the medical records either and Emmet Kelly is one of the toughest guys in the world that don't allow anybody to look at anybody's personal medical file and I don't blame him Q. Was there any way for you at Monsanto when you were doing industrial hygiene work to be able to see if there was any correlation between any of the exposures that you were measuring and monitoring and any resultant diseases that might be occurring A. We did with some of the contract 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 doctors Kelly did it He had a bunch of -- he hired doctors and they were largely contractors in the individual areas and he had a tic sheet 100 for them If anything had happened that they thought was unusual I ended up at the plant trying to find out what the hell it was But as far as looking at those records I didn't get a chance to do that At least with any names on them I didn't Q. Did you have after you started doing the profiling and surveying of plants did you identify certain groups of workers that ultimately either through Dr. Kelly or others were given certain kinds of physical examinations because of the kind of work they did A. We had -- we had those people yes and those people were in -- when we checked the plant we knew when we went in that department - or - had a certain screen physical screen through the physician whether he was Monsanto or whether he was contract Made little difference He dealt with those records We did it on PCB's We did it on amine and nitro -- aromatic workers We did it on chlorine workers too By government asked us to 101 do that Q. Was there ever a time while you were a Monsanto employee that you did one of these physical screens for people who worked with asbestos A. Well asbestos was a product that everybody in every plant had to use because of the insulation problems 10 As far as I -- and I'm not sure in my 11 own mind I don't believe we ever had very many 12 catalysts that used asbestos or asbestos form 13 carriers pallets if you know what I'm talking 14 about 15 We sold the pallet cook it and then 16 use it for cattle I don't think so What we did 17 do in these areas was we made sure and we -- I 18 lectured eight thousand times about the TLV levels rm 19 and their darn respirators and they were issued E 20 respirators by name and the respirators were E 21 periodically cleaned and recartridged even if they we 22 had not shown use 23 It's the only way you can run a 24 respirator program and it's like helmet programs 25 We had the same problems there : 7 a 1 H C f ~ ki RF . b. i J 1 2 3 4 5 10 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You know you go visit a guy in the 102 hospital in some place he's got a crushed skull and he's got a perfectly good helmet and of course it wasn't on his head and when the rock hit his helmet it didn't hurt anybody which was on the ground of course not on his head So we did some of that That was largely the safety people and the safety people got -- their system corporately grew like the industrial hygiene and medical system grew and we went together frequently in looking at the safety and health aspect of something because it's awfully difficult to separate Are you doing something here that's making a person be exposed too much The safety guys some of their guys could do a lot better job than our hygiens could do in connection with what they did and therefore where they interfaced with an individual compound that was hazardous Q. If I could get you Mr. Garrett to do it for me as best you can if we can kind of go back in time to the mid 1950s after you came to St. Louis and were in the corporate program What would be the typical thing that you could tell us that you would be telling workers working with asbestos about TLVS and wearing respirators and -- A. Respirators respirators respirators Helmets with respirators because the helmet rule Monsanto is absolutely universal and we could 103 enforce that We could enforce the respirator rule We also could scare them a bit because it's a eebade scary material And we lectured I lectured them 10 on lots of things including asbestos I lectured [ [ 11 the East St. Louis plant periodically about that [ 12 and about amine compounds 13 Q. Can you give us just your best 14 recollection of what you would say about asbestos 15 in the 50s 16 A. Tell them it's a hazardous material 17 only if you inhale it If you inhale it it 18 becomes a very hazardous material and you will rs 19 maybe regret it down your life span It will ey 20 certainly shorten it if you inhale enough of it 21 So the respirator is given to you for 22 that purpose Wear the damn thing and it was 23 essentially that but the safety people in the 24 plants did a good deal better job than I did re 25 They had records and they had - I don't know where they got some of the films they had but they had some films that -- Dr. Kelly wouldn't have allowed us to use films showing people that were dying of asbestosis but some of the plants could get them and I think I did a 104 pretty good job you know We had -- we had asbestos to my knowledge in every plant in Monsanto I watched a bunch of people redoing some valves in our main 10 office and that was the worst looking mess I ever 11 saw and we stopped that 12 We got the contractor in and he either 13 changed his manner or out he went We'd get 14 another contractor So I don't know I've never [ [ 15 -- we talked it It was one of the talking [ [ 16 problems FO 17 If you were handling problems where 18 you were in the racks changing insulation all the res 19 time and we had insulators that were by -- in some es 20 of the unions they were individuals that were 21 classified as insulators 22 In our case in one of the -- I don't 23 know who -- I don't know what union is what in 24 25 these cases but we had one called asbestos workers and then one of them were called insulators and in the insulator system they used asbestos insulation 105 We used preform a lot Later as we came down the tube we began to use preform because it created less problem of smearing and [ [ mudding joints and so forth [[ And so as far as I know our plant safety and health people did a first class job of wid raising cane about asbestos So did we It's one 10 of the routine raised cane things 11 It's like cyanide and Monsanto made 12 enough cyanide or used cyanide So yes we did 13 it 14 Q. So when you said earlier respirators 15 respirators respirators how did you mean that 16 A. Anybody that in any way installed or 17 took out any asbestos for any reason however 18 small wore a respirator They were issued a 19 respirator and they wore it and they changed it Bisas 20 each day ! td 21 i They turned it in even if they did not 22 use it and it was recartridged if that was on a 23 project where they were insulating 24 Q. Would that be true whether they were 25 called insulators or asbestos workers or anybody tor weatm ie tetxextt F bo 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 else 106 A. Yes because in the plant you're looking at a process unit here that's manufacturing aniline compounds If the insulators are in there insulating the process people have got to -- that are running the process have got to have respirators too and they're issued them and they're issued them from our safety supply people and that's the way we keep records the way we've always kept records Q. How far back in time can you tell us that that was done at Monsanto this way the wearing the respirators A. No I can't I can tell you that in the last fifteen or twenty years they've been doing it What happened prior to that I do not know All I know is they had them and in most of the plants where I was at the respirators were issued so they had a record of it Q. At Texas City when you were there in the -54 time period was it your experience that asbestos was handled as you've described in Texax City K A. When the two Americans came into my 107 pilot plant to take loose the asbestos when we checked it you had to have two insulators come in I had two electricians disconnect this and pipefitters and so forth The insulators came in took off the insulation they both had respirators As matter of fact one of them told me to go get lost while they took it off 10 Q. Because you didn't have a respirator 11 to wear 12 A. Because I didn't have a respirator 13 there so I got lost 14 Q. Now the insulators that were at Texas 15 city that you've described they were given the 16 clothing and they showered 17 A. As near as I can tell you yes and 18 when it happened -- started and when all of the [ 19 issues came afoot I do not know but they were 20 21 22 23 24 25 when I was there they wore respirators They came out with their respirators They came out with gloves and aprons and took my -- the insulation off my pot Q. Was there a way that you had at the corporate offices in Monsanto in the 50s of D L PS RN 1 Ee keeping track with your monitoring data that you collected 108 A. We always -- and I don't know If I did it today I think I'd do it the same way We did it by plants and overlaid the plants by product For example we made the same product in three plants We took plants that you would be interested in if you're talking about aniline or 10 chloroanilines or this plant this plant and this 11 plant and you go and check their records 12 individually or go to the plants we frequently 13 did and looked at their records in their safety 14 department and frequently the doctor would come 15 along and go to the physician if he was assigned 16 If he was one of our physicians which 17 in the bigger plants like Springfield we had a 18 physician I'd go talk to the physician and take 19 the poop back to Dr. Kelly or Dr. Johnson or one 20 of the other doctors 21 Q. You say Springfield was one of the 22 bigger plants 23 A. Springfield had a physician all the 24 time for the while I was there and I didn't 25 realize that until the Springfield plant manager introduced me to him 109 I will have to say he had the most hidden place I ever saw His dispensary was excellent but it was underground I don't know I don't know why Don't ask me Go ask the plant manager why Q. Springfield's located in -- the Springfield plant A. Springfield Mass 10 Co 11 Q. Springfield Massachusetts A. Primarily a polymer plant eer 12 Q. I've seen some records that seem to 13 indicate that asbestos was used in making products 14 in Springfield Are you familiar with that 15 A. Yes because we used -- not only that 16 we used wood meal if you know what wood meal is 17 Q. I'm afraid I don't 18 A. You grind wood up until it's like 19 flower a wood flower and what it was used for 20 was the early manufacture of plexi- -- not 21 plexiglass Oh the damned -- oh the most common | 22 -- of all the early ee 23 24 bo 25 MR GAUDET Phenolics THE WITNESS What MR GAUDET Phenolics xe rR Q. Plastics 110 A. Yes Q. Phenolic resins A. Yes And the stuff was used as a reinforcer in phenolics This by the way Was made for telephones We had problems with -- terrible problem with that powdered stuff We had a man fell in that thing one time working maintenance man and they had to | 10 empty that whole damn thing out to get him out of i ano i? 11 there and he was dead He died He suffocated on 12 And we did some safety rack work up 13 there Ground wood And I mean it's called wood 14 fiber It looks like fiber and the asbestos is 15 also used in that same process for different kinds 16 of plastic or 17 And in the phenolics what you use as 18 you're reinforcing material is frequently based on [ 19 what the phenolic is going to be used for and ee 20 there's eight million recipes 21 So sitting outside of the phenolic [i 22 resin unit at Springfield used to be several large 23 -- these forty feet high tubes filled with the 24 stuff they use to make various types of resin 25 Now Monsanto got out of that business ban : eo 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 a lot and people made their own stuff We sold in phenolics We got out of the phenolic business too but we sell them plastic monitors and they can make it in M our technical research people helped them set up 111 We set up people in business like everybody does I'm sorry but let's be honest with ourselves Gasoline companies set up service stations for people So the -- yes we used asbestos there in chop form in the tower and the asbestos workers and the aniline wood workers both were required to wear respirators The guy had a respirator on by the way that was in the tower when we dropped him out Q. The use of asbestos at the Springfield Massachusetts plant is that something that you yourself monitored A. Yes I did I took samples up there on that -- that whole system where they went back through and I'll bet -- we did it until they quit making phenolics there which was years ago by the way Q. Yes sir A. I was in a place that made -- one of PORE Pear ' 1 ae our customers made equipment to cremate people and they used a lot of plastic there too but that's beside the point That had nothing to do with this 112 Q. Have you learned that any of the people at the Springfield Massachusetts plant that worked with asbestos have come down with asbestos disease A. I've learned that there -- I have not 10 11 learned that any have Now the best -- you best ask Dr. Kelly that now but to those -- in those 12 days I never heard of one but when I first went 13 to Springfield they had very strong rules and 14 regulations connected with their -- with that 15 operation and that was before there was really a 16 big organized central health and safety group 17 Q. That would have been in the mid 50s 18 A. Yeah 19 2 At the Springfield plant that you 20 visited Mr. Garrett in the mid 50s do you 21 recall if there were any other kinds of control 22 techniques being used besides just wearing 23 respirators for asbestos 24 A. No they were taking samples 25 Q. They were A. Yes The crank samples yeah I remember the hemocytometer we used to use to count You remember 113 Q. Yes sir Yes sir A. Pain in the butt 1ti| Q. Were there ventilation systems being 4 used at Springfield fic Basten, A. Yes We had -- as you probably know cerSay Monsanto owned half interest in a plant next to ty 10 the Monsanto plant there [ 11 That was half owned by a company -- a 12 big power company in Canada and that plant we 13 did work and dealt with the parent company in 14 Toronto I believe or Montreal I guess it was 15 with the other -- because they were a partner in 16 it Little bit more -- you'll remember it because Le 17 it had to be done with the other partner See fi yy ry at 18 That is -- and I guess each -- both 19 owned half and the agreement was that they were 20 power plant operators up in Canada They owned 21 much of the power out of the falls and the 22 government bought that out and we had a deal in 23 the contract that if the government bought it out 24 we could buy out their part of that plant and we 25 did and it became part of the Springfield plant And they had -- they made resin 114 materials there more than just raw material They actually made certain kinds of resins and a great many specialty resins in that plant And we -- and we -- they were just like they -- the Monsanto plant regardless of who owned them Q. And they were using asbestos as part BORANIOBORANAIRO BORANAIRO of the specialty's formulations too 10 [ A. They -- as near as I know We checked [ [ 11 it I did sampling in that plant at the request 12 of the plant manager Did much sampling and we 13 used the old cytometer to count the squares 14 Q. Can you recall what you generally 15 found I know the numbers would not come to mind - 16 but did you generally find that exposures were 6 17 below the threshold limit values above near 18 rs A. We found -- I tell you the truth I 19 don't think I ever saw with that method a sample rT 20 that exceeded the TLV 21 Now the TLV shrank during the years rd 22 as you know and people began to dodge the use of me 23 asbestos in some respects and probably rightly so 24 I don't argue the asbestos [ 25 manufacturers here because I'm saying that it's 10 11 12 13 1.4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 better for them as well as everybody else If you 115 don't need it don't use it and I think probably in the 1950s that began to become the issue and we didn't -- we -- I don't know that we did any great changes but wherever we didn't need it we didn't We stopped using it in a couple of operations at the East St. Louis plant but they finally went out of business anyway ... MR OLIVER Objection Q. So basically that's the application of one of the industrial hygiene principles of substitution A. Absolutely Eradication is a very good one too if you can get to it No it's senseless I think we probably -- I think the chemical industry by and large has solved more problems by removal and change than any other single issue Don't use the damn stuff Well how we going to do it Well you got research people tell them to find out how and oddly enough in very many cases they could find out There are other materials re Sa: [ mn. U' C oem 2a Fre : We use chopped rag in some of the damn 116 things In those specialty resins they made in that old plant the one that we finally bought the other half of when the government of Canada took over the power plants up there that plant used I don't know what -- God they used everything from old Maggy's drawers off -- as additives for various small batch operations and they were very clean and very neat about it but they -- you ask 10 when are you going to make some kind of fender on 11 some automobile that General Motor's wanted and 12 this is what they wanted So who am I to argue 13 with them 14 Those specialty plants probably were 15 the best knowledgeable plants that we had in 16 connection with respirable dust of any kind and 17 that plant did a very good job of I think probably 18 - if you want to know the truth in Texas I could 19 get most dust sample out over there by the beach 20 than I could anywhere else but in the plants that 21 we tested dust in -- I tested some for the State 22 of Texas one time and we were in dust storm and 23 I said You got to be kidding We ain't going to 24 get anything but dust What do you want You're 25 not going to find out anything with the state 10 11 _ _ 12 13 14 - 15 16 L 17 rn 18 oo. 19 [ 20 21 22 23 24 25 guy so we quit but out in west Texas on the 117 spray berry sic trend No I think we did -- I think we probably are lucky for two reasons One when I came to Monsanto the knowledge of asbestos was pretty considerable They had the respirators To me they should have used respirators in doing other things too but they didn't but the asbestos man come by he always had a respirator But some of the other people did not who needed them too Not with the same filter I don't mean that And that's what we did in the years I was there We got it to the point where a person was exposed to something he was either protected or we changed the process Q. I thought I heard you say something earlier and tell me if I'm wrong but that because a TLV was set at a certain level that what I think I heard you say is that that wasn't what you maintained exposures at if you could get lower you would A. We tried the 50 percent I think a lot of people did that I think you'll find a lot of practicing industrial hygienists that -- where you could do it 118 Now we also had tied up some -- we fenced them off and tied them up so you couldn't -- you couldn't get to them People couldn't get to them You could do that today a good deal better than you could with better instruments today You could get electronic switching gear that will open and close valves better than a man 10 can 11 That wasn't true in the old days and 12 so we -- where you could do that we do it And I 13 think our safety design people have come a long 14 way in the years 15 I -- well hell we didn't even have 16 any when I first came up to St. Louis but we do Umre 17 now and we've got a very first class group and I PS 18 think they do a good job 19 Q. What would be the rational that you es 20 were using in trying to look at 50 percent of the 21 threshold limit values 5 i5 f 22 A. Well we would -- it just gave you -- 23 all it did was gave them a way to look at their 24 counter thing and say That's within our standard 25 It's 50 percent of the TLV if they wanted to use that 119 Personally I'd just as soon it be zero but there's never -- I never saw a zero so I don't know what anybody's talking about when they say there was no exposure to anything if it's in the county And in the chemical plants along the Texas area you can find anything you want to in | the area I mean hell if you have got a good 10 enough sampler or good enough method you can ORT 11 practically find anything in very very minute comevee 12 amounts 13 Q. Was it your philosophy then Mr. 14 Garrett what I think I'm hearing you say is that 15 any exposure that wasn't absolutely necessary you he L 16 ought to just not have ares 17 | A. Absolutely and if there were -- if FS 18 the hazard was sufficient to justify the 19 manufacturer then the hazard was sufficient to ea 20 justify the construction of facilities where less [ 21 and less exposure could be possible in -- at 22 enclosed operations 23 When I -- you know these old four 24 unit chemical manufacturing houses where you've 25 got one unit on each corner of a processing ad r: Fane rs ey r ie operation where you walk in everybody's got them 120 First thing we did was we stripped the concrete down and boy you talk about having a hissy and the hissy was because they'd get cold or get rained on but why put an envelope over that damn thing to encourage that If you have an accident and a leak get the damn building down so we took more buildings down than you can shake a stick at and 10 caught hell from the plant manager because It's 11 going to get cold and we're going to have to 12 insulate better and we're going to have to do this 13 and that 14 But we took a lot of buildings down 15 and particularly in the old organic processing 16 plants 17 Q. That was to minimize exposures 18 A. Well where you had an accident 19 Hell we blew a valve every once in a while so 20 did everybody else that I know of and the process 21 to follow that up is one hell of a mess inside 22 I'll tell you what I saw one time was 23 one where there was a darn flammable leak inside 24 of one of those four unit buildings and they 25 handled - well but the point is if something would have happened and ignited that it would have blown those other three processes to pieces too and my God only knows what's in those processes So we got them in that plant -- that process got the plant to remove most of the brick and the concrete and support it with steel and most of them if you find today in a multipurpose multiprocess unit operation petroleum or 10 chemical you won't find any buildings 11 Buildings is where the foreman's 12 office is and where their damn coffee machine is 13 and where their card punching machine is and 14 where most of the bitching goes on but the fact 15 is the processes are sitting out in the open in 16 open racks which is a -- the greatest thing that a5 17 ever happened in the chemical industry and the 18 petroleum industry 19 Q. Would you recall Mr. Garrett if 20 Monsanto's plants in the 50s when insulating work 21 was going on if it required the removal of old 22 insulation if that was done wet or not 23 A. I saw a whole system being done down 4 weve 24 at our Chocolate Bayou plant and it was wetted paw iS 25 down but -- as a matter of fact they had the sprinklers on it the place Guy worked in water all over 122 You in a way you got me in a trap I don't know whether I agree with that or not and I'll tell you the reason Unless that water is trapped and carefully gotten rid of you could r? spread that damn asbestos from here to hell and back and when it dries everybody is going to get asbestos 10 If you take care of it properly fine 11 but that means where does that water go How are 12 you going to trap it when you're messing around 13 with a rack in the middle of the plant 14 Have you got a ditch dug over here 15 where you're going to trap it So you can take 16 that stuff out so it doesn't dry on the ground and en 17 every truck and every man that walks by it helps oR 18 generate dust 19 We had a hell of a mess over that 20 thing They finally decided that you couldn't do e 21 that So they dry removed it The last part of 22 that same process at Chocolate Bayou was dry 23 removed 24 Yeah you have respirators on but the a 25 majority of it was dry removed The rest of it was sprayed down and into the gutters but the 123 steht point is parts of the racks go over areas that are not well drained That was my point MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive again MR BROWN To that last one MR OLIVER Yes to the entire response of that last portion as well pom xO A. Goody for his side I realize I'm 10 giving you a lesson in industrial hygiene that [ 11 maybe you don't need i 12 i 13 Q. No sir A. That's my only way to answer the 14 questions ~O_ ,o 15 Q. That's exactly what I would hope that 16 you would do Along that line you're a certified eS 17 industrial hygienist Mr. Garrett 18 Fe 19 A. Yes Q. And I would think you consider eA 20 yourself to be a professional in that area 21 il 22 A. Yeah I do Q. And are so recognized by your peers 23 A. I'm too blunt but I am not a very [ 24 good consultant [ 25 Q. Well perhaps that's what makes you a y al ee ial Kwsa . ecw l C res BE I I I 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 good consultant A. Well I told them first it was lousy and they didn't like it I don't know any other way to tell them it MR FOGARTY Objection Q. Mr. Garrett I've got about 12 o'clock Do you want to stop for lunch Give me a chance to get reorganized again here and see if we can get -- A. This time let's take off all the hardware so we don't pull the equipment apart Deposition stood in luncheon recess at approximately 12:00 p.m. and resumed at approximately 1:37 p.m. AFTERNOON SESSION All parties present by and through counsel and the witness JACK T. GARRETT having been previously sworn testifies further to wit MS FLATT We're on record Edward Carstarphen not present at this time CONTINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR HOBSON Q. Mr. Garrett during the luncheon break I noticed something -- and perhaps we made 124 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 a mistake this morning I was looking at your resume and I'd asked you earlier about when you 125 first went to work at Texas city and you looked on here and you told me October '53 and when I was looking back through your resume I noticed here where you had October '53 that's the date that you left Texas City and it shows you starting at Texas City in January 1950 and I wonder if about -- A. January '50 is the right date I'm sorry Q. That's okay I might have rushed you through that A. I must have got the wrong You know I saw October of 1953. That's when I went to work in '50 I graduated the University of Tennessee in 1950 Q. And so then it would have been in 1953 that you moved to St. Louis A. To St. Louis yes Q. While you were down in Texas City I wanted to ask you if you might remember any names from that facility Would you recall a Mr. William F. Woolley 0-0-1-1 A. Name sounds familiar Woolley H 49 Ry i ef 1 C ea [ can't place him Q. Would you recall a Dorothy Wilson A. Yes 126 Q. And how would you have known Dorothy Wilson sir A. Oh the name is familiar I don't know I can't place the place Dorothy Wilson Q. Were there occupational nurses at the plant 10 11 12 13 A. She was a nurse Yes bless her heart She was a -- she lanced a couple of dandy boils I had She was a nurse huh I couldn't argue 14 My wife is the nurse from St. -- from 15 Monsanto -- from here so I better keep quiet 16 That Dorothy was -- Dorothy was the nurse huh 17 Q. Would you recall a -- it's either 18 Marietta or Marita Pawlik w Pawlik 19 Powlik 20 A. No no can't recall that 21 Q. And how about a Douglas Pierce 22 e 23 A. Nope not readily 24 Q. Claude Hamilton 25 A. Hamilton i T [ fi r bi 11 11 od |! Lu E E F : [i i _ r 1 2 3 4 150 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q. Yes sir A. Boy that don't tick a big bell but it rings a bell What was his -- Q. That's all I know about the gentleman sir 127 A. How about a Mr. B.D. DeWalt e capital a A. DeWalt He was an engineer in the plant I think Q. Would you recall any of his activities any of his duties A. No not specifically Q. What was the safety engineer or safety person's name A. Mooney -- Q. Mooney A. -- Stalling Q. Stalling A. Stallings Q. Stallings A. I think it's the plural name but it doesn't make any difference It's Stallings or Stalling - I believe is his name Q. Do you remember attending the Gulf Coast Regional Conference on industrial health in Houston when you first joined the company A. I've been to so darn many of them I think I remember that name of that outfit I 128 think I gave a paper at one of their meetings but I don't know where it was It was a discussion of the toxicology of fish to various kinds of me cyanides gE Q. Would you recall a Florence Andrews A. What 10 11 Q. Florence Andrews A. Florence Andrews No. 12 Q. How about a Mr. Fred L. James 13 J 14 A. Not good there either 15 Q. In your work for Monsanto Mr. 16 Garrett did you ever have any interface with the oi 17 ASA the American Standards Association later 18 became ANSI the American National Standards org 19 Institute es 20 A. No. I had -- I think we had some 21 dealings with them over a standard connected with Lcs] 22 tank streaks one time but I don't remember what 23 24 25 it was about Q. Are you familiar with what ASA standards were A. Yeah some of them I am We used them as everybody does I guess Q. Would you give me your best understanding of how ASA standards were in use in 129 the 1950s A. They set down standards along with many other standard setting organizations for many many things that ultimately became safety related but weren't necessarily safety related 10 initially and that's the strength of materials 11 bursting strength of equipment that sort of 12 thing And I think they set down standards -- 13 14 for example they would set down an example of how 15 bursting strength of a large tank or the bursting 16 strength of a milk bottle for that matter because ioe 17 both of them can be hazardous and that has been 18 my -- most standards are ASA standards of one kind eg 19 or another A lot of construction standards L 20 Q. Would it be accurate to say that these 21 ASA standards were the standards of good practice ~ fe 22 for industry at the time 23 A. Partly but because industry had many 24 agencies establishing standards I think they're 25 better now than they used to be I think there were more people out setting standards in the old people days than they were -- the petroleum set 130 standards for petroleum products and the chemical people for chemical products and I don't know how many -- how -- you mess around with railroad equipment and you find out the railroads set their own standards if you want to know the truth about the matter And they had their set of reasons for 10 it I'm not -- really I'm not trying to in any [ 11 way derogate them I'm just saying that there are 12 so many different standard organizations that you 13 meet in construction or in transportation Look at the standards established for 14 15 aircraft for example for passenger carrying r 16 aircraft The same is true for railroads I wish re 17 somebody'd enforced them but that's beside -- I 18 chased too many wrecks I guess re 19 Q. In the case of ASA standards would Ey 20 those standards be something that Monsanto would 21 have been looking to and relying upon in their sg 22 work 23 24 25 A. For construction materials probably but I don't think they'd look forward to ASA to set any kind of health standards I think there tate Eo Fs ms rs az | 4 oeey ro Nou 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 are too many much better equipped and better educated agencies to set those including some federal and state agencies Q. Well for instance are you familiar 131 with ANSI -- A. Yes Q. -- or ASA standards for respiratory protection A. Yes I am now Q. A. - Was that one of the safety or One of the -- yes and one of the ones that established the pressure cushions on masks and so forth Yes I agree No. We used the word ANSI I don't know Q. Is the ANSI -- A. American National Standards Q. Is the ANSI standard for respiratory protection one that you felt was not a good one for ANSI because it was health related A. No not necessarily No not necessarily I -- to tell you the truth the standard setting associ- -- people that I knew that we did most of the early work with for standards in handling products probably came from manufacturers or from the MCA the then MCA now E [ 24 roe 1 E 7 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CMA and the American Petroleum Institute group I worked with them too I was a member of one of their committees one of their 132 medical committees I would be more inclined -- now for strength of materials and stuff like that the standards established by the health agencies probably took into account any standards that were otherwise required We used probably more than anything else used the TLV list We put many things on the TLV list did the work and established them there And we put some in the CMA's guide books and we put some -- we did some of the work that ultimately led to standards from the Petroleum -- American Petroleum Institute And their -- they also put out daily sheets And this is many years ago They put out daily sheets chemical safety data sheet that's what you call them was put out by the Manufacturing Chemists Association The API put out a whole series of data sheets on things that were largely petroleum related The drug people put some out as well 133 These were raw material drugs These were not -- because they had to put out very detailed ones for approval on drugs that were being used by people So the agencies involved that we were most involved with that I've been most involved with were probably the TLV committee of the MCA -- I mean of the American Industrial Hygiene Association the MCA committee work that backed up 10 11 12 13 14 a lot of the chemicals We established the data for some chemicals that went to the MCA and from the MCA went to -- went to -- ultimately set the standard in the -- for PCBs for example and for some of | 15 the nitro and amine compounds i 16 -- So the agencies I'm most frequently 17 most familiar with were probably the government Pe 18 agencies and they took their numbers from most of 19 these committees or agencies established by 20 individual manufacturing groups like the MCA and 21 the API and there are a lot of others that do eo 22 these drug people 23 So that's where most frequently I 24 think most of the standards that are currently 25 used probably came out of a composite of these i3Sa atte eae Ao nage wee pees r a q ro 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 134 agencies Q. Did any of your work whether it was with these agencies or these organizations that you mentioned about or through Monsanto did they bring you in contact with any of the insulation manufacturers or their employees A. Probably but the trouble is that the particular committee was established for specific -- the specific business and the -- any insulation manufacturers would have been ancillary to the primary business of chemicals or petroleum products But in any case their standards were always put forth to the -- to the TLV committee of the American Industrial Hygiene Association Q. Do you recall meeting any of the employees from the insulation manufacturers A. Oh I knew -- I knew a guy who was a member of the American Industrial Hygiene Association friend of mine that worked for oh the big -- big asbestos manufacturer on the west coast Well the one that got sued to death Q. Well there have been several A. I'm sure they were Q. Fibreboard A. No. 135 Q. Manville A. Manville I knew those people two of their people Q. Do you recall their names [ [ A. Good Heaven's no My recall of [ [ incidents is fine My recall of names is zero 9 re) ananelwe.. Q. Can you tell me under what circumstances you remember meeting those folks 10 11 12 13 A. Well I met them in a meeting somewhere I think it was -- I think it was a AIT meeting on standards somewhere H probably don't recall where it was Probably one of the 14 national meetings came in and it was not 15 Some gentleman 16 17 18 19 Zucker} Q. You've been talking about several organizations and I wanted to try to make sure we're talking about the right one the same one 20 21 22 23 24 25 together TLVs are levels -- A. Threshold limit values Q. Yes sir Those are set by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists ae en co i 3 Be A. Governmental Industrial Hygienists 136 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 yes Q. The ACGIH A. With most of the input from AIHA and their -- and the people that manufactured that material I've been involved in that many times were involved in Q. Now when you say you committees that had to do with TLVs then the committees you worked with were in the American Industrial Hygiene Association A. The IHA that's right Q. Not the American Conference -- Governmental Industrial A. No but we dealt with them because they were the regulators and we gave them the data We dug up half the data They come to us and ask us for data on this and that or something else particularly some of the oddballs The AIHA published a little series of booklets or data sheets of their own and we set the standards for the PCBs and some of the others gave them the data we had which was extensive particularly in our manufacturing we've dealt with all of them and data and it turned -- So out to be the standard that was established on the TLV a leme anal ---- an --, Ce esa. Cowan 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 137 list Q. You did say earlier I think that -- I think Monsanto put things on the TLV you list is that right A. We put -- we were asked frequently where we had -- we were one of the manufacturers of chemical products -- to help develop TLVs with the -- with the TLV committee of the AIHA which dealt with the committee of the association We said -- we did this on products that we were primary manufacturer of or one of the primary We did the PCB work because we were the only one that made the PCBs And incidently our standards were accepted by the French and Britain -- German manufacturers of it too because we had enormous enormous amounts of information on the data on the exposure to those materials in our own manufacturing operations and we manufactured them at four different sites But anyway we did some of the others We were asked on -- particularly when they got to setting some of the standards on anilines and the chloroanilines the nitroanilines Monsanto's a primary manufacturer 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 of aniline materials or was I don't know that they still are or not and we did a lot of work on that because those things are dangerous son of a 138 bucks MR FOGARTY Objection nonresponsive A. The chloroanilines were probably the most dangerous material I ever saw manufactured Q. In that list of materials that you just told me about that involved setting TLVs is there any one or one group of those that you had particular responsibility for more than any others A. The PCBs we did Elmer P. Wheeler and I did the PCBs and wrote the backing for it You have to write a backing sheet or a backing report detailing where your data came from how much data you have what your manufacturing facilities are where they are and so forth what regulations you feel are necessary to protect the health of the people and what have you practiced in safe handling and that's what we did But in answering all those questions we frequently got a lot of questions about materials that you were not the primary ay [ C7 soe . ^' a se CT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 manufacturer of but you manufactured it and had some data and we dumped the data into -- any time they asked we dumped the data for them One thing I loved about Monsanto I never got told not to by anybody any time 139 anywhere Q. Was it so that for PCBs -- which I think you said you had direct responsibility for doing A. Q. I sure did Did you at Monsanto come up with a TLV number for PCBs then A. We came up with a recommendation as to the least -- what we considered the least hazardous level that we had seen in manufacturing practice The unhappy part of it is we'd never seen any hazard in manufacturing and we told the committee this but we also gave them copies of all of our detailed toxicological research work including long term tests Q. So you had some animal datas that were sent A. Oh yes we had two year data on that So we turned it over to - incidentally we turned area) woo Fy ao OE ore er L 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 it over to the -- to the OSHA too Q. About how many people were involved in 140 manufacturing PCBs over the years A. Oh God five hundred No four hundred probably Wait a minute One two three -- we manufactured PCBs in Anniston Alabama in East St. Louis Illinois and originally at the plant in Missouri the old home plant in small quantities there The test materials came out of there but the manufacturing levels were at East St. Louis and in Anniston Alabama The Anniston plant was shut down for -- reasons if you saw it you'd understand why We had no way of taking care of any waste there at all We had a hell of a time with it Now somebody would build a phosphorous manufacturing plant out in the middle of no place We had a creek about this wide We finally ended up owning it and putting tile in and making it a sewer which we tested checked and treated and finally they give up So we moved The only plant in the latter years of the manufacturing of PCBs were done in -- at East St. Louis Illinois and we had 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 a manufacturing plant in Europe and I believe 141 that was in Belgium but I'm not sure Q. I'm curious to know what kind of logic you used in coming up with your recommendations for TLV for PCBs How did you do that A. Well it was difficult to do We looked at the toxicology with long term studies with rats and acute studies with several species rats rabbits and guinea pigs although we rarely used guinea pigs Rats rabbits and we had a third -- a third specie I can't even remember what it was And we tested from these data -- by the way it's not very toxic as you can easily imagine From these data we calculated based on the most sensitive animal -- and the most sensitive I believe was a rat -- what it would be if we took tenth of that and if that -- We felt that would be hazardous Based on our experience with our maintenance people primarily we figured that was probably correct So that's essentially how we set it Q. In what kinds of programs do you recall having to deal with the maintenance people ov to observe what kind of medical problems they 142 might have experienced A. Well we went through and sampled We sampled PCBs in those areas And incidently we had a hell of a time doing it because we never found very much The stuff as you know unless you're -~ it's very hot is a syrupy material to start with It's diluted in using it in transformer 10 cases for example 11 It's not -- you say the electrical 12 people do this They don't They dilute it and 13 there's what's known as transformer fluids are 14 made and these are mixtures of PCBs different 15 numbers different chlorinated types and bland 16 solvents nonflammable if -- as much as possible a 17 because PCBs were not flammable rr 18 They were used in places where you ce 19 were -- it was well to take a little care because 20 they were used in tight places 21 Q. I take it that in doing the animal Be: 22 toxicology work that these test animals would be 23 exposed to different doses of the material and 24 then you would look at the animals to see what 25 kind of biological effects were present H [ ore eo PS fe ae J 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 143 A. That is correct That's correct The reason we used multiple species is because we wanted to know if there was anything -- we'd never seen a case with our own people We'd -- the only manufacturer of PCBs and the work in the U.S. was Monsanto And the only manufacturer in Europe I believe was Rhone Poulenc and oh Leber Quesin a German company in Leber Quesin Made in Leber Quesin What the hell was the name of the company But anyway make -- but we dealt with them too by the way The people from Germany came over to talk to us and we were over in Europe talked to them and talked also to - they had a toxicologist One of the great toxicologists of the world was a German that worked for Bayer and we talked to them -- wasn't any sense in talking to the French as you probably already know so we talked to Germans They came over and talked to us looked at our data and they felt that our standard was pretty severe They didn't think anybody would ever exceed it but they thought it mom eoerny paren ORETReasinre [ aT. ' ra ' mz [ was pretty severe based on the data But that's the general sense of how it 144 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 happened Q. In doing these laboratory animal studies I take it that the exposure to the animal would be monitored over their exposure time period of years A. These lifetime studies yes There's no -- no basis in acute studies going to help you except it gives you an idea of when to start running and if you exceed X number of -- you'd have a hell of a time getting that much PCB It would be like drinking too much Karo syrup -- It's very difficult very doesn't -- it isn't very volatile But anyway we tested it and we worked with the toxicology laboratory We did not do it ourselves We never did any of our own toxicology work We did it with contract labs Q. Were the animals exposed by having them breathe it or by putting it on their skin A. We breathed We both breathed We pasted it on their skin the abdomen that had been shaved using a standard transfer to see if it was absorbed through the intact skin and inhalate t* ores & ht htht ven a omit An ore a r 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 inhalation We did everything but duck them in it I didn't do it We did it -- had it done by our contract people and we used the University of Cincinnati a lot We used two private labs that 145 -- out on the east coast a lot We had an acute place in St. Louis that did acute work pret nearly exclusively for us and for Mallinckrodt and maybe a couple of other people Q. Now the workers who made PCBs that were Monsanto employees about what time period would Monsanto have made PCBs A. From about 1935 to about 1985 Q. And I take it that at least for some of that about fifty year time period there would have been no monitoring data to determine exposures to the Monsanto ~-- A. Well we didn't -- we did monitoring but we didn't get anything and we did -- we took monitors on the people In the first place the process was an enclosed -- tight enclosed process and it required very few people Actually the guy that ran it sat in a control room with dials and adjusted the ed temperatures and the pressures 146 The only person that ever got any exposure after we cooled it shut it down depressurized it was the people that did the maintenance on it and it was those people that we tracked more often than anybody else We never found any problem We thought you might get a rash and irritation because of the chlorinated contact but we never 10 did that either but we never got enough exposure 11 either I don't suppose 12 Q. And I take it that these employees 13 that would have been making the PCBs at Monsanto 14 that included the maintenance workers as well as 15 the operations people 16 A. If the maintenance workers at the 17 Krummrich plant was assigned by region -- but it 18 isn't fair because they might -- if this regional ra 19 maintenance group had too many pipefitters they i 20 went over here 21 So you're talking -- if you went and 22 looked at the standard workers including fitters 23 and insulators and the whole bunch would be -- 24 could be transferred from group to group but they 25 probably stayed within their own craft shell Qua aN [ ower wed E 2 t a ied 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 because workers this was a plant and -- this was a united they used individual chemical recognized 147 crafts which we could care less an insulator's an I don't you know insulator whether he's working under what union would frequently be rules and these people transferred from unit to unit and would be used from this unit maintenance to to this help it if this unit was down for bring it down and make sure all that stuff in the it's -- they don't dump creek because it would do a creek It would separate and no good you'd have two levels in level and the creek The fish may like the top not like the bottom level In they may any case this is how we did it that worked on it were The people oddly enough -- the plant was pretty large the one at Kearny was smaller in The one at Anniston output Pretty much the same The one at Krummrich was built after the one in Anniston so it had a few modern conveniences otherwise the like flushing toilets maybe but themselves had thing -- the people very little exposure to anything We tested with standard organic fluid ee a) ne ere bidec [ a n a: wee ty 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 testing materials and found -- I don't think we ever found any or very little It's not easy to analyze these things by the way I'll give you credit for that It's damn difficult to analyze for very tightly chlorinated compounds You got to break them down somehow and knock that chlorine out of there so you can test -- you can test a sample for it So it really is a pretty tough 148 analysis But as far as we were concerned based on what we saw in many many thousand acute tox tests and many many hundreds of long term tox tests that's probably the most innocuous material we ever tested I hate -- I know they'll holler PCBs Let them holler They're going to burn this soil out here in St. Louis sure as God made green apples They better crank that little dude up pretty high to be able to burn those chlorinated hydrocarbons out of there but if they want to fine it's done because it couldn't possibly hurt anybody Q. Now is it your experience or can you tell me Mr. Garrett is this how other TLVs have } ane my es wee Slo t cone) L on > PS ea 3 a 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 149 been set historically A. In most TLV committees and I've been on a couple of them you gather any information you can from any kind of literature source and if you've got a lot of good buddies you can get a whole lot of them to look in some literature that you don't normally have particularly medical literature that you don't maybe have access to particularly foreign medical journals which they don't really have Most of their stuff is if it's for safety or health control reasons it's in the medical journals If you had somebody that could read French and read French journals regularly or -- we had a man in Europe that did the German journals for us Get all this junk dumped into the committee all these pieces and bits of information and then get a detailed tox study which we did detailed long term tox study lifetime term and a whole mass of short terms in various types of animals and all of this together it begins to look like probably it ought to be thus and so and then you begin haggling and 3. we we ae ilk: in arguing about it and bunch highly skilled and trained in of people that are this business -- and 150 these are not hygienists These are almost exclusively that do this maybe a medical doctor toxicologists or two thrown in and they come up with the 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 answer My personal opinion is they've done one hell of a good job and by the way our TLVS are copied by everybody in the world And the TLVs that ultimately get Q. published by Governmental the American Conference of Industrial Hygienists those are put levels that it's believed that most forth as workers won't suffer ill effects not all workers right MR FOGARTY Objection leading I don't know I've never heard A. Well of a TLV in no one and we certainly would never recommend and we recommend -- many ~ any TLV that is in the area that even causes a symptom whatever it is We don't want that to happen You don't have to have it happen today with modern equipment AN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You can't run a backyard chemical plant anymore with a bunch of castoff kettles and believe me there were a lot of those when I first come into this business You can't do that These things are in triple out -- triple layered stainless steel containers with everything running through multiple dials and pressure guages pressure drop guages concentration guages | and everything you can measure It just doesn't make any sense to put it out If you can smell it there's too much 151 There's too much That was the old rule That old rule had a hell of a lot of sense to it It had a hell of a lot of sense to it Q. I'm sorry I didn't understand The old rule being what A. The old rule it used to be the old rule was if you can smell it it's too much Hell you've heard that for God's sakes Lord knows we used it enough times in the old days That is not true There is a lot of stuff -- I mean that is probably as good as you can get but you're going to get below that if you 3 a co Noth Noth 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 do these full tox studies and we did them not only once but we did them more than once in multitude of animals We should have We got shalalied enough about it Q. So what you're saying is the old rule was if you can smell it it's for sure too much 152 and -- A. Or you could feel it that's right That's the old rule and it served fairly well Not good enough by any stretch Q. And now as things have progressed the fact that you can't smell it is not good enough A. Well the old rule worked for toxic immediate effects acute effects It never would work for the subtle effects of long term exposure no And that's the reason we did the long term tests If our own processes -- any time we manufactured a new chemical that we were going to market for whatever reason we did the full tests and it's strange there are some we withdrew We did not think they were - we thought they were too toxic in some kinds of toxicity that might -- and we withdrew They weren't that happy a compromise of the materials 1 1 ren _ waste r ks 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 153 already on the market Q. Getting back for a second to TLVs The TLVS that were in effect in the 1950s and 1960s it's pretty clearly stated isn't it that those TLVs were intended to protect most of the workers but not necessarily all the workers A. Well I never heard it put that way I think -- I think in my company I'd have been fired if I'd have used that term at all 8 How is that sir A. Well the old man wouldn't have it You're going to protect all of my workers or you aren't going to protect -- or you're going to -- we'll find somebody who can or we'll quit go making it and that's the way we worked You'll find Kelly will tell you that tomorrow I think Q. Is that one of the reasons why you weren't satisfied just to meet a TLV that you wanted 50 percent or even less A. Well we didn't even ~~ that -- you got to give yourself credit Every safety -- look at the number of materials that margin you've seen through the years experience that have suddenly in your professional became more toxic 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 because of some specific effect on some specific organ that took years to develop and by that time you're too far into it to help some of them so we 154 didn't want to do that We've always been pretty cautious We by the way have our own toxicology groups at Monsanto that supervise all these studies We do some of the toxic -- the acutes ourselves We don't any more We used to We do -- now these professional toxicologists do the work with the people that do the work supervisory Q. If I understood what you were saying there then because it's known that as more and more work gets done new effects are discovered and so the prudent thing to do even though there's a TLV is to minimize the exposure as much as you can -- A. Q. Absolutely -- because you never know when the new effects are going to come out A. That is correct MR FOGARTY Objection leading also mischaracterizing his testimony MR BLANK Do you have some problem with leading an adverse witness I mean is there > } a oe we some wierd rules that you're working under that make that a reasonable objection MR FOGARTY I don't think that this 155 witness is an adverse witness MR BLANK Oh I forgot we sued Monsanto Excuse me It must be a mistake THE WITNESS Do you want me to go out 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 while you fight Q. No sir We're just trying to figure out why these unnecessary interruptions seem to be happening A. Can you possibly hold it off for a minute so that we can have a -- a break to go to the john Q. A. Absolutely sir Okay Please MR OLIVER I object to the last side mark too MR HOBSON which one the absolutely sir Temporary recess was held MS FLATT We're on record Q. Mr. Garrett before our break we were somewhat into a discussion on TLVs I think You said that the concept of protecting most workers was something that you didn't think would go over 156 well at Monsanto nmedaae MR FOGARTY Object to the mischaracterization of the testimony Q. Well tell me if that's wrong then A. That was right I don't think that if it's possible to determine the end effect no effect level that you don't do it Q. Okay I'm not sure I understood what 10 you're saying I don't want somebody else to say 11 I mischaracterized it so explain to me what you 12 mean by that please 13 A. If you can determine the no effect 14 level of the material whatever it takes you 15 should do it That's my opinion 16 Q. Can you tell me talking about cow 17 materials for which there are TLVs are those no 18 effect levels rs 19 A. Many of them are sali 20 Q. How about asbestos 21 A. I don't know I have nothing to do 3 & 22 with setting that standard It was already on the 23 books when I came around and we abided by it so I 24 25 don't really know about that You might go back and check whoever - By 1 3827 ae | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 did it and find out what they did and how they did 157 it Q. So you just wouldn't know one way or the other -~- A. Q. No. -- whether asbestos was a no effect level or not A. It's been set so long and been practiced so many years that I didn't -- we just didn't argue it We used it and that served us well as far as I can surmount Q. Now you were talking about the use of PCBs and how Monsanto being the only U.S. manufacturer that you were involved in putting PCBs on a TLV list Did you feel that at Monsanto that you in fact did establish a no effect level for PCBs A. Based on the years we had manufactured it and the yearly physical exams of the men that worked it for years and years we think we established a no effect level yes Q. And do you feel Mr. Garrett that that's the manufacturer's responsibility to find a no effect level if there is one 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 A. That's an onion I'd just as soon not bite into I don't know how you mean by that If does not help establish the a manufacturer of the materials that he's manufacturing standards that are going to expose someone else I think 158 they should Q. help at least And how would you advise today in your consulting practice a manufacturer to help set TLVs find no effect levels A. Well if there is enough literature in the tox or medical or industrial hygiene -- to show specific finite literature to establish levels and their effect or no effect on workers then it should be looked up and it should be used in a judgment that goes behind all standards We've judged wrong in some standards Everybody has I think you'll find that looking 18 at the records Then I think whoever manufactured has 19 of taking these data and 20 the responsibility with his own data and coming 21 filling in the gaps 22 23 summary that says thus and so is the up with a case and that it is as near as we can determine level or whatever you want to 24 a no effect I 25 determine to be filled and Q. And if there are gaps the data doesn't exist should the manufacturer 159 attempted to test to fill those gaps A. Yes I think so Q. Are there situations Mr. Garrett where it's just not possible to find a no effect level for chemicals or for materials A. I guess you could say that a material that is inherently a corrosive is probably going 10 to subcutaneously effect the skin of a human being 11 in some ways Now your point is well made in that 12 13 you're talking about where is the end of this 14 affair going to -- where is it going to end up 15 There are ways of testing the very very minute 16 effects of corrosives for example on skin bi 17 Your question is okay If those 18 exceeding the minute effects is that the one you 19 want to set for your standard If it's possible oe 20 to be set at the level that doesn't effect the 21 standard Now that's not always possible I eee 22 won't buy that wa 23 Q. What about at -- 24 1 A. Let's look at petroleum for example 25 Let's look at the ordinary gasoline and what 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 to this from the flammability standpoint happens I mean you can't -- you've got to do -- a lot of professional judgment has got to go into these 160 standards It just happens that in the case of the PCBs we couldn't find any effect at all Q. In the case of materials that can cause cancer do you believe it's possible to find a no effect level that will protect everyone A. Everyone Q. A. Yes sir No. In my -- if this is a -- if this is an active reactive chemical that can cause cancer can you get a level that won't cause cancer in anybody in the world I don't think you could do it by any normal toxicological means and any of the mathematical means of calculating the effect based on the positives negatives and nulls I don't think you can So that you've got to -- again you're back on the judgment base and everybody that stands on the judgment base is going to get shot at So I don't know Q. Do you hold Mr. Garrett to the 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 opinion that workers should be told if they're working with materials that can cause cancer 161 A. You damn right Q. How long have you felt that way And I take it you feel that way fairly strongly A. At the number of lectures I've given to worker groups at Monsanto and to other groups at request largely somebody requesting through some president of Monsanto I would say from day one that they should be told Now they should have some good -- and this is one of the biggest problems You brought the best one up that you can bring up and that's cancer You've got to preeducate your people as to what these levels mean and what they are For example if you can create cancer with one molecule I don't know how you'd ever prove it Second if you can create cancer with levels of way below the level that causes any other discernable effect I don't know whether you could justify that because I don't think you'd ever develop a cancer enough to do it because in cancer studies you've got to have more than one because you'll have ideopathic stuff occur and f 9.95 he peny, & rsa mee ra me 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 certainly will in some of them damn boy you beasts that they breed for that If you stomp on the floor 11 percent of them drop dead from something anyway so it's a difficult task Your question is well asked I 162 don't know the answer to it I think that a good set of genuine systemic toxicological studies is the base of all this stuff When you get through that you find of the carcasses of from a good set of diagnoses what -- the effect it had If the beast died what did he die of An enlarged liver A ripped out esophagus or what And then back off from that situation and find out where the target probably is for that particular material and you'd be surprised incidently by what the targets are And then from that point try to evaluate it -- first evaluate whether it's needed or not If it isn't needed don't make it And believe me the chemical most of them that I know have turned companies down literally thousands of materials that people want them to make I know we have Monsanto Many many times we've turned them down many Will you make this for us 163 No you dummy Make it yourself because it's going to be highly hazardous and even the raw materials will cause cancer No we're not going to make it for you Why should we do it It would be foolish and would endanger our employees I don't know whether we really realize trained employees mean to a 10 how much good and you frighten one of 11 manufacturing company them in a processing unit and you got beau 12 troubles in that processing unit You may never 13 14 meet quality again You just can't do it And Monsanto -- and most companies I 15 16 know that I dealt with deep -- in very great and this would probably be Dupont and Dow 17 depth 18 and some others some of the good petroleum 6 the Standard oil groups and 19 companies Phillips we both their -- back when they did 20 I've dealt with 21 have a South American deal I even dealt with rs 22 those people mea The point I'm trying to make is 23 24 there's a word called prudent and boy everybody 25 in this business whether it's safety industrial B [ ~ro co [ rey r ~ ~~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 hygiene occupational medicine toxicology or whatever it damn sure better understand what is 164 prudent and what it means Q. What's it mean to you sir A. Is it prudent to manufacture Do you make enough money to pay for the corpses The answer is no nobody makes that much money So that's not prudent That isn't even smart Getting down below the smart level is it prudent to run the risk Evaluating risk is an exceedingly difficult task unless you've got a hell of a lot of data that shows what happened when something did go wrong and you almost never have that I think good prudence in the minds of good industrial medical personnel is probably good enough At least it's been my experience Now you can't grab these things out of the air Boy they -- and oddly enough some of the old TLVs probably were grabbed out of the air They have come -- they have been grabbed out of the air with experience and some of them have played the same game They have turned out to be prudent standards Hl \ Aa - rs en alte. fae 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Setting standards is my idea of running in a three wheel car I don't think you're going to get there without at least some accidents You're going to drag that wheel somewhere It just isn't possible to do it You can run down to the -- as low as you can go and you've got to run two years in rats and then you find out nothing happened or that something did happen What are you going to do go back another two years on another That's the only way to do it unless you're spread and boy you don't know The other thing that fouls you up is the differences in the toxic manifestation at 165 different levels Hell at one level it kills you because it blows out your respiratory system and down here much lower it kills you for something else We better know that too That's also prudence in testing The other thing is to be prudent is -~- into the prudent equation requires the how are they going to use it and how are they going to make it How much personal contact can be had in the manufacturing and can you eliminate that in the proper manufacturing Comes under the prudent 166 argument No I -- when we had anything to say about it and we had a lot to say about it from time to time -- by the way we didn't make a whole lot of people happy sometimes either but if the industrial hygiene or industrial physicianist thinks he's going to make his boss happy all the 10 time he's crazy He's not going to function 11 It's tough to go into a big meeting 12 where we're going to manufacture Alpha Baloney A 13 and it's going to solve the world's problems and 14 you walk in and say No. 15 pretns i 16 Boy I've done it I know What do you mean Oe 17 Peace And then we start that scare business 18 [ 19 How would you like to have cancer How many times 1 20 you been asked that I wouldn't like to ever have 21 it Anybody'd be an idiot that would [ [ 22 So the answer is use good data use 23 prudence use experience and believe it or not 24 sometimes you might be wrong MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive 25 Q. -- Is it best to 167 ne . A. What is that babbling going on down re inede there Q. I think you've identified it sir 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. Okay Q. Is it also prudence that in considering what steps to take that one should error on the side of caution when possible MR FOGARTY Objection leading A. Probably I think what you need to do is assemble all the data you've got all the data anybody else has got and you know as well as I do within the chemical industry or within the petroleum industry you can probably pretty well get the data I don't think -- we never have held it up from anybody We've sent bundles -- used to send -- if you had a regular bundle and PCB must have been that thick and we got questions from Denmark and all over the world We sent them a bundle and let them put their prudence in motion There used to be an old statement -- how did it go In the mind's a prudent man thus and so Okay If prudence doesn't play a part in it < i i s 11 1111 or L 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I don't think we know from half the things we use now We've got enormous experience with them We don't know how much because nobody's ever touched that subject to find out how many hours of work 168 hours have been assembled We've been doing that to -- in some of the newer chemicals and the number of working hours that are assembled become immense in a big operation where you've got a big maintenance group and a big production group and a big handling in your handling and packaging group It's an enormous number of hours I don't think anybody ever realized that before We did some at our Chocolate Bayou plant We were running -- what did we do How many people get it How many hours of exposures Exposures ran unto the zillions of hours Did we get anybody hurt Okay You go through the medical records You go through the records of your dispensary You go see your safety people You go through your hygiene and occupational medical people if you've got them And you find out together no we've had no problems We got fourteen million man hours of work in with no problems develop 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 All right The equation now is 169 beginning to solve some of the prudence that's needed Frequently we can't do that What are you going to do about that same manufacturing before you started it There's where the problem comes in I don't know how to solve it We did what we thought -- we would put our own sons to manufacture That's the best standard I've ever known Would that be where you'd let your own kid do it Q. If you were assembling the literature on a particular material that already had a TLV established and you found an exposure reported in the published literature that was below the TLV and associated with that exposure there was disease what would that mean to you A. If you could -- if you could establish that in fact that was true that the standards should be changed Q. Would it at least be a red flag to you to pay more attention A. It would be a red flag to your prudence it certainly would But the trouble with that is how many pieces of data have you seen oo Foo fp C C L Lhe 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that contain sufficient safeguards to be accurate and honest I don't know I'm asking you because 170 I don't know Q. The prudent thing to do though would be at least to pay attention to that and -- A. I would think so yes Q. --- and further work would be indicated then to establish whether or not that TLV is variable A. If it's possible or if the further work wouldn't do anything more than duplicate what's already been done because you're talking two years at least and probably more than that if you're looking at exposure to dust Q. And if you're talking about looking at exposures to human populations you may be looking at a working lifetime before you know the answer A. You may also be looking at a population that has a certain level of exposure significantly as -- by simply being alive particularly in cities Have you ever done any of these curbside tests Q. Nodding head A. Oh boy You can find anything at the curbside You've got a product How did it get there I haven't the vaguest damn notion how some 171 of them got there Some complicated organic identifiable chemicals can be obtained on the corner of a busy street corner How did they get there I don't know They're there It's from the combustion of gasoline at various levels of auto maintenance various 1 10 heats of engine various slides of tires skidding [ 11 tires and all the rest of the crap in the world 12 including asbestos from fading brake shoes So 13 don't know 14 From the standpoint of intelligent 15 prudent people you've got to set some kind of 16 method of doing this or quit manufacturing t sey 17 anything rsa" 18 Okay If you decide not to do that 19 then you're going to have to make some kind of 20 planned approach to these things and at some point 21 in the data collection time you're going to have lite 22 to say The data looks like it's okay so we'll do | 23 it or we won't do it That's my only way I 24 don't know any other way to do it 25 Now if you find out as you pointed out that that selection is not doing the job then it should be reevaluated but you better have 172 some damn good substantiated data Q. Is what you're saying Mr. Garrett is it before a professional industrial hygienist ought to think about recommending a TLV be changed that you have to have very well substantiated data to make the challenge A. Oh that depth -- that would be 10 11 12 13 difficult to make a good answer to that If I were in a -- if I were working with something that would cause end -- untreatable and noncorrectable disablement I wouldn't use any You couldn't do 14 15 16 17 it at all You'd have to use a triple standard You'd have to use your own judgment the data you see your own experience with materials of similar 18 type and a good deal of trained prudence 19 Q. So the higher the risk of use of the 20 product and the more likely that outcome can't be 21 reversed the more careful you have to be in using BAroR 22 the product 23 MR OLIVER Objection leading 24 25 Q. Is that right A. Now in the -- during the war the government made people manufacture things that were just plain hazardous I'm sorry but they were just plain hazardous I don't know Was that right I don't think so but they did it 173 We -- they manufactured more gasses that you couldn't -- you can't manufacture without some problems But like we always said somebody had to whip them and with fifteen minutes and another peanut gun they could have whipped us 10 Q. In looking at the setting of threshold 11 limit values or permissible exposure levels that 12 you would recommend as a professional industrial 13 hygienist if we're talking about a material that 14 can cause cancer would it be prudent that no 15 matter what number is attached to that material if 16 that workers still be told that this can cause eT 17 cancer 18 A. If the prudent -- if the material rs 19 were -- if all the data were plain and Oe 20 unobstructed unobstructed by normal 21 circumstances okay What is the man normally ee 22 exposed to in his everyday life You can't stop some exposures You 23 24 just can't It's a part -- unless you stopped us 25 from using automobiles and stop from using CT C C C ae OPS ee eS mm er 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 airplanes and everything else You can't Now I don't know who went through those prudent exercises but somebody did I 174 don't know I know one thing that if the stuff -- if you've got clean and clear enough data unobstructed by other effects unobstructed by other materials and that justify lowering the TLV it ought to be lowered Q. In dealing with asbestos today is there a no effect level that you can tell us for asbestos cancers A. There's levels that you cannot get any identifiable results from in animals but is that what -- is that going to emulate anything else I don't know But there are levels starting at zero if you can find zero where things don't create problems and you can actually back into or go up to levels that are harmful -- that knowledgeably are harmful I think the other problem connected with this material is that a trained person -- it depends on who's going to be using it I certainly wouldn't put many of the things that we the 1 11 = es ret az er 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 have -- we sell today that have satisfactory limit values I wouldn't put them into households as such but in the hands of experienced and trained and prudent people I don't -- in manufacturing I 175 don't think there's a problem -- Q. In looking A. So you -- you're really in a bad ball game here You -- should you stop the manufacture and use of any product any product that under any set of circumstances and any test one test should you do that I think you'd be out of business completely You'd probably be wondering around with a club in your hand Q. In your career at Monsanto was there ever a time when you thought or you believed someone at Monsanto had a no effect level for asbestos exposure A. I never saw any effect and by the way we did lung screens on lots of workers I never saw any effect that I thought asbestos created using threshold limit values at least in the latter years I don't -- I haven't seen any in the earlier years when it was higher but I haven't seen any Now that doesn't mean as it doesn't in the case of our PCBs doesn't include everybody and under every circumstance as far as I know I 176 don't know No I think you could -- you could -- my problem is are you -- are we going to use this standard for lawsuits or are we going to use this standard for the health of workers in plants that have full medical facilities and so forth 10 I don't know whether that's even a 11 relevant question or not 12 Q. But what I'm really trying to find 13 Mr. Garrett is was there a time when you felt 14 while you were a Monsanto employee or that you 15 were aware someone else in Monsanto had an 16 established no effect level for asbestos where you 17 could go and say This is the level for asbestos below which no one will get disease 18 exposure 6 one 19 A. You know it's funny We use the TLV 20 for asbestos and I never had any arguments about 21 it or any arguments with it ke, 22 No I don't think it ever created any that we know of Please believe me 23 problems 24 we're a chemical company We have about sixty 25 seventy thousand workers cote ean rn ih a 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Most of them are exposed to insulation 177 materials of one kind or another because they're close by and you've got wind blowing over insulated material and what there is We can find asbestos by analysis anywhere I can find it in your street corner in pretty heavy concentrations if you've got a stop sign there stop light there Q. But were you able to convince yourself or to tell others that at this level there will be no effect from asbestos while you're a Monsanto employee A. I thought that the TLV establishment system was sufficiently armoured with protection that the chances that a person was going to get any problem from that level of asbestos if you could analyze it and it was a continuous level I would -- I don't know I don't think we've ever seen anything We've done the same with a lot of other materials that are very toxic We've set standards on those and I don't know if we had twenty hour exposure That's the other problem we faced always If you had twenty hour exposure to highly toxic substances I don't know Q. So if I hear what you're telling me 178 then and tell me if it's wrong Mr. Garrett you're saying that for asbestos while you were at Monsanto you believe the threshold limit value as it was then set was the no effect level A. No I thought that was the -- a good safe standard Now no effect level is a term a that is extremely difficult to define and probably 10 is not ever obtainable in any case so I would say 11 that I thought it was a safe level for our 12 workers yes 13 Q. But you at Monsanto even as far back 14 as the 1950s still chose to control asbestos 15 16 exposures well below the threshold limit value A. We chose to control them and we didn't 17 really sample that much but yes they were below 18 the threshold limit value because we took care I Fa 19 think anybody - We -- but that's nothing Ca 20 We did the same thing with other .. 21 levels Any time we even approached the TLV level Gane 22 in concentration of certain material we'd press 23 the rush button We would do it for asbestos 24 It just -- it's one of these things 25 You set a standard I know We've set some standards and I -- you know you wonder in your 179 own mind hey if you've got the right guy at the right time with the right weaknesses in his organ system that you don't know of and he doesn't either and you feed him this stuff at this level is it not going to do any harm I don't know The answer is we've done the best we ied know how and we've done it with beasts and it hecti hadn't hurt them so we don't think it's going to 10 hurt you 11 And our records have been -- are very T T 12 excellent following that premise . 13 Q. If you would have been working with a 14 threshold limit value for asbestos of 5 million 15 particles per cubic foot back in the 1950s and 16 would have gone out and done measurements and OU 17 found say 4.5 million particles per cubic foot -- 18 A. I'd start coasting -- I'd tell them to oP 19 start coasting back start cutting her back es 20 21 Q. What do you mean by that A. Their effect -- their exposure's 22 coming from something The pipe it's either 23 going out the pipe or it's going off their tables 24 25 or somewhere Put a little more control in That's getting too close Q. You would not be content that close 180 to -- A. Not when they're approaching the TLV in a material that can cause lung diseases of fatal termination no I'm not going to do that I'd have them raise the stack level or do something immediate or shut the bloody thing down And that's going to be one hard thing to 10 11 do It's difficult You're talking about 12 useful materials and very very tight limits where 13 people are exposed in very very different ways may 14 and we're doing that in everyone 15 -- How -- we don't know what people 16 how people are going to use materials We give 17 them a TLV that we think is correct We have no 18 idea how they're going to use it They may be 19 bathing people up to their necks in the damn 20 stuff We don't know 21 22 Now how far can you go with a customer -- let me answer you this question How 23 far can you go with your customers in interfering 24 in their business because that's what they think 25 it is 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q. Of course you have the option not to sell to them which you said you've done A. Of course you do and you find this out after you make -- you build a big plant to provide a couple of customers and you find out those customers are that way and what do you do 181 I don't know If you can demonstrate there's a reasonable hazard there I think you should shut the two plants down The point is are you looking at twenty hour samples Are you looking at twelve to eight hour samples Are you looking at what What about the guy that double shifts We always run that problem past you We've had every question you can imagine asked particularly by the federal people What happens if the guy is working a double shift Well how often does he work a double shift I don't know you know That's a good point In the manufacture of chlorinated nitrated organic chemicals where you do have a bit of a tendency if you build beyond certain w levels of some internal problems do we shut the 182 damn thing down or what I don't know We've never had anybody we thought were hurt -- was hurt That's a bad -- that's a -- the starting point only in setting examples Only the starting point We've been making this stuff for forty years never hurt anybody How do they know Have they looked at the kids in schools Have 10 they looked at the birth rates Are they down 11 Have they looked at the general viability of the 12 fetuses born in their particular area Heaven's 13 14 knows There are a lot of things you can do 15 that TLVs should reflect on and do more and more 16 and more and I think it's a great idea 17 We did a survey with OSHA at East St. 18 Louis We did it in the community Just the 19 community in the area of several chemical plants 20 including our big Krummrich plant and they -- We 21 went out and got the birth records and the still 22 birth records and the records showing what . 23 occurred to the degree that you could match them 24 Now you're talking a hundred thousand ary 25 people which you're playing games with five a 11 1 11 el ~ ' w i L i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 hundred of them and it's difficult to draw any conclusion but the conclusions that we drew were it was a reasonably healthy community OSHA themselves told us we can show 183 a lot unhealthier ones and some healthier you ones So I don't know My personal opinion is if you can show me that there is a genuine risk in connection with the use of any product at the levels and you know that that -- those exposures are at the levels or below the levels you say they are then I think they ought to change it Q. Let me ask you the flip side of that Mr. Garrett For the threshold limit value for asbestos that existed in the 1950s and early 60s do you believe that there should have been the same pure clear conclusive data to establish the TLV as you would need to change it A. Yes Q. Do you know if in fact there was that kind of pure clear conclusive data A. Well you've got to go back and look at the levels and what they -- the levels are a damn difficult job You're talking fibers You're talking bits You're talking the damndest Syn ee eo a an 4 Be 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 things to measure there is in God's green earth 184 accurately I wish they'd do it on gravimetric levels That's my personal opinion God we've -- what kind of -- are you going to measure -- how about this size asbestos particle Is that one in the count I'd rather see it in a gravimetric way I'm sorry Sure you're going to say Well all you got to do is get -- inhale a rock Okay If he inhales a rock he's probably going to hurt himself anyway The point I'm trying to make is what is the best and most prudent thing to use to protect the most people and all the people if possible or quit using the damn stuff That's my opinion Q. I take it from your comments then you were certainly personally aware of problems that were inherent in doing these dust counts when it came to asbestos A. Oh yes I've dust counted with that damn Bausch & Lomb contraption It gives you an answer invariably wrong but that's beside the point di208  ( 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 It's an answer and you can write it down And you take the hemacytometer and take a bunch of damn dust into a liquid medium and measure it in there and it conglomerates or associates and you've got a whole flock of crap It's not easy to do That's why people in this trade get bald like you are and I'm rapidly getting there just trying to figure out what the hell you can do to better better operate the system for all workers You don't kid yourself Chemical workers and people that plaster with this are not the only workers at risk Everybody's at risk I think if we got rid of automobiles we'd get rid of most of the bad things in this country anyway but I'd have to get rid of my bird What the hell I don't want to do that 185 So there you are I think that when you start out -- and we started out with some of ours we set the first standards We did just about as much as we could and we backpeddled We'll take tenth of this and so forth It's as good a way as I know of to do it even now You have a material that caused an ithe Se [ id te 4 i oo i sa eleie 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 acute intoxication which upon continuance over a few minutes is going to cause death that's where you start with NOW how -- you back off from there Where do you stop In any case I don't give a damn if it causes cancer or causes your toe nails to turn backwards where do you stop And in a manufacturing handling operation they're only there eight hours usually and you hope they get to go into a environment that's a little less hazardous or potentially hazardous so I don't know I don't know how to do it 186 I can say this we've been doing very well in the American chemical industry with the standards as we set them with all their faults Q. And from time to time when the wrong standard was set and information came to light that there were new biological effects -- A. There were recommendations for change and most of them were changed if that -- if those data could be duplicated Q. And for someone to know if these biological effects the new ones are happening someone has to be looking correct A. Yes but I think you'll find in most 187 -- health is one of the most expensive products most expensive states of mind you can pay for in modern day manufacturing If you don't believe that go ask your insurance people So you're going to do -- you've got to rule out the people who have certain kinds of -- let's say you're looking at a respiratory irritant okay You've got to rule out people 10 that have got tuberculosis people that in the war 11 somebody shot one of their lungs out they only 12 got one pump Do you do this Do you know who 13 they are Do you have any concept of who does 14 have that 15 Who's a pulmonary cripple in an area 16 where you're looking at pulmonary effect It's 17 hard It's hard And I think the people in the race" 18 threshold limit committees have done a marvelous 19 job with what they've had to do with and have made ies 20 the changes necessary through the years where 21 there's a sufficient data to justify them Fy 22 That's what I think and God knows if mz 23 it weren't true I don't know how many Monsanto 24 people would be dead right now 25 Q. What would be your thoughts Mr. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Garrett about a company that would have some 188 data be it laboratory animal data or human data that could possibly contradict a threshold limit value and they not send it in to the committees to be set A. Produce it Q. I'm sorry A. Produce publish it and get it in the literature and it will then immediately go into the committees Q. What would be your impression of a company instead of doing that sending it in and publishing it would hold it back and let people to continue to use a TLV that would have the - that they'd have questions about MR OLIVER Objection calls for speculation Incomplete hypothetical A. I don't know My enthusiasm for it would be less than zero but I don't know what you could do about it If you knew the data had it -- had it correctly obtained did it with proper testing and backing you could publish it yourself I suppose You'd probably get shot but that's beside the point Many of us are going to get shot one of these days anyway 189 MR OLIVER Objection nonresponsive A. All right We have had first class excellent luck with TLVs and believe me we don't just make asbestos We make -- we had at one time over eleven hundred materials that Monsanto manufactured God bless them they quit making a lot of that small crap had small unit -- 10 manufacturing units that made buckets full of 11 stuff for people 12 Now I suppose we probably have 13 sixteen or seventeen hundred problems that you 14 would make sure that you were not messing with or 15 that your people were not being exposed to 16 excessive amounts of or that people with certain 1 17 kinds of -- of physiological ailments were not 18 messing with rea 19 That's another thing that we didn't E 20 put into this equation and that is what do you do 21 with a guy that has a problem -- a liver problem [ [ [ 22 You can't fire him You can't do it 23 by law You hired him and if you didn't properly 24 test him or physically examine him to start with 25 you got him on your rolls What do you do with C [ [ pers 'i [ E [ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 those kind of people I don't know Frankly I 190 don't know what you do You try to move them around in the plant First thing you know they end up as the guard at the gate and we got some guards at the gate in our company too Q. I take it from something you said earlier that you would be critical of someone who said We've been making this product for forty years and we've never found a problem if they've never looked to see if there were problems A. But of course not because they haven't found a problem If they haven't looked they don't know whether there's a problem there or not They wouldn't know what a problem looked like if it came to them We do -- a good industrial hygienist is not going to allow that to happen He's going to say Hey we looked If we don't look I go somewhere else and look because I'm not going to be a party to this kind of nonsense I'm not going to be a party to that kind of business Hell you might just as well put him in the electric chair and say electricity doesn't hurt him or better yet I got a better excuse He did it himself He pushed the wrong switch 191 No thanks I don't think we have in our -- you're asking my experience base We've never messed -- we've never had any occasion in Monsanto that I know of to criticize the TLV on asbestos so to talk to you about that it really is not quite fair Q. Well -- and I don't want to be unfair 10 with you Mr. Garrett -- 11 A. Oh I know 12 Q. -- at all I was under the 13 impression though that at the Springfield 14 Massachusetts plant that Monsanto had found cases 15 of asbestos disease 16 Do you know anything about that at - 17 all 18 A. Not to my knowledge If they have I PB 19 do not know It happened either before me or fee 20 after me If they did in -- in the old long term 21 employees I don't know I don't know how they ee 22 would They haven't handled it for so many years 23 Q. I understand that Monsanto even went 24 back and did medical evaluations of people who had 25 retired that had worked in that operation A. We've done that several times We did -- on many other things We did when we did the TLV work on -- when we did the work on -- 192 that's a customary project If you've got a company town and Springfield certainly is a company town but a better one is East St. Louis Illinois or that immediate area we found that 84 percent of our J cf employees at the East St. Louis plant and the x ? 4 3 10 retirees lived within fourteen miles of the plant 11 I think And we went back and checked the 12 C 13 health of many of those people in connection with 14 the problems on PCBs and on some of the 15 chloroanilines some of the nitroanilines we went 16 back and checked their health and also with their ove Wessa. 17 permission and most of them gave us their 18 permission 19 We had a few that didn't and we [ 20 stirred up a couple of court cases out of it as 21 you can easily imagine And we -- we went back [ 22 and checked with their physician in connection 23 with problems connected with their health 24 The thing that surprised me is our 25 epidemiological work that OSHA did not like at all We did all of East St. Louis and all of the 193 manufacturing people separate and it indicated that without doubt you were healthier if you worked at Monsanto two or three other big companies than if you didn't work at all if you lived in that area Now these are obviously eschewed data from where you're looking for something and get something for free Every time you get it you 10 know damn well it isn't any good but it's true 11 The actual data -- because we had 12 very very detailed health data done over a three 13 year period by OSHA on the people that lived in 14 that area and then we did our employees 15 separately and they accepted it It was by their e 16 standards FO 17 And they came up with that well we 18 know people that work always were healthier people es 19 that don't work Well I think that is probably a er 20 truism 21 Now a truism is something that's true we 22 as long as you believe it So I don't know Ee 23 24 Q. But as far -- A. My personal opinion is that in our 25 case we've never had a problem with the TLVs if * ve . ta | a a E E 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 194 they were genuinely genuinely followed -- 2 Of course at Spring A. We've had some awful problems trying the worst thing that to put -- noise is probably I've ever tried to check out When you find out how many people shoot motor guns boat and shoot skeet and without any -- that ride around sounds like in a a damn jet taking fishing I off by the don't know hour on how you every weekend then come back with the records of what noise they encounter in the plant has to do with their total hearing acuity at age sixty or seventy or eighty or whatever It's difficult to do Q. But as far as Monsanto going back and looking at any retirees from the Springfield Massachusetts plant for asbestos disease you really don't know anything about that A. I'm sure they have it if someone's data to indicate that said that and produced any We've gone back and checked the Springfield employees Q. for other things But you don't know personally about any of the asbestos A. No not about anything done for asbestosis -- asbestosis or any evidence of lung engagement -- involvement in that No. Now the problem I face I think 195 probably every day and the problem everybody else faces is do you -- what effect does coirritants ty Pet have on things And that -- I suppose liquor is the ~- biggest problem with that What does it do Does STSKelas it solubilize materials that are not otherwise 10 soluable or increase the solubility or absorption D D D 11 Interesting question isn't it 12 Q. Yes sir 13 A. Do you have any idea how much liquor 14 is drank by the employees of the average Monsanto 15 chemical plant A hell of a lot Some of which 16 they make in their own backyard 7 bg 17 The point I'm trying to make is I 18 don't know how you can -- how you can say that 19 this is what they got this is what they're 20 exposed to because we tested them while they were 21 at work 22 Q. You say you don't know how you can say 23 that 24 25 A. No I really don't We do say it Don't -- I didn't say we didn't say it I said I syehapeyyye 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 don't know how you can say it and be completely 196 honest with yourself Noise exposure for example is a good example Any dust exposure Where in the world do you suppose they could not get dust At home You got to be kidding That's my problem And this is true honestly of a lot of things There are a lot of other material believe it or not that they're exposed to Caustics for example particularly in the wintertime Q. I guess what I'm hearing you say Mr. Garrett is that it's really almost impossible to know what workers are exposed to A. To positively demonstrate toxicology or any toxic effect on anything except those things that are so unique they will not experience involvement with them in anything except their work and where can you do that In the PCBs we were in -- we were home clean because there was no way they were going to have that stuff in their normal every day affair but when you start messing with dust we started trying to mess with alcohol I mean you're kidding yourself ee 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q. So if you've got these epidemiological studies of workers and they're exposed to dust and they're exposed to things at home and alcohol that they drink and then they -- you look at their health experience it's just almost impossible to say what anything causes or doesn't cause A. Unless there's a unique circumstance 197 that recurs physiologically then you might Q. Something like mesothelioma asbestos A. Could be Certainly mesothelioma would Asbestosis in itself I don't know You can -- that just -- ordinary tracing of the lungs in the picture I'm not sure you could really prove that's asbestos but boy when you get down to mesothelioma you're down to a -- pretty close to specific that I know of I've never seen one We've seen lung cancer incidently All of lung cancer not necessarily mesothelioma by any mess of the means As a matter of fact the commonest lung cancer is not mesothelioma Q. Would it be accurate to say Mr. Garrett based on your experience as an industrial hygienist that once you get asbestos fibers into the air that are of the particle size that can be G G G | 1 11 =rx Pr rao en ar wey 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 breathed into the lungs that that asbestos fiber 198 tends to stay airborne A. In those levels at which we test for as respirable sizes probably right Probably very little movement of the air mass would not keep them lofted That's my personal opinion Anything -- I don't know It depends Anything above certain levels I suspect would drop eventually and a lot of asbestos will occlude to other materials in the atmosphere and drop out So will a lot of other fibers by the way These fibers like manufacturing silk or manufacturing nylon yarns and stuff we have a lot of fiber problems and we've ventilated -ventilate those machines so that we try to backvent them to get away from the workers mouth and nose We have a problem with people shutting them off once in a while That's a wit to do that You know this is a person asking for something that he wouldn't like when he gets it I don't know I think the average American worker average American worker is probably as healthy as any in the world and the records show in -- that most of the time at least  L EO ore Tra Oe Ea 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the TLVs are sufficiently severe for an eight hour 199 day Now you work back -- you can always question this because how many people double shift how many people don't have days working and how many factories are there in little countries where they can work all day and all night too Second where you can always find places where there are materials handled that are not normally handleidn commerce that are hazardous that nobody knows about or cares about that can create troubles I think this is what grew the current OSHA I think it was grown because of negligence on the part of a few but I think it was caused We don't -- it's the most difficult damn thing in the world to mess with a blend of materials inorganics or organics don't make any difference What effect does each of them have What is the cumulative effect of five different organic ornate compounds for example Are they the same No they're not the same because they've got different molecular diameters or radii if you wish So they can get into places 200 that the others cannot TT wekad Some of these compounds are so damn o big it's a wonder you can get them in your nose even so I don't know You asked a question I don't know how to answer All I know is that in our own experience we have worked on the TLV base and until I -- and we think it's good because we've 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 contributed to the TLVS We've done a lot of research to make sure that -- that if there's a need for change that we get the change in That's where we stand MR POWERS Object to the responsiveness of that answer A. We've got the peanut gallery growling 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 again I guess Q. The threshold limit values experience that you've had with them that you just told me about where you think it's been mostly good the threshold limit value though for asbestos has been one that has been changed because the values that were originally selected didn't improve that A. We've changed benzine twice that I know of during my own working experience and by the way this is probably because of chronic possibility very limited possibility of chronic 201 problems We've changed a great many of the major petroleum fractions We've changed a lot of those So it's been a dynamic system It's not completely stagnate system They don't just do -- do this and lay it aside and move it over here To a certain 10 extent they do But if you bring up the subject 11 sufficiently with sufficient data and submit it 12 the TLV committee will go over that data I can 13 14 assure you of that I don't know the answer to all the 15 questions by any stretch If I did I would be a 16 soothsayer I guess is 17 Q. But the asbestos TLV is one that 12 18 proved by time needed to be changed correct 19 A. I don't know I can't really say ced 20 that We have not experienced that but again 21 we're not primary asbestos users so I'd be remiss 22 professionally to even answer that question 23 Q. Well you know that the TLV for 24 asbestos has been changed 25 A. I knew it was changed as was about 10 11 12 13 14 15 just can't be afforded So I would say that if we tested the atmosphere around where they were working -- and boy that is difficult to do You're mostly outside and the wind blows one way or the other way and it's a hell of a mess to do a decent asbest- -- or dust study Anyway you'd have to have fifty dust test machines and you'd have to pretty nearly put them around in a ring so that you'd catch the nuances of the wind and its effect on that floating cloud or whatever you got up there You better be able to separate asbestos from everything else too in your testing which I'm not sure everybody does So 203 16 don't know 17 No I don't think you ought to -- if 18 you can demonstrate that asbestos is hazardous to ar 19 people at levels in working environment of less 20 than what it is now then it ought to be submitted 21 to the TLV committees for change [ KA | 22 MR POWERS Object to responsiveness 23 24 25 of that answer Q. The question though Mr. Garrett is at Monsanto in the 1950s when you were dealing with your insulators and you told them 204 respirators respirators respirators the reason you did that was because you felt it was prudent to minimize their exposure to asbestos because you knew that it was a dangerous material correct A. That's right and you couldn't test for it because you just simply didn't have the people and the testing equipment 10 Q. And the methods were questionable 11 anyway and that was the prudent response for you 12 and your people 13 A. Probably Probably Excessive 14 prudence I suppose would get you to stop all of 15 it but -- all TLV because there are probably 16 levels at which they can create problems but I 17 don't know 18 All I know is that in our own -- we 19 were primarily organic chemical people We did per 20 lot of organic chemical work We did a lot of 21 work on the TLVs in that area 22 23 We -- in an ancillary way we were interested in the materials that we had to use for 24 maintenance of our equipment and to keep it 25 operating 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Asbestos was one of those issues We 205 knew it was a hazard We tested for it We found levels pretty close to the then TLV and we found that upwind work was a good idea and we recommended it particularly when you're out on the racks taking asbestos out off of old pipe racks Other than that we never saw an asbestosis case or anything that we thought approached it Q. And further step of prudence that you -- made in the 1950s at Monsanto at Texas City A. Was put them respirators on Q. And not only for the insulators but for anybody else who was going to be there when the insulators were doing their work A. That's right That's right including their foreman who didn't like it worth a damn Q. And if it was an operator that was going to have to be there while the work was done -- A. He wore one too 0 Mr. Garrett I've been reminded of an area I wanted to go into Can you recall any of the insulation O O [ feora rt me 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 manufacturers for the products that you used at Monsanto ever sending you any information about health hazards that could be connected to their 206 products A. Yes Manville sent us some MR POWERS Object to the question as being vague A. Now the asbestos we ordered insulation materials loose and we got it -- with it got a folder from Manville Q. And do you remember what the -- A. It was pretty complete as far as what was known at that time about asbestos hazardous as an insulation toxic as a ventilation dust It would cause all kinds of problems including cause you to lose your hair you know that sort of stuff and yes I saw it We didn't need it We already knew it Q. Is that the only insulation manufacturer that you can recall seeing A. The only one that I can remember That was loose stuff that we used to make called mud stuff the bags of it You've seen it In fact Manville were written all over Ht a f* ,, , , ,, ros 2 L L ra E ooo it and we used it for patching is primarily what it was used for and to mud over preformed stuff that had just been wired to the stuff And on a plant like Texas City which was all liquid you can imagine the number of miles of pipe they had and all of it was insulated And so -- 207 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. -- in fifty different sizes Q. About what time period is your recollection of getting this Manville material A. 15- -- oh Lord it had to have been '55 '60 or something like that but I didn't need it It was already outlined in most of the books in this area By the way when I first started in the business there wasn't any industrial hygiene books You depended on medical journal articles committee work and your own common sense I guess if you had any Sometimes you don't have a very good temper in this business but they won't let you kill anybody though Boy some of them needed it Feleteceys OY ~s C [ ea [ [ aa 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Oh I saw foremen sometimes that ought to have been hanged Oh you know tobacco dripping out I'll have you know it ain't ever 208 hurt me It's a fine thing to teach young operators It's too bad you couldn't retire them early just to get them out of the way It's happened to everyone you know And that's another one of the problems that we face Q. What is your earliest recollection Mr. Garrett of when you began to find reports of cancer being related to asbestos exposure A. I wrote a report one time called Cancer and Chemical Structure I thought I was doing somebody some good so I decided to do it It turned out to be about three hundred pages long and it's been copied and recopied around I see it every once in a while at Monsanto I wrote the damn thing twenty years ago and what was known then about cancer and those structures of chemicals and materials of common materials that were available In a big multiunit chemical plant it is difficult to tell a operator who's rotating 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 through the many different units all the things that in excessive concentrations would cause cancer because his drinking water is likely to do that if he drinks too much of it That's very likely why he drinks Wild Cat Whiskey but that's 209 beside the point The point I'm trying to make is if you -- you could tell people that primarily were interested in asbestos in their insulating operations so you're talking about insulators and their immediate supervisors about asbestos and its hazard as far as cancer is concerned At the same time in a big chemical plant you've got a dozen other places where you've got to tell someone about excessive exposure to this or that or someone else or if you overcook your operation you're going to get thus and so which will cause cancer and you've got an awful lot of different problems to address and maintain and the problem is you're trying to maintain some feeling of control amongst those -- amongst your people Everybody handles asbestos that's in the insulating business Those same people are likely -- are liable to be exposed to materials and I've taken air samples up on the racks near a 210 bunch of exit pipes a bunch of unit vent pipes not looking for asbestos but looking for the stuff in the vent pipes Some of that stuff might be causing the same problem The other you don't know is synergism amongst chemicals to -- and believe me there are synergistic couples of stuff like asbestos and some chemical material So you've got a hell of a 10 job 11 Asbestos we thought and to -- and 12 our records show would cause no problems at the 13 TLV okay 14 Q. And that was in your plant 15 A. That's right -- 16 Q. In your plant L 17 A. In our plants as near as I could 18 determine we did a lot of sampling and the [ 19 plants did a great deal of sampling We took care [ 20 of asbestos in workers by demanding them to wear 21 protection 1 22 Q. Respirators respirators respirators re 23 A. Right respirators respirators 24 respirators 25 Q. And by following that practice you never saw any asbestos disease A. No. What you're asking a lot of it is conjecture You're looking at industrial hygiene data and the many many many many gobs of data I've seen from all kinds of things 211 particularly couplets We were looking at couplets one of a i which was asbestos in those couplets We never 1 found anything 10 We did find some in where you could - [ 11 where other material would cause about the same a 12 effect and therefore if you had 50 percent of poet 13 one and 50 percent of another you had a hundred 14 percent like chlorinated aromatics for example 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ... Q. Would there be any other products other than the phenolic resins that you told me about earlier that you're aware of that were made by Monsanto that contained asbestos A. Contained it no The years I know the old -- what the hell was that stuff called 22 23 24 25 Carbide made it Q. A. processes Lite Lite The old Bake None of it that I know except that 3 toa. aad ke . Pos es m es 7 10 11 12 13 14 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I've seen reinforcing fibers used but I've seen a lot of nylon reinforcing fibers too So I don't 212 know I've seen a lot of work done on nylon reinforcing fibers but it isn't really toxicology It's more stretch and break I don't know All I know is that our experience a chemical company primarily who manufactured chemicals and at one time petroleum products we had an oil refinery at Lyon oil in Arkansas at Monsanto They used probably more insulating -- incidently I think probably a refinery uses more insulating material than even an organic chemical plant at least it looked like to me they did We had no problems We had -- we had lots of problems We had no problems with asbestos that I know of in my own experience in my own time I knew it was a problem and we certainly used that to prevent it if we could Q. And by prevent it you mean that's the respirators respirators respirators That's coveralls A. That's taking showers Every day they got changes of clothes We went down to shoes and socks underwear and all We didn't want it at home Q. And that was even back in the 1950s A. That's right And I will say this cannot force a man -- we went through a court you suit to find this out You can't force a man to bathe Did you know that You probably already 213 know that aon Q. But you went to that extent to try to 10 get people to bathe to reduce the hazard [ [ [ [ 11 A. In many cases We did it for PCBs 12 We did it for a lot of things and we tried to 1 13 scare the hell out of them if that -- that don't 14 do much good Then Time magazine comes along and 15 we ' 16 writes it up as a hell of a scare affair Then it ls 17 scared the hell out of them I don't understand 18 that but no we didn't -- we had -- we did a lot r bee 19 of work on a lot of products 20 21 22 23 We got to where we were fairly competent at picking the ones that we thought We tested all We had regular screen that we tested them in using rats and anything that occurred in 24 those rats on postmort we followed up on 25 anything at wounas on ... L oS rer a ie: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 If that thing blew the kidneys out through the anus we wanted to know why the hell that happened and we wanted to back off on our standards That we did And I think we tested 214 them all Now when we got into a product where it was going to be used by other people then we began to do a very detailed toxicological study using rats rabbits and so forth and multiple levels of exposure and so forth Q. In your work that you did with amine compounds did you ever get into any research or any literature that dealt with the nitrous amines A. Oh any time you manufacture amine compounds you're going to mess with nitrous amines yes Q. What is the earliest time period that you can tell me you worked with nitrous amines A. Oh gosh I guess when we first got to messing around with nitrogen chemicals and that probably was in -- early in my St. Louis career Q. So mid 50s or so A. Probably yes Q. What was it that from a toxicologists industrial hygienist's standpoint that you found for nitrous amines in that -- in that era A. Well nitrous amines were extremely acutely toxic You probably didn't have a chance to test the toxicology over a period of time 215 -- because if your subject was dead -- so we many of the nitrous amines are extremely toxic They're very reactive Oh don't ever mix them with anything including your shirt tail They are extremely reactive substances And if 10 you can get them off clean you're lucky 11 It's very difficult to get a nitrous ii 12 amine one of the short chain nitrous amines loose bus 13 as a -- it's a wonder it doesn't grab the glass 14 you know that sort of thing It's a difficult 15 thing to do i 16 We've done -- we did a lot of work on a Proll 17 it We did it at Nitro -- I mean at yeah Nitro 18 West Virginia We did it at -- in Alabama a 19 We found nitrous amines in practically se 20 every amine operation at a certain extent to 21 certain levels in virtually every nitrogen r is 22 compound Every amine operation we had there was 23 some nitrous amines formed 24 Q. Being a chemist can you explain that 25 Why? omnes SO A it tf i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. Pretty easily as the degradation of amine compounds and the slight base oxydation of nitrous amines MR HALL Question could we take a 216 break Q. Is a break okay with you Mr. Garrett A. Certainly Temporary recess was held Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1 marked for identification JS MS FLATT We're on record Q. Mr. Garrett I went over your resume just a little bit earlier and I've been informed by my associate here that I've gotten the wrong title on here I should designate it as 230112 capital A capital A capital T. So with that change for the record so it's consistent with our numbering scheme that we've been using Let me ask you sir is this a true and correct copy of your resume A. Yes Q. All right I've also asked the court reporter to mark as Exhibit 1 to the deposition the notice for the deposition which calls for L feu fA bine U } fi _ be { { = Ly e ae 1 3 3 4 55 160 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 certain documents to be brought to the deposition 217 by yourself Does that look like the list of documents you were asked to bring A. Yeah Q. And I understand that you have reviewed that list and the only document that you have that's responsive is your resume is that right A. That's right I don't keep documents I did't -- they all belong to the company and they all went back when I quit Q. Before the break I was asking you some questions about nitrous amines and you were kind enough to go into that with me A. We -- Q. The materials that you called nitrous amines in the 1950s that you said were contaminants of some of the other materials the amine compounds you said that those were very acutely toxic is that right A. Uh it's hard to say It's hard to generalize as you know but by and large nitrous amines are oxidizing agents of some caliber and they consequently are probably toxic by inhalation 218 or by swallowing I don't know why in the world anybody a a ever swallowed it but that's beside the point Q. The compounds that these nitrous amines were being found in the aniline materials or the nitrogen materials were there already concerns about the carcinogenicity the abilities of materials to cause cancer that were sort of apparent compounds in nitrous amines 10 A. The only ones we really have worked 11 with in the last twenty years were comtaminants in 12 processes where you were pretty roughly treating 13 amine compounds largely aromatic amines and for 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 that reason we assumed and I think probably rightly so that there were some minor amounts of aromatic nitrous amines in some of those products It's difficult to analyze for in extremely low concentrations As near as I know we decided that the contaminants from these were not a very good idea to be eating processes lunch on and had issued restrictions in the your manufacturing plants on the processes and process 23 24 25 wastes Q. I think I would still do the same Some of the aromatic amines that otal 4 a a i ie we 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 you're talking about were known to be carcinogenic at the time is that right sir A. Well not nearly so much carcinogenic as just plain toxic You're talking about the nitro -- aromatic nitro amines aromatic 219 chloroamines and this group of compounds And you chemically mash at them a bit you might -- particularly with a -- with nitric acid something like that you'd all end up with a nitrous amine It will split off on you and so our interest in nitrous amines -- and it was really -- we have been interested in them toxicologically as a contaminant forever I guess Q. It would be fair to say wouldn't it though that at least one of the toxic properties of the aromatic amines that you were concerned about was the ability to cause cancer MR FOGARTY Objection A. Certainly the suspicion that it might yeah Now whether they were all tested or not none of ours -- none of the ones I have any knowledge of were tested But no I wouldn't -- they are extremely active materials Q. And then would it be also true Mr. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Garrett that you were concerned about the potential ability of these materials to cause cancer that were aromatic nitrous amines as well A. Well we were concerned about the general toxicity involved in the handling materials that ultimately developed either from their own destruction due to heat or something and in handling nitro and amino 220 aromatics We handle lots of them We've handled anilines We made die anilines We made the chloroanilines We made chloronitrobenzenes and for these reasons we had a fear of nitrous amine formation in our processes Some of it -- to the best of my ability I don't know that we ever isolated any of them Q. But part of the concern that led to these fears was at least in part the ability for these materials to cause cancer in people MR FOGARTY Objection vague and ambiguous A. Well I think it was probably the cost of what the toxicology in fact was Whether you had -- whether you could develop a carcinogenesis e e Loa acny spo res re i oe" ca 4 : 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 from minute quantities or whether you could get the hell blown out of you first with small -- with 221 larger quantities They're toxic Most aromatic amine and nitro compounds are toxic in the first place and with a little help they'll put you underground pretty quick And anything that you subsequently make out of them with -- where you still maintain that amine structure you're liable to have the same problems So we -- we always were and always were dealing with nitrogen containing aromatic compounds and the nitrous amines happened to be a product We never -- I don't think we ever made one purposely We made some but we didn't make them purposely To tell you the truth I don't think it ever was much of a -- I think we probably conked those processes out or didn't make them or something because I don't recall -- I have a pretty fair memory I don't recall that we ever did anything or ever occasioned any great studies because I don't think we had any reason to 222 Q. And earlier we talked about prudence in the area of industrial hygiene and toxicology A. Yeah Q. Would it be your opinion sir that in dealing with nitrous amines even back in 1950s that prudence would have said there should be some concern about the ability of these materials to be toxic and in part carcinogenic 10 A. In the 1950s probably not but 11 shortly thereafter yeah And the problem ~- we 12 tested of course we tested some of our 13 materials Some of which were -- turned out to be 14 carcinogenic but they were not nitrous amines 15 We did some straight nitrogen or ~- : 16 straight nitrogen containing aromatics that were : pgpGe. 17 not nitrous amines 18 The problem with -- our problem with ra 19 nitrous amines was that an unwanted product oe. 20 build in processes using amine compounds in 21 efforts to condense them and otherwise in other ae:a) 22 chemical reactions and I think probably anybody 23 would be interested 24 The materials themselves are pretty 25 toxic as per se and whether they're carcinogenic or not is an interesting argument I doubt seriously if -- well I imagine that a great many of them are but -- because of they're extreme 223 activity But we never had any problems with it because they were minute products in our processes and it took some mighty fine analytical bi chemistry to find them and to characterize them as 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 less than so I don't think we could ever isolate some of them enough to test them plus the fact that carcinogenic testing is boy is something else Wow That is extremely costly extremely argumentative the results I don't know We made and sold an awful lot of amine -- simple amine compounds aromatic amine 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 compounds I don't know -- I don't know that we ever got any comments or compliment -- or requests from customers to test them for carcinogenicity I don't know whether we ever did ourselves or not If we did I didn't know about it Toxic -- my tox group could have done it I don't think they did it without our knowledge but we were we would be somewhat suspicious if we were going to manufacture them in any great quantity or if we were going to manufacture anything in the quantity that would produce enough of them as a product to be a 224 product hazard So yes we probably suspected that [ [ some of them at least if they were -- if they -- were electrically imbalanced ones you probably it probably would be carcinogenic 10 Q. The them you're talking about are 11 12 13 14 15 16 the nitrous amines A. huh No no I'm talking about the nitrous amines that would be the result of operations that produced other chemicals Q. Yes sir The contaminant part A. That's right as a contaminant part 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Again -- Q. Now I take it that shortly after you began your career with Monsanto you would have known that the aromatic amines particularly a beta napthylamine had been identified as a human bladder carcinogen years earlier A. Yes Lord knows we made it -- Q. A. So -- = and we knew it caused cancer I will tell you this in all the years I was at Monsanto it was the only proven carcinogen that we ever proved was carcinogen itself per se Q. Would it be accurate to say Mr. Garrett that because of the experience with beta naphthylamine that the toxic -- A. We were doubly cautious yes 225 Q. A. Yes We sure were and we canned an awful 10 lot of research projects for a company that 11 was -- one of its primary efforts was in the nitro 12 and amino chemistry and particularly in the nitro 13 and amino aromatic chemistry To quit messing 14 around with them was amazing but we did 15 Q. Would it be your opinion Mr. Garrett 16 then that for companies in the 1950s who were sane 17 interested in nitro and amino compounds and their 18 manufacture that prudence would have said be 19 cautious of these materials causing cancer 20 A. Oh you're stretching it pretty far 21 We knew that beta naphthylamine -- by the way 22 this is a naphthylamine this is not a biphenyl 23 We were -- we had a great many suspicions about 24 25 some aromatic groups some aromatic structures One of them was where you had an Tn oF ^'n. ra x " 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 imbalance sufficient to put a nit- -- a very 226 electronegative group like a nitro -- nitro or nitrousa for that matter group or an amine group on the end of a very large gob of carbon material We had a suspicion that that was indicative of some kind of physiological action on the part of human beings There have been some tests done that didn't necessarily carry that out but there have been some tests done that do carry it out We were prudent and very very careful We had as you know we brought people for all their life tested them that had -- that had been exposed to beta naphthylamine and we tested those people all their lives Every one of them until they died Some are still alive Q. And that is part of the prudence that you spoke of in dealing with these kinds of materials A. Absolutely You had to damn near demonstrate and have the money to do toxicology for it before you demonstrated -- before you came to any of Monsanto management with the idea of producing any of these compounds Q. So it was almost to the point where it wasn't a matter of -- 227 A. Thumbs got to be up Nobody's going e caoe-ncscone to be working with it If you don't have it the la -~ money to test it and time go away Q. Not going to make it A. -- and think of something else Yeah That damn mess caused us more trouble than -- I ~ swear we wrote more letters and more reports and gave away more research reports than you could 10 shake a stick at over that damn beta naphthylamine 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 thing Q. Did you ever come in contact with a Dr. Charles Hine that you can recall A. Yes Charlie Fine man Q. How did you know him Mr. Garrett A. Funny I can recall the man's name and -- where'd Charlie work at Damn I can't I remember him I can't draw where he came out at Q. I'll represent to you that from time to time he went to American Petroleum Institute meetings and had some affiliation with Shell Does that help you any A. Yes it does help me a lot He was the guy that helped us in fact through some of the API meetings to look at some of these ~ [ ] ] ] - oral F ki 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 aromatics See Monsanto's a primary aromatic 228 producer of aromatic amine and nitro compounds We produced the dinitro We produced the diamine and we were interested That's all died of natural death because nobody could ever demonstrate that they had enough money to pay for the toxicology that we had to do on beta naphthylamine Q. If I could Mr. Garrett here's a letter or really it's a memorandum on Shell Development Company letterhead dated April 28th 1950 and it shows that the author is one C.H. Hine M.D. consulting toxicologist Subject is Certain Problems of Environmental Cancer in the Petroleum Industry This is a document that's been used many times in litigation I've been involved with it If somebody wants a copy of it I'll be glad to let them have it But I wonder sir if I could hand you that and ask you if you've ever seen this memorandum that Dr. Hine is shown to be the author of here A. BOY I don't know - room ot LALA LA E E 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2 It's several pages long A. Now Charlie wrote a lot of stuff He also wrote some ~- some parts of books and that sort of stuff in this -- in this racket He had some beliefs that well I 229 don't know whether we've demonstrated them or not I think he thought the petroleum industry was the dog in all cancer but I don't know about that There they are and that's all of them their answer seen in its compounds mean aniline and its derivatives You MR FOGARTY Object nonresponse Q. You're looking at the table that's A. Yes Certain Recognized and Suspected Carcinogenic Agents Encountered in the oil Industry THE REPORTER sir could you repeat that THE WITNESS Ma'am THE REPORTER Whatever you just said could you repeat that please THE WITNESS The title of this table here is Certain Recognized and Suspected Carcinogenic Agents Encountered in the oil Industry Showing the Organs or Systems Chiefly 230 Effected Okay Q. As you look down that list Mr. Garrett do you see any there that you would disagree with being in that table A. Yeah I do a lot Charlie was -- went a little overboard I -- the funny thing is a lot of them -- some of them are true and some of them are not true 10 Q. Okay sir Which ones would you agree 11 12 13 14 15 with A. Well benzine itself is in my opinion is a lot less a carcinogen than people think it is and our -- I don't know why anybody would know any more about it than we do because we 16 had handled it by the tons 17 We're the biggest benzine purchaser in 18 the world at one time according to somebody that nal 19 told me that > 20 Benzidine I'll buy Asphalt I don't 21 know because I don't know what they're talking 22 about Asphalt's like saying goo I mean goo can 23 be a lot of different things 24 t Aromatic organic chemicals I don't 25 believe that's true of that because it indites too many materials Aromatic organic chemicals includes an enormous number of chemicals that have never been demonstrated to be carcinogenic Anthracene crude I don't know there 231 Aniline and its derivatives when you're messing with aniline aniline does not cause cancer We tested aniline We know You can -- some of its near derivative will because let's be honest with ourselves beta naphthylamine 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 causes cancer Creosote I don't know what creosote is I don't even know what mineral oil is crude because mineral oil to an oil people is stuff virgin oil out of the ground and mineral oil can contain a whole lot of things Naphthylamine that's a dandy That is surely a carcinogen and certainly the beta 18 isomer a oil shale I don't know 19 aca 20 Paraffin I don't know why paraffin 21 would cause skin cancer I really don't L L 22 Pitch I don't know what pitch is 23 24 25 either Soot I don't know what soot -- soot on a little carbon can be four thousand compounds [ ays i G G [ D ~ ee 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 spindala I don't know what spindala even is and tar of course is practically anything There are some dandies in here and Charlie knew what he was talking about in some of 232 these things He suspected these I don't think there's ever much of proof that some of them were there the carcinogens of sufficient power to create problems in industry but there's some here that are dandies The naphthylamine beta is really a dandy It causes cancer Benzidine some of its close derivatives cause cancer without a doubt Q. There's a second table there too Dr. Hine's letter or memorandum A. Oh he's talking about precancerous lesions and that stuff Q. Yes sir The second page of that table on precancerous lesions there's one there that shows lungs Do you see that A. Bone marrow Yeah lungs Pneumoconiosis and chronic pneumonia Q. And the causative agents that are listed under lungs re [ rr cf OF ae 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. It says asbestos arsenic tar sock oil whatever the hell that is or is that soot oil I don't know Mist Chrome salts chrome pigments nickel carbonea That will do it Some of them will Some of them won't He has gone from pure inorganics to organics that really kind of makes the thing not very useful to anybody except that he has got some of them that are dandies Q. Do you have any recollection Mr. Garrett of Dr. Charles Hine sharing his thoughts about the pneumoconioses and asbestos being 233 precancerous lesions A. No. Q. As far as you can recall that never came up at any of the API meetings A. Not to my -~ no not to my knowledge To be perfectly honest with you I never saw Charlie at many of those -- many of those meetings Well this may not be true I knew him You know you're asking me to look back thirty years and come up with a name of the guy and what his serial number was on his butt or on his tag I can't even remember my own vers: Byte we roa an 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 serial number anymore I'm glad 234 Q. That's why I said earlier just your best recollection is the best we can do A. No. I knew Charlie I knew he was a -- was a -- did a lot of work in this area He has in there included all of those known carcinogens but there's a lot of them in there that are simply not carcinogenic or do they -- how many of them raises the back of -- the hair on the back of my head -- and I'll bet I have as much experience with cancer from chemicals as anybody -- would be the beta naphthylamine derivatives Where is that group listed again Can I see it a minute Just a minute Aniline no Anthracene uh Aromatic organic chemicals my God that's a million of those It's not specific enough Asphalt which is all a mess of -- benzidine I would be suspicious of many of its derivatives Benzol derivatives don't mean anything because benzol is a common name not a chemical name Chlorinated aliphatic hydrocarbons is bologny We tested too many of those Creosote I don't know about because we L L r 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 creosote is a goo that's created in the oil refining industries Mineral oil is crude I'm not -- I 235 don't believe I'd buy that Naphthylamine beta is a dandy It is really a nifty carcinogen in humans oil shale what is the substrate the oil shale is coming out of He doesn't define that and until you do define that you haven't got much to go on Paraffin oil crude I don't know what that means Pitch if he means organic slop goo that comes out of a heating chemical materials to make products pitch and soot I don't know Spindle oil I don't even know what that is Tar as -- what's tar I don't know what tar is Those I would -- I would buy the ones that he has -- most of the then known carcinogenic materials fall in his categories but there's a vast number in there that fall -- that have never been proven and we've tested some that have shown no carcinogenic tendencies and believe me We've one a C oe men | * oe ie 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 had big problems with naphthylamines before Q. Mr. Garrett if I could I would like to kind of switch gears with you for a second 236 A. Okay Q. Let me ask you some names of some people if I could and see if you might recognize it and I don't know if this is true but the affiliation I have for these people is something called Monsanto Research Is there a separate entity that you know of called Monsanto Research A. Well there used to be and I suspect there is still There used to be a research operation that was for the whole corporation Then the individual divisions had research as well and the organization now I think is a little different than that and changed but that doesn't make any difference It still may be true at the time these were done Q. These names may or may not be associated with that organization but that's how I have them listed What M T the first name is William H. Westendorf e A. Yeah We had him for a while Q. Can you tell us what he did sir at D a <8 ae ra oa i hl 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Monsanto A. No because I don't know If you're talking about useful work I don't know 237 Q. Well -- A. From my standpoint Q. Okay Can you tell us that he was in Monsanto Research even A. No I can't even tell you that I think he was You know I bet you're talking thirty years memory and mine is beginning to fade I can't hear worth a damn either but go ahead Q. Was there a Monsanto Research operation in Pittsburgh at some time that you know of A. No not that I know of Q. The one that you're familiar with was located where sir Monsanto A. All over the country We had research facilities in the operating divisions The old plastics divisions operation research center was at Springfield Mass The inorganic division's operational research center was originally -- oh God where is it All of it's in St. Louis now It's all been sucked into St. Louis and put in the labs either at the main office here or the ones out in the county the two big labs which is a good idea because it is 11 this is bad 238 10 11 12 13 14 ideas and good ideas You don't have people working on individual division work but you do have them working where you can use the specialists throughout the system here that you couldn't use when they were all over Hell's grace Q. The next name that I have Mr. Garrett is Theodore K. Kozuszek k A. Kozuszek Ted Kozuszek Q. Yeah How did you know Mr. Kozuszek A. I would just as soon not say 15 ~, 16 Q. Well -- A. Well just one of those things H oe 17 don't think -- I don't recall him that well 18 anyway and I would be -- I've heard the name rsa 19 let's put it that way eet 20 Q. I'm not inviting any negative 21 connotations at all 22 A. Oh I understand that too If I knew 23 anything that would help you I'd say it but I 24 25 don't know Q. Would you recall a Mr. John E. ay ~ pare Bradley A. No that doesn't mean that he wasn't in Monsanto I just don't recall him Q. Yes sir How abouta Mr. Carl D. Bohl h A. He worked for me Q. He worked for you A. He worked for me He was my noise 239 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 man Q. Oh that's the gentleman that you told me about earlier that was the person that was really good at noise work A. Best man I ever saw in industrial noise yes Q. Okay Is Mr. Bohls still living or working A. He's out in St. Louis County living out there He's divorced -- I mean He's divorced He's -- he left Monsanto almost at the time I did quite -- his wife recently died He's living by himself out in St. Louis County In fact I saw him the other day Q. Would you recall a Mr. Richard H. Burr u A. Dick Burr yeah I knew him [ [ [ at eal i Ors es ro 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q. A. How did you know him Dick Burr was a -- was a safety man and worked in our -- in one of our safety 240 operations Q. Was he in manufacturing or at the corporate level or can you say sir A. The last time I had track of him he was in one of the divisions 2 In which facility would you recall A. Oh I don't know It would be a number of facilities but I don't know where exactly he was Q. Do you remember what division he worked in at Monsanto A. I would suspect it was the old organic division but I don't know I would be hazarding a guess Q. How about a gentleman named John E. Howell w double ? A. No. Q. And how about Dr. George J. Levinskus v - A. Dr. Levinskus was our toxicology was the director of toxicology in the medical department wo aa & ra en a rae 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q. And can you tell me for what time 241 period Dr. Levinskus ~-- A. George came from -- oh gosh Had to have been -- when I retired he had to have been there almost twenty years in St. Louis Prior to that he worked -- he was a ~~ was working out of a school one of the universities in Connecticut I believe Q. Would you know if he's still with Monsanto A. He retired from Monsanto Whether he's still in town or whether he's moved back to the east or whether -- his kids are scattered all over hell I know that I don't know No I really wouldn't I'd be hazarding guesses that would be hazarded twice over Q. Would you recall ever meeting a gentleman named Roy Bonsib who was with Standard Oil of New Jersey A. Oh Roy Bonsib I wrote two papers with those people I don't recall that name I wrote a couple papers with the oil guys some of the oil guys What have we got somebody having a fit Q. I think it sounds like a shouting match back there behind the doors MR BLANKS Straighten them out 242 Warriene Q. Mr. Garrett let me just hand this across to you It's the first page of a publication it's called Dust Producing Operations in the Production of Petroleum Products 10 and Associated Activities by Roy S. Bonsib who 11 is shown to be in 1937 with the Standard oil 12 Company of New Jersey 13 Let me just ask you if you've ever 14 seen that cover before that you might recall sir I can tell you I got that from Jim 15 1 1 16 Hammond I don't know if he might have ever given 0CdSE= ": 17 you a copy of it or not A. I know Jim pretty well Old Jim and I 18 ra 19 used to fight the battle between Humble and 20 Monsanto 21 a Q. But you don't recall seeing this 22 report from Mr. Bonsib 23 A. No I do not I do not even recall 24 the name actually Keep in mind you're looking at 25 a very old memory Q. Well this was written in July 1937 too long before you came into the business A. That's true I was still practicing with my stick in the National Guard Armory in Durant Oklahoma at the time -- 243 Q. Thank goodness A. -- in an effort to get a dollar and a quarter a week for drilling 2 I'm glad somebody was doing it 10 A. Got paid every three months I needed f wd i bese 11 the dollar and a quarter badly It got me to 12 spend five years of my life in the military 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 though Q. We're looking here sir at your resume and I see here one of your listed publications is called A Review of Exposures to Oil Mist and you have some authors on that A. huh Q. Nathan Van Hendricks A. Van was with the Standard of Jersey Q. Yes sir George Collings H. 22 23 24 25 Collings A. Isn't that strange I wrote a paper with him I don't remember where he's from I think he probably was with Standard of Jersey ) t pane chet paces [ [ ~ also but I'm not absolutely sure of that Q. And then you've got A.E. Dooley Allen 244 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. God where did that come from Q. I believe he was with the Texas company or Texaco A. oh yeah Al Dooley was our -~- was a hygienist chief hygienist for Texaco and I knew him very well He and I -- but the other guy I don't draw up Q. And then J.B. Rather Jr. is the other listed author I'm afraid I don't know Mr. Rather A. Neither do I very well apparently Q. You authored that paper in the archives of Environmental Health in 1962 with those gentleman at least according to your resume here How is it that you came to author that paper with these gentleman Can you give me a rendition there A. We were -- we were -- actually it was Van Hendrick and I had get some information from these guys is what we wrote the paper with but we wrote the paper because there was a big hoopus EES. ... 1 , t rancor: ~ kia Bre 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 about pits oil pits that sort of thing and what 245 you do with waste oil And keep in mind you're talking many years ago so you didn't have some of the modern destructive devices that we have today Q. Do you ever remember learning Mr. Garrett that Allen Dooley published on the subject of asbestos disease -- A. No. Q. -- in the 1930's A. No I don't doubt that in the slightest Q. Did you know that Mr. Dooley had been an employee of the State of Pennsylvania at one time before he went to Texaco A. No no but that doesn't surprise me Most of the early industrial hygiene people came out of state governmental operations including my initial boss Elmer Wheeler was the New Hampshire hygienist prior to World War II went off as a reserve officer fought his battle with his aircraft unit in the ETO came back and was put in the then U.S. Army industrial hygiene laboratory I didn't know they even had one but 5 they did and it was over in the -- in the chemical warfare place and so there were a lot of -- those people came out of -- mostly came out of the states because originally there was no federal 246 government thing When I came back from the war there wasn't even any federal laws on pollution or anything else and we helped to phrase some of them ewes 10 The states were getting to a point [ 11 where they were so ragged in their applications [ 12 and their demands that there was never going to be 13 any interstate commerce unless the government 14 intervened and they did in about 1960 -- 1955 15 '56 '57 16 They didn't bring much to the party 17 but the fact is they did bring some kind of ST 18 interstate ability to the party You know 19 Pennsylvania had one law and West Virginia had ] 20 another and hell nobody could abide by any of 21 them so nobody did ey 22 Q. Do you recall learning about the 23 Heeley Act at any time 24 25 A. Q. Yes Would you know sir if based on your H [ ... ~ ~ ~ pers ' oe" 32 a ee Re 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 experience if Monsanto was subject to the Heeley Act 247 A. No not -- I wouldn't know whether they were subject to it or not Q. Do you remember any of your work as an industrial hygienist with Monsanto dealing with compliance with the Heeley Act A. No probably was but it was in compliance with whatever we were attempting to comply with at the time Q. Do you recall meeting Dr. Clyde Berry A. Yes Q. How is it that you know Dr. Berry A. Where did I meet him I have no idea Q. He's shown as being at the same meeting in Houston in 1951 that you attended Could you have met him then when he was an employee of Standard of New Jersey A. Could be Could be Q. Do you recall knowing him when he was a standard of New Jersey employee A. No I don't recall him being there I really don't But people in this business highly -- highly skilled separate types of technical people the oddballs if you want to Bia ene 1 . - bomina d us be - 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ask have really -- in those days we were 248 oddballs Nobody knew what the industrial hygienist was so you didn't tell you know You worked for Monsanto What do you do I work in their laboratories What laboratories Their research laboratories That's perfectly honest because the laboratories for our toxicology work was in the research laboratories So we told them -- told the flat truth You tell them you were an industrial hygienist in those days their mouth would drop open What is that You know That's very much like some of the specialties in medicine are just about as bad Q. I think Dr. Berry's description was a one man molecular film stretched thin and ruptured in places A. Pretty much so Some places it was ruptured purposely and in the construction thereof in some it was done accidently MR HOBSON Mr. Garrett you've been awfully patient with my questions today and I appreciate it sir I'm going to invite these other folks to have any questions if they don't we're done If they do I might have a few more but thank you very much sir THE WITNESS Okay Thank you We 249 haven't thrown anything at each other MR HOBSON That's a good beginning 10 11 12 THE WITNESS You didn't stand up rare up in the air and call me a dirty son of a bitch so I could get mad at you and then you'd - have a picture of me doing this so MR ELLIS Let's see A. -- you could and show it to the damn 13 court in Beaumont Texas 14 MR ELLIS Let's see if anybody else 15 has got any Anybody Lo 16 MR HOBSON Mr. Garrett thank you 1 17 very much for your patience sir You've been 18 very kind ed 19 THE WITNESS Thank you [ 20 Witness excused 21 Witness excused 22 By agreement of all the parties the 23 signature of the witness is not hereby waived 24 *** 25 334 I Jack T. Garrett do hereby state that I have read the foregoing questions and answers 250 appearing in this transcript of my deposition Page 3 through and including Page 249 that this is a true and accurate corrected report of said answers given in response to the questions appearing herein 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Jack T. Garrett CERTIFICATE STATE OF MISSOURI > ) COUNTY OF ST LOUIS ) SS Before me personally appeared Jack T. Garrett to me known to be the person described and who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to and before me that he executed said instrument in the capacity and for the purpose therein expressed in the WITNESS my hand and official seal this day of , 1993 NOTARY PUBLIC My Commission expires NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE 251 STATE OF MISSOURI ) ) SS CITY AND COUNTY OF ST LOUIS ) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 I JULIE STELFOX a Certificate of Merit Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Missouri do certify that pursuant to the foregoing stipulation taken at the offices of Stouffer's Concourse Hotel 9801 Natural Bridge Road County of St. Louis State of Missouri JACK T. GARRETT came before me was by me duly sworn to testify the whole truth of his knowledge of the matters in controversy examination aforesaid was examined and his then written in stenotypy by me and afterwards typed and signed as hereinbefore out on the day in that behalf aforesaid and set said deposition is herewith returned I further certify that I am not counsel attorney or relative of either party or clerk or stenographer of either party of either party or otherwise or of the attorney interested in the event of this suit Given under my hand and notarial seal at my office in the County of St. Louis State of Missouri on the of , 1993 My Commission Expires May 31 1997 20 _ 21 Fr 22 am 23 24 ieee 25 Julie E. Stelfox Certificate of Merit Notary Public in and State of Missouri Reporter for the and