Document 1gm4awqLNpV5wG52XQ7GJZVkj

Death from Dust and Dr. E. Cuyler Hammond, 61, of the American Cancer Society, confirmed When the Pittsburgh Coming Cor the deadly relationship in studies of poration closed its asbestos insulation workers at a Paterson, N.J., asbestos plant in Tyler, Texas, two years ago, it plant. They documented their work in did an unusually thorough job of clean scientific papers and meetings. They ing up after itself. Some 60 workers spent also showed that even small quantities a week scraping asbestos waste from ma of asbestos fiber could be lethal. Seli chinery and depositing it in a nearby koff studied a woman who died of meso dump. Then another crew took over. thelioma, a cancer of the membrane that Ceilings and walls were steam cleaned. covers the lungs and lines the chest and Every piece of equipment in sight was abdomen. The woman's only contact scrubbed down: some machinery was with asbestos came when she washed disassembled and shipped to P.C.C.'s the clothing of her husband, who worked home office in Pittsburgh. What was left in an asbestos plant. was cut up and buried. When the crew After the work by Selikoff and oth finished, all that remained of the plant ers, P.C.C. officials ordered a study of were two dilapidated wooden buildings the asbestos-dust hazard at Tyler in that had once seen service as Army bar 1963. The report seriously underestimat racks during World War II. ed the hazard. A 1966 dust survey found P.C.C.'s scorched-earth policy has asbestos levels above recommended left few visible reminders of the facto thresholds in many areas of the plant, ry's 17 years in Tyler. But the scars from and a 1967 survey by the U.S. Public the plant's presence will not soon dis Health Service's Division of Occupa- appear. While producing insulation for- lional'Health'confirmed that the levels the boilers and pipes of naval ships, were high, but did not warn of the health workers in the plant were exposed to hazard. After a Labor Department study enormous quantities of asbestos dust, two years later reported the same con which, once inhaled, never leaves the ditions. respirators were issued to work lungs. Now. based on previous ex ers in the plant's dustiest areas. But, ac perience with asbestos-caused diseases, cording to workers, at no time did P.C.C. medical experts estimate that as many officials tell them that they were exposed as 300 of the 869 employed at the plant to a health hazard. "I even had one tell since 1954 will die of asbestosis (a per me that stuff, asbestos, is good for you," manent and often progressive scarring says J.C. Yandle, 48, a former employ of lung tissue from inhaled asbestos ee. "He said you could eat it." fibers), lung cancer or cancers of the co Silent Violence. It was not until a lon. rectum or stomach. 1970 law created the National Institute Their deaths should come as no sur for Occupational Safety and Health prise to either company or Government (niosh)--and gave the Labor Depart officials. Doctors have long suspected ment's Occupational Safety and Health that asbestos dust is hazardous; there has Administration (osha) the authority to been ample documentation of increased enforce compliance with asbestos stan incidence of lung disease and cancers dards--that things began to happen. among people exposed to the mineral. In 1971 a niosh team visited Tyler, con As early as 1961. Dr. Irving Selikoff. 59. firmed the danger of the dust levels, of New York's Mount Sinai Hospital. and emphasized the extraordinary haz ard. The team pointed out many ex amples of poor hygiene practices: the company lunchroom was close to the production area and workers were us ing compressed-air hoses to blow dust off each other (and thus spreading it about), and the company was selling burlap bags contaminated with asbestos. NIOSH promptly notified osha, which inspected the plant, fined P.C.C. 210, and gave it four months to come up to standards. When a reinspection showed that the company still had not installed necessary dust-control equipment, osha fined it 7,990 and promised further ac tion. Forced to make a decision. P.C.C. opted to close the plant. It cited economic as well as environmental reasons. The closing should help protect cit izens of Tyler from any ftirther risk of contracting asbestosis. But it will do lit tle to help those already exposed to the asbestos dust. Asbestosis and related cancers may not develop until 30 years after exposure to the particles, but once they do, they are painful and often fa tal. "He hurt with every breath he took, because his lungs were tom and scarred on the inside from breathing asbestos fibers," said Mrs. Robert Thomas of her husband, who died five months ago. Steve Wodka, 24, of the Oil, Chem ical and Atomic Workers Union, which represented the Tyler plant's labor force, charges P.C.C. with negligence, a form of "silent violence." One group of for mer employees is suing P.C.C. for 100 million in damages: some individuals are also bringing 1 million suits against the Government for failing to protect them. But neither the suits nor any belated medical care that the workers may now receive are likely to alter the odds against their survival. Now that they have been exposed to asbestos, the deck is stacked. Prescription By Computer , 1' Properly programmed, the comput er can plot the trajectory of a rocket, keep track of a store's inventory, cor relate census data and help predict weather more accurately. But can it be trusted to make the kinds of life-anddeath decisions that doctors do? The an swer may be yes, according to a team of scientists from Massachusetts Insti tute ofTechnology and Tufts-New Eng land Medical Center in Boston. The researchers report in the American Jour nal of Medicine that they have taught a computer to exercise virtually the same clinical judgment that a physician must use in choosing a form of treatment. In the process, they have learned more about how doctors make such decisions. When the researchers began trying to write a decision-making computer program three years ago, says Dr. Wil liam Schwartz, chairman of the departmegQCKg&OQSt Tufts University 54 T1MF 1?71 February 15, 1973 Dr. John G. Wells 41 Jefferson Street Newnan, Georgia Dear Dr. Wells: Thought you might be interested in this article that appeared in the New York-Times -Sunday Magazine, and, also, a rebuttal from the.Asbestos Information Association which they have' not" agreed.to publish. One item v;hich struck me was the apparently-known fact according to Dr. Selikoff that asbestos related diseases do not appear iii any workers until approximately 25 to 30 years from exposure. I certainly would be interested in your comments on this. .- . ' Sincerely yours. RCH:bt Attachment Revonne C. Hunt Manager? 50020005 Asbestos Information Association North America 22 East 4Cih Si'Ot-t New York. N Y. I CO!6 212-669-3378 . i>~CA c.H ^0 January 26, 1973 Gentlemen: For those cf you who ray r.ot have alreadv `seen it, attached is a copy of the January 21 New York Times Sunday Magazine article on asbestos by Robert Sherrill. As predicted in our memo of January 17, the article is a cornucopia of innuendo, misinformation, and unwarranted^suppositions, all designed to portray the asbestos industry in the United Stat as an irresponsible villain. Also attached is a copy of the AIA/'NA letter to The 'lev/ York Times on the article, he letter has been reviewed and approved by the members of the Executive Committee and has received legal and red! ai clearance-"as" well. Each member company of the Association sheui feel free to use the lette as needed to deal with questions raised as a result of the Times article. A short covering note which acccmoar.ied the letter tc the Times is also atta We shall keep you informed when and if the Times, agrees to publish the letter. \ ' \> Sincerely, - .. . Matthew Swetonic Executive Secretary Enclosure 5002000* ;, j } 15 1973 MANAGER'S OFFICE HOGANSVILuu Asbestos information Association North America 22 Cast 40*h Street New York. \. Y. 1001c 212-669-33 73 '- January 26, 1373 Mr. Lewis Bergman The Editor The New York Times Magazine 229 West 43 Street Mew York, Mew York i:`C36 . . _ ' Dear Mr. Bergnan: In a New York Tine-3 Sunaay Magazine article entitled "Asbestos, the saver of lives, has a deadly side" (January 21), your writer, Robert Sherrill, unjustly ar.d harshly attacked the United States asbestos industry for its alleged total irresponsibility regarding the health hazards faced by its employees from the inhalation of asbestos dust.. Mr. Sherrill created this horrendous ar.d. erroneous portrait by the simple procedure of purposefully ignoring and refusing to include in his article any evidence to the contrary, even thcuch data on medical researc.n sponsored by the industry, money spent on dust control equipment over the years and other relevant information was sent him. by the industry, and which he claims to have read thorcuchiv. Although Mr. Sherrill did make a token.approach- to the industry for its comme nts, he refused eitr.er ts meet with industry- ren- reser.tazive. s or to visit an ascestc? plant, claiming that ha did r.ct-have enougr. time to v.c so. A lack of time can never ;=j.ve as u legitimate excuse for a journalist' failure to properly research and document an article. In printing Mr. Sherrill's one-sided ar.d irresponsible article, The New Tir.es 3 s s utt.q s r'esccr.s--~i.i--xus ccj C'sncsy and; therefore has a sorer, moral as well as journalistic abligatic: to onr.t the attached letter o~ clarification. While we appreciate the xus icr.cc.t is 5cr.6rtT.aw ur.usu3.-i, in comps riser, with the 20 or so columns: allotted to Mr. Sherrill, cur letter, if anything, is not long enough We await your response. Very truly yours, *# C *a4*nn i Executive Secretary Enclosure 50020007 Asbestos information Association North America 22 East 40th Street New York. N. Y. 10016 212-689-3373 . '' -- - January 26, 1973 The Editor The New York Tiroes Macazine 229 West 43 Street New York, New York 10036 _ Dear Sir: . P.rbert Sherrill's lengthy article, "Asbestos, the saver of lives, has a deadly side" (January 21), contains numerous statements of "fact" and interpretation with which we disagree however, the continued inference throughout the article that the asbestos manufacturing industry in the United States has steadfastly refused through the years, even~'tc the present day, to honor its obligations with regard., to the health of its employees is one that we believe deserves comment. I believe it is appropriate to state at the outset that the Asbestos Information Association/North America and its 19 metier companies are fully co'grrrz'an'f of' the' potential serious health effects of excessive asbestos dust inhalation and of our obligations to protect industry .workmen from the various asbestos related diseases. It is also important to point out that the asbestos related disease, being found today among some long-term industry employees is a result cf conditions existing decades ago, at a time when neither the industry . nor the medical profession knew very much about the health effects of asbestos and even less about the proper means for ' their control. It is because this statement cf principle contrasts so sharp:y with the picture of the industry painted_by:Mr. Sherrill that this letter has been written. . To give credit where credit is deserved, there is r.o doubt that Dr. Selikoff, whose research rir.dir.cs and statements have received enormous publicity ever the cast half-dozen years, served as a catalyst to precipitate a new and stronger sense of urgency and responsibility in the asbestos industry in the United States than had ever existed before with regard to occupational health. Unlike Mr. Sherrill, however. 50020008 '7W r ^ j, ** 2 *" The S'ew iV.rk Tires Page Two January 2.1, 19 7 3 Magazine Dr. Selikcff has never tried to place the blame for past mistakes ar.d failures cn- the industry alone. In a 1970 paper describing t e results cf a joint industry-labor sponsored research rurrcc;gect, he stated that "It * AAo easy to me, .ce in what right be called the demonological theory of/''V f` industrial hygiene histo ry." Rejecting the proposition that either industry :r c reunited labor was solely at fault, he continued: "Both cor.cius icr.s are toe convenient and are essentially erroneous. I t is much nearer"the truth to say that both industry and labor shared in ignorance and neglect of the problem. Sci er.ee and medicine are also at fault here for inadequate at rentier, to environmental and occupational health.' Mr. Sherrill's evaluation of the situation was not so balanced. Using words such as indifferent, defensive, hostile, uncoopera tive, etc. to describe the industry response to the problem in general end to Dr. Selikoff's Lr.dir.gs in particular, Wt s ele< :red a number of isolated incidents,f mostly from, the early 1960s, : iccum.er.z his thesis of a totally irresponsible indus tr; At r.o point in the article does Mr. Sherrill make mention cf anv of the orcaressive stems taker, kv the industrv to learn more about the health hazards of asbestos and the proper means for their control. For example, in referring tcr_ the recent "explosion of literatu: on the occupational hazards of asbestos," Mr. Sherrill used as an example the October 1972 Lyon conference or. asbestes- health sponsored-by the Me rid Health Organization. In the very next sentence, he then "states" that the asbestos industry has "not seemed exactly., overjeyed to receive all this new data, In reality, using the same.conferer.ee .as ar. example, of the approximately 125 attendees at Lyon, more than three-dozer, were representatives of the-.world-asbestos industry seeking not, as Mr. would have us believe, to avoid knowledge but seeking ir. fact, to gain even more knowledge cn asbestos and human health. In addition, of the 48 medical and technical papers presented > at the conference, nine represented the findings of industry i sponsored research, and another five were reports presented i i ; d) by asbestos industry scientists on their own research. In comparison, only six of the papers at the conference were presented by doctors associated with Dr. Selikoff's laborer:r at Mount Sinai and one of those was a paper coaurncrec with an asbestos industry scientist! 50020009 A i r*/4 *- * i. ilc - The h'-ov i:rK Ti.rr-'s Page Three January 26, 1273 Mayanne ' In fact, two of the wer Id's largest nongovernmental sources of funds for asc -mitt, research, are the Institute of Occupational and Envirc r.rer.tal Health in Montreal, which is sponsored by rho '`I'JSP. ~ Asbestos Mining Association, and the Ashestasis 7.,'3S62rcr. Council, sponsored by the British asbestos r.ar.ufac turir.g mtustry. The data generated through research sponsor ed by t hase two organisations and also by various asbestos ies actir.c ir.deoendentiv has contribu significantly to our hr.owledge of the biological effects of asbestos. These facts simply do not support Mr. Sherrill's statements about an unc ccperative, indifferent industry.' Later on in the article, Mr. Sherrill insinuates that the infamous Tyler, Texas pi ant is indicative of conditions thoughout the industry. Mr. S herrill is obviously theorising from a lack of knowledge rath er than from valid documentation, for had he accepted our rate a ted. invitations to visit an asbestos manufacturing plant, ha would have realised that, the situation which existed at Tyler i s not indicative of conditions thoughout the rest of th,e. incus tm This is not to say that every dust station in every piar.t in the industry is below t he' five" fiber* standard established by the U. S. Labor Deparcr. er.t. The industry has always admitted that seme difficult er.g ir.eering problems are still to be over however employees are b eir.g protected by other approved means while engineering ccr.tr els. are ..being instituted. The asbestc manufacturing industry has spent approximately $110 million in the past decade cr. d ust control and expects to spend an additional $95 million over the next few years to achieve complete compliance wit h the Labor Department standards! ' In discussing the 1964 Tew York Academy of Sciences symposium ' on asbestos, Mr. Sherrill neglects' to mention that following the symposium, a group*of asbestos textile manufacturers, disturbed at the high rates of disease Dr. Selikoff was finding among nis insulation workers,' approached the U. S. Fublic Health Service and requested that the government undertake a complete investigation of the Y. S. asbestos textile industry to determine if a serious health problem, existed. The industry gave its complete cooperation to the government on this study, which eventually involved nearly 10,000 asbestos industry employees throughout the country. Progress reports on the various findings of this study have been presented at medical meetings for a number of years. Teedless to say, ycur writer made absolutely no manner, ir. his article of the industry's 50020010 The Editor The New York. Tir.es Magazine Page Four January 26, 1973 ' role in initiating this study, nor of the complete cooperation extended to the government by the various companies involved. With regard to the Department of Labor standards on asbestos, . Mr. Sherrill attacks the government: for its decision to retain the present five fiber per cc standard for another four years before lowering it to the two fibers per cc standard recommended by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the- Departme-nt'-s own-asbestos Advisory Committee. What Mr. Sherrill fails to mention is that both NIOSH and- the Advisory Committee recommended that the standard not be lowered for two years (Mr. Sherrill would have us believe they wanted it lowered immediately), and that Labor's decision to delay the adoption of the stricter standard for an additional two years was to grant the industry the time required to develop and install the sophisticated engineering controls necessary to achieve such- a-tight- dust- standard. In addition, Dr. Marcus M. Key, Director of NIOSH, is in total disagreement with Dr. Selikcff's prediction that of the .100,000 or so new men that he estimates will enter the asbestos industry in the next four years, approximately half will die of asbestos- related disease because^of Labor's delay in adopting the two fiber standard. Dr.. Key assured the Labor Department in a letter sent prior to the publication of the standards that "a new employee could work up to*ten years at five fibers per cc before the remaining working exposure of two fibers per cc would approach" a potentially hazardous buildup of asbestos in the body. Dr. Key also admitted that the NIOSH technological "feasibility data were limited" and that if the testimony \ presented at the* hearings5'and'the Arthur D. Little "feasibility study indicate that a two fibers per cc level is not achievable until four years hence, I. would accept this as a reasonable health standard." - It should also be noted * that-as-late as 1968, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists' (the only national standard setting body in existence at that time) recommended standard for asbestos exposure was five million particles per cubic foot of air ----- approximately 30 fibers per cc. This standard was lowered by the ACGIH to 12 fibers per cc in 1968 and to five fibers in December 1971 by the Labor Department. Thus, the standard for asbestos exposure has been lowered twice in the last five years, and represents a reduction of approximately 83 per cent of the pre-1968 levels. These races sr.cun --.-- _ ^ -.-o. .r_ivvce ^v* s*r>vs',- f described by Mr. Sherrill in its proper perspective standards are extremely tight by comparison with past levels, and the industry's support of the five fiber standard does not represent a refusal to honor its obligations to its employees. The Editor The Lew Vork Tires Magazine Page Five January 26, 1973 In addition, contrary to Dr. Selikoff's statements in the article, the medical evidence for two fibers is neither extensive nor compelling, and is, in fact, heavily outweighed by data showing that five fibers is an acceptable safe level. Thus, the Labor Department's decision to adopt the two fiber standard in 1976 clearly demonstrates, contrary to Mr. Sherrill's evaluation, that when controversies of this nature arise, the question shall be resolved, not according to industry's wishes, but in favor of the-greates-t protection to employees. . Of equally serious concern is your writer's obvious disdain for the Arthur D. Little Incorporated health panel of "11 doctor? and technicians, all but two or three of whom reputedly have been 'consultants' to the asbestos industry at some time in their careers." One does not have to be particularly acute to insert the intended "paid medical lackey" or some such phrase in place, of. the word "consultant." In reality, of the 11, three were, government doctors (two from NIOSH and one from the Department of the Navy); one was the medical director of the nation's largest asbestos manufacturer; two would have to be considered consultants to organized labor; only one is an actual consultant to industry; and the remaining four have done extensive researcrvdn^.the., asbestos-health area. _ The only way Mr. Sherrill's statement makes sense is to assume that since at least five of the doctors on the list have conducted research sponsored by the industry, this makes them "consultants" in. Mr. Sherrill..'s mind and as such their findings ' and opinions automatically become untrustworthy. This is a rather curious attitude in light of the fact that Dr. Selikoff (a member of the parrel), whose research work is the central focus of the article, was himself the recipient of substantial research funds from the Johns-Manville Corporation, one of the companies singled out in the article as being uncooperative. While there are many other unwarranted statements and attitudes expressed in the article that deserve comment, it should now be quite clear, on the basis of the evidence presented in this letter, that the asbestos manufacturing industry in this country is not the indifferent, hostile villain that Mr. Sherrill portrayed in his article. Since much of this information was sent to Mr. Sherrill or relay to him over the phone, one must assume that his failure to inclu any of this material in his article was no accident, and that it was ignored because it would have contradicted the horrendous picture of the industry that he wished tc project. I I 50020012 T, Pacy - . x Janetrv 26, r ' ' '\ 1373 In this same vain, it shoo, .d be noted that while the Department of Labor was severely art a need in the article, r.o opportunity was given to Labor to cicra nd or explain its actions. It is also significant :r.at v;ni s Mr. Sherrill admits that Dr. Seliko: is only tr.a of, "the three or four top authorities on asbestos disease," there is no mer.t ion whatever of who the other top authorities might be, or v hat their views are on the various aspects of the problem, his omission is important because many cf the world's rankin'g asbestos-health experts believe that many of the extrapoln tions and predictions made by Dr. Selikoff are not justi fied by the published medical data. In conclusion, I hope that this rather lengthy letter has demonstrated, quite c-learly to you the incomplete, erroneous, sensationalized and distorted manner in which Mr. Sherrill presented the asbestos-helath situation in his article. Very truly yours, '7/7. . Matthew II. Swetonic Executive Secretary 50020013 THE NEW YORK TIKES MAGAZINE JANUARY 21, xy/j L^i fc m "X . rt i tcj v--3 ,y '..-i'fc-j 1 i v^i_j ^_.-a w n. c^B^si r-1 -^r-) n LjLi wwiBw^ wx* XRxa Va7 \JtJJI VuTlxa fcrU *-' t Sid uj V iw4 'dStfT' .i * *d i j t .4 By Robert Sherrill . Shipyard work attracted about 4.5-million Amer icans into its ranks at one time or another during World V/ar U, and an estimated 3.25-million of those people are still stiver- If tht^thmlraboarthe experience at all these days it is probably to again remind themselves with satisfaction that things could have been worse. Whether tr.ey went into the work simply for a paycheck.-or as a kind of emancipation (at some shipyards nearly one-third - of the workers were women), or as an alternative to the military draft, those who built and repaired America's ships took comfort in supposing that however dirty and boring the work sometimes be came, at least it was safer than being in the front lines. ' - Now tt appears they may have been wrong to think so. The fatality '-tatistics are still too scat tered and iffy to yield a solid conclusion, but there are some disquieting hypotheses to be drawn from such cases as that of the New York tire company executive we shall cai! Charles Annin because his family prefers to keep his real name Out of this. Annin had never had a serious illness in his life. He was a 200-pound, robust, hearty- fellow who looked much younger than his age, 60. He enjoyed sailing in his spare time and ran. a taut ship on the job, too. Then in December, 1371, he began getting sharp pains in his chest, enough to worry about, enough to send him to the doctor. Tests showed his heart was in fine shape, and the Jung X-rays showed noth ing wrong. Still, the pains persisted and.grew worse, aod in April the doctors decided to go in for a look. They found that Mr. Annin was suffering from ' mesothelioma, a kind of cancer that has only come Into the medical fraternity's conversation in recent years. Mesothelioma, which has been so rare that tt is not separately categonzed in international medical classifications, is cancer of the chest lining or of the abdominal lining. Everyone who gets it is going to die from it within a year be cause it covers the whole lung area from apex to base, or infuses the whole abdomen, and no sur geon can take out so much and leave a survivabie patient. It is a painful disease and progressively so. The cavity lining fiils with fluid, which must be drawn off periodically; wren th" disease strikes the chest area the patient i,Or,-;v sutlocates. i-ioae of the usual cancer palliatives co much good, and there is no known cure. Mr. Annin's meso thelioma was discovered in April. Ke was dead 14 weeks later. . The thing that makes hi3 case--among a number of others--seem so ominous to some occupational health experts is that they know what caused it, and they know that the same cause has touched the lives of millions of other Americans. The cause was asbestos. Now, asbestos can be credited with saving many lives: fireproof clothing, fireproof insulation in buildings, safer and more durable brake linings, etc. But now asoestos is beginning to reveal its other side, not oniy in the appearance of the compare- tively rare meeothalioma, but, on a much broader scale, as a catalyst of just plain lung cancer, and of asbestosis, a crippling disease which scars the lungs and interferes with the passage of oxygen into the blood. Anyone with an advanced case of asbestosis will probably feel more comfortacie climbing the stairs backward, so that be can sit down on each step. He also can be certain that because of the presence of the asbestosis he has as much ciiance of developing cancer as of escaping it. Heavy doses of asoestos in the tungs also encourage the carcinogenic eifects of tCDacco smoke to a remarkable degree; studies have shown that asbestos workers who smoke have a lung . ' V\ Robert 5hernif is the Washington correspondent of The Nation. r*-.' -z t'~' C53 per cccst t>er tlian tokens la i-J r i. i cc-puieuco. C-.c- ..owiirv, preimblv ffvw nudien or so Arar.'it.-i uulation venters, construction work ers, c-I-r finery workers, etc.--breates a snrnriicant emount r,; i.;bcstos dust everyday they 50 10 work. Ti3 lizard also crops tin m distinctly r.oaocctroatioral pieces, suen as ti.a Northside Elementary School in leader, Wyo., watch recently was closed by the state heslth tiernrinent because asoestos which had been sprayed as an insulation on the ceiling was beginning to come ioose and mix with the air in dangerous amounts. But wnerever en countered, the hazard is especially insidious because it is lilce a long-term ume bomo: For reasons doctors don't fully understand, the diseases related to asbestos do not explode for many years alter the patient breathed it in. . Mr. Armin, for example, had had nothing to do with asbestos since World War II, when, from 1941 to 1943, he was a tinsmith in the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Ha helped install fiber'giass in destroyers* refrigeration holds, and he also secured asDestoscovered pipes with hangers and straDs. Alter 1943. he got a v ' :te-collar iob away from tne shmyard and never .in worked with asbestos. Kis 29-year lag between contact ana iilness was not surprising; indeed, for asbestos disease. 25 to 30 years is the normal period between exposure and development of symptoms, which is why medical scientists who have specialized in the occurrence of asbestosrelated industrial diseases believe that the first big wave of cancers from World War n shipyard ex posure may be at hand. Among those who think are Drs. Irving J. Selikoff and E. Cuyler Hammond. Dr. Selikoff of Mount Sinai School of Medicine, City University of New York, is at least among .. the three, or four top authorities on asbestos disease. Dr. Hammond is vice president of the American Cancer Society in charge of epidemiology and statistics, who already has gained a slice of immortality as the fellow most responsiole for statistically denr- onstratirsg the relationsmo between smoking and cancer. To some high officials at the U.S. Depart ment of Labor and to many high officials in the asbestos industry, these two doctors and their colleagues represent a kind of reform plague. Indeed, Selikoff is seen by some leaders of the asbestos industry as a cruel showman. F. J. Solon .Jr, vice-president for environmental- affairs of Johns-Manville Corp., the nation's largest producer of asbestos, says, "To terrorize peopfe wno worked in shipyards 30 years ago, and now can't do a g.d. thing about it--that's something I couldn't square with my conscience." Of the shipyard dangers, Selikoff says this: "We do know that there are a large numoer of meso theliomas in Great Britain. Probably over 1,S00 now, people who worsted in British shipyards start ing in 1235. They are rive years auead of us, so Britain casts its mesothelioma shadow over 'the United States. We know it's a large number, but what the count wiil actuary be v/e do not know. Nor do we know the percentage of incidence in Britain; they don't have wnat we cail a population base. But any percentage would be a iemeue situation. The only data that we do have, that gives percentages, is a new paper just come out by Dr. D. Fic-tcher in Barrow, England, who followed e cf r'.'-ani wre-tegs from 1.33 to : :e rr-ent. .1 ba compered i.'.ore wuo i.' i S-ray stigmata of asoestos exposure with the general male population in that area. He found a three-times in crease of lung cancer among those who had X-ray evidence of asbestos exposure." (Industry spokesmen note that the British experience may not be wholly compar able to the American, since in British yards asbestos was ap plied with a spray process not used in the U.S.) The thing that is so alarm ing to Selikoffs group is that some risk applies not only to asbestos workers (only cr.efive-hundredth of the ship yard payroll), but to every body who worked downwind or in the general vicinity of the asbestos jobs. In ship building, this means anybody who has worked within the confines of the ship's struc ture: welders, shipfitters. machinists, pipefitters, elec tricians, carpenters, boiler makers--the whole gang. "You don't have to work with asbestos for 30 years to develop mesothelioma or some other cancer or asbestosis from it," Selikoff explains. "Absolutely not. Because once you get it in your lungs, it stays there forever, and as the years go by your lung continues to be exposed even though you may be out in the Rockies. The nice air in the Grand Canyon won't protect you because you've already got it in your lungs." In 1951. the lung X-rays of Robert Ken looked normal. He was a little short of breath, and Dr. Selikoff couldn't un derstand why, but he put it down to all that dust Kerr was breathing at the quarry where he worked. X-rays in 1954 showed Kerr developing some lung scarring. U looked like asbestosis, and Selikoff asked Kerr if he had ever worked with asbestos. No. he said, never. He told Selikoff his whole employment history and asbestos W'ork wasn't part of it. By 1953 the X-rays showed scamr.g m both lungs. Selikoffs suspicions in creased: Was Kerr certain he had never worked with as bestos? Nope. Never. But as he talked to Selikoff. Kerr's Wife 'Interrupted: "Bob, do you ram1 .r.Jur who. = jot mciTiea? In . ,1, y.v. worked ia that i..~ > ...~t {.iitx.'' "Ch sure." : - ' --r ' but I cr.i.y worze. .. itx months as a veaver.~ "And hare's his film on Jun. 7, 1972." says Seiiitoff. "Yet can see the white stuff al through the lungs. Bob's re tired now, 50-odd-years oia living in Florida, unable u breathe, can't even da hi: own lawn. Six rr.ontns u1935! Came up from Florid; to see me to make sure h: had no cancer. He doesn't He just can't breathe." . A number of asbestos-com pany officials and asbestos union officials who rest through the ranks have fount that they are no safer io. having been away many year:' from the actual handling o: asbestos. Raymond Rider en tered the asbestos trade ir 1947, but in the nineteen-six' ties he became an 01 tick. with New York Local 12 r.. the international Associatior of Heat and Frost Insulator: and Asbestos Workers, ar.c for 10 years he didn't toucr the stuff. But he had breathec enough in his early career X-rays taken in Jan., 1971 showed he waa still ir. the clear, but by Feb.. 1372, thev showed' mesothelioma. Since then he has had lung surgery, 24 cobait treatments and ex tensive chemotherapy. His fa ther, George Rider, also a union officer, diec of the same disease. ................. The response of the indus try and esoecialiy cf the Fed eral bureaucracy has been strangely indifferent The ran dom breather may not care, even though asbestos car. harm him too--if. for ple, he inhales asbestos thrown into the air by the demolition of buildinzs. Eut tne asbestos worker feels very lonely with his special demon. William G. Bernard, secretarytreasurer of the Asbestos Workers Union and himself a victim of lung-scarring, com plains, "You know, we have damn near as many, or more, people who work wuli as bestos as there are coal miners in the country. But r.oocdj cares about us. because w? oon't have any disasters. The miners have a disaster ar.c their pictures show up on tr.E they put a black lung bil T.rcv :h Cor rvs. We have a ' ' r ". Ti* o# pccr-iB ^ -t ;-i . .err trouo.e. died of cancer of the stom- nun. cci-n ana rectum. Over seven ror cent oed r4 ea- but r. ->r;VY tiout iw" r* * camn Nor ere these figures pecul iar to the iocais in question. Seiikoff goes on to cite more . \< H Jen. 1. 19. extensive studies confirming r mis 12 and that similar increased deaths 32 of the Asbestos Work "occur ;n every single group ers Union in Nw York and of asoestos workers that's Newark, N. J. !._d 632 mem been examined." And he con bers. Dr. Selikc*;' and his col- cludes: "This is simpiy an leagues have traced the 625 occupational disaster without ' who matter here (seven died parallel in American history." " eariy, mostly of acciden Such an alaiming finding .is tal ` causes). Given their just now Deginning to pene age, 203 of those men trate the thinking of workers, . would normally have been ex which is rather odd, since as pected to die by the end of bestos industry officials and IS62. Instead. 255 had died the U. S. Public Health Serv --an excess over the normal ice and the U. S. Department death rate of more than 20 of Labor have known for ; per cent. About seven should years that asbestos could be have died from iung cancer, a serious hazard. For more ' ' but 45 died of it. Instead of than 60 years cases of asbes the normal nine cr 10 deaths tos disease have been posi from cancer o: the stomach, tively diagnosed. coion or rectu.... there were Deaths due to asbestosis 29--"not so ur.exoected." 3S were clearly defined at least Seiikoff points out. for "any as early as. the nineteen- body who inhales dust aiso twenties. The association be ingests it. Any worker is al- tween lung cancer and oc ways spitting out the stuff cupational exposure to asbes you think he's cniv inhaling." tos was proved in a paper And whereas noaody in the published in 1955 by Sir general population dies of Richard Doil, then chief sta- esbestosis--scarred lures--12 ' ' t'stician cf the British Medi men in this study group died cal Research Council. In 105 of it during the first 20 years, consecutive autopsies at one and 4 died ot mesothelioma. asoestos plant in England, he That left 370 cf the group found 18 deaths due to lung still alive on Jan. 1. 1363. Be cancer. And in 1965 an equal tween then ana the end of ly conclusive connection was 1971, 78 of them should have established between asbestos died if they followed the pat , and- mesotheiioma in a oaper tern of the gcr.sral popula published by Seiikoff. Ham tion. Instead. 123 died. "And mond and Dr. Jacob Churg why? The same thing," says in The New England Journal SelLkcff. "There should have of Medicine. Since then, there been four or five lung-cancer^ has'' been an explosion of deaths in this group. There literature on the occupational were 43. There should have hazards of asbestos, encour- been no deaths of mesouie- aged-by symposia such as the lloma--that doesn't occur in one held recently in Lyons, the general population. There France? by scientists' from were 23. There should have- around' the world. been three deaths of cancer of the stomach or rectum. There were 12. And of course there should have been no deaths from scarred lungs. ' There were 20. . "If we total up this one mall group of workers from Jan. 1, 1943, to Dec. 31. 1971, almost 20 per cent died of lung cancer. Gut of the 430 men who died, one out of every five asoestos worxers died of lung cancer. Almost seven per cent died of meso thelioma. Almost 10 per cent iI ' .' The asbestos industry and the U. S. Department of La bor have not seemed exactly overjoyed to receive all this new data; indeed, their basic response has been a combina tion of defensiveness and _ hostility and furuveness.^In. 1964, when Seiikoff was or* tanizina .-.n ^international symoe.'ium. tie receiveu a let ter :rom the law firm repre senting ri-oestos textile com panies, nicrming him__that the. jndustry_ was_aware. of what he was up to and impiying that if_ any_derogatory remarks 3b-":t asbestos t _er-->n?Te --i .e ceric* **3" cr .id t --t to 'i t <. vert. '. * U. 5. . - Health Service conductor! .nr samplings id a couple cc dozen asbestos olants in 1224, but it refused to disclose its findings to Seiikoff. or, as tie puts it, "apparently the kev to the file cabinet was lost." Though workers m shipyarus today are subjected to muen the same asoestos hazards as la World War II, Navy medi cal officers generally refuse to talk about the proolem or to discuss what they are doing, if anything, to protect workers in the yards under their command. Seiikoffs crowd has run t into this wall since the begin ning. In the early fifties, hav ing recently won the Ameri can Public Health Associa tion's Albert Lasker Award in Medicine for his part in devel oping a drug crucial to the control of tuberculosis. Dr. Seiikoff opened a clinic in Paterson, N. J., to ccr.~ue his research into pulmonary diseases. Among his first pa'tients were 17 men who worked in the Union Asbestos and Rubber Company plant, which started production in Paterson in 1940 and closed in 1954. At that time, ail 17 men were strong and work ing, and appeared likely to go on doing so for many years. But within seven years, six were dead, and today, oniy two survive. Seven died of lung cancers, one of meso thelioma, one of stomach cancer, one of colon cancer, four of asbestosis, and one of "other" ailments. Some thing strange was developing, and Seiikoff wanted to broaden the investigation to find out what had happened to all the men who worked in that plant from the time it opened. He needed money, jnd he aslid the U. S. Public Health Service for a grant. U turned him down. When he 'ached the asbestos ecr:-=- oJ.'lcisLi to let rim "heir personnel roccrc*. > raid 5 .;y had l.* r--i. .iOCfrta the lemcrve vo: had ::;a used in v.-.-.r -jr* .tica. ail la employes nsa : to be cleared by tr.e r 33 d.. !a list of the workers on `factory's payroll during - war veers 1941 to 1C-15 exist, and by a process S koff prefers rot to discuss, got his hands on the nno m the 933 workers of that t- *That*s all we needed," recalls. "That and a lot work, because . v,*e had trace those 933 men. Surer irgly, we were able to f 877 by the end of 1971." The effort proved reve ing. According to Dr. Hu mond's calculations, - hr -- normal population grouo that size, considering age sex factors, 239 woutd h; died by 1971.- But in r group, 484 were dead. N mally 50 could have been > pected to have died-of so: kind of cancer: in this grov 143 died of cancer. 1 group's lung cancer rate v, nearly 700 per cent higr than the general population its stomach and coibn cam rates were twice as hi; Seven men had died mesotheiioma. ' In those war vears. ma of the workers had been e ployed for only brief penc at the plant. "Of those w 7,-crked far one week or 1 when X-rayed 30 years ia.' half of them had some sc. ring; nine had nothing and had somevsearring. Less rhr one week, and they had a normal X-rays!" says Selikc: who never ceases to . amazed by the statistics : and Hammond use. "So li problem is not oniy how- rcuc you work. Of course, l more you work, the worse is. But even those wno h: very little exposure, if yt Uve long enough you're goir to have problems." 50020016 lnthgueo, ana wanting to throw hit net more widey, Selikotr went to Johns:*!a.ivi!le Co.-porr.tion w Man* N. J. He was not wet* xme. `Somehow." he s3vs. -the company couldn't find itself able to cooperate." Nor aould the Federal Govern ment find funds for the re-earch. But Joe Modrone. presiuent ot Locai ou-j. i-mied Fapermakers and Paperwork-is, which has jurisdiction at Sfanviile. took Selikoff into the basement of the union's headquarters and scratcned around and came ud with the seniority lisc for Jan. 1, 1353. There were about 3,000 names on the list. Of these. 6S9 had worked at the plant for 20 years. Selikoff's men set out to track them down. "Let's see now what-hao- pened to them--and mind, thi3 is only the beginning of what will haopen to them." says Selikoff. "' n their. ages, there should ..ave been 134 deatas among the 68S. There were 199. And again, why did these people die who were not expected to die? Eight should have died of hmg cancer; 27 actually did.-- And 15 died of mesothelioma." Two or three Urr.es as many died of cancer of the coion or cancer of the rectum or of the stomach as normally would be expected. Ten per cent died of asbestosis. "It was becoming monotonous--a hell of a monotony! So not oniy in the plant at Paterson but now in Manwile, too, the same pic- ' lure." But while Selikoff and Hammond and their crowd did everything they could'to uncover evidence of the dis aster that was occurring in . the asbestos industry, indus try and Government remained unmoved. The most impressive case of boieaucracy/industry indiffer ence occurred at the Union Asbestos and Rubber Com pany factory in Tyler, Tex. This is the same outfit that had operated the factory in Paterson, N. J., before closing ft in 1954. Union Asbestos later sold out to Pittsburgh Coming Corp. But under any name, the Tyler plant was still a foul place to work. Reputedly, in some areas of the plant the asoestos dust Was so thick workers couldn't see across toe room. Medical facilities consisted cf two first-aid cabinets, one with a 4- .i... a... > . * . .: ,, _ Beyond the factory itself, asbestos waste was dumped in nearby fields, sometimes to j a dcotii of three feet, that j children sometimes used as a playground. Bags in winch as bestos had been shipped to the plant and which were suil coated with asbestos dust were sold to local nursery men who do a' tremendous business in roses. It is futile to guess at the number of nurserymen and customers who breathed an injurious amount of asbestos dust from the sacks, but the factory workers can be counted. Personnel records microfilmed by the Public Health Serv ice show that be tween 1954 and 1972 at least 895 persons were employed there. They were working undet^deadly conditions and the U. S. Department of Labor and the Public Health Serv ice were aware of these con ditions at least as early as 1967. But they kept quiet. Inspectors from the old Bureau of Occupational Safety ' and Health (BOSH1 took air samples in 1967 that showed that the count of asbestos fibers' was in some parts of the plant 60 times higher than today's officially declared safe level of five fibers per cubic . centimeter. These findings . were withheld from the work ers. In 1968. because the Tyler plant turned out asbestos in . sulation under a Navy con tract, it was subjected to an .inspection by the Labor De partment under the Waish' Healey Art. The comoany could have been heavily fined or even dosed because of its health violations: instead, the Labor Department took no ac tion at alL That's the way things stood until 1970, when Congress passed the Occupational Safe ty and Health Act. With that act, BOSH was phased out and replaced by NIOSH--the National Institute of Safety and Health. With the change of initials came a change of bureaucrats and attitude, too. Among them were Dr. Joseph K. Wagoner, who became director of the Divi sion of Field Studies and Clinical Investigations, and Dr. William M. Johnson, a re` cent product of the Harvard School of Public Health, who became Wagoner's assistant. They inherited a medical chaos, a bunr.t rround of o<d statistical bones hastily oov- * m hv theip mTUp<g/\r< " *We even inherited about 2.000 air sarooies that hadn't been counted." Jonnson re calls, "because the nrevious inspectors had been out col lecting data without ever coming to grips with what they were doing. They would just keep rescheduling sur ' veys, sometimes a second or third time around at a plant without really giving any thought to what it was really showing from a health stand point." , Buried deep in the files he found Tyler, Tex. Why had , Public Health Service and La bor Department officials l' covered it up? "I could say they were stupid, or that it was criminal negligence, or bureaucracy, or-l-could-say--- they were afraid that if they did start getting concerned about this that their right of entry would have been cut off," says Johnson, "but the fact is, I don't know." All he did know immediately from the records he uncovered was that "the plant had no bust ness operating." "' But still the higher bureauc racy balked. "We transmitted 'our sampling results' to the . Labor Department," says Johnson, "and also followed up with a comprehensive re port." The report-' showed that of a sampling of 17 men . who had worked in the plant 10 years, eight had asbestosis. "The Department of Labor 4 50020017 1j.;:i o m --ov'd net 'ncoor our samoles. rtxy wanted to tn-a O-.iir nra (or compliance. They -rent ip--f don't rcmemoer he exact date; 1 believe n was Jovemaar. IS7I--and they cck rorru samples and came.. n> with citations, but they .'idn't mention asbestos in the citations and the citations zaiy aiiced up to S210 in non* serious violations.'* Dr. Johnson, despite the fact that he has cniy a re stricted view of the industry, rays he knows of "about a half-dozen plants" in wnich the aroestos levels are iour to eight times wnat the Labor Dopcrtraent concedes is the maximum sate level. But ac tually, nobody knows how widespread the hazard is. Fed eral funding tor inspections is So much public ridicule and at a rock bottom minimum. lad publicity greeted tnat vanishment that Lacor felt obliged to nsinsoecx tne facojry end levy a $6,290 fine. Two we^ks later, miming tr.e 2ne were too great a burden to bear. Pittsburgh Comine decided to ciose the plant. Left behind were'-manv-'TyleF' residents who will eventually die of asbestos disease. Are there other zsbestos outfits stui humme iwsv in the same condition u:at tilled the lungs of Tyler? Some are trying to shape up. At the Johns-Manviile plant in New And unions may be as leth- arsic as industry or Govern ment when it comes to in forming workers of the risk. Officials of the United Ce ment. Lime and Gypsum worKers. which has iunsdiction at a plant where asbestos itesf^tSSSregHtraaon is slid to be ewer 100 times the-safe level say they haven't even bothered to get their workers X-rayed yet, though a U. S. Bureau of Mines report ex posed the danger last March. As for the enforcement of Jersey, for example, company officials claim--and union of health standards established under the Occupational Safety ficials agree--that a 90 per-' and Health Act. Federal offi-'' cent of the factory the asoestos liber count is already be ri.iK have conceded in testi mony before Congress that if low the five-fibers per c.c, max imum set by Federal health standards. The dust is sucxed up through hoods over the machines and captured in a central tae house. And at J.- they were going to enforce henih standards properly, they would need about one hygienist per 35,000 workers. So far as *an be determined, the Labor Department at pres SC'l asbestos miii In Asbestos, Que. the bagging of the mineral is done entirely by machines; everythinTM is en closed: human har.es don't touch it, and the uust is re portedly csrried-away- in* 70, 000 separate sucuon opera tions. Johns-.Vlanvuie is aiso ent has 60 hvmemsts -- or about 1 per 1.2 million work ers--to _ enforce all health standards, net just those relat ing to asbestos hazards. Since there seems to be no grest^rush to, enforce any as bestos health standards, it r.aro.y matters waeuier tne "considering" hiring only non- ~ smokers in some o: its opera tions. "This corporation has a ~ conscience 30- races'' long?' says J.-M.'s Vice President Solon. "We've sent out in fractions to dean up or ciose standards am the proper ones. But the manner in which tney wenr-decided may give some further indication of wnat the laboring man can expect in the way of protection from tne Federal agencies and the down, but I wont tell you industry. the waoie industry takes that attitude." At issue was whether to set the standards at a maximum perrrussiote air content of two ascestos fibers (each longer than 5 microns) per cuoic centimeter or rive asbestos fibers. In cither case, that's quite a bit of dust. A cuoic centimeter is about the size of a small thimble of air, and a workman will innaie about six to eight million of them in a typical day. So the issue was whether to require the companies to maintain condi tions which would prevent a worker from having to inhale more than 12 million to 16 million fibers of a certain length, or 30 million to -10 mil lion fibers. With a suostance tnat the Labor Dcpartmentconcedes "is causally related to asbestosis and cancers," the multimtilion differences were obviously no trivial matter. With what appeared to be an effort to get the best an swer, Labor Secretary James Hodgson early in 1972 ap pointed an outside Advisory Committee on Asbestos Dust made uo of scientists and en gineers and labor officials. He also had uie assistance of an inside advisory irrouo of med ical men and scientists put together especially for thisproblem by NIOSH. Also from the outside he hired Arthur D. Little, Inc., a consulting firm, to come uo with some advice on the economic feasibility of reciuirir.2 industry to get rid of its asbestos dust. Arthur D. Little's panel of experts was made up of 13 executives from the shipbuilding indus try, 12 executives from the asbestos industry, and a health group of 11 doctors and technicians, all but two or three of whom reputedly have been "consultants'* to the asbestos industry at some time in their careers. . The Advisory Committee on Asbestos Dust told Hoagson 'be should drop the standard to two fibers. NIOSH*s panel agreed that two Fibers was - ikiim too low. But Arthur D. Little concluded that five fibers was penectiy safe ana that droooing the standard to two fibers would oust Indus try far too much money. In addition, tout days of hear ings were held at the Labor Department ouices in Wasningtea.'whh industry contend ing that Selikoff is riant un to a point, but tnat r.e goes too far end interprets his find ings too wiiaiy. Matt Swetcusc. Secretary of tne Asoestos Information Service, a New York health cats distri bution center funaed by the industry, says, "There has been cunsideraoie controversy with Selikoff not so much cm the effects of asbestos, but on the best means to control it and what sort of leveis are necessary to control various asbestos diseases." Industry people, says Swetonic. be lieve- tfaaLrthe. penLs-ot-the-in sulation. workers--wno face periodic massive doses of asimstos-laden air--are too often confused with what in dustry contends are the man ageable low-level exposures of the asbestos manufacturing factories. In Lhe end. Hodgson, insist ing that he had arrived at his decision by an indeDendent appraisal of all evidence, re buffed his own advisory group and said that a fivcnber standard would be in effect for the next four years. (Coincidentally, Jonns-Manville Corporation the same day notified its stockholders that the ruling would not hurt their sales arJ eamres.' Selikoff points out that t.-..L ruling was designed to set 3 safety level for asbestosis, r.ot for cancer, and5 that in any csserquafi/iedrscienrists sim ply cannot be sure enough about the nature of asbestos related disease-to'sav where the level should be fixed. Ir this iieht, he~areues,-HodeaorTs ruling"was at best in cautious. "There's a lot o: published evidence that in tw< fibers per c.c. mesothelioma oc curs, lung cancer occurs, as bestosis occurs. An ir.austr.a hygiene practice in our coun try has been that when then is a serious nsk. you build in big safety factor. But wha 50020018 C?wssjder 6 the Labor Department - has done is say, `We don't know for sure what level will cer tainly cause cancer and with out this knowledge there is no requirement for^extra`cau tion,' instead of saying, `These are the lives of hundreds of thousands. of American workers that we are respon sible for 'and therefore let's et the most prudent level.' " The A.F.L.-C.I.O., agreeing '.vu Selikoff, has sued the Department of Labor in the ,U. S. Court of Appeals, charg ing that Secretary Hodeson did not consider the evidence or act to protect workers as the law requires him to do, and demanding that he re view the evidence again and set tougher standards. From the opposite direction, how By continuing the five-fiber ever. conies pressure to ease standard for another four up further. The National In years--a- period- that - will- sulation Contractors Associa probably see -100,000 or so tion has petitioned the Labor new men enter asbestos-re-" Department to give its mem fated industries--Selikoff pre ber- companies--who reore- dicts the Labor Department sent a large segment of the has doomed _ 20,C00_. to _ un-.- industry that hires asbestos Meanwhile, Selikoffs flying wedge continues relentlessly down the field. Not long ago, Selikoff was having some drywall construction work done in his office. Ke sal there watching the workmen and all of a sudden it eccurred to him: "I said to myseif, well, hell, if these guys have been' putting up that stutf--watch them spackle it and sand it down so you can't see the joint--they're not immune. L. had enough background knowledge to know that the taping compound has asbestos in it. So I got in touch with the painter's union, and their- necessary lung-cancer deaths,- workers--a year's deferment 7.000 to unnecessary meso from monitoring require tapers came up to see me. To thelioma deaths. 7.0C0 to un necessary asbestosis deaths as well as deaths of other can cers. And that's not counting ments. The N.I.C.A. promises that if the asoestos workers will cross their fingers and hold their breath until the end make a long story short, that week one of their men was operated on for lung cancer. So we cut the lung; the elec combination effects--asbestos of 1973, virtually all of the tron microscope showed it plus'tobacco smoke, asbestos insulating companies by then was loaded with asbestos. plus the coal-tar pitch work will have swuened to asbes This is a new trade, began in ers like roofers must handle. All In all. Selikcff predicts that ``bv a stroke of the pen, tos-free materials such as 1946 or so, right after the fiber glass. war--everything became dry- wall---most of the guys in it 50.000 raore lives were thrown for only 10, 15, 20 years. We down the dram." just began a survey at the union's request. We've X-nycd our first 17 men, and rise of the 17 have unestosta- These are the old-timers, with 25 years in the trade. Very mild, because these are eariy cases so far. But we know what's in their lungs." And so another group fails under Selikofi's cloud. . But of course, as- in any scientific confrontation, there is always- the- possibility of miscalculation. Perhaos Seli koff and Hammond and their colleagues at Mt. Sipai HospitaLand in the American Can cer Society shouldn't' frighten shipyard workers and painters and pipefitters and.insuiaiion. workers and the rest. Perhaps Assistant Labor Secretary George C,. Guenlherr-who once defended the small fines levied against corporate health violators by saying that "we are not in the fund raising business"--was cor rect to upbraid Selikoff for having chosen, os Guenther judged it, "to overdramatize the matter." It is not. how ever, an argument that evades resolution. Those who have worked around ssoestos for any length of time v>,L soon er or later, find cut v.no was right, a . F0020019 \ jjtfl 31 1973 Tho skin ex the salamander Asbestos, a name that embraces a num ber of fibrous mineral silicates, has been used by man for thousanos of years, and for most of that time its quaimes have produced confusion ana mys:eryund myth. Ih the aggregate it is a rock with ail of a typical rock's rigidity, but broken up it yields fibers that can be spun and woven as easily as flax or cotton. For centuries It was commoniv assumed that asbestos was- a vegetable rather than a mineral. There was something obviously strange nd wonderful about fibers that seemed so gossamer and yet were as strong as Steel wire; an ancient explanation of asbes tos' most mysterious power was that the material came from the skin of the sala mander, a mythical animal that could endure fire without harm--a notion that i was useful to poets even as late as last century (Southey: "Fly, Salamanders; on Asbestos'- wings. To Wanton in my Delia's fiery glance"). Asbestos remained pnmaniy a curiosity ' until,.the lS70`s when--because of us . flexibility, its tensile strength, its invul* . nerabilty to heat and acids and aixaiies-- i it was-./inst. commercially mined. In the I Intervening years it has become a prized ingredient in thousands of industrial- products: floor tiles, filters in the manu facture of beer and other foodsturfs, electrical tape, paddings of ail sorts, paper binding, paints, etc. Nearly four million tons are mined annually throughout the world; the United States, though it contributes little to the total production, is the world's largest consumer of the mineral. The Bureau of. . Mines says we used 733.571 tons in 1971. U.S. use of asbestos has grown' i,GG0-fold j in this century, compared to an 30-fold | growth for petroleum. Nineiy-tive per j ' cent of this is chrysolite asoestes from i the open-pit mines of Quebec, Canada, probably still the world's most produc tive source, although Russia is bcginntng to chatlcnge Canada's production lead. Amosite asbestos, most important for shipyard work, comes largely from South African mines. Rudolphr Wild,- the- brilliants _ engineer whose work a generof.cn ago. . ' persuaded the U.S. Navy tnat amosite i asbestos was superior for shipyard insu* i - lation and should be written into. Navy 5 contract specifications, paid fc-r his m- ' i ' volvemenc with the magic...mineral He _ died of mesouieiiomsL--R. S. . . - * 50020020 JA:.: 31 873