Document 0gDabvQ7eGmgoaQoE1vGNN2bM

-2- , .BARRON'S December 9, 1974 EXPLOSIVE CONTROVERSY Continued from Page S of articles, charging that a "Watergate-type cover-up" had been engineered to con- : ceal the truth about the ' danger of the chemical ; , and that the industry admitted the facts only when they were about to be discovered by the public. Dr. Selikoff, NIOSH and the unions demanded that VC producers reduce the expo sure level to zero. However, OSHA, which was responsible for taking l into account the technical and economic consequences of its regulations, decided to compromise on a temporary emergency standard of 50 parts per million, pending further study. This level, the equivalent of a teaspoon of vinyl chloride in a room 20 by 20 feet, wentmto effect on April 5. Then the government was embarrassed by another dis covery. In mid-April, the Manufacturing Chemists As sociation, which had spon sored tests at the Industrial BioTest Laboratories in Northbrook,. 111., reported that two angiosarcomas had ' been produced in mice at the 50-ppm exposure level adopt ed by OSHA. That agency immediately proposed a change to a "non-detectable" . .level. But it decided before putting that standard into effect to hold public hearings to collect all available evi dence. i j Meanwhile, PVC produc- Jj ers, who had been keeping a low profile ever since an nouncement of the Goodrich ! deaths, were becoming alarmed at the adverse pub licity and the threat of exces sive Washington action. In dustry spokesmen answered charges of labor and health groups that they were dere lict in failing to act on the warnings of the European research by pointing out that these findings did not wave a red flag because all the liver cancers reported had oc curred in animals. It wasn't until disclosure of the Good rich deaths that it became apparent that the cancer could occur in human beings. Makers of VCM and PVC - agreed that they had an obli gation to tighten safety stan dards. Via the Society of the Plastics Industry, they pro posed as an alternative to zero-level exposures that they be permitted to reduce average levels over a threeyear period to five ppm in VCM plants and 10 ppm in PVC ones. They also sug gested an initial timeweighted average exposure of 25 ppm, with a ceiling level of 40 ppm. to be effecj tive from October 5,1974. Meanwhile, throughout the country fabricators be came worried that their business would be seriously affected, if producers were forced to shut down or cur tail their supplies, owing to "unreasonable" government regulations. Fabricators bombarded the Labor De partment with letters, warn ing of the hardships that would ensue from such ac tion. ----------------------- :-------------------- Spokesmen for the phonograph record business wrote that polyvinyl chloride is vital to their product and they couldn't survive if pro ducers cut their supplies. A medical equipment manu facturer wrote that devices it provided for heart surgery and kidney dialysis treat ment used PVC as a vital in gredient, and it could be forced to shut down if it couldn't get the resin. Public Hearings Amidst this tense atmo sphere, OSHA opened its public hearings in Washing ton on June 25. They lasted through July 11, generating over 200 oral and written submissions, adding up to 4.000 pages of testimony. On the first day, Dr. Herman Xraybill, of the National Cancer Institute, testified that OSHA's temporary stan dard of 50-ppm exposure was inadequate because at that level, according to recent studies, there was a high probability of causing can cer in man. On the other hand, Dr. Paul Kotin, former head of the National Insti tute of Environmental Health Services and a spe cial consultant to Air Prod ucts & Chemicals Inc., argued it was inappropriate to set a standard for humans on the basis of animal exper iments. Other representatives of Air Products said the firm had hopes of achieving an average time-weighted exposure of 20-25 ppm of VCM in their plants by Octo ber 1974. However, they stressed that it would be im possible to do better without significant improvements in current control technology. A team from Dow Chemi cal testified that the firm had already gotten its level down- 10 ppm, on an eighthour time-weighted average, in most of its operations. N5 CD ("J Q (vj j l| j | ' BARRON'S Tenneco Chemicals testified it might be forced to close its vinyl chloride plants if OSHA insisted on a zero level. The firm supported the indus try's plan for a three-year , program, but said it hoped to | be able to achieve the final ; goal sooner in a new plant it I is building in Texas. Dr. Selikoff testified that, while the only prudent course was to provide a zero-level, if he were con vinced the industry was making every effort to re duce exposure as fast as pos sible, he would be as "pa- ' tient as Job" in requiring the ultimate standard. Peter Bommarito, president of the United Rubber Workers, argued that if PVC cannot be used safely, the industry ought to shut down. He ob served that the country got j along without the material j for 200 years and could do so again if necessary. { Report Ignored After the hearings con cluded, OSHA, to help it ar rive at a decision, contacted Foster D. Snell, a division of Boos, Allen, Hamilton, to un dertake a study to determine what the consequences to the industry would be if stan dards were to be applied at various levels, ranging from zero exposure up to 50 ppm. In late August, Foster Snell reported its conclusions that it would mot be technologi cally feasible to mandate a zero-level. It recommended that OSHA set gradually phased requirements for reaching its goal, to permit collection of' additional data : and fuller assessment of ! newer medical findings as ' they become available. -i- On October 4, OSHA pub lished its ruling. Ignoring the Foster Snell report and the arguments presented by the industry at the hearings, it decreed that beginning Janu ary 1, 1975, the limit of expo sure must be set at one part per million of VCM (or vir tually a zero-level) as mea sured over an eight-hour working day, with a ceiling of 5 ppm measured over any period no longer than 15 min utes. To help achieve this standard, respirators will be required for all employes ex posed to chemical inhalation in excess of these limits, excent that until January 1, 1976, the use of such respira tors will be descretionary for employes whose exposure is at a 23-ppm level or under. In addition, monitoring and measuring programs must be initiated in plants to de termine whether exposure levels exceed 5 ppm; tests must be made monthly or quarterly. Moreover, medical exams must be given every six months to workers who have had 10 or more years exposure at a plant, and an nually to all others. Warn ing signs, posters and labels in plants must carry the in scription: "Cancer Suspect Agents"; they must be shown on all packages of PVC. Although the new rul ing will apply to the produc ers of VCM and PVC and to the packaging, repackaging, transportation storage of the chemcial, it won't include the handling or use of end products. BFG33346 \V f Political Pressure Needless to say, produc ers were shocked by the rul ing. They thought that they had presented a strong case in pointing out that no ani mal--let alone humandeath has been reported at under 50-ppm exposure. Some trade observers be lieve that the OSHA regula tion was issued under heavy political pressure from unions and industrial health crusaders. Others feel that OSHA proposed the most sel vere standards possible, fig! uring that the industry would challenge the ruling in court, and that the latter would then have the responsibility' of resolving the issue. Actually, OSHA wrote a loophole into ita exposure regulation. This provides that while trying to get down to the one-part level with en gineering modifications, the industry could meet the deadline by supplying work ers with respiratory equip ment. However, producers claim that such devices are in short supply. Even if they were plentiful, PVC makers contend that they are dan gerous to use. At the OSHA hearings, government wit nesses conceded that respira tors, worn full time on the job, would be "instruments of torture." People with less than normal pulmonary func tions can't breathe properly in them; 32% of the male population over 35 falls into this category. Faced with the task of complying with a virtual zero-exposure level and a shortage of respirators, pro ducers have warned that they may be forced to shut down all or a substantial part of their operations. SPI hired the Arthur D. Lit tle consultant firm to assess the impact on the U.S. of a total shutdown of VCM and PVC facilities. Surveying all the industries dependent on such materials, Little con cluded that a complete shut down would result in a loss of 1.5 million-2 million jobs and losses of at least SGO billion in production and sales. Serious Consequences No one, of course, expects a toted shutdown of the PVC industry--even if the OSHA ruling is not delayed or mod ified by the courts. But just a partial shutdown or slow down could have serious con sequences. Hence, leading PVC makers are taking vig orous steps to try to adjust to the situation. Goodrich has announced that it will spend 542 million over the next three or four years to reduce worker exposure to the low est level possible in the six plants that make or process the resin. Diamond Shamrock, a major resin maker with two new plants, already has re duced its exposure levels to a range of 5 to 25 ppm; it I hopes to improve operations further with the use of respi ratory equipment. The firm is going ahead with construc tion of a 200-million pound facility, which is expected to come on stream next year. Robiniech, a resin and poly vinyl pipe fabricator, says it plans to apply new engineer ing techniques in its Painesville, Ohio, plant, and a Jap anese process it has ac quired for a new plant in i Texas. But for the industry j as a whole, the future is ; filled with uncertainty. DUAL-PURPOSE FUNDS Friday, December 4,1974 Following is a weekly listing of the unaudited net asset values of dual-purpose, closed-end investment funds' capital shares as reported by the companies as of Friday's close. Also shown is the closing listed mar ket price or the dealer-to-dealer asked price of each fund's capital shares, with the percentage of difference. Cap. Shs. N.A. Val % Price Cap. Shs. Diff. Am DualVest ...... 3'/, 3.47 -9.9 Gemini ..........,-r. . 5 459 -241 Hemisphere .... .12 000 2 Income and Cap .. . 314 331 -5.4 Levtraoe ............ . 414 4.82 -4.4 Pegasus Inco&Cap . 414 --41.79 2 Putnam Duo Fund . 2% 222 +29.5 Scudder Duo-Vest . 3H Scudder D-V Each . 15 7.10 --338 1173 -4.4 Upper Analytical. BFG33347 Mefrno TOs B F Good rich OEPT. 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