Document 0LNyM78qqRNqGNyBZMNZj95Gb

SC-ALL-00900 I SC-ALLF-00265 1934 TRANSACTIONS National Safety Council Incorporated TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL SAFETY CONGRESS Cleveland, Ohio October 1 to October 5, 1934 The Cleveland, Carter and Statler Hotels Cepyrixkt, 19J5, Notional Safety Council, Inc. Publication Plan THE TRANSACTIONS of the Twenty-third Annual Safety Con gress, National Safety Council, 1934, are published in two volumes. The first, containing the General Sessions, the Special Subject Sessions, and the Industrial Section Sessions, is presented herewith. It is sup plemented by a smaller volume containing the sessions of the Street . and Highway Traffic Section, the Child Education Section, and Home Safety. The large volume is being sent automatically to the Industrial mem bers of the Council; the smaller volume is sent automatically to mem bers who are believed to be chiefly interested in those sessions. It may also be secured on request by other Council members. For the benefit of many members who have found it advantageous to distribute copies of these TRANSACTIONS to supervisors, fore men and others among their personnel, who may keep them for contin uous reference, the following quantity prices are quoted: 1 to 10 copies of the large volume, $1.50 each; 11 copies and over. $1.25 each. Copies of the smaller volume, $^0 each. THE PLAN OF PUBLICATION is the same as that foDowed for tile last three years. It is a condensed record. The papers of each session or division of the Congress have been assembled, edited with care and discernment to eliminate extraneous matter and abbreviate the less essential portions, and the concise remainder is presented for study and reference. Although not "complete** in the sense that every word is reproduced, it is an interesting and valuable record which em phasizes the memorable parts of each paper or address. The original manuscripts are on file in the Council Library, available for additional reference as desired. . Although the National Safety Council endeavors to eliminate from discussion at its conventions matters which are not pertinent to its purposes or which are contrary to its policies, the Council cannot ac cept responsibility for the views expressed either in the papers pre sented or the discussions thereon. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, INC. 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago CONTENTS PAGE Council Officers and Directors..................................................................................................... 4 Council Purposes and Policies..................................................................................................... 9 Annual Meeting of Members......................................................................................................... H Annual Banquet .................................................................................................................................... 21 Subject Sessions-- . Dust in Industry............................................................................................................................ 23 Fire Prevention in Industry........................................................................................... 31 Fusion Welding and Cutting................................................................................................... 41 Industrial Nursing .................................................................................:............................... 45 Industry and Its Motor Vehicle Accident Problem.............................................. 51 Maintaining Interest in Safety........................................................................................... 59 Mechanical Methods of Handling Materials............................................................... 67 New Workers............................................................................................................................. 73 Poisonous Fumes and Vapors........................................................................................... 79 Safety Equipment ..................................................................................................................... 85 Safety Organization and Program.................................................................................... 93 Safe Use of Chemicals in Industry................................................................................... 99 Safe Use of Electricity in Industry................................................................................... 103 The Injured Worker.......................................................................... Why People Fall.......................................................................................................................... 121 AH Ohio Day.......................................................................................................................................... 127 FERA Safety Conference................................................................................................................ 131 Industrial Safety Lectures-- Selling the Safety Idea................................................................................. --.............235 The Psychology of the Safety Movement in Changing Times........................ 140 Accident Prevention Equipment Manufacturers* Section .*................................... 149 Aeronautical Section .......................................................................................................................... 153 A. S. S. E. --Engineering Section.......................................................... Automotive and Machine Shop Section................................................................................... 163 Cement Section .............................................................................................................................. 177 Chemical Section ................................................................................................................................ 187 Construction Section ........................................................................................................................ 199 Delivery, Taxicab and Bus Section.......................................................................................... 209 Food Section ..................................................................................................................... Marine Section.........................................................................................................................................227 Meat Packing, Tanning and Leather Industries Section.............................................. 245 Metals Section........................................................................................................................................ 255 Mining Section.........................................................................................................................................269 Paper and Pulp Section......................................................................................................................289 Petroleum Section ..................................;......................................................................................... 307 Power Press Section....................... 325 Public Utilities Section....................................................................................................................... 337 Quarry Section...................................................................................................................................... 349 Refrigeration Section.....................................................................................:................................. 357 Rubber Section .................................................................................... Safety Section, ARA--Steam Railroad Section, NSC.................................................... 383 Textile Section ..................................................................................................................................... 413 Transit Section ..................................................................................................................................... 419 Wood Products Section.................................................................................................................... 435 Index............................................................................................................................................................... 445 219 113 159 365 National Safety Council Incorporated HONORARY MEMBERS Association of Ikon and Steel Electrical Engineer.* KonpJiT W. Campoeil ARTHUR WtIJJAMS OFFICERS (1934-1935) John E. Long, President. Robert I. Catlix. Vice-President for Public Safety. D. D. Fennell Vice-President ior Public Relations. I-ew R. pAiMPJt. Vice-President for Safety Councils. Auiut S. Kegula. Vice-President Inr Engineering. C. W. Smith. Vice-President for Industrial Safety. R. T. Solessten. Vice-President for Meml>ership. Dil C. H. Watson. Vice-President fur Healtb. . A. W. Whitney. Vicc-PrcsMlent for induration. W. H. Worth. Vice-President (or Finance and Treasurer. W. H. Cameron. Managing Director and Secretary. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (1934-1935) A. I_ Armstrong. Kastman Kodak Cmnpany C. B. Acel Past President. J. 1. Ranasii. Past President. C. W. Heroouist. Past President. F. W. Braun. Wood Products Section. W. H. Cameron. National Saicty Groncil. Rorert W. Campbell. Past President. T. H. Carrow. American Railway Association. Rorert 1. Catlix. Aetna Casualti* & Surety Cjfay. J. E. Culuxey. Rctblehcm. Steel Comtmny. Uwi. A. Df.Rloil Past President. Marcus A. Dow. Past President. D O. Fennell. Consulting Engineer. I). 1_ Fennell Kansas City Safety Council. Capt. K. W. I'iskf- Jil. Marine Section. R. B. FoRTftN. Lehigh Valley Safety Council. Harrv Cvilrert. The Pullman Company. Mfrle C. Hale. Automotive & Machine Shop Section. G. T. Hellmith. Chicago. North Shore & Milwaukee Railroad Co. Hon. Harold G. Hokfman. Street & Highway Traffic Section. Thomas P. Kf_\rxs. Indtistrial Commission of Ohio. Walter G. King. Past President. 4 Officers and Directors Franklin M. Kreml Evanston Safety Council. John E. Long, Tlic Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corp. Titos. H. MacDonald, L'nited States Department of Agriculture. E. J. Mehren, Portland Cement Association. I. W. Millard. Accident Prevention Manufacturers* Section. Harold L. Miner. K. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.. Inc. Arthur T. Morey, Past President. Lew R. Palmer, Past President. C. E. Pettidone. Past President. C. E. Ralston, Western Pennsylvania Saietv Council. Albert S. Rem;la. Industrial Relations Counselors. Inc. Lt. Col H. A. Renixger, Past President. George M Sanford, General Klctcric Cnmj^ny. KonsRT L Schmitt, l-ouisviJIc Safety Cmmcil. Harry A. Schultz. United States Steel Corporation. Charles B. 'Scott. Past President. Lester D. Seymour. Aeronautical Section. C. W. Smith, Standard Oil Company (Indiana!. Walter Dent Smith. Delaware Safety Council. R. T. Solensten. Elliott Service Company. Clarence P. Taylor. Massachusetts Safety Council. C. P. Tolmax. Past President. J. A. Voss. Metals Section George H. Warfel Union Pacific Railroad Comiwmy. Dr. C. H. Watson. American Telephone & Telegratth Company. A. W. Whitney. National Bureau of Casualty &* Surely Underwriters. W. E, Worth. International Harvester Owipnny. Arthur H. Young. Past President. DIRECTORS (1934-1935) Frederick Archer. Child Education Section. William F. Ardern. Safety Div.. Mihvattkee Assiciation of Commerce. A. I~ Armstrong. Eastman Kodak Company. * William H. Baker. Quarry Section. J. I. Raxasii. Consulting Engineer. H. I). Baxta. Paper & Pulp Section. Ernest W. Beck. United States RuIjIkt Products. Inc. W. A. Bennett, Worcester Safety Cottncil. C. W. Bergquist. Western Electric Cronparty. David S. Beyer. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. E. F. Blank, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. C F. Borkenhagen. Kenosha Safety Cotmici. F. W. Braun. Wood Products Section. Col Phil H. Brockman. 5l Louis Safety Council. Preston D. Calli-m. Baltimore Safety Council. W. H. Cameron. National Saicty Council. T. J. Carney, Chicago Safety Council. T. H. Carrow, American Railway Association. 6 Twenty-third Annual Safety Congress--National Safety Council Robert I. Catu.v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. Carl C. Ciemexts. Refrigeration Section. Koscof. D. Conux, Rahway Safety Council. - H. Herbert Corson, Safety Dept.. Nashville Chamlcr of Commerce. J. 1*1 Clllinev. Bethlehem Steel Company. Kmvami Dana, Boston Elevated Railway. 1C. A. Davipsox, Consulting Engineer. Kiciiakd H. Davis. Blackstnne Valley- Safety Council. Charles D. Dawson. Grand Rapids Safety Council. Lewis A. DeBlois, Consulting Engineer. Jav E. Decker. Mason City Safety Council. James B. Douglas. The Philadelphia Gas Works Company. Ixtuis I. Dublin. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Charles H. Eames. Textile Section. D. D. Fennell, Consulting Engineer. ` D. 1- Fennell. Kansas CHy Safety Council. Doxaui A. Finkreixer. Toledo Safety Council. Cait. E. W. Fiske. Jiu Marine Section. Howard B. FoNn.%. Burroughs Wellcome & Co. (U. S. A.) Inc. R. B Foktuin. Lehigh Valley Safety Council. E. N. Goldstine. Construction Section. Onto M. Craves. The General Crushed Stone Co. Harry Guilbert. The Pullman Company. Isaiah Hale. The Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. Merle C- Hale. Automotive & Machine Shop Section. Major Bolling H. Handy, Richmond Safety Council. D. T. Harrington. United States Bureau of Mines. G. T. HELLMirrn. Chicagofi North Shore & Milwaukee R. U. Co. On as. E. Hill. New York Central Une$. Hon. Harold G. Hoffman. Street & Highway Traffic Section. Claude J. Holding. Alhanv Safety Council. Jt*Lii:s W. Horse. Hudson County Safety Council. Harry D. Immfl. Pennsylvania Dept, of 1 jhor & Industry. Lex Jf.xsen, Berkeley Traffic Safety Commission. Edgar P. Kaule. York County Safety Council. Thomas P. Kearns. Industrial Commission of Ohio. K. T. Keller. Detroit Industrial Safety Council. Ira V. Ketxer. Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Co. E. J. Kreu. Public Utilities Section. Franklin M. Kreml. Evanston Safety Council. C. L. LaFouxtaine. Great Northern Railway Co. Frank J. Laxahax. Fori Pitt Mallcahlc Iron Co. John Lauermax. Meat Packing. Tanning & Leather Industries Section. Simon Lazarus. Safety Council. Columbus (Ohio> Chamber of Commerce. Joseph Lillicii. Rochester Safely Council. Dr. R. M. Little. New York Department of Education. G. O. Lockwood. Petroleum Section. J. E. Long. The Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corp. W. R. I-oyd. Safety Div.. Birmingham Chamber of Commerce. Officers and Directors A, E. Luxdstkadt, Delivery, Taxicab & Bus Section. Tuos. H. MacDonald, United States Department of Agriculture. L. T. McArthur, Peoria Safety Council. Miller McClixtock, Harvard University. T. H. McKexney, Illinois Steel Company, South Works. A. D. McWhorter. Safety Div,, Memphis Oiamlier of Commerce. H. T. Martin. Fisk Rubber Company. J. O. Martin, Employees' Publication Section. F. W. Matson. Minnesota Safety Council. . J. Meiiren, Portland Cement Association. T. O. Meisner, Power Press Section. Wm. G. Metzger, Mining Section. I. W. Millard, Accident Prevention Kquitunent Manufacturers* Section. Harold L. Mixer, E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co* Inc. Henry J. Mixeur, Elizabeth Safety Council. Lawrence M. Moore, Eastbay Safety Council. R. B. Mobley, Industrial Accident Prevention Associations. John A. Oaktel. Carnegie Steel Company, George C. A. Orr. The Detroit Edison Coniiianv. Lew R. Palmer, Equitable T4fe Assurance Society. John C. Parker, Brooklyn Safety Council. David A. Patton, Newark Safety Council. C. E. Pettibone, American Mutual Liability Insurance Company. Gen. George B. Pillsbury. War Department J. B. Power, Seattle Traffic & Safety Council. C. E. Ralstox, Western Pennsylvania Safety Council. Albert S. Regula. Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. Lt. Col. Henrv A. Rexixger, Lehigh Portland Cement Company. Makixus Riter. Paterson Safety Council. G. E. Sanford, General Elctcric Cotnpany. Henry G. Sciiaffxer. Eric Safety Council. - T. A. Sciiesdel. Food Section. Robert I- Schmitt. I<ouisviltc Safety Council. H. V. ScHREinER, Transit Section. > Harry A. Sciiultz, United States Steel CorjKjralion. Charles B. Scott, Bureau of Safety, Inc. Lester D. Seymour, Aeronautical Section. Earl S. Siiartzer, Utica Safety Council. - Ray H. Sheets, Madison County Safety Council. Dr. L A. Siioudy, Bethlehem Steel Company. Ernest L. Simonds. New* Haven Safety Council. Lee E. Skeel, Cleveland Safely Council. C. W. Suirn. Standard Oil Company (Indiana). Walter Dent Smith, Delaware Safety Council. R. T. Solexsten, Elliott Service Company. E. C- Spring, Lansdale, Pa. George R. Stephens, Safety Bureau, Buffalo Chamber of Commerce. Lucius S. Stores, United Railways & Electric Co. 7 8 Twenty-third .Innnal Safety Cnni/rens--National Safely Cuuneil Da. F. M. Sulzmax. Troy Safety Council. Alfred H. Swayxe. General Motors Corporation. Clarence P. Taylor. Massachusetts Safety Council. Arthur M. Tone. Consulting Marine Engineer. W. \V. Trench. Schenectady .Safety Council. \\\ 1). Turdeville. San Antonio Safety Council. J. A. Voss, Metals Section. H. A. Walker. Rubber Section. George H. Warfeu Union Pacific Railroad Company. On. Cass4vs H. Watson. American Tcleplwnie & Telegraph Company. Harry M. Wember. Illinois licit Telephone Company. Aluekt C. White. Jr.. Springfield Safety Council. S. HL Wiimxc. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. A. W. Whitney. National Bureau of Casualty & Surety Underwriters. W. H. Winans. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 1)r. C.-E. A. Winslow. Yale Medical School. . Harry Wise, Sr.. Chattanooga Safety Council. J. M. Woltz. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company. W. E. Worth. International Harvester Comiany. K. J. Zauft. Safety Bureau. Duluth Chamber of Commerce. Earl \V. Zimmerman. Safety Div,, Syracuse Chamlier of Commerce. J. B. Zook. Cement Section. Council Purposes and Policies The fundamental purpose of the National Safety Council is to conserve human life. It seeks this goal through a continuous campaign of accident prevention that is nationwide in scope, applies to all lines of hazardous activity, and directly or indi rectly reaches our entire citizenry. It is a non-profit organization non-sectarian, and free from political affiliations. Since its organization in 1913, it has won respect as an essential national institution. Inseparable from accident prevention is the Councirs work in improving health conditions and jiteventing vocational diseases in American industry. Today there are 4,000 incmliers, representing every state in the Union, and many of the Canadian Provinces. There arc 400 foreign members. The membership includes industrial cur|H>rations. firms, individuals, public officials, schools, chambers of commerce, clubs and civic organizations. About 70 per cent are industrial con cerns. including the hig steel companies, the oil ctrmpamcs, most of the railmads in tlte United States, the automotive industry, and others of outstanding unjiortancc in unr national industrial field. Origin and Growth The history of the Council is an absorbing story. Unfortunately it cannot be detailed here. Suffice to say llut the First Co-Of)erativc Safety Congress ivas held under auspices of the Association of Iron and Steel Electrical Engineers in Mil waukee. in 1912. and. as a result, the National Safety Council was organized in New York the following year with fourteen members. During the first year the member ship increased to 971. - Tlie pioneers of American safety went to work on the sound premise that acci dents were an unnecessary part of our scia1 order and that through application of proper remedial measures they could be avoided. They set about to nationalize this theory, and to develop tlte detailed methods and materials through which accidents could lie jircventcd. The mcmliers of tin: organization now arc more than ever cint-mccd that accidents arc unnecessary and tint they can be and arc being pre vented. Striking examples of reductions in many different fields prove this conten tion. Results of Organized Safety Since the National Safety Council was organized in 1913, tlte national accident death rate in all fields excepting motor vehicle has ftccn reduced 42 per cent The motor vehicle accident problem continues to lie a serious one. While there was a slight decline in fatalities m 1932--the first drop that ever'occurred--1933 witnessed a slight increase, and the rise lias (teen so accentuated during the first three-quarters * of 1934 that the year will probably represent a new. all-time higlu Bettcr-thanaverape results in motor vehicle safety have been achieved among school children, in commercial vehicle fleets, in states with projicrly administered drivers license laws and in cities wtfh an effective community safety organization. These bright spots indicate that tlte national problem can lie solved by a careful study and afiplicatum of the methods which (tare already produced results. Tlte National Safety Council was started as an industrial safety organization and the best results arc to he expected in this field. Here spectacular achieve ments have been made. Tlte steam railroads, for instance, have reduced the accident rate among employees 75 per cent during the past ten years. A group of our largest steel industries have cut their accidents 90 jh.t cent since 1913. Every year, scores of industrial establishments go through the entire year without a single'dis abling injury among their employees. Along with these reductions the whole psychology of accidents has changed. Employer and employee both look at the projiosition from a different viewpoint than they did some two decades ago. Accidents now arc really out of date. Tn many 9 22 Twenty-third Annual Safety Congress--National Safety Council WHEREAS, there is such pressing need for prompt executive action to put these measures into effect and stop these needless tragedies; THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED: That the National Safety Council re spectfully urges the President of the United States to call the Governors of the several States into conference as early in tle new year as practicable, to lay be fore them the seriousness of the situation, the remedies which have been developed ior correcting these conditions and the necessity fur prompt and united action in alt the Stales to ado|>t and more energetically carry on an effective program for tlie jirotccthm of life and limb on our streets and highways. By forma] motion, and by a rising vote, the entire audience of delegates and guests approved this action of the Council Executive Committee. Following this. L1.-C0I. Reninger read llw following letter received from the President of the United States: THE WHITE HOUSE My dear Mr. Long: WASHINGTON September 27, 1934 1 wish t extend to the memlnTs m* tlic National Safetv Council, in session at the twenty-third Annual Safety Conference, my most cortftal greetings and my heartiest good wishes for the success or your endeavors. The fact that you arc concerning yourselves with saving life, tltat you arc keeping hi view huirau values and juTsonal security commends your program to the entire country. ' I am greatly impressed and pleased with the constructive steps already taken toward the elimination of accidents, csjiecially highway disasters, which, I>ccause avoidable, arc doubly tragic. This is a problem which we must attack with the utmost energy and persistence. Ultimately we may expect to reach the solution of highway safety, provided complete cunjtcratiun on the jiart of all citizens is given to concerted efforts of groups such as yours. At present the rising toll of fatalities on roads and city thoroughfares indicates in a manner all loo grim that we are still far from the goal. American automotive developments ami our unequalled system of highway com munications which have given signal contributions to our convenience, pleasure, and commerce, must nut be permitted to devolve into instruments of death and disaster. I assure you oi my keen |crsnal interest in your efforts and commend your splendid program to induce co<pcration among every citizen in our nation with the movement looking to the prevention of needless fatalities--a drain upon our most precious natural resource which must be ended. Very sincerely vours, Mr. John E. Long. President. National Safety Council. c/ Cleveland Hotel, Cleveland. Ohio. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. President John E. lumg then an>sc and introduced Mr. Harotd G. Hoffman, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of. New. Jersey, who presided as Toastmaster. His witlv inmxhiction of tlie speaker of the evening. Dr. John I- Davis, of New York Chy. was highly appreciated by the hig audience; and was only surpassed, pcriiaps. by the brilliant address of Dr. Davis, himself. " Dr. Davis was listed hi the program to #i*cak on "The Spirit of America.' Despite this handicap, he seized the opportunity to present a highly popular mono logue--so {Hipular in fact that his success mounted steadily throughout the evening; and it was readily agreed, after an hilarious session, tliat no lianquct of the Council had approached this for many a year. ADJOURNMENT TW ENTY-T II / HI) ANNUAL SAFKTY CONGRESS NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL Dust in Industry FRIDAY AFTERNOON SESSION October 5, 1934 The session devoted to a discussion of Dust in Industry was called to order by Dr E. G. Mcitcr, Director, Industrial Hygiene l-aboratory, Employers Mutual Lia bility Insurance Co., Milwaukee, who presided. Dr. Mcitcr briefly welcomed the delegates and then introduced tlie first speaker. Types of Dust That Cause Occupational Diseases By LEROY U. GARDNER, M.D. Director, Saranac Laboratory for the Study of Tuberculosis, of the Edward L. Trudeau Foundation, Saranac Lake, N. Y. Tlie speaker said in part: Experience has demonstrated that the lung tissues can tolerate very large amounts of most kinds of foreign dust particles without, serious interference with function. Tlie lung may lie intensely pigmented by colored dust* with no evidence that respiration is impaired. But dusts com|ioscd. in whole or in part, of silica have been shown to lie dangerous liccausc they stimulate the growth of the connective tissues of the lungs and bring about the formation of scar tissue. This dcstrovs the normal elasticity of the organ which is necessary tor respiration and it thickens the delicate membranes so that a free interchange ot gasses is impeded- Fortunately, these results only follow the prolonged inhalation of very large quantities of silica. . . ... ,- . Experiments have demonstrated that the injection of silica into the tissues ot animals kills the cells where the substance lodges and excites an inflammation. When healing takes place a very dense and characteristic kind of sear tissue forms. Most non-siliccous dusts produce no inflammation and very little scar. It has liccn shown tliat such changes do not follow the injection of silica unless the particles arc very fine, three microns or less in diameter, and unless enough of them localize in one area. With larger particles the rate of reaction is so slow that little change occurs within a year. As a general rule, the finer the fiarticlcs, the more rapid the cellular response. The reaction to fine silica begins within four or five hours and it continues for a period of years. If the silica is combined with liases in the form of silicates, it rarely produces such active and progressive changes. Tlie silicate of magnesium, asbestos, docs cause the formation of scar tissue in experimental animals and in the human lung, but most other silicates are not generally recognized as irritating. Recently it has been claimed that a hydrated silicate of aluminum and potassium, called scricite. is responsible for most of tlie eases of silicosis. This silicate, a transformed feldspar, is often associated with quartz and it has liccn identified in the lungs of persons suf- 23 24 7 wcnty-third .-liiuiml Safety Congress--Xutiunaf Safety C ouncil ferine ,rum silicosis. However, at least two tyjfcs of scricitc have failed to excite significant chanpv* when injected into animals. Experiments with Otis suitslance arc still in progress. Kaolin, an alumino-silicatc of potash, lias also produced quite characteristic changes in the lungs of rabbits. But our present knowledge does not pcrmii us to assume that silicates as a class will produce serious tissue damage. Most observers now Ivlicvc tliat uncoinhined silica, or quartz, is poisonous to llity tissues li-causc it is slowly dissolved in the fluids of the body. Certamiv the majority of the cxperimcmnl ol<servations suggest a chemical injury, hut it is'difli- cnlt to understand how enough of such an insoluble sulistancc as quartz could lie dissolved within eight hours to produce a well marked, acute inflammation. If solubility were the only factor one should discover a more active response after the injectbm f the iiv-rc readily soluble silicates, hut such is not the ease. For merly it was held that silica (troduced its effect mechanically. The hard sharp quartz particles were lieln-vcd to ahraid the lung surfaces and excite the formati.tn ..f scar tissue as a manifestation of healing. This theory is no lunger Ienable if when animals are injected with other hard, sharp particles like diammul carlmrumhmi or aluminum oxide, there is no inflammation and praettcallv no formation of scar tissue. Ultimately it may lie shown that the irritation of silica is due to some unrecognized property possibly related to its atomic structure. . When quartz ]'articles are inhaled they produce three *|*ccific effects which arc mil excited by any ntlicr tyie of dnst yci studied. They alter the tiehavior of the pulmonary phagocytes: they stimulate the formation of circumscrilied nodules of scar tissue: am! they subsequently increase the susceptibility of tlie lung to infection, espe cially tulterculnus infection. I*hagocyles that ingot ui many quartz (articles arc killed hv this irritating *u1stancc. As the cells die thej- lilwratc their burden and several new phagocytes ornic out to take it up again. !y a rcixiition of this jimccss enough phagocvtcs accumulate s> that many of them ingest only a few particles. Under such circum stances the stimulus is not strong enough to kill hut merely accelerates the motility of the cells. They naturally lend to leave the air spaces, enter the Imiphatic ves sels ami accumulate in the lymph nodes. This (imrcs* U-couws more rapid under tltc influence of the irritating silica and very considerable numbers of particles arc consequently localized in the miles. * After six or eight years tltc quaru in the nodes lias caused a narked over* growth oi tlie fibrous elements in these structures. Ullimatelv the readion develops to such an extent tliat the mile is entirely replaced hr a mass oi coarse, glassy scar tissue Wires, ntun several times as large as the original mile. Such nodules en croach tip*n and conqwess the lymphatic vessels. The drainage system oi tlie lung is choked and effective reiuoval of stihsoiucmly inlialcd dust is gradual!*- diminished. Dust now accumulates around the lymph vessels awl sheets of scar tissue develop in this location. These prefiiniuary changes do not constitute the disease, silicosis: thev involve only the lymphatic system. The respiratory tissues are not appreciable' affected. in good stern X-ray films these preliminary changes mav lie visualized as a thick ening awl Itcading oi tlie shadows cast hv the himid vessels together with a widen ing of the shadow oi the root of the lung. The blond vessels are thickened because the must mqMirtaut lymphatic vessels course through their walls. Tlie beading is due to the minute nodule* of silicotic scar tissue m the lymph nodes within the lung. Tlie r*t slud**w is whletie*! Uvausc ot the silicotic reaction in the traipli wiles in this location. . ' If still more dust is inhaled it can no longer l*e effective!v carried off through the lymph vessels. The pliagncytes n*\v carry it into the walls oi the air spaces. Otten the yells group themselves in nodules hut sometimes thev are scattered. In these locations the silica again stimulates the formation of scar tissue. The result t* a general thickening of die septa In-tween tltc spaces and nodulation throughout the^ ttmctmnal pnrtiim of the lung. This change seriously interferes with function as interchange of gas cannot take place through the thickened walls of tlie air spaces ami the tissues lose* their normal elasticity. I .css involved air spaces dilate and their walls stretch, producing the condition known as cmphvscma. which is also inenm(atihlc with effective respiration. With tlie formation of silicotic nodules in tlie functioning (arts of the lung the Ihfst in Industry 25 disease, silicosis, is said to begin. On the X-ray film such wilules cast dear cut. round shadows. As they iiKrcasc in mmilirr and size they him util the iormcrly accentuated linear sladows oi the blood vessels. In a well marked ease both lung fields may be thickly seeded whh hundreds of such sharply defined, rounded, nodular shadows. Where there is ciujihyscma. often at the lases. no markings are visible and the film appears black. . The condition of silicosis is a progressive one and it continues to develop alter a man lias left his dusty occupation. Scrums results only follow, Imwcvcr. when he leaves with many nodules in tle lung tissue itself. As Audi nodules increase in size they replace important functional dements. Obviously the continued growth ol only a few nodules situated in the lymphatic system could have little effect other than to increase the obstruct*'** already (ircscui. , Tlie serious part of silicosis is its frequent complication by lul*crcuU*sis. This mav arise from reactivation of a pre-existam latent infection or it may result from a new infection from without. The danger of infection increases with the amount of silicosis present. The course oi the infection in the siticotic is usually chrome and it often fails to produce clwracleristic symptoms for ^months m years after its onset. Many times it is accidentally discovered in routine X-ray examination oi groups of active workmen. However, evidences of disability arc much more marked in silicotic individuals with infection than in those with uncomplicated disease. Occa sionally tuberculosis may run a very acute course in the silicotic subject imt this is also true in other persons. The cause of the susceptibility of the silicotic lung to tuberculosis is not perfectly understood, hut it would seem that the action of the silica tm the tissues creates a medium favorable for the growth of the lacteria. The tubercle liacilli multiply atui a slowly pnigressivc tissue reaction ensues, hut the usual clinteal symptoms of tuberculosis arc often held in abeyance for a long time because the dunces for absorption of (toisonuiis pr<ditcts of infection arc mini mized by tlie olistructcd lymphatic system. It is also possible tliat s*ime of these poisons may lie absorbed on the silica (articles, as Cummins has suggested. Ulti mately the infection gains the upjier land, symptoms develop and deatli from tulicr- culosis ensues. The only other type oi dust which is generally recognized as a cause of severe pulmonary injury is asbestos, a silicate of magnesium. This sulistancc is fibrous in character and is more readily soluble than quartz. Apparently the protective upicr respiratory mechanisms seem inadequate to jireveiit the inhalation of many such fibres and even quite long ones may. penetrate into the finer bronchial tidies. These structures have irregularities in their walls which seem to hold tlie fibrous dusts. In this location the asliestos (articles arc siirmtimld ami ingested by phago cvtcs. The cells do not seem to he particularly irritated for they are not espe cially numerous nor do they migrate rapidly into dumps as in tlie ease of phago cvtcs dealing with quartz. Ajiparcntly iw*st of them carry their luirden of asbestos fragments directly into the wall* of the tidies in which they lie. The mildly irri tating dust sets up' a proliferation of the connective tissue cells in the walls result ing in collar-like thickening of the tidies. Contraction of the new connective tissue narrows or closes tlie tube and thereby shuts off the ingress of air to the more peripheral air spaces. These spaces (lien collapse, a condition known as atelectasis. This m itself is a cause of fibrosis or scarring of lung tissue. The result is a fibrosis of numerous relatively small areas in the lung due to the collar-likc constricting fibrosis about many small terminal bronchial tidies. The lymphatic system seems to play little part in disposing of asliestos dust and very insignificant amounts of this dust are found m the lymph nodes. _ Not a few eases of ashestosis die of tultcrctilosis or hrnnchnjnieumonia hut the prevalence of the former infection is probably much less common than in silicosis. Surveys oi large groups of asbestos workers fail to reveal sudi a high incidence of tuberculosis as found m similar studies ott silica workers. The inhalation of unusual amounts of non-siliccous dusts apparently fails to pro duce significant alterations in the lung. It is of course possible that injurious ones rav ultimately lie discovered, hut none are recognize*! today. The non-siliccous particles enter the lung and arc ingested by phagocytes as in the case of quartz. The cells arc not stimulated to move very rapidly and as a consequence many of them remain within the air spaces for a long time. Some, particularly those con- 26 Twenty-third Animal Safety Congress--Motional Safety Couneil tabling relatively lew janiclvs, make their way into the iynipliatic system and accu mulate in the lymph nodes. In sufficient concentrathm, or jterltaps because they are mixed with >mall amounts of silica, tlicy set up a lmv grade, non-progressive chronic hitlammation. liui this reaction results only in a little thickening in tlic lymph nodes and about the lymphatic vessels. The lung tissue may be variously pigmented, (lack from coal ir red ir> nn iron. Inn there is no formation oi .stir (issue titat inter feres with function. Tle susceptibility to lulnrrculusis ot the person with such pig- metitatHm is nut increased but it is apparently quite definite tliat pneumonia is unduly pre\-a!ent in coal miners ajtd tliat chronic bronchitis results from the inltala- tHui of cement. Tle X-ray films of men working in noil-siliceous dusts shows either nothing at all or a more or less marked accentuation of the linear shadows cast by the blood vessels. This, of course, is due to tl*c chronic inflammatory cltanges about the |ymphatic trunks in walls of blood vessels. The elTects oi mixtures of free silica and non-siliccuus materials are less clearly defined and should receive more serious attention. It would seem unwise to assume, as has been dime in the |iast, tliat the non-siliccous substances serve only as inert diluents and that only tlc quartz coiiqioneiU oi a dust is ot siguificaucc. lixjxri- mental and clinical data arc accumulating which suggest tliat at least some oilier dusts may materially modify the action ol" quartz, both in its cajeicity to produce nodular fihriisis in the lungs and to increase the susceptibility to tuberculosis. For example, animals. inlialing heavy concentrations oi a mixture oi equal parts of |ure silica and liemalitc dust tor eight hours a ilay over a jktwkJ of 14 months have >hown not even the slightest indication of nodule iormatnm in the lung, whereas pure quartz dust, inhaled tor only two hours a clay, produces definite nodulatioti. It also scents to be true tliat animals inhaling such a mixture arc much less susceptible to tulierculosis than those exposed to pure quartz. In the ease of the human iron miner, some lungs show definite silicotic nodulation. others only a very few nodules and many no nodules at all. All exhibit hcavv dcjtosits oi iron particles with a cellular connective tissue reaction. When these findings can lie correlated with chemical analysis of the lung, tissues and the approximate amount of rock work which these miners Itave icri**rmcd. some relationship lictwccn the exposure to silica and the fibrous nodule formation may lc established. Tulicrculosis in these iron miner* is apparently less iirovnUiU ami much less severe than in men exposed to pure silica. What lias been said ot irm miners is also prnliahly true of ftnlr> workers and coal miners. It is generally accepted that men in the latter nccupatudi liave less tulicrnijosis tlinn the average for the age period: Cummins believes tliat they liave tlic infection liut tliat it is so atypical and benign in its manifestations tliat it escapes diagnosis. Mrnti'wi should also lie made of mixed dusts like certain slates ami granite containing large amounts of free silica in combination with silicates. Experimentally these substances behave atypically and do not produce nodular fibrosis unless there is complicating inicclion. The same may also he true in human licings. Unques tionably such dusts arc capable of producing typical silicotic nodules anrl they pre dispose to tuberculosis. From a theoretical standpoint thev should receive mudi more intensive study to clarify onr views on the whole subject. At tlic present time it appears that the action of their quart* component is modified and partially neu tralized by the other substance* which they contain. * Using Exhaust Systems and Respiratory Equipment To Protect Workers Exposed to Dust By STUART W. GURNEY and DAVID S. BEYER Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Boston , The speaker said in iart: A number of our states have liad references to dust elimination in their labor laws for a good many years, but no state lias as yet thoroughly enforced those laws. The codes of "five states which we investigated provide tliat grinding, buflmg and polishing wheels should lie exhausted. although two of the stales exempt from these provisions wliccls on which water is used. Dust tn industry 27 This seems ill-advised, since a study of wet and dry grinding in Connecticut by Winslow and Greenburg lias shown that tlic application of water does not hv any means eliminate the dust Itazard. ..... It may be remarked that, with everything else equal, a high static suction will give a higher velocity at the point of origin of the dust, fume nr gas tlian a low one; but this alone is not a measure of the effectiveness of any exhaust system. Wisconsin has adopted tlic principle of specifying a limit to tlie numlwr of dust particles of respirable size per cubic foot of air. After all. this is wtal we are primarily interested in, to keep tlic dust contamination down to a point where it will not be harmful. These variations and conflicting provisions in state codes merely reflect tlic gen eral lack of authoritative standards. It is accordingly fortunate that definite steps arc now (icing taken bv the American Standards Association to develop the proper basis for such codes. * There arc two committees working on this problem; the Ventilation Code Committee, sponsored by the American Society of Heating & Ven tilating Engineers, and the Exliaust Code Committee. sjicmsorcd by the Inter national Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions. It is also arranged to appoint sub-committees to take up five specific subjects: Abrasive cleaning, chromium plating, granite cutting, rock drilling, and spray coating. lit addition, a Still-Committee on Fundamental Principles of Design and Operation and Maintenance of Exhaust Systems will be appointed. Tlic two most important considerations in an effective exhaust system are: I. Velocity of air flow; 2. Arrangement of the inlets (from the standpoint of near ness to the dust source, stiape, etc.). Many an installation that is otherwise all right fails to remove the dust success fully merely because there is not enough air being drawn through the system. In a series oftcsls tliat were conducted under actual working conditions by Theodore F. Hatch, Department of Industrial Hygiene, Harvard School of Public Health, a machine used in dressing stone was employed, and it was noted tliat with an air flow through tlic hood of 230 cubic feet per minute, there were over one hundred million dust particles in the surrounding air. When the air flow was increased to a little over 250 cubic feet |icr minute, the dust concentration tad dropped to forty million, a marked improvement. As tlic air flow was further increased, the drop in dust concentration was relatively slower, ami it took a volume of alxnit 380 cubic feet per minute to firing the dust concentration down to ten or fifteen million particles per cubic foot, which was considered reasonably safe tor this type of dust. _ It is accordingly possible sometimes to take an installation tliat is not satis factory ami. if the* remainder of tlte system is well designed, by merely speeding up the blower or adding a larger one. to bring abont the desired results. Another very inqxirtant consideration is to get the inlets of the exliaust system as close as possible to tlic source of the dust. Tlic drop in efficiency as we get further ,vvav from the inlet is really surprising to one who lias not studied the prin ciples involved. It should be remembered tliat if we have the open end of an ex haust pipe or air duct in operation, the air tends to flow in from all sides, even from behind the opening. As we move away from the cm! of the pipe, the velocity drops very rapidly, so that even at a distance of five inches from the hood the velocity may he less than 10 per cent nf tliat right at tlic hood inlet. This is the most important consideration to keep in mind and one which is frequently lost sight of in designing exhaust systems. It is not uncommon to see an exhaust inlet a few indie* in diameter with which the person making the installation Imped to draw- dust from a distance of several feet, hut the air flow even a foot or two away from the entrance to the inlet may lie negligible. , Still another important consideration having to-do with the design of the inlet is the addition of a flange. The effect of this flange is to cut down the air that would flow in from behind the opening, thus drawing it nearly all from the front. Thus the efficiency of the system is substantially increased and tlic scope of the ex haust extended appreciably." without increasing tlic power consumption or otherwise adding to the expense of keeping up tlic system. There arc also other considerations of perhaps lesser importance. For example, air cannot he "pulled" from a distance by mcrclv directing an exhaust pipe toward the point in question, but it can lie "pushed" or Mown, directionally, for a consider- 28 Twenty-third Annual Safety Comjre.t.<--Xutionul Safety Council aMc distance. This principle may he used advantageously in directing! the dust toward the opening *i the exhaust inlet and thus getting the desired results with a lower exhaust vehn*itv and power consumption than would le required it suction alone were dc|tended ntum. litis principle lias !>cen applied effectively in drilling material containing asltestos, where the exhaust inlet is placed at cme side of the drill ami a small air jet at the opposite side of the drill, blowing across the table, turns lle panicles that would fly ntn from this side and directs them hack into the exhaust system. It is also l*cing applied t< foundry shakc-out work. Other considerations in designing exhaust systems include the elimination ot unnecessary Uitds nr curves, the provishni of clean-out brs. and the proper con struction of joints. Where there is a general ventilating installation and oik or more exhaust systems, care must Ih* taken to see that tlicv do not conflict with each other. After an exhaust system lias been installed it should be tested by taking actual dust counts to sec that the dust is really Iving cut dwn to the desired point, and such counts should In.* taken at intervals after the installation has Itccn made, to sec that it is still functioning pTojierly. Tlie tact tliat the dust panicles that cause the trouble are so small that they are invisible under .ordinary conditions l less titan 10 microns or 1/2500th oi an inch in diameter! often makes it liard to convince the practical plant manager that there, is any dust present: it also makes it imjtossiMc to tell, without tlte use ot spe cial instrumetits. whctlivr tin* completed cxltausl system is actually removing the dust. '' It might scetn like, an insult to one's intelligence to sav that after an cxltausl system ltas <*uce lvn installed it should Ik- maintained in g*l <perating condition. However. the uunuTous rases one encounters in tlvc plants where this <4iviotis neces sity is not carried <n. indicates tliat it is really one of tlie major considerations in eomu-etton with the elimination ot dust or funic*. Cases arc not unioniwn where the blower has in some manner Itccomc reversed so tliat the air is 1icing ejected and diffusing tin* dust, rattier titan drawing it in: other instances where the efficivncv of the system lias K*vn lowered >r its value nullified by dogging up. dis connection r wearing out ot the piping, etc., are all too common. . One cmuHTi). of which, the writers liave knowledge. has a "L"' tube permanently installed in iv oi its main exhaust systems s* that the foreman or safety man can tell at a glance whether there are any .changes tliat w*nld irulicnle a break-down in tlte system. All such installations should have regular inspections by some compe tent txTSoii as a routine part oi their upkeep. * . It will lx* sullieieiit here to discuss respiratory equipment very Iwieflv. Tlie simplest form of this equipment is the filter respirator. Such respirators Jiavc a definite value for tcmjiorary use such as sweeping up. denning out bins, sliovding materials, etc., hut they require careiul filling anil constant su|Tvision to sec that they are living projw*rly used. . It is our opinion. after watdiing the sincere efforts in a nunilicr of plants to enforce the use of these respirators, that it is rather impracticable to require tiicm to Ik used m full-tiim- op-ration. One notices the mett. under these conditions, surrciititiously pushing the respirator aside ami gasping in free air like a fish out of water. Certainly. :i they arc to lx- used any considerable length of time, fre quent rest (tcriods slmnld Ik* allowed where Ole im-n can get out into the free air for a few minutes refreshment. Then* are also the large air-u-d 1idm*:ts. with which most if us arc familiar, used lor samlblasting. etc., which liave Ikvii carried to a high state of jtcrfcclion for the purjinses to which they arc adapted. We.helicvc. however, tliat much more use could lie made advamagcmtslv of the type of np]iaratus that lies, midway liclwccn the filter respirator and the air-fed helmet, namely, the light, nir-ted respirator which covers the nose and mouth and leaves the rest oi the face excised. With a light hose attachment, this device offers cmtsiderahle freedom of movement, and if air outlets were supplied so the h**>e could he quickly transferred from one outlet to another it would seem to he practicable to use them over a considerable area. They afford the advantages of a pure air supply without excessive weight anti without* the restriction to fircathing that is imposed by the filter respirator. Dust fit Industry 2`t The Medical Supervision of Workers Exposed to Dust By w. j. McConnell, m.d. Assistant Medical Director. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., New York City Tlte speaker said in part: The Itannfulncss ui dusts varies widely in accord ance with the physical and chemical natures of each individual MthMaiicc. Certain dusts are soluble or slightly s-oluble in the Indy fluids and their lianuful effects arc prupurtiotial to the toxicity oi the conq>oumls innnvd. 1-ead. mercury. _;md arsenic arc examples of jiotsonotis dust. Other duals exert their harmful effects locally on the skin ami mucous membranes ami through irritation to the respiratory passages. Chronic acid and alkalies are examples. Attention recently has Iwn called to tlte prolwihly harmful effect oi dusts arising from radio-active ores. A fourth group oi dusts which are insoluble or very difficultly soluldc in the Imdy fluids may iiiiitatc liarniful pathological lung condition*. These may lie stilidivided into uon-fihrosis ami fibrosis producing dusts. The organic dusts, mainly the vegetable fillers, such as cotton, jute. hemp. etc., are non-fibrosis pr!ueing dusts. Tlie tihro>is .producing dusts arc limited, so far as we liave evidence. to a few of the inorganic mineral dusts, such as tree silica, crystalline silicon, quartz, and certain combined silicates. Oi the fibrosis pniducing dusts those liaving a high percentage of free silica are admittedly the most important because exjiosurc over a i>eri*d of years to such dusts distinctly predisposes the individual to (ufierctilnsis. _ TIk* effectiveness of dust control measures in preventing diseases iinduced by dusts can lie determined mly by careiul physical examination oi the workers mi cxtKiscd under the guidance of competent medical siqn-rvisbin. The Iwuefits which accrue to the cmjilnyer and emph*yec. alike, as a result of the physical examination of alt applicants for employment, as well as jicriodical examination of those already engaged. would indicate very careful consideration by industry of a program for control of sickness. Such a procedure protects the employer from engaging *i applicant already physically or mentally imixiiretl who later may claim disability for a condition`either tint associated with employment or contracted during a pre vious employment. Tlte npidicnnt'* physical and mental condition is established and Iiv keeping record of his subsequent illnesses ami accidents, the question of rc- sitnsibilitv for injuries ami sickness need never arise. . . The applicant is protected from engaging in work for which lit* is physically ill adapted which, if undertaken, might easily bring al*mt serious' impairment of his health. For example, an .i|>plicai with an arrested tii!*crcuhsis who seeks work in a certain dusty occupation, if allowed to engage in such work might readily convert an inactive luhrrenh*sis mm an active one: thereby endangering life or at least seriously impairing the applicant's future efficiency and aiming capacity. Whereas the same applicant if asstgne<l to a iisilion* tliat involves no such ex posure. might lie expected to continue for years as a useful and productive work man. The examination of applicants for employment likewise protects those that arc already employed from the risks of conmumtcahle diseases such as tiilxTculosis and varioii* acute respiratory and other infections 1icing intriluce*l into their midst hv a new applicant. Many of the younger individuals who seek employmiiit liave never lieforc re ceived a thorough physical examination and consequently are unaware of the tlg- fccts from which tlwry suffer. As a result of physical examinations, many ckdccts arc located which mav Ik rctwivel or corrected licforc they have caused irrcjiarahlc damage, therchy increasing the efliciency of the worker and often averting definite and finally chronic diseases. Ftirtlicriimrc. incipient tuberculosis.. imsus|a*ctel dis eases of the iKart. kidneys, anti a host of other diseases *i a similar nature, arc discoverctl and the applicant referred for projicr mtxlica) care am! irealnwnt which otherwise might !avc been jitistponcd imtil toil late. . . Oi even more imtK.rtancc titan the initial physical examination of applicants is the periodic examination and care of old employees by an industry. Such a pro cedure serves to check the efficiency of preventive measures designed to prevent occupational diseases. It offers the most effective way of controlling the health of <30 Twenty-third Annual Safety Congress--Rational Safety Council large groups of workers by discovering carJv not only occupatiofwl diseases, but many oilier c-inditions tliat go undiscovered until the worker is acutely ill or lie- ome> disabled. If tin* various contagious conditions go unrecognized others be- conur infected, tlnrdiy causing serious cc-mmtiic loss, as well as endangering tile health of a group of indiriduals. _ rite information obtained from physical examinations affords tlie medical sujer- visfir die ojiportimity to make certain that employees arc engaged in suitable work out ni which tiny are getting maximum results, to correct the effects of undue cx- INtstn-c to harmful environmental conditions, anil generally to lessen all occupa tional hazards. As a public health measure, it is impossible to over-estimate tlie value i! perNialic examinations in establishing interest in sickness prevention. The set-up of a profter program for medical control of workers exposed to dust deimuls U|*>n the mitnWr of employees involved and individual plant conditions. A series of articles under the title of "Tlie Medical Department Manual" by Dr. .llart 1*. l-'i>l cr. apix.iriitg in mrreni mmilHTS of "Industrial Medicine." gives a com- pn-hnisivc nivtuim of the organization and oi*eratirn of a medical dcimrlmcnt. 1. The establishment a medical department with adequate facilities and med ical personnel who liarc qualified in tlie field of industrial medicine. A process analysis of all operations in the plant should lie made and tlie medical supervisor slioiild list all |ossihle health 1vizards and familiarize himself with tltcir physio logical effecis. If necessary, he -should cmdurt research studies to determine the harmful effects of new sultstances inlr.*diH-cd into plant processes nlmut winch little is known. In cooperation with oilier departments. he should investigate the extent of the hazards ami devise measures of control. 2. The routine examination of all applicant* for-employment. The procedure .dioiild iiiclii-k- a detailed history of the applicant's previous illnesses and accidents classified under ia> diseases of childhood. (Id general infectious diseases, (c) respiratory diseases. fd venereal diseases. and Cel aceiilntls and resulting physical deircis. A detailed Vii-try of previous occupations engngetl in is very im]>oirtant. A mere .-inu-mrnt of du* type of industry in whirl) the applicnut was engaged has slight mine, if any. Tin- exact duties i>criormod in each occupation should le mucd and information ascertained as to the tnroliaMe length of eximstirc to hazard ous substances. Alter the hi-Mry has Uni taken and a photograph for identifica tion )ttn-|Kises (ti iwin of roirtinel is made, tlie applicant should In* directed to the examining room whrre he is instructed to remove his clothing for physical exam ination. This examination should In* made as complete as is considered necessary to determine the aiipltcam's physical condition. ' If the applicant lias been or will In* cxjtnsed to dusts which induce lung dis ease*. an X-ray picture of tin- chest is an important part of the examination. This part oi the examination mnv Ik* referred to an experienced rncntgcnclocist. as the value of this method of diagnosis depends ti|m tlu* tv|n- of pictures lateen anil the cxjn-rience of the rentier who mtcrjirrls them. The examining phvsician also may need additional inforntatioit obtained by lalioratory atuilvscs oi* tlie blond, sinrtimi. and tin.* urine. T1h-s- aids to diagnosis should U* provided <<r made avail able when desirable. X Tin- rating and placement of applicants. In cnnjicrattint with tin* personnel department, the applicant should 1*e rated ami placed, not only mi his training and jia>t ext>cririirc*. hut n!<o on his physical and mental nhilities to fitl vacancies occtir- ring fr-m lime 1*> time. Tlu- Tvool.oi liis physical and mental examination should l*e the rmifidential property of tlu* medical di*|inrtmml. 4. IVrindirnl physical examination*. The frequence of periodical examinations necessarily mtv-t dc|H*nd mum individual circumstances according to the need for such examinations n< determined hv the sttt*crvishtg physician. Where physical examinations are matte for the first time, the employees f lottg standing sltould he given amide explanation of tin* Imiefits of snelt examinations and Ik* given assur ances tliat their jobs arc secure. ' 5. Provisimi for the disabled. Kiiiplnvccs who develo|i disabilities during the course of cmplovmcnt sin uhl lie re-assigned to occtuialions which will not interfere with or aggravate tlu* disability. *r they should lie provided for in other ways. .WjnrRXMRXT rii'Exry-TH i an annual saw tv conghkss X ATI OX A l. SAMTV COfXCIL Fire Prevention THURSDAY AFTERNOON SESSION October 4. 1934 The Fire Prevention Session convened in the Sialler Hotel with Oiairuian Harold L. Miner, Manager, Saivty ami Fire Protection Division. M. I. dttl'mit dc Nemours & Co.. Wilmington. Delaware, presiding. After hriellv welcoming the delegates. Chairman Miner introduced the first speaker. How Home Fires Are Caused By R. B. CRISWELL Ohio Inspection Bureau, Columbus, Ohio Sjieaking cxtctni>unmcuiisly, Mr. Criswell gave a demonstration of the devices employed and the arguments advanced by himself and other mcmlicrs of the Ohio Insiieclion bureau in Itringtng to the attention of school childrai fin.* serious hazards of ilanmtahle substances in the homes. Mis object was to inform safety engineers, ami jicrliaps others in his audience who might lie interested in licconimg safety ${ieaker*. how to use simple devices in convincing the school children of the necessity for caution to avoid fires and explosions. Mach device ami method was outlined lirietly. but with striking detail, some of the dcmoustnitioos living as follows: A match, still blazing, was thrown carelessly into a small waste liaskcl, ns so many persons still continue to do. ami the waste {taper immediately dared into a dangerous blaze. With a short talk aliuut tlie forest rangers and their watchfulness in {tutting out smoldering camp fires in the North Woods, lie next carefully broke a match to make sure the match Itad gone out completely Ik-fore he tossed it aside. Said he, "Chaperone your matches: they* shouldn't go out alone." A small doll house, wired in similar fashion to a comfortable home, was ex hibited. and after an explanation outlining the many light and lamp fixture*, coupled with electrical devices, which might Ik* loaded onto the electric circuit in any home, the speaker attached these devices one after another until the fuse blew out; then he used a copjicr jieuny to plug the circuit until a fire developed in the attic of the doll house. Strangely enough, an ordinary fish bowl, with the goldfish swimming aliout. if exposed in a sunny nook of the living room, with a flimsy curtain in the right spot licsidc it. or even a flammable rug underneath, can cause a disastrous fire. The circular fish bowl and the water act as a lens to concentrate the sun's rays. This has happened repeatedly, said tlie speaker. A pretty little doll, made of pyroxylin. or some other flammable material, has often liccomc ignited in the liand of a child and Itas hunted the child severely before 31 2OS Tzeent v-third Annual Safety Congress--Xational Safety CotnicU C Hager & Suns Hinge Mig. Co. (Item? Machine Shots Division--Group H). Chase Companies. Inc. Xoera -Mis. Co. (licavv Machine Shops Division-- Group /). Krnsco Derrick .<v K.|uip:mnt O'- I). & chine Shops />ivision--Group If). Pump & Supply Co. <//.-.irv Mi% Pittsburgh Steel Co.. National Steel Fabric (Heavy Machine Shops Division-- Group If). "Your Hour" The final feature of ihc program was the annual event entitled **\our H`iur . Ivil ?iv T. H. McKcnncy. Supervisor of i-abor & Safety. Illinois Steel Co- Sutl Chicago. HI. Mr. McKennev presented a number of questions hi Ins diaractensitc maimer.' ami a general discussion ensued which was participated in hv all the delegates. Tltc discussion was. of course. cxU-ni|H.rancou* and no record <i available. .IDJOUKX, MUST - riv r.NTY-Tin an anneal safety cox guess Ar.7 7V OX A L SAFETY COEXCIL Mining Section Officers 1933-34 Genera/ Chairman--P. M. Arthur. American Zinc Company of Tennessee. Mascot. Tenn. Vice-Chairman in Charge of Membership Coal Mines--Frank 11. Dunham. Pickamis. Mather Jfc Co.. Mather. Pa. I iec-Chainuan in charge of Membership Meta/ .1/iur.c--J. \\*. Alt. Calumet it Hccla Consolidated Cupper Co.. Calumet. Mich. I'iee-Cltairnuin in Charge of Engineering--\Ym. f. Metzger. 1 Unison Coal Co.. Scranton. Pa. Secretary anti X~es Letter Editor--Daniel 11arm xgton. Cnited States Bureau ol Mines. Washington, I). C. Entertainment Committee Chairman--J. T. Ryan. Mine Safety Appliances Co.. Pittsburgh, Pa. Easier amt Slide Committee Chairman--.!. J. Formes. Coiled Slates Bureau ot Mines, Pittsburgh, Pa. Program Committee Chairman--R. X. Hosier. Coal Mine Section, Pennsylvania ComiKmsatum Rating & Inspection Bureau. Harrisburg. l*a. Publicity Committee Chairman--M. R. IUiu>. Explosives Engineer. Wilmington, Del. Statistics Committee Chairman--W. W. Adams. United States Bureau of Mines, Waslimgtcm, D. C- * Memlters at Large-- W. H. Comixs. Xalional Lead Co- St. Francois. Mo. M. K. Faikue, Tltc Mining Con>oration of Canada. Ltd- Toronto, Ont- Can ada. C. W. Ginns. Harwich Coal and Coke Ccl, Pittslmrgh. pa. H. C. Hknkie. Phelps Dodge Corp., Bislicc. Ariz. Thomas E. I-ir.iiTFooT. Koppcrs Coal Co.. Pittsburgh. Pa. Lee Iuixc. CHnchfield Coal Corp.. Dante. Va. George Martinson, Pickands, Mather & Co- Hibhing. Minn. D. D. Moffatt. Utah Copiicr Co- Salt Lake City, Utah. M. W. Price. Jeddo-Highlaud Coal Co,, Jcddo. Pa. I- T. Sick a. St. Joseph I.cad Co- Bonne Terre. Mo. Howard I. Young. American Zinc. Lead & Smelting Co- St. Louis. Mo. 269 2*0 Ttivnty-ihird Annual Safety Congress--Xational Safety Council experienced. have |*rnver1 nMist successful. raters from the Xational Safety Coun cil arc also extensively used. However. Iiulletin imanl.s may lose a great portion of their effectiveness, in spite of Titular changes ot materials. We felt that a new method should be tried, and tlte moving picture with sound rcpr**lucli<jns was adopted. We now liave tour or five imjlergrouml theatres. equip)**! with permanent bcndics, a ten font screen, and electric lights. Notices of scheduled shows, whidi arc held before the men start their shifts, are i>o>icd a day or two in advance, and as the men enter tlte mim* they are greeted with music amplified from jthonograph records placed on an ordinary tuni-tahle equip)**] with an electric pick-up. Lively niarclics and [popular pieces are played as the men gather at the theatre. * Tin: first film is usually a comedy which makes for a feeling oi good fellow ship and creates in the group, a responsive mood for the discussion oi safety, health, or other similar subjects. To illustrate or clarify some accident, sterc- ojitir**n slitles are extensively used, Following the safety* red, a second comedy or educational film tlut might fit in is usually given. Tlte entire program takes about a? to 4 intmttes. It las lcen noted tliat all employees. whether engaged in under ground or Mirtacc work. make every effort to be present at these shows. Through iliis method of publicity and education by sound movies, it lias been a great deal easier sell the Men to the men of the desirability not only of indi vidual pers*na\ safety. 1ml also the necessary cooperative spirit *for a well rounded program i watching out for the safety of fellow* workers. All of our underground men now use safely liats ami shoes, and our statistics show that since the adoption of tlicsc two devices, many accidents to the head and feet have been eliminated entirely am! ulltcr* greatly reduced in severity. . Having once obtained tlte cooperation ami confidence of the employees, manv suggestions for making ulcerations more sate have been volunteered by tlte men. Accidents on the haulage lines at one time t*ccurrcd in frequent numbers, but one by tun* they liave liven eliminated, as have the serious accidents caused be falling rock. A great ]art of the credit is due to the individual cmplovec; Imt do not forget that results would not have l>ccii obtainable if management had not awakened his interest and his desire to have for himself and his associates a safe place to work. Tliat otir Missouri safely pre-grant is successful from a monev point of view is shown hv the total costs, including the Safety Department expense, of $Z39 per $100 of payroll, and it is l*clio ed that front a human point of view we also have a right to le very pleased. as tlte comparative ntnnlHTs of lost-time accidents ami death* jirove. In 1928 we had 320 lost-time accidents and five deaths: in 1929, 438 lost-lime accidents and no deaths: in 1930. 304 lost-time accidents ami two deaths: in 1031, 174 h>st-tinic accidents and two deaths: in 1932. 123 lost-time accidents and oik* death: and in 19.13. 70 lost-lime accidents and no tlcaths. ln^ tinny small cities and towns throughout the United Slates, one of the large American eomjianics may l*c the sole employer, and if so is usually the principal taxjiayiT. When such conditions exist, it is just as imjuirtant to consider tlte safety of the onunranity as it is to improve the safety of the individual employee. The management, therefore, must take an active interest in the general welfare of tlte locality. In the lead belt of Missouri the St. Joseph lead Company is the principal employer, and in order tliat ihe communities in which the men and their families live might have the licncfit of pure wajer. it Ins constructed an extensive system whereby the chlorinated mine water is delivered to the house and stores. The com pany lias also Intilt a dairy or pasteurizing plant, for the purpose of supplying a suffi cient quantity of pure milk for the people. especially for the children. Vi3 per cent ot the* local real estate ami property taxes liave been used for building and main taining schools, ami in this way the primary and secondary schools in the lead belt have been developed until they are today among the best in Missouri. With the assistance of the company, a local health unit was organized on July 1. 19J2. in order to demonstrate the efficiency and economy oi adequate health service for the prevention of disease and the promotion of public Itcnllh. Tlte group life insurance plan tltat was adopted by the company and given to its employees in 1919. and the formation of a definite pension program in 1914, have also proved valuable aids in tlte safety program, as they have aided in reducing the lalmr turnover. Miuinf) Section 281 It is also to Ik* realizes) that a safety program or method tliat is suitable for one comiany or location may not be desirable for another company. l**or example in our two New York state mines, which have the same regulations regarding safety liats. shoes. giggles, etc., aud where the primary rule is also enforced tliat each and every man is responsible for bis own safety and for the safety of his fellow worker, great emphasis is placed on housekeeping or cleanliness about the mines and mills. Faeh department of tlte two divisions lias a metal sign, ruled in three columns: one living for the month of the year, while the other two arc for the house keeping rating and lost-time accidents. If the conditions arc good, a gold star is placed on the sign: it only fair a green star is awarded, while for |mor cleanliness a red star is given. A gold star counts ten. a gTeett five, and no score is given for red. These scores arc posted monthly on the bulletin hoard, and the basis of comjiarison lictween the two mines is thereby made jmssiblc. If a score is not perfect, or at a reasonably high figure, the department which is negligent receives outsiderablc adverse publicity. J{ there arc no lost-time accidents, a gold star is placed in the accident column. The results oi our Xcw York safety program arc reflected by the achievement of operating 162.912 man-hours with only one lost-time accident f which incapacitated a worker for two days 1. and this record resulted in the 1932 award of the "Sentinels of Safety Trophy." THURSDAY MORNING SESSION October 4t 1934 The Dust Problem in Mining Operations By D. E. CUMMINGS Assistant Director, The Saranac Laboratory for the Study of Tuberculosis, Miehigamme, Michigan Tlic sieaker said in part: Kefugc can no lunger lie taken under the shelter of ignorance tliat the prolonged inhalation of dust may lead to serious disease, for tlte medical, technical and lay press is filled with accounts describing the dangers associated with breathing certain dusty atmospheres. Wlcil. then, should !k* the priqivr course to pursue iu meeting this problem and dealing with it in a satisfactory ntanner: Doth industrial and lafioratury studies prove that only certain dusts are danger ous when inliated, and tluil quartz or other forms of pure crystalline silica arc most dangerous, constituting a sjiocific tissue poi$*n. Where uivu arc exposed to a suffi cient quantity of very fine pure crystalline silica dust only, a true hazard always exists. The dusts of silica in combination with other elements generally give rise to pulmonary reactions which differ in many respects from those caused hy pure silica, and which vary rather widely among themselves in their lianitfulness. As a class, and with the notable exception of nslicslos, silicates arc less dangerous tlum pure crystalline silica. Not only arc certain dusts apparently incapable of producing a specific harmful reaction when inhaled hy themselves, but when asso ciated with silica favorably modify the usual response to this tlangcrous dust. Tlie effective size range ol particles causing disease is now regarded as three microns and smaller, while the qualities of hardness and sharpness arc no longer regarded as of significance. The term pneumonokoninsis is intended to descrilx: the changes arising out of the prolonged inhalation of any dust, harmful or otherwise, and docs not necessarily imply tlte presence of disability, nor a predisposition to pulmonary infections. The term silicosis refers sjiecifically to the disease whidt results from tlte prolonged inlialation of harmful silica dust, am! is diaraclcrtzcd hy a generalized nodular fibrosis in the lungs and pulmonary lymph nodes, and increased susceptibility to pulmonary infections. Pure silicosis should be regarded as a gcniunc occupa- 282 Twenty-third .1initial Safely Congress--Xalional Safely Council condition. iuit it should also Ik- understood tint uucmnplicalcd silicosis is M.*1)otn disabling to any significant degree. disability usually results from pulnxmary iutcctions. generally tulxrculi >us. which the silicotic contracts or reactivates more readily, and handles less successfully than the normal |iersnn. - Kvery effort sltould In* made to prevent silicotic* from contracting infectious which wilt later prove disabling, and to protect those who liavc pulimmarv infec tions from Ix-mg <laugcrously exjsisetl to harmful dusts. In <m1cr to letermiiK* which workmen in a liazardous industry liavc silicosis or pulmonary infections, all em ployers stiuuld have a thorough physical examination including the taking of a complete occujiational history and satisfactory stereoscopic roentgenograms of the chest. Since the rate at which silicosis develops tlcpcnds upon individual susceptibility and the degree of exjmsure. it tulhxvs tlmt these factors sltould lie tlelerminetl as aecuratelv as tM,*><h!c. Individual susceptibility to a dust hazard can be estimated fairly acctn-alely from a single examination, and ran lie defined quite exactly hv repeating llu-se examinations at regular intervals. Tlte degree of exposure for each individual should lie evaluated by determining the length of service, and the con centration. size distribution, and cmnpositiim <i tlte dust susiicudtxl in each working place during cacti ojx*ratiou. The method generally used to enumerate dust I articles is that accepted as staiulard practice by the l\ S. I\ H. S. with the addi tion of lark field illwnittaiiou as suggested ly Kelmcl ami Cummings. Size dis tribution studies cau Ik* made by any of the several satisfactory techniques. The com- ]tositioii of the dost can Ik* studied hv tile usual quantitative analysis, supplemented by (Htrographic and rational chemical analysis to determine the amounts of free amt emnbmcd silica 'and the other minerals. * A medical am) technical survey should Ik* supplemented hv an analysis of the mortality records in and aliont the l<K*nlity under study, and hv the information obtained front carefully ]K*rimmed i*st-jitorteni examittations on employees who luive Urn excised in the industry anti who liavc died front any cause. It these pro cedures for recognizing amt delining a hazard arc carried mil under tlic stiix*rvistini of an organization Cmi|x*teut to deal with the many complex anti confusing asjHxrts of tin* problem. the investigation will U* worth while regardless of the conditions which are discovered. WIktc the findings of such a study fail to disclose a sig nificant liazanl. U>th the employer anti employees wilt gain the protection which this knowledge affords: and if a health hazard is discovert*l, the trigiital investiga tion will serve as a guide to the jmigram which should lie inaugurated to over come the dangers disclosed. The most severe dust liazards in mines or iti plants can U* reduced as success fully as were accidents hv the Safety First program, and the chief requisite to success lies in establishing adequate cntr-<l |irocedttres. The physical condition of all the employees must U* determined at regular intervals, and well interpreted riKiitgcnogram* provide a most satisfactory control procedure. Men applying for work should not U* hired until they itave jiassed a thorough physical cxaniinatuni. including chest nxntgeiiogranis. Reliable records should U* established to show the exact lime, place and duration of employment for each jxrsun working in iiazardous |N>>itious. 1'oltcies of emp1oynK*nt shuuld Ik* workel out for each mine or plant, based u|*m an accurate knowledge of the physical condition of each employee, so tliat all of the workmen may Ik* protected from contracting occupational disabilities. Occuiiatiotis shotihl Ik* selecte*! winch are comjatilde with the |4iysical condition of tin* employee. Care should Ik* taken to protect the silicotic from infection, or the case ui infection irom liarmful ex]x*sure to silica, or the normal individual front contracting either silicosis r pulmonary infections. Kngineers should lx* csixcially trained to recognize and deal with dust hazards in mines or plants, and it should lx*comc accepted inactive. where a Itazard exists, to uiaintain a constant dteck on the amount of dust present in the working atntiK- phere. The methml of dust rnunting accepted as standard by lltc U. S. P. H. S. should lx adopted hv all industries having a hazard, not only to determine the ainnunt of dust in the air. Iuit more particularly to maintain a control over the effective ness of tile pnxcdurcs adopted to reduce the dust. Records should Ik* kept which will disclose the amount of dust present in each working place, and the preventive measures which are in use. Minin;/ Section 2S3 Shortly after the inauguration of a program designed t control a known dust hazard, it will Income evident tliat marked improvements can lx* effected without incurring an inqiractica) expenditure. Personnel problems will arise, due to the reluctance if labor to accept new procedures, awl in the end. tliese pnddcnis must lie dealt with by educating workmen to recognize the necessity for introducing meth ods to control dust liazards. The question of wliat men sliouhl lx told regarding their physical examinations should follow tlte practice adopted by any reputable physician tn dealing with individual eases. As industry In-emuvs more familiar with this problem, it will discover the serious need for further research. Since silicosis is a true cx*cupatimial disease, disability resulting from or at tributable to it should lx cotnixnsahlc in the same manner as other injuries sus tained as the result of employment. Only the intelligent cwipcration of industry will bring about the formulatum of reasonable occui<alional disease legislation and its fair administration. Silicosis from the Operators* Standpoint By G. C. BATEMAN Secretary, Ontario Mining Association, Toronto, Ont., Canada The s|x*akcr said in part: It is important to knmv what causes silicosis, hut unless a knowledge of the cause leads to a cure, it is not nearly as iniitnrtaiit from the njicrators* viewpoint as the knowledge of how to reduce the incidence. With all the research work tliat has Ixen going on throughout the world for many years, we still do not knmv tlx* cause and we still have no cun.*. Ian we liavc learned a lot alwnrt hmv to reduce tlx* incidence. ' The silicosis provisions of tlx* Ontario Mines Act and tlx* Comjxmsation Act were passed in I92fi. These jrovidcd for tlx* examination of all nx*n employed in positions in mines where they were exposed to silica dust, for all such wmkers to lx the holders of medical certificates certifying as to frcctlom from tulxrciihisis of the respiratory organs, and also for comixnsatinn to men affected by silicosis. This legislation was intniduccd as a result of a survey in Northern Ontario mining camps which indicated tliat silicosis Had made alarming progress among the miners. There being no reason at tliat time to question the results of this sur vey. the operator* agreed to do all tliat was asked of them and coojxrated fully with the Government in the steps considered necessary to meet the situation. When this legislation was first introduced in Ontario, wc were advised that men with a moderate degree of *i1ietsis. while not physically disafded. were better out of the industry and that they should lx* paid a lump stmt which would assist them in rehabilitating themselves in some other occupation. We were further advised that if we took active steps to clean up tlx situation then existing, pension the more serious cases ami remove men in the early stages ol silicosis from underground, the sttuatum would lx well in Itaixl. the first cxIKiisc would lx tlx heaviest, and that from then our liability would lx practically limited to tlx anteprimary cases as they developed. When the 192fi Amendments were approved by the mines it was our under standing tliat men in the anteprimary stage liad suffered no impairment of working capacity and that tlx $500 payment was a compassionate allowance for rehabili tation and not for disability. We further understood tint with the fiaynicnt of $50f> to these men our rcsjionsihHity in rcsjxxl to tlx-ni would lx* practically ended. It devetoixd. lunvcver. that the legal position was different. The Compensation Board cannot make an award except for disability and where disaliilitv ins <mcc lx*cn established the claimant can come lack for review on evidence of further disability. It is generally accepted tliat si)icsis predisjMiscs a man to tu!x-milnsis. It followed, therefore, tint with secondary silicosis as defined in the Act. if any anteprimary silicotic at any future time ami from any cause whatsxvcr developed tuberculosis, bis condition was considered to lx the result of his original disability and he was entitled to total disahilitv compensation at an average cost of $12,000 per case. ' 2&4 Twenty-third Annual Safety Congress--National Safety Council When, therefore. an award nf $500 was made the Comicnsation Board imme diately set tip a prospective reserve i*<r progression of an additional $11,500, with the result that we had an estimated liability to the end of 1932 oi several million dollars, most nf which was outstanding. ' -With the passage of time tt aln> liccamc apparent that the removal of the men from underground cuqiloyniem in the early stapes oi silicosis did not have the results anticipate*!. The layment of a lump sunt award did not in most cases serve the end e\|iectcd. As a pcncral rule this money was expended for other thinps ami the men made little effort to reliahilitatc Otcmsclvcs. A certain nttmlwr oi men classified as silicotic continued in their underground employment and we fottml practically no difference in the rate of progressfim in those who c**Uinucd as com pared with tlti.se who were taken out oi the mines. Some of this may have lcen dne to the altered economic status. Imt even if the cc*montic status had remained the same, we were forced to tltc eoticlitsn that there was little ii any Ixrtcfit to the mill hy removinp them from underground work, tmless of course, there was evidence of an onset nf tu!*crculi*>is. It should. t course, Ik* understood tliat during this time active efforts were made hy the mines to improve ventilation and to allay dnst. Without this the alnnc statement would not Imhl true. Slops were also taken hv the mines to prn- viile that men iti the early stapes nl siliosis were place*! where the conditions imderprouwl were most favorable. Our exinTiencc also indicated tliat tlic earlv stapes of silicosis do not necessarily mean an iuiieiinmut of workiup capacity. This is all the more inqMirtant <m ac count of the difficulty of diagnosing silicosis in its early stapes, as there is no sltarp line oi demarcation lietween the prc-antepriniary and the nntei.rimary. or Indween nntvprimnry and primary stapes, and as a matter of fart, we lirliove tliat there is a prent <le:d more uncertainty in the diagnosis nf silicosis tlian the medical nun are willing to admit. The determination is larpcly a matter of (tcrsonnl judgment ami therefore subject to error. A print deal of what may !c rend into an X-ray film depends ujion the Iccbgiqtte in taking the film. Certain ntlier diseases and chest conditions will also give in tin* film an appearance simulating tliat of silicosis and we believe it is safe to say that without a definite knowledge *f occupational history the diagnosis of silicosis in its earlier stages would lie practically imimssihlc. !ti view of tltesc conditions, it was felt tliat tlic industry was carrying an unfair Imrdcn and in 1933 the Act was amended. The anteprimary ami primary classifica tions wore delete*!, compensation was made payable only for disability, which mentis aclttal impairment of working cajmcity. men with a moderate degree of silicosis were allowed to continue underground work and the industry was relieved from unlimited liability in restect to progression by providing tltnt the claimant must nvike and establish his claim for disability within two years of leaving the employ ment at which he was exposed to dust, to entitle hint to compensation. As 1 said before, silinisis is essentially an employer's proldctn. It is in many places an inqMHiant item in his cost of priKluction and tn a considerable degree it is a controllable item of expense. If the employer simply leaves the matter in the hands of the iloctors. lie will liavc no one to blame Imt himself over wliat it costs him. The opinion of the ordinary practitumer and even of tlte ront genologist atul expert clicst and lung man mav lie of little value. Only the opinion of those d<dors whi have liad siwcinl training in the diagnosis of silicosis from both clinical and X-ray examinations should Ik* accepted, and even those opinions cannot lie acccpti'd in all eases. We do not say this with any intention of criticizing the iuciiiIhts of the medical nrofosiim. bin where tlte natter is so iin]*<rtaut and costly to industry, where so little is actually known about tin* disease, ami where there is still an element of mteertaintv in the diagnosis of silicosis in its earlier stapes, ton much care cannot l*e exorcised, and the closest scrutiny by industry which lias to my tin* bills is most necessary. The l*cst results can only lie obtained by the employers and the doc tors working together, but the employer must consider it as mu1 of liis |tarticnlar problems. I liavc also stated tliat in the absence of any cure it is much more important Mining Section 285 to know* how to reduce the incidence than to know the cause. We Iwlievc the chief preventive measures arc as follows: 1. Improvement tn fundamental working conditions in tlic matter of ventila tion and allaying dust 2. A rigid initial examination to keep out oi the industry those men whose physical condition would indicate a type most susceptible to silicosis and utliefcttlosis. 3. Control of tulierctdosis not only among employees, but also aiming those with wlumi they come hi contact. It gxrs without saying tliat if silicosis is caused bv the inliakiliou of du>t. the removal of dust will remove tlte cause. This means ventilation and lots of it. and where jiossihle the wetting down of dusty places. In mining Mirations tin* chief source of dust is liclicved to Ik* from blasting, therefore the time interval before men return tn a Masted face Is important. Ventilation and water will remove the visible dust from the air. but it is tint the visible dust that causes the damage. It is the dust tliat ranges lictwrctt onehalf and five microns that is dangerous and is so difficult to remove, and the quan tity in the air can only he determined by sonic method of sampling. We would consider it a mistake to liavc either the type of sampling apparatus or the jiennissihle dust count defined hy law. This may lie all right on the Ram! in South Africa where comlitions arc more or less standard, hut it is not advisable in the United States or Canada, where comlitions vary so greatly. For one thing, we do not knmv what cotislitutcs harmful dust and there is no standard practice for the treatment of dust sample slides. Tlte untreated slide of a sample taken near a carbide lamp in an otherwise dust-free atmosphere, wmtld show an apparent very high dust count. Oust sampling, however, should Ik* a part ot the rcgnlar routine, using the type of api<aratus Ik*si suited to the particular conditions, amt this will slimv whether the atmosphere is good. fair or poor. Xext to ventilation and the laying of dust, the most inqmrt.nit measure is to carefully select the type of men to lie allowed to work in the industry. This re quires a rigid initial examination which sliouhl include a complete jdiysiml examina tion and X-ray. By this means men with thr type of chest which would fmlicate their susceptibility to tulicrculosis and silimsis can Ik* eliminated. Tlic complete physical examination should also have a Inucficinl effect on (he accident rate. Unconqdicatctl silicosis is not a big problem. Iml silimsis ami tuU'rrulosis com bined represent a very real problem. Tlic measures for the control of ttdierrttlosis are well known. Particular care should bo lakott tlut imit with tttlHTcnlosis lie withdrawn fr*im the iudustry and given pmiKT care and treatment. Hares wlicre the employees li\*e should also Ik- snt*orvised to see tliat tliev are tut cx|tose*l to tubercular contacts. Some Aspects of the Silicosis Problem By DR. H. H. MOORE and DR. M. J. KELLY Medical Staff. Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mines, Ltd,, Timmins, Ontario, Canada The speaker said in part: In 1928 the Ontario Mining Act Mas amended to provide phvsical examination on employment and yearly thereafter, or twice yearly if indicated, of all underground men. To he employed the workman must hold an official certificate good lor twelve months, stating tliat he is free from disease of the resniralory organs. Tin's certificate must lie renewed at each annual examina tion. tn the meantime, an amendment to the Workmen's Ounpeusatinn Art pro vided fir the appointment of medical officers working under the supervision of the Compensation Hoard to conduct these examinations. Cases oi silicosis arising at these examinations arc submitted to the Workmen's Conqicnsatinn Board ii the total exposure to silica of five years in Ontario mines is verified. In addition to this routine with silienties. there is a close cheek kept on the possible undue progress in the fibrosis in any case and if necessary steps are taken to remove stteh a case from harmful contact with silica. * 2*^6 Twenty-third .-tnnnai Safety Congress--Xational Safety Conned Tlie act in its present imn was ]ta*scd in 1923 and served to dear the situation which had Ihti'ito inv< i]vcd hv the tie-up nt large stuns of moiie>' in reserve tunds against possible future claims lv men adjudged silirotic previously, hut who liatl since Iwen lM sight of <>r who were carrying on at work showing a niinimtnn or tin disability. Fr<n tlx* workman's point ni view, tin* new act is a threat step forward, as it allows a man to continue at his usual duties underground as lung as he is able to work without any serious degree of discomfort. Previously. a workman was ad vised to |uit underground work when a certain stage oi fdrrosis had been reached, regardless his ability to carry n. and sacrificed his rights to compensation if he continued to work. In tin* X-ray examination of the chests of the 2007 men employed at the Hollinger mines during 1922. determinations are graded as follows: .Yoririuf is a cliest slew ing little or no fibrosis, where the condition of the lung is hotter titan the average fr the age- .V. /*. or "More Fibrosis" is a chest which is normally found in the average adult at the age of the miner tmder consideration. .1/. /*. /*.. "More Fibrosis Plus" i> a chest showing slightly more fihr*sis than normal iir the jiarttcular age. .1/. /*. T. /'. or "More Fibrosis Plus Plus" is a chest showing considerably more fdirosis titan normal and is a prc-stlicotic stage. Silicotics arc that group which show a great deal of fibrosis and taking into consideration the mining history and consequent exposure to silica, arc thus termed. Admittedly, disability may or may not he present. This last group ranges from tlic early silicotics with a minimum of disability In the late complicated or secondary cans with marked disability ami utlHTCulosis. It must lx added that a large numltcr of men at the commencement of employment at the Hollinger. and withi mt previous mining exix*ricnce or cmtnct with silica, show chests of M. P. P. rating. Following are the results of this exam ination : Normal ......................................... XI................................ 1.4^/: M. F............................................. 020................................ 40.fi M. K. P........................................ 022................................41.4rr M. F. P. P......................................08..................................-U* Silicotics .................................... 24............................... \.\^r Average ointact with silica of nun working ami M. I*. P. P......................... 12 years. Silicotic.......................................15 years. Xext is an analysts of the cltanges in chest rating in 1022. * Normal to Normal t M. F. lo M. F. P. to M. F. P. P.to M. F. P. P. to M.F. -----M.F. P. . M.K. P. . M.F. P. 1* T.P.......... A.P. A. P. lo p................................................ 221 M. F. Normal ... m. f. r. to M. F........... M. F. P. P. to M. F. .... M. F. P. P. to M. F. P. . T. 11. T. T5. ? to A. r. to M. F. P. P .. 11 . .221 .. 1 .. 20 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 r. to A. P.......... ..2fif, Total 407 These figures cover approximately 500 men in whom there was some change in chest rating during the year, and the direction of the change. The remaining 1500 men slmw no rltaugc from the previous year. It will lie oliserred that 221 nun showed an increase in fibrosis rating, while 3't show chests which are im proved. Tle explanation given for the group which shows improvement is* in the first place, that some concurrent bronchial or utqx*r respiratory infection had complicates! the picture at the i>rcviotis annual examination and so caused a more Mining Section 2$7 advanced rating to lx* given. Hie second explanation is tliat constant improvement in radiological technic is making diagnosis more accurate. It would seem, therefore, that on the whole the situation is showing consider able improvement from this vicw|toint. During 1922 no rase progressed front the pre-silicotic to tlx* silicotic stage. In die years up to 1922. 1211 men liad Ik-vii rated silicotic and the total cost to tlx* Hollinger involved a sum of $915.951). which figure includes the progressive and contingent funds set aside to cover future costs and possible future claims. Two objects have lx*cn kept in mind during the many y<;ars of study oi the dust problem at the Hollinger Mine. 1. The collection of complete data regarding the nature of air breathed by workmen in different occttjtations. its chemical composition, temperature, humidity, dust content and rale of flow. 2. Working tests of all practical methods of improving the condition of such air. In searching to adapt a method for the determination of air dustiness, it was realized that ii instrument has Imn devised which would measure tlic dust con tent of tlx* air with scientific precision. Furthermore. It was felt (hat the principal object of making determinations was to ascertain if the dust oxtnt of the air was undesirably high, and if such a omdition was found, to devise a mctlxid of reducing it. Hence., for practical |ittrjxi*c*. tlic iiist'uiuent which piissesses a high efficiency in the range of desirable concentrations and gives a quick indication of <langemus quantities of dust is most desirable. Tlic circular Konimcter. invented hv Sir Rnlxtt Kotzc and introduced lo the M iuers' l*hthisis Prevention Committee of South Africa in 191fi. lias tlxTefore been used in the Porcupine Disttict fT the past etRlit years. A summary of our invcsttgati<ms along this litx* may Ik* given as follows: 1. AImkiI 900 of tlx* underground force are engaged in work which will pro duce dangerous dust if measures of control are not applied. 2. Of this numlxT a little over 400 arc engaged in shoveling broken ore into cars and the average dust cx|xstirc dues not exceed 200 particles if the muck piles are kept tlmroughly wet and blasting carefully restricted. 2. The remaining 500 men are engaged in drilling and blasting operations and are subjected to severe (xitentia! ItauinL Men engaged in stujics wlw> do nut liavc to return to the working faces have an average cximsurc of alumt 1200 particles, while using the ordinary type drills. U is felt tliat tlic use of the "dustlcss" type of drifter will reduce tlx* concentration of dust to somewhere near 200 jiaflidcs. 4. The men engaged in deveki|mx*nt drift* arc exposed to the same concentra tions of dust, namely. 1200 particles. Where jmssiMc. two development drifts are workcil simultaneously by tlx* ric crew, so that tlu* tm.il do not have to go lack through the dense dust after Masting the cut. There arc only a few exceptions to this rule and when necessary to go Iiack to load the remaining holes, the men are provided with the *]x*cia1 respirator. 5. The high dust concentrations in the vicinity of stnpcrs wc hope to deal with hv the use of compressed air masks. Also the practice of driving adjacent raises simultaneously lias reduced the hazard after Masting. With the constant improvement and ntatiitenancc of general health conditions kept always to the fore as most desirable and necessary in aiding in the solution of the silicosis problem, the men at the Hiillingcr Mine arc cared for under a contract ntcdical system. Tlic facilities and service at mine, office ami hospital arc most complete and efficient ami in combination with the animal or semi-annual check made by the medical staff of the Compensation Hoard, health of the workers is under constant supervision. Men who reimrt with such conditions as non-tubcrcuhnis or non-silicotic chest trouble. with focal infection in teeth, tonsils, sinuses, etc., arc singled out and treated and observed and where necessary changes in occtqsition arc made or rest and vacaliou periods advised. < At the mine, constant improvements liavc Ikxii made and at present the follow ing Is the routine. A worker coming off shift removes all his mining clothing, nsuallv wet. and racks them on a set of hooks attached to a chain and pulley. These wet clothes arc pulled up to a height of 15 to 20 feet and Itang thus in a hot. dry 2S8 Twenty-third Annual Safety Caiujrcs.<--National Safety Couucil atmosiiKfr i*r M t 15 hours, during which they arc thoroughly dried. After widrosiug tin* inimf losses through a t-erics oi shower laths of tanjicraturcs vary ing from hot to cold. After drying lie proceed* to his locker where he has placed his street clothes bcfre the beginning of the shift. With a view to reducing the infection of silicotics with tuberculosis, a clinic ha* Uni established in Ttintnins. An experienced public health nurse is cmployied full time and it is her duty to visit all tuUrculosis susjiccts and jiaticnts. all con tacts with these cases and'contact* with silicotics to arrange for their examination and sut>ervisiiii and if necessary for treatment. Weekly clinics arc held at which such patients are examined clinically, radiologically and hy bacteriological and bio logical tests. Since January of 19.13. approximately 30 dangerous eases of tuberculosis have Uvn removed froty the district to a sanitarium and many more less severe eases placed oil U*d rest at Immc or mi restricted activity. It is felt that by removing these eases in mi contact with silicotics. that within a comparatively short time ttilK-rurlosis will U* moderately well c< enrolled ami since tuberculous infection Is necessary to precipitate secmidary silicosis, this movement, it will be appreciated, is an excellent one. ADJOURNMENT TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL SAFETY CONGRESS NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL Paper and Pulp Section Officers 1933-34 General Chairman--H. G. Gilson*. Oxford Paper Co.. Ktnnford. Maine. I *iVc-C7miVmui in Chari/c <*/ Membership--H. D. Ra?:ta. Hulicrg Pa|cr ami Fibre Co.. Green Ray, Wis. Secretary amt Nezvs Letter Editor--Ir. 1- Irvin*. St. Croix PajKT Co.. Woodland, Maine. Program Committee Chairman--K. K. Grant. The Crystal Tissue Cil. Middletown. Ohio. Eni/hieeriuti Committee Chairman--GroktiE J. Aha ms. International Paier 0>- NVvv York. X. Y. Statistics Committee Chairman--R. I. Dickinson*. Cornell Wood Products Co.. Cornell. Wis. Health Committee Chairman--Dr. I- H. Fukctitlixg. The Cliampion Coated Pa|er Co., Hamilton. Ohio. Poster Committee Chairman--Don C. Hunter. Oxford Miami Paper Co.. West Carrollton, Ohio. Contest Committee Chairman--A. Scott Down. The Paper industry. Chicago. HI. Members at Jjsr*te-- Krxest Augustus. The Mead Con*- ChiMicothe. Ohio. W. J. Rrf.nnax. State Department of I.alir and Industry. Augusta. Maine. M R. Rrown*. Oregon and Columbia Ra*in Division. National Safety Council. Portland, Oregon. Wm. H. PiRvnGKS. Redi'ord Pulp & Pajier Co.. Rig Island. Y. Kf.sxrtii I- F.mst. The Champion Coaled Pajicr Co.. Hamilton. Ohio. W. A. Gleasox, Hammcnnill Pajier Co.. Kric. Pa. John* Luxurigan*. International Paper Co.. Xcw York. X. Y. W. J. Peacock, Northern I'apcr Mills. Great Rav. Wis. J. J. Plzak. Consolidated Water Power and Paper Co.. Wisconsin Rapids. Wis. Samuel Pruvn. Findi-Pruyn and Co., Inc., Glens Falls. X. Y. r.. D. Rogers, Rird &* Sons. Inc.. Fast Wal|Klc. Mass. F. H. Rosebush. Xckoosa-Kdwards PajitT Co., Port Kelwards. Wis. 289 350 Twenty-third Annual Safety Cunyress--National Safety Council The Dust Hazards in Industry By DR. R. R. SAYERS Medical Officer in Charge, Office of Industrial Hygiene Sanitation, United States Public Health Service, Washington, D. C. . The sjieakcr >aid in |art: Realizing tlie iinjMirlaiicc oi the dust problem in industry, the L nited States Public Health Service in coujierattun with the Bureau of Mines began its first study oi the health oi workers in dusty trades in 191-4, in the mines of Joplin. Missouri: and later, in 1923. the Public Health Service inaugurated a series of dust studies. These later studies were all conducted in the same manner in order to jicrmit as detailed a ctmijiarison as jmssihle lictwcvn the different investigations. Briefly, these methods of study may Ik* divided as follows: (1) examination to determine the general physical condition tit the workers under observation; (2) special physical examination t> determine the prevalence oi sjiecific diseases of the respiratory system and the lung pathology resulting from exposure to the particular dust Itazard: (3) record <*i tlie nature anti severity of the disabling illnesses: (4) analysis and tlctailcd study of the occupatimial environment: (5) occupational mortality statistics relating to the sjiecific-dust; and (0) autopsies. Tlie first six intensive investigations carried out by the Service dealt with the health of workers exjioscd t> dusts in a cement plant, granite cutting industry, anthracite and Iritumiuous coal mining, silverware manufacturing plant, cotton doth manufacturing, and in municipal street sweeping. Brief studies were later conducted hi certain slate, granite, utarltlc and talc quarries, while more recently a rather extensive study oi the health of anthracite coal miners was completed. These six dust studies showed tliat tin.* workers in tlie granite cutting plants who were cxjnised to the highest dust concentrations were found to'suffer from an excess ii pulmonary tul>crcult>ts after 15 years <r more of vxixisurc and developed silicosis from 2 to 10 years. In the group cxjnised to a lesser amount of dust, silicosis developed only after jirolonged exposure, with no excess oi tulicrculosis. It was found tltat a close relatumship existed between tlie degree of dust exposure and the extent and severity of the imltmaiary damage. Anthracite coal miners suffered from dysjmnca and otlicr signs of imcumoconiosis and experienced a high rate of respiratory sickness: in addition, an excessive mortality from influenza- pneumonia and jiossihly tulicrculosis was found. Bituminous coal miners experi- enccd a generalized fibrosis of the lungs and an excess mortality from influenza and imeumonia. Cement workers showed some signs of early pneumoconiosis with an excess of diseases of tin* ujqier respiratory tract. On the other liamt workers in the cotton cloth and silverware manufacturing plants and niunici|)al street sweepers were negative for respiratory conditions and other illnesses when compared with the general industrial imputation. Rock DriUin/. For five years, the United States Bureau of Mines studied lead and zinc miners in the Tri-State District. Oklahoma. The ore here is high in free silica. Oi the 7.722 men examined, a group of I.M7. or 21.3 jxrr cent, was definitely diagnosed as having silicosis, not including those diaguosetl as having tulicrculosis. All the men diagnosed as haring first-stage silicosis had worked an average of 13 years, hut those men starting in tlie mines after 40 years of age worked an average of only 8 years. . ' Tlie work of rock drilling in subway and tunnel construction in Xcw York City is in some rcsjK-cts similar to that of some of the activities in the hard rock mines, at least in so far as the manner in which dust is evolved, the type of dust and tlie resultant hazard. Recently the result of a study of nick drillers, blasters and excavators was reported by the Xcw York TwIktcuIosis and Health Association. An examination oi 208 rock drillers, blasters and excavators showed tliat 118. or 57 jkt cent of tlie men had silicosis in various stages of progression. Tlie exposure of most of these men (75 per cent 1 had lcen for 20 years or more. _ Sandblasting. Xo study of the health of sandblasters has Itccn reported in the United States: however, a study of the dust closure of sandblasters was recently completed by the United States Public Health Service in cooperation with the Quarry Section 351 Xational Safetv Council. This investigation indicated that, judged hv the nature of the dust and degree of the exjHtsurc. a real hazard exists in this occujmtton. This study also brought out the fact that it is possible to conduct sandblasting with safety, provided jiropcrly designed and well maintained equipment is used. Diatamaceous Silica Workers, Most of the data on silicosis have liccn gathered from studies made Imth in industry and experimentally on dusts containing free silica in the form of quartz. Such studies have ticcn made in the granite^ industry, pottcrv trades, liard rock drilling, etc. There arc other free silica minerals in existence that are not crystalline m nature but of an amorpliuus coinjiositioii. In Santa Barbara County. California, there exists the largest and purest diatomaewus silica deposit in the world. This substance consists of alxnit 85 |*er cent free silica. Recently an examination was made of 1118 workers selected among those employed less than 1 year. 1 to 2 years. 2 to 5 years, and more than 5 years. All oi the workers were Mexican laliorcrs and the examinations consisted of x-ray determinations, social and medical histories, and clinical examinations of the clicsts. Dust determinations were also made hut these were not reported. The outstanding feature revealed by the examination was tlie splcndidphysical condition of the men. Eighty-four jier cent of the workers were reported in excellent. physical condition. It was found that GO men showed signs of early pneumoconiosis: 15 were in the moderately advanced stage and fi in the advanced stage. _ This latter finding was among workers with a history of exposure of more than 5 years. Dust Hazard in the Granite Quarry Industry. It is a common liclief that granite quarrying is not so dangerous an industry as granite cutting in enclosed sheds: quarry work is done outdoors and hence may mrt lie attended with very- much dust exposure. However, certain quarry operations require the use of jmcumatic tools, which are usually associated with the formation of considerable quantities of dust. It was thought that a study made in a representative granite quarry might cast some light on our problem. Accordingly, a study of a clintco- radtographic nature of fi3 quarrters was made and iKcupational dust exposures were also obtained. The dust determinations show tliat nearly 38 per cent of thc^ workers ('drillers) were exposed to many times the amount of dust considered safe at the present time. Drillers were the only jtersons showing patbulngic lung changes. Half of these workers with an cxjiosurc of 5 to 19 years liad silicosis, ami 4 of the 5 men with more titan 20 years of such trade life showed this condition. This studv suggests that quarry' drillers may cxjicricncc as high a death rate from pulmonary tuberculosis as do jmcumntic-tool workers in granite cutting sheds. lifted of fnhated J/erWr Dust. The pulmonary fihrotic cliangcs due to tlie inhalation of marble dust appear to lc slight in comparison with those caused hv stone dust containing a high percentage of silica in the form of quartz. A recent studv made hv us among marble workers showed that although marble dust, when inhaled in concentrations averaging about 25 million particles per cubic foot of air. produced a mild bilateral, linear fibrosis in a certain immlicr oi the 80 men examinetL no serious lung changes were noted and there was no disability due to the dust, even after many years of cxjiosurc fnwrc tlian 4fl years in some cases!. The marble dust under consideration consisted of 98 per cent calcitc and 2 ier cent dfdcmitv. with no silica present. ^ Dust Hazard in Abrasive Industry. Artificial abrasives arc widely used in industrv and for this reason the effect of the inhalation of dusts produced in the manufacture or preparation of tliesc products is t great imjmrlancc. In 1925. 1929 and again in 1931. Dr. Dark of the Xorton Company at Worcester. Mass., made investigations o| workers exposed to aluminium oxide ami silicon carbide dust jiroduccd in tlie manufacture of grinding wheels, which showed tliat during a j*criod of 13 vears there were proportionately twice as many eases of pulmonary tuber culosis * among those working in the alirasive dust departments as in dejiartments where no abrasive dust occurred. In 1931. Kessler, of Xcw Jersey, reputed the occurrence oi over 100 cases oi alleged silicosis in (lie alirasive powder industry, in which the dust consisted of 99 per cent free silica. Exposure to Silicate Dust. It has been the belief tliat tlie inhalation of dusts composer! of silicates (combined silica!, in comjiarison with silica (free silica in the form of quartz!, was innocuous. Of recent years many investigators have become cognizant of the hazards of silicate dust exposure. Asbestosis. a fibrosis J52 Trenttv-third Annual Safety Contjrcss--A'at'umal Safety Council <1* the limps caused hy the inhalation of asliestos dust, has already been described both in its clinical and nxutginographic manifestations hy investigators in other cmntries. Inn to date no studies have lecn reported in the* United States. Cement dust, which contains al>out 22 i*r cent comhmtd silica, has been studied' and the effects ot the inhalation hy workers has lcen discussed here. In March. 1933. Drvessen. of the United States Public Health Service. reported the results of a study conducted among tremohte talc and slate workers. The slate dust to which these workers were exposed consisted mainly ot silicates, there hemp less than 3 per cent ot eptarte in the dust. The talc was a hydrous calcium-magnesium silicate, hemp 45 per cent talc and 45 per cent trcmulitc. with no quartz jircsent. The n*sults t the study seemed t<- indicate a rclationsliip lietwccu the amount of dust inhaled and the effect of tins dust on tle 1tings of w<rkers. _ Statistical Studies. Recently. Ianza and Vane estimated that there are some 50n.tXK) workers enpaped in the mininp. quarrying ami manufacturinp iiulustries m this cmmtrv in which an cxp***ure to silica dust to a harmful degree is en tailed. Their atialvsis of mortality experience of tucli'e life insurance companies for the period 191;i-192fi showed that the actual mortality from respiratory lulicr- cnlnsis among tin* silica exjo<cd persons was about three times that of a non silica dust group. li one considers their data for certain occupations in metal mines and pranite ami sandstone quarries. occnjiations known t lx? cxjtoscd to hiph concentrations of hazardous dnsts. then the comparison is more striking. since the actual deaths among these workers was found to he ten times that of the cx- ficctcd deaths. More detailed statistics on occupational mortality as rejiorted hv the Registrar-General of Enpland and Wales f 1921-19231. and summarized by Britten, show the hiph rate of 1 .SSh jkt 100.000 for tin and cupper miners, while the rate for "all occupied and retired males'* was only 150. Other occupations with silica exposure showed an excess. From the evidence just presented conccrninp the injurious effects produced hy the inhalation of certain dusts, it is apparent that a knowledge of the properties t a given dust whirii letenninc its capacity to prmlncc pulnxmarv pathology is essential. Xttmerous investigation* of the industrial dust problem indicate that these properties are the chemical and mincralopical cnmimsttion oi the dust, its eimcentration in the imlustriat atmosphere, and its jarticle size. In an earlier portion of this disctission evidence was presented which indicated that a close relation existed Ivtween morlndity ami mortality rates from various respiratory diseases and the exposure to certain dusts in industrv. In the studv of the dust hazard in the pranite enttinp industry, it was definitely proved that there is a direct relation U-tween the magnitude of the dust exjmsurc and sickness and 'death resulting frm tuberculosis. It is quite evident, as a result of these studies. that the rcmctly tit the dust evil lies in die effective removal or suppression of the dust to cnnccntraiion omsidcrcd sate. However, im set rales mav lie cslal>- lislnxl tor the mechanical proteetnm t le instituted in an attempt to control indus trial dust. Specific conditions encountered in a plant will tleterminc the type of |im!cc!hm to lie employed. * The protection of workers against certain dusts knmvn to lie toxic mav at limc> he accomplished liy the substitution of a non-toxic material for the toxic'onc. One exaniple oi such a procedure is the possible use oi a metallic or other type of artificial abrasive tor sand in the sandblasting process in those operations in which it is nut essential to use sand, a snhstance high in quartz content. Again, tlie mechanical cnelosurr oi the dnst^reating process also serves to protect the worker. An excellent illustration of this type of protection is afforded hv the modern sandblast larre! used in the rlcnninc of small objects. Sometimes* it is possiMe to protect^ the worker by the sulistitmion oi wet for dry processes, as wet -drilling instead of dry. In one instance, in the granite cutting study previously mvntitiiKxI. an 4>pcrator using a diamond i/->int tool worked the slime wet; the resulting dust aithumtcd to 22 million particles \vr cubic foot. The same ojicrator was then requested to work the stone dry: as a result, the amount of dust reached the high figure of 45 million particles i*er cubic lout. In tlie wearing of aslicstos doth h has hewn possible to rednee the amount of dust in the air hv wet weaving to one-fourth of the amount present when the process is conducted hy dry methods. Another example of this procedure in allaying dust is the use of a jprav of water (Jtntrry Section 353 in Icyncr and jack-hammer drilling in liard rk. although the new tyj*c of Kelly dust trap is now finding much iavor inr this kind oi work. The Kelly trap consists of a metal chandler designed to enclose the drill steel at the rock surface. Xo attempt is made to secure a mechanical seal with tlie rock or between tlie trap and the drill steel. The dust is rcimurcd hv an air stream and is carried into an exhaust system connected to tlie trap, hscnjn.- of dust jiarticles through openings Iwtwcen the uneven rock surfaces and tlie trap is prevented by the air seal produced hy the inflowing air. Tests made on this trap under actual working conditions slum- tliat tin* dust concentration at tlie worker's breathing zone may lie kept down to less than 111 million jiarticles j>er cubic foot with a 60 cubic toot per mimttc rate of air flow through tin? This trap is a stcji forward in the program of dust removal: however, in underground work, such as in mines ami subways, there is still the need to solve the problem oi comjiact dust disposal cquijmienl. In certain cases, sttch as in the samlldastiug oi large castings in sandblast rooms, the practical safeguard to the worker is to provide him with a mask r helmet of the positive air pressure type. In die samthlast investigation previously men tioned. it was fotnul that tvlten from 5 to < cubic ieet of jiractically dtist-free air per minute are supplied to the helmet, the worker receives ideal protection. How ever. one must always hear in mind that the ultimate criterion of jiroteciion should tie the dust determination of the air within the helmet during blasting and not tlie quantity of the air supply itself. ... In most dusty processes, however, the most effective means of dust elimination arc by the use of projicrly designed cxliaust ventilation systems. Sinev in many instances it is difficult, costly, and at times an unnecessary procedure to remove all the dust in the vicinity of a worker, we need first to determine the minimum amount of a certain dust which the worker can apjmreutly tolerate with impunity. Such information can l>c mafic available hy the tyjH* of studies carried out hy the I*ullic Health Service. For example, hi the granite study already referred to. it dnst at the breathing level of about 10 million jiarticles |er cubic foot 135 jkt cent free siltcal. . ... Studies of `dust removal devices used in granite cutting plants at the time this work was owinded showed tliat a linear velocity of I.5MI feet |*cr minute as measured by an anemometer at the face of tlu? dust-removal hood, would keep' the dust at the breathing lew] to an amount les than 10 million jiarticles |*er cubic t<rt. A word should be said concerning personal respiratory protection. against dusts. It las already Iicon shown that in the use of jtositivc pressure respiratory devices in sandblasting, it is mqiortaiU to have a well-designed device sit|*|1icd with aluml 6 cubic feet of dust-free air jicr minute to give lull protection to the worker. With reference to respirators of the filter type, there is still much to In? accomplished iu die design of an efficient and comfortable mask for continuous use. Of great value are standard methods for the testing of tlu; efficiency oi respiratory |>r*- tection devices. Drinker advocates testing a device against the particular dust which the respirator is to encounter, these tests to lie made l"th in the kilMirntnry and under actual industrial conditions. He further suggested that some inijnrtia) agenev slwnild conduct such tests and certify the devices for industrial use. the work `living dune on a cost basis. Tlie U. S. Bureau *f Mines has prcjiarcd such a schedule for testing and approving respirators. I wish to stress the imjMirtnncc of good housekeeping in the effort to comlmt the rlust hazard. Good hmisckrcjung should not only imply the removal of accumu lated dust almut a workroom hut shottid also embrace efftcieot maintenance ui dust removal `devices ami respiratory protective equipment. Systematic inq>cctini of all dust siqipression cijuijmicnt shottid lie an axiomatic principle in every dusty industry rather than the casual attention which it now receives in many instances. Report of the Nominating Committee The chairman called for tlie report of the Xoniiuatiug Ommnilev at this i*oint. and new officer* for the section to serve during the ensuing year were nominated and elected as follows; 382 Twenty-third ,-hwital Safety Cuiujrcss--XatioualSafety Council National Safety Council*- annual proccvdiugs: -When the sample had been allowed to stand twin 24 to 48 hours we had a little reaction. S.n'ex itself was very* satis factory l*ut its cnn|MiundeI condition. with a little age, caused dermatitis.** Members of this C'mnnn'tfee personally saw fir. Shirley with a sample of Safex in. his arm tinder a piece of ailhcsivc. It had been there for 4 davs. He shotted tJe naked arm and it had only a little rash, as stated hv him. The test (as nude by Dr. Shirley) of fastening samples tf Sairx and Sate* comjioumls to the flesh for days at a time would not In* a parallel condition to employees working with any such cimiiKiunds. KvtVrvnev is made in Mr. Nolan's brief on page 19. to the hazard oi x-rays. This hazard might take place in any industry and is not peculiar to the Rubber Industry. In fact there arc very few rublier industries equipped with an x-ray machine. The Committee knows i no ruhler company where x-rays are used other titan in die Medical Department and under the ojwratiun of skilled technicians only. Therefore, this illustration. as nientioned hr Mr. Xolati. is far-fetched and* slwuld carry no weight in this lirief as allying to the rubber industry. Signed: \\\ I- Sciixeihet. It. F. Goodrich Co- Akron. Ohio. J. T. Kiun-rv. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. Akron. Ohio. R. R Morse. Firesuxtc Tire & Rubber Co,, Akron, Ohio, li \\*. Heck. United States Rubber Co.. Xeir York, X. V. P.vt'L Vax Ct.r.F>*. Van Clcei Hros. Co.. Chicago. 111. October 1. I9M. ADJOVRSUtiXT TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL SAFETY CONGRESS NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL Safety Section, A R A -- Steam Railroad Section, NSC Chairman--C. R !*aFoi\\taixf.. Great Northern Railway Cn,, St- laul. MnjnI'irsi riVe-Chnirman--H. A. Pawii. Chicago & North V\ estern Railway, Chicago. Second rice-Chaimum--W. H. Faiukis. Central Railroad ofNew .-I compU'tc report of these sessions is published by the Ainericnti Kniki'ay .-Issaciatian in a booklet entitled, `"Proceedings of ihe Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Safety Section, Cleveland. Ohio, October 2-1, JQ24." Copies of the booklet are tri'ailable from the Association of American Railroads, Af, V- C. The follouing is a condensed record. TUESDAY MORNING SESSION October 2, 1934 Tlic opening session oi the Safety Section, American Railway Assieiatiun-- Steam Railroad Section. National Safety Council was called to <rdcr hv Cliainnan C. I.. LaFinmtainc, Grrat Northern Railway. St. IVtiI, Minnesota, who presided. The invocation was delivered by I_ G. Bentley, Chesapeake and Ohio Railway. The report of the Secretary, J. C. Cavistrm, New Vork City, in which he outlined brieflv the activities of officers and standing committees during the last Annual Report of the Chairman By C. L. LA FOUNTAINE Great Northern Railway, St. Paul, Minn. The sjjcakcr said in part: Let us go lKick for a moment to the resolution adopted at our annual meeting in 1924. which set a goal calling for reduction. Iwscd on tlic 1924 record, of 3$ per cent in casualties to employees on duty. Class 1 railroads, by 383 384 Twenty-third Annual Safety Congress--Notional Safely Council the end ot I930. Many thought at that time that such an achievement would be difficult. What occurred has long hern history'. The railroads actually brought n!>oi;t a reduction in the casualty ratio ot almost double tliat asked tor. C<oscqui-ntly. those who had to do with the making ot the goal set in 1931. calling for .1? per cent reduction in employees injured hy the end til 1933. felt it highly desir able that they set the goal high enough to tax the maximum efforts of all railroads. Approximately f<wty railroads accomplished this goal, hut the Class 1 railroads as a whole made a reduction <i 2d per cent in titeir casualty ratio. While the safety oflirers may have a feeling of disappointment at this result, we should 1>c encour aged by the fact dint the railroads were able t bring aliout a reduction in the casualty ratio to employees on duty |*cr million man-hours worked of 2d per cent in a three-year period, which followed a rcducti*n of 7 jcr cent in the casualty ratio <!uring the previous seven years. l*he Committee of Direction now gives you a new mark at which to aim. It is a new goal, railing tor a 5 (>er cent reduction |*cr year in railway cmphiyers* injuries during the next >ix years. 1934 to 1959. inclusive. We feel that this goal will lc far exceeded In- the railroads now having the higher accident ratios, that it is possible of attainment and will l*c accomplished hy the railroads having lower accident ratios. Tltc statement furnished bv the rinrenu of Statistics of the Interstate Commerce Omnnissinn. covering accidents rej*ortCfl hy steam railways tor the first five months of 1934. shmvs an upward trend in casualties to employees on duty. While 1 do n*it deem this increase as (Wirticnlarly alarming under the circumstances, it has lirovided a warning as to u hat may he expected with any material additional in crease in Intsincss. imless effective preventive measures can he adopted by the rvsiievttve railroads. * The injuries which have brought almnt this upward trend in our casually ratio are principally non-train accidents. This is due, in niv opinion, to the imusttally large increase in the man-hours worked in this branch of the service during tin: fir.-t hali of tins year, rather than to any inactivity on the part of the railroads in accident prevent***! work. The railroads were asked to carry on an extensive pro gram of track and equipment maintenance, to purchase rails, cars ami engines, or rrlmild if the circumstances require. This made necessary a sudden and large in crease in the fiirces. resulting in either the employment of new nxm or the return to service *'f men wlm lud Itcen inactive in railroad service for some time. Tltc work tltat was required of these men in inost cases was oi a more liaxardons na ture. Kr example, in the maintenance of way department the increased man-hours were ci*n>timvd largely in construction work, relaying of rails, hank-widening and inllasting tracks--heavier week and more dangerous titan that of ordinary track maintenance, which lias Iecu carried on m*rc generally for the last two or three years. Thi- is also tntc in the^ maintenance { equipment department, stripping ami relniitding ami stcel-underframing cars ami heavy locomotive rejair work, with large gangs of men. newly organized. I thi.tk we had a right to look forward to a momentary increase in the cas ually ratio. lut 1 l*elievc this condition has since adjusted itself and 'c will he aide' to In ing Ivick our accident ratio to a lower level than it was for the year 1933. Tltc rcs|*onsild]ity for the promotion of safety is essentially a function ami problem of management. The success with which it is promoted on any railroad scents likely to l*c pretty closely in proportion to the attention given to it liy ex ecutive ami operating officials of all ranks, and (he enthnsiasm for safety they arc aide to arouse among employees. N'ever before in the history of railroads have railroad executives and officers given so much thought, time and effort to acci dent prevention as at the present time. 5afcty officers should feel greatly cncnttrnged hy this tact. Another source of encouragement for safety officers is the pro nounced trend toward greater recognition, particularly by jiersons and agencies which take tltc lend in moulding public sentiment, of the accident problem. It is pr*daldy still true Ihat tin: gravity of this problem lias not been l*ronght home to the average citizen with sufficient cmjdinsis so that he makes it a matter of per sonal concern, but there arc clear indications tint the efforts of the National Safety Council and other agencies dedicated to accident prevention will carry forward our fight against accidents in marked strides. Safety Section. AR.-l--Steam Railroad Section, XSC 385 Report of the Committee on Education By L. G. BENTLEY General Safety Agent. The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway. Richmond, Va. The speaker said in jartc Hie Committee on Ettucati<m tens organized snort after the setting ot the 35 tier cent gia1. and the purposes oi the committee haw- been three-fold, all educational. In the first place, it was the intent oi die com mittee to educate officers ami employees as to correct methods oi work ami as t unsafe methods of work, undertaking never to set out an unsafe iiK-thod of work without showing in Com|*an.M<n the safe way of doing dial job. There is another pur|>osc of the committee, and that is to inform railroad men and others throughout the country, and even throughout die world, of tltc progress of safety work on American railroads. Then there is the inspiratiinial jnistcr that always commands a licttcr sale dian any otlicr class of poster because it ap|cal* to the hearts oi men. Kvery matt really down in the IhiUoui of his heart wants to do wliat is right, and if the mind runs along with the heart, the hand will soon begin to form dtc liahh of traveling in the same company. I have chosen for discussion from this year's posters a icw ii the m*st im(*irt- aut, illustrating hazards which liavc caused more deaths and more injurk-s ami more suffering tliau the other classes of railway employee injuries. (Mr. 1 lentley then dcscrilwd at considerable length die following (Misters:) "Safety Demands a Firm Grip and a Safe Knot-hold." In 1932 there were 220 train service employees killed in all classes of train service accident*. and of that number HI5. or 48 |*er cent, tverc killed in tailing from engines or cars or while getting on or off engines or cars. We sold 6.600 copies of this (Mister to alwiut hall tltc railroads oi the United States. That was the equivalent of furnishing one jxwter in* each 30 raih-oad employees in train service thmuglimit the country. We also sold 34.000 copies of die circular dealing with the same subject, am) that was a nuniiK-r equal to one ior each six train service employees in the United States. However, they were most all sold to a few of the railroads. lint wliat has been the result of our campaign for the last ten years during which we liavc been driving on this particular kind of accident? The number of train service ent(ihiyccs exposed to this (articular liazard de creased 37 per cait. The numficr of employees killed in this class of accident decreased 47 per cent, ami tltc number of employees injured decreased 74 per cent. "Mishandled Material Means Many Maimed Men." We distributed this poster in the Hope tliat it would reach the supervisors am! foremen and that it would make them more careful and more diligent in super vising the liandling of material. We felt. ton. tliat by getting it In the attention of the men. they themselves would get the idea that ior the last ten years on an average fifteen tliousand of their number had been injured on American railroads while handling material. Tliat is more than were injured last year in all classes of railroad accidents. 5.000 copies of this (Mister were distributed. . In 1932 there were seven employee* killetl and 3.7R7 injured while liandling material. Tliat constitutes 5 per cent of the death* ami 38 per cent of the injuries in all non-train accidents on American railroads. "Please Sir. Look Doth Ways." -^ There are one million railroad employees in tltc United States subject to the <langcrs that this (Mister is trying to cure. In 1932. 128 out of a total of 367 train service accidents, or 35 tier cent of all the deaths in train service accidents, were the result of being struck or nm over hy engines or cars. 1 consider this the most difficult (irohletn in connection with railroad men. Not only train service employees, hut shopmen and trackmen, station employees, officers from headquarters. every man wlm works for the railroad is subject to the danger of bring struck or run over by engines or cars. It is for this reason that the Committee on Education has produced more (Misters and more illustrated matter ^ Twenty-third Annual Safety C onyress--National Safety Council vt\ this pn*hlcm than m any other class of accidents. Because every time you have two tram service employees injured l>y lciuq struck * ruti over, one of* them is Killed. A later lister ,m the same subject was entitled "What a Whale of a Difference a rew Feet Make. It illustrated tlie vast difference front a safetv |Kim of view that a tew feet can make when a man chouses to cross a track quite close to the end it a standing Imx car. Itrhind which an engine tnav l>c approaching. and the same man doing the same thing at such a. distance mt\ the box car that he can readily see down the other track whether or not an engine is ajipruaching. * Address By WILLIAM BUSHNELL STOUT Member of the Society of Automotive Engineers, and of the Detroit Aviation Society The .<t>caker said in jiart: \\ hen we start any new engineering devclojmicnt wc get great punishment lor mr ignorancr. In fact. I sometimes think there is onlv utu- sin in the world and that is ignorance. I>ccau*c we do get punished for it. anil very quickly. And when wc start a new industry of which we know nothing, when "c arc Irving to find out wliat it is wc are trying t do. we arc in a very dangerous inrun! ot development. Then as wc lwgin to realize and recognize those dangers, ami use our intelligence to get around them, wc get to a {mint or development where it is not dangerous any more, only hazardous.* Then as we study further and acquire c.\|*crincc we come to a point where that industry by the application intelligence and study liecmucs a safe and practical thing. * \\ hen we started in on aviation it wa.< dangerous. There is no question about that.. As we look Imck now wc know just limv dangerous it was. Wc knew nothmgahuit what wc were trving to do. We knew nothing of the stresses in the ;nr* '\v had an idea tliat flying wouldn't require anv particular strength; if vu would just make something tliat was light enough it would go up in the air. `So tlte first ainilanes were made of very flimsy materials, put together with stove lnlls. and with uiider-|owcrcl engines Thev would jnst hare!'* get of! the ground and wc knew m.thmg aUmt flying. Wltcn a ntan got tip and happened to pull the stick lock and chmlwd !-> sKvjdv s tliat he lost his speed and by losing his speed ,M<1 ]}s hit and tell tnmn. we railed (hat a "nose dive** whicfi was a very fata! thing. * iK-ii we came to the idea--ant! it was forced on its verv cmpliaticallv--tliat air* plant-s had to l*c strong. Our airplanes today are built to stand tremendous vHocjIh's. I was up m a ship ycsterilay ihat cruises at two hundred miles an hour, which is lorn* limes the stress that was felt in the Miami cvdooc. and vet this shin sails along without anv trouble or interference ami is a thmisaud times safer than the first airplanes that would only go firtv miles an hour. This development was brought nlmu! by means of a whole lot of structural analysis It required a gnud deal of experimental work to take the guess-work out m the Innmmc oi tin* structural jiart of the airplane. ... l^,c I11-**- while wc were learning wliat was going on. manv wings came off \\c started m with structures that were designed for firing loads and with a taetor of safety of three or four times the flving load. At slow speeds, wc got away with it. Then w? Iwgan to step up the speeds. We got up to around 150 nnies an fi*mr ami then, without any wanting, and with no ajquircnt reason, all of a smlden a wing would stay behind in tlu* air and tlie airplane would dive ahead When one particular arctdimt cctirre<l that was given a great deal of promi nence at tlie time, a very thorough investigation showed the trouble to i>c com pression rracks ui spruce soars. In other wonts, we had hern making airplanes of woM and they were Pertertly satisfactorv at slow speeds because the stresses on the wood werent sufficient to hotlwr us. Init when we got to high snecds the enm1'ressi.nn crack* l^-can t dvwlon. awl after awhile the spar would fracture just !dce a faticuc crack. Immediately wooden aindancs were dropiicd from all air lines. All of these developments have a very dirert connection with safetv. The newer (lungs bring higher speeds, and on account of the higher speeds they must bring Safety Section, ARA--Steam Railroad Section. XSC fcv new methods of stojiping. new methods of grade crossing control, new methods of control of the automobile driver, who isn't always as smart as he might lc. and a whole Jot of other things. On the air lines wc find tliat the greatest liandicap is the human clement ami undoubtedly we have the same difficulty as is indicated by tliesc {Haters. In the early days* wltcn we first started flying on our lines in Detroit, wejiad about four instruments on the dash. Wc hail pilots with pretty good training--pmhablj a couple ol hundred hours in the air. the licst available in tliat day. Tliosc pilots would Ukc those planes and fly them. If there was a fog. they would lamL They didn't know anything about flying blind. If they got hUo a fog they didn't know whether they were upside down or rightsidc up. and no nian in the world could tell. _ .. Today, however, things arc different. Yesterday in Detroit I . rode m a ship at a speed of 200 miles an hour which had about $6,000 worth of instruments on the dash. Tlie <lash is a small area and it is just full of instruments of every kind. The pilot who has flown for many, many years can fly blind even better than In can fly when lie looks out of the cabin. He lias a radio |ani which he flic* accurately as on a string from one town to another. When he wants to land, he can pull "down his flaps and land in a space the length of a good sized room. As part of his training, every six months flic pilot goes out with a Detriment of Commerce man. He is put *m the cabin and everything is shut up so he can't sec a thing. They take him out for an hour and lose him. He doesn't know what direction lie is giving. The instruments arc covered. At the end of an hour's time thev pull the covers off the instruments and tell him to find out where he is. He has* to go through a number of maneuvers first, right ami left turns, etc. Then lie lias to find a certain city and tell the instructor, or the man who is examining him. when he is over the airport. #. .. Suppose thev- leave from Pittsburgh and flv in the direction ot Detroit. They fly for an hour. Well, this other chap docsti t know hut what they arc down m Washington, liccausc he can go a long distance in an hour, at 2<10 miles an hour. At the end of tliat time, he is turned loose and told to take the Department of Commerce examiner to the airport at Cleveland. He feels around, unlit he picks up a beacon. He listens to the hcacon until he locates it and finds out what Itcacon it is--between which two cities it is. Tliat gives Him his due as to where hr is. Then he takes a compass course until the picks up the beacon running into Cleve land. follows the beacon into Cleveland, and when he gets over the airport, by the landing signal on the lieacon. lie signals his examiner. If lie docs that successfully he can fly for another six months or until his next examination. _ You will sec that wc go to the greatest extremes on everything connected with the air lines to insure the safely of passengers liccaitsc undoubtedly air transporta tion. to the man in the plane, ami everyone else, is the most hazardous type of transportation wc have developed as yet. For tliat very reason, it can he made the safest, because we have to take these safety precautions, whether wc want to or not. Progress and Possibilities in the Prevention of Injuries to Railroad Employees By T. H. CARROW Superintendent of Safety, Pennsylvania Railroad, Philadelphia Tlie speaker said in pari: In the year 1924. the Committee on Statistics con cluded that the hulk of all injuries to employees were chargeable to the human element and that "by improved training, supervision and discipline.** which implied tlie formulation and enforcement of safely rules, a 5 per cent reduction in the casualty rate could I* effected each year, which. Uy tlie end of I9.V). wnold lie equivalent to 35 per cent, which figure was established as the safety goal. It is iiu|>ortant to hear in mind that np to 1924. discipline, which was mentioned in the committee's report as a primary means of improving tlie employee injury record, had not been invoked to any appreciable extent by very many roads. 388 Twenty-third Annus! Safely Congress--National Safety Council The concerted effort 'ai the part of all railroad* to reach the safety goal gave a tremendous impetus to safety activities. Then began the publication of great quantities of Maiistiral information showing graphically the standing of the re* M>cciivc roads and many railroad executives, seeing their properties lagging on safety. rcvamiH.il their safety organizations. Those that were already well organized intensified their activities. During the years following tile setting of the safety c.a1. something liapiicned that was unprecedented, ami that was a continuous down ward trend in the employee casually rate lor ten consecutive years. I do not know of a single railroad that did not make substantial gains for safety during that peritxl. You will retncmlMT that the rate dropped front the peak of 31.15 in 1917 to a low of 24.84 iti 1921: tliat the rate then rose to 30.89 in 1923. and front tint dale on showed a rmitinnou* drop each year down to and including 1931; in which Year the rate was 7.52 or Tfi jktt cent under 1923. Nothing like this was cut accomplisltcd i"T safety licforc. I'atal injuries to employees oi Class I roads actually dropped from l.(W in the year JUi? l<* -188 in 1933. -Yon-fatal injuries dropjKxl front 148.1-16 to 14.126. On a man-lwutr basis, tliat is. making due allowances for fluctuations in tlc numlter of employees in the service, the reduction in employees on duty killed in 1933 under 1923 was 42 tier cent and the reduction in injured was 78 tier cent. We liave t\r some time leen in a period of marking time in safety, so to speak, preparing for wliat I lielievc will lie a more intensive ami effective campaign during the ernninp years. In this respect the history of the accident situation is analogous to |lx* history oi many oilier aspects of railroad ojieration. .Ml through the vears in which tlie railroads were so wonderfully developed there were lwriods wiicii im provements in locomotives, cars, rolling stuck, signalling systems, shop machinery, awl methods pi operation, respectively, were at a temporary standstill, bnt in due course and in every direction we find a revival of activitv and sotiscqnctit im provement. We therefore crane to the <[ticstim as to the extent of improvement in the acci dent record of the American railroads it is reasonable to expect. Tliat it is possible to further improve the record is obvious. On this head, the president of the American Railway Association recently stated: "The employee casualty rate lias been reduced 77 per cent during the last ten years. A large reduction in casualties to passengers lus also taken ptacc. Not withstanding this reduction in employee casualties, there is still quite a spread be tween the high and the low rates among railrtnds of the same class, indicating that further improvement is possible in the accident record. For example, among the larger carriers (reporting 100 million or more man-hours1. the lowest rate in 1933 was 1.6S employee casualties per million man-hours, while the highest was 10.02. Among the smaller carriers (reporting less than two million man-hours), the sin-cad is between 1.01 employee casualties per million nmi-hours. and 43.97." One prominent railroad executive believes tliat accidents can lc prevented "to the point of almost total elimination.'' Safely men probably liave different opinions about the matter. It is a tact, however, that can he readily proved by the causes of accidents, that the hulk of all injuries lieing sustamedhr railroad emplovecs today, as in former times, result from cause; over which tlie officers, supervisory forces and employees, individually or collectively. d<> liave control; that is, front man failure. What arc the general preventives of man failure? TJie first preventive is to select the right nx*" fur the job. In. times past, this was not always possible be cause the supply id applicant* was frequently inadequate. This, however, is not likely to he the ease in the near future, so our troubles in this direction should he at an end lor a long time at least. Tlie second preventive jc right thinking and right acting. A man must first think how he should act to lx* safe and then lie must act as he thinks. The diffi culty comes in getting ix-nple to think and act as they should. Now. the way to get people to think and act as they should is as old as civilization; it is hy training. a. ti^ght we have come to express in the phrase, "training, supervision and dis cipline.** although supervision and discipline are merely two of many phrases of training. * `* Now. what is tlie first requisite to training? Knowledge of the subject on Safety Section, ARA--Steam Railroad Section. NSC 389 which one is to train another. In safety, it is knowledge of safe practices.. These arc shown hy the causes of accidents and by job analysts. When sate practices arc reduced to writing thev arc usually called rules, or at least tliey arc equivalent to rules. Therefore, if all safe practices in any occupation were reduced to rules aiw if complete obedience to such rules were secured, it would insure complete immunity fnmi accidents irom man failure. This means that the first step m saiety is to provide adequate roles; the second step is for focal officers ami suf/cnw** (we teachers) to know and understand the role*: and the third step is to see that the employees know, understand and obey the rules. In consonance with these ob servations. the following items are presented for the consideration of the Safety Section as some of the essential elements in an effective saiety program: ,, 1. A comprehensive set of safety role* outlining the safe ways oi working. 2. A practical, working understanding of the roles or safe practices by all local officers, supervisors and employees, to he assured hy suitable examinations. 3. Invariable olwdicnce to all rules, violations not resulting in accidents repre senting the same degree of cul|<ab*diiy as when accidents do result from such violations. , , ,,, ,. 4. Definite awl not perfunctory otecrvation* In- local nfheers and stqicrvisors to detect violations of safely rules and formal report d violations detected as a requirement of management. ... .. . .. 5. Fonnal disciplinary action on proven violations. with entry on discipline record covering every ease. ...... ,, , fi. A monthly awl cumulative record of the violations of rules or unsafe prac tices detected hv cadi local officer ami supervisor, and a ninthly summary hy dciartmcnts for divisions and system. . .. - , 7. All accidents, regardless of how trivial, shall he ^ reported and investigated promptly to determine cause, rcsjmnsibility and disciplinary action to lie taken wlicrc responsilxlitv is shown. . & Investigation sltntild invariably develop an answer to these two questions: (a) Was accident due to the violations of a rule? CM If not. slionld a rule lx* provided ? TUESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION October 2, 1934 The "Green Book" By LEW R. PALMER Secretary, Committee of Award, Railroad Employees* National Safety Contest and Conservation Engineer, Equitable Life Assurance Society. New York City The speaker said in jart: Tlie vear 1933 ended the ten year period ot tlie Railroad Employees' National Safely Contest as set up by thc^ National Safety Council and recorded in the respective issues oi tl*c "Green Rook." ^ A constant studv of railroad safety contest records during a period of ten years lias established what I believe to be a fundamental fact: that it is necessary to break down our entire Class I railroad exposure into a sufficient number of competing groups so that there will not l>c ton wide a variation between the man-hour exposure of the largest group contender as comjarcd with the man-hours of the smaller contenders in the same group; otherwise, the larger unit, with its more uniform casualty rate, will he handicapped by the more widely fluctuating rates of the smaller contenders; for it is generally recognized that under normal conditions the greater the man-hour exposure the more uniform the casualty rates are year hy year. For that reason, the revised plan suggested for the 1934 Railroad Employees* National Safety Contest includes six groups for standard Class I railroads ami two groups for switching and terminal roads, it being a matter of record in connection with switching and terminal roads tliat a great deal more interest has been developed in our annual contest since these roads were given what was considered a fighting dtance for competitive honors. 390 Twenty-third Annual Safety Congress--National Safety Council There is one change tha- has been under consideration on several occasions: that is. the weighting of employee fatalities in nur Railroad Employees* National Safe!}* Contest: and it is a subject tiiat I lx*!cvc should be given serious consideration. 1'ossibly others liavc noted tiiat in one or two eases small Class 1 railroads have rcjeirted a single employee cisualty tor the year and--as recorded--that one casualty happened to lie a fatality. Ollier small roads with two or three in* juries and no fatality naturally felt that their somcwltat larger total casualty rate represented. in reality, a better safety record. On the other liaml. we arc confronted with a situation which lias heen recognized by many; that the longer we can keep the rcsjcciivc contenders working hard for first honors, the more acci dents will lie prevented, and when a iatalitv occurs on the small road and is weighted by five <r ten tiiat road's diances of winning an award have liccn elim inated. Furthermore, ii tatalitics were to lie penalized through weighting we would find instances where it would le necessary to cliargc heavily for an accident carrying no violation of rules as against an unweighted injury due to flagrant violation of sate practice. It must Ik* rvmemfered that a fatality, in many eases, is such by virtue oi a fraction of an inch or a fraction of a second, or by a number of other uncon- trollahlc variables. " After serious consideration of these pltases of the situation it was deemed inad visable to weight employee fatalities in our Railroad Employees' National Safety Contest, for it was generally omccfled tiiat the way to prevent fatalities is to elim inate accident causes, anti that tw> much cmpliasis on fatal eases might laul to discount the real iuijtorlance oi reportable injuries and the need for investigating the causes oi minor injuries and even the near accident tiiat might reveal a serious hazard. This leads tip to another inii*ortant principle. Years ago it was discovered tiiat the one-day lost-time ease was the "lowest denomination" tiiat could, with ultimate safety. lc utilized in an employee safety contest. . Report of Committee on Train Accidents By G- H. WARFEL Chairman of Committee, and Assistant to Executive Vice President, Union Pacific System, Omaha, Nebraska The sjteaker said in pan: A train accident i* imc with or without casualties, arising in omncclion with the operation or movement of a train, locomotive or car. which results in ilamage to equipment or other railway projxTiy in excess of $150 (including Ci*st of clearing wreck and local expense of transferring lading, but not ilamage to the lading). Tlie outstanding features revealed by the 1933 statistics on train accidents arc: 1. A slight increase in freijneney of occurrence, jwrticularlv derailments. 2. Several accidents with an unusually large number of {icrsons hurt, notably rear end collisions. 3. A greater number of casualties than in any year since 1930. resulting in a casualty rate per million train mile# 5 per cent aln.ve 1930. instead of the 33 per cent reduction h|cd for. _ 5. Train accidents accounted for 22 of the -18 passengers and travelers killed and 65 of the 468 employees killed (on dmv) in accidents on Class I railroads. The year's total 5/23 tram accidents of all kinds occurring on the road and in the switching yards is the smallest nuniler ever recorded in any year. It includes 1_?1U collisions. 3.J**! derailments. 478 locomotive breakdowns and 635 miscellaneous accidents. There were 153 (icrsons killed ami 1.253 injured, exclusive of trespassers. lnth figures lieing Itigher titan in the preceding year. When these accidents are classified by causes, we find: 1JU due to negligence oi employees: 2.324 due to ilefccts in or failures of equijmtcnt: 656 due to defects in car inipn|HT maintenance of way and structures; 930 due to miscellaneous causes. The forms of negligence most disastrous front the standpoint of himian casualties in 1933 were: first, disregard of fixed signals: second, excessive speed in violation Safely Section. ARA--Steam Railroad Section. NSC 39! oi restrictions: third, failure to properly protect by flagmen: fourth, overrunning meeting points with other trains: fifth, switches set in wrung jiositinti. While the frequency rate of train accidents showed a small increase in 1933_ as compared with the remarkably low figure oi the preceding year, the rate of 7.22 accidents per million train miles run remains much lower than for any year prior to 1932, and represents a reduction oi 63 |*t cent under the base year of 1922. The frequency rates of collisions and derailments are slightly higher iti 1932. while Uvo- motive and miscellaneous accidents attained a new low frequency of 1.43 per million train miles. . However, when we look at the figures tor human casualties in train accidents, we find there lias been a disturbing increase in both fatal and mm-tatal injuries, the total casualty rale for 1933 licing higher than for any year since 1929. This increase in casualties was due almost entirely tu tlx* unusual ninl*cr of |*crsons killed and injured in four or five accidents occurring m different mails. There were 83 |x*rsons legitimately riding on trains killed in train accidents in 1933. including trainmen, {icrsons carried under contract and passengers, as comjiarcd with 61 the preceding year. Moreover there were 1.099 trainmen, persons carried under contract and passengers, injured in train accidents in 19.13. as com]arcd with 779 m 1932. . . ... The 1.219 collisions, which involved 42 passenger trains, resulted in 32 fatalities and 630 injuries exclusive of trcs|iasscrs. Certainly, tltc imperative necessity for taking all itossihlc practical measures for the prevention oi collisions must lie obvious to every officer, supervisor and employee on American railroads, when it is realized tiiat more than 200 casualties resulted from a single accident of this diameter last year. The conclusions of the I. C. C. Bureau of Safety investigators in each of the major rear-end collision eases reads almost the same: "Failure of an engmemnn properly to nhey signal indications amt stop at signals of a flagman." _ In many other reports of similar accidents with a smaller toll of casualties, the conclusions reveal violations of rules by various employees ns well ns cugincmcti. and in several cases referred specifically to failure of operating nfliccrs to properly enforce observance of rules. ^ The press and public usually ascrflic such occurrences to "human faUiltility." and place the onus of responsibility almost entirely ott the shoulders and conscience oi the erring employee. Without any desire to minimixe tin* enudoyee resixnisibility. . candor compels us to point out that tliere are occasional cases in which the greater degree of responsibility properly rests ti]*on the management ami nix-rating officers of the railroad involved, for their failure to utilize methods which have Ixvti found highly effective for prevention of such accidents. We refer to tlx* inauguration of continual Imna fide surprise tests, carefully arranged to assure the surprise feature, made bv men who truthfully report every detail of the actual performance of all members of the crew, and followed by severe ami unremitting discipline for failure or negligence in any detail of performance. These vigorous measures must, oi course. Ik preceded by a thorough campaign of education and examinations to assure that the oiKrating rules arc fnllv understood, not only bv tlx* rank ami file of em ployers. but by dispatclicrs. trainmasters, rood foremen of engines. 5i!|x*ritiUiideiiis and supervisors in mechanical and maintenance of way dciurtments. Preventing Collisions and Derailments Due to Negligence of Employees By C. H. LONGMAN Assistant to General Manager, Chicago and North Western Railway Company. Chicago The s{teaker said in part: An analysis of the collision* and derailments on my own road shows that 88 per cent of the collisions and 25 |xt cent of the di-railnients can lie traced to the failure of employees to observe the rules or special instructions. One of the most serious derailments which we have Iiatl was due to the failure of tlie cngincman to properly control the speed of his train on a four degree curve. 392 Tu'cnix-third Annual Safety Conyress--Xational Safety Council which resulted in the death oi an engineer ami a fireman and injury to other tminluT* of tlic crew. lie endeavored to negotiate that curve at 55 miles an hour, while the maximum sjHx-d permissible lor passenger trains was 25 miles. In order tliat we might prevent accidents due to excessive sjived the Division Officers as well as the Saicty Officers arc required to make checks to see that the sliced restrictions arc complied with ami a report of these checks is made to the ficncral Superintendent each month. The train sheets in the dispatchers' office arc checked to sec that the sjiccd restriction*- arc not exceeded, and this also serves as a check on the train dispatchers to determine whether or not they arc permitting excessive sjieetl in sjieed-rcslricted districts. Tlic division engineer from time to time also checks the election ui the curves to see that the proper sujicr-ctevation is maintained. The only method tliat we know of preventing accidents due to the disregard of fixed signals by cngincmcn and trainmen is to make {icriodical checks each month. This is done by the division and Safety Department officers to see that the men n|*ervc (he indication of signals. Failure to pruvide proper flag protection is covered in Rule 99v On our road we require the general officers as well as the division officers and Safety Department officers, when riding trains, whether freight or passenger, to make it a point to check and see tliat Rule W is complied with in every rcsjicct. Tliis is in addition to the assigned mnnlier <i checks which arc made each month by the division officers and reported to the general superintendent. a Failure of engineers on second and third class trains to properly control the stccd of their trains within yard limits is covered hy Rule 93 oi our operating book of rules. The only way that this can lie controlled is for the division officers and local officers in the yards to nltscrvc the s|ievd at which the second and third class trains nmvr at all times. Violations arc promptly investigated ami disciplinary action taken. Collisions and derailments due to switelics licing set wrong occur mostly in yard limits, so far as our own r<id is concerned. and the only way in which this can he rectified is tor tin* general yardmasters and vardmasters to see that the switches arc jiroperly lined up. Failures on the part of employees to properly line switches lack arc investigated and disciplinary action taken. Another thine is to check your engineer anti fireman and switchman to see that they arc looking in the direction they arc going so tliat they will observe a switch that is set in die wrong position. It has Jwvn many years since we Iiave had an accident due to the improper liandliug of a train order, anti this can l>c credited to the fact tliat our management lets instituted and maintained a systematic check of train orders and train dispatchers. In my estimation failnre to keep proper lookout has been the cause of more accidents than any tidier one thine. This is particularly true oi yard collisions.^ It was not so long acn when the first thine tliat a locomotive fireman on a switch engine, working nights, would do would l*c to look for the "hay Itoard." If the engineer was the slccjiy one he would take the fireman's place on tlic "has* board." and the fireman would nm the engine. Today our division officers. including yard- masters. nuke checks in yards to see that the cngiuciucn comply with the mlc which requires litem to keep a proper lookout at all times. Preventing Failures of Car Journals, Wheels, Trucks and Couplers By W. B. MOIR Chief Car Inspector. Centra] Region. Pennsylvania Railroad Tlic sfieaker said in part: How can we best prevent failures of car journals? First. In* careful machining ami ins|iection at ottr wheel shops where the axle is prepared for motmting. A magnifying glass may lie used to advantage. Numerous journals have hccii found with hair-line detail fractnrcs which could not have liven discovered with the naked eye. and which if permitted^ to lie returned to service under a car arc nothing more or less titan potential accidents. Safely Section, AHA--Steam Railroad Section. XSC 393 Second, the care and attention given to car journals in tlu: transportation yard in tlic way of proper lubricaliuii. Many failures of car journals arc caused liv lack oi proper lubrication. Another imtential failure <>i car journals is the sudden cooling of a red hot journal with water. Train crews shotthl not throw water directly on a red hot journal, as the sudden cooling of the outside surface sets up internal stresses which in many cases cause a scam to develop on the surface of die journal, with tlic result that after the journal^ is trued and replaced under the car. this scam will develop into a progressive fracture. The failure oi wheels is an intensely interesting problem. Prevention of wheel failures can best be accomplished by careful workmanship at the wheel shops where the wheels are Ixircd and mounted. It is important that the Itore be true and the mounting pressure correct. In the transportation yards. I Iiave found that tlic average car in*j*oct>r. through long cxiicriencc, is highly qualified to pass nn wheel delects. There arc two general classes of defects. First, those which are liable to cause accidents such as cracked plates, scams and loose wheels; lltc other delects are in extreme eases liable to cause trouble hut not as serious as those listed above, and arc chipped rim. wont through chill, shell outs, slid flats, etc. Train crews slioutd also be on the alert for defects in the ease of brakes sticking, and should by all means refrain from throwing water on a hut wheel, as such treatment will result in thermal cracks on tread and flange, as well as cracked plates. Defective brakes on equipment arc in many cases die cause of wheel failures, and it is very important that the air brake equipment lie kept in good working condition. A careful check should be made of wheels when cars are on the shop tracks to detect defects which are liable to result hi an accident. In the ease of multiple wear wheels under |ta$scngcr cars, we have iound dial hy n*hitc-u*a$hing the luck of the wheel plate and rim. cracks in plate and tinder side of rim were discovered which could not |>c detected with the naked eye. When a car is cut out of service for jicrkxlicat air-brake attention and after being placed on shop track, a very careful check is made of the (nicks, and in the ease of arch tar trucks the arch liars arc insjicctcd at all licmls. front and hack, to detect any cracks tliat may have developed. A mirror is used to examine the hack side of the arch har. Incidentally, this mirror inspccti<m is made nn all cars cquipjicd with arch bar trucks, irrespective of whether they are shnpjK.fl for periodical air brake attention or not. All brake beams are dropped and examination made of tlic hangers; limits of wear iiave liven established and gauges provided for checking the wear. The same procedure is followed with respect to brake hanger pins and key holts, all cotter keys and split keys which show evidence of excessive corrosion arc renewed. The same procedure is followed with rcsjicct to ctnqders and draft attachments, the couplers are dmpjied: yoke and entipic examined for cracks at vital points; loose rivets in coupler yokes renewed: couple cross keys cheeked for wear; all cross keys, if not cquiptird with A. R. A. cross key* retainer, arc removed and a modified cross key applied: the distance fxrtwcen stops is checked and corrected, if necessary: loose rivets in coupler steps renewed. Preventing Derailments Due to Defects In Track, Bridges and Roadway By A. H. PETERSON Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, Chicago The speaker said in part: Among the forces of nature which it is necessary for us to combat arc those of temperature, precipitation, wind, ami fin*. The sudden changes of temperature common to many parts of our country rctuk*r it extremely hazardous to surface track out of face. Raising should, whenever possible, be done during the cooler parts of the day. and all raised track should lie tnmned ami liack- fiJJrd as quickly as possible. Rails should lie securely anrlmred, ordinarily in the direction of traffic, but sometimes in both directions. * 394 Twenty-third .1 mutat Safety Cotu/ress--Xational Safety Council During the summer months cjc joints may lie unloosened, bars tappet] lightly with a maul, ami again retightctieiL Similarly, in cold weather, tight joints mav be opened up. S|ecial care should lie taken with |*iints where steel has been laid adjoining rail of lighter seclim. as there is a constant threat that the light rail may suddenly give way against the thrust *{ the heavier, more rugged track struc ture. t Heaving track is a familiar phenomenon to most trackmen in the colder climates. Drainage will go a long way toward eliminating this jnssflulity. There is scarcely a man in track work who does not know that the various soil components, some of which are more retentive of moisture tlian others, cause track to heave both laterally and vertically. Such ]mints must he watched carefully, especially when the frost is going out, as the track does not always settle hack into position uniiorody. Under tlic head ui precipitation conics snmv and rain. Birth arc a lane to the trackman and sujiervisor. Heavy and unexpected ram lias Iwen resi*unsib!e tor many a derailment. Only last year, on one of our middle western railroads, there occurred a cloudburst, during which five and a half inches of rain fell in a period of three hours. A bridge under which there had not been more tlian three feet of water for twenty years was forced to withstand the onrush of a fifteen-foot fl<wd. Heavy rainfall is itu respecter i railrcul property and adequate flow-ways must be provided. Narrow track shoulders should not lie neglected. Wooden bridge ends subject to wash sliould lie riprapiKd. _ A careful cystcm of liank widening should le carried forward yearly. Refuse at the end of cuts should lie eliminated and tin.* cr<lcd material dug away. Adequate drainage in all cases by means of proper sewers or ditches must Ik* provided. Ditches in all cases must 1*e deep enough and with sufficient gradient m*t only to earn* away the surface water rapidly hut to drain as much as possible of the sub soil as well. Water-pockets in fills constructed of clay materials offer another danger, due to slides. Usually, due to a strata of jKirnus material surrounded by denser, more impervious soil, the water is held from escaping projierly. The sujiporting top hallast is thereby weakened and many derailments have occurred because of the track structure at such points suddenly giving wav under the wheels of a train. The bottom of these water-pockets must Ik* tapped by the proper methods drains. Slopes may be sodded to prevent slitting. Various types of vines---alfalfa or Ber muda grass--nut only serve to prevent sliding, but also arrest considerable drifting snow. Windstorms have caused many tram derailments, due to blowing cars off sidings onto main lines of otlicr tracks, or blowing trees, telegraph poles, or other obstacles across the rails. Derails must lie provided for at all tlaugerous lints. especially on descending grades. Trees should lie cut lack to a safe distance from the track wlicrcvcr possible. In some sections of the southwest. winds arc an especial liazard due to the light, sandy top soil drilling. Tlic placing of sand fences, oiling of sandy soil adjacent to railroad tracks, and the planting of resistant vegetation arc some of the more common preventives of such accidents. Wooden trestles on our important lines arc rapidly giving way to steel hut on our less im|ortant lines they will prolmhlv lie with us for a long time to come. In some cases the tops oi wooden trestles have liecn covered with sheet metal to prevent their ignition from cugim* coals. Vegetation sfumld Ik* carefully cut away from wooden abutments and inspections carried on systematically to sec that this item ^ is not neglected. Weed huniers should Ik* carefully followed and all fire in tics carefully put out. If this is not done, all or a portion oi the tics in a single panel oi track may be consumed, permitting the rail to push out of gauge or to depress under traffic, and thus lead to a costly train accident. Nor is the highway crossing free from its liazards. __ Planks should lie taken up licfore freezing weather begins and all dirt on top of the tics and underneath planks cleaned out. Flange-wavs should receive especial consideration and all tee. snow, or other material cleaned out carefully. Ton many derailments have occurred due to snow and ice in flange-ways. _ On gravel or dirt ballasted highways there is an added tlanger due to vehicles drawing stones or dirt upon the crossing atid into tlic flange-way. Here it coro- Safety Section, AR.4--Steam Railroad Section, XSC 395 Icts under traffic, as more and more is deposited, until eventually the wheels of a passing train arc lilted up and over the rail. Highway repairmen operating roadscrapers are sometimes careless or ignorant of these dangers. Track foremen should make it their duty to advise all such persons of the possible consequences of this dangerous practice. So far very little has been said atom inspections. It is, however, hv regular and careful track inspections that incipient dangers may l>cst lie found 'and cor rected. Tlic trackmen, the foremen and the sujicrvisors should train most carefully the men upon whom they ara to rely. With sections rapidly liceomiiig longer anil longer, it is not always (lossihle for the foreman to supervise his gang and also patrol his -track. The track inspector therefore liccuttics the first line of defense. He must be able to think clearly and rapidlv in whatever emergence mav arise, always remembering that the safety of the train service rests in his Hands.' Moreover, the foreman himself must he ready at all times of high wind, licavv rain, or any unusual weather conditions to patrol his track, ami to him is given the power to preserve the lives of passengers and trainmen, and to him is given the privilege of speeding up the wings of transportation. WEDNESDAY MORNING SESSION October 3, 1934 Report of Committee on Prevention of Highway Crossing Accidents By H. A. ROWE Manager, Claims Department, Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad, New York City Tlic speaker said in |iart: The report of this committee for tlic year 193.1 again shows a slight reduction hi the number of acctdeuls and fatalities at railroad highway crossings and a substantial reduction in the numlicr of injuries for the fifth consecutive year since the year 1938. The record is as follows: Year Accidents 1928.................................. ... 5.800 1933.................................. Fatalities 2.568 1,511 Injuries 6,667 3.697 Reduction............... ... 22K$(44?A 1.057 2.970 (41%} Casualties during the four months of Jime. July. August and Careful Crossing Campaign, compared with the same iK'ritwL 1928 to 1933. inrinsivc. were as follows: Year Accidents 1928.................................. 1929.................................. ... 1.827 1930.................................. 1931.................................. 1932.................................. 1933.................................. Fatalities 858 749 640 496 432 491 Injuries 2.092 2.140 1,505 1.196 1.022 1.124 It wiU he noted that automobile registration in 1933 was 23.827.290. and repre sents an increase of 1.4 per cent over the preceding year; this is quite com|iarable with the number of automobiles registered in the jicak year of crossing accident casualties. _ * Gasoline consumption, which is a fair barometer of automobile use. was 16.025. 562,000 gallons during the year 1933; which is an increase of a trifle less than 2 per cent over the preceding vear. The increasing use of smaller cars with greater mileage per gallon of gasoline, indicates that the traffic over and across railroad tracks was fully equal to tliat of 1932. 396 Twenty-third tnniml Safety Congress--Xatiamil Safely Council More than 92 per cent ot all railruad-higlm-ay crossing casualties involved the oj>cration oi automobiles. The remaining 8 per cent includctl persons in animal* drawn vehicles, bicyclists, pedestrians. etc. To the credit of the automobile driver, and the activities oi the railroads, atten tion is called to the increasing numlicr of automobiles actually in use, at highway crossing, tltc figure now lieiug one *leath tti 15.769 autontobilcs. Crossing accidents, resulting in injuries, are also iavnrably rvdectcd. as during the iast year there was but one crossing injury to each 6.443 automobiles operated. Illustrative oi the thoughtlessness of some motor car drivers, it is interesting to note that in 19.13. again, motor vehicles colliding with the sides oi trains accounted tor a large iuiml*er of all crossing accidents; namely 28 per cent ot all accidents. 17 per cent oi the fatalities, and 40 per cent of the injuries. Yottr committee earnestly recommends tliat the individual railroads particularly stress tlic necessity of their train crews and others giving adequate and timely warnings to the public of the approach i trains to a highway crossing. The com mittee is also unanimous tliat warning from engine should lie continued until the crossing is definitely reached. Tliat suitable standardized mctliods of protection l*c cntplnyctl. where necessary, at crossings, to facilitate uniformity and the public understanding of .the signals. Tltat crossings lie peri*dically insjicetcd and maintained in sound travahle condi tion. Your committee also recommends tliat greater advantage lie taken of the opportu nity of presenting the crossing safety subject to school children throughout the nation, in sintilar fashion to the way litis work is taring conducted hv some roads, jiarticularly the Atlantic Oast l.ine. It is also recommended tliat officers or suitable representatives of railroads present the crossing accident situation at hmcltcon clubs and other places wltere men gather, this work often reaching those wlm arc em ployers of drivers of motor car vehicles. Summary of Conditions and Practices Involved In Certain Accidents By W. J. PATTERSON Director, Bureau of Safety, Interstate Commerce Commission The speaker said in part: It is difficult to discuss the subject of railroad acci dents without appearing to take a more or less critical, attitude concerning the exiting shuation. Obviously, there would he no such accidents unless defects ex isted. rules were violated. or someone failed to think or act in a safe manner. last fall the Cuntmissiim investigated a rear end collision on an eastern railroad in which 14 persons were killed ami 32 injured. The accident occurred on a double track line cqui]ipcd with automatic Hock signals and an automatic train stop device. The enghieman of the following train received a calling-on signal indication at the entrance to the block in which tlic accident occurred: this signal authorized him to proceed at "restricted speed.** which was defined in the liook ot rttlcs. Tlic engineman o]>crated a ioresxalling lever of the automatic train-stop device and entered the Hock at a low rate of speed; at that time he knew the Hock was occupied bv another train, having been following it when it entered the block. Imt Ik assumed that it would keep moving and conset|Uvntly allowed the speed of his own train to increase with the expectation of prrcecding as far as the next automatic signal: however. tlK preceding train, which was out of sight annmd a curve, stopjied short of tliat automatic signal on account of switching operations head. The engmentatt of the second train was looking across tlic curve in order to pick up the indication of the automatic signal and failed to see the rear of the standing train or its flagmau until too late to avert the accident, although he had a view of the standing train for a distance of alwuit 90ft feet. The rule tinder which his train was proceeding was simple and easily understood. It was evident that the employees did not have a dear and correct understanding of wliat was meant hv the term "restricted s|ecdM and that proper effort was not made either to observe or enforce the requirement* of the rule. Safety Section, ARA--Steam Railroad Section, XSC 397 Shortly before the accident above referred to. there were two other accidents which were of an unusually serious nature. One occurred in the southwestern section of the country and was caused by a flood resulting from a cloudburst Itaving washed away the fill sup|orting one of the abutments oi a bridge, permitting it to collapse under a train; while the other occurred on an eastern railroad ami also involved flood waters, the center pier of a bridge having been undermined. In the first of these two eases not only did it appear that the washing away oi the fill could have hem guarded against hv rip rap or oilier protective measures, but the need of such protection had existed for two years. In addition, rains earlier in the month had resulted in the liank of the stream amt also tlic toe on the sloj*c of the fill supporting the abutment, being washed sufficiently to direct attention to the need for protection. I^ocal residents using the highway had observed the condi tion and recognized the possibility oi danger to the railroad bridge hut no repre sentatives of the railroad had matte sufficient insjKctkm to discover the condition. One of the functions which must necessarily accompany the sale o|>cration of a railroad lias to do with the taking of protective measures liefurc actual danger develops. In the second ease involving flood waters, the undermining of the center pier of the bridge permitted it to settle under a passenger train, resulting iu the derail ment of the entire tram, the death of two jicrsons and the injury of twenty others. The piers of the bridge had been built on a gravel foundation, no provision being made to guard against scouring, because it was staled tliat the gravel was too compact to pern it the driving of piles. American Railway Engineering Association rules covering inspection of bridges provide in part tltat the ins|>cction of foundations should include an examination for indications of semiring or undermining, and that when necessary, soundings should lie taken for this purpose. The evidence of this ease indicated tliat the coiniiany had made no underwater ins|icctim nor taken any soundings for the purpose of detecting possible scour at any time suliscqucnt to the erection of the bridge 29 years previously. Speed lias been a factor in a number of the accidents which were investigated. One of these involved the derailment of a passenger train due to excessive sliced on a sliarp curve, the evidence indicating tliat the engine turned over from centrif ugal force, without marking the ties lietwven the rails, while traveling at a sjiced estimated to liavc been from 50 to 65 miles per hour, although the speed of |iasscnger trains on the curve where the accident occurred was restricted by slow Ixiard to 30 miles per hour. The other accident in which speed was a factor involved failure liropcriv to control speed in an occupied block; this is a frequent cause of accidents. This accident occurred on a single-track line, trains being operated under a manual block-signal system. The first train liad 113 cars with a IicIjkx lichiud the caboose, while |ic second train had 127 cars with two engines on the head end and a helper liehiml the caboose. After inssrng the Iasi block offic? the first train had licen stopped and shortly afterward was struck by the following train. More or less fog had prevailed, and it was very foggy in the vicinity of the point of accident. Investigation developed that the second train |isscd the last block office 41 minutes Iwhind the first tram, made no stop en route, and had proceeded at an average speed of about 23 miles per hour, whereas the maximum iiennissiHc speed for freight trains with hcl|cr engines was only 25 miles ter hour and under the rules a follow ing train in an occupied Hock was required to he njicralcd under such control that It could Ik stopped short of a train or obstruction. The lirief references I have made to accidents investigated by the Bureau of Safety during the past year do not retwesent unusual conditions. Accidents of this kind are encountered in our work year after year and are detailed in our accident investigation reports made public from time to time. Many' railroads arc availing themselves of the information container! in these reports to aid fit discovering and correcting dangerous or undesirable conditions and practices on their lines before they result in accidents. Certain railroad officers devote their entire time to safety work, yet they arc seldom found at the scene of a train accident or in the investigation room. A train accident ts a serious matter.. It may and frequently docs result in a considerable number of deaths and injuries, and large projierty loss. Surely the fundamental idea of safety applies to train operation and the methods and practices followed in 398 Tii'culy-third Annual Safely Congress--National Safety Council connection therewith, vet the duties and responsibilities oi safety officers do not appear to include ufictating conditions and practices which vitally affect the sale handling of trains and the maintenance *<i the track and cquijnncnt involved.. In the ease of each of the accidents to which 1 have referred, there was not a single recognized safety officer present at the investigations. In connection with the inm-observance <>l rules wliich was involved in some of the accidents 1 lave mentioned, there is one matter which I desire particularly to call to your attention. Frequently an investigation indicates that employees have been doing or have leen failing to do certain things hi violation oi the rules until it develops into an established practice and this practice finally results hi an accident. lTndcr these circumstances the employee usually is held at fault. Rules and instruc tions governing the operation of trams arc based on years of cxi*cricncc and arc the result oi careful deliberations of the best minds among experienced railroad oper ating officers: yet there arc occasions when these important rules arc not enforced, violations luring overlooked as a matter of expediency. An derating officer assumes a grave responsibility if in bis desire t cxjicuitc the movement of traffic he permits violations of the rules to go imcorrcctcd. The rule* of various railroad* differ, but all of them have the same ultimate object in view, namely to insure that signals are displayed hchind a train to provide adeipiatc iirotection. In many instances how ever, it is common knowledge licit in order to avoid delay the flagman is not ex pected or required to comply with the rules. On some roads the flagman start* lack promptly and cmtntics*for a proper distance or until recalled. Hut on others he loiters around tite rear end or is mil expected jo go liack any great distance: when those things arc oliscrved frequently the natural inference is that tile employees arc reflecting the attitude of those charged with enforcement f rules on the jiarticular railroad involved. Another example of rule* bring frequently overlooked lias to do with speed. l venture to say tliat violations of stccd restrictions or rules governing speed are among the most common rule violations on, the railnads of this country. Chrt >t 87 accidents investigated lv the Ilurcan during the fiscal year ended June 30. 1W, excessive spectl was involve*! directly or indirectly in at least 17 eases. To avoid accidents, there arc two essential principles to he kept in mind: fn>t. rigid enforcement of and nlxxlicnce to rules so tliat as a result^ of ^instruction, train ing and practice tlie employee will, in case f emergency, instinctively do the right thing: and secondly. thonmgh investigation t all accidents for the purpose of ascertaining nnt *miv the immediate cause* Imt also the underlying factors lending up to the immediate causes, and then applying the proper remedies or preventive measures. Report of Committee on Train Service Accidents By D. G. PHILLIPS Superintendent of Safety, Wabash Railway, St. Louts, Mo. The speaker said in part: Our record of train service accidents shows that in 1933 a total of -4.598 persons were killed and 15.107 jicrsons injured. Confining the figures to employees on duty, we find that a total of 329 were killed and 6.032 were injured. Of these 209 trainmen were among the killed and 120 were other em ployee fatalities. And among tlie injured. 5.468 were trainmen and 564 other em ployees on duty. . .. ... The relative importance of traiu service accidents as compared with accidents of all classes becomes evident when vnu note tliat out of a total of 500 employees killed on duty in 1933. oi these 329 were classed as train service accidents, while of the 15.583 employees injured in 1933. 6.A32 were injured in train service accidents. \\Ticn major injuries alone are considered, die proportion of those injured in train service accidents is much higher. Another thing that nukes the nutter of train service accidents of great importance is that nearly all of these accidents arc. pre ventable: in other words, hundreds of employees arc killed and thousands injured unnecessarily. The causes of accidents of this class and the remedies to prevent accidents of Safety Section, AHA--Steam Railroad Section, NSC 399 this class are just what they were a year ago. and just what they were four years ago. The task before us therefore is not to discover causes of accidents and' not to discover what the remedy is. for these luve liotli been nude apparent years ago. The.important thing before us. then, is what to do. or ratlier how to get the remedy applied. Let us look, then, at some of the outstanding types of these accidents. . Coupling or uncoupling cars or locoinolh'cs. The Interstate 'Commerce O.niimission figures show that in 1933, 12 persons were killed and 246 injured; and tliat of these 9 trainmen were killed and 238 injured, and 3 other employees were killed and 8 other employees injured. This type of accident is the oiic*in which speed seems to be accountable for most of the injuries but in realitv they are tlie result of violation of rules. *" Those in su|>crvisory capacity should see to it that men in this class of service, as well as all others, fully understand that a request for work to fie dime in less time is not in anv way to lie considered as jicmtissiuii or imitation to violate safety rules to accomplish the task. * Operating hand brakes. Qi the 15 [icrsofis killed and 514 jiersons injured in 1933 .while operating hand lwakes, all were employees on dirty. All those killed and 511 of the injured were trainmen. While there* was an increase of 25 per cent in fatalities when compared with 1932. the mmilicr injured decreased 13 per cent. There has been a steady improvement in the total iiuuiIkt of casualties, the figures for 1933 showing a reduction of 55 tier cent under 1930. ` In studying the causes of these accidents, we find considerable evidence of lack of forethought and care on the fart of the men. It is recommended that a definite educational jirogram lie instituted with con centration on the following suggested subjects: the imjMirtancc of first sizing up the job quickly and thoroughly from all angles: the different types f hand brakes, method of operation: brake clubs. examination fur strength ami proper use of; position of feet on brake platforms and mani|mlatum of the pawl: imiMirtancc of sectirc forcing, particularly in winter; imjmrtancv oi having a firm grip: precautions taken with (wakes that arc set too tightly: precautions to l>e taken when on a moving car or on a standing car. Getting on or off ears^ or foeontoth'es. The total number of (icrsons killed in this manner in 1933 was 5Ifi. while the total injured was 3.785. Of these 15 em ployees were killed while *m dirty and 1345 injured: II of the killed were trainmen and 13(56 injured, while other employees killed mnnliered 4 ami 79 injured. This tabulation slmws progress. Wlicn cniiqiarcd with 1930 the total casualties to employee* no duty decreased 52 per cent including a rcducthni of`67 ;ht cent in fatalities. There was a decrease of 19. r 56 per cent, in the ntindwr killori and a decrease of 204. or 13 per cent, in those injured as compared with 1932. The chief causes of accidents under this classification arc falling, cither due to slipping or tripping, getting in w off cars or locomotives while in motion, and stepping dmvn on uneven roadbed or wi 4*trudiom. * Many of these accidents occurred at night <ir during inclement weatlier and some were due to defective equipment. Most railroads have safety rules in effect which, if complied with, would have prevented a great many of these accidents. The greatest progress can he made hr rigidly enforcing the rules and applying suitable discipline in individual cases of rule violations. Operating^ locomotives. In 1933, 5 pcrs*ms were killed and 834 |>crsnns injure*! while operating locomotives, all of them being employees on dutv. Accidents under this classification are generally due to the failure of engincmen to comply with the operating rules of the railroad, as well as the safety regulation* established for tlicir protection. Many improvements can he tnadc in* tlie method of cleaning fires. Iiandiing cial, as well as the methods of using fire tools, am) it is recommended that safety officers give jarticular attention to this subject. . One of the outstanding causes of serious and fatal injuries under this classification is the faking of water at water plugs in all kinds of weather, and in a great number of instance* the inefficiency of operation is due to the lack of projier maintenance of these water plugs. Tlie unexpected movement of tlie locomotive plays its part in the serious phase of injuries under this cause, and proper cooperation hv the men on the locomotive is essential to eliminate this type of accident. ' The operation of stokers and power reverse gears, squirt hose and other me- 400 Tzi'i'itty-ihird .lnnual Safely Congress--Rational Safety Council chanicat equipment call ior constant education and training to eliminate them as potential accident hazards. _ Operatin'/ pitches. Although none were killed in this manner in 1933, 176 persons were injured, all of them being employees on duty. Oi these 1G5_ were trainmen and 11 oilier employees. The reduction oi casualties due to operation of switches has shown a verv marked decrease over 1930, - killed in 1930 against none in 1933. 378 injured in 1930 as against 176 in 1933. This indicates that employees are exercising more care while handling switches. Of the causes leading to these injuries we would enumerate the following ^ as the roost important: insecure footing; haste in attempting to throw the switch; im proper position of man throwing the switch: switch hard to throw; and unsafe conditions around switch. The first three of these causes might all come under the single heading "haste.*' Before attempting to throw the switch a man should be sure his footing is secure, that his body is tree oi tlte movement oi lever, and he should never lake it tor granted that "the switch will be easy to throw; because of variable weather conditions, the switch tltat is easy to throw todiv will be hard to throw tomorrow. A man should never undertake to jerk-the switch lever over; because if he jerks on the lever with the expectation that it will move easily when tor some reason it is hard to moye. injury is apt to result. He should always take a firm hold and throw the snatch over with a steady uniform movement, being sure tlut there is tin obstruction that will catch his hand in the movement of the switch lever. Those wltosc duty it is to keep the switch in good working condition, and to keep the vicinity of the switch clear of unnecessary obstructions, should see that this duty is performed. Switches nw] frequent inspection. ' Struck and run ovr not at public crossings. The total persons killed in 1933 numbered 1.792 and 958 jwrsons injured. Among employees on duty 101 were killed and 146 injured: of these 32 killed were trainmen and 74 injured, and 69 killed were other employees and 72 injured. The reduction of employee* killed on account being struck and run over not at public crossings is very marked. 231 having l>een killed in 1930 as compared with 101 in 1933. I think this good showing lias been largely brought about by the special attention given to the elimination of tlte causes of such accidents. An examination of casualties under this heading classifies nearly all of them as due to one of three causes: (1) failure to look both ways Itefore stepping on the railroad track; (21 walking on the railroad track or foul of tlte track when possible to walk elsewhere, and (3) walking too close to the end of a car in a live yard. Practically all ot these injuries arc easily capable of Wing eliminated. The remedv is apparent and may be briefly stated as follows: (1) always look both ways before* stepping on the railroad track: (21 never walk on the niilruad track or foul of the track when possible to walk elsewhere, and (31 never go within ten feet of the end of a car in a live yard. Getting On or Off Cars and Engines and Operating Hand Brakes By E. A. MEYER Manager, Safety and Fuel Departments, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad, Chicago The shaker said in part: Accidents resulting from the operation of hand brakes show an increase oi 3. or 25 per cent, in fatalities during the past year. In all there were 15 killed and 514 injured. You can plainly see that here is a field for some intensive work to cut down these injuries that are so unnecessary. Very few of these accidents were caused from faulty cquiiimrnt and a great many were due to falls.' losing hold, slipping or losing balance. I Wieve that we could cut down Safely Section, AHA--Steam Huilroad Section, HSC 401 these accidents to a minimum if an educational program were carried on among employees. 1 am liappy to cal] your attention to the fact that accidents due to getting on or off cars or locomotives show a decrease, only 15 employees being killed instead of 34, a decrease of 56 i>er cent. Instead of 1,949 being injured, there were 1,345 injured or a decrease of 13 per cent. All of these accidents due to gelling on or ofT cars nr locomotives were due to the following unsafe habits: uncertain hand or foutlmlds. attempting to get on or off when not competent to do so, inability to see where they were alighting, and alighting on rough, uneven or slippery surfaces or on frogs or switches, or care lessness. Before we Itad safety rules, men were getting out of gangways of locomotives facing outward and performing other hazardous stunts, trusting to luck tltat they would alight like a cat, on their feet standing up. These were unsafe habits and it has been hard for some of the older men to break themselves of such habits. * " One of our master mechanics had a habit oi getting down but of the gangway of an engine when facing outward. He realized it was a dangerous practice and that he was setting a had example for lus men. One day lie did this as I happened along and he remarked to me: "I am going to break myself of that habit." So'he deliberately got on and off the engine several times in the proper manner until he felt sure of himself; and then lie remarked to me: "That is the last time I am going to bungle the job of getting off an engine." Moreover, he stuck to the good liabit. In other words--he crowded out a bad habit with a good one. Coupling and Uncoupling Cars and Engines and Air and Steam Hose By D. A. KLUMPH Supervisor of Safety, Pere Marquette Railway, Grand Rapids, Mich. # The speaker said in part: In the coupling and uncoupling of cars and locomo* lives, we were able to show a reduction, comparing 19.13 with 1930, especially to trainmen,--and they do most of that work. ' A comparison of the injuries to employees from this cause, for the past four vears, shows conclusively that it is not rules alone that will stop these' injuries because if there is any one tiling tltat is adequately covered by the rules it is this kind of work. To quite an extent, it is the older employee who is injured in per forming this work, and it seems to he doe to his opinion tltat because of his cjqicricncc in the old Imk-and-pin days lie can still go between moving cars without injury. But in most cases he will not allow a mcmlicr of his crew to do it because of the danger involved. '` Because all injuries of this type are caused by violation of rules, it is within the power of tlte operating officials to stop tlicsc accidents through rigid enforce ment of rales. Coupling and uncoupling air or steam hose: we find that comparing 1933 with 1930, we have had more fatalities and fewer injuries in 1933. The principal cause of these injuries seems to be failure to reduce the air brake pressure before endeavoring to uncouple the hose, and perhaps a more rigid rule in regard to this might be introduced with good results. Another cause for many of the serious accidents is failure to protect the work man wish Mae signals or otherwise in complrince with the"Muc flag rule. These violations^ in many cases arc too often caused by the desire on the part of someone to gain time at the expense of safety. * As to tlte rule situation, which is my pet hobby, firrnu.se I have been pretty closely connected with it for a number of years. I feel that we can have too many rules. It seems to me tliat the more rules we have, the greater numlicr of violations to rules occur. Tt is a pood deal the same with rules as with our laws. We have so many that the average man doesn't know he is violating the law in what he is doing. 402 Turntv-third Annual Safety Congress--National Safety Council Struck or Run Over--Not At Public Crossings By D. G. PHILLIPS Superintendent of Safety, Wabash Hallway, St. Louis, Mo. The *|icakcr said in part: Last vear, out of 500 employees killed on the railroads of the United States. 101 were killed lccasc of being struck and run over, not at jrahlic crossing--almost one-fifth of the total numt>cr. Xearlv all fatalities and injuries due to luring struck and run over can be clas sified under three heads: firs*, stepped on tin? railroad track without first looking tn l*olh directions: second, stood *t walked on the railroad track what he could Itavc walked some place else: third, walked t*i close to the end of a car in a live vard. All railnad employees and other i>cr..n> know, without anybody telling them, tliat those three things arc dangerous and unsafe. They know they shouldn't do them and they don't want to get hurt nr killed. Then why is it. when all of them agree <m th^isc things, that 101 railroad employees were killed tn that way last vear; Tliat is the answer that you and 1 must find out. The answer ts. in an offliand war. supervision. But you have said nothing, you have solved no problem wlen you say, ">uiervision" When yott say "supervision" you must include that coursc oi conduct m the part of supervisors that secures the coo|ieratiiai of the men. There are a gn*xl many tilings that are dune in lle exercise of supervision. In te of our shot* not Umg ago, the shop su]ertn1ciiden\ found a man without goggles doing what is known as "p<*gglc work." He pnmiptly subtended him tor five 'fays and sent him home. That is sujiervision--one kind of supervision, or. rather, a part supervision. It had a wmdcrtul cITcct. csi?cial1y on ilur other fellows. A few days later, this shop superintendent heard that the man's family was in very destitute circumstances. We were only working aliout fi days a month at that time, and he lost five days of the six on account of not wearing his goggles. Tltc shop superintendent went out to tliat man's Imusc. He had five little children, two of them under five years of age. and the only food of any kind in tliat house was tine-half loaf of 1trend. This was in the winter time and all they had was one stove, a cook stove. Tlic superintendent was so moved that lie came hack to the shop and took up a collection of alxrat S20 and presented it to this man's wife. A short time afterward, when the man came lck to work,he tliankcd me with tears m hts eyes for the money we had given him. I told him that we had not given the money to him. hut tliat we had given it to his wife. "Well." lie said. "I will tell you one thing. Phillips: you will never find me guilty again of doing tliat kind oi work without my goggles on." And the question with me. gentlemen, is which had the strongest influence on that man's action, the five days' time which he lost, or the help tliat was given his family in a lime oi need? Here I# some more supervision. Mr. Cole told me this story the other day. He went down to his shop round-house, and unind a man who was not wearing goggles when he should have lccn wearing them. He called him down off the engine where he was at work. He knew the man's circumstances, that he was just al'ut ready to get Ins home .paid for. I don't remember what tlic fellow's name is. Intt Cole said. "George, you have violate*! the goggle rule." George knew it He said "George, you lave a little girl in your home, eleven years old. who lias never. Itccausc of infantile paralysis. l>ecn aide to pm her feel to the floor. You have a wife who is already worn out with the care of that invalid child. George, if someone would go to vour home and tell your wife tliat you have heen Winded in l>nth eves, how would you feel, knowing tliat you were no longer aide to help care for that little invalid and to help her mother in the struggle to keep things going r" George had stood with his head down while Mr. Cole was talking to him. He looked up with tears in his eyes. He said. "Mr. Cole. I have never been talked to about safety in that way before. I have always thought there was a lot of hooey Safety Section. ARA--Steam Railroad Section. NSC 403 in this safety movement. But I now realize wliat it means to me, and you cau Test assumed that never again will 1 do that kind ot work without my goggles on." Tliat is some more supervision. Notice the results. 1 >on't think tor a moment that I am deprecating punishment for nu-cnforccmcitt of rules. Satclv rules should be adopted and they should lie rigidly enforced by whatever methods are necessary to cause the employee to comply with them. But enforcement is only a part ot stqiervisiuii. Here is some mure supervision that brought good results. On the Wabash Kailway this year we laid 00 miles of new llU-jiound steel. We Ixad a gang of 115 or 120 section men engaged in that work. About the time they started this work we happened to have a division safety meeting within four or five miles ot where this camp was. The supervisin', a Mr. Watkins by name, loaded his fellows up and bruught them in to the safely meeting. I was there and I told them just how to do their job without anyItody getting hurt. Aliout three months later, they completed tliat job, and not a single man had been injured. WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION October 3, 1934 Interesting Employees in Looking After Their Own Safety By J. CLYDE MIXON Chief Clerk to General Superintendent, Northern Division, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Savannah, Ga. The speaker said in part: Otic of our South Carolina philosophers, Dob Quillan, once said: "If we would pray more often for common sense, we would not lave to pray for rain." Expand that thought lor yourselves. Safety is common sense in action. "interesting employees in looking after their own safety" is but another way of saying, ''Sell the idea of safety to vour men." Before one can sell anything to someone else one must sell oneself. You may lie sure tliat hi a section where there is a poor safety record it is primarily the result of the indifference oi a supervisor** officer, or the result of his inability to sell the idea to his men ami keep them sold on it. We must keep everlastingly at this proposition of 'safety. A wise man who lived in the Orient once said: "Nothing is ever definitely finished among men, for each thing stops only to begin again." We can put tliat down as a law of nature. It has been said that "eternal vigilance is the price of safety", and tliat is quite true. We must constantly drive home the doctrine of safety mimledncss. ^ If the supervisor is indifferent, there isn't anything to do aliout it hut "<k*capitatc" him, and the sooner the (letter, liccausc it is au indication not only of narrowness but of his unworthiness to be a leader oi men and a representative of enlightened management. It should not be difficult to get men interested in locking after tltcir own safely. The first law of nature, the law of the jungle, the law oi sell-preservation, is or should he invoked by every worker. It requires some time, however, for men to be sold on this idea--tliat they must look after themselves. There is also, of course, the appeal to a man's higher nature, the duty he owes to his family, then to his fellow workers and the |iuhtic wlioiii he serves. But I want to ajiproach this subject largely from tin? angle of responsibility and tlie opportunity of the supervising officer. It thrills me sometimes when I think of the opportunities tlic supervising officers--the foreman, the master mechanic, the trainmaster, the superintendent--have if they exert themselves as the leaders of the men working under their supervision. What an opportunity tills man has to accom- 404 Tzecnty-third Annual Safety Congress--National Safety Council jiJi&h something worth while in this brie* span of life, where we arc all put here for a purpose, and where true happiness is derived from doing something to help our fellow man. Men can be led. We see evidence of this every day. We see men being led In* unscrupulous leaders and demagogues into destructive patlis. Unfortunately die vast majority oi men. it seems, like to have someone else to do their thinking tor them. This trait oi human nature should be capitalized bv the supervisory officer not only in his efforts W Utter safety but in aiding him to carry on all the activi ties for which he is responsible. After all. safety is really a synonym for efficiency. Where there is a jonr safety record there will also be found a state of inefficiency. The supervisory officer must, therefore, so sell himself to his men as to become their leader, their authority, their guide, their teacher. It has been done, it can be done, and it must be done ii the supervisor is to live up to his respousibility in this age oi ever advancing i*rogre$s and complexity, and if he is to maintain his right to hold a supervisory ]*>itiun. Tliis angle--the opportunity oi the supervisor--has lcen neglected in the past. The supervisor can and should be made a development agent for loyalty. Someone has wisely said iliat "an ounce oi loyalty is worth a pound of cleverness.** Our discussion naturally leads us into the question oi discipline, highly necessary in any organization where large numbers are employed. However, the chief meaning of this word discipline is not "correction" or "cliastisemcnt" or "punishment": but the foremost definition is this: "the treatment suited to a disciple or learner: education; development oi the faculties by instruction and exercise; training, physical, mental or moral." Education is a intent iactor in this business of safety, just as it is in any worth while undertaking. We have our established channels oi education and instruction in this safety movement. We have our committees. We have our organizations. However, these orthodox methods arc not always sufficient. Interest sometimes lags. It is your job and my job to see tint interest is sustained. Education of the right kind must come largely from personal tutorship. Here again, tin.* responsibility and the op|K>rUmity of the supervisor must be stressed. An employee does not reach perfection when he lias passed an examination, or when he has been promoted from one rank to another. It is a constant, unending process of evolution and development. Our scheme must be fitted to meet the needs of the hundreds oi ever-clanging ficrsonaltties with which we have to deal. Someone has said that the standard rule book is the railroad man's Bible. This leads me to mention a practice on our road tliat may not prevail everywhere. Attendance at our safety committee meetings is not compulsory, tliough they are usually well attended. We find, however, some disinterested, utiloyal (perhaps ratltcr than disloyal), workers who do not receive the benefit of what transpires at the safety meetings. Attendance at our rule meetings, a scries of which is usually held semi-annually, is compulsory'- Our trainmasters, who usually conduct these ndc meetings or schools, invariably devote a period of time to a lecture aon the first rule m the book: "Safety is of the first importance in the discharge of dutv^' Moreover, in discussing all the rules, the safety aspect is not forgotten and ts stressed. Tills question resolves itself to a great extent into a study of the science of personnel management. It is a big subject. _ Some railroads and many other indus tries have personnel departments, hut those in cltargc of such departments act only in a general way. The immediate 'supervising officer is the keynote of the success of healthy personnel relations in any establishment, and great indeed is his responsi bility as well as his opportunities. I would like to close my talk to you with these words from tliat great soul, Hlbert Hubbard, whom I am fend of quoting: "The man who is worthy of being a leader of men will never complain of the stupidity of his helpers, of the ingratitude of mankind, nor of the inappreciation of the public. These things arc all a part of the great game of life, and to meet tlicm and not go down before them in discouragement and defeat is the final proof of power." Safety Section, AKA--Steam Kailroad Section, XSC 405 Report of Committee on Non-Train Accidents By c. F. LARSON Superintendent of Safety, Missouri-Pacific Lines, St, Louis, Mo. __ The speaker said in part: The nqiort ui our committee (which has lx*cn dis tributed to all delegates; shows tliat there arc greater numbers uf injuries occurring in non-train accidents than in tram and train service accidents combined. You might get an erroneous impression from tliis, that there is a higher casualty rate in tliat type of occii|iatiun than in train ami train service occuiotions. That is not true. It is because there are more men working in those two occupations--main tenance of way and maintenance of cquiinncnt--than in the others. Therefore, there is more exposure to injury and more accidents occur. I have taken some figures from the I. C. C. reports with respect to the casualty rate among non-train employees and I find tliat uuder the head ot maintenance ot way and structures in 1933, in Group A, the larger railruads, the average was 6.03 as against 12.04 in lransjortation; in Croup B it was 5.68 in maintenance of way 05 against 13.03 in transportation. The ratios in Group A were from 1.48 to 13.99 in maintenance ot w*ay. To give you many of these classifications would take too much time. However, iii Group D we find a peculiar situation. These ratios per million man-hours under the head of maintenance of way start with none (not a single reportable casualty on one road) and run tqi to 34.26. Under maintenance of equipment for your mcclianical men, in Croup A, the average was 5.88 as atzninst 12.04 in transfiortatico. In Group B, the next largest railroads, the average was 6.03 as against 13.03 in transtionation. So it would appear tliat while we have been worrying about the greater number, of accidents prevailing under the head of non-train occupations, we arc making a 1letter record than they arc in the transportation department. Falls of Persons and Handling Materials and Tools By ALBERT A. MILLER Engineer, Maintenance of Equipment and Structures, Missouri Pacific Railroad, Si. Louis, Mo. ' Tlic speaker said in part: In the maintenance of way dejartmails of our rail roads, between 90 and 95 per cent of the men engaged are liandling materials or tools when they work. They arc ordinarily doing things under tlic direction of someone who has been delegated to accomplish certain definite results with men. materials and tools. These men arc subject to orders and will do that which is a reasonable demandupon their-efforts. Where direction is proper and the results to be obtained are discussal and made plain, men ordinarily (icrfnnn in an orderly and harmonious way. Where men. materials and tools together arc involved, onlv one of the three has intelligence. The other two--materials ami tools--have no intelligence, no thought and no ideas. They move or arc moved cnttrclv without any power within themselves. Mai arc not at the mercy of matter: material and tools arc not masters hut servants; they can be controlled ami made to answer thought whenever ami wherever man wills it sol But men do liavc weaknesses tliat should lie adequately covered by a factor of safety. Some of the weaknesses of men arc fear, timidity, lack of cajacity to con centrate. lapses in clear thinking brought almut hv the' jarring tcstimotiv of the senses, thinking beyond the act instead of synchronizing a clear thought witii the act. These weaknesses arc the unseen fractures in thought. Why is it not just as logical and just as reasonable to overcome these weaknesses of thought hv adding more thought as it is to overcome the weaknesses in matter by adding more nptter? Should we not expect almost like results? Based upon experience and tlic best thought that could be brought to bear upon -UK> Twenty-third Annual Safety Cunyress--Xational Safety Council the mailer* involved, we luive provided rule* which, we say. it thoughtfully and conscientiously ful lowed should iirevciit accidents,--not only those of a kind involv ing men tailing <>n account of the liandling of materials ami tools--but must accident* oi all kinds. _ When accidents do hap;*.-!!. we investigate to determine, if possible, the underlying cause*. Information brought together following such investigations is broadcast in order to give other* tle iwnctil of the conclusions. __ Tltere is. 1 believe, a very much stronger tendency ami a more lively disposition to dig down and uproot underlying cause* nw than obtained a few year* lack. Just to sti|HTitcially examine into an accident i* dattgeruti*. if it is exjuxted to use inforniatioii so collected for giving out to others; ii the cxamittatioti into the umler- Iving causes is exact and complete, then information from such analyst sent out to others will surely bring some worth while results. Assume that all men read the rules which should govern them and lliat they tnifler>iaml them: assume that they hear and Comprehend the proper words of advice :utd direction as they come from sources of decidability and seastmed thought; assume lliat the thought of self preservation is generally as strong in one man a* in another; am) further assume tliat clear thinking during the processes of ordinary functioning is as available to one man as to another--would there then be as many falls of iwrsons dm- to handling materials and tools as now olrtnin : Then why do we coniitmc to lave such accidents, and why don't \vc do thpsc things which will prevent them? The real reason why we c<uitmuc to lave sikHi accidents is that we arc per sistent law Itrcakers: mr weaknesses uaiiifesl themselves; clear thinking is then submerged in a sea of coiii'iima with the result that some law, rule or regulation is violated and the result is usually disastrous. . The reason that we don't do those things wlticfi will prevent these acciifcnts is that supervision las not vet made up its mind. When supervi*ii*n definitely and courageously sets itself t the task of finding and providing an adequate fn^tir of safety for men. then the weaknesses of mitt will lie as impotent to do harm as the weaknesses of material--shackled as they arc by a factor of safety. Falls of Objects; Motor Cars--Care and Operation By G. B. FARLOW Division Engineer, Baltimore A Ohio Railroad, Pittsburgh, Pa. The sjivakcr said in part: The usual accident frn falling objects consists of track employee* living. struck l>v falling stone hi cuts. <>r from cml ur other lading falling irom imsMiig car*, ami such accidents in the bridge and building department as dropping of tools from overhead, drpping if fdocking or other materials front bridges, buildings and structures on employees working underneath. 'Hie majority of these accidents are preventable--those involving trackmen In* the observance of the general rule oi properly clearing all running tracks at the apjiroaeli of trains: and in die other crafts, largely a matter of discipline in (lie gang. Well organized gangs, proiivrly supervised, can so regulate their tasks tliat it will not l*o necessary ior men to work directly above one another, where they might be struck by objects falling. ^^ The cure is obvious; give the employee the proper training, insist on the proper discipline, ami this class of accidents, in a large measure, can l*e overcome. The subject of "Motor Car Care and Operation'* is one tliat is of major im- jNirtauce in the maintenance of wav department. The care oi the muprr car is primarily the respnsihiliiy of the employee in charge. It is his duty ftefore placing the motor car on the track for movement to determine ly careful inspection, that it is in sale operating condition. It is important tliat supervisory officers frequently check condili<m of cars assigned to foremen, signal maintaincr* or other employees authorized to use them. It :s the supervisor's duty to so impress his subordinates tliat they will take no cltanccs by operating a car with defective brakes, operating equipment, running gear, safety railing or deck. It is. however, the railroad's responsibility to furnish cars of safe construction. Safety Section, ARA--Steam Railroad Section. XSC 407 There is stilt in operation on a mmd*cr of railroads the type oi car which is not safe to nm. My opinion is tiascd on a number of (tcrsonal encounters, as well as the sad history oi unfortunate accidents to others. This type oi car is known as the "side load car." It consists of a frame, the engine and seating arrangement lictng placed directly over one rail and equipped with one or two wheels on opposite rail of lighter construction in the form of an outrigger. The design of this type of car is fundamentally a hazard due to the fact that the center of gravity is imt over the center of wheel bearing hut carried over one rail. ' There arc many improvement* that can still Ih- made to lighten the weight of rail motor cars used for inspection service and those for medium and heavy duty. There is a crying need for improvement in the manner in which tools are carried on such cars--a source of potential accidents. I can think of no more severe casualty than that which would result from tool* tailing off a motor car while traveling at maximum Sliced {cmiittcd by the rule*. T*o!s falling fr*ni the car might easily cause a disastrous derailment, and men on the car in such a catastrophe would ltavc no opportunity of avoiding injury. Safely rules liave. therefore, liecn designed to overcome such a hazard. They consist usually of a cautionary admonition to place the tools ami material carried on such cars in a secure position and remind the foreman or other employee in charge tliat he is responsible to see tliat tools arc in a secure jmsitioo; Imt I ask you. in all fairness to these men. whether the provisions made for carrying necessary l*ols by track gang or bridge gang on a motor ear are such that they can Ik placed in a secure position? I believe tliat the methtKl of carrying tools on a motor car could lie improved upon: the motor car can lie so designed lliat a suitable receptacle wider the seating arrangement of the car can tie provided and designed to fit tools normally required, and when such tools are placed within this receptacle entirely encased on both sides, ends, bottom ami top. that such class of accidents ran lx prevented. Until such improvement is made in the design of motor cars, ii is itn|Mirtanl tliat suiter- visors frequently elieek their gangs to determine if the necessary tools are placed as securely as possible and the responsibility of watching them definitely assigned to individuals in the gang. ' Eye Protection and Safe Clothing By J. C. MILLER Shop Superintendent, New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad. Conneaut, O. The Speaker said in part: Kye injuries liappen so suddenly and without warning that even the safest worker cannot avoid them without the* mechanical protection of popples. How far this protection should he carried.. I have not personally de cided. There arc few places where it would lie unsafe to wear goggles constantly, and yet sometimes they should not lie worn, that is where the head room is not sufficient and the visitm is obstructed bv the goggle. W'c have had some l>ad head cuts from wearing goggles in such locations. How* ever, on the whole, to prevent eye injuries every employee should Ik provided wjth proper fitting goggles, and compelled to wear them when doing any work that may result in injury to the eve. or wlicn in dose proximity to work that might result in fixing particles. *` In considering saic clothing, it is an established fact that any loose sleeves, neckties or other apparel should not Ik worn around moving machinery. Safety shoes, leggings, etc- arc very helpful. In a large organization, where stock can Ik carried subject to purchase by the employees, such protection readily available can reduce the number of accidents by their use. In allowing gloves around drill presses. fairing mills and lathes to place and remove material, employees should Ik educated that these gloves must not Ik worn during the actual time any of the machines arc in motion. Any infringement of this requirement should remove the privilege of wearing glows to handle the material at all. even at the expense oi a few scratches and cuts. Tltere is not a more danger ous job than wcari.ig glox*cs around moving or rotating machinery. 4US 7 zccnty-third Annual Safely Congress--Xational Safety Cunncil In the repair yard> we have augmented our blue flag i>rotcction with lock switclics and flags equipped with a derailing device in nuny instances. Too much stress cannot be placed tqon carefulness at all repair yards. The car repair tracks should lie locked and tlic blue flags placed by a nun or men carefully selected for tins job. When the time for removing the locks and flags to allow the tracks to lie switched or other work iu Ik placed arrives, the. greatest possible care should be taken to warn cvcrylmdy along the rciuir tracks ui the move contemplated, and equal care must be given to the rdockitig and placing of flags when switching is done. _On our road, we do this hv whistling and hy jicrsonal warning to each employee tieforv the engine is allowed to conic onto the track. Any violation of the blue flag rule is severely dealt with, and yet with all our precautions, we have had one fatal injury in the car rcjtair yards during the present year. It lias Ihvii my i-xjiericnce that men arc very seldom injured on any job where flic danger is apparent, tlut is on work that is inherently dangerous. Injuries and hurts generally occur on jobs where one would think, at first glance, no danger was present. It stands to reason tlut if every employee had someone standing over hint to warn him of the hidden dangers ill the work he was doing, no injury would occur. Uni this methxl of preventing accidents is oi course impossible. Substiunioii for Mich a pttKcdmv was built tip to a certain extent in the mind of one employee hv the association of ideas. For instance, if a man would associate safety with Ins hands, and every time lie noticed his hands, think of safety, or every time he thinks ofNsafety, l*k at his tumls. in a short time.such a workman whose work is done by his 1lands, would so establish this thought in his niind tlut as soon as he started to work and his hands came into view Itc would naturally look around to sec what hidden clangers there may Ik* in the vicinity of tlic job he is starting, and in a very short time this process of thought would heenme me chanical. the same as driving an automobile or any other physical effort in which we engage tlut is soiiK*wlut complicated, and in which the movements arc done subconsciously when perfected Falls of Persons and Objects By L. M. GRANGER Tool Room Foreman, Erie Railroad, Homell, N. Y. The sj*eaker said in part: Oi the thousands oi men injured on American Rail roads. every third man lu? received his injuries in connection with a fall or falling 4jcct. Some of the conditions which lead to injuries from falls and falling objects are as follows: Poor condition of floors, platforms ami walks; aisles not kept open: material carelessly piled; ^pnnr ladders and scaffolds: j*oor lighting: nutcrial falling from cranes, cars, engines, trucks, skids, etc.; window glass liccoming loosened by vibra tion of cranes, steam hammers, etc.: |mrly maintained counter shafts, line shafts, pulleys and belts: poor lires n trucks; oil and grease on floor, platforms, cranes, etc.: failure of cables or brakes on traveling cranes; material leaning against walls: firing rivet licads and chips; coal falling from tanks: insecure footing and band bolds; stepping over loose material: slipping on rails: ladders slipping: getting on and off moving locomotives; cars, trucks, turn tables, etc.: throwing material from cars, engines: h*osc clothing, greasy gloves. A modem railnud shop :s a busy place. Exposure to jmssibtc injury menaces the workman from all sides and from aliove and Mow. Tlic traffic density through the main aisles of the shop often equal that of the nuin stmts of our towns. We do not have tlic service of traffic lights or officer# to direct it. In n-r shops we mark the aisles with white lines and strive to keep them open at all times, the power trucks move in prescrilHxl directions and as far as possible follow regular routes. All nutcrial is moved on skids or tote boxes to eliminate excess handling. Skills are carefully loaded under the supervision of foremen to minimize the danger of parts falling or jarring off. Each department has available a hand lift truck with which to move the skids in Safety Section, .-f/\*.-/--Steam Railroad St'etion. XSC 409 or out of the department without wailing for a power truck, which leaves no alibi for having the dc|iatimcnt cluttered up with material un which no work is being done. Each power truck driver tries out his tirakes and horn at the licginning of the day's work. Trucks arc insjKCtcd. greased and oiled at regular intervals and all necessary repairs promptly made. Where tlic bad overhangs the liody of the truck a workman precedes the truck to dear the way. Electric traveling cranes arc carefully inspected and repaired each thirty days by a competent machinist and electrician who give sjtccial attention to brakes, cables, limit switches, lund rails, etc. A record is kepi of these inspections to fix respon sibility for any oversight. l%ach crane cjicraior tries his tirakcs. lioru * and limit switch at the beginning of his trick. Crane o{>crntor will not move crane or h<ttsl load except bv signal from tlte floor nor will lie move any had if the hitch docs not npjenr safe to him. Endless rope slings arc used for moving light nutcrial with smooth surfaces to prevent slipping; endless steel cables ami had chains arc used for liaiidling heavy material. Siiccial slings are provided for handling bundles of flues or units, which wrap, entirely around the bundle to prevent dropping any jurt of the load. All chains used for lifting are annealed each month; the length of chains adjusted ami honks rcsliajtctl if necessary*- A record is kci>t of this msttection. The floor siacc under cranes is illuminated hy flixxl lights, high overhead. Each crane has a sjxit light for use of the operator. Line sliafts, countershafts and overhead belts arc rapidly living eliminated by installation of individual motor-driven machines. Tlut jMirtion which remains in shop is inspected daily. All ladders are equipped with safety strikes. All hose and handle tools arc repaired under sujKTvision oi the tool room and arc ui5|KCtcd when issued. To assist in checking on all these conditions and the enforcement of safety rules, we have a group of our Safe Practice Committee nuke a weekly inspection of the entire property and render a written rcimrt of all physical defects and all violations of rules. This committee has authority to remove from service at once any defective equipment found, also to stop any unsafe practices they observe. They dismiss from (heir minds everything except safety and concentrating on the one object, they accomplish much that might otherwise Ik overlooked. We also lave a coiniuitP'C of supervisors who make a weekly ins|cctim of all departments, whose duty it is to observe and report mi housekeeping conditions and place two prominent signs, one reading "Dirtiest Department in the Shop** and one Mi*lrancst. Department in the Simp.** The unwelcome sign never remains in the same department a second week. With all our precautions, we still have injuries due to falls and falling objects. I have yet to investigate a ease that was not primarily clue to carelessness or thoughtlessness, not always carelessness on the jart of.the victim luit carelessness on somel>ody rise's part. In my opinion three things are essential to safetv: 1. A safe place in which to work. 2. Safe tools and equipment. 3. Intelligent and alert workmen. There is no place in industry fur the careless workman. He is and should Ik eliminated. The employee who is injured through carelessness is a imrkcd nun and had better watch his step. We do not however liclievc in discipline as punish ment for violation of safety rules. Discipline as education is a valuable weapon. Most men will react favorably to a frank discussion of their faults. We of the Safe Practice Committee try to study each nun who is injured or who violates the safety rules through carelessness to determine why Ik failed to think, wlut occupied his mind to the exclusion of his own welfare, how to wake him up, am! consider all methods iair that attain results. If the offender is an old man. we remind hint tlut an accident might end his career of usefulness to his employer, tlut his advanced age would automatically keep him out of further em ployment elsewhere. The fear of a dejn*ndcnt old age haunts every working man beyond fifty years. Tlic middle aged offender is reminded that his carelessness might seriously interfere with his ambitious plans for the education of his children. 410 Twenty-third Annual Safety Congress--National Safety Council A different appeal i needed lor young men and !*oys. Okl age and its attendant problems arc a dim and distant picture to them. It they have given any thought at all to marriage and family life, it apjieaU In them only as a glorious adventure. Inn they do think of sports. When we remind them that an accident might slow them up on the hasciiall diamond or the football field or might cramp their style *n the <Iance floor., we talk their language and get their attention. We draw upon all our store of iaticncc, all accumulated knowledge of human nature gained through years of cxjicricncc. to get ur safely message across. Station and Warehouse Accidents and Their Causes By J. ROMANOFF Supervisor of Freight Operation, Erie Railroad, Cleveland, O. The speaker said in |art: A freight station, freight liotisc. or transfer is only as safe as the agent wants it to lie. * Investigation oi accidents generally reveals that tlte real causes arc carelessness, thoughtlessness, failure to comply with safety rules. Lack of experience, and indif ference to unsafe practices <41 the jart of sii|KTvision. This latter cause is. a* a rule, directly or indirectly rcs]wnsihle for the following unsate cuduion or practices around freight stations: the gang plank dial 's not secured; the siti*|*osedly empty car?my; |oor Iwiusekecpmg: the container or material temporarily placed mi platform or aisle: lack oi .sufficient help on heavy shipments and truckhcub-: hnpn*jcr]y balanced truckloads: impruper stowing, piling load ing: the heavy shipment loaded <n two-wheel truck when dolly slmuld lie used: the sltpitcrv platform that has not Iteen salted r sanded: defective cqui|nncnt; die liandling oi sheet steel, threaded valves or other ireight with sltarp corners or edges \Wthout gloves: tin.- trucker who is careless in his trucking in and out of cars. The responsihility fr tlie prevention of accidents rests with the agent, and his attitude is reflected in the actions of his supervision. Acculents cannot U* elim inated without intelligent direction and the active cooperation of every employee. t'lHijivratimi drpetKls entirely on the attitude assumed hy the suiivrWsitqi and their ability to point otrt to employees in a diplomatic and impressive way what the results from unsafe conditions and practices are. "* Here arc a few safety suggestions su|HTvisiou might well inflow: 1. He safety minded. wholeheartedly and enthusiastically. 2. Conduct safety campaigns with the same thought and intelligence that lltcy comhict their station operation. .1. Eliminate all hazardous cmdit< us and practices. 4. Secure the confidence ami resj>eci of all employees in order to gel the neces sary coi|cration. . Omsider the character of tlte person they are talking to and in selling safety make it (tt-rsonal. Tie interested in the employee and his family. Make him" realize tliat safety *> of vital importance to him. to his employer, hut also to those dcpendent U]>m him. . A new employee sliottld l*e projK-rlv instructed <m how to do his job safely and efficient!}*, and during tin* peri.*! of his apjtrtiuiccship should receive sjtccial attention from his immediate su|*ervi*ir. who should see that lie is cmplcd during his training period with a safety-mmled employee. 7. SuiH*msi.n should prevail tii**t employees to rettort any and all unsafe e<MuIitiims and practices regardless of how rumor they think they may lie. R. An injured employee .should not !* jurmincd to return to work until author ized to do so by the doctor. The employee returning to work taforv In* is aide to IH-rform bis duties projtcrly is only a hazard to himself and to his fellow employees. A supervisor shtiuld make intelligent use of safety iinmphlets. bulletins, cir culars. slogans, and rules. 10. Supervision cannot sit Kick and lw satisfied with past activities on safety. Thejoh will not Ik* finishctl until all accidents are eliminated and all circumstances making accidents possildc are wiped out. Safety Section, ANA--Steam Railroad Section, NSC 411 Report of Committee on Non-Train Accidents By C. F. LARSON . Superintendent of Safety, Missouri Pacific Lines, St. Louis, Mo. The speaker said in part: Your attention i> again directed to the fact that non-train accidents exceed both train accidents and train service accidents com bined. According to tlte records of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 118 |*cr- sons were killed in non-train accidents in 1932, representing 22 per cent of the total killed: and 9.417 were injured in nm-irain accidents the same year. rcprcMuting 58 lcr cent of the total injured. It would scent lltal the main effort against non-train accidents should be carried on in the maintenance of way and maintenance of ciiuipmcut dcitartments. since they produced // icr cent id all railway employee accidents outside of train and train service classification. This 77 per cent is divided between the two departments as follows: 36 per cent maintenance nt way, with 3.436 casualties, a casualty rate therefore of 7.78; 41 per cent in maintenance of equipment ami stores, with 3,946 casualties, a casualty rate of 6.94. In planning a campaign on non-train accidents it is the thought 01 this committee tliat particular attention should lie directed to the four principal classes of accidents iu the departments affected. These classes are as follows: _ Falls of persons. 25 killed and l/>54 injured, a casualty rate of 17.6. Handling tools and materials. 5 killed and 2.949 injured, a casualty rate of 31.0. Falls of objects. 7 killed and 968 injured, a casualty rate oi 10.2. Hand and Motor Cars (care and operation non-train only). 25 kilted and 73d injured, a casualty rate of 7.9. All other classes of accidents. 56 killed and 3.116 injured, a casualty rate of 33J. Your committee again calls attention to tjic fact that eve injuries arc not set ,ut in the Interstate Commerce Commission`s statistics, but arc undoubtedly in cluded among other causes and should not lie under-rated. Injuries to (lie eyes arc among the most serious casualties tliat industry must grapple with and. therefore, rules governing tlie use of goggles in all Itazardous occtt]*ations must lie enforced. Frequent chcck-tip with track iorccs should lie made hy roadmastrrs to know tliat section and extra gangs arc supplied with the requisite number of goggles. Me chanical department sujicrvisnrs should lie held to a strict accountability for observ ance of the goggle rule. #_ In conclusion, your committee would suggest the following "Ten Point Program for Safety Work.** to lie a part of the ilaily thought and activity of every supervisor anti safety leader: 1. Set a safe example, ami otherwise show by word and deed an interest ami liclief in accident prevention, and a will to get resuits iy this feature of the work. 2. Act promptly on every corrodible and removable unsafe condition oliscrvcd by or reported to you. _ 3. Let no unsafe act or practice go unchallenged. fmt seize the opjKirlur.iiy to prevent the inevitable result. 4. Make it a part of the daily game to find ami counsel or correct the unin formed. thoughtless, indifferent, careless or reckless ones--<imlining safe methods of work and giring sjiecific warnings of hazards and methods of meeting them to Iwth old and new men. ' _ .. 5. Search out the cause or causes and responsibility lor every |*crsonn| injury, and after finding the delect in man. method material or niiidition. use the informa- lion towards preventing another similar accident. ^ 6. Plan and oversee every unusual job and the more Itazardous kinds of regular work. #, 7. Foster tlte widest possible spread of interest iu accident prevention. 8. Keep the safety bureau informed of safety ideas am! measures adopted by von which might he extended over a larger territory. * 9. Raise tlte standard of physical ami mental well Itciug wherever practicable, as one of the greatest factors in safety efficiency. .. 10. Check up constantly your own safety work ami tliat of your associates. 412 'Twenty-third .1 annul Safety (\ntifress--Xatiomd Safety t ottueil Report of Resolutions Committee The rejort of the Resolutions Committee was then called for anti it was pre- >iiitoI ly Roliert Soitt. Oiaimum. Director of Department oi Insurance and Safety. .Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Wilmington. X. C. _ "Be It Resolved by the Safety Section oi the American Railway Association in Fourteenth Annual Convention assembled at Cleveland. Ohio. Octoltcr 2 to 4, 19.t4, tnclmivc. that the thanks oi the Association Ik: eNteniletl to: "Air. Lew R. Palmer. Conservation Engineer. The Equitable Life Assurance Society, for valuable work in the preparation of railroad employee casualty statis tics. covered hy `The Green Book*; "Air. William J. I'atterson. I director. Bureau of Saietv. Interstate Commerce Commission. for his presentation of `Summary of Cuntlitions and Practices In- volveil in Certain Accidents Investigated hy the Bureau of Safety.* also for his presence and offer of continued association and cooinration of the Bureau of Safety in furthering the work of Accident Prevention on the American Railways: "Tin: retiring Chairman, Mr. C. I- 1 jFountainc. General Safety Siqicrvisur. Great Xorthvni Railway, for ahly guiding tlte affairs of the Section during his term ii office: "All other officers of the Section for their faithful and energetic services during the iiast year: _ "Mr. 1*. Af. Metcalfe, Suierintcndcnl of Safety. Xurlhcru Pacific Railway, for his intelligent and untiring efforts as Chairman of the Program Connnittec. thereby contributing largely to tile success of the Fourteenth Animal Convention; * "All oilier Committees for their zealous work in. such a commendable cause as tlie conservation m* human life and limb: "The Management of tlx* Hotel Cleveland for their cnntrihntiKi to the well lieing and comfort of our tncmlicrship and gursts: "lie It Further Resolved: that these resolutions lie spread ujkjii the records of the Section and tliat the Secretary transmit a copy to all of those recognized herein.** The report of the Resolutions Committee was duly accepted, and jiasscd hy the delegates in the usual way. * Report of Election Tellers The Chairman then called for a rcjnrt of the tellers on election of officers for the Section during the coming year, and this report was presented hy H. S. Corbin. Oiainuan of Committee. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad as follows: CAdirniun. T. II. Carrow. Superintendent of Safety. Pennsylvania Railroad First I*/v Chairman. W. II. Failing. Claims Attorney. Central Railroad Comjemy of Xew Jersey Reading Contiiany. Second 1`i.v Chairman. C. F. J.ars*<i. Su|tcrintendent of Safety. Missouri Pa cific Lines. Members of the Committee of Pirceliou: Faslem Territory: H R. Cole. Assistant to \*icc President. Erie Railroad: and Oias. E. Hill. General Safety Agent. Xew York Central Lines. ICesteni Territory: L. F. Shedd. SuiicrinUndcTit of Safety. Chicago. Rock Island and Pacific Railway. Southern Territory: 11. H. Beatty. Sin*vrinteudent of Safely and Sanitation. Southern Railway. on Semination: Isaiah Hale. Saiety SnjHTinteiidcul System. Atchi son. Topeka & Santa Fc Railway. Chairman: O. II. Blnkemore, Superintendent of Safety. Xorfolk & Western Railway; I"). A. Klumph. SuiH-rvisor of Safety and Examiner of Rules. Pere Marquette Railway: 11. C. Munhv. Suj>crintcndent oi Safety. Cliicago. Burlington and Quincy Railroad: I. C. Yocttm. Afanacer, Safety Department. Chicago. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omalta Railway. .iDJOl'RXMEXT nrnxrr-ruiki> .ixxr.n. s.irnrv coxc ri:ss x.rriox.u. s.-n irrr cocxcii. Textile Section Officers 1933-34 C.n.rit Ch,iiriimit--II. K.u/lw. Ijnnll T.-.MiK- lii.<|iliilr. Ij.will. Mass. I'ict'-CImiriiiiiit in CVitir./r i'/ I'niiimiii--Ii;sstus M.\cXri.rv. K1 Wallace St.. Malden. Mass. _ /'iee-Chainnau--M. W. Hmss. Proximity Manufacturing C.. <inWi.ro. X. C. I`iee-Chairman--B. K. Brown. Columbia Alills. Inc.. Chicago. !H. Secretary ami Sexes Letter Editor--K. K. Pi.ack. American Aliitual Liability In surance Co.. Huston, Alass. tiiitliiu'i'rinii l oinmi//,v CVimVimin-- l'.in. IV. \':rs. I'li-fin.iilli r..r.l:in.- l".. -Vrlli Plymouth, Afass. Memlvrshif Committee Chairman--K. G. Paiksktt. X*<rtli Carolina Industrial Com mission. Raleigh. X. CFoster Committee Chairman--Fkku W. Skiii.. Aetna Life Insurance Co., Hartford. Conn. Statistics Committee Chairman--J. T. Troijnukm. American Rcmlierg (.`orp.. and American Glauzstoff Corp.. Klizahrthtnn. Teim. Members at I.artie-- Artiii'h I'.ARi.mv. Amistriig ( ork 1 .. l-incaster. Pa. Rvssku. T. FisHCR. The Xation.d Association of Cotton Manufacturers. Bos ton, Alass. Wai.tkr Hr.Mt-URrvs. Xatuma! Associathm of Wool Manufacturers, Boston, Mass. TUESDAY MORNING SESSION October 2, 1934 The opening session of the Textile Section was called to order In* Acting Chair man E. K. Place, American Aim ml Liability Insurance Co.. Boston. Alass.. who presided Chairman Place introduced George Riclunan. Secretary. Richman Broth ers Company. Cleveland. Ohio, wlio made a brief welcoming address to the delegates on behalf of the Convention City. 413