Document wDam4r9e1dgw2noykb9j4BE4E

FILE NAME: CertainTeed (CERT) DATE: 1982 Feb 1 DOC#: CERT054 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Notes on Legal Deposition of Leon Horowitz Castleman File: Certain-teed w/c = with cover letter or memo If DATE = 0, undated CD-ROM Document #:CT ^ 9 ^ 3 ^ DATI __ published article from journal __ published government report __ government inspection results unpublished or internal report unpublished presentation from conference newspaper article letter memorandum __ industry warning labels __ industry sales literature __ industry recommended practices meeting agenda __minutes ___ attendee list __ cm i l legal filing of defense legal filing of plaintiff legal deposition legal testimony-o fu ^ legal deposition summary / index Castleman.CERT001099 LEON HOROWITZ 2/1/82 Video Dep - Weisberg et al. v. Bell Asbestos Mines et al. PCCP, Assorted cases between 1978 and 1981 27 Leon David Horowitz, 63 yo, Burlington, MA. Chief Industrial Hygiene of the Hygiene Section for the American Mutual Insurance Co., Wakefield, MA. 28 Divis of Industrial Hygiene of NY State Dept, of Labor, 9 years. Then consultant in I.H. field for 4 years in NYC. Employed by K&M, 1960, two years after, CT bought them out and he continued to work with CT into 1968. Then he went to work for American Mutual Insurance Co. Where he was employed in 1982. 29 IH, State of NY. Two fold job - safety division - visited industrial plants and surveyed occupational disease hazards. Other part - examined exhaust system plans, made corrections, followed up. Involved all industries including asbestos. Examples of asbestos industries - Todd Shipyard. 30 Cutting insulation for plumbing systems in Todd. Asbestos glove manufac. in upstate NY. After State of NY IH, no contact with asbestos industries. 31 While working for State of NY, state of the art for all dust was capturing the dust in a midget impinger. (Shein, JD - obj. as Horowitz was called as a fact witness). 32 Dust collection - taking samples useless unless compared to a standard. 33 Standard was 5 million particles per cubic foot. (Amer Conf of Govt Industrial Hygienists) This body is a group of gov'tl people who annually or semi get together and decide the standard. 34 The standard is national. Went to work for Keasbey & Mattison. Answered ad in NYT for dust control engineer in Ambler, PA in 1960. He was hired. May o f 1960. Functions. 35 He was hired to design and have installed all industrial exhaust systems pertaining to the control of toxic dust, gases and fumes. Duties expanded to include industrial hygiene work for K&M. IH's function is to recognize, evaluate and control hazards and a dust control engineer is a narrow part of the control aspects of dust exposure. DCE designs equipment, Horowitz did. 35-6 Once CertainTeed took over, Horowitz's duties remained the same but changed later on. The Safety Director left CT to go to GP and Horowitz took over duties for whole Castleman.CERT001100 company. This was a corporate-wide, company-wide position. Abt. 1965. At K&M, his scope of duties was for every K&M plant. 37 There was an asbestos cement pipe in Ambler. He visited other K&M plants in the country. When CT took over, he visited the asbestos cement plants. . 38 Once became Safety Director, no longer dust control engineer. In 1960, understanding of nature of asbestos related disease. . . . (Objection by M. Cohen as not expert) 39 His understanding was what they called pneumoconiosis disease. Lung disease due to exposure to dust. Disease is asbestosis. Disease contracted by breathing. . . . 40 Study by US Public Health Service which the ACGIH decided to use the 5 million per cubic foot standard. 41 Same standard used by the state o f NY. The standard meant that 42 80% o f the people exposed to asbestos would be protected by the standard. This was understanding when went to K&M. Had no knowledge of other diseases caused by asbestos at that time. (1960). At some time after 1960, he learned that a link was suspected between asbestos exposure and cancer. Read it in the literature. 43 He recalled reference to England and S. Africa investigating the possible assoc, between lung cancer and asbestos. This was between May and Sept. 1960. Prior to late 1960, he contacted his insurance co to find out what they knew. 44 They sent him abstracts relating to the news. He participated, in 1960, with Dr. Knox. Knox represented T&N in a visit to the US at that time. In Sept. 1960. Purpose for Knox visit was to inform mgt of K&M that there was an assoc between cancer and asbestos exposure. 45 Horowitz sat in the Knox meeting with K&M. Others in meeting were A1 Spedding, VP of Engineering Schneider, H.B. Childs, Hutchcroft. 46 Childs had to do with claims - he had records of claims due to accidents. 47 Hutchcroft was in charge of research, R&D. Schneider was VP o f Engineering, Spedding was Horowitz's immediate supervisor. Part of the discussion was the urgency that Dr. Knox informed management or was trying to inform mgt 48 of the awareness of the association between cancer and asbestos in England was much greater than in the US. He showed a picture and described mesothelioma which Horowitz had never heard of before. (1960). As a result of the meeting, K&M organized under Childs' direction a Loss Control Committee and Horowitz was asked to propose an IH program. He made a proposal. Horowitz 2 (not attached) is "Proposed Castleman.CERT001101 Industrial Hygiene Program for all K&M Plants" dated 6/17/60. Meeting was therefore before 6/17/60. This was an outline drawn up pursuant to discussions. Written by Horowitz. Went to Childs, Spedding and probably Schneider in K&M mgt. Document came from Horowitz's personal file. Under A it reads "Number one is evaluate existing exhaust systems etc., each system to be tested at least once each year. And number two is initiate monitoring program to include dust counts of atmospheric samples obtained at each operating machine, as well as in the general air in the plant. Dust counts taken by impinger method. Material used to retain or catch the dust is isopropyl alcohol. Put in glass bottle called impinger flask. It is connected to hand operated pump w/rubber hose and operated by Horowitz, by hand, similar to organ grinder. Glass tube in which dust collected held close to breathing zone of operator by Horowitz. The operator is the person he was trying to determine exposure. Dust collected while operations were going on. Operating conditions noted such as machining heavily or lightly or not at all. Operator whose exposure was being measured could be a production line worker, a helper, anybody. It was an employee of the company who was exposed. Three 10 minute samples were taken. Results averaged. Tube held as close to the breathing zone as possible w/o interference. This was the method o f collection used at K&M and CertainTeed. An 8 year period. Number 3 of document was "for inadequate existing exhaust systems, a, reconstruct where possible, b, replace obsolete and inadequate equipment, c, completely redesign exhaust system, where necessary." Under b and c, stated "b, personal respiratory protective equipment to be used only as a secondary means of dust control, and c, medical control. Under Medical Control, 1, pre-employment and routine physical examinations, including x-rays, 2, rotation of employees where required, and 3, education for personal and industrial hygiene. Under b, respiratory protective devices are only a temporary and not a positive method of protection of the worker. Horowitz-3, 8/3/60, "Notes on Papers at 13th International Congress on Occupational Health." Authored by Horowitz. Went to Spedding; Horowitz was reporting on a meeting. Horowitz usually attended meetings by himself. During course of work at K&M and CertainTeed, he attended various meetings dealing w/IH. Various organizations. Reported to superiors only transactions pertinent to "our problems." Anything having to do w/exposure to asbestos dust, silica dust, talc, mica, etc. These were all substances used in the K&M and CT processes. Ex. 3 is true and correct copy. Castleman.CERT001102 57 Para. 5, "the relation between asbestos and lung cancer has not been firmly established. Lung cancer related to industry require much study." 8/3/60. 58 Horowitz 4 - "Dust Collection Cut-Off Saw", 8/19/60. A letter to Charles D. French, Plant Mgr of Plant 8 at K&M at the time written by Spedding, Horowitz's supervisor. Horowitz was asked to determine a design for this operation. 59 Horowitz had to do with the furnishing the info in the letter. Letter states it was Central Engineering Division's responsibility to maintain a healthy and dust free industrial atmosphere in all K&M plants. One method was by properly redesigning and/or installing exhaust systems - the dust control section was requested to design an exhaust system for the new cut-off saw for reworking pipe. 60 The term "dust" in the letter was especially meant to mean asbestos dust re the cut-off saw. This was because the cut-off saw was for cutting asbestos cement pipe. The "dust control section" was Horowitz himself. For a short time he had the assistance of a recent Drexel grad, John McGinney. 61 McGinney assisted in taking dust counts for a short time. The documents discussed thus far were kept in Horowitz' file in the regular course of business at K&M. Horowitz-6, dated 10/13/60 was to all plant mgrs entitled "Respirator Program for all K&M Plants." Term K&M was crossed out at certain points and CPC replaced it. The same document was intended and was used for direction to all Plant Managers after CertainTeed Products Corp took over operation. 62 Notation at bottom o f document which stated memo was issued in 1960 and must be strictly enforced. There are re-issue dates of 8/9/67 and 12/6/67. This document was written by Horowitz. His signature is at the bottom. 63 Horowitz-6 read "dust respirators must be used by K&M personnel at all operations involving the use of silica, cement, mica, talc and asbestos dust." K&M was crossed out when it was changed to CPC. The second para, reads "a program for the use and care of dust respirators must be promulgated at each plant in order to protect the health of operating personnel. It is the responsibility o f the Plant Manager to insure that the following program be closely adhered to:" 64 Whether this policy was enforced was the resp. of the plant managers. To his knowledge, the method of enforcement was posting this on the bulletin board at each plant. 65 As part o f the Loss Control Program, Horowitz determined that the bulletin should be presented to all plant mgrs. 66 Item 2, respirators approved by the bureau of mines refers to a proper respirator used for asbestos. The U.S. Bureau of Mines was the only body approving or testing respirators. Castleman.CERT001103 Horowitz-8 is a memo [to] HB Childs, "Dust Control", 12/1/60. Horowitz received a copy of this. 67 Doc was written by Mr. Scranton to Childs. Horowitz does not recall that Scranton was on the loss control cmtee. 68-9 Objection by J. Shein re significance of the purpose of the testimony. Bell offered this witness. Shein states that the sophisticated employer defense is not delegable in PA, so he questions why testimony is offered. 72 Horowitz-9 - "Dust Control Report", 12/6/60. Name Almand C. Stabler, M.D. appears on the last page. 73 This doc in Horowitz's personnel file during yrs with K&M and into his file during yrs with CT. Still in his possession at time of dep. This was a reporting by a consultant medical person consulting for K&M reporting on the existence of a relationship of the disease and asbestos. 73a Document received in the course of duties as an IH for the company. Written in the ordinary course of business reporting to the Loss Control Committee. Horowitz on the LCC. 73b He rec'd the doc as a member o f the committee. 1st two paras - "it is difficult to reach any definite conclusion on the subject of occupational chest diseases in asbestos industries. Asbestosis o f the lung is a constant fear o f all employees, and a problem to management. There is comparatively very little known of the disease, especially in its beginning and early stages. How to control its cause is still theoretical. There has not been enough research and study of asbestosis to protect the industry." Second page, 12/6/60, Sec. B states 74-5 In a program we now have, column one, pre-employment examination and chest x-ray, including a detailed history of past dust exposure and lung conditions. Two, medical inspection upon return to work, of all employees that have been out of work over three days because of illness. Three, yearly x-ray pictures of all employees on a voluntary basis. 75 Sub under 3, "we are fortunate in having a well qualified doctor to read the x-rays. He is a chest specialist experienced in the reading of x-rays, and also as an expert witness in many Court hearings. B, any x-ray picture that is suspicious is re-x-rayed with a regular large x-ray plate. C, persons whose x-rays are normal are so informed. D, persons whose results are questionable have their reports mailed to the family doctor o f the employee, and the individual is notified of the action taken. This report contains the findings of the x-rays, but no diagnosis. E, all cases that need adjustment of their jobs are removed from any dust areas. Item 4,dust exhaust fans and respirators are used in certain areas of the plant. Castleman.CERT001104 76-7 C, Program we need. "Extensive dust count control, it is an accepted fact that over a space of years, the lower the dust count the fewer number of asbestosis cases." 77 "Since this is a proven practical application, we must use it to its best advantage." Item 7, "gaining the confidence of employees, a , since it is obvious that each year more cases of alleged asbestosis are arising and going to Court, we cannot ignore it. We should take the initiative in dust control, preventive medicine and education of the employee to the ffect that mgt is interested in their welfare and protection." Horowitz 13, a doc "Asbestos Textile Institute Meeting, Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee., June 8th and 9th, 1961, memo written 6/12/61. (ATI) 78 Written by Spedding., copy to Childs. Horowitz rep'd K&M at the ATI meeting; his duty was to inform his immediate superior o f the contents of the mtg. 79 Was his practice to prepare memos for meeting he attended. This practice continued after he went to CT and CT took over. McGinley and Stabler were present during the ATI meeting. 80 Wanted Stabler at the meeting b/c Kenneth Smith of Manville would be talking. Subject was to be health aspects related to asbestos. Stabler did attend this meeting. In 1st para., each member submitted its dust counting technique and existing medical program. K&M submitted its techniques. 81 K&M 's dust collection techniques were comparable to other companies. 84 Horowitz 15 - Doc written by Horowitz in his duties as a member o f the LCC. Subject was analysis of environmental conditions in Ambler plants from IH point of view re recent x-rays -10/9/61. Speaks of x-rays of 653 K&M employees in 5/61. 85 15 o f the 653 reported "possible pulmonary disease or damage" cases by Dr. J.J. Kirschner, Specialist in Pulmonary Disease. The second page, "Recommendations" "a company policy must be established with respect to occupation disease, such as to correct sub-standard working conditions and protect the health and safety o f the employee. To comply with local, state and federal regulations in conformance with good industrial practices with respect to health and safety. Policy should be directed to by the LCC" 4 paras, follow: 1) Educational program, 2) x-ray program, 3) Respirator program and 4) engineering. 86 Horowitz 15 copied to Stabler and D.W. Keach. Keach was industrial relations. Horowitz 17, "Meeting of Loss Control Committee." Dated 1/8/62. Meeting No. 4. 87 This doc was possibly authored by Childs. In Horowitz's personal file since it was written. Received in capacity as member o f LCC for K&M. 88 Title of Horowitz 17 is "Company Policy on OD." OD is occupational disease. This Castleman.CERT001105 includes asbestosis. The last para, o f the page, "The company will make every effort to improve the safety and working conditions of our plants and offices. Necessary tools, equipment and safeguards provided insofar as possible to protect our employees against illness or accidents. It is the responsibility of supervisors to promote the safety programs, and to instill the safety concept in each of their employees. Safety program can be effective only if all employees accept the principles of safety and practice safety all times, on and off the job. For the good of all concerned, unsafe acts and conditions cannot be tolerated." Horowitz-20, "Use of dust respirators" Use of Dust Respirators, 4/5/62 written by Horowitz to J.S. Simmons, Safety Director. Written in the usual course o f duties as an IH for K&M and continued to keep in file after went to CT. "There are several areas in K&M plants which require the use of dust respirators. The following list of operations which should be performed with the use of dust respirators is made up o f two sections depending on the degree o f dust exposure." Sec. A, "Operations which must be performed with a dust respirator." There is a sep para, for each plant referred to. Two locations in plant 1, 11 in plant 4, another section devoted to plants 6, 7, 8 and9 and one says pipe plants. All K&M plants in existence at the time. Number 6 was Santa Clara, Number 8 was Ambler. Not sure of 7 and 9. St. Louis may have been 9. There are 5 locations/operations in each pipe plant that required wearing a dust mask. "Operations which should have dust respirators available for use at the discretion o f Plant Manager and/or operator.. . . There were two types of operations which required the wearing of a dust respirator - "2m1.ust" and "optional." Mr. Simmons was apparently an official with K&M. Horowitz- Horowitz 21 - "Asbestos Textile Institute Meeting, Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee, 9/13- 14/1962. Horowitz was a member of the Air Hygiene and Mfgr'g Committee. This was a meeting he would usually attend. Horowitz became a member of this committee within months of being hired by K&M. When he attended this meeting in 1962 of the ATI, he was attending for CertainTeed. K&M had already been sold to CT. He still attended meetings even though with CT because the US Public Health Service was presenting a program to ATI in which they wanted to evaluate dust exposures as well as make a medical study of asbestos plants. USPHS had proposed it to the ATI. As a member if K&M, he was involved with the USPHS and had recommended to CT management that since the meetings were still continuing and that they (USPHS) would visit the plants that CT now owned, that Horowitz continue going to these meetings and that's why he went. Castleman.CERT001106 97 Mr. Johnson is the chief engineer for CT Products. Davis was a vice-president in charge of Pipe Division, the area brought over from K&M. Fink was Safety Director for CT Products. The doc referred to was written by Florowitz. 98 Horowitz 22 - summary of another ATI Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee meeting which took place on 1/24/63. Memo written on 1/29/63. Reporting was to Mr. H.C. Johnson, VP/Chief of Engineering at the time. 99 First title, "Environmental and Medical In-plant Occupational Health Study of the Asbestos Products Industry." The study was being done by the USPHS - a continuation of previous discussions the USPHS had on their proposal to study the asbestos industry. Part of the study actually took place. The only part of the study that was undertaken was the environmental - the medical never took place. As part of the study, two CT plants were visited - St. Louis and Santa Clara. 100 A team of USPHS workers came to plants. One person was assigned to take work hxs of employees while a team of 4 were doing dust sampling. Horowitz 22 written by himself. 101 Horowitz-23 or 25. 6/1/64. 102 Horowitz was reporting on some materials he read re asbestos exposure and neoplasis to Mr. R.L. Lanz, 6/1/64. Lanz was the VP of the Pipe Division of CertainTeed at that time. Horowitz wrote to Lanz to inform on discussions and the press and in the field abt asbestos and its relationship to cancer. He reminded Lanz that there was an ongoing program with the USPHS to make a study of the asbestos industry. 103 The purpose of this memo was to urge the company to join in the study, to have the USPHS visit CT. Handwritten at the bottom is Horowitz's writing "R.L. Lanz phoned on 6/2/64, notification, okay for U.S. Public Health Service visit." 104 The writing indicated that the USPHS was permitted to visit the CT plants. There is a ref to Selikoff in the memo. Horowitz attened the ATI Hygiene meeting in Phila. on 4/29/64 with Selikoff and another one in 1964 at the Waldorf, an international conference. 105 The first time Horowitz heard Selikoff speak was the International conf at the Waldorf. (1964) The subject of the conference was asbestos and its relationship to occupational disease. The disease the conf involved were asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma. All three diseases were discussed at the conference. He was the only member o f CT at the conf. 106 Selikoff also spoke at the Philly Conf. American Industrial Hygiene in 1964 107 April 29, 1964. The subject was related to the asbestos exposure and neoplasia, and the Castleman.CERT001107 article (newspaper) was attached to the memo. He did not have the article. Neoplasia means cancer related. Horowitz was the CT person in attendance. Horowitz 24, "X-Ray Program, 10/16/64. Written by Horowitz to Ankstat who was plant mgr of Santa Clara. 108 Horowitz 25 - written by Horowitz. "Chest X-Ray Program" 8/11/65. Was attempt to tell all plant mgrs and direct them on having an x-ray program. Lanz is in 1st sentence, D.J. Donald - Dr. consultant at Ambler plant or at headquarters. 109 Horowitz-26 - a Table of Organization for K&M at time he worked there. 10/1/60. In personal file. Horowitz 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 19. 110 All but Ex. 12 refer to meetings attended by Horowitz for the ATI. 111 Memos all written in usual course of duties. All kept in personal file since time he wrote them. Horowitz-7, is a reporting to Mr. Barge, 11/22/60, on a meeting in the Industrial Hygiene Foundation which occurred on 10/27/60 in Pittsburgh. Mr. Childs wrote it. 112 Rec'd copy in course of duties. Industrial Hygiene Foundation (IHF) is organized to help industry approach and do research on various occupational disease problems. Horowitz27, IHF meeting, 10/25/61 at Mellon Institute in Pitt written by Horowitz and Spedding 10/30/61. 113 Notes about meeting. Similar to the memos written after ATI meetings. End of document discussions. Now, procedure followed when conducted of dust counting at K&M and CT. Tube near breathing zone o f worker, one exposure, three samples, ten minutes. 114 When taking dust samples at K&M and CT, workers would "usually, very frequently," talk to him about what he was doing. 115 He told workers he was sampling dust in the air at the station they were working. 116 He conducted these counts in plant 8. Does not recall when 1st did this. Did do dust collecting at plant 8 while at K&M. 117 Also did dust collection at plant 8 while working for CT. Followed previously outlined procedure. Took dust counts at K&M or CT in areas respirators were required. 118 He observed respirators not being used in these areas. If he so observed, he would talk to plant mgr. Tell him there's a respirator program and refer to it and tell him they weren't adhering. 121 There was a respirator program at the Ambler plants continuing from K&M to CT. 123 Respirator program came from staff and the understanding was they all knew about it. Castleman.CERT001108 124 Arthur May was IH before Horowitz at K&M. He would represent K&M at the ATI meetings before Horowitz began there - Horowitz would see May at the meetings. Also a Mr. Schmidt's material was in his desk when he began at K&M. 125 When he came to K&M, there was some dust count equipment. They had most of the equipment he needed. He bought some accessories. They had a midget impinger, glass collecting material, hand operator pump, tube and microscope for counting. Basic tools. 126-7 No Canadian fiber supplier ever came down to instruct workers at K&M plant or CT. (Bell Asbestos is questioning) Horowitz never personally contacted a mining supplier. 128 He never recommended contacting a mining supplier to any of his superiors. DIRECT EXAM OF HOROWITZ CONCLUDED CROSS EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR BRINCO MINING LTD 129 Literature that Horowitz received re asbestos and cancer was the type o f literature that "crosses your desk" at K&M. General literature re occupational health was in his duties at K&M and at CT. 130 Met Dr. Knox from T&N in 1960 when worked for K&M. He understood the Knox visit was because Knox was in the country making several visits at a rep o f T&N and he wanted to speak to mgt to inform them o f the information he had that he was disseminating in the US. Horowitz understood that there was a relationship between K&M and T&N. He thought T&N was an English co. that owned K&M. 131 Dr. Knox was the only contact Horowitz had with T&N. Horowitz may have spoken to T&N people when he worked for CT at meetings. No specific discussions. MICHAEL BROMBERG QUESTIONING FOR LAKE ASBESTOS - CROSS 132 The exhibits are items that belong to Horowitz. They were in a file at home. These were papers he took with him when he left CT. It was his practice to keep copies of papers. That was part of his practice at CT. 133 All references to meetings in memos took place after the meetings. He would prepare cover letters reporting to the company about meetings. In ordinary course o f business. The respirator program memos were prepared in the OCB. 134 These were prepared in the OCB at both CT and K&M. Dust counting at KM sometimes would exceed 5 M/cf. 135 When went from KM to CT, all o f his papers and files stayed in the same place. It was a continuance of the job. What he knew about asbestos on his last day at KM was what he Castleman.CERT001109 knew first day at CT. DAN BRUCH - CROSS FOR CERTAINTEED 135 Horowitz not an officer at KM. Not an officer at CT. 136 Dust conditions improved between 1962 and 1968 re asbestos cement pipe plant. 137 CT did not remain a member of the ATI after purchase o f the cement plant b/c they no longer had a textile plant. Horowitz attended 2 meetings o f the ATI after CT took over. USPHS visited the St. Louis and Santa Clara acp plants of CT between 64 and 67/68. Our of the exhibits, three are post-62. 138 A lot of the KM exhibits have "confidential" written on them. May have been a general policy. Three CT exhibits, Horowitz 21, 22 and 23 - two don't have confidential written on them. Probably accidental. No knowledge as to why. USPHS studied the textile plants first b/c higher exposure in the textile plants. 90-95% o f the product is asbestos. 139 Use o f asbestos in acp is only 14%. Ex 15 - refers to study of 653 KM employees in 1961. Para. 2 reads "it is significant that most o f these people are older employees, who have been employed by KM for 19 years or more. Although there is no dust concentration data available, it is probably that dust concentrations in the past were much greater than in recent years. The beater man operation, which in general has not had adequate dust control, appears several times on this list. This would indicate that more adequate dust control is necessary at this operation." 140 Dr. Delmar Donald was a consultant to KM in Ambler. JOEL GUSKY FOR CAREY-CANADIAN MINES 140 As a result of Knox's visit, the LCC was informed. The committee disappeared when CT took over. 141 Some of the employees were no longer with the company and there was no decision made to continue the LCC. Spedding was not rehired at CT. Horowitz-6, reissued within 4 mos in 1967. He reworded the first para, to add "where dust control is not sufficient to maintain airborne dust concentrations below maximum permissible limits (respirators must be worn around dust including asbestos). 142 He meant that respirators are not a primary means of control. When he started with KM, he was in the engineering dept. May, 1960. About 10 people in the dept. When CT took over in 1962, about eight people were in the dept. CT took over what was known as plant 8. They also took over St. Louis and Santa Clara facilities. One other pipe plant, 4 all together. Castleman.CERT001110 143 Between 62 and 68, CT acquired other acp plants. CT built plants in Riverside, CA and Hillsboro, TX. TX in 64 and then CA. 144 When worked for KM, reported to Spedding. Mr. Johnson was who he reported to at CT. He office was in Ardmore, PA. Horowitz's office was in Ambler. Horowitz reviewed his 1980 depo before testifying today. Referred to Dr. Melvin First of Harvard U in that dep. Dr. First made a report about Plant 4. 145 He had not been able to locate that report. Not too much was done in response to First's report. An analysis of costs needed to follow his recommendations was made. Very costly. One of the assignments after he began at KM was to adapt the problems in the First report. Between 60 and 62. 146 Estimate was for $3OK in 1960 dollars. JOHN MASON FOR T&N ON CROSS 146 Before coming to KM in 1960, Horowitz had knowledge concerning possible hazards connected to asbestos exposure. From his training in IH for the state of NY. This knowledge came in about 1947. 147 The knowledge he acquired and which he retained throughout his working time until he joined KM was that asbestosis was a pneumoconiosis disease, or a disease that caused by dust in the lungs. And, that a TLV of about 5M /cf made it approx, as toxic as silica at the time. He brought this info and knowledge to KM. No one at KM had to tell him this info. 148 Spedding was his boss when 1st at KM. He hired Horowitz for purposes o f dust control engineering. Spedding wanted Horowitz to do what he had done in his previous experience. Spedding approved plans, he was chief engineer. Plans were for design of industrial exhaust systems. Removal o f mostly dust. 149 Equipment had to be designed around the job. He designed exhaust systems for individual machines. 150 He determined a need to exhaust systems by doing dust counts. It dust counts exceeded the tlv. Goes through the process. Began with CT between April and June of 62. 151 Re dust counts, part of technique was to use visual observations. Then take air samples. Then you could determine whether there was a need. Dust collecting around machines could be so voluminous that it could interfere with the job. Designed exhaust systems for old and new machines. 152 His plans were approved for existing machines. Also for new ones. Designed systems in new plant in Hillsboro. No new plants in Ambler, but new processes. Castleman.CERT001111 153 Systems in plant 8. In plant 4. Only plant with new machines was plant 8 while Horowitz was there. (Unclear whether KM or CT years). 154 Hired as dust control engineer. The purpose was to reduce the threshold limits. Primary control was wanted - control of dust - secondary control is respirator. 155 Parameters included whether you wanted to continue to work and use material or not. Dust control relates to the best engineering method available. You cannot have much confidence in respirators to protect an employee from breathing dust. 156 This is because the respirator may not fit properly. They plug up, they get dirty. Horowitz wrote a memo in 60 or 61 which stated mandatory use of respirators. This was because the exposure was greater that the tlv and engineering methods had not or could not been used to reduce it. 157 There were areas where you could not though engineering get dust levels below tlv. For example, the maintenance man going into a dust collector to clean it. 158 As for machines, if sufficient $$ put into it, you could design a machine to reduce dust below the tlv. Horowitz's job to seek out areas and report them to mgt. In Sept. 1960, he attended a meeting with Dr. Knox. 159 Talk was o f a very positive association between asbestos and cancer. The word mesothelioma came up at that time. First time he heard the word. He was to "spur" on the LCC to control dust. 160 The control of dust was an ongoing thing. There was not immediacy - "let drop everything." The purpose of reducing dust exposure was now clear. A continuing thing. 161 Dust collection goals now differed in that "it was a management directive" to everyone that a LCC existed. Greater awareness. No new knowledge about the control o f dust was needed. The acceptance of the association between cancer and meso and asbestos was "not taken verbatim" merely b/c Know or Selikoff said there was. The IH community .. . 162 technical, scientific community said "there are suspicions" "lets do further studies and lets find proof." It wasn't an immediate thing. 163 Whether [asbestos] caused asbestosis or cancer, there was a large question about meso. One of Horowitz' memos talks about informing foremen about hazards. He does not know whether this was done. Whether plant managers were informed is a question b/c out o f Horowitz's responsibility. 166 Asbestos, when he started, until "we" were convinced o f a cancer hazard, was not a special hazard any more than other exposures. Castleman.CERT001112 167 "This company" did more asbestos than silica, but there was also talc, mica. He had no direction to communicate directly with the employee. 168 He felt he was as much knowledge about hazards of asbestos as any one else in his expertise. The knowledge came as slowly to him as the rest of the community. As much as the next guy. 169 After at CT, they did not belong to the ATI, he went to two meetings. He did go to NIMA meetings. National Insulation Manufacturers Assoc. He represented the company - "we directed our attention to the hazards of insulation materials, of which asbestos was included. He worked on the preparation of brochures in that regard. He worked with John Viberberg. 171 Ex. 6 - where KM in 1960, he drew a ling through it and put CPC. He probably did this in 62-63. He doesn't know. 172 Probably done within the 62-63 (KM to CPC) time frame. The words about dust control not sufficient to maintain airborne dust concentrations below maximum permissible limits was probably added in 67. 173-4 For those 7 years, the memo meant that respirators needed if dust levels over tlv. To plant managers. He would mail this memo in regular mail. Mailed in 60 and 67 - in 67, added words "where dust control is not sufficient. . ." 175 Where maximum permissible limits were exceeded would have been true since 1960. 176 Goal was cleanliness in the field. Informed plant managers. Language added after CT, but obvious conclusion in KM days. 177 One thing that would have Horowitz do dust samples were visible dust in the air. Generally, if you see it, its an area that you would want to determine with instruments. Very subjective method. Just b/c see dust did not mean that tlv was exceeded. Only way to make that determination was with impingers. Used a Greenberg-Smith impinger. 178 A midget impinger by Greenberg-Smith. Worked under Dr. Leonard Greenberg in the state of New York. There were occasions at KM when dust exceeded 5M p/cf. He usually recommended that some action be taken. Change of technique to extreme redesign, exhaust systems. 179 He was the expert at KM during his tenure. O/s consultant was only Dr. First from Harvard. He made recommendations to KM. 180 First's recommendations followed at Plant 4. Cost factor. Still dust levels exceeded 5 m/cf. Not all o f his recommendations were followed. Castleman.CERT001113 181 Between 100% and zero of his recommendations were followed. Horowitz believes his recommendations were taken seriously. Factors included cost issues and time delays. 182 Respirators (re his Oct. 13, 1960 memo) were an ongoing program where excessive dust levels. Communicating with workers was the plant manager's responsibility. 183 Horowitz would just report excessive (5 million c/f) dust levels. After Horowitz' dep of 6/30/80, he did further search of docs from KM and CT. 184 What he found he sent to Elizabeth Gibson at Shea and Gardner. Referring to a letter dated 7/2/80 wherein Horowitz states he send documents to Shea. 185 In the letter is reference to 11/10/64 memo. Ex. 28 to dep. 186 Ex. 29 actually. Memo from Horowitz to Mr. Davis (VP o f pipe division) written on Nov. 10th and reviewed commentary made by Dr. Shaw as a result o f their attendance at the conf. on biological effects of asbestos at the New York Assembly of Science. Prepared in the ordinary course of business as an employee of CT. Mr. JL Anderson appears under Mr. Lanz' name. He was Chief Engineer in replacing Spedding in Staff Office. 187 Lanz was his superior for a short time. Page 2, second full para. First sentence "The discussion at our meeting with the four representatives from Turner Bros Asbestos Co the evening before the conference was mostly on the accomplishment of the asbestos research counsel of England." 188 The only representatives he could recall were Davis and Knox. Davis was a scientist from England. Dr. Shaw was also there. Meeting held b/c management reafeed the people from Turner were on the agenda and since they represented Turner Bros or TurnerNewall, CT newly acquired the 189 asbestos cement plant, they thought it would be nice to get together. There was no business relationship between Turner Bros Asbestos Co and CT in 1964 that Horowitz knew of. Horowitz's connection to Turner Bros after the meeting referenced in the memo was when he met Dr. Knox at the Industrial Hygiene Foundation. Knox was a speaker there - "that's all." 190 During KM years, Horowitz heard of Bell Asbestos Mines Ltd. He thought they were owned by Turner & Newall. 191 Horowitz had no input into what fibers were put into products. Both KM and at CT. Dust monitoring was done by Horowitz - employees never wore monitors. He followed them around. 192 In Horowitz's prior deposition, he stated subjectively that KM plant 4 was the dustiest. Castleman.CERT001114 That is because of making the pipe insulation. 193 CT did not acquire plant 4. Nicolet did. He never went to plant 4 between 62 and 68. [Mr. Mason questioning now] In Ex 29 (11/10/64 memo), he wrote that Knox said that US Industry in general did not want to accept the fact that asbestos was hazardous. 194 While Horowitz was not in US Industry, it was difficult for him to accept at the time [that asbestos was hazardous] The intimation was that doctors are more ready to accept a negative attitude than a positive attitude. 195 His reasons for not readily accepting asbestos as a hazard was that traditionally in industrial hygiene, you needed more exposure, time weighted exposure, to get an occupational disease than mesothelioma which is not related to time weighted exposure. This was difficult for him to accept. 196 Horowitz found the meeting with the 4 Turner Asbestos guys did a little more to convince him that the professionals accepted the fact and that he should review his thinking and listen more and learn more. HE DID NOT LEARN ANY MORE ABOUT THE HAZARDS OF ASBESTOS THAT HE HADN'T BEEN INFORMED OF BEFORE [meaning in I960?] 197 [Dan Bruch for CT questioning] Eight hour weighted average for measuring fibers/cubic foot meant a worker who was exposed for a full 8 hours a day, forty hours per week, fifty weeks per year. Chances are he might get an occupational disease. 198 [Mitchell Cohen questioning] Cohen represented certain plaintiffs in the action. Horowitz worked at the time of the dep for American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. Wakefield MA 01880. When Horowitz originally interviewed for KM position in 1960, he was interviewed at KM offices at Rockefeller Center. 199 At time he began with KM, he was not aware o f who insured KM for workers comp. 200 When he first became aware of who insured KM for workers comp, it was American Mutual Insurance Co. 201 It's his understanding that American Mutual Liab Ins Co insured KM while Horowitz worked there. 202 Did not know the terms of the policy as to whether wc policy covered asbestos diseases. Does not know if AMLIC paid any asbestos claims while he was at KM. 203 Horowitz was aware as he testified that in 82 that AMLIC had been named in asbestos lawsuits. Nature of allegations were general awareness on products. Not aware of specific allegations. Castleman.CERT001115 204 His awareness was that AMLIC's insureds were manufacturers of asbestos products many years before. 205 Not aware o f any allegations that KM and AMLIC conspired to preclude the distribution of info re health hazards at Ambler facility. 206 Re Knowledge: At the time Horowitz joined KM (1960) they were a member of the Industrial Health Foundation which published abstracts on all papers dealing with occupational diseases. Does not know how long KM was a member of the IHF. 207 KM would have received the abstracts. Part of membership. Does not recall personally seeing the abstracts when he first started. From the time he started, he recalled seeing all the abstracts. This included the period he was with CT. 208 IHF has a library and they cover occ diseases and industrial hygiene, related subjects, etc. They would have to cull out an abstract on asbestos. Mainly published when symposiums or the like. IHF did publish specifically on asbestos if there was a symposium. 209 IHF definitely did send abstracts to its members on asbestos disease. He recalls receiving these almost immediately and this raised the question of the relationship between cancer and asbestos almost immediately after joining the company. (1960) 210 He was not aware of the cancer/asbestos relationship prior to KM. Horowitz, upon learning of the relationship between cancer/asbestos, called the insurance co, the AMLIC he now worked for, and asked them for abstracts of articles on the subject. They sent two pages. 211 The articles were written in England and South Africa. These were the only articles he saw from before the time he started. He did not have to tell AMLIC about IHF as a potential source of this type of info, they already knew, they were at the meetings. AMLIC was a member of the IHF. 212 In his role at KM, he kept his eye on the literatures, any discussions as a member of the AIHA (American Industrial Hygiene Association), as a member o f the IHF and with the local people in the local industrial hygiene section. Anything 1960 forward. 213 As for literature, he limited himself to what was available through the insurance co. 214 Horowitz brought certain amount o f experience from prior jobs to KM. He did not feel it necessary to go back and look at pre-1960 literature. 215 He felt if there had been info pertinent to IH he would have obtained it in his field. No knowledge o f the alleged relationship between carcinoma and asbestos exposure at time joined KM (1960). Castleman.CERT001116 216 Not aware of IHF's abstracts going back 30 years prior to 1960. Horowitz asked the insurance company for the abstracts prior to Knox's visit. The AMLIC articles only meant that the field required more study - they alluded to the fact of the relationship. It wasn't until Knox's visit that "it was more substantiated than the few abstracts" he had read. 217 A sa IH, he depended on other specialties' skills. The fact that the US, ACGIH and all the authorities that he leaned upon for information and guidance did not accept the studies o f 20-30 years prior to change their TLV's was sufficient for Horowitz not to research and accept the abstracts as being more pertinent that the prevailing knowledge at the time. 226 (After objections of counsel). Questioning by Mr. Shein (Joseph) Timbers worked for KM and then for CT. 227 In 1960, the asbestos products KM manufactured included asbestos shingles, siding in plantl, insulation material in plant 4, pipe insulation material, a paper product used for the electrical industry, asbestos paper product, a rubber product containing asbestos for gasketing, asbestos cement pipe and asbestos textile. 228 Does not know any of KM's tradenames. Timbers worked in plant 8. Plant 8 manufactured asbestos cement pipes only. They used the raw asbestos which came in bags of 100% asbestos. Came from South Africa, various places. Cassiar is the only one he recalled. 229 They got blue and white fiber from different sources. Some came from Canada. The finished product contained about 14% asbestos. 232 Raw asbestos was moved by forklift most times. From railroad cars to the plant and from plant storage to the hopper, where it was opened and bagged and dropped into the hopper. Forklift operators also picked up finished pipe, broken pipe, etc. Most raw asbestos was in a paper bag. 233 Most of the raw asbestos was white in color. Finished product - couplings were boxed - a hard solid asbestos cement product - 14% asbestos. Pipe left on large trailers. 234 It was piled up and tied down. Varying lengths but around 20 ft. No warning labels he could recall at KM. 236 From 60-62, no cautionary labels on bags of raw fiber 237 Does not recall blue fiber in plant 8, only in plant 4. After 1962, CT, they were in limbo until re-hired, but essentially in the same office. CT only picked up plant 8 in Ambler, ACP. 238 ACP exact same product with CT as was with KM. Same content. Couplings had a Castleman.CERT001117 rubber gasket. Brought in from the outside (rubber gaskets). Couplings boxed as before. Between 62 and 68, does not recall seeing any cautionary labels. 239 Does not recall any cautionary stamp on the pipe. Was told when started at KM that KM was a wholly owned subsidiary of Turner & Newall. Fellow workers told him. He personally had no relationship with T&N, so he received no information from them - but Dr. Knox did visit. 240 No info from T&N between 60 and 62 on latest developments in medical or scientific asbestos hazards. He found out T&N had a research dept when Knox visited. Thought Research Counsel was separate from T&N. 241 Not aware o f any research T&N did itself. Knox came to visit June of 1960. Told about the visit beforehand and invited to attend meeting. Horowitz understood Knox to be the medical advisor of T&N. 242 Knox meeting: majority was Knox discussing the "whole problem" and at end of meeting, showed Horowitz a cross-section of the lung which he pointed out had mesothelioma in it. Implication was that meso was from asbestos exposure. Meeting was an hour or two, at engineering office. 243 Meeting not held at the plant. Knox's implication was that in the US, we were not measuring asbestos the proper way. 244 No full time medical director at KM. 245 There was a part time medical director-type person at KM. Not sure o f title. Not sure whether Knox saw the plant (throughout the plant). 246 The subjects of dust control and monitoring were two different things. Subject of monitoring was discussed at Knox meeting. As a result of the meeting, Horowitz did not change dust control methods. He has no info on cautionary labels on products vis a vis T&N. 247 He no personal communication with T&N. Nothing crossed his desk. Does not recall seeing Asbestos Magazine at KM. Asbestos Magazine is vaguely familiar, but does not recall seeing it. Knows nothing about it. 248 In June 30, 1980 depo, Horowitz recalled using the term "maximum allowable concentrations" as a standard. Not an absolute figure. It is a guide. The concept of the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists is that 80% o f people exposed to asbestos would be considered safe. 249 Other twenty percent? That is why there are tlv's which allow you to go above or below a value. As long as it averages out to 8 hours/day, concept is if you can keep below that, Castleman.CERT001118 you will protect 80% of the people. There are 20% or a certain number of people that have greater susceptibility. 250 Explains the difference between tlv and maximum allowable concentration. 251 Question o f whether the tlv applies to meso. Even today, there is no value when speaking o f cancer producing material. There should be zero. 253 Ex. 29, 11/10/64 memo. 254 Knox stated at the meeting that US industry does not want to accept the fact that asbestos is very hazardous and they will accept any doctor's view that is was not hazardous. No particular physician was referred to. W.C. Heuper is a very well known medical person with cancer experience. 255 At some point, Heuper with the NCI. 256 Question about bounds of expertise for IH's. 257 As an IH, he depends on the expertise of other specialties. Those IH's who are not medical people depend on the medical specialty for their conclusions. IH's wait until there is a concensus and the whole medical community is ready to accept it and when organizations like the ACGIH will accept a view and change their limits, then IH's accept it. Does not readily accept positions before concensus. 258 Reference to 1965 Dr. Heuper article. Lots of objections 262 Horowitz is not a commercially interested party. 264 Horowitz cannot speak to the commercially interested parties referenced in Heuper's article. 265 Does not know of the business relationship between Bell Asbestos and T&N. During KM years? No. 266 Knew T&N owned a mine, but not which one. Does not know if Bell supplied fibers to KM between 60 and 62. Nor after 62. No knowledge of Cassiar as a supplier. Believes Bell and Cassiar were at ATI meetings. 267 Was never introduced to them. If they were at ATI meetings he was never introduced to them and did not know them. No reps of T&N either. Never has seen a book called Turner & Newall, The First 50 Years. End of Depo for the day. Continued 2/2/82. Castleman.CERT001119