Document ppB4QgNX2EbbnK39eNa3DBNrw

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT United States Department of Labor . Washington, D.C. 20210 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION USDL: 86-130 CONTACT: Chriss Winston OFFICE: (202) 523-6091 AFTER HOURS: (703) 532-6254 FOR RELEASE: Immediate Tuesday, April^1, 1986 CONTACT: David Demarest OFFICE: (202) 523-8231 AFTER HOURS: (703) 548-6360 STATEMENT BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR SECRETARY WILLIAM E. BROCK CONCERNING OSHA CITING OF UNION CARBIDE FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH VIOLATIONS On September 17, 1985, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration began a comprehensive, wall-to-wall inspection of the Union Carbide Plant at Institute, West Virginia. The purpose of that inspection was to determine whether the company had a safety and health management system in place and to assess its effectiveness in ensuring employee safety, in responding to chemical spills and releases, and in preventing potentially catastrophic accidents. I'd like to tell you what we found. We found what we believe to be very serious problems with the Institute plant's safety systems, its recordkeeping, its safety-and health programs, and its safety management systems. We found a lack-of^proper^.respiratory protection^- a problem for which Union Carbide has been cited in the past. We found employees without respirators being asked to detect the presence of deadly gas by sniffing the air after alarms indicated a leak. We found a seriously deficient recordkeeping system -- a system that must and should be the cornerstone of any effective safety and health program. We found a failure to record critical background information on asbestosis cases -- then.second time Union Carbide has been cited for inadequate recordkeeping on asbestosis. We found deficient equipment design, inadequate maintenance, and a lack of monitoring devices which limit the company's effectiveness in preventing chemical releases. And we found an inadequate safety management system where hazards are not properly recognized nor promptly corrected. -more- DPMC-01835 LAW 008356 It has always been the policy of this Administration to seek to achieve workplace safety through a reasonable, balanced approach with employers .--the vast majority of whom are equally concerned with the protection of their employees. But we will Impose the full penalties of the law on those who blatantly or repeatedly violate the safeguards necessary to protect American workers. As a result, this morning at 8:30 a.m., OSHA Issued the stiffest penalties In its fifteen-year history by citing Union Carbide for a total of 221*1nstances of alleged safety and health violations and proposed a penalty of $1t377,-700. e. Our wgapaHe- today is a necessary and appropriate one to correct a situation characterized by complacency and what we believe to be a willful disregard for health and safety. There is no way to absolutely guarantee the safety of this or any other plant, but the margin of error is very small when dealing with dangerous chemicals. In this case, while control systems are In place, deficiencies exist which could lead to failure in the future; these deficiencies must be eliminated and the systems properly maintained. We are also very serious about recordkeeping and will not tolerate Improper reporting. Too many things depend on it -- Individual companies' ability to recognize and correct hazards; OSHA's ability to concentrate Its resources In areas where the most dangers exist; and, ultimately, the safety of the workers themselves. Today, OSHA takes a very serious step but a step that we believe must be undertaken to assure that the workers of this plant are provided with the safety and health protections that are the right of every American worker. ### DPMC-01836 LAM 008357 News Office of Information United States Department of Labor Washington, D.C. 20210 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION CONTACT: Chriss Winston OFFICE: (202) 523-6091 AFTER HOURS: (703) 532-6254 CONTACT: David Demarest OFFICE: (202) 523-8231 AFTER HOURS: (703) 548-6360 OSHA CITES UNION CARBIDE WITH 221 SAFETY AND HEALTH VIOLATIONS, PROPOSES $1,377,700 IN PENALTIES In the largest enforcement action in its history, the U.S. Labor Department's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) today cited the Union Carbide Corporation for a total of 221'instances of alleged safety and health violations and proposed a $1,377,700 penalty. The citations, issued this morning at Carbide's Institute, West Virginia, plant, resulted from the completion of the first phase of a comprehensive, wall-to-wall inspection begun at the site on September 17, 1985. In announcing the citations, U.S. Secretary of Labor William E. Brock called the action "a necessary and appropriate response to a situation characterized by complacency and what we believe to be a willful disregard for health and safety. "It has always been the policy of this Administration to achieve workplace safety through a reasonable, balanced approach with employers -- the vast majority of whom are equally concerned with the protection of their employees," Brock said. "But we will impose the full penalties of the law on those who blatantly or repeatedly violate safeguards necessary to protect American workers." Iri"its'summary of findings, OSHA concluded: -- that although a safety management system is in place, it is deficient in several key aspects including a lack of^safety accountability for supervisors, inadequate recognition or prompt correction of hazards, inadequate training, and improper recordkeeping; -- that the company's effectiveness in preventing catastrophic chemical releases is diminished because of deficient equipment design and selection, failure to install or maintain early warning devices in critical areas, and inaccurate maintenance records; -more- DPMC-01837 Lam 008358 -- that while an emergency plan Is In place, its effectiveness could be materially enhanced by ensuring that operational personnel participate In emergency drills; and -- that little If any progress has been made over the last three years in improving plant- injury and illness rates, largely because recordkeeping violations make the company's'goal-setting and corrective action -- -programs meaningless. The citations include a total of 8 willful violations with 130 instances at $10,000 for each instance; 28 serious violations with 72 instances at $1,000 for each instance; and 19 other-than-serious violations totaling $5,700, for a total of $1,377,700. The willful-violations focus on two areas. First, OSHA alleges the company failed to provide-respiratory-protection to employees required to be exposed to -unknown levels of phosgene, an extremely deadly gas. Employees were required to "sniff" to determine the presence of this deadly gas. This instance represents one willful violation. The remaining willful violations centered on failures to record instances of injuries including those requiring medical treatment or resulting in restricted activity or lost workdays and a failure to provide critical-supplemental-medical information .on asbestosis cases. Calling accurate and complete recordkeeping "the cornerstone of any successful, effective safety and health program," Brock^said OSHA is "very, serious about recordkeeping and will not tolerate improper reporting." The 28 serious violations cited by OSHA related to: -- the company's ability to detect chemical leaks; -- design deficiencies or work practices which contributed to the probability of major releases of chemicals; -- the failure to provide adequate back-up systems in the event of major chemical spills or releases; -- potential fire and explosion hazards; and -- potential exposures of employees to highly toxic materials and other serious safety violations. "There is no way to absolutely guarantee the safety of this or any other plant," Brock said, "but the margin of error is very small when dealing with hazardous chemicals." "In this case, while control systems are in place, deficiencies exist which could lead to failure in the future; these deficiencies must be eliminated and the systems properly maintained." -more- DPMC-01838 lam 008359 -3- The 19 other-than-serious violations related to technical recordkeeping violations, and deficiencies In safety measures relating to housekeeping, ladders, guardrails, audicmetric test procedures, fire extinguishers, and the like. Along with "the violations, OSHA made almost 200 recommendations aimed at Improving plant safety. These recommendations Included suggestions to Improve: -- the back-up control systems such as the sizing of pipes, venting of flares and scrubbers, and the location of storage vessels; -- work practices and procedures; -- execution and content of safety and health programs;~and -- the monitoring of exposures and leaks. The results announced today of the first phase of OSHA's Inspection included a total of five production units. This is the third chemical process inspection OSHA has conducted at the Institute, West Virginia, plant since the Bhopal tragedy in 1984. An inspection of the methyl isocyanate (MIC) unit was completed in March 1985; and investigation of the aldicarb oxime unit was completed last August. Union Carbide now has fifteen working days to contest today's citations and ' proposed penalties. A willful violation is defined by OSHA as one in which an employer either knew that what he or she was doing constituted a violation or was aware that a hazardous condition existed and made no reasonable effort to eliminate it. A serious violation is one in which there is a substantial probability tha death or serious physical harm could result and that the employer knew or shoul have known of the hazard. ### DPMC-01839 LAM 008360 CX r * Executive Summary of OSHA's Evaluation of the Company's Safety and Health Program and Inspection of Five.of*It& Eighteen Process Units , Union Carbide Corporation Institute, West Virginia I. Scope of Inspection The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) began a comprehensive inspection of the Union Carbide facility located in Institute, West Virginia, starting on September 17, 1985. The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether the company has a safety and health management system in place arid to assess its ef fectiveness in ensuring employee safety and health, in preventing chemical spills and releases, and in respond ing to potentially catastrophic chemical releases. II. Background On August 11, 1985, the aldicarb unit of Union Carbide's Institute plant experienced a large release. The release resulted in the hospitalization-of-six-employees and -~approximately^1.35'area^residents, who experienced acute eye and upper respiratory irritation. An OSHA accident investigation was undertaken that same day to determine the nature of the release and the ex tent of employee exposure and to investigate preventive measures regarding hazards associated with normal aldi carb production methods within this unit. The Agency concluded from its investigations that the catastrophic release of toxic chemicals on August 11, 1985, and its resultant exposure of six employees was i the cumulative result of several errors. As a conse quence, it was decided that a complete inspection of the Institute plant would be conducted. The present inspec tion is the first step toward accomplishing that deci sion. III. Investigative Response f An evaluation of the company's safety and health program was undertaken in accordance with'the'guidel ines :cur- rently published in Appendix B of OSHA Notice CPL 2, -March 17,"1986, which had previously been distributed to the field offices during the summer. This entailed a thorough examination of the injury and illness records maintained by the company, both the first reports of injury and the log of injuries and illnesses. OPH6-Q104O LAM 008361 In addition it involved a close look at the safety man agement system in place in the establishment and the procedures that had been developed to prevent catastro phic chemical, releases and to respond to emergencies involving such releases, should they occur in spite of the company's best efforts. OSHAhas completed the physical inspection of five of the 18 process units located at the Institute plant. OSHA's Conclusions 1. Although a safety management system is in place, it is deficient in several key aspects: . a. First 'line supervisors are not held accountable for safety and health even though they have primary responsibility for day-to-day safety. b. Hazards are not adequately recognized nor are they promptly corrected when recognized. c. Basic safety and health training is not manda tory for first-line supervisors. d. Recordkeeping is improper and is intentionally so. 2. The company's effectiveness in preventing catastro phic chemical releases is diminished because: a. Equipment design and selection is deficient. b. Failure to install or maintain early warning/ monitoring devices in critical areas. c. Inaccurate maintenance records which do not allow for scheduling tests and inspections of some critical equipment. 3. While an emergency plan is in place, its effective ness could be materially enhanced by ensuring that operational personnel participate in emergency drills'. 2 DPMC-01841 LAM 008362 .4 -Little', if any, progress has been made over the last three years .in' improving plant injury and illness rates largely because recordkeeping violations make the company'8 goal-setting and corrective action . programs meaningless. Proposed Citations A total of 221 violation instances were found that are alleged for citation. These comprise 8 willful viola tions, 28 serious violations and 19 other-than-serious violations. The willful'citations are as follows: 1. Failure to provide respiratory protection to employees required to be exposed to unknown levels of phosgene gas, a potentially fatal gas. Employees were required to "sniff" to determine the presence of this deadly gas. 2. Failure to record properly instances of inju ries resulting in lost workdays or restricted work activity and injuries requiring medical treatment as required by OSHA regulations well known to the company. 3. Failure to maintain properly first reports of injury as required by OSHA regulations well known to the company. The 28sserious citation items include 8"violations of Section'5(a)(1), the "general duty* clause of the Act. These violations relate to the company's ability to de tect chemical leaks and to prevent or control major re leases, the failure to provide adequate backup systems in the event of major chemical spills or releases, po tential fire/explosion hazards, potential exposures of employees to highly toxic materials and other - serious safety violations. The 19 other-than-serious violations relate to techni cal recordkeeping violations, deficiencies in safety measures relating to housekeeping, ladders, guardrails, audiometric test procedures, fire extinguishers, and the like. 3 DPMC-01842 LAM 008363 VI. Recommendations In addition to the proposed citations, OSHA is issuing approximately 200`recommendati6ns. Many of these are aimed at assisting the company to improve its safety.and health program as veil as its safety management system. Others_are addressed to hazards-where"no'standard exists and Section'5(a)(1) is not applicable under the guide lines of the FOM. The recommendations primarily address the following: 1. Enhancement of redundant-prbcess~controls,'such as adding relief"valves, revising vent systems and improving monitoring and alarm systems; 2. Improvement of work practices and procedures; such as revising calibration methods on gas/ vapor meters or monitors, improving equipment maintenance records; 3. Expanding the content and improving execution of the safety/health program, such~as making basic safety and health training mandatory for all managers, conducting weekly inspections tailored to each unit. 4 DPMC-01843 LAM 008364 ALLEjGED VIOLATION SUMMARY A total of 55 violations have been alleged, with a total proposed penalty of $ 1,377,700, in the following categories. 8 Willful Violations (130 Instances) 28 Serious Violations (72 Instances) : 19 Other-than serious Violations $ 1,300,000 72,000 5,700 Willful Violations The first willful violation is for failing to provide respira tory protective equipment to an employee who was required to determine the source of phosgene gas leaks by sense of smell. The remaining 129 -instances of willful alleged violations are for failing to follow OSHA regulations for recording occupational injuries and illnesses. There were 128 cases of injuries which were not recorded on the Log of Occupational Injuries and Ill nesses (OSHA Form 200) for calendar years 1983, 1984, and 1985: The non-recorded cases included sprains, strains, back injuries, hernias, lacerations, abrasions, contusions, eye-injuries, frac tures and chemical inhalations. Lost workdays were involved in 7 of these cases; restricted work activity in 66 cases; and medical treatment in 55 cases. The final willful alleged violation is for-failing to maintain a supplementary record of each injury and illness recorded-on the log in the detail specified by OSHA regulations. There-were -no supplementary records for-45-cases of-asbestosis-and-2 cases of me sothel ioma'which'had been "recorded on"the'"lbgs for 1983, "1984, and 1985. In addition, the supplementary form being used by the employer did not include details such as the name and address of the physician or hospital. DPMC-01844 LAM 008365 Serious Violations The 28 Serious alleged violations cover a range of safety and health hazards. OSHA standards and OSHA's general duty clause were both cited. The general duty clause has been cited pri marily for deficiencies in 4 different units in system design or work procedures which create hazards of toxic substance inhala tion and fire or explosion. The alleged violations of OSHA standards pertain primarily to respirators; guarding of plat forms, scaffolds, and runways; ladder design and use; and . electrical hazards. A. General Duty Clause Violations Empioyees~were potentially exposed to"inhalation^of phosgene, carbon monoxide and chlorine as a result of possible breach of containment of those substances. The following conditions cited under OSHA's general duty clause contributed to the hazard. * inadequate carbon"monoxide leak detection and warning methods; * ^inadequate -chlorine leak detection system; * deficiencies in valve design, selection,or/and use; * corrosion and deterioration of nuts and bolts on com ponents of a chlorine tank; * out of date maintenance list used to schedule periodic tests and inspections of critical safety items, such as safety valves. The above conditions, with the exception of the inadequate chlorine leak detection system, and the corrosion of nuts and bolts on a chlorine tank, also contributed to a fire/explosion hazard. .In the Acrolein Derivatives Unit, the general duty clause was cited for potential exposure to inhalation hazards from possible breach of containment of acrolein. The following cited condi tions contributed to the hazard. * connection of a steam line to a nitrogen line which was used to pressure acrolein from one vessel to- another (inadvertent introduction of steam to the acrolein could lead to a runaway reaction); * defective pilot alarm on the flare tower; * failure to plug an open-ended valve on an acrolein line to prevent valve failure or accidental valve opening; DPMC-01845 lam 008366 * failure to provide a remote-operated valve which could be used to prevent Acrolein release if the transfer line from the railroad tank rack to the acrolein storage tanks broke during transfer. The above .conditions.also contributed to a fire/explosion hazard. (The fire/explosion hazard due to the lack of a remote-operated valve was cited under an OSHA standard.) The general duty clause was also cited for potential exposure to inhalation hazards from possible breach of containment of propy lene oxide in the Rigid Polyols Onit. The following conditions contributed to the hazard. * metals used in the casing and nuts of transfer pumps used at two oxide storage tanks are susceptible to fracture and are incompatible with ethylene oxide; * failure to provide instrumentation, including alarms, in the control room for monitoring and warning of rapid pressure changes in two oxide storage tanks; * failure to provide a monitoring system to detect oxide leaks from reaction vessels, storage tanks and associa ted piping; * discharge of gases and vapors containing propylene oxide directly to atmosphere through normal vents and emergency relief devices on 2 oxide storage tanks, without first passing through a device to remove the propylene oxide. The above conditions, as well as the proximity of the unit con trol room to equipment containing material which is flammable and has exothermia reaction properties, also constitute fire/ explosion hazards. A violation of the general duty clause was also alleged in the Syn Gas Unit, KEA Structure, for an explosion hazard from poten tial blocking of a safety relief valve. The drain hole on the discharge piping for the valve was pointed upward, thus subject ing it to potential accumulation of liquid and ice. In the Compressor Building of the Syn Gas Unit, the general duty clause was cited for employee exposure to being struck by the load on an underslung hoist, which could result from inadvertent hoist movement. t B. Violation of OSHA Standards Numerous violations of OSHA standards pertaining to respirators are alleged. Deficiencies include the following: * no emergency respiratory protective equipment was pro vided for maintenance employees in the Acrolein Deriva tives, Larvin and Rigid Polyols Units; DPMC-01846 LAM 008367 Violations for the followed assorted conditions were also alleged: ' * inadequate guarding of a shear; " inadequate storage of one oxygen and one acetylene cylinder; . * lack of an eyewash on a work platform at the top of chlorine storage tanks; * failure to cover exposed live electrical parts in a junction box; * failure to provide corrosion protection on three acrolein storage tanks; * insufficient means of egress from 2 areas in the Larvin Unit; * life vests were not provided for employees working at a dock. Other-than-serious Violations The 19 other-than-serious alleged violations cover a variety of safety and health hazards and deficiencies in meeting regulatory requirements. They include, but'are not limited to: * failure to record 36 burn cases on the~Log of Occupa tional Injuries and Illness (OSHA Form 200); * deficiencies in the audiometric testing procedures; * design deficiencies in fixed ladder cages; * deficiencies in the emergency plan, scope of monitoring, and monitoring records for ethylene oxide; * inappropriate use of flexible electric cord; * lack of a barrier or other protective device to prevent employees from stepping into an open sodium hydroxide solution drain; * failure to test the PA alarm system every 2 months. DPMC-01847 LAM 008368 * airline respirators used by mechanics and pipefitters in the Phosgene Onit while breaking piping and repairing leaks were inadequate, in that they were not equipped with breathing air cylinders which could be used if the air supply failed; * operators in the Acrolein Derivatives Unit were not trained in the use of airline respirators with 5-minute escape tanks in emergencies; * written procedures for use of respirators in the Phosgene Unit did not cover all situations under which respira tors should be worn, such as while testing for chlorine and phosgene leaks; * training for workers in the Phosgene Unit on proper use of respirators was inadequate; * monthly inspection of self-contained breathing apparatus for emergency use in the Phosgene Syn Gas Acrolein Derivatives and Larvin Units did not include a determina tion that the regulator and warning devices functioned properly; * inspection of self-controlled breathing apparatuses for emergency use in the Syn Gas Unit did not include checks on all specified components; * inspection records of emergency respirators in the Syn Gas, Acrolein Derivatives and Larvin Units did not indi cate findings; * emergency respirators for protection against ethylene oxide in the Rigid Polyols Unit control room and at the ethylene oxide unloading rack were not the proper type. Inadequate guarding of platforms, scaffolds and ladders was found in various locations throughout the Acrolein Derivatives, Syn Gas, Rigid Polyols, and Phosgene Units. Alleged violations of OSHA standards pertaining to the design and use of fixed, step, and extension ladders are also cited throughout these units. Violations of an OSHA electrical standard alleged for use of electrical equipment, such as light switches, fans and motors, which were not intrinsically safe or approved for hazardous locations in various areas in the Phosgene, Acrolein Deriva tives, Larvin and Rigid Polyols Units. Alleged violations were also cited for power-operated industri al trucks which were used in locations where volatile flammable liquids were handled, processed or used and were not of the type approved for use in such locations. DPMC-01848 LAM 008369 Memorandum 1 \ San Francisco, CA March 28, 1986 OSHA PILOT NATIONAL EMPHASIS PROGRAM Previous correspondence has alerted you to the details of this program. OSHA's review of the Cincinnati Refinery was completed on March 25, 1986, and the refinery advises: Opening Conference -- February 21, 1986 A fhree-person OSHA team visited, advising their intent was to concentrate in three areas: H2S system, flare system, amine system. The inspectors indicated that there was some regional office control as to the selection of facilities to be inspected; however, it was also apparent that additional guidance was emanating directly from Washington, D.C. The inspectors also communicated that this inspection would differ from the routine on-site inspection program, but that their.charge was admittedly ambiguous.-- Inspection Process Refinery was visited eleven dimes "from 2/21 through 3/25. They discussed at length various aspects of our operations and safety program with members of safety, technical, operations and maintenance staffs, as well as with hourly employees and union representatives. They reviewed in detail the following items: flow diagrams, P&.1 drawings, safety procedures, training records, operating procedures, physical equipment including SCBAs, firefighting equipment and safety records. They also performed several full refinery walk-throughs accompanied by company personnel. Closing Conference -- March 25, 1986 The inspection team leader outlined the following areas for possible citation issuance: o Amine Absorbers. (1) Non-stress relieved vessels may show corrosion/cracking at weld points and should b? jwbject to magnetic particle testing; (2) ambiguity in inspection records. o Flare. (1) Maintenance of igniter and pilot system (e.g., broken sightglass, rusted valves) should be improved; (2) install back-up or redundant pilot system. o H?S System. Installation of an additional monitor at the 421 unit (HF Alkylation). o Blocked Valves. Lock (preferably) or seal block valves located under safety valves. DPMC-01849 LAM 008370 2- - o Fire Training. Based on local equipment, fire brigade training should be scheduled quarterly instead of annually. o Control Room Ventilation. Needs modification. o Hydrocarbon Sensing and Shutdown. Equipment needs improvement. o General Record Keeping. Minor Incongruities. o Protective Equipment. Minor isolated hygiene issues. o Flare Flame Management. Personal inspection as opposed to video review. The.inspectors noted that many of the above-items are not-violations of specific OSHA standards, but subjectively could be considered violations under the general duty clause. They indicated decisions regarding citations would be made at a higher OSHA level and would take at least two weeks to develop. - As additional information is made available, we will keep you advised. DPMC-01850 LAM 008371