Document Xg3n7DDrGxYekwNNgNm9YJgy

A Report by the National Academy o f Public Administration NOVEMBER 2 0 0 0 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00001 rTehfleecvtiethwesveixepwressosefdthienAthciasddeomcuymasenatnairnesttihtuotsieono.f the panel alone. They do not necessarily National Academy of Public Administration 1120 G St.,NW, Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 First published 2000 Printed in the United States of America TSthaendpaarpdesrfuosreIdnfinortmhiastipounblSiccaietinocnesm--ePetesrtmheanmeninciemoufmParepqeur ifroermPernintsteodfLAimbrearriycaMnaNteartiiaolsn,al ANSI Z39.48.1984. ISBN 1-57744-083-8 Environment.Gov: Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00002 Panel Jonathan B. Howes, Chair Alvin L. Aim Mary Gade Donald F. Kettl John J. Kirlin Jonathan Lash Janet Norwood William D. Ruckelshaus Beverly Stein Officers of the Academy David S. C. Chu, Chair Jane G. Pisano, Vice Chair Robert J. O'Neill, Jr., President Philip J. Rutledge, Secretary Feather O'Connor Houstoun, Treasurer Project Staff DeWitt John, Director Richard A. Minard, Jr., Associate Director Benita Carr, Administrative Assistant Kathy A. Chapman, Administrative Assistant Anne Ruffner Edwards, Editor Judith Greenwald, Senior Research Associate June Taylor, Conference Coordinator Sylvia Tognetti, Research Associate Diane Turchetta, Research Associate Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00003 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00004 Table of Contents FOREWORD 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11 Summary Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 CHAPTER 1: INNOVATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 17 The Case for Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Drivers of C hange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 The Leadership Challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Report Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 CHAPTER 2: TRANSFORMING REGULATION 31 Self-Certification: Expanding the Universe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 A Private Transformation: Firms Adopt EMSs andThird-Party Certification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 StarTrack: EPA'sEMS experim ent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Oregon and Wisconsin: Building a Performance Track. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 New Jersey's Facility-Wide Permitting P roject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 The Proliferation of " Caps' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00005 6 Environment.gov CHAPTER 3: USING THE MARKET 65 Cap-and-Trade System s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Reducing Water Pollution Through Allowance Trading. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Reducing Air Pollution Through Allowance Trading. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Open-Market Systems and O ffsets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Exploiting C om petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Greenhouse Gas Emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Delivering Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 CHAPTER 4: PROTECTING WATERSHEDS: A NEW CONFLUENCE 93 The Problem of Nonpoint Water Pollution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Two New Tools: Collaboration and TMDLs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Comparing TMDLs and SIPs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Civic Approaches to Watershed Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Civic Watershed Efforts Can Improve the Environm ent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Making Watershed Approaches W o rk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 TMDLs and Watershed Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 CHAPTER 5: FOCUSING THE EPA-STATE RELATIONSHIP ON ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS 135 Defining and Measuring Environmental Performance...................................................................... 136 Performance-Based Management in the States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Re-negotlating the EPA-State Partnership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Transforming an EPA Regional O ffic e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00006 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 7 CHAPTER 6: TRANSFORMING EPA 163 Reinventing Superfund....................................................................................................... 164 Enforcement.................................................................................................................. 167 Information and Evaluation: Tools for Performance Managem ent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 The Management Agenda at EPA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Findings....................................................................................................................... 180 Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 CHAPTER 7: TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 183 Summary Findings........................................................................................................... 184 For the 21st C entury. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Summary Recommendations................................................................................................ 190 APPENDIX A: THE RESEARCH PAPERS 195 APPENDIX B: A GUIDE TO EPA'S STATUTES 197 APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY 199 APPENDIX D: THE PANEL AND STAFF 201 Panel M em bers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Project S ta ff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 203 ENDNOTES 207 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00007 List of Tables and Figures TABLE 2-1: Number of Firms Known to the Massachusetts DEP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 TABLE 2-2: Arguments For and Against ERR Dry Cleaners Record-Retention Flexibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 FIGURE2-3: Summary of StarTrack Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 TABLE 2-3: States Developing a " Performance Track" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 FIGURE3-1: Summary of Selenium Discharges............................................................. 70 TABLE3-1: Summary of RECLAIM Trading, 1994-1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 TABLE3-2: VOCTrading Activity Under Open-Market and Offset Systems.................................75 TABLE 3-3: Hie Bureau of Reclamation's Salinity Control Projects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 TABLE 4-1: Primary Causes of Failure to Meet Water-Quality Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 TABLE4-2. TMDLs: A P rim er. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 TABLE 4-3: A Comparison of the SIPsand TMDL Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 TABLE 4-4: Common Features of Collaborative Watershed Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 TABLE4-5: Summary of Case Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 FIGURE 4-1: Bernie Fowler Sneaker Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 TABLE 4-6: Funding for EPA's Section 319 Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 TABLE 5-1: Number of States with Delegated Program A uthority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 TABLE 5-2: Percentage of Output and Outcome Measures of Environmental Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 TABLE 5-3: The Impacts of NEPPS on States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 FIGURE 5-1: States with NEPPS agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00008 Foreword ith this report, Environmenl.gov, the National Academy of Public Administration completes its 1993 charge from the Congress of the United States: to analyze trends and efforts in environmental protection, and to provide advice, strategies, Atiegse,nGdaeftotinrgCRoensgaurneltsdss:,iaEnNPsiAegwhatnDsdfirotehrcettiShotenaftfoeusr,tuEthrReisA. r,AeaspndodirdtRcethshoeallvfliienrngstgtthewesoPnaavrtoaiodluonmxaloe,sfrEeongfviooirunoranlmw,eosntratkat,leP,Serlootttcienacglti,Pobnr:uioAsrini ness, and community leaders to come together to address the remaining environmental chal lengesfacing the country Furthermore, itoffers specificapproachesthose individuals and groups canInun1d9e9rt3a,kCe,obnogtrhesismamskeeddiattheelyAacnaddienmtyhewfhiietuthree.r EPA was investing its own energies and encouraging the nation to invest its resources in addressing the most important environmental issues. The 1995 report examined riskmanagement, EPA'sorganization and management, and the agency's relationship with states, local governments and regulated entities. In 1995, Con geasnresvesissrsoiannsgmkeiednnntwoavlhaepttrihoveteerecEftifPooAnrtshhbaayddEiimPmApprlaoenvmdeedontathesdearstrheteosuAilmt.cpaIrdnoev1me9y9e'7ns,vrieCrcooonnmmgrmeensestnadalsapktrieoodtnefscotariontnhd.iswrheeptohretr, Together these three reports offer a picture of environmental protection that is unmatched in its scope, independence, and depth. Each offers specific recommendations, based on re search and on the judgment of the seasoned experts and public officials who have served on pgruoidjeecdt tphainsetlhsi.rLdirkeeptohretirwporrekdeedcedsilsiogresn,ttlhyeamndemlobnegr,scoarfetfhuellydifsrtainmgiunigshtehdeiAr cqaudeestmioynps,adneellitbheart ating their findings, and structuring their recommendations. The result of their efforts is a significant plan to ensure that our children's children can enjoy the natural heritage of this nreavtiiIoenwn.adodfitnieown, athgiesntchyiridnirteiaptoivretss;earvneds faosrathmeoidmelpfoorrtahnotwrotloe ctohnedAucctadaenmuynbciaansepdl,aeyxitnertnhael nation's governance. Sixteen research teams gathered information to inform the Academy's own research and the panel's deliberations. Anyeffort of thismagnitude isthe result of true collaboration. Our thanks and appreciation go out to the exceptional researchers, and to those of their peers who reviewed their results; to Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00009 10 Environment.gov the agency and program managerswho allowed examination of their initiatives; to those senior EPA officials who helped us ask the right questions, and draw meaningful conclusions; and to the num erous business leaders and federal, state, and local government officials who gave gen teermouOpseulyrreopdfrobthyfeeosisurirotinsmoaerlrpoarwniddaetthatehniedr depxeeparteshrotniosafel.ApT1lehAaeismurer,epaoatrtrtuthilsyesvtsircsooinopgneeararynfodernpavrloilrmtohniosmseeeoncftoatnlhtpirsirboruetetpicootnortsr..aAre1 served his coun try with distinction as Deputy Administrator of EPA and as Assistant Secretary of Energy. His passing leaves a void in the community of those committed to the future of America'snatural resources. We are grateful that A1w'as able to be such an integral part of this panIenl aredpdoitrito,na,swweewlliallsgtrheaattlhyemwisassDaecWoliltetaJgouhenaannddfRriiecnkdM. inard, the founders of the Center for the Economy and the Environment. They leave the Academy a stronger, better place for their presence. As they accept new' challenges, we wish them well. The Academy is also de lcaiamgnhottlneydgttoEoPtnhAoistaerntedhpaotthrSet uasestalolteennse.Koefintheer wauiltlhboertshoefCaenretseera'srncehxpt adpireerctoonr.tKheeicnhearncgoinntgribreultaetdiosnigshniipfis We commend this report and its strategies to the nation's environmental leaders--elected, appointed, career, and volunteer--and to all itscitizens as well. There ismuch for all of us to do. Robert 0 'Neill, Jr. NPraetsiidoennatl Academy of Pubhc Administration Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00010 Executive Summary he nation's current environmental protection system cannot deliver the healthy and sustaining world that Americans want. Absent significant change in America'senviron mental governance, the accumulation of greenhouse gaseswill continue to threaten the rouxnyogfefno-sdtfaefbpeilrleittityliinzogefrastlhagenadeg;loostmbhaeolrgcpwloimilllluactteaonnattnsindwuiaellllctotohndeteisngyursaetdetmeo stchhtehoakhteedarielvtpheernos,dflamoknielslii,to;antnshdeoefusntAucmaorneietrriscowallnietsdh. The regulatory programs in place in this country simply cannot address those problems at a price America can afford. A different kind of program can, however. That "program" is a transformation of the nation's environmental governance. From the EagnevnicroiensmtoenbutaslinPersosetesc,tiinodnivAidgueanlcsyan(dEPoArg)atnhirzoautgiohnsstwatieths aanndimcpoamcmt ounntihtieese,nfvroirmonmreegnutlanteoerdy to adopt new roles and accept new responsibilities. Furthermore, they will need to use 21st Century tools to address the problems of the 21st Century. Innovators throughout that system oovf egTroahvlliessryrnesaptneocmret,hhaaasvpeproraodlrvueecadtdoyrefdstiehsmteaoNnntastttoiroacntheaadlnAtghece.aedfefmecytivoefnPeussbolifcmAadnmyionfistthroastieonne'swCteonotles,r bfourt the the Economy and the Environment, examines those attempts to innovate, and recommends the best approaches for broader implementation. The report considers not only specific policy tools, but also the respective roles that public and private institutions, as well as individuals, mboutsht EplPaAy aTnhdeitrsepstoartet aclosounctaelrlpsafortrs.organizational change and management improvement at The Academy panel responsible for the report directs its recommendations to the next administrator of EPA, the next commissioners of the 50 states'environmental regulatory agen cailelsA, mtoeCriocnangsrecsosmanmditttheed stotatperolevgidisilnagtuarehs,etaolthenyveinrovnirmonemnteanl tacfotirvtishtesiarncdhibldurseinness'schleiladdreerns., to Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00011 12 Environment.gov Summary Recommendations The next EPA administrator should: 1. Tackle the big environmental problems a. tuShneeldenecratttatiwoknionoganrwdthilCrleroeenqogurfiertsehsetihnmedoaesdvtmedliiofnfpiiiscnturglattsroterrmattoeagianiedinsogtpoteainndvndiorrovensastmitvheenetmtoaol. lcBshytaolnleeacndegdsersesitsyas;ntsdhuoecsnhegaange problems. The panel suggests three environmental issues as worthy of a national commitment of energy, resources, and innovation: reducing nutrients in watersheds reducing smog preparing to reverse the accumulation of greenhouse gases b. Define the challenges in terms of measurable environmental improvements. c. Commit the agency to deploy the most cost-effective tools to achieve those results. d. Build the nation's familiarity with the market-based tools that will eventually reduce greenhouse gas emissions. e. Encourage states to experiment with bold forms of regulatory' and non-regulatory management, such as facility-wide permits, performance-based management contracts, cap-and-trade systems, pollution taxes or fees, information requirements, collaborative caopmprpolaiacnhcees-taosssiestttainncgegtooaollssaonfdvdaerisoigunsiknigndsstr.ategies for protecting watersheds, and f WinnoorkvawtiiothnsCwoonrgkr.eTsshteo asdemcuirneisthtreataourthshooriutlydasnedekaepxpprloicpirtiactoinognrsensseicoensasal rayutthoomriazkaetiothnotsoe use cap-and-trade systems to reduce nutrients in watersheds and the components of smog in air. That authorization should enable EPA to issue group permits in airsheds and watersheds where states or EPA regions are capping pollution allowances, and using trading systems rather than traditional permits. 2. Invest in information and assessment a. The administrator should work with Congress to create an independent, w'ell-funded bureau of environmental information. In the meantime, the administrator should strengthen the existing Office of Environmental Information by leading efforts to ionbtjeegcrtiavtee danadtaroatfiohnigahlizqeuathliety.daIntaasdydsitteimons,otfhethaedmmeindiisatrpartoogrrsahmosu,ldansdtrotongdleyvseulopppoortthtehre office's efforts to work with the states to create a cooperative federal-state data system based on uniform definitions and comparable scientific methods. b. cTohmepardemheinnsisivtreatsoyrstsehmoutoldminovneisttomr tohneeyq'uaanlidtypoolfittihcealncaatpioitna'lsisnurbfuaiclediwngatearsc.reTdhibaltecaonudld Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00012 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 13 be done by insisting that all the states have delegated authority to implement federal water-quality standards, and that they bring their monitoring networks and report protocols up to high, consistent standards that would provide sufficiently detailed waterquality data to make sound management decisions. c. The administrator should use environmental data in decisionmaking at the national level, and when negotiating with states on National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS) agreements. The administrator should hold political and career managers accountable for achieving measurable environmental improvements. d. The administrator should build the agency's capacity to improve federal and state programs by investing in an external, peer-reviewed evaluation network. 3. Hold states accountable for results a. The administrator should redefine EPA's expectations of states in terms of environmen tal results, rather than only of process. b. The administrator and the state commissioners should revitalize NEPPS, requiring that states and regional offices base priorities and work plans on serious self-assessments informed by pubhe participation. EPA should provide to those states with effective environmental programs substantial discretion in how they manage and deploy those programs. Regional offices should audit the effectiveness of such state programs, rather than review individual permits or activities. c. The administrator should also complete the transfer of routine regulatory functions from regional offices to the states. 4. fUosceusalolnthaecthoioevlsinagvacriliatibclaelteoncvhiraonngme menatnalaggoemalsent cultures and practices to a. Revamp EPA's planning and budgeting systems to move the agency towards strategic, performance-based management consistent with the intent of the Government Perfor mance and Results Act (GPRA), eliminating those practices that reinforce fragmented programs and relationships. b. oDfevtheeloapgaenndcyimstpalretimngenwtiathstrreaotreggaynfiozrataidodnreosfstihnge rthegeioonuatdlaotfefdiceosr.gIafnnizeacteisosnaaryl,sEtrPuActure oshfotuhledasgeeenkcsytaitnuttoorsyepcahraantegemsetodiaalloofwficreeso. rIgnatnhizeamtioeanntthimatew, tohueldademndintihsetrfartaogrmsheonutaldtion delegate more decisionmaking authority and management flexibility to those offices, while holding regional administrators responsible for achieving environmental progress. tTohfeacaidlimtaitneirsetrgaiotonraslhaocuclodugnitvaebirleitgyioannadl faldexmibiniliitsyt.rators budget-implementation authority c. Delegate decisionmaking authority clearly and demand expeditious, thoughtful deci sions. Ensure that disagreements among program offices or among regions and head "qcuoanrtseernssuarse" iwdietnhtiafniedexpprloicmitpbtilaysafnodr arecstioolnv.edM. aRkeeplcaecretatihne, haogwenecvyer's, cthasautaalcdtieomnsanardefor coupled with evaluation and accountability Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00013 14 Environment.gov d. Build EPA's management skills now to avoid a crisis as senior employees retire. The next cadre of managers will need new skills: expertise in place-based, cross-media manage ment; economics and business; information technologies and communication; biotech nology; and international trade. Congress should: 5. Authorize EPA and the states to use the tools they need to tackle the big problems a. ApoultlhuotiroizneinEPaAir aanndd twhaetesrt,ateexsptloiciimtlyplliebmereanttinagllosuwcahnscyes-tteramdsinfrgomsysttheemscotonsrterdaiunctes of traditional facility-based permitting, provided that trades would not result in unaccept able risks in local areas. b. Empower EPA to let states tty new approaches to address water quality and related problems in watersheds, including alternatives to total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) where those alternatives appear likely to improve the environment more effectively or efficiently than TMDLs could. c. Authorize and encourage state experiments with performance-track systems that replace traditional permits with whole-facility agreements or "beyond-compliance" strategies. d. Work with the administrator to create a statutory basis for continued experimentation and innovation in the nation's environmental system. Support innovation through the appropriations process. 6. Invest in information a. Aprpopgrroapmriaatsesessusfmfiecnietsn.t funds for major improvements in environmental data and in b. Authorize establishment of an independent bureau of environmental information and assessment. c. Direct EPA to redesign its implementation of GPRA to provide more information about the nation's overall progress toward meeting critical environmental goals. 7. Put aside partisanship because America wants Congress to solve serious problems a. Members should use the environment to demonstrate that political parties can come together to set aggressive public-policy goals and provide the means to achieve them. b. Share with EPA a willingness to try new7approaches that hold promise of better perfor mance, and must refrain from unfair criticism of EPA if some innovations fail. c. Banedcotmheesatnateencvoimromnmisseinotnaelrlseaindeerx.pMlaeinminbgertsooAfmCeornicgarnessswshhyoualcdtijooninotnhethaedbmigineisntvriartoonr mental problems is necessary and why innovation is essential in making progress. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00014 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 15 Members should help business leaders, environmental advocates, and governors find common ground on approaches that will achieve the nation's environmental goals at the lowest possible social cost. M e regulators and legislatures should: 8. Challenge EPA, Congress, and one another to transform environmental governance a. Continue to develop and deploy approaches to environmental protection that can deliver measurable results more effectively or efficiently, and be models for implementa tpiroongraacmross.s the nation. States should build evaluation into the design of innovative b. aCnodmimncirtetaoseenthveiropnomliteicnatlalprimespsuroreveomneonnt,eraenjeoctthaerrotollbdaeclikveorfeennvviirroonnmmeennttaallrsetsaunldtsaradss, well as efficient programs. Accept the challenge of reporting on a meaningful set of core performance measures, and being judged in relation to comparable states. c. Commit to build adequate environmental monitoring systems. d. Make the next iteration of NEPPS work by investing in better self-assessments, expanding ptiuesblwicitphatrhtiecirpeagtiioonnalinofsfeictteisn,gpparritoicruitliaersl,yaonnd pvriogobrleomusslyonfeignotetriasttainteg srioglneisfiacnadncree.sponsibili e. lEaqnudi-pusceodmemciusinointisetshaantdprroegteioctnsorweinthhianntcheeesntavtiersonwmithentthael vtoaolulsesa.nd incentives to make Business leaders, NGOs, and foundations should: 9. Embrace more effective and efficient policies for environmental protection a. Reject calls for a rollback in environmental protection at the state or federal level. b. Work with EPA and states on trading networks; building credible environmental man raeggeimstreanttiosny.stems (EMSs) and International Organization for Standards (ISO) 14001 10. Help build a national system for gathering, disseminating, and using environmental information. a. Provide better information about firms'environmental performance to the public: both local communities and regulatory agencies. b. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and foundations should support efforts to use environmental data and to evaluate environmental programs. c. The leaders in the information-technology revolution should lend their support and resources to help EPA and the nation build a dynamic information system. Their Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00015 16 Environment.gov technical, financial, and political support could accelerate the transformation of EPAby a decade. namewoTnmhgeettnhheeoxdststEaftPoesrA.maInaddlmoivninigdiseutnarlvasti,orocrnowmmilpelnahntaaivelesp,rmocguorcmehsmsg.uoTnoihdtieewyso,arNrkeGtroeOabsdu,yila--dndoenvsetwnatieethsaighneartv--heebfaoegreetnhncoteyusgtaihnntdg ful, committed, consistent leadership to help them make even more progress. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00016 CHAPTER 1 Innovate for the Environment hose who take elected office in January 2001 have within their reach the tools to implement a new environmental agenda: one that will address serious problems now beyond the efforts of traditional regulatory programs; and one that willreduce the costs enoUrmsionougfsiltnyhneiomnvapattoiivrotena'ntsotcoeolnsn,vtiainrnoudninmigmeeanngtavinliargotoinvamelselwenatidathleirpnsrhothigper,edtshse.ecaUden:ited States could achieve three forveeeriwngheAlmmethriecma'strhirvoeursg,hlarkuenso, fafnfdroemstufaarrimesffireoldms,tchietyosxtyregeetns,-daenpdlestuinbgurnbuatnrielanwtsntshat enabling America's cities to breathe easier and its mountains to stay greener by finally bringing under control many of the dispersed sources of ground-level ozone and smog preparing America, and perhaps other nations of the world, to make choices about how bgereset ntohoinucsreegaaseseesnergy efficiency and reduce production of carbon dioxide and other The nation can accomplish those aims if it commits to transforming its approach to pollu tion control and environmental management. This report tells how Key elements of such a new approach are already being used: a shift away from end-of-thepipe technology requirements and toward whole-facility environmental management and per mreiqtutiinrge;mceanpts-afnodr -ftarcaidlietiessy,swtehmolsetwo adtreirvseheddosw, anndpoelvluentiosnta-tperse.vTehnetiiornhaclolmstsa;rkanisdthpeercfroeramtioanncoef incentives for technological innovation, for civic involvement and collaboration, and for placespecific solutions. As a result, the approaches tend to achieve environmental results at lower costBsutthbaenfotrraedtihtieoUnanlitreedguSlatatitoesn.can complete the transformation of its environmental protec tion system, it will need better information about the environment, as well as more robust evaluation of environmental management efforts. The challenge is not merely technological: advanced monitoring systems and information technologies already maintain public account ability in many innovative approaches. It is, rather, organizational: EPAwill have to change, as Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00017 Environment.gov will state environmental agencies, businesses, and the many other organizations that comprise the nation's system of environmental governance. Revolutionary information technology is already transforming the links among and between those organizations and the citizenry-and tphruivTsaihtneespdUiernceiidsteitodhneSmttiaatltkeeesormsfttuhhsaitstcrdoeepntoteirrntmu. eEinnteovsimtrtnharnenseqfnout.ragmolivtyiitssoaefimntvheiedronanatmttihoeenne'tsaneltnimrveairnnoeantgwmeomernektn.otfspyustbehmc, and not because innovation isgoodperse,but because the present system will notsolve the most pressing of the nation'soutstanding environmental problems. Neither will it fulfillthe ultimate national agenda of providingfuture generationscontinuing economicprosperity; coupled with the quality boefnlieffeittshtaot foluowr cshfrilodmrecnl'esacnhialdirreanndwwillarteeqr uainrde thheaatlthalyl,psaursttsaoinfasbolecieectyossyhsateremtsh.eArsessuproinngsitbhiolistey for innovating for more effective and efficient environmental protection. Increasing the efficiency of the nation's approach to environmental protection is essential liaennnddgivesi:hdroueuadlludocbrineccgool"lmeccoetmipvpealreitanonvfcireEoPcnoAms'tsesnc,"otatrlhereemsaipmsosionosuninb. tiTlfiihtriiemss;sreaopnrodcrortemfdomuccuuisnnegistipoenusbmtwhucosatpnpadartypsrtoiovfamttheeae"tttrctahhneasilr action costs," the time, money; and labor consumed in negotiating an agreement. Reducing those costs will make it economically and politically easier for the nation to improve the envi ronment, both in the short term nationally and in the long run globally. Neither the United eSmtaitsessionnorofogthreerennhaotiuosnesgoafsetsh,efowroerxldamaprelel,ikuenltyiltoevmeraykoenemiuscchonpvriongcreedssthtoawt tahredyraerdeudcioninggthseo at the lowest possible price. One of the virtues of America's environmental management system has been the consis taaecnntdecdythtaehnrdseyessttdeaembcialitdthyeesydaesgruiovp.epBdoufrtrtoitamsresttrnheoentgskethreieehpsaisonfbgesucwpoemewpeii,tnhigncemhnaavnnigyroincngamsteeesnc,htiatnslowsloteagatyuk,tneecsshstah.neTghnineagtsiotpanutubethencs attitudes, or changing globalrelationships. Even the most ambitious and successfulefforts in the United States to use innovative techniques to manage environmental problems seem cautious and inadequate when compared with the problems the system must confront over the next two tdheecardeseps.onTshibeilniteyx7--t EtoPAimapdlmemineinsttrmatoorreasnidgntihfeicnanetxrteCfoornmgsr.ess will have an opportunity'--and The Case for Change pervTaosdivaey'tsyepnevsiroofnpmroebnlteamlrsegthualattaorreyosyusttleinmedcabnelfoawil:the nation because it cannot addressthree Policyproblems: Traditional regulatory approaches can keep most forms of industrial pollu tion in check, but they cannot reach many of the remaining sources of pollution and environ mental degradation: the large and small users of fertilizers, the hundreds of millions of con sumers of electricity and fossil fuels in the United States and the billions of consumers around tthraedwitioornlda,larengdutlhateordyi7raepctpprohaycshiceaslstuhcrceeaetsdtion erecdousycsitnegmpsoallnudtioenn,dtahnegy7eoreftdenspfaecilietos.aEcvheienvewthheerier gainsat the lowest possible cost to society; and they7provide too few incentives for entrepreneurs to develop more efficient technologies. The United States has relied heavily7on one policy tool fTohractotnotorol lclainngnoptoellfufeticotinv:eltyh7ereednufcoercpeoalblulet--ionanfrdomvigmoirloliuosnlys oefnfsomracleld, --disfpeedresreadl soorusrtcaetse, poerremveitn. from thousands of large business-like farms. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00018 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 19 Managementproblems: Congress and the executive branch have organized EPA, as well as other executive agencies, in waysthat result in narrow--and sometimes ineffective--attacks on environm ental and economic problem s. EPA'sdivision into offices and programs focusing exclu psairgvoeebmlyleeomnntsa.siEtrrPupcAotluliusretnioothnt,aowtrgdaaetenarilzspepodollwourteilloylntwo, iaftnhodsctheoramzoparlrredexos,upmosnwudlatistltoaeysin,efrcoerderaeesxinanvmgilrpyolnec,mohmeanpstlpaerlxoaadnrudrcaenedcgoeanmmoemannitcs among public and private institutions, or the changing capacities of states. That EPA cannot currently collaborate effectively with the Departments of Transportation, Energy; Agriculture, Interior, and State hobblesthe nation'sabilityto manage the environmental aspects of large-scale iasdsdueressssutchhosaespgrloobblaelmtrsabdyei,tsperlofdAuscctioonnstaitgurtiecdu,lttuhreea,goerncclyimcaantenocthpaonsgsei.blEyPbAe tchaenpnrootteacdteoqruoafttehley nation's environment, despite the expansive responsibility implied by its name. Politicalproblems: The political status quo is deadlock. The divisions between the two major ptAhomelietsirtciaactleapsn,asrhataigevrsee,ebiemotnwpteehdeeendbCabsoirncoggardoeasilssnanonofdvetanhtvieoiprnorenasmniddeennetnta,vlapinrrodontbemectetwinoetnae,lnhptohrwoegefrveeedsres,.reaBalcgehocavouefsrtenhmososeenmtinaasnntdiy tutions has an opportunity' to be rewarded for ending the political stalemate, for joining a political consensusfor change. The alternative, muddling through for severalmore years, would probably not be catastrophic, though it would certainly waste economic and human resources, faanidlinsgertioouacsltyweoruolddewtheaekneantitohne'ns actaipoanc'istyp'ottoenptrioaltelecat ditesrsehnivpirroonlemiennatdidnrethsseinfugtgulroeb. aMl eonrevoirvoenr, mental crises. This report, prepared by a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration, lays poruitvaatsetrsaetcetgoyr. fTorherepfoarnmelactotnhcelufdedesertahla, tstEaPteA, aannddlCocoanlglerevseslssohfouglodv:ernment, as well as in the focus aggressively on reducing nutrients in surface waters, using cap-and-trade systems, targeted public spending, and collaborative watershed processes to achieve state, local, and national goals focus aggressively on reducing ground-level ozone and smog, using a combination of market-based tools to reduce emissions of several of its chemical precursors: nitrogen ocoximdepsou(NndOsx)(,VpOarCtisc)ulates, and, where adequate safeguards are in place, volatile organic ecnoambpleansiteastetsotoacehxiepveerihmigenhterwlietvheblsooldf nenewvirroengmuleantotaryl paeprpforormacahnecsedaensidgntoeddetoveelnocpourage innovative control technologies and techniques teaosptraeebrdlfiuoscrhmeapacnorlceleud-timibolaenn,, aaagusetwhmoeelrlintatastsiyhvsaetremsmoutgroceeaecroeofdsyetsontwvemiarorsdnmtheenmtaol sitn-feoffremcatitvioenustheaotfwteilclhsnuipqpuoerst strengthen the management of EPA, focusing on speeding up decisionmaking and developing more effective structures at headquarters and the regions for managing problems in specific places reframe EPA's critical relationships with states, other federal agencies, and nongovern mental institutions, to enhance their collective capacity to address complex environ mental problems Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00019 20 Environment.gov The panel bases that strategy on its collective experience, on research completed by the Academy stafE, on 17 retrospective evaluations of innovations in environmental management completed by a diverse group of academic researchers, practitioners, and consultants, and on faopcruToshsnpeoeectvtoiavnleulyaltooioonknstahptertohavepipdelenicvaanirtioeoxnntmroaeofnrntdaeilwnparproyoblrlieecsmyostuoraocnlesd:daoenptdapiotlhertdeukcnnhitoaiwensgleitnhdggatermefrloaatmyioltnihesehafihipeesladda..mTohnegy companies, individuals, and government agencies, but also on the challenge of innovating Parts of the environmental management system in the United States are dynamic--the growing availabilityto consumersof "green electricity,"forexample--butmuch of itisossified. The research fdoermmoanlrsutrlaetmesatkhinatgg, oarveearnmmoenngttphreomgroasmt cs,hbanecgaeu-rseestihsteayntaprearbtassoefdtihnetshyestleemgi.slTathiveerepsreoacrecshs aalnsdo documents the extraordinary efforts of numerous elected, appointed, and career officials to reshape those programs, to enhance their effectiveness, and to improve the environment. bounslWyinaehshasa,tntahdnefdurlethoseefaibrncriohtiaaddtoieveressen,noavltlirsoohfnotmwheeimsnttahclehcofousmlelnmexbuteencniattuyoseBf ctyhhneayencgaeepsspuitenyad,reethrdewtoAaybceaindceEomnPsyAtr,fuotchctueivsseetdaatenosdn, successful. EPA managers are proud of many initiatives not covered in these pages: efforts to reduce diesel emissions, to implement performance measures for enforcement programs, to promote voluntary energy conservation, to expand public access to information about the hevaezrayrdinsiptioastievde,boyrhtioghp-rpordoudcuectaiosnc-ovroelcuamrde fcohremthiecaelfsf.ecTtihveenpeasnseolrdcidomnomt istemt eonutt otof dpoacrtuicmuelanrt institutions. Neither did it choose to evaluate reform efforts intended to weaken environmental protections. Rather, the panel sought to understand the potential of new approaches to envi ronmental problem solving, as well as to identify barriers that frustrate progress. Tomorrow's Problems and Opportunities The environmental management system of the future can and should be more dynamic, effective, and efficient than today 's. But what should it look like? What problem swill it need to solve? Who or what will be its prime movers, its rulemakers? What role will government insti teurtniaonncsep,l"aya?ftePrriavlal,teiscnoomt psoalneileyst?hNe odnogmoavienrnomf feonrtmalaolrggoavneirznamtioennst?alInindsitvitiudtuioanl sc--itizleengsis?la"tGuroevs, courts, and agencies--but arises from the actions of the rest of civil society Which forms of governance will be most effective at managing the environmental problems of the next 20 yEePaArs,?CMonogsrteisms,paonrtdanthtley,sgtaivteesndtohenorawn?ge of possible answers to those questions, what should The panel answers most of those questions in this report, though it approaches the question of the fiiture's most pressing environmental problems with considerable humility. Forecasting environmental trends is beyond the scope of this project--and is notoriously difficult. Never theless, making thoughtful decisions today requires critical thinking about the future. In this esexctetinodne,dthdeispcaunsseilopnreosfecnhtsanagfeeswinasinsustmitputtiioonnsalarbooleust tehnavtihroanvme eoncctaulrrtreedndosv,eranthdethlaesnt daemcaodree. Within that context, the panel then offersthree "scenarios," short, provocative narratives about the future intended not to predict events but to stimulate critical thinking about near-term de ceinsvioinros.nmTheents,ctehneaericoosnsohmayre, asonmd esobcaiestiyc,absusut mthpetyiodnivsearbgoeuitnthseevceirracluwmasytsanthcaets itlhluasttwraitlel sthhaaptevtehrey different systems of governance--each with its own strengths and weaknesses--are possible. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00020 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 21 Drivers of Change The panel assumes that the following eight trends or drivers will continue for at least a decade and are likely to alter fundamentally the environment, what people know about the environment, and the institutional capacity to manage the environment: increased demand for energy services, particularly as China and India become wealthier nations, which will probably increase the emissions of greenhouse gases increased wealth and demand for resources in the United States and abroad, including a growing demand for access to relatively unspoiled natural areas for recreation and housing increased pressures on ecosystems, particularly from land-use changes caused by development, and from the spread of non-native plant and animal species increased costs for maintaining and replacing the nation's aging infrastructure for delivering drinking water and treating wastewater increased access to information through ever faster, smaller, and cheaper computers, environmental monitors, cameras, and web devices increased global trade, communication, and harmonization of environmental standards and norms increased understanding of the human genome, how organisms--probably including ginednievtiidcumalahkueumpanosf--plraenstps,oanndimtoaelsn,vainrodnmmiecnrotaolrhgaaznaisrmdss, and the capacity to modify the increased improvements in technology; such as fuel cells, theoretically enabling the replacement of carbon-based fuels with hydrogen-based fuels Jfie Current Context Absent from the list of drivers above are "toxic dumping" and most forms of industrial ptphooelllluCuttlieeoransntboAecrieraduAuscecte,EttPhhAee'isCrrealegiraunalanWtdoarwyteaprtreAorgcetrm,amaisnssdihooantvsheaeknrdesptmat ttauhntoeassge,epthrthoeebailgreemhnascziyanrhcdahoseucfsokrw.cAaesduttelhsao.r1grieSz-tesrdcoanblyge national programs have required firms to use particular pollution-control technologies, and required states to achieve specific levels of air quality Those programs have matured: most are nEoPwA'sim10plreemgieonnteadl obfyficsetas.teSetantveisrotynpmiceanltlayliassgueencpieersmaicttsintog wfiritmhsvoarrypiunbgldicelgyroeewsnoefdowvearssteigwhattbeyr treatment facilities; states--and occasionally EPA--enforce those permits in an effort to main tain a culture of compliance. Chapter 2 of this report examines the strengths and weaknesses of that permit-based com pliance system, focusing on innovations designed to reach activities that permitting cannot tmouerceh,coormtpolieannccoeurwagiteh pruebgluiclaatonrdypsrtiavnadtearadcst.orEsPtAo pisropduuscheinegnvsiormonemoefnttahlobseenienfnitosvbaetyioonnsd, but most are coming from state agencies and from regulated businesses themselves as they struggle to find more effective and less costly ways to meet their state's environmental Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00021 22 Environment.gov and economic goals. Most businesses are not seeking a "rollback" of pollution-control requirements, but do want to avoid being required to install yet another level of control tech nology, particularly if they can point to greater environmental gains they might achieve more fcahsetTearphcleyhraeontihgseearswninoistpehr.eordpurcetsiosunrperoocnesthsees.rePgeurmlaittotirnygresygsimteme sassiwmepllly: caadnenmotarnedspforonmd qtuhieckmlyarekneotufgohr to the needs of manufacturers of computer equipment, pharm aceuticals, and specialty chemi cals, for example. The thne-delay in securing permits isjust one aspect of the transaction costs associated with variouspermitting systems. Other costs include labor and legal fees incurred by ma beunstianlemssaannadgietmsreengtuliasttoorydaegveenlocpy wTahyusstooneloowfetrhethcohsaellceonsgtse.s Aofnaonthyenreiws ksyesetpeimngofdoenwvnirtohne notoriously high transaction costs of trying something new The time to accept those challenges is now: the entire environmental regulatory system rwaepimtpheotatrerasdmpaoobinlseie-tdoalrltioonwgeaxtnepccloheintsoynlseotewgmietsescaahnrndeofelaoncgailbiietlsyin-algenvdthelereerlmaetpieslsdaicopenomshcecanyptsto.ooAflsst.rmaAdodintviioatonnrcaielnspgieinrmmopnirt-osvsiyetesst,eatmnhdes need for inspection and enforcement operations declines. The Internet is enabling more infor mative versions of EPAs Toxics Release Inventory, for example.2 (Chapter 3 of this report examines several efforts to innovate using trading and better monitoring data.) O f course, EPA has been more than a regulator or a source of compliance data. It has psyrostveimdes,ddfurinndksinfgor-wlaartgeercsaypsitteamlsp,roajnedc,tst:htrhoeucgohntshtreucStuiopnerofuf nsedwpargoegaranmd ,wtahsetecwleaatenrutpreoatfmcoennt taminated sites. But analysts predict that municipalities will need to raise billions more dollars in the next decade to repair, replace, or expand their water treatment systems. States and vcoirmonmmuennittiaelspmroajyecatsls, orasnegeikncgafsrhomfrotmhe ErePsAtoorartiootnheorf fleadrgereaelcsoosuyrscteesmfso(rsoutchhearspthlaeceE-vbearsgeldadeens) to paving farmers to install better manure-management systems to reduce phosphorus and nitrogen loadings in rivers, lakes, and estuaries. Ecosystem restoration,production agriculture, internationaltrade--thoseproblemshavenever bleeveenl ipsainrtcroefasthinegElyPrAeqreugiruinlagtothrye scpohoerrdei,nyaettedenmviarnoangmeemnetanltporfotpeocltliuotnioant, tnhaetuloraclalreasnodurrceegiuosneas,l economic development, and land-use decisions. Chapter 4 of this report focuses on watershed management and considers how EPA fits into that multiparty network of problem solvers. Among the most potentially significant changes EPA has implemented over the last decade hoargvaenbiezeantioinnailtssrterulacttiuorneshoifptshwe iathgesntcayte,sd, ethscroriubgehd NinECPhPaSp,tderes6c.riIbned19i9n4CAhdamptienris5t,raatnodr iCnatrhoel Browner consolidated all of the agency's enforcement staff under the new' Office of Enforce ment and Compliance Assurance (OECA). In 1995 and 1996 she moved the planning function fOroffmicetrh,eanOdffliectethoef vPeosltiicgyi,alPelavnanluinagti,onanfdunEcvtiaolnuadtiisoanppinetaor.tIhne 1O9f9f9ic,eshoef ctrheeatCedhitehfeFOinffaincecioalf Environmental Information, nominally on a par with OECA, and consolidated a number of the remaining pieces into the Office of Pohcy, Economics, and Innovation. Meanwhile, EPAs New7England regional office reorganized along functional lines that went further than head quarters: it organized the permitting functions of the major media programs (air, water, solid wofasRtee)giinona 1s.inGgilveeonfftihcae,t aanbdoubte4g0anpetorcreendteofifnEePitAssro1l8e,3v7is5-e-vmisphloeyaedeqsuwarotrekrsinanredgtihoenaslixofsftiacteess, such changes may have a large impact on EPA as a whole.3 They may already presage a step Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00022 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 23 toward the nation's adoption of an environmental protection system based more on achieving specific environmental goals than on meeting activity-based targets. It is safe to say that most Americans do not care how EPA is organized, whether a local ftchaocentysoidrsyotehncaat,srreoenahebaboplueetrdmthaiettaeo. nArv3si0Aro,mnomrewreinchata:ntassbhtaoatvuuettordereydmubcoaisnnissgtroharetesatdlathtoivsttehircraethlaemtsloafrsdotemtlharpgeoeelndlcueitceioasdnue,ssea,bthooouwgtaeptvhreeorr, tecting endangered species and wild places, about leaving future generations of Americans a natural environment that isasrich, beautiful, and sustainable aspossible. Many Americans also care about environmental governance: it makes a difference to farmers if new rules are coming fhraovme aEcPhAanocretthoereDveiepwartthmeeirnctoorfpoArgartiecudlattuareb,efitomreaikt iesspaosdtiefdfeorenntcheetwoebbu,sainndesistpmeoakpeles iafgtrheeayt deal of difference to many Americanswhether the nation'senvironmental laws apply to people, regions, and companies fairly asebcotTvoehr eaannthddrtaeheheonscscteonomafreibonisnvetihrtoahntemmfoellinontwadlisgftfraeorrutepwnstitwhhaavtyhese.eFbxorporloaeidxteardmantphgleee,poinoftteghnoetvifeairrlsnotafsntccheeeniawsrsieuobe, stinhdeedspicsrsriievbmaetide nating environmental information, while EPA has missed out. In the second and third sce narios, EPA has established itself as the most credible provider of web-based information. In the second scenario, EPA drives a host of national environmental programs, while in the third, ttohestaagteenacnydfoloccuasel sgpovriemrnamrileyntosn. Iinnfoalrlmtharteioens,cleenavariniogs,mAomsteorfictahnesressutpopfotrhteenrevgiruolantmoreyntparlopceross tection, though they choose very different institutions and tools to achieve it, and the results vary somewhat based on those choices and the other details in the scenarios. The scenarios do ntfiroce,tshafontldhloionwnkteihn"egj.udsIimct traaigtgehisnt.oe":fR"aGtohledri,ltohcekspaEnffeelcht:o"ptehsatthisa,torneaedisenrsowt tiollouosepttihmemistiacs, aonneintsopoirpaetsiosinmfiosr Scenario 1 : The Green Web Frustrated by almost a decade of gridlock in Congress and inertia in federal and state en vceirnotnumryeanntadlwageenntcsiheos,pepninvgiroinnsmteeandt.aNlisotnsgaollvbeurnt msteonptpaeldorlogbabnyizinatgioCnosnjogirneesds afot rtcheestwuritnh oafntehwe generation of manufacturers, utilities, and Internet companies to establish dynamic markets for environmentally friendly products and services, ranging from organic foods to clean cars ianndlaregleecntruicmitbyegrsencehroasteedtof"robmuyrgerneeewna,"bleevesonuwrcheesn. NcoosrttshwAermeesroicmaenwahnadt hEiugrhoepr,eaanndcomnasnuumfaecrs turers responded. Americans deliberately invested their pensions in sociallyresponsible stocks, and boards of directors responded. By 2002, most automakers could assure consumers that firms registered to the ISO 14001 standard for environmental management systems produced their cars. By 2012, consumers could set their e-shopping programs to purchase only com pletAelcytirveicstyscwlaibthledpigroitdaulcvtisd.eocameras and inexpensive remote sensors played a critical role in establishing and policing the system. They called global attention, via the Internet, to environ mental "predators." Originally; the term was reserved for companies using wood cut from oldgbreoawptphlifeodretostsr,aonrchroeurstiwneitlhy tlaoxppgirnagzitnhgepwraecbtilcisetsinagnsdohfototexliscweimthitatebrosv, eb-uatvietreavgeenwtuaatlelyr'ucsaem. Tehtoe green web could provide so much information to consumers committed to using that informa Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00023 24 Environment.gov tion, that it corrected one of the classic market failures: the propensity of firms and individuals to externalize their environmental costs. Most federal and state environmental regulatory program s atrophied. They stopped trying trooliennasovaarteeg,uthlaetiorrymboastckcrsetoatpiv:iesstuailnegntpwerefnutnceltsoerwy'hpeerrem, aitnsdatnhdeyenhfuonrckienrgedacdtioownns aingtaoinastroaurteilnae tively small number of firms and facilities that were either indifferent to the web'spressure, or were operating in areas where consumers and investors simply didn't care. EPAmissed itschance to become one of the premiere "content providers" on the green web, ceding that role to several large NGO s and for-profit companies. Thus consistency and objec twivoirtlyd-haanvde hnaovtebreaepnidaimmopnagcttshoengtrheeenfowrtuebn'esssotrfeningdthivs.idBuaaldcdoamtapacnainesboerfwlahsohleedseacrotourns.dTthhee green web tends to feed consumer fears and accelerate consumer fads. As a result, international markets punish genetically modified foods one day; a particular brand of cotton the next, and gasptoteoreidbdsuwpteristohdthwuachteicmdhaiindt ecNatanhteisopgnrreeXaedntihwnefeobnremsxoat,ptiaoonwndetortfhhueolnuasrfeeohvreocrelsdfesotarhreeoniurvnifdroortnhtumenweensotraalldyi,emaanprdrloattvheeerm.aTuenthote--mvatethrieyc connections it can provide between consumer preferences and purchases--has left many won dering what would happen if consumer demand for greener goods began to flag Scenario 2 : Old Glory Not since the dawn of the Great Society; some federal officials noted, had Americans held them in such high esteem as at the end of the first decade of the 21st Century Americans had a renewed faith in Congress and the executive agencies, including EPA, because the institutions hadAsmucecreicssafnusllwy atrnatnesdfocrlemaenderthaeirm, csleelavneesrtowabteetrt,earnadchsioemveetahsesunraatniocen'tshpartiothrietiiersg.randchildren would be able to enjoy the outdoors and a stable global climate. They were willing to do their share to achieve those goals, but they really did not want to have to sign onto the Internet every night to check up on corporate emissions rates, the source of their strawberries, or the compli asunrceetrheactoervdeoryfotnhee pcloamyepdabnyy tthryeinsagmtoe bruulielsd: athnaotfifficgeaps-agrukzdzolewrsnwtoewrne.bAadndfotrhtehyewaatmntoesdpthoerbee, no one could buy a gas-guzzler. So, Americansturned to federal and state regulatory and natural-resource agenciesto manage tiinhnefmoeremnevatiitnrioognnnm-baeatinsotendfaomlr oethar serumerge.isoE,npParAlovanimodwibnigewnsotoruskrtsacneasdsoamrfdupsco. hlEluamtsioipsnsoiwsosniitbsh-letarsathdmrinouguchgshyflsemtxeimabriskliertety-lbaysaospenodswsaiebnbldebased registries; companies report their environmental impacts through constantly updated websites managed by an office initiated jointly by EPA and the Securities and Exchange Com mission. Although those new regulatory'requirements are lessprescriptive than in the old days, tchreeaysianrgelystiollnhroetmlyocteonsetensstiendg aanndd oofthteenr oinvfeorrtmuranteiodn. Ttehcehnaogleongcieys'stoenafuotrocmemateenct oumniptlriaenlicees ians surance. Compliance rates are veryhigh. The degree of flexibility available to companiesmakes enforcement more difficult in some sectors, though scandals have been rare; companies are ianlwtoCaytohsnemgprieensrdsmfupalonouerfnettdhaemcpqouunbiesliyitcioirnnetloaotfeioxonppsaendndasimnpgaacgaeenaNdnGrdeObenusvilcidarionnngpmrpeoundbtualcilcleyw'ifsaettnheseriytaivnseedelasfinetw.d;erinstyostfeamrms; payments targeted to achieve environmental gains; into environmental monitoring and data Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00024 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 25 interpretation; and into basic research with the potential to improve energy efficiency over tune. Congress eventually revised the federal tax code in ways that made environmental con servation lessexpensive and environmen tal harm (producing carbon dioxide, developing natu rtiavleaI,rrAoenamisc)eamrlilcyoa,rneassexsfetpodepneprsaeivldea.wnTodhrrseytamitneygreianabvdoirauoctnttomhresenienntatvlhieraogenecmnocneioensmt,aylnordseisnppgrootnrgadrcaekmd osqfubiwecckhaleymreteogtmohvoeercerhnaemfnfgeenec.t programs were heading. As the government became more environmentally sophisticated, citi zens became less so. Some bureaucrats worry about what would happen in the event of a problem that would require public understanding and action, not just public support. Scenario 3 : Local Option Just as simple organisms confronting varied habitat evolved into the dazzlingly complex array of specialized speciesthat inhabit the earth today, sotoo has the management of environ mmeannataglipnrgombloemstsa.iSr taanteds,waactteinrgposilnlugtliyoonrpinrocboleamlitsio. nPse,ohpalveeoarsgsaunmizeeddparriomuanrdy rsepsepcoifnicsipblialicteysf--or watersheds, mountains, or economic resources--are the front-line of environmental action in most parts of the country. By 2010, several states replaced traditional permitting systems with individual compacts negotiated between and among firms, communities, and state regulators, which achieves local esunbvsirtaonntmiaelnretasloaunrcdeesctoonboumyidcegvoealolspamt erenltartiigvheltys tloowvaclousatb. lSeohmabeistautb.-Ssttaatteesarsehaasrihnagvae laalrlgoecawtead tershed created their own nutrient-trading system to protect the river and its estuaries. The pimeopEpoPlseeAiapnnlaayynasedaidgcihrtiibtoiocnraaillnsgctoawbstiaslitozeinrnsghthereodilredreiencsitidhdeiesdndttyofnalraemmt sti.hceainrdrivvaerrisedbescyosmteme :eiuttmroapinhtiaci,nrsaathcerredthibalne and up-to-date environmental inform ation system.Data from reliable sourcesalloverthe country pmoeunrtainl ctoonthdeitiEoPnAs anreetiwmoprrko,veinngabolrinwgocrsoemnimngu,nwitiheesr,esptaatretsi,cualnadrlryehgaiormnsfutol ssoeuerwcehseorfepeonlvluirtioonn moreignitnaatpep,rwohacehreeshuamppaenarextopobseurheasvtionvgatrhieoubsighgaezsatrdims apraecht.igEhPeAst,alasnodgwuihdeerse adiffoferwreanrtdm-loanokagineg environmental research program that continues to shed fight on environmental risksto human health, ecosystems, and economies. Armed with that risk information and local performance data, people ask their state and municipal governments and their local businesses for the envi raocnromssenthtethcaotutnhetryywant. The effectiveness of those state and local authorities, of course, varies The federal government has essentially abandoned the notion of setting consistent regula tory standards for the whole nation and has delegated to the states all of itsplace-based permit ting programs (retaining pesticide registrations, toxic release inventory; the acid-rain trading program, and a fewother programs that are national in scope). EPA also concentrates on global reenpvriersoennmtaetnivtaels iisnsuCeso.nTgrheessmtoilltiaoknes soefriAoumsearcictiaonns olinvicnlgiminatceocahsatanlgaer.eTashehaavgeencaclyleodffoenrstlhitetlier assistance, however, when conflicts arise among states. EPA'sinformation systemsmight clearly identify- a group of polluters in two states that are degrading air quality in four states to their east, but the downwind states have few levers to move their neighbors to act. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00025 26 Environment.gov Lessons from the Scenarios The three scenarios illustrate a number of points, chief among them that the United States willneed a strong federal environmental regulatory agencyfor decades to come. Newtechnolotnghiaeensnc--eatmciohonanlailetconhrgiienevgoesfsyietssntevemnirvso,inrtomhneemnInteatnletrpanlroegtto,eacflutsie,olbn-eu.ftTftihchieeeynntcaactniaornnso--tismhsaiorvabecrtuohlaoedupsaolnywdeeldrimitvoeinrtrsaaetentshtfhaoetrmgoonvlhyeorwa federal system actively engaged in resolving local, state, and national conflicts can reliably lead to enhanced environmental protection at the lowest possible cost. EPA must remain the back bone of the system, establishing national policies and standards, ensuring a degree of consis tencAyltahcoruogssh stthateess,taabnidliteynbguaiglitnigntion tghleobsatalteunsvqiruoonminehnibtaitlsisisnuneosv. ation, it also prevents many environmental problems from getting worse. The nation'sbasic system of environmental regu lation is--and will continue to be--an essential component of environmental protection. It is rlaersgpIeotlnaysptihpbreiolaiutrysghufonrrleitgkhueelliyarttiphooanttetahnnatiytaAlinimmdiepvraiidccuatsnalsopnhlaatvhyeeeirmr-wasdhilelabrceeodmaebpnleavnitroioesnd,motmoewnintn.ast,eatnhdeofnloewanoof tehnevritraokne mental information over the Internet. As the "green web" scenario illustrates, a wide range of businesses and NGO s -willuse the web to promote various causes, and to provide information that may greatly enhance the efficiency of environmental protection. Freedom of information issysatepmroofofuthnedlfyutAurme.eFriocratnhetrnaadtiitoinonto, arenadpsthhoeufludllbbeenaefpitasrot fotfhtehienfeonrvmiraotinomneangtea,lhgoowveevrenra,nthcee federal government must establish itself as the most credible source of consistent, reliable, and useiul data about sources of pollution, environmental hazards, and place-specific environmen taaglecnocniedsitaionnds.alEl oPfAthheasstaatcesrihtiacvael reoslseenintiabluriolldeisngastwhaeltl.system, though several other federal The Leadership Challenge The innovations described in thisreport demonstrate some of the approachesthat the nation parnodblsetmates.sIwnimll onsetecdasteos,utsheetionnmoavkaetiopnrsogarlseossdeamgaoinnssttrsaitgentihfiecavnatluoeuotsftaanpdriencgioeunsvcioromnmmoednittayl in environmental management today: leadership. At the national level, EPA was preoccupied for most of the 1990s by political struggles between the White House and Congress, and between the federal government and the states. oSfinfcuen1d9in9g5,aint dhaasusteheomrietyd waseirfeathstealheimghaetestbeentwviereonnmCoenntgarlegssoaalndacthhieevaadbmlei.nAisstraatrioesnuoltn, missauneys who believe statutory reform could make environmental protection more effective and more efficient have rejected legislation as a productive strategy. They simply have not trusted Con gress to pass legislation that would help the nation address its environmental problems. During the same time frame, the courts struck down a number of EPA initiatives--includ tiinvgesanexacteteemdepdt ttohereadguecnechy'usmauatnhoerxitpyo.sures to ozone and fine particles--finding that the initia The combination of those forces created challenges for EPA and its state counterparts. It was clear to many inside and outside EPA that the agency needed to innovate, to "reinvent" its psiroongarlamaust,hyoertiztahteiodnisftorursstigbnetiwficeaennt ErePfAoramn.dTChoenagdremssineifsftercattiovrelcyreparetevdenatnedOsfeficcuerionfgRcoeinngvreens Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00026 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 27 tion, which made headway on a number of issues within the agency and tried to encourage innovations among the states. In 1997, an Academy panel concluded that those efforts were moving in the right direction, though ultimately of marginal impact because they were so ttoigthatklyincgonrisstkras.i4ned by EPA'sauthorizing statutes, aswell asby an agency culture that was averse Those constraints are evident in virtually all of the case studies the panel commissioned for this project. The innovations are encouraging, but they are not dramatic or unequivocal. Most of them make managers operate with one hand tied behind their backs. Often, the most forcefill constraint has been EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, which has rsetastiustteodryi'nlneogvitaimtioancys porrompoigsehdt hbayvEePwAeaaknedntehdeEsPtaAte'sscwahpeancitthyotsoeeinnfnoorcveattihoenslaawppeared to lack Regardless of who wins the 2000 presidential and congressional elections, the next EPA administrator will have to deal with the aftermath of five years of stalemate on environmen twitasiltghpooovluietcryanmilneegWnact.ya,shbiuntg, tmono.reCiomnptionrutainngtlyin, itthweosualmd elepavaeththweonualtdiolneaevveetnhme onreewfraudsmtrainteisdtrwatiothr To make progress on outstanding environmental problems, the administrator will need a good ear--to hear the public's mandate--and a gift for challenging Americans to do their part in accomplishing that mandate. The administrator will need to articulate a vision for the fauglefinllciyngatnhdatitvsirseiolant.ioAnnsdh,iposf wcoituhrsteh,ethsetataedsm, ainnidsttrhaetonr ewnigllangeeetdhetoafginedncaywanayd ttohewostraktecsonin structively with Congress--or around Congress, if it proves incapable of meeting its own leadership challenges. tnaekxeTt thaoidsemnreicnpoiousrrtratagftoeocriunasnseos"vtiahtsteioreoncntolhymrohmuoegpnhed,o"authtioothwneseevonenrv,itrhisoenamspterepensstcatrhlimpetanionenxagtfoeEmrPfAeanilatudsryem.stiTenmihs.etrrVaetioeawrreisnhtghoouthlude sands of other environmental leaders at work in America and abroad--people in business, NGO s, schools, state houses, and town halls; people within EPAitself and its state counterparts; padeompilneisitnrantourmmeruosutswfoerdke,raanldagfreonmciewshwoimth EaPnAimmpuascttleoanrnt.hTe heinsvrierpoonmrt einnct--ludweisthinwfohrommatitohne and advice for environmental leaders throughout the governance system. Setting the Agenda for 20 0 1 numTbheer--nepxet rahdampsinaisstfreawtora,satwfteorocrotnhsrueleta--tioonf swigitnhifiCcoanntgreensvsi,roshnomueldntiadlepnrtoifbyleamms atonaagdedarbesles first, and then mardial the support and develop the tools that will be needed to make progress. The Academy panel commends three problems in particular because they pose high risks to human health, the sustainability of ecosystems, and other social values, and because they are ripe for action:nonpoint runoff of nutrients, sediments, and other pollutants into surface waters; smoMg;akanindgpprreopgarreisnsgofnoranayreodfuthctoisoenporofbglreemenshwoiullsreegqausireemnieswsiownsa.ys of thinking; new marketbased tools to keep the costs of action as low as possible; new levels of coordination across federal agencies, state and local agencies, and numerous sectors of the economy; and new ways tsotrastheagriecailnlyfo; rismthataitotnheanaddmreisnpiosntrsaitboilritiinensowviatthestfhoer AapmureproisceatnhapteoApmlee.rWicahnastaisgrmeeosits iimmppoorrttaanntt., Innovation for its own sake is unsustainable, as well as pointless. As the studies described in this Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00027 28 Environment.gov report demonstrate, innovation is difficult, time consuming, and filled with risk. Innovators need to know that their efforts have a chance of making a significant improvement in a signifi cant problem. Although smog, nonpoint runoff and climate change are difficult issues to ad wrdoroensrmtsh,eytnetctaahrlgnpeicrtsoa.lblIlynenmanosdvwapthoioilcinthi,cbmalyluyns,ettchreeesmysiatayirn,ewpoiafllrsftuoocllhfowEmP,aaAgn'nsdiatsugoednteodtoah.-awtiAll pmroegrirceasnssosnhothueldoftihnedr tehnevmi Report Structure manTahgeemreesnt toafntdhidserveeplooprts erexcpolaminmsetnhdeaAtiocnasdefomrya'spprelyseinagrcshominetoofintnhoovsaetitveechennivqiureosnmtoeonutatl standing environmental problems. Chapters 2 through 6 draw from the Academy's own re search as well as from the 17 studies completed by independent research teams for this project. (The lull research reports are available in separate volumes and on-line at the Academy'sweb s7itsey.)n5thEeascizheostfhtehoresepocrhtasp'ftienrdsicnognscalnuddersecwoimthmfiennddinagtisoannsdanddetpairleesdenretsctohmemmeansdaaptiloannsf.oCr ahcatpiotenr. Appendix A lists the research teams that prepared papers for this project. Appendix B pre sents a summary of the major statutes that EPA administers. Appendix C is a glossary of the tfeisrtmedsiunseAdpipnetnhdisixreDp.ort. The panel members and Academy staff responsible for the report are Research and Analytical Methods This is the third major report about the Environmental Protection Agency prepared at the raenqduethsteoEf nCvoirnognrmesesnbty. thIneN1a9t9i5o,ntahleAAcacdaedmemy oyfpPuubblliischAeddmSeinttiinstgraPtriioonri'tsieCs,eGnteettrinfgorRtehseuEltsc:oAnoNmewy Directionfor EPA,6 and in 1997, Resolving the Paradox of EnvironmentalProtection: An Agendafor Con gress, EPA, and the StatesJ The former analyzed the consequences of EPA's media-specific stat utes, its stove-piped management, and its failure to integrate planning and budgeting in ways that would lead to more effective priority setting and use of analytical tools such as risk assess m"reeinntvaenndtiocno"sti-nbietinaetifvitesa,naanlydsics.onTchluede1d99t7hevyowluemree htraavciknegdonselyvemraalrogfinEalPAim'spmacots. tTihmeproerptaonrtt stressed the need for performance-based approaches to regulation and state oversight in order to encourage the regulated entities to find the most cost-effective ways to meet their federal wenivthirroenlemveannttaelxopbelrigtiasteiosnusp.eIrnvisbeodthaorefstehaercphrosjteacftfs,anadn pArceapdaermedyapfainneall poufbfleilclorwepsoarnt.d others The U.S. Congress commissioned this report in EPA's FY 1998 appropriations act. The appropriations committees directed EPA to dedicate money to the project: m$2a,n0a0g0e,0a00sefroiretshoefNinatdieopneanldAecnatdeevmayluoaftiPounbsloicfAredcmenintiEstPraAtiionnittioatdiveessigtno aimnd prove the effectiveness and efficiency of EPA activities. These studies shall also assess how lessons learned can be built into ongoing agency programs. Tityh,ea ccorintifcearleeeslenmoetentthoaftmEePeAtinhgasthyeetretoqudierveemloepntasporfoGgrPaRmAeavnadlueantisounricnagptahce most effective allocation of resources. EPA is to enter into an agreement with the Academy within 90 days so that the reports may be made available to the Congress within two years.8 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00028 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 29 The Academy responded by forming a distinguished panel to oversee the work. That panel and the staff of the Academy's Center for the Economy and the Environment spent several months talking with senior EPA managers, EPA staff members, state environmental commis ssiigonniefrisc,aennt vinirnoonvmateinontasl iandevnovcairtoesn,mbeunstianlesmsalenaadgeerms,eanntdfoorthevearsluiantioonrd. eTrhtoe Aidceandtiefmy tyhealsmooisst sued a general call to researchers and others to propose innovations for study To the Academy's delight, many program managers within EPA urged the Academy to evaluate their programs. The process produced a long list of innovations from which to choose. Eventually the panel settled on the topics presented here, and commissioned a set of highly respected independent reseAalrtchhoeurgshtoEuPnAdearntadkeotthheeraonfafilcyisaelss awnidthwdriirteecrtepknoortwsldeedsgceriboifntghteheinirnfoivnadtiinognss. in question reviewed each of the research papers, which were also reviewed by the Academy panel and peer reviewers, the researchers had final control of their own reports including their findings icanonnndovvreeancteiovdmesmommeanenda4ag0teioemnnesvn.irtSoanimpmpuerlontaatancleholeeusasdalyenrdsthfoerrogAmacnaairdzoaeutminoydnasthtlaeifsfnsuacetosino. dnIuntcoJteuddnisecitu2ss0os0wt0hn,etrfheinesdeAainrcgcahsd,eirnmetcoy ommendations, and implications of the 17 research reports in a roundtable setting presided over by the panel.9 The staff and panel consolidated all of that analysis and commentary into this report. pSaenneiolrexEePrAcisoefdfifciinaalsl shaayvienrtehveiepwubedlicaantidonc.oTmhmeepnrtoecdesosnhtahseyideoldceudmaewnto, rtkhooufguhnctohme Aprcoamdeismedy independence and objectivity Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00029 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00030 CHAPTER 2 Transforming Regulation ltering the way EPA and state regulatory agencies relate to individual sources of pol lution and environmental damage from factories, power plants, dry cleaners, feed lots, and sewage treatment plants is an essential step to improving the nation's environ tpuorlyiceiecsonmmoimgehnytt:.pthAroesvypieedciett,hseoorrfftahthieleytocfmauirlartxeonimtmriizenegimuthliaezteeonrtyvhiesryopsnrtiemvmaetneatraaelnbidnecnpoeumfbitlpsicatthcibaotlsent ewowfitmhteetchehetnino2gl1oscgteyCrtaeanindn standards. Some of the old regulatory systems are simply too slow for firms trying to compete in an information-based economy Reducing the ozone levels in cities, the eutrophication of lakes and streams, the emission and deposition of mercury and other persistent toxic chemicals, laastowreyllsayssttehme emffoecretseoffficcliiemntataencdheafnfegcetiwveil.lTdeinpkeenrdinognagroovuenrdnmtheenmt'sacrgapinascwityilltonomtadkoe tihtserjeogbu. The United States can continue to make progress against environmental problems--and can do so at the lowest possible cost--if it changes how it regulates. New information technolo gaainnedds,niimenwnpoeivrnaastttiiivvteue.tipoonliaclycatopoalcsi,tiaessttrhornoguganhdousttathbeleepcuobnloicmcyommamkeitmreegnutlatotoerynvreirfoonrmmebnottahl fqeuaasliibtyle; Numerous public and private institutions have been experimenting with alternatives to tra ditional regulation.This chapter examines several of the most promising effortsto change how government agencies--or societyat large--coerce or entice sources of pollution to reduce their esinovnisrotrnamdienngtadleismcpriabcetds.iTn htheelensesxotncshfraopmtert--hossehoeufflodrhtse--lpatnhde fnreowmEthPeAeaxdpmeriinmisetnratstowripthlaenmthise next steps. Nothing described in this chapter has dramatically improved the environment, or demonstrated simple fixes that make improvements quickly or easily Indeed, most of the at tieennmtveiprrptosrnetmtoaetiinnotnnaolovpfartoietbshlseatmavteus tibosergyeonainusgtehvtooerriretelyyq. uMcioranekstitenrsagtiinnhegeda--dbwaynadtyraaaddgioatiipontnsint, gtph--oelinftaiacrtsim,onaonr'sedmrEaodPstiAci'ansltcrcaahcuattnaiogbueles. EPA's regulatory apparatus focuses most of its attention on individual facilities and the permits they need to discharge pollutants to the air, to water, or to waste-management facilities. And the reformers who developed the programs in this report were trying to correct for a number of gaps and failures in that current system. Particularly, they were concerned about the following: Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00031 32 Environment.gov mUennrteagl uhalarmtedinsAoumrecreicsa: many of the most significant sources today are unregulated. Congress and of pollution and environ the states have focused their environmental controls on larger point sources of pollution, and on a relatively samndalpl rnoucmesbseedr ofofoidms.pLoratwanmtapkreordsuhcatsv:ecnaorst,rterquuckirse,dgafasormlineer,s,pleasrtgiceidoerss,mdrailnl,ktiongtawkeater, responsibility for runoff of nutrients, pesticides, and sediments from their fields and feedlots. Likewise, municipalities and homeowners have generally avoided regulation of runoff from their streets and yards. The numerous environmental and economic impacts of sprawl are largely unregulated as well. Traditional regulations would be ineffective against many of those dispersed sources of pollution in any case. Under-regulated sources: many small business, including dry cleaners, printers, and photo-processors, are ignored by regulators because individually they contribute so httle ptiomlleu.tiCoonlltehcatitveinlys,pheoctwinegvearn, dthtoaskeinbguseinnfeossrcseemcteonrts aacretiopnasrtaogafitnhset tphoelmluticoann pbreobalewmas.teSoo,f too, are the cars and trucks that Americans drive. Older vehicles tend to contribute disproportionate shares of pollutants into the air; larger and less efficient vehicles contribute a disproportionate share of carbon dioxide. Again, traditional regulations are ineffective in many such areas. Unduly expensive and static regulation: most federal and state pollution-control regulations require firms10 of similar types to install pollution-control systems of similar ttyhpeeysp. rTohvoidsee n"otecinhcneonltoivgeyssftoarnfdiarmrdss"toagreor"eblaetyivoenldy ceoasmyptloiainmcpe,l"emtoernetdauncde eenmfoisrscieo,nbsut further than the level that can be achieved by the technology; they provide few incen tives for firms to create new- technologies or processes that might achieve better results; twehmaeniystssri.eoqInnus;iaraedndsdiotimtohene,ystothhueurcusencsiotfosotromsvoiectriye-ctoyofnmtthrooerleraetnqhduainoretihmsenerencstoessuosrfactreeysnttoporaueccnhlduieedrve-ecsotshnoeturrrocelestsuhlfetrioirtm finding or implementing the most cost-effective approaches to minimizing their com bined environmental impacts. tal pTrhoeteicntnioonvabteiocnaussdeesthceriybereddiunctehiesncvhiaropntemr ecnotnatlrpibruotbeletomtshweittrhaonustfaodrdminagtiomnooref elanyveirrsonomf uenn duly expensive or static regulation. It bears repeating that despite its weaknesses, the U.S. approach to regulation has achieved pcaoirronbaslineddmerwsaballitseetreednarveaibrcoolnvemeaneaenrretathwl abindenetlehyfeiutysn.w1d1eoCruslotdomobpdel,iaaabnssceweneatlpls,poaemnaerdsshtooarvtbeoefitnhrseepgniuroelradmtonruiynmpAermorogeurrasicmrae..foTTrhhmee effortsaimed at achievingwhat the Clinton administration has sought: "cleaner, cheaper, smarter" approaches to environmental protection.12 Six of the studies the Academy commissioned for this report evaluated significant innova tuinornesgiunlpaotelldutaicotniv-istoieusr,caencdonptrriovlast.eTahnedppruobjelcictsoepnecroatmiopnass.sSlaormgee aonfdthsemmallexfiprmlosit, rneegwulmatoendiatonrd ing and information technologies; others create new relationships among regulators, the regu lated, and communities; some create market pressures that should foster continuous improve mdievnidtsu;aol tbhuesrisneasreseos'nclyontavnicgteionntiatlhlyatrereladtuecdintog gthoevierrnenmveinrotnpmroegnrtaaml ism, fploacwtisnwgiilnlsitmeapdrofvroemthienir Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00032 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 33 bottom line. The six studies by no means exhaust the list of potentially significant innovations being tested in America today From "green accounting"13to Environmental Defense'son-line "Scorecard" 14 and the World Resources Institute's Forest Watch,15 many public, private, and non-governmental organizations are responding to the weaknesses of the current regulatory systTemhewinitnhocvraetaiotinvsiteyvaanludacteodmbmyitthmeernets.earch teams demonstrate that firms--including very small businesses--using some form of "environmental management system" can improve their performance, and reduce the tune and effort regulators need to spend inspecting their behavior. TathinegMcoamssparcehhuesnesttisveEnenvvirioronnmmenentatlalRreesquultisrePmroegnrtasmanednpgraagcetsicbeussfionresfsirsmesc,tothrseninunseegsosteilfcertification, coupled with the threat of inspections, to achieve broad compliance.16 New Jersey's facility-wide permitting pilot demonstrated that firms and regulators could improve environmental performance by treating a firm as a whole. In some cases, consolidating the participating facilities' air permits under a single performance cap pwacaihrtthiieocvuuetldaprerlyinovwrirhaopennpmrtohevenatpla.el17ramnditsfianlalonwcieadl gfaacinihstioevsetrosctahcakn-gbey-tshtaecirkmteacnhunfoalcotguyripnegrmpriotsc,esses Larger firms committed to maintaining a leadership position on environmental perfor mpraongcraemhatvheatdethmirodn-sptararttyedauthdriotourgshcapnarptircoidpuatcieonreilniaEblPeAcrNiteiqwueEsnogflafnacdi'hstSietsa'rTenravcirkon mental management systems. A strong audit report, or third-party certification, can signal to regulators that their inspection resources can be better deployed elsewhere.18 States are now experimenting with whole-facility compacts in which the regulator and a company agree on a set of broad environmental performance goals (generally extending beyond mere compliance with standards). In return for that commitment, the regulator provides the firm with the freedom to achieve those goals through nontraditional means.19 Those innovations are leading regulation awayfrom permit-by-permit controls of a facility's technology and toward a whole-facility' standard for environmental performance. The firms benefit from the enhanced flexibility; and the public still has the assurance--backed up by a threEaatcohf oinfstpheectiinonnovanatdiornegsudleastocrryib' eadctiinont--hisocfhaapdetefrinaedddcraespseosnaempaisrstiiocunsla. r regulatory chal lenge, and has merit in its own right. Taken together, however, they lay a working foundation for a more dynamic and cost-effective approach to regulation: emissions and effluent trading Trading systems, discussed at length in Chapter 3, can reduce the cost of meeting an environ mtaleinntfaolrgmoaatliwonh.ilMe satkiminuglatrtiandginthgesdyestveemlospwmoerkn,thoofwceovnetrr,odl teepcehnndosloognietsraannsdfobremttienrgetnhveirroelnamtioenn ships among regulators and sourcesof pollution:finding waysto bring many new; smaller sources of pollution into "the system;" finding waysto hold firms accountable to the overall system with oinugt reeaqcuhirfaincgilisttyattiocmpeeremt iutsn;ifaonrdmfitnedcihnngowloagyystsotaenndsaurrdesetnhvaitromnamyebnetailnwapelpl-rboepirnigatwe ittohothuet rfeaqciuliitry and its community Each of the following cases contributes to that transformation. None of the innovations suggests that regulators can--or should--disappear, however. Whatever else changes, individuals, communities, and businesses will always have incentives to pass the cost of pollution or pollution-control on to others. That is why some form of regula Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00033 34 Environment.gov tion--whether imposed by Congress and government agencies, or by a voluntary' association of sources with a mutual interest in adhering to a standard--will always be necessary Self-Certification: Expanding the Universe The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)has achieved two re markable breakthroughs with its implementation of its "Environmental Results Program:" ictlehaansinggre, aatnlyd epxhpoatnodperdoctheess"inugn--iveornser"ecoofrdsmwailtlhbtuhseinsetsastees'sinretghurleaetosreyctsoyrsst--emp,rianntdintgh,udsry likely to be responsive to state requirements titakheaspcerresoatneadl raepspoownesrifbuilliitnycfeonrticvoemfpolrytihnegowwitnheresnovrirmonamnaegnetarlsroefguthlaotsieonbsusinesses to Thus, the program has simultaneously expanded both DEP's reach and its effectiveness. mTheeasduerapbalretmreednutcmtioakneisnaproelalustoionnabflreomclatihme tphaarttiicnipjuatsitntghrseeectoyresa.rs the program has driven a The Environmental Results Program (ERP)requires an individual in each firm to certify in writing each year that his or her business is in compliance with a comprehensive, facility-wide set of environmental regulations. To make that certification meaningful to small businesses without environmental staflj the department has provided each sector with straightforward wToorgkabionotkhsetowigdueisdtepothsesimbleanpaagrteircsipthartiooung,hthtehestsatteepesvtehneypnubeelidshteodtathkee tgouiadcehbieovoekscoinmKploiarenacne., to accommodate the large number of Korean drycleaners. In their evaluation for the Academy, April and Tim write: ERP's affirmative statement of compliance shifts the onus for compliance to the regulated entity: Under the typical regulatory process, firms are supposed to comply with applicable regulations. However, many firms are ignorant of the multitude of regulations with which they are required to comply Many pboroogkrsa,mwso,riknschloupdsin, ganEdRPo,mhbavuedsdmeveenlo--petod hcoemlppbliuasninceesassessisdtaentecremtoionles--rulweoarpk plicability, as well as the means to comply. The ERP certification is several steps beyond these attempts to better com municate regulatory requirements.20 It ranges in length from four pages (dry cleaners) to seven pages (printers). In filling out the certification, firms must determ ine the applicability of various requirements and certify their compli panrocep.riTethoer loarsthpiagghe-roafnkeiancgh ocfefritciifailcathtieonfircmonmtauinsst paossiigtinvaetluyreaspsaegrtetwhahte:re the tTiohne isnigtnhaetocreyr'thifaiscapteiorsno.nally examined and isfamihar with the informa The information contained in the submittal istrue, accurate, and complete. Systems to maintain compliance are in place at the facility; and will be maintained for the coming year, even if processes or operating proce dures are changed over the course of the year. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00034 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 35 The signatory is"aware that there are significant penalties including, but not limited to, possible fines and imprisonment for willfully submitting false, inaccurate, or incomplete information." 21 tionAtlhtheoruegqhuitrheemseunbtsstabnecceamofe tmheucrheqhuairredmeretnotsigrnemorae.inAedpruilnacnhdanGgeredi,ntehrroquugohtestehlef-ceenrvtiifriocna mental manager at a medium-sized electronics firm, which had participated in an early pilot of the ERP: "It meant that my boss [the president] gave me the `keep me out of jail speech'every time that he signed it." And the person responsible for compliance at a small printing company ysaeiadr,s."IIn'mthgelapdosthiteioynmIa'mdeinit--reIq'muiraend.eImt'pslsooymeee--thianngdthifeyI s[aDyEwPe] hsahvoeultdo hspavenedbe$e1n00d,ohineg[tfhoer owner] says go to hell. But with the certification requirement, now he recognizes he has to spend the money"22 Most of the facilities comprising the three business sectors involved in ERP had been virtu carlleyaitninvgistihbleewtoortkhbeodoekpsaarntmd ceenrttibfeicfaotrieonitpimlanpsle, mhoewnetevdert,hDeEpProegnrgaamg.edAsthpearretloevfatnhtetrpardoceeassssoof ciations and other stakeholders in an extensive process of technical collaboration and negotia tions. The trade associations helped DEP build a registry of the state's dry cleaners, printers, aanppdrpohaochto. pBryoceexspsoanrsd.iTnghethreesnuultms,bperersoefntsemdailnl bTuasbilnee2ss-1esbienlsoiwde, dtheme ostnastter'astreegthuelaptoowryersyosftetmhe, DEP not only increases the scope of compliance with regulatory standards, but also levels the economic playing field among hundreds of competitors and thus reduces the incentive to ig nore environmental safeguards. TABLE 2-1: NUMBER OF FIRMS KNO W N TO THE MASSACHUSETTS DEP SECTOR Printers Dry cleaners Photo processors Total DEP-IDENTIFIED FIRM S PRE-ERP ~250 ~30 ~100 ~380 DEP-IDENTIFIED FIRM S P O ST -ER P ~ 1 100 ~600 ~500 ~2200 The Environmental Results Program has produced some beneficial environmental results, tthhoeupgrhinaticntguaslemcteoars(usruecmh eanstsswairtechfeinwg Tthweocqhuemanitciatalstivuseesdtutdoiewsadsohcpurminetnintegdpirmespseros)vethmaetnDtsEiPn predictswillreduce the release of approximately 168 tons of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) statewide each year. (VOCs contribute to the formation of ground-level ozone and may be toxic.) DEP estimated that the program would cause the state's dry cleaners to reduce thenaggregate emissions of perchloroethylene, a hazardous air pollutant, by some 500 tons per year. wInaastdedwitaitoenr.,23photo processors were expected to reduce their discharges of silver-contaminated Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00035 36 Environment.gov The Environmental Results Program isnot voluntary. All companies in the three sectors are required to participate, and by inspecting a percentage of the participating firms, the enforce ment staff at the DEP has made sure that participants take the self-certification seriously In tdsheelaevtdet,shspeoaymrwteoiolflfbtthheeeinvpsiaspritebiclcetiepudanttiihvnaegrnsbewusaiilsnl etchsosemerspecgeotumiltaoptrilsoainwnshtroheaqhtuativhreee.inrointvsoellvf-ecmeretinftiemdaakneds imt madoerethliekemly The department was sufficiently pleased with the success of ERP in the three initial sectors manednat mofoangcethrteifi1c8atpiiolnotp-prohgasraempafrotircsipomanets8,,t0h0a0t idtiwscahsamrgoevrisnogfaihnedaudstirnia2l0w0a0stwewithattehre, fdoervtehlooup tshaonudssaonfdsgaosf sottahtieornfsirrmesspionnsstaibllliengfoorrompoerdaitfiynigngpbuomilperss.wTithhevdapepora-rrtemcoenvet reyxpsyescttesmEsR, Panedvefonr tually to cover some 25,000 facilities. Massachusetts and neighboring Rhode Island arejointly developing regulations and workbooks to apply to auto-body shops in both states.24 And other states have shown interest in replicating the program. souNrcoeso. tMheorsitnonfotvhaetiootnhderesicnriitbiaetdiviens thhaivsereipnvoortlvheadsacosvmearleldnusumchbearloarfgfeirnmusmwbheerroefrepgoullluattioorns and facility managers have negotiated customized permits or special arrangements. ERP, how ever, demonstrates how a state can expand its regulatory program to include thousands of otherwise un- or under-regulated firms, while producing potentially significant reductions in their aggregate pollution loads. The approach helps reduce compliance costs for participat rineggufliarmtorssa.nd, once the rules and workbooks are written, greatly reduces transaction costs for ERP could be adopted on a broad scale in many states to bring tens of thousands of firms tmiuntaroanlycsoormeulrpactleiivasenolcyfenswumtiarthilelsnottaprteeuransttoaiofnfndwsarihndestro.eTaphamertaaonpafpgtrheoemarceehngtcuolpaurtolodgryrea'vcmehnaobllreetnmrgaoeddiinsifgfiiensddytisontegrmeadwwucaiteyhtoaogubrtirccirunelg ating huge new transaction costs. (Those issues are discussed in Chapter 3,)EPA's approach to enforcement of federal standards, however, may limit the potential impact of ERP and pro grams like it. EPA Constrains ERP The Massachusetts Environmental Results Program is more than just evidence that selfcertification is a useful policy tool for bringing small businesses into compliance with environ mfoeunntda--l setaffnodratsrdtos.cIht aisnaglesothaepsetrrfueccttuerxeaomfpelnevoirfotnhme ecnhtaalllerneggeuslatthioant .confront--and often con ERP's original goals were to consolidate all the environmental requirem ents facing various business sectors into a single performance-baseddocument, and then eliminate all of the corre sponding permits. The result would give businesses a clear emissions cap and provide maxi mum flexibility in how they might meet it. ERP has only partially achieved that goal. It has neleismsionramteadksienvgesriaglnaiifri-caanntdeqwuaitpemr-reenltatcehdanpgeersm. Nitsowth;aitnperxinchtearnsgheafdortoswhiatvcheibnegftooresedvoeirnagl pbruasci tices that reduce VOC emissions, printers may change their processes freely without first get ting a permit, provided they certify annually that they are operating under the cap. ERP elimi nsmataeldl efnewteerprrpiseerms. i(tTshine tphreogotrhaemr'sseecatrolyrsa, dhvowoceavteers,epnavritslyiobneecdaiutsaesfaenwaeprppreoramchitsfoarpwploirekdintog wsuicthh medium and large businesses as well as small operations.)25 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00036 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 37 ERP made many people nervous from the start. Environmental advocates and many DEP employees were fearful that the department would lose control of both standard setting and enforcement over the regulated entities.26 Staff was particularly worried that any ERP stan dards would eventually become less protective than traditional permits. DEP requires all new psooullructeisonofovpeorllauctieorntaoinvearmaocuenrtt,ationgaomthoruonutg, hasawBeelsltaAscahlilesvoaubrlceeCs wonitthroplrToepcohsneodloingcyre(BasAeCs Tin) review That requirement allows permit writers to push firms to adopt newer and cleaner tech nologies. Some DEP staff feared that once in place, ERP's performance-based requirements would remain fixed, and thus produce less improvement over time. Other DEP staff countered tmheant tms abneycaluarsgeeosfoeuxrceemspotfiopnosllmutaiodne watetrhe--e tiamnde wthoeurledgruelmataioinn--s weexreemapdtofprotemd.B27ACT require To reduce that internal conflict, and to avoid potential conflicts with EPA, DEP decided to roll out ERP with relatively small businesses, those which neither had nor needed many federal permits: hence dry cleaners and photo processors in 1997 and printers in 1998. To the extent tbhealot wit twhoeufleddecoranlsroaldidaar.teDorryeclliemaninearste, hpoewrmevitesr,, EpoRsPedwaocuhldalbleenwgeobrkeicnagusweitthhesioruursceesofoppeerrcahtilnogroethylene issubjectto aNational Emission Standard for HazardousAir Pollutants (NESHAP). Even relatively small dry cleaners are covered by a federal Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT)rule. April and Greiner explain: Massachusetts had an existing dry cleaner Reasonably Achievable Control TInedchevneolloopgiyng(RthAeCETR)Pstraengdualardtiofonrsfdorrydcrlyeacnleearns,ebrsu,tthitewEaRs nPowt hoirgkhglryouepnfloorockeedd. tqouitrheemfeendtesr.aIlt wMaAsiCnTteraesstaedminodinecl.reDasEiPngwseacnttoerdenavsiirmopnlme,eunntaiflipeedrfsoertmoafnrcee even beyond the MACT level, so DEP actually increased the stringency of requirements . . . DEP did not consider it necessary to apply for MACT pro gram delegation. Based on its good relationship with Region 1, managers expected that EPA would retain the principal authority for enforcing the MingACSuTchstcaonodparedraatniodnDhEadP bweoeunldqeunitfeocrcoemthmeoEnRinPtrheequenirveimroennmtsefnotradlrayreclneaa.n28 But the federal-state relationship did become a problem. As noted above, the requirements DapEpPhende--goatinadtemd woriethlitkheelywtoorkbgereonufporwceedre: considerably more stringent than the old ones it had Tcohveerfeedd;eDraEl PMhAaCsTnohcausta-olfofw, seor tahpeplsitcaatbe'islirteyqcuuitr-eomffe, nsotsvweoryulsdmaapllpslyoutorceaslladrreyncoletaners. DEP ismore stringent in requiring leak-detection equipm ent instead of the "sniff test" for perchloroethylene; the federal standards classify the sniff test as a "MACT" technology DEP's standard requires dry cleaners to test for leaks twice as frequently and to main tain more logs of those tests. In order to persuade the dry cleaners to accept those stricter requirements, DEP agreed to continue the state'spractice of requiring dry' cleaners to retain their environmental records for three years, rather than adopting EPA'srequirement of five years. Because the federal MACT Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00037 38 Environment.gov standards in all sectors require five years, however, DEP could fulfill its ERP agreement only if it could persuade EPAto accept the change. DEP could have petitioned EPAto delegate to it on a sector-specific basis the controlling federal air toxics program. (California had done just tfdhleealxetigbaainltiditoyrnefrdaounmcdeEadcPrcAeecptohtrrtdoh-uergepthernothtgieroanamgree'snqrcueyicr'soermfdlae-gknsethsei.pp)iDnregEinPrevrqeeunjitericoetnmedpenraotdsgv.riIacnmesft,rePoamrdo,jEeDcPEtAPXtLoso.suegehktththaet EPA established Project XL--a loose acronym for "excellence and leadership"--in 1995. It was presented as a vehicle in which leading companies, communities, business sectors, and even states could use to obtain regulatory flexibility by committing to superior environmental ppaenrfioersm, tahnocueg.hSianscae viteshcirceleatfioorn,ePnrcoojuercatgXinLghsayssptermodicucinendosveavteioranl,stthroenpgroaggrreaemmheanstsbweeitnh acodmis appointment. 29 The Massachusetts dry cleaners illustrate some of Project XL's weaknesses. DEP started its XL proposal in March 1997. After roughly a year-and-a-half of extensive negotiations and pubhc involvement, Massachusetts became the first state to sign a final XL prercoojercdt-raegterenetimonenrteqwuitihreEmPeAn.tsTfhoer samgarelledmryenctl,ehanoewresv. eRra, tdhiedr,niottseatuothuotraizperoDceEsPs ftoorraepdpurcoevitnhge specific requests for flexibility as addenda to the agreement. DEP agreed to submit addenda to EPA Region 1, which would then forward them to EPA headquarters and to an interagency review committee. In accord with that process, in March 1999, DEP submitted to EPA the dry hclaesawneorrkpeadckhaagredwtoitmh aitkseretqhueeasgtrteoecmheanntgwe othrke,rbeucot rEdP-Are'steOnftfioicne roefqEuinrfeomrceenmts.enRteagniodnC1o'smsptaliff ance Assurance resisted the proposal. April and Greinerjuxtaposed the arguments for and against allowing the change in record rtheteeIonnntiJlouynlwyia1ny9T9E9aPb,AElePc2oA-u2sldebneetxlDotewEnPd dthraafttfcleoxmibmilietnyttsooDnEthPewporoupldosbael iifnfDoErmPianpgptlhieeddfeoprafrotmrmeanltEthPaAt delegation of the MACT program for the dry cleaning sector, the very route that DEP had rejected two years earlier as too long, uncertain, and potentially incompatible with ERP's ap proach to self-certification and enforcement. EPA recommended that Massachusetts follow tCaianlifaosrtnroian'sgaepnpfrooraccehmteontthperoMtoAcColTanddelceogmatipohna,nacnedsetrmatpehgaysiCzeadliftohrantitahheapdactokacgoemsmhoitutlod EcoPnA to inspect 100 percent of its dry cleaners each year in order to gain its delegation: a commit ment made possible onlybecause California rehes on local fire departments and health officials fcdooercmiidnpeshpdaenwccthieoentthhsr.eorMutgoahspsausecrlshfuu-ceseedrttteisfleiccgraaettaiiotoennd.aintsdEsRpoPt tionsmpeocvteioinnst.h30e AopspoofsJituelydi2r0e0c0ti,onD:EtoP ihmapdronvoet Thus, EPA's statutes, and the agency'stradition of enforcing them, frustrated a reasonable approach to innovation. Prior to the start of ERP self-certification in September 1997, no one had been regularly inspecting Massachusetts'small dry cleaners. When the state attempted to honor a negotiated agreement that increased the stringency of the requirements in ways that tcwoueeldn pthroedruegceuleantovriraonndmtehnetaslecbteonr,eEfiPtsAwchoiuleldsinmout lstaayneyoeus.slTyhsetrsetnagtethmenayinhgatvheescigonnendecatiPornojbeect XL agreement with EPA, but EPA still insisted that the Clean Air Act's MACT delegation requirements had to be enforced. The agency could not set a precedent that other sectors or othTerhsetaMteassmsaicghhutsseetetsk.Environmental Results Program has demonstrated how a state regula tory agency can improve environmental performance by shifting enforcement strategies and Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00038 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 39 TABLE 2-2: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ERR DRY CLEANERS RECORD-RETENTION FLEXIBILITY PRO CON CONSISTENCY Important for small sources to get consistent message and not manage records differently for different programs. A common record retention requirement is three years (e.g., RCRA manifests). All federal MACTs have five-year record retention. M aximum time frame allow ed by law (42U S C 2463: federal government cannot bring enforcement actions seeking penalties for actions more than five years old). SMALL SOURCES Inspector experience says small sources either have no records or all their records from startup. Enforcement experience says the last six months to one y e a r's w orth of records is sufficient to derive penalty. W a n t fullest time frame available because inspectors d o n 't get out to small sources very often. Three vs. five years w ould remove 4 0 percent o f the available time frame for punishment. PRECEDENT SETTING Since flexibility is granted within context of the XL program, it should be clear flexibility is not open to everyone. MACTs have never deviated from the fiveye a r time frame. XL has mostly been about single-facility flexibility, site-specific experiments that d o n 't set sector- or program-wide precedents. SUPERIOR ENVIRONM ENTAL PERFORMANCE Derives from sector participation in the entire ERP. Does not judge element by element. ERP standards for dry cleaners are more stringent; the program brings more sources into the system, promotes higher compliance via certifications and w o rkbo o k process, and has potential for sector-wide superior environmental results. N o direct link between record retention and environmental performance. N ot clear what benefit dry cleaners derive from reduced record retention, or w hat superior environmental results accrue. PAPERWORK REDUCTION Important to offer small facilities something in exchange for higher regulatory burden. A verage dry cleaner has 2 5 0 0 square feet o f flo o r space, and needs every inch. W o u ld have liked real regulatory relief but believed they g o t as much as they could. The real burden is in record keeping, e.g., logs, purchase records, not in holding them an additional two years. It w ould take more effort to go in and purge records than to keep them. developing effective compliance-assistance tools. Self-certification of compliance appears to be an effective strategy for regulators seeking to expand their reach to under-regulated or under inspected enterprises, provided the state maintains a credible system of oversight to detect fbruasutidoonrsaobuurcsees.,Agsatshsetasttiaotnese, xanpdanadustoE-RboPdtyoschoovpesr,tthhoeuesxapnedrsimmeonrtewwilalspterowvaitdeervdaisluchabarlegeinrsf,ocromma tion, and possibly significant environmental benefits. As part of ERP, the state and EPA have worked collaboratively on developing what Massachusetts calls Environmental Business Practice nInindgicraotoorms, EwPhAichisminacylinperodvteougsievfeiial isntactoemwihnegnytehaersa.gEeRncPyhpaesrcaelsivoedseamthornesatrtattoeditshoowwnliettnleforrucne ment capacity UntilEPAfinds a more effectivewayto encourage experimentation, programs like ERP will have a hard time demonstrating that they might also be productive approaches to im proving the performance of larger sources of pollution requiring federally delegated permits. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00039 40 Environment.gov A Private Transformation: Firms Adopt EMSs and Third-Party Certification Regulatory agencies and the public have sent a clear message to companies over the last three decades: pollution and other environmental impacts are problems the companies must cmahgaaenlnalgceein.egsIenabrtehyesdlloeawvsetlyl1or0peiyanlegiazrfisno,grpmtaharaltst"toehnfevtrhiiresoepnormifveEantMteaSlsemscwtaonilralheganevamebelternattnhsseyfmsotretmmoeso"dpotehrreaEitreMrmeSssop.roeRneesfgefuitcloaiettonhrtalyyt' as well. One of the reasons the Massachusetts Environmental Results Program succeeds in improv ing the performance of small businesses is because its workbooks and self-certification forms hmeelpntfiarnmdsccormeaptleiaanncde.mDariyntcalienanaerssim, fpolreeaxnadmspylest,eamreatgicuiadpepdrotoacchhetcokefnovrilreoankms peenrtiaoldmicaanllaygteo fix anyproblemspromptly, and to document their actions. The EMSs employed by larger firms are correspondingly more complex, of course, but they achieve the same goals: to help firms iedfefinActiinefyny7cUaynodSf.mbthauensiiarngeoespstehorearitrmioeunnsnv,iicraionpndamliatevynottiahdlalitemghpaaalscpmtrsoaabdnleedmaosnb.leigffaotirot ntos, and thus improve the overall comply with environmental regulations over the years probably has an "environmental management system," 31 though it may simply be a set of steps one or two employees know they must take to stay in compliance with regulations. In such cases, loss of those employees may mean loss of the "system." To pmreenvetanltmthaanta, gfiermmesnatn.dJetrnandifeerasNsoacshiatainondsJhoahvneEdherveenlofepledddmefoinree fEoMrmSaslaasp"pfrooramchael ssttroucetnuvriersonof rules and resources that managers adopt in order to routinize behavior that helps satisfy corpo rate environmental goals. They' are a subset of management systems in general." 32 The au thors point to the American Chemistry' Council's (formerly the Chemical Manufacturers As istodciiareticotns)""mRaenspaognesrisbtloe Cesatraeb"lipshroegnravmiroansmaecnotadleoobfjebcethivaevsi,orastshiagtnfirtesstphoantsdibefilinitiytioanll,obceacteaursee sources, and regularly' measure and report progress."33 The private sector has created the EMS innovation, and now' the public sector is trying to figure out what to make of it. Should government agencies be encouraging firms to adopt EMSs? Should agencies treat firms with EMSs differently? Will firms with EMSs begin to ask rceagnualatthoirrsdt-opatarktyectheretisfaicmaetioinnteogfraatfeidrm, s'syspteermfoartimcaanpcperoinacahntyoweanyviaruognmmeennttaolrprreoptleaccteiotnh?eAronlde of a regulatory' inspector?34 The next several sections of this chapter begin to answer those questions, documenting the cstornentrgibthusteantod twheeaekmneesrsgeesnocfeeoafchcaapp-parnoda-ctrha,daensdyastlesomssuagngdesptienrgfohromwanthcoes-beaaspepdromaacnhaegsemmigenhtt of the environment. The first section examines ISO 14001, the predominant international standard for environmental management systems. The next section considers "StarTrack," a program initiated by EPA Region 1to create a specialregulatory status for leading firms imple menting EMSs verified by a variety of third-party auditors. The third section analyzes efforts mineOntraelgopne,rfWorimscaonncsein,byanedstEabPlAishhienagdq"upaerrtfeorrsmtoanecnec-otruarcakg"e pfirromgsratomascshoiemveewbheatttersiemnivlairrotno StarTrack. The chapter concludes with an examination of New Jersey's long-standing pro grammatic attempt to accomplish some of the same goals through integrated facility-wide permits. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00040 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 41 ISO 14001 The International 0 rganization for Standardization (ISO), based in Geneva, develops stan dards to promote international commerce. In addition to product standards (e.g, for screw tdIhSarOredasd1,s4w)0,h0iit0chhsaedsreidefesin,veweslhotihpceehdedstwesfeoinntheiiasglthehlleyemevsiessinebntlsteioamfl aeanl"eamqgueeamnlittseynomtfsaaynnsateegmnevsmi:rteohnnetmIsSyenOsttea9ml0m"0(a0QnsaMegrSiee)ms; oaenfndtststayhnse tem. The EMS standard is defined in "ISO 14001"; other documents in the ISO 14000 series offer guidance on lifecycle assessment, environmental labeling auditor training and related topics. globISalOEM14S00s1tawndaasrfdo.rMmaolrleytahdaonp1te0d,0i0n0Sfierpmtesmanbderfa1c9il9it6ie,saanrdouranpdidthlye wbeocraldm--e pthaertidcoumlairnlyanint Asia and Europe--have "registered" to the standard. In the United States, only 463 organiza tions had done the same as of December 1, 1999,33 though that number is likely to grow significantly in the next few years. offiIcSiaOls a1n4d00r1epirsesaenvtoaltuivnetasrfyrosmtanodthaerrd,nadteivoenlaolpgeodvlearrngmeleyntbsyablusosipnaesrtsiecsipfoartebdusinintehseseds.ra(fEtiPnAg of the standard.36)Firms use ISO 14001 to help them identify and manage their environmen tal obligations. Some firms, including major auto manufacturers, also require their suppliers to be registered to the ISO 14001standard, presumably because they believe that the manage mopeenrtatseysmteomreweiflfliceinecnotluy,rathguesthperoirtescutpinpgliethrsetroepmuatiantitoainnoafgthoeodfinenisvhierdonpmroednutaclt raenpduktaeteipoinnganitds price down. The standard does not impose or suggest any particular environmental performance tar gets. It does, however, require that firms identify their significant "environmental aspects," tdheomseonimstpraatcetsathceomfirmmit'smoepnetratotioconms oprliparnocdeu,ctotstmheayprheavveenotinonenovfirpoonlmluteinotna,laqnudaltioty.thFeircmosnmtinuust ous improvement of their environmental management system. An EMS must include provi sions for training workers, for record keeping for establishing an environmental pohcy, and for periodically refining goals for environmental performance. Firms must docum ent every aspect of tFhierimr simdpolenmotenhatavteiotno odfevaenloEpMfoSr,manaldEmMuSsts,moafkceotuhrossee. dTohceuymceanntsiganvoarileabISleOto1a4u0d0i1toarsn.d compliance issues altogether; they can develop their own unique system for managing their environmen tal responsibilities; they can use a system that conforms to any of several European tEchhMeoosStsaesntIadSnaOdrda,1rod4rs0;h0371ir,iotnrhgethayenhyiancvdaeenapicemhnpodliecenemtotehfnitsredal-nfp-aEaurMtdyiStfiintrhgmaatoncrdo"snreeflogfri-smdterscaltrao"ritInoSgOatuhd1ei4itr0th0co1em.nfE.ovAremnreitigyfiswthtrietahyr checks to ensure that each element of a firm's EMS is in place, conforms to the standard, and is linked to the achievement of an organization's environmental goals. If all is in order, the registrar addsthe organization or facilityto the listof "ISO 14001-registered" entities. Tomaintain their registrations, firms must demonstrate annually to their auditors that they are maintaining tthael igrocaolms manitdmeonbtjteoctciovmespltihaenyce,spaencdifaireedmiankitnhgeiprropglarensss.inIfacahireevginisgtrwahrafteinvdesr e"nsvigirnoinfimcaennt nonconformances," it must notifythe firm immediately; if the firm failsto correct the problem, the registrar is obligated to suspend or terminate the firm's registration. somNeaosfhthanedfirEsht Ure.nSf.eflidrmussetod sceaeskersetguidsiterastaionndtsotathtiestIiScaOl a1n4a0ly0s1issttaonddeatredr.mTihneeywfohuant dmaotviavraietetyd7 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00041 42 Environment.gov of reasons, depending of the type of business, the corporate culture, and the firm'sposition in regard to environmental performance. Among those motivators: haadveesitroeptoasasdmdursigteorrwtoithananinitnedrneaplepnrdoecnetssaubdyitloetrting employees know that they would aanddeslieraedoenrshthipe ptoarttheoifrfpaacrileitnitesfiwrmithin a corporation to demonstrate their competence a desire to demonstrate to the public or to regulators that they were taking environmen tal responsibilities seriously, and thus should be considered national leaders in the field, worthy of recognition and closer relationships with regulators eamdiesssiiroentsoractoems pensate for-or even obscure-compliance problems or higher-than-average Many analysts have sought to explain why relatively few U.S. firms have registered to the standard. One answer isthat the registration auditsmay cost from $50,000 to $100,000.38Nash and Ehrenfeld concluded that early adopters in the United States tended to be large firms with wtI1rS9iebO9llu9-1teee4ssd0taw0ibc1itllsilbstchyhhea2dat0nea0gnl3elv.oa3i9rsfoptnhomweieernrpftauallrtpcsorosmugppraapmnliieserssasniumdcphalmaesmpFleeonrftdinEaaMnndcSiGsalceoannnedsriassltteManftfowtroeirstsohuimorcrperlsee.gmTisehtneotrsetehdeatitor envEirvoindmenecnetatol pdeartfeorsmugagnecset,spthaartticEuMlaSrlsyawnhdeInStOhe1f4ir0m01s sEeMt oSust tcoandoheslopinfircmorspiomraptreovpeoltihceieisr or ambitious goals. There is nothing in the standard, however, to ensure that firms will go beyond compliance requirements or achieve excellent results. Nash and Ehrenfeld conclude that implementing and maintaining an EMS registered to ISO 14001 can have a positive im pact on firms'behavior: We found that adoption of ISO 14001 led to two types of changes in the case study facilities. First, adoption has formalized and reinforced existing envi ronmental practices. Second, ISO 14001 has led to increased integration of elantvoirryocnommepnltiaalnocbejhecatsivbeeseninitnosbtiutusitnioenssalpizraecdtiacsesa.pBriyotrhitiysfwoer bmuesiannestshamtarnegagu ers and, in several facilities, pollution prevention activitieshave been incorpo rated into responsibilities of many workers.40 It remains to be seen if smaller firms, and those that implement formal EMSs merely to satisfy their business customers, will respond so aggressively It also remains to be seen how vigorously independent auditors "enforce" or uphold the standard. Nash and Ehrenfeld con clude that despite the lack of a requirement in the standard for compliance, ISO 14001-regis tered firms will tend toward better environmental performance. In written comments in response to this report, EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance argues that ISO 14001 fails to provide regulators wa fitihrmsu'scahdaospstuiorannocef t[hoef astfainrmda'srdcodmoepslinaontcgeuawriatnhtereecgounlattiinounosu].sWimepargorveeemthenatt toward compliance. Managers may adopt the standard, but fail to devote the Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00042 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 43 resources necessary for implementation; registrars may overlook managers' failure to address compliance issues. These examples are not what drafters intended, however. Continual improvement toward regulatory compliance is tmshtaeetnecstla:ela"rpthienirstfeosnrttmainoadnnacorefdIbSdeoOyeos1n4nd0oc0to1em.sFtmaobrilteimsxheamnatbp,slieon,ltuthhteee iprneotqlriuocyidr,uetcmotieconontmstopfoIhSraOnence1v4iwr0oi0tn1h applicable legislation and regulations and to continual improvement." ISO 14001 drafters viewed comphance as a performance requirement, not an empty commitment.41 The Multi-State Working Group (MSWG), an unusual affiliation of public and private practitioners and academics, is undertaking a long-term study to monitor the impact of ISO 14001, as well as the impact of less-formal EMSson the environmental performance of firms. IoattfhCEahMs,awSpsei.tl4h2HETilPlhA,ew'sMhfiinSchaWnwcGiilalplhaserultppicptiorparatcn,ktessththaeabvpleiesrhafedodormpateaddnactaaebcoaosfnehseuantnstdhureseddUosncoiuvfmefriserimntytstowhfaiNtthroevraatchrhioCeusasretosyslpienenas tiallythe same conclusion asNash and Ehrenfeld, while cautioning that regulatorsmust remain vigilant, even if firms are registered to ISO 14001: Eofviednevnicroensmugegnetsatlstmhaant aagceommepnrethseynstseimvesahpapvreomacehritto. cNoomEpMliaSncise athgrouuargahnutesee of compliance. Consequently governments must continue to maintain some degree of regulatoryoversight over allregulated entities, regardlessof whether ascnruetnintiitzyeheanstitainesEthMaSt hianvpelavcoel.unHtaorwileyviemr,pgleomveernntmedenatns EshMouSl.dEnnotittiuensdthulayt systematically discover potential compliance violations through an EM Smay be ehgible to take advantage of federal and state incentive policies for self dinisgcslouscuhrevso,launndtagryovdeisrcnlmoseunrtess.s4h3ould not unduly scrutinize entities for mak ISO 14001 is still new; and it has attracted many critics. Some argue that the standard itself iiststosiognwiefiacka:ntthaastpietcsthsoaunlddgdoeamlsafnodr icmomprpolviaenmceen, tp,uabslwicepllaarstipcuipbalitcioanccinesastfoiramu'dsiitdreenptiofritcsa.tiSoonmoef critics point to faults in the registration process. Others argue that the worst thing that could happen to the standard would be to load it down with pubhc policy objectives--or any require meamnedenrtagsnethninacnteowovofauftoilodrnmmoaalfikzpeeodatedEnoMtpiatSilolsynalslaearsgsreeaspipmpeepcaatlecidnt.gpatortfoirfmbsu.sMinoesstswmoaunladgaegmreeen,thisowa estveepr,ftohrwatatrhde, StarTrack: EPA's EMS experiment AdmEPinAisRtreagtioornJ1oihnnitiDateeVdiiltlsa"rsStwaraTsrpaacrkt"icpuillaortlpyroinjetecrteinste1d99i6ntoseteeisntgseivfetrhailrhdy-ppoatrhtyes' ecso.mRpeghiaonncael audits similar to financial audits done by independent certified pubhc accountants and relied upon by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission could begin to privatize EPA's en faocrcreedmibenlet ospyestreamtioonsf.cIofmthpohseanficremasucdoimtsm, tihtteend tEoPcAomwpoluialdncbeecoaubllde itdoenfoticfyusthietsminseslpveecsttohrrsouagnhd Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00043 44 Environment.gov enforcement resources on firms more likely to be in violation. Project designers also wanted to see if EPAcould encourage firmsto become environmental leaders by offering various rewards to those firms that volunteered to participate in the project. Bcoymreecsotganrsi,zianngdatnodmroewveartodiangpeernfvoirrmonamnceenlteavl e"lsbtaeryso,"ndEPmAehreopcoedmtpoliaennctiec.e more firms to be Finally, the pilot team envisioned EMSs and third-party audits as a means of improving the flow of information between firms and the public. If participating companies made environ mental-performance reports available to the public, they would have an incentive to maintain a high level of performance. And their neighbors would have a better understanding of the comTphaenpieilso'tehnavsirdoenmmoennsttarlactehdallseuncgceess.s in several of those areas, and has shed fight on some of the challenges states will face as they try to establish equally ambitious "performance-track" systems. partIinciepaartliyng20in00S,ta1r5Tfriarcmks., Tsioxjooifnwthheicphrhojaedctb, efiernmisnhvaoldvetod dsienmceonthsterasttea:rt of the pilot, were an established compliance-audit program an acceptable compliance history a cooperative relationship with regulators a top-management commitment to EMS implementation and continuous environmen tal improvement significant pollution-prevention efforts with quantified results44 metNthasohseacnrditeErhiar.enTfheeldstraefpfodretlitbheartaEtePlAy luefsteadmcboingsuidoeursatbhleeddeisficnriettiioonnoinf adnec"iadcicnegpwtahbilceh" cfiormms pliance history to provide enough room to allow in the program firm sthat were starting lowbut were committed to improvement. Participating firms had to: conduct an annual compliance audit (with regulatory staff in attendance as observers); perform an annual EMS audit (again with observers); publish an annual environmental perform ance report; and commit to conduct a thIinrdr-eptuarrtny, aEuPdAitgeavveeryputhbrlieceryeecaorgsn.4i5tioTnhotoseSrteaqrTuriraecmk penartsticairpeasnutms bmyalrisiztiendgitnheFmiguornei2ts-3w.eb page and applauding them in other venues. Nash and Ehrenfeld report that: EPA also offerswhat it calls"partnerships" to firmsparticipating in StarTrack. By this the agency means "constructive feedback to help improve auditing programs, environmental management systems, and measures for improving overall environmental performance." StarTrack promotional materials fist additional benefits to managers of firms. These additionalbenefits-which are ninostpleicsttieodnipnritohreitfyoarmndal"eaxgprereesms leanntes sseigrvniecde bfoyrtpheermpaitrstiaens-dinocthluedreremguoldaitfoierdy actions."46 thatAtfhteerpciolontdfuicrmtinsgaenxdtepnasritvieciipnatetirnvgieEwPsAanadndfoustracteasreegstuuldaiteosr,sNhaasdh faonrdmEedhrceonnfesltdruccotinvceluredlead tionships that strengthened their mutual understanding and trust. Those emerged because Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00044 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 45 FIGURE 2-3: SUMMARY OF STARTRACK REQUIREMENTS Annual Comprehensive Regulatory Compliance Audits Annual Environmental Annual Environmental Triennial Independent M anagem ent System + Audit-based on ISO Performance Reports, + made publicly Third Party Review + 14000 available A udit all federal, state, and local regulations with StarTrack Audit Protocol Identify deficiencies in facility EMS. Fill out EMS Implementation Plan to schedule correction of deficiencies. Reports: Facility Profile Policies and Management Community relationships Environmental management Operational performance Product information Verifies: Com pliance status Scope and accuracy o f audits and audit findings Effectiveness of EMS Overall adherence to StarTrack Identify all areas of non-compliance and fill out Corrective Action Plan regulators spent considerable time in plants observing audits and learning about individual EMSs, and the firms put a high value on that engagement.47 Perversely, however, the pilot facihties consumed more, not fewer, EPA resources. The StarTrack staff had made a dehberate effort to engage state regulators and representatives of EPA'sOffice of Enforcement and Com pliance Assurance (OECA) in the pilot in order to overcome OECA's natural suspicion of privatizing compliance assurance: A chief concern for OECA at the outset was that participating companies mhaisgnhot rtehdaupcpeenatetden, taicocnotrodicnogmtophthaencOeEoCncAe aanddmsitttaetde einntfoortcheemperongt rpaemrs.oTnnheisl with whom we spoke. There is no evidence to suggest that environmental performance at StarTrack companies isdeclining, or that companies are tak ing advantage of the penalty mitigation provisions offered by the program. w"Iany,m" oesxtpclaasinese,dcoonmepmanainesagfoelrloawt OthEroCuAghfaomnitlhiaerirwciothmSmtaitrmTreanctks.in a serious Yet OECAhasnot accepted the idea that companies admitted into StarTrack dPolannonitnngeeadndtoPboehcinysApencatleydsibsyatEPOAE.C[ATh, eb]elaiecvtiensgtdhiartecRtoegr ioofnth1ehOasffyiceet toof prove that the program provides compliance assurance. "The fact that these Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00045 Environment.gov companies are less likelyto violate environmental lawshas not yet been estab lished," he said. More experience isneeded to test the reliability of the audits and the third-party system. Others at OECA also urged that the program noleebmesedsrsavremetohdriesecaotuivdmeiterse.,d""eToxvhpeelratoihnneelydcoawunarsOyeEtooCf bA5u0silotdarfslfeopgeairutsidmointas.c,"yhIefinandotqhsueuabprstretoargnsrtwaiamilllphirsaovtboe to see the program as legitimate." RcoenpcreersnenatbaotiuvtetshoefcboosttshoOf SEtCarATraancdk.s0tatfeteennbveitrwonemenefnitvaelaangden1c0iepseeoxpplerefsrsoemd agencies observe compliance and EMS audits. Inspectorsfrom air, water, and waste departments take part. Preparing for audits, participating in them, and assessing results require substantial amounts of time. [Amanager from] New7 pHaatmingpsihnirSe'tsaDrTerpaacrktmreeqnutiorefsEonnveirfounlml-teimntealeSqeurivviacleesnetxfpolraihniesdatgheantcpyarFtiocuir New Hampshire companies belong to StarTrack.48 Nash and Ehrenfeld conclude that the pilot has demonstrated that the first of StarTrack's taosrsyu7manpdtioancsowmams citomrreenctt:troegpuerlaiotodrisc cthanirdre-apsaortnyabaluydeitxspteoctbfeirmmosrwe iltihkealygothoadncootmhperlisatnocebehiisn compliance, and hence that EPA can reasonably change its ownbehavior toward participating firms. Specifically the researchers recommend that EPA reduce its direct oversight of partici pating firms, and have inspectors focus on poor performers.49 They also find that StarTrack is nEoPtAanhaesffaevctaiivleabvleehtiocloefffeorrfeirnmcos--uraregcinoggnfiirtimons taongdofebweyeroinndspceocmtipolnias--ncearbeetcoaouwse7eathke. EinPcAenctoivuelds not or did not put participating firms on an "express lane" for permits or provide any unusual regulatory flexibility7. Is StarTrack improving the performance of firm s that participate in the pro gram? The answer, based on our case studies of participating facilities, ap pears to be no. While environmental performance at StarTrack firm s is im proving, improvements should not be attributed to the program. To be admit tinedcl,uadefasceinlivtyirmonumstehnatavlepaerhfiosrtomryanocfe pimolplurotivoenmpernetvaesnatigoonaal.nFdiramnsEthMaSt mtheaett these criteria are managed by people who have already invested in environ mental performance improvement, and are committed to continuing to do so. Neither is StarTrack likelyto improve the performance of facilitiesthat might aspire to participate in StarTrack. The reason is important. Our cases show7 that the factors that push managers to develop beyond-compliance programs hamavbeitliiottules teonvdiorownimthenatgaelnpcrieosg.raOmusr breesceaaurscehthsuegygaersetsbtohtaht mcaapanbalgeearnsdadmooptit vated. In our statistical analysis we saw that facilities that have already insti tuted advanced management systems such as ISO 9000, and that are owned bhyavlearthgee coarpgaabniilzitayti-oinnste, ramres othfeknoonwesletdhgaet aanddopretsIoSuOrce1s4-t0o0e1m. TbrhaecseetfhaecEiliMtieSs standard. In the case study facilities, managers were motivated to invest in Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00046 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 47 environmental performance improvement by the need to improve efficiency and reduce costs, and, in some cases, to gain stature with corporate manage ment. Managers told us that they also wanted to improve their reputations with agencies. But this desire, on its own, was not a sufficient incentive. 0 ur cases suggest, therefore, that even if EPA could deliver the benefits it has promised in StarTrack, these benefits would stillbe inadequate, on their own, to shift the curve of environmental performance in the direction of excel lence. Larger forces shape the environmental practices of firms. Fortunately othfecsoemfoprlcieasncheavaendinbreeycoenndt cyoemarpslpiarnocpee.lAlegdemncainesyhcaovme pstaonoidesatinthtehesiddeirleincetiso.5n0 EPA does not plan to remain on the sidelines, however. In the agency's July 1999 publica atigoenn,cAyimcoinmgfmoritEtexcdeltloendcee:vAelcotiponas"topEernfcoorumragaencSteewtraarcdksh"itphaantdwAocucelldereantecEonuvriarognemfeirnmtasl Ptoroggroesbse,5y1otnhde compliance. On June 26,2000, the agency formally launched its Performance Track program, and invited firms with strong compliance records, an EMS of some form (not necessarily ISO 14001 or one audited by a third party), appropriate public reporting and outreach, and a AceonpmvpihmrocinatmmnteesnnmttaetloetapicnohglileuEvtPieAomn'sersnettadnutrdcaatcirokdn.s"waEnilPdl:Acreorcmeegipivloeinapanulc-beolftifocicraeepcpsotlgayfnffiotwiroianllc;cr"eewvpiitlealwnbceeeaatcolohwtha'epprp"ilnoiacritatityoionfnoar.l inspection targeting purposes"; and will be eligible to attend various meetings with EPA offi cials. In announcing the program, EPA committed to amend various guidance documents and taolssoeceokmrumleitctehdantgoeusntvheaitl wa o"unladticorneaalteenmvoirroensmigenniftiaclasntterweawrdarsdhsipfotrrapcakr"ticinip2a0ti0o1n,. oTnheethaagtenwciyll reward firms with exemplary programs with various as-yet-undefined benefits.52 The imple mentation of the performance track includes a commitment to improved environmental per formance and pollution reduction, as well as to continued comphance. itspEroPmA'isspeesrofforinmsapneccteintrgapcakrptircoipgaratimngs wfirilml ssulcescseoedfteonn,lyanifdtrheewaagrdenincgyhfiingdhsaachwieavyetrosfwiviethunpetwo7 regulatory7flexibility The former willrequire a cultural change within the agency, and the latter mtheaiyrrfeoqrueirruensntaetrust--orIyS7cOha1n4g0e0, 1as, ESPtaAr'Tseraxcpke,riaenndceowthiethrsP--rosjiegcntaXl Lthseuggrgoewstsin. gThsoepinhiitsitaitciavteiosnanodf pmreivnattoerernevpilraocnemgoenvtearlnmmaennat ginesmpeecnttiosnyss,teamnds,tthheempoattuenratitaiol nofotfhtihred-ppriavratytecseertcitfoicr'astrieosnptoonsaeutgo environmental regulation. That maturation opens up new possibilities for more cost-effective regulation. Third-party ccearpt-ifaincdat-itorand, efoproelxluatmiopnl-er,ecdauncthioenlpsryesdteumceintrvaonlsvaincgtiomnacnoysttsraadnedrse. nhance the dynamism in a menAtsptehrefoformlloawncineg-bsaescetidornegduemlaotonrsytrpartoegs,rasmevsewrailthstiantethsehiarvjuerbisedeinctiwoonrsk. iTnhgefyorayreeastrrsutgogilminpglteo find incentives with sufficient power to make their systems work. Oregon and Wisconsin: Building a Performance Track The promise of "regulatory heaven" floats in front of Wisconsin business people who listen to a state employee describe the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resource's (WDNR) new "Environmental Cooperation Agreements" program. Volunteering firms would have to com- Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00047 Environment.gov mit to a new way of managing both their environmental impacts and their relationships with the department, but in exchange, they could escape "regulatory hell,"53 the world of ordinary permits. Oregon calls its perform ance-track experim ent "Green Permits," and its goals for the piinnrggollgyyrsaftlmeroxnaibrgleeeanrtevlgieruaoslnatmtaoserlynotf"attylipeWresri.fs"ocAormncsacionnrc'sd:eitniongpertxoocvhSidapneegiirne,cbfeoynrteaiavdremlsyift2otar0n0cco0em, bipnoattonhioesnsteatotoedfpetrhliorvgeereraiimnnccsrreehaaassd been maturing for several years, were authorized in state legislation, and were building innova tive relationships with severalfirms. As of July2000, both programs were also stillworking with EPA to determine exactly how much flexibility they could deliver to participating companies. REPesAeawriclhl gerivJeerthryeSsptaetiers'seannoaulygshisloatfittuhdeetwtootpersotgthraemlismciotsncolfutdhees tahpaptroitaicshsetisll.not clear whether Wisconsin and Oregon'swork to date illustrates not only a new way of thinking about how states might better regulate facihties, but also the challenge states and EPA face in sorting out tshoemirerroelseesmanbdlanaucethtooriEtiPeAs.'sSppeerifroirdmenatnifcieedtrfaivceko(stheeerTsatbaltees2t-h3a).t are developing programs with TABLE 2-3: STATES DEVELOPING A "PERFORMANCE TRACK" OREGON W ISC O N SIN Green Environmental M anagem ent System (GEMS) Permits 19 9 7 , legislation passed; 19 9 9 , rules adopted Three tiers: Participant, Achiever, and Leader. Cooperative Environmental Agreements 19 9 7 , legislation passed. N E W JERSEY M IC H IG AN M INNESOTA Silver and G old Track Program for Environmental Performance September, 19 9 9 (announced) Three tracks: Silver, Silver II, G old. 5 Clean Corporate Citizen (C3) Program 1 designees as of Novem ber 19 9 9 Benefit to participants include: " faster reviews o f air emission source and storage tank permit applications, and expanded waivers for construction and operation o f air emission sources during permit review, and plant-wide applica b ility limits (PALs) for air emissions." 54 Regulatory innovations legislation designed to test state " XL permits." 55 LO UISIAN A Legislation providing for an innovations program, adopted in 19 9 7 .56 IL L IN O IS A non-statute-based pilot project offering participating firms with EMSs: " assistance from Illinois EPA staff in completing data collection protocols, technical assistance in pollution prevention and public involvement, access to independent research on ISO 1 4 0 0 1 , and Illinois EPA recognition and publicity." 57 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00048 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 49 Speir describes the essential elements of the Wisconsin and Oregon programs, their history, and the would-be participants' preliminary proposals for cooperative agreements or green permits. As of late July 2000, none of those proposals had been finalized. fairhmWisstiwosrciytohnosafivnestrdraoegsneiggrnepecedorrfidotssrmpseraeonkgcirneagmatsotaompaerkneegraebgqigeuignsaiotietnsjfu.os(rtOpcraoergrtpoiconir'psaatpetriooegnnr.v)aimTroh,neimnWecnoitnsactlroalnesstai,dnreesrqstua, tibureutest authorizes the state Department of Natural Resources to sign agreements with up to 10 firms. Each agreement has to meet a long list of requirements, including the following: "cPurrorevnidt elaawt least the same level of protection of public health and the environment" as "caEunsceo, udriaregcetlfyacainlidtyinodwirneecrtslya,ntdo othpeeraairt,owrsattoersyasntdemlaantidc"ally assess the pollution that they p"Eolnlucotiuornagreedfauccitliiotynoswtrnaetresgaiensd.o. p. werhaitloercsotmo pimlyipnlgemweitnht veefrfiifciiaebnlteaanndd ceonsfto-recfefeacbtlieve pollution limits" m"aEbananclcaoenu"creaagsaetmofoabcnoigltihttyhreeogweucnloaentresodmanaicdn,dospuocenirraaeltgoaurnlsadttoeednavceifhrfioeencvtmes eosnufpttaehlreiiimorrpfeaacncivtlsiitriooefsn,mth"eewsnhetialelefpfaoecrrhtfsioetrvhiantgis acceptable to the community in which the facility is located" Consolidate environmental requirements into a single cooperative agreement "to the extent that consolidation is practical and efficient" "G ran t. . . greater flexibility' than would otherwise be allowed" under present law "Seek to reduce the time and money spent by government and ... facilities on paper work and other administrative tasks that do not result in benefits to the environment" "Encourage public participation and consensus ... in the development of innovative environmental regulatory methods and in monitoring . .. performance" "Seek to improve the provision of useful information to the public" "Provide pubhc access to information about performance evaluations" "Encourage facility owners and operators and communities to work together to reduce pollution below the levels" required by current law58 The statute requires that each agreement "specifywaste reduction goals in measurable and verifiable terms" and "contain pollution limits that are verifiable, enforceable and at least as stringent" as current law Participating companies must commit to implement an environmen tmcaolemnmtmsaenfonartgeopmnubeiltnisctEsiMnyvsStoelmvanembdaebsneetdienoxvncoelIevSdeOdanin1y4tmh0i0en1agsuainnridnIgSaOltlhoew14say0ns0t1e",mintr'tsaepdreeitsritfoeondramplaepnrescroemn. siTtghsryeosurteepmq"u5s9,iroteor even StarTrack. Speir reports that firms are apprehensive about those requirements. The emphasis on public involvement reflects the program 's roots. Wisconsin conceived its "cooperative agreements" as analogues to the Dutch "covenants" between businesses and the Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00049 50 Environment.gov communities in which they operate. One aspect of a covenant isthe presumption that commu nity representatives can make soundjudgments about a company'soverall program, balancing environmental, economic, and social concerns. The Wisconsin program calls on communities troathhTeehlrpethifnainnthalaadtamgprrieonecimsetsresa,nttibsvuewt ldoaouwelsds. nTboehtafgotirvnmeoatcilooiznmedwmoiunrnriicteoydnrtEerpParcAet,ssehanontwadteitvvheeurs.sasudbecjeiscitotnomcaoknitnrgacrot llea.w, EPA has had concerns about the legal implications of calling the agreements "contracts," especially as to their enforceability. The concern centers on wfinheesthoefrctohnetcraocnttrlaawct, ltaankginugagtheemaiggrhetesmugenget sotuat roefmtehdeycoonnltyewxtitohfinththeetrcaodni tional administrative and enforcement remedies associated with permits. The compromise presentlyin development would allowthe agreementstobe called fcuolnl taradcmtsinbiusttrawtoivueldparolscoesresq(uniorteicteh,actothmemy benett,reaantdedenasfopercrmemitse,nint)clausdsoincgiatthede with permits. Whether these "contracts" will also generate an additional legal remedy in contract law' ispresently unclear: that will depend on the language of the final agreements.60 Because the agreements would involve requirements framed by federal programs delegated to Wisconsin, EPA insisted that it had to approve the overall program. Negotiations lasted 18 months, and resulted in a memorandum of agreement between the state and EPA, the first "RiengnuolvaatotiroynIsnangorveaetmionen"t("threeasoc-hceadlleudn"dEeCr tOheSuAmgbrereemllaen"tJ"oisnigtnEePdAby/ SthtaetEenAvgirroenemmeennttatloCPouurnscuiel of the States and EPA). The final memorandum does what the Massachusetts'XL agreement does: creates a process whereby most thorny issues are resolved as they arise by an interagency group. Speir explains: A key issue, and one that appears to surface anywhere these kinds of pro grams are discussed, is what exactly constitutes a "federal requirement" trig gering a necessity for EPA approval. This is still an open question under the mreseumrfoarcaenddiunmthoefneaggoretieamtioennts breeatwcheeedn ObertewgeoennaWndDRNeRgioannd10EtPhAat,aarnedprheass ently on-going The issuehas been generallyresolved by WDNR'sagreement to submit all applicationsunder the Cooperative Agreement Pilot Program to EPA Region 5 for its review, and to w'ork out any concerns that may arise through an Inter-Agency Implementation Team process.61 Despite the ambiguity that remained about who would determine exactly what is accept able, four firms submitted proposals to WDNR seeking various kinds of regulatory flexibility in exchange for past or future performance beyond compliance.62Most of the applicants sought permission to combine permits, reduce or consolidate reporting requirements, or replace prowceistsh-ospuetcwifaicitipnegrmfoirtsnewwitphearmwithso.lOe-nfaecfiliirtmy esmouisgshitonascrcoasps-emneadbilaincghafinrgmes: ittowcahnatnegdetoprdoecveeslsoeps a new process for treating its waste that might result in the need for a water discharge perm it; the change, however, would enable the company to shut down its incinerator. As might be espxepceicfitcedthiannatphreoicr epsrsoimnvisoelvsifnogr nimegportoiavteidonp,etrhfeorfmirmansc'ei.niAtifatlerrepqrueelsimtsifnoarrfyledxiisbciulistsyiownesr,eomneoroef Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00050 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 51 the four firms withdrew its application. The others are moving through the review process. Neither the firmsnor WDNR--or even local environmental groups--has yet sought to clarify how to meet the statute's public involvement requirements. ianggeTmohuertnettehSefyifrsimtneesmpaPoreienratmst riotof"utpghrheolgyprrtaohmgeras(GmamE. eM(OpSor)ei,gnaotnnidnatOdhoerpesgtteaodtner'isusnlaeetswrion"uAGghurlegyeuntshteE1ns9av9mi9roetonpmoimiennpttliaenlmwMeonartnka 1997 statute.) On June 1, 2000, EPA and Oregon signed a memorandum of agreement to implement the GEMS program. All parties are wondering how far the new system will be able to go in transforming relationships between regulators and firms. perfTohrme saynscteem, arnedquainreascftiirvmessttoakheahvoeldanerhinnpvloelmveemnteendt EprMocSe,sas hbiesftoorreytohfesytrcoanngaepnpvliyrofnomr eennttrayl into even the lowest of the three tiers. The system also requires apphcants to pay $5,000 as a first installment to cover the state's costs for reviewing an apphcation. hagaesInbnceyce,oxacmnhdeankognteho,ewprnabraetsniceaifp"itpasnecrtosfomwrmmouaelnndcsreuerlcaaetdievdweeriat"h:"itsnhicnergefleairsmpino'gsinplteevoreffloscromofnaptnaeccretf".orTwmhitaehnircnueltewhes-oerutesldguurpelacwetohivrayet increasingregulatorybenefits.63 Speir summarizes the distinctions among the green permit tiers: For all GEMS permits, the agency may apply its enforcement discretion to madednrteaslsmapapnraogpermiaetenct osmysptelmia.ncFeoirsAsucehsitehvreoruganhdimLperaodveermPeenrmtsittos,ththeeenavgiernocny "may provide expeditious review's of proposed modifications to existing per mits, modify existing permits for maximum flexibility for process changes wpehrimchitdso. .n.omt ondeigfyatrievceolyrdimkepeapcint gthoer erenpvoirrotinnmg erenqt,uierxetmenendtst,hceodourdriantiaoten roef porting cycles . .. or provide other benefits that streamline regulatory interac tions or benefit the facility." In addition, "the agency may provide waivers of environmental laws, if needed, to make these incentives possible." For Leader Permits, the agency may facihtate innovative approaches that isnuvcohlvaesmfaocrileittahtianngoanesufapcpilliietyr-(ceu.gs.t,ommueltriprelelaatpiopnhschaitpio.6n4sforthe same project), One particular negotiation in Oregon serves as a good example of the value of a perfor mance track--and of the dilemma it poses for EPA. LSI Logic, a semiconductor manufacturer, is working with Oregon DEQ in an attempt to expand its flexibility The LSI plant already has uiatlftdaimociealsitteynl-yow,ttiodeexhpaaeivrcetpoetnhrmeatuittm,oabhsraedplolpeaespnaenrimnInittthefeloprslhaalonlrtmtinetedtrhimae, ws66taitt(heIn.o6t5enleStprreeiepirdorrtetopfooarrcthtshiteehveaentatLirSseiImsweitlo,autrhlrdoeusligukelht, through EPA'sProject XL at its Chandler, Arizona, plant, only to end up with separate federal, state, and local permits.) More significantly for its day-to-day operations, LSI is seeking expedited permits; as with many others in high-tech manufacturing, its officers com plain that the present system of permitting impedes their market flexibility. Aspart of a proposal to conserve water and to test a "massbalance" approach to wuste management, LSI also requests approval to increase the concentration Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00051 52 Environment.gov of a particular contaminant in its wastewater, without increasing the actual "loading" to the treatment system. AcunrdreLnStIreogffuelrastaonryotshcehrepmreo.pToshael tfhedaet rhailgrhelgiguhlatstiaopnsa,rtiincuthlaerirperxotbelnesmivwe idtehtathile, at 40 CFR 265 Subparts BB and CC, set out required control devices, moni toring, inspection, and labeling requirements for tanks storing hazardous materials, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LSI's equipment is more advanced than the regulations envisioned (its system op eorxaitdeiszeurn"d--era "cnoengtarotilvdeepvriecsestuhrae,t"bfuorrnesxaaimr pemle,isasinodnsi--s vaenndtednotot rael"etahseerdmdail rectly to the atmosphere). Still, the regulations, which were designed with large hazardous waste treatment and storage facilities in mind, cause the firm tmoeinntssp,ercetc,omrdosnitthoart, aanred smubajienctat itno riencsopredcstiospne,ceifviecntothtohuegrhegtuhleaytodryo'nr'etqrueairlely apply to LSI's system. LSI seeks an exemption, based on a finding that its system is equivalent--or superior--to the system envisioned by the regula tions. RCRA is quite prescriptive in its requirements. The question will be whether meeting the intent of the regulation (i.e., control of emissions) is ac ceptably equivalent to employing the technology' required by the regulation. There are questions, of course, about exactly how that determination of eaqpupievaarletoncbeewthoeuslodrtboefmchadaen.geAtshsautmwinogulidt fcaolul ilndtobethmeasdeceo, nhdowcaetveegro, ritywofouthlde MOA discussed under the Wisconsin program, those "approvable without any change in the federal program," though a federal notice approving the change would likely still be required. Interestingly, observers note that /LSI had sufficient air emissions to require a Title V permit, its present practices would likely fall within an exception within Title V But emissions are below7the threshold at which Title V applies. Also of interest: LSI reports that its "new relationship" with ODEQ , which is already evident, is one of the most beneficial aspects of participating in the pcoilnottapcrto"gwraitmh .aTDheEQnewstarfefleartiwonhsohiispaisblleartgoeldyeavofutencetnioonugohf taim"seintgolethpeoicnotmof pany to understand its issues and arguments, and who doesn't show up only for inspections.67 eanfvaAicrisolitnthymeaeLsnSat,Iwbeuhxtoawlmei,pllaliensgsauadgnygdnesaatbmsl,eitchtoeenmvtaealriunpetraiosienf apcorpanecsrtftiaocnremtslytahncahcteam-ntegreaintcgokriatepsxpecrxeoaeacdctthhreeilsapittuisobtnrhescha'sitpmgetenonettrhaoelf requirements as defined in environmental statutes and regulations. EPA'sdilemma isthat those requirements--the RCRA regulations, in this instance, as well as the underlying statutory re EquPiAre'sminesniststetnhcaet oEnPAtheis"reenqfuoirrceedabbiyliltayw" otof pimerpmleimtsernetquainrdesecnofomrcpeh--andcoe wnoitthfitthLeSleItvteerryofwtehlle. law, not the spirit. The specificity of EPA'sregulations is intended to paint bright lines between comphance and non-comphance, eliminating the need for plant managers, permit-writers, or Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00052 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 53 enforcement officers to make judgments about the effectiveness of the overall system as it appliesto an individualfacility Under a performance-track system, it isnot clear what activities would--or should--trigger intervention from EPA. iesaucnThihqfeiuremW, airsnecdqounthisraientsiajmundpdogOsmirneegngttohsneopmnroothgsteraetfmrfaesdctseitovaferftsawnbdiethtewftfehiceeineimnetspstlaeitbcioltifsahesensduvmirreopgntuimolanetsnottrhaylacrteoeqnaudcihirteifomancesilnoittnys and new opportunities for environmental gain. The two programs further assume that state employees, in consultation with public stakeholders, are capable of making thosejudgments on the public's behalf If Oregon approves the LSI request, it will be because its environmental rIefgWuliastcoornssdinecaipdpertohvaetsththeefawcailsitteyw'sactoenrt/rionlcsianreeraattolreapsrtoepqousiavla, lietnwtitlol btheobseecsapuesceifrieegduinlaRtoCrsRdAe. cide that the facility'snet impact on the environment will be reduced. Those decisions are not purely technical; they involve judgments about the relative efficacy of different technologies, tihmepAoretrlltaeatanisvcteesiohnafczedatirhffdeesrceprneotastteiydopnebsoyfodfPirfeofnejvereicrntoXtncmLh,eetnmhteaicleanhlsvariarmonndomreexrnepstoatsolurearsettiaopbnal.itshhwmaeyns,t and the relative has fretted about the need for an objectivedefinition of "superior environmental performance." The innovative, challenging notion the legislatures in Oregon and Wisconsin embraced in their performance track statutes is that their state agencies should exercise their judgment, that permit writers shouIltdr--emoaninasptiolobtebsaeseisn, hatolweafsatr--EtPeAstwthilel lleimt tihtes otwf otrastnastefosramndinpgatrhtieciirpraetliantgiofnirsmhispgsowwitihthfitrhmesir. experiments. If the agency responds as it did in the Massachusetts Environmental Results Pro gram, and even in StarTrack, the two pilots will demonstrate very little except that attempting tpcooronnsseeegcrovutatiitanitvgee--aLfSaaIcnifdloitlryes-vwsioeifdlfaeeticpnteigvremt--hietaiRspptCirmRoaeAcchosttnoasneudnmavriidnrosg,nImLljSefIonrtcaeolxmualdamnpbalegee,emExPpeAenct.rtee0dtatihtnoesrttfahikremethsarwemoaout rlodef follow suit. It is harder to predict what would happen if EPA lets the two states exercise their discretion. And that, of course, is the point of conducting pilots. N e w Jersey's Facility-Wide Permitting Project To see what might occur if states continue to develop integrated, multimedia permits, one needs only look at New Jersey's Facility-Wide Permitting Project. Initiated by the state legisla ture in 1991 as part of the innovative Pollution Prevention Act, the project has engaged 18 tchoamt pcaonniseosliidnattihnegdpeevremloitpsmceannteolifmfiancailtietys-owmideebpaerrrmieritssto(FpWoPllsu)t.i6o8nT-phreeivreenxtpioenri,eanncdesthsuagtgseigst nificant gains can be assured if facility-wide permits explicitly require firms to reduce emis sions. Pollution prevention--P2--was a relatively new term in 1991 when the New Jersey legisla ture passed a law requiring all firms in the state reporting toxic release inventory emissions to pErnevpiarorenmP2enptlaalnPsr,oatnecdtitoonfi(lDeEaPb).riTehf esusmtamtuateryalosof tchreematewd itthhethpeiloNt epwrogJerrasmeyfDorefpaacriltimtye-nwtidoef permits. The permits were to be based on the details of a facility's P2 plan: the descriptions of each manufacturing process, and an accounting of the specific uses and fate of all hazardous mintaetnesriiavleslyinwitthhosfaeciplriotycesstaseffs.onDdEePvealsospiginngedthaosheigphla-npsroafnilde tgraronuslpatoinfgstthaeffmminetmobbeirnsditnogwpoerrk mits. That intensive use of staff produced severalremarkable results, according to Helms, etat. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00053 54 Environment.gov Each of the 12 signed FWPs consolidated between 12 and 100 permits into a single facility-wide permit. Some of the factories had had a separate permit for each of dozens of air-pollution sources or "stacks." The facility-wide permit first aggregated those saoiru-recmesisisniotonssecpaparoatneeiancdhusptrroiaclespsr.ocTehsoseses wcaitphsinaltlhowe ffaicrmilistytoan"tdrathdeen" rgeednuecrtailolynssewtiathnin their facilities.69 gTreanmofhathsebe1e2nFoWpePraftaicoinliatilesflerexpiboirlitteyd: tthheayt tnhoelboingggeerstnbeeendeafiuttfhoorrtihzaetmionfrotomcthhaengperothenpchearmngiet pdroioesrnto't iinncsrtaelalsinegthneeiwr "enqounipprmoednutcot rocuhtpauntg"inogr tehxecierepdrothceesirsepse,rpmroitvtieddedemthisesion levels.70 The intensive review7that accompanied the FWP assurance improved the regulators' and plant managers'understanding of the plants and their systems. Together with DEP staff facility managers in virtually every firm discovered at least one air-pollution source rmthesoaurtelltairncegkseofduacracilerit-eyiqn-uwteiinrdesedivppee,errnmmoitittsb;ewocneareuesftaehctuihlsietymphoroarcedearsocscuwugarhasltyien4ts0eimgurpnaltpyeedbremacciartuotessdes mtshoeeudrpicare.osc.e71ssTwhaes Firms reduced the emissions from facilities, not necessarily because of the integrated p"Eernmviirt,obnumtebnetcaalumseanoafgwerhsastatwh7etyheleirarfanceidlitiinest,hoeftpernocfeosrsthoef fdiersvtetliompien,gasthaespeeriremsiot:f connections and materials flows, rather than as a checklist of point sources."72 FWP permit writers, working in cross-media teams, discovered and eliminated a cross media shift of VOCs. In one plant, the existing permits had required the operation of "strippers" to remove VOCs from an air stack. The process left the VOCs dissolved in water, which eventually was discharged to a local treatment plant. There, the wastewater wasenaeyswtpharayot.ctTehsehsieerdseifinnfogsrletus-c--mheaadnwiduamtyhetphefaratmcmiliitotyws'tsriorteefsrtoshuheracVdeOsn--Cevwseeervrfeaopblloeoriwnaetgeddwthabseatcepkdro.i7nc3etossthfaeraeinrough to fOacnielitcyonmepedanedy ctoreudpitgsrtahdeepmroagnryamofwitisthsyssatevminsg, tahnedftihrme 'FsWopPerpartoiocnesisneNnaebwleJdertsheey The company and the DEP to work out the permitting expeditiously Were it not for that cooperation, the firm might have left the area.74 The ebb and flow of the FWP program illustrates some of the classic challenges of innova tion. Created by one administration with high hopes and a high profile, the subsequent admin istration all but wiped out the staffing and special status of the program before it could make good on its promise. The status of the FWP permitting team s aroused the jealousy of other DEP employees, leading to behavior within the department that slowed the FWP and con osttrhaeirnwediseitslogsatiinnst.erSeostm, aedodfinthgetopdaertlaicyispaantidngthceoomvperaanllieesxpweenrseesolofwthdeeplirvoejericntg. EdvaetraytooneDwEPit,hoinr DEP, as well as in the participating companies, discovered that the program was more complex to administer than they had expected: the demands on staff time were much higher; and the wenevreiromnumcehnhtaalrdbeenr etofitdsissptiencgiufiicsahllyfroamttriibmuptarobvleemtoetnhtes rmesuultlitimngedfiraomaspoetchtesroffortchees.final permits Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00054 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 55 None of the permits includes a true multimedia cap (on the total emission of a particular chemical, for example). Rather, the DEP staff essentially "stapled" fairly traditional water and waste permits onto the consolidated air permits.75 (Helms, et al., note that water-discharge permits have traditionally been aggregated to a single point of discharge for a whole facility, so ptheermcoitnsteexntteanndds tnoartuesroeuorcfethceonwsaetrevratpioenrm, hitasbditiadt nreosttocrhaatniogne, uonrdoetrhethreenFvWirPo.n)mNeonntealopfrothbe lems that regulators in Oregon or Wisconsin might include in their performance-track permits as they negotiate a facility's overall environmental hnpact. Managers of several of the partici pating FWP firms said that they believed the integrated permits would be more effective if they ianncdlusdpeildl pmroevreenpteiromn.i7t6s and activities, including water conservation, stormwater management, The New Jersey permits are more conservative than those envisioned by Wisconsin and Oregon not only in the scope of environmental impacts they encompass, but also in the degree of flexibility they presume to offer participants. According to Helms, et al., the project's staff concluded that more flexibility would have yielded better results: P2 Office staff felt the FWP writers are constrained because they have to follow every existing DEP rule. Allowing exemption from prescriptive per mwiitthtionugtrfuollelsowifinthgethpeemrmwitocuoludldprboeviadtelemasotraeslpereowteacytifvoer oinfntohveaetinovni.roFnomr eenxt ample, it would be easier for FWP writers to create facility-wide air caps, change reporting requirements, set realistic permit limits, and develop per mits that require P2 commitments if the FWPs did not have to meet the specific requirements of the DEP regulations on those issues.77 Because the process was working within the general parameters of traditional regulations, both the state and EPA regard the new permits as equivalent to the old. DEP and EPA worked together smoothly on the project. EPA generally reviewed each of the permits but did not need mtdoeavpjerolorovpsiomdueercanentsyoofoftfhatiehr FepWoslplPuectpiioraonl c,aepasnpsdr, ohtvohawelseavgiteeran,ncEtyiPchAiapsadtneevosetilynoepOteddreeicgtisodTnediatlwnedhVeWtphriesocrgotronasmaicnc.f7eo8prDtpteuhrreminFigtWtitnhPges as equivalent to Title V permits. The root of this concern is the fact that EPA's implementing regulations for Title V require seven-day advance notice to the state regulatory' agency of any change at a facility that does not require permit modification. While msqeuovidereinfm-idceaanytitononoftcinaconetitifsaykianen,giiDtmiEspPnroowvteiatmhsiegnnoto1d2c0ofmodrapyfaasrceaidlfittetyormathacenhaasgnixegremshoaasnstthhbseeeaFnWpmePramdreei.t With the 120-days-after requirement, not only ispaperwork cut back, but the facility managers can also try changes and abandon them if they do not work out, without ever notifying the agency If facihties currently operating under FdeWr PTsitwleeVre, rtheqeyuiwreodultdo mloseeetsitghneifsiecvaennt-odpaeyraadtivoannacleflnexoitbicileityre. quirement un Aisstuteh,isbejucnauctsuerteh,eirteisaruenccehratnagineswuhnedtehrewr anyotaitfibcoattihonEPwAillacnodnDtinEuPe tthoatbemaany addressthe problem.EPA iscurrently revising Part 70 (the rule implementing Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00055 56 Environment.gov Title V), partly based on comments about the difficulty of making changes under the original rule. One of the recommendations being considered is changing the notice requirem ent from seven days before to 120 days after a tcaihpcaippnraognaetc,sh]wbahydicvihnocctlhauteedsiS.ncgMhteheraeinn1gw2hC0i-older,apyDonrEaotPtiiocaenlsao[sopinsaecroot onf sftihadee"rNGineogwldtaJTkerriasnecgyk"aFpWdriofPfgeprraeamnrt for companies demonstrating environmental leadership. DEP is attempting tXoLmpakroejethcat,t wprhoigchramco,uwldhiecxheims cputrpreanrttilcyiupnatdinergdfeavceilliotipems fernotm, a csetartteaiPnroEjPecAt rfeacgiuhltaiteisonesn,tesructhheas"GthoeldseTvreanc-kd,a"ytahdevaagnecnecnyomticaeyrbeequaibrelemteonat.llIofwththeeFmWtPo continue the 120-day notice practice through the flexibility provided by XL. In that case, EPA'sdecision about accepting FWPs as Title V equivalent would have less effect on the facihties.79 Thus, New Jersey, like Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin, is contemplating a special arrangement with EPAto allow a degree of flexibility and innovation that, in New Jersey'scase, has demonstrated some environmental benefits and few risks. Helms, etal, conclude that the FWP processhas been more significant than the facility-wide nunatpuerremoiftttehde spoeurrmceitssathnedmcsreolsvse-sm. eTdhiae tprraoncsefessrsl;etdhreegsiunlgalteo-rpsoainndt-ofafcciloitnytamcat ninagDeErsPtoimdipsrcoovveedr communication and trust between regulators and facihties; the efforts to link water and waste permits to air permits, however, achieved very httle. "This isnot to dimmish the importance of menaviAinrstoainimnmipnelnegmtaalemnputreoldttheincnteiNdoienawmp-eJareysrpsneeyoc,ttfibvaceei,labitupyt-ewtromidsieut.gp"ge80ersmt tithteinbgetsut rvneehdicoleuftotroahcahvieevvinergymhiuglhthtnreadnisa action costs. Some of those were associated with start-up; some relate to the problem of fitting an innovative permit into the existing regulatory framew-ork; and some are the result of the intensive relationship that developed between DEP and company staff Once in place, the twraenresaacbtlieontocaovstosidfolrefnagctihhytiepsercmhaint greinvigewthse.iAr pmroocnegssitessldersosopnpsefdordrtraamnastfiocramllyin, ghorwegeuvleart,ioans,ththeye New Jerseypilot program demonstratesthe value of process-level emissions caps, an idea essen tial to the development of emission-trading systems. The Proliferation of "Caps" One of the common features of many of the innovative approaches described in this chap ter is an emissions "cap." Generally, a regulatory agency sets a limit for one or more pollutants, above which a firm may not emit. In most cases, regulators then allow the firm to determine how-best to stay under the cap, allowing it to make process changes without the traditional pre raeppporortvinagl trherqouuigrehmtehnetsp.ermitting process. The degree of flexibility varies, as do associated EPA has been experimenting with flexible, facility-wide caps and perm its through Project XL, and through so-called "P4" permits (Pollution Prevention in Permitting Project). Helms wanitdhhMerecroclklePahgaurems eaxcaemutiinceadlsspelvaenrtalinofSthtoonseeweaxlpl,erVimirgeinntisa,,EaPmAo'snJgantuhaermy.1T99h7eXagLreaegmreeenmtesnett permanent facility-level caps on several air pollutants, and requires increasingly detailed and Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00056 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 57 frequent environmental reports as emissions approach those caps. As long as emissions are low; reporting requirements are minimal. In exchange, Merck spent $10 million to convert itsboiler at the facility from coal to natural gas, achieving a 94 percent reduction in S 0 2emissions, an 87 percent reduction in NO xemissions, and a 65 percent decrease in hazardous air pollutant tehmeisfsimiondsa,mceonmtaplafrleadwstoobfatsheelitnreadleitvieolns.aTl pheermreistetianrgchseyrsstedmes:cribe how the cap corrects one of In addition to providing direct incentives to P2, the Merck XL permit also removes perverse incentivesthat discouraged the facilityfrom pursuing the best possible environmentalpractices. For example, a significant disincentive for P2, as articulated by Merck, by the FWP companies, and by other companies in a variety of circumstances, isthat facilitymanagersmust go through tohfettheediroeuassopnesrmMitearcpkplhicaadtionnotpprorecvesiosuesvleynciofnavneerwtedpiietcseboofileeqrsuitpomgeanstwloaws ethrsaetmthisesicoonms.pOannye would have had to obtain permits for the new boilers, while the old boilers remained grandfathered out of the permit requirement. a prSoidmuilcatrblya,caknaEnPdAforertphrefsroemntaotinveesptaotientteodaonuotththearttporaiovroitdo thhaeviXnLg tporogjeetcat,nMewercpkerwmoiutladtsahnipy one site, thus "gaming the system" to avoid the permitting process (which could take up to a year), and potentially damaging the environment with unpermitted releases. The people who provided both these examples pointed out that such behavior is not Merck-specific but typical of rAegtuhliardtedsycsotemmpicandiiessi.ncentive is that most companies usually choose a new piece of equip ment that emits right at their permitted limit in order to avoid having EPA lower the emissions limit based on the new piece of equipment. However, the features in Merck'spermit--a set cap MEanPedArcawktioheuarledddanrnoepitnolcorewtninetigrvteshytesoteekmmeei--spsiecomhnasinscsgiaeopdn,stMhaasetlrocpwkermavseaprnsoaesgsineibrclseen,sptaienvcedifibincetacolalyausbaeseknoeefdftihctheiaeal sposrnuoerc.auBnrceeecmatuhesnaett staff to buy the lowest-emitting gas boilers possible with reasonable reliability The presence of such perverse incentives is a clear call for change in the current permitting system.81 As noted above, Intel has been instrumental in developing facility-level caps, using the P4 ptorrosc.eAssltihnoOugrehgtohneafnodrmPreorjeincvtoXlvLedinaCmhaanjdolrers,oAurrciezoonfa,atior npeogllouttiaantetsaganredemtheenltastwteirtharemgiunloar source (and thus not subject to the federal Tfile V requirements), the Chandler negotiations caught the attention of national environmental groups and became a symbolic battleground. Environmentalists argued that the cap on hazardous air pollutants was too loose because it wgroouulpd aanlldowthIenrteegl tuolastuobrsstiintuvtoelvmeodrfee-lttotxhiactstuhbesctaanpcpersofvoirdleedsss-utofxfiiccieonntelse.vAelcsoomf smafuentyityanaddvtirsaonrys- parency even if the relative toxicity of the emissions should change over time. Intel agreed to publish on the web quarterly reports of the Chandler facility's environmental performance: notably the reports on hazardous air pollution emissions are estimates based on measurements of the raw7materials used in each process, not the product of continuous emissions monitors.82 settIsn, Ttehxealsa,sNt ethwreMeeyxeiacros,, aInndtelOhraesgorenp(lwichaeteredtthheaAt aloghreaesmiteehnat sinrefdouucreodthitesraisrtaetmesi:ssMioanssstaochthue point where it isnow officially a minor source). In early 2000, Intel wasnegotiating a sixth such permit with Colorado's environmental agency. All of the permits rely on mass-balance esti menavtiersoonmf eemntiaslsipoenrsf;oarlml raenqcueirtehIannteml toostpustbaltiusthesmroerqeuiinref;ornmonateioonf atbhoeuptearcmtuitasl esumbissesiqounesnatntdo Chandler has invoked Project XL or required much federal involvement.83 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00057 58 Environment.gov The proliferation of emissions caps represents a fundamental change in how regulatory agencies relate to pollution sources. Caps invite businesses to apply the same kind of ingenuity to environmental protection asthey do to the rest of their business, provided they are in fact free tTohiennreosvualtteisanlidkealyretonobteliammiteodrebeyftfhiceiecnotnasptrparionatschoftotyepnicvairloBnAmCeTntaalnpdrMoteAcCtioTnr.equirements. Findings The innovations described in this chapter have the power to transform the relationship between businesses and environmental regulators in the United States--a necessity if the na tionEiPsAtohaacshbieevene ibtsotehnvaifroorncme feonrtainl ngoovalastiaotnthaendloawceostunptoesrs-ifbolrececo: sat.financier and promoter of numerous pilot projects and an enforcer preventing those pilots from getting off the ground. That internalcontradiction should come asno surprise: EPAhasnever been a monolith. Rather ilteaisviangcoalmlecptlieornooomf refogrioennst,repproregnraemurss, ionffoicnees,coanrndeirnodfivthideuoarlsgalonoizsaetlyiobnotuonpdrobmy oshtearidedeagsotahlast, good soldiers in other parts of the organization feel compelled to frustrate. So it iswith recordretention rules in Massachusetts, Title V permits in New Jersey, and permits and performance "contracts" in Wisconsin. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate that EPA is both promoting marTkheet-bsatasteeds,paosllautgioronu-tpra, dairnegpsryosnteemtso, tahned smamakeincgonthtreamdicutniomnasr.kTethaibslec.hapter has featured initiatives championed by states with strong commitments to environmental protection. But EPA officials saythey also have to deal with state initiativesthat would undermine environmen tal protection, or even reverse environmental progress. Because the Academy panel chose to meveanlutaaltemoannlaygtehmoseenft,edtheirsalr,esptoatret,ionrclluodceasl innoiticaatsiveesstuthdaietsapprpaeisairngtoEbPeAimfoprropvreemveennttsinignaesntvaitreoonr firm from implementing a destructive new idea. Among the most interesting innovations in this chapter are those that enable or encourage firms to go beyond compliance. The pilot projects--and their critics--illuminate several com mhaovne malirseuanddyemrsatadnedainllgtsheofecnovrirpoonrmateenbteahlagvaiionrs. tThheey frierasstomniasbcloynccaenp.tiAonnoisththeartims tahnautftahcattupreorls lution prevention is always a "win-win" proposition: that reducing emissions and waste is al ways profitable and desirable from a firm's point of view: In fact, within today'sregulatory system, responsible firms acting responsibly may not find mit aintchthoeitrheercorentoumrnisc ainvtaeilraebsltetotortehdeuccoemwpaasnteie--s.bCecoanussideetrhteherectausrensofoncoilnlavbeostrmateionnt mbeatyweneont officials at the Dow Chem ical Company and the National Resources Defense Council to iden tify and hnplement pollution-prevention strategies at Dow'splant in Midland, Michigan. Teams of engineers and scientists succeeded in that goal: they found P2 strategies to reduce nearly seven million pounds of emissions and wastes per year at an annual savings of some five million dDoollwares.mTphloeyaecetsiownesrreeqinuiitriaeldlynvoenreywrepleurcmtaintttintogtsinyskteermwsiothr sspoemciealorfegthuelaptolarnytf'lsemxiabniluitfyacBtuutritnhge systems, afraid of causing far worse problems than they might solve. The effort succeeded only because the NRDC and local activists pushed Dow hard to achieve the targeted results. The ffionratnhceiaflirrmetu'srcnosmonmtihtme ePn2titnoveNsRtmDeCntstowofoullldowhatvherobuegenh twooithloiwmtpoleamttreancttactioomn.p84any capital but Another misconception is that all firms oppose regulation, and would prefer deregulation. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00058 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 59 That belief leads to the cynical viewthat companies engaged in pilot projects such as XL or the performance-track systems must be trying to avoid doing something that would benefit the environment. Some firm shave behaved that way, of course, but more often, firm s trying to use isnonmoEevvaoetnfivttehheaeporpetrhaoesaorcnPharebosljteeocatascXshuLimevppeitoipononeseittrhisv.aet results have been unfairly criticized, government agencies can provide aswere Intel and economic incen tives to coax otherwise reluctant businesses to make improvements beyond mere compliance can lead to murky thinking Regulators like to believe that they are leading the companies forward, while in some cases, companies are leading the regulators--as well as their competi tgoorvs--erntomweanrtdreggrueleantieornpmraacyticraesis.eItnhdeeebda,r FfoorrecsotmRpeeitnithoarrsd. tSsoamysetfhiramt aacftiirvmiti'sess:trategic use of .. . make it easier for government regulators to adopt policies that benefit the lfairrmtecthhantoilnoigtyia;tfeodr tehxeamchpalneg, feisr.mBsycdaenmsoomnsettriamtiensginthdeucfeearseibgiuliltaytoorfs taopraerqtuicirue it of competitors, who are unlikely to be able to match the cost of the first mover .. . The technology in question could be a tangible mechanism for re ducing pollution, like a device that removes sulfur dioxide from the gas leav ing a boiler. The same logic would apply, however, if the technology were less tiannfogrimblaettihoanndmiscalcohsiunreer,yoor raepqruoicpemssefnotr; pitumbliigchptafrotriceixpaamtipolne,inbereasopurarcceticaelloof cation decisions .. . What raises the costs for followers is not a technical limi tation but the cost of changing established ways of doing business ... What mcoamttpeerstiitsotrhs,atatnhdettheacthnitofloosgtyerissmleessaenxinpgefnuslivperefossruthreefoorriginindaulsftirrym-wthidaen afodroipts tion.85 One of the negative consequences of EPA's conservative approach to innovation is that it reendvuircoensmtheentoapllpyoprtruonteitciteisvefoprracoctmicpeest.itRioengualmatoonrsgafnirdmpsotloicdyrmivaekbeurssisnheosuslsdecgtuoarrsdtoawgaairndsmt tohraet error,just asthey must guard against lowering the environmental bar. Recognizing the diversity of interests among regulated entities is a first step toward better regulation, and a prerequisite for effective negotiation of beyond-compliance agreements. aboIvnetchaencfhitaipntteorsatlhaargt eforltlroawn;stfhoirsmraetpioonrt oilfluthsteranteastiohonw's esnovmireonomf tehnetailnpnroovteactitoionns dperoscgrriabmed. Facility-level caps, for example, may become a foundation for regional N0 x-reduction trading systemsthat could help improve urban air quality. Some combination of caps, self-certifications and third-party certifications could make possible a cost-effective strategy to reduce nutrients and other nonpoint sources of pollution in surface waters. The complex facility-level planning manedrggeoawli-tshetptilnagcet-hbaatsdedrivweastsetrastheepdemrfoarnmagaenmcee-ntrtaecfkfoirntistitaotifvoesstearnmdoIrSeOse1n4si0t0iv1emlaanyd-gursaedudaelclyi sions and more coherent civic action to protect resources that are beyond the scope of EPA regulations. Finding 1: Many individuals within EPA have struggled over the years to innovate, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of core EPA programs and those delegated to the states. The studies completed for this report illustrate numerous cases w-here those efforts have Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00059 60 Environment.gov been stifled by EPAs conservative interpretation of its mandate. In addition, specific statutory requirements sharply limit EPAs authority to experiment with some new7approaches. EPA has invested so much effort in establishing and protecting the legal precedents for regulations that iTt hisantothweuinnnabovleatoironusnwthiellAincgatdoeamuythsoturidzieedsicgonuiflidcannottepxrpoedruimceensitgsnwifiitchanaltteenrnvairtiovnemaepnptraolagcahienss., is due in large part to those federal constraints. Finding 2: EPAs commitment to compliance assurance--to systems in which require ments can be precisely defined and in which violations can be clearly detected and prosecuted-- henavsisruocncmeeednetdalinhaersmtabalirsehoinugts"idcoemEpPlAiasnrceeg"ualsattohreynaourtmho. rBituyt, beevceanuusenisvoemrsaanl ycoomf tphheacnacuesewsitohf existing standards willnot dehver the environmental improvements Americans profess to want. Neither can the rigid comphance model, with its emphasis on the uniform application of tech nology standards, achieve most environmental goals at the lowest possible costs. andFeifnfidciinengcy3:oAf rtetghuelahteoarryt of many innovations designed to improve both the effectiveness systems is a degree of flexibility not present in many regulations today. Such flexibility7allows individual firms to find their own best ways to meet an environ mentalrequirement, and thus encouragestechnologicalinnovation and experimentation. There iosvienresfcirampsa.blFeletexnibsiloenabpeptrwoaecehnepsr,oivnicdliundginflgextihbeiliptyertofofrimrmasnacned-trparceksesryvsintegmtsigdhetsaccrciboeudntaabbiolvitey,7 may appear--or actually prove to be--less certain to produce their desired results than the status quo approach. The New Jersey facility-wide permitting project demonstrated, however, ttaihnvaedt, emevniefsnourntchdeeaebrmsiltoiotsoyt7dpi,rneosracilrglinppotriorvegedra,asempvesec,ntbsbeoycf"atguhoseeocdbu"orfrtiehrmnatsrr.eeRgeeusglsauetlonarttyioa7rlssytmosteucmsotnicntaisnniusbteeodnceoanucvnciotreuornnptmraobedinluittcayl progress. Regulators and policymakers must also recognize, however, that no system isperfect, and that the gains from flexibility7may outweigh the risks of less control. theFpiunbdhicnagn4d: sIon-tchaellepdassttfaekwehyoeladresr,sEmPAoraenfdritllhyeinstaetnevsihraovnemmenadtael cdoencicseirotnemd aekffionrgt.stTohionsveolevfe forts have been motivated by several goals, each of them laudable: to ensure that decisions reflect pubhc values; to build pubhc understanding of environmental challenges and manage ment options; to attain pubhc "buy-in" on otherwise controversial decisions; and to mobihze pmuobrhecflseuxpibploertapfoprraocatcihoensstnooet nstvriircotlnympeanrttaolfmthaenraeggeumlaetonrtywpilrlorceeqsus.irAedremgiunliasttoerrisntgo smomakeeomf othree complexjudgments, and regulators will increasingly turn to stakeholder groups for guidance. There is the danger, of course, that regulators will abrogate their authority to make decisions, yielding that responsibility to volunteer members of advisory committees. Programs that rely heavily on such volunteers are probably unsustainable--and may actually diffuse regulatory7 accountability statFe irnegduinlagtor5y:7pTrhoegrMamasssianctohutsheettdsoEmnaviinroonfmsmenatlallbRuseisnuelstss. Program extended the reach of The program encouraged small fteircmhnsitcoalcaressaitsetaanpcperwopitrhiattheeetnhvreiraotnomf eennftoalrcmemaneangt.emERenPtissyasnteemffsecbtyivleinmkoindgelcfaorerfduellayl'infrgamwietdh smaller firm ssubject to state permits. The experiment is silent, however, on the potential utility Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00060 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 61 of the approach for managing problems permitted by EPA-delegated programs. EPA'sinability or unwillingness to sign off on the state'srequest for shorter record-retention requirements for dry cleaners underscores the tenacity with which EPA clings to the enforcement model, even when engaged in a formal Project XL agreement. idenFtiifnydainndgm6:anTahgeeetmheeirrgeennvceiroonfmISeOnta1l4r0e0sp1oannsidbioltithieers voluntary; is likely to private efforts raise the level by of firms to compli ance and create some opportunities for pollution prevention. A well-designed EMS should provide the same kinds of insights into a firm'soperation as the New' Jerseymaterials account icnogmrpelpiaonrtcse., Astlattheoaungdh ftehdiredra-pl raergtyulcaetortrisficaaretijounsttiofieIdSOin p1r4e0s0u1miisngnotht aat gceuratrifainedtefeiromfsaarfeirlmes'ss likelyto pose compliance problems than uncertified firms, and thus less desirable as targets for inspection. That conclusion could change if the integrity of the third-party' registration process were to be compromised. to IFSOind1i4n0g017:byEPreAquRierignigonpa1r'sti"cSiptaatriTnrgacfikr"mpsrtoogpruamblisahddeendviarodnemgreenetoalfrpeupbolritcs,acacnodubnytaobpileinty ingthe audit processto some externalobservation. It isnot clear that those requirements strength ened the environmental performance of the participants, however. Indeed, StarTrack does not oaprdpeeratrotomparkoeviitdsenesuwffpiceirefnotrimncaenncteiv-tersactokfpirromgsrtaomchwaonrgke, EthPeAirweinllvnireoendmtoenextatlepndermfoormreafnlecxei.bIinl ity to high-performing companies. tahsefFapcioinltiedtyni-tnlieagvl8evl:aoSlurteaptroeofecfrefesowsr-talsertvdoeincl rgeemhaitisegshpioeernr-fspoceramrpfosar,nmfcaeisn-ttgerrafcisrekmnrdesgeweu,iltaohtorgrfyree-wapetrerorignprsaepmremcstiwitoifnlllesdx, eibbmuiltiotyon;nstlsryuacttohe the extent that EPA allows such experiments. If EPA permits states such as Wisconsin and Oregon as little flexibility in changing their regulatory programs as it did the ERP program in Massachusetts, the experiments are not likely to demonstrate much of value. Absent a clear msigennatsl fwroitmh fEirPmAst,htahteipt wiloiltlslewtitlhl heatvweohstttaletetsoetxepste.riment with bold--and risky---new arrange Finding 9: Process-level and facility-level emissions caps work; and, if set at appropriate levels, they offer a desirable alternative to stack-by-stack regulation, especially if the caps per mfirimt psrtoocefisnsdchthaenigreoswwnitbheosuttwparyiosrtoapcpornotvroall oemr liesnsigotnhsy, paenrdmtihtutisngmparyocreemsseosv.eCdaispisnceennctoivuersagtoe pollution prevention or provide opportunities for firms to "raise the bar" for their competitors. Used in conjunction with other performance-track tools (e.g enhanced pubhc accountability, third-party certification of EMSs, the incorporation of unregulated environmental aspects); caps may be a regulator's most valuable negotiating chip: a reward regulators can offer in exchange for beyond-compliance performance. builFdiinngdicnagp-1a0n:d-Ttroaddaey'rsepgruollaitfoerraytisoynsteomf fsaicniltithye-lneveealrefmutiusrseio. nIsnsctaepasdlaoyfsnthegeogtriaotuinngdwcuosrktofmor ioznedacwahposlwe igthroiunpdiovfidfuaaclihftiiremssa,nrdeglueltatthoorssewfiilrlmbes daebtleertmoianpep--lytharpoeurgfohrtmheanmcea-rekneht--anhcoinwgbceaspt to achieve the net emissions reductions. Today's facility-wide and process-level caps generally Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00061 62 Environment.gov rely on emissions estimation techniques rather than on the more precise continuous-emissions monitors available for only a few chemicals. The enforceability of those caps demonstrates that trading systems do not need to be based on continuous-emissions monitors. Recommendations 1. Transform regulation. The next EPA administrator should pursue innovations that hold promise for solving par teifcfuicliaernceynvainrdonemffeencttiavlenperossbloefmths,e sruecghulaastonryonpproociensts.poTlhluetiaodnm, iannidstrfaotrorinschroeualsdinmgatkheeitovEePrAal'ls explicit policy to find the least costly ways to meet environmental goals. a. The administrator should make full use of her or his discretionary authority to promote innovation within the agency to reduce internal institutional barriers to innovative approaches, and to encourage the states and private businesses to lead the way. b. The administrator should make it clear to the agency, states, regulated entities, and the general pubhc that he or she is willing to take risks to develop better systems. EPA should end its practice of permitting only those experiments that pose no possibility of increasing some pollution or decreasing some measure of enforceability. c. rCeognuglarteisosns,hporuolvdidaiuntghothreizaedEmPiAniastnrdattohrewsittahtetshteodtiaskcerebtioolnd tnoewausthteoprsizteo stirtaen-sspfoercmific ppreorfteocrmtioann,cperoagvrideeedmtehnetsaapnpdroaacwhiedse rreamngaeinorfeanseownaabplpyrotraacnhsepsatroenetntvoirtohnempeunbthacl , verifiable, and facilitate accountability. 2. RUesceentthpeil"otnperwojetoctoslhsa.v"e demonstrated the value of several new approaches to environ mpreongtraalmms.anSapgeceimficeanltl.y:EPA and the states should build many of those approaches into their a. States should adopt and adapt the Massachusetts Environmental Results Program to their own small-business problems. Wherever possible, EPA and the states should pstraongdraarmdizdeestihgen,caonmdptloianspceee-adssthisetarnacpeid/ fianctirliotyd-ulcevtieolnreoqfutihreemseelnf-tcsetrotifriecdauticoen tahpepcroosatcho.f EPA should signal its support for the program by yielding on the record-retention issue. b. cEoPmAmanitdmtehnet stotatiemspsrhoovueldd ernegvairrodnImSeOnt1a4l 0p0e1rf-ocremrtiafniccaetiaonnda,saallnelisnedbiceaitnogr eoqfuaalf,irtamrg'set enforcement resources at firms that have not certified. c. EPA and the states should expand their use of facility-wide emission caps, enabling fsitramy sbetolomwaakefixraepdicdappr.ocess changes without pre-approval, provided their net emissions d. EinPfoArmanadtiothnetestcahtnesolsohgoiuelsdtocosntrteinnugethteoneoxrplroeiptltahceectraapdaictiitoynoalf ancecwoumnotanbiitloirtyinsgysatnemd s. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00062 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 63 3: Make the "performance-track" work. EPA and the states should collaborate on creating a system that will encourage firms to keep raising the bar on environmental performance. a. EPA should give Oregon and Wisconsin the greatest possible freedom to implement their green permits and cooperative environmental agreement pilots. In addition to clarifying the extent of the states'inherent flexibility to implement the programs, EPA should ask Congress for authorization to protect firms that volunteer to experiment with new approaches to environmental management. b. EPA and several states should make it clear that participants in performance-track systems should be eligible for facility-level emissions caps requiring no prior notification of process changes, including under Title V air permits. c. EPA and several states should allow firms to use means other than BACT or MACT to achieve their emissions caps or overall environmental performance goals. d. EPA and the states should develop front-line permit writers with the capacity to make and explain judgments about facility-level environmental management strategies. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00063 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00064 Using the Market mong the most important public-sector innovations in environmental management in the United States today are those that apply market forces to environmental protec tion. They are significant for two reasons: They are reducing the cost of improving air and water quality in many parts of the country: the less expensive it is to protect the environment, the better off society will be. They are demonstrating the effectiveness of the most plausible tools the nation might apply to outstanding environmental problems such as nonpoint runoff of nutrients into surface water and the emission of greenhouse gases. fgurlalmyThus.sisiInctghfomacpautreskeresetxofpnolratchienesstphoooetwexntEetPniaAdl ,tahsneodmretehacsethaltioemsr,iitnaanctirdoenassosemotfehmeoteahfrefkircefiteetdnoceoyrlasol ftporthoaegdirrdarrmeesgssualtrawetoosruyoc'fcpetrshose nation'smost serious and intractable environmental problems: nutrients in surface waters; and urban smog, the combination of ground-level ozone and fine particles. The chapter draws on npeowlluatnanaltyssiinsoafir.trading systems designed to reduce nutrients in surface waters, aswell asvarious The Academy panel commissioned two research teams to analyze the results of several ongoing trading systems.86 Michael Hix, Eric Ruder, and David Sugarman, of Environmental Econom ics, Inc., evaluated so-called "offset" and "open-m arket" trading systems in four of the 12 states that have adopted such programs to control VOCs: offset programs in Louisiana, New York, and Texas open-market programs in Texas and Michigan Robert Kerr and Steve Anderson, of Kerr, Greiner, Anderson and April, and John Jaksch, of Batelle, analyzed three programs to attack smog precursors: New Jersey's offset program for VOCs Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00065 Environment.gov New Jersey's open-market program for VOCs Southern California's RECLAIM program, a cap-and-trade system to control emissions of sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) They also studied two other cap-and-trade systems, both of which were designed to reduce effluents in surface waters: the San Joaquin River (California) Grasslands trading system for selenium, a contami nant associated with irrigation in the west the Tar-Pamlico River (North Carolina) trading system for phosphorus In addition, they examined an open-market trading system related to water quality: Michigan's draft statewide program for nutrient trading, and its parent, the Kalamazoo River pilot project Finally, they considered three other cases sometimes described as "trades": one involving wofetnluantrdiemntistiignatsiuornfabcaenwkiantger,sa:nd two involving "trades" between point and nonpoint sources Ohio's experience with wetlands mitigation banks the Rahr Malting permit in Minnesota a trade involving an office building and private septic systems discharging into the Sudbury River in Wayland, Massachusetts rtrealadtTeiv,oeogfeeftfshfeeetscr,,titavhneondseeosspceaosnfevmsataruridokiueetsssm--anodidnetbhlsoeftwhoroartirkraodanfindogtwhpeaortlelsru.cthioonlacrsreodfiftesrovralaullaobwleanincseisg--htscainpt-oanthde(The project did not commission research into a wide array of other policy tools that may be described as market mechanisms: pollution taxes or fees, for example, or deposit-refund systems, labeling requirements, or requirements for the public reporting of emissions. Those tools help internalize the costs of environmental harm in a firm'sproducts or services, or they menehnatnacl eimthpeaccta.pTahceitryeoisf acorincshulmiteerrsattuorechdoeossceribaminogntgheperoffdeuctcitvseonnessthoefbtahsoisseotfoothlse,ihreenncveirtohnis study's focus elsewhere.) Among the trading approachesthe Academy examined, the one offering the greatest poten taiballeinsubcoctehssatior apnhdaswealteeardisotuhteocfagpa-saonldin-etraadned stoysrteemdu.cEePSAOh2aesmaipspsiloiends,thoenetooofl twhiethprceocnusrisdoerrs of acid rain.87 EPA, the states, and Congress are poised to expand trading programs to airsheds, and to implement some fairly large-scale pilots in river systems and estuaries. Those pilots should demonstrate that in many situations, trading systems can deliver relatively certain and equitable results. ConAglrleosws,anacnedttrhaedisntagtersemwialilndseceixdteretmhaetlythceonptorloitviecrasliaclh,ahlloewngevesero, fainmdpilteims penostisnibgletrathdaint gEPsyAs, tems outweigh their potential economic and environmental benefits. EPA appears ambivalent on the issue: endorsing the concept of trading in various policy statements, while simulta Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00066 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 67 neously developing rules that would make illegal some of the trading systems that are already achieving environmental and social goals. Cap-and-Trade Systems Cap-and-trade systems similarto the familiar SO2-trading system Congress created in 199088 could be used to reduce nutrient loads in watersheds or NO xand VOCsin airsheds. Experience with effluent trading in water and ozone precursors in air demonstrate the potential for capand-trade systems to achieve specified social goals for the environment at a relatively low cost. notTfihtealel.sFseinrmtiasl--raatinodnfaalermfosr, fcorerathtiantgmtraatdteinr--g svyasrteymins tsoizree,dlouccaetipoonl,luatgioe,nteiscthhnaitcaolnseospihzeisdtioceas tion, production processes, and attitude. Those differences make it relatively less expensive for some operations to reduce their environmental impacts, and relatively more expensive for oth ers. Trading systems exploit the variances by allowing firms that can reduce their impacts cohfetahpelycotostgsepneectrrautem". eTmhiesshioignhr-ecdouscttfiiornmscrbeudyitsth"ewchriecdhittshbeyeccaaunseseiltlitsocfhiremapsearttthhaenortehdeurceinndg their impacts directly. In short, some firms pay others to meet their environmental responsibili ties for them. Their transactions reduce the total amount of pollution released by the partici pating firms at lower overall coststhan would have been possible if regulators had simply asked eaamcohufnitr.m to install the same piece of control technology or reduce emissions by the same None of the trading systems described in this report works in a "free market"; rather, they all start with government intervention in the market to achieve a broader social goal. The most rimegpuolarttaonryt kaegyetnocmy makuesta icmapp-oasneda-tpraodlleutsiyosnte-rmedwuocrinkgis,coapf coonurpsaer,ttihciepcaanptsi,tsaelrfegAulleagtoisrlyatdurrievoerr that creates incentives among participants to reduce their emissions and generate emissions credits to trade. In 1990, for example, Congress required coal-burning utilities to reduce thenaggregate emissions of S 0 2by 10 million tons. Another important element is the government decision as to which dischargers fall under the cap; that is, the designers must "close" the system. And finally, program designers must decide how to make the initial allocation of pol lsuetlilocnrecdrietdsiitns aremlaotniognthtoe pit.articipants, so that each firm knows its baseline, and can thus buy or Numerous technical and policy challenges complicate the task of establishing a robust capand-trade system, just as they complicate the task of establishing any effective regulatory re ginimg teh.eFcorreedxitasmthpeley,attrtaedminpgt tsoyssetellm, asnndeesedllrienlgiatbhleemtotoolsontolyvoenriefyutshera.tTfihrme ssyasrteemacsntueaeldlytogeennesruarte that no user buys so many credits that its emissions then create unacceptably poor local condi tions--a "hot spot" that might pose excessive health risks or environmental damage. And the system needs to keep transaction costs low enough to avoid discouraging trades. The pilot projects analyzed bythe Academy'sresearchers illustrated how-some systemshave overcome-- oisrsubeesenshoovuelrdcosemeethbey--twtohoresesecahraclhlernegpeos.rt(sRaenaddethrseiinrtcearesestestduidnieasfpuullbtlriesahtemdewnittohfththise vteocluhmniec.a)l Reducing W ater Pollution Through Allowance Trading It has become apparent that the United Stateswill be able to end the eutrophication of lakes and estuaries only if it reduces the amount of nutrients pouring into surface waters from agri Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00067 Environment.gov cultural operations: both fields and feedlots. Those operations have not been effectively regu lated, and trading systems offer one approach to bring agriculture into the environmental era with the least amount of government intrusion and expense. gtuernbEiaxdnc,dewspsahrnomusteprrhi,eoanrntusdsfplleorswosmipnlogetaiesntathonetsfguorrrofawscwtehimwomaftaeinlrggaaoreerinraerhciuvreegaresti,polrnaok.beWlse,mhaennidntethhseteuaaUlrginaeiset.edWdieSatttheaetreyssbd.eeNccoiotmrmoe pose in the water, but that process consumes dissolved oxygen. Fish and other aquatic organ isms suffer and the ecosystem is disrupted. For example, nutrients pouring into the Gulf of Mexico from the Mississippi River have created a vast "dead zone" in what had been a highly wprhoidcuhcctirveeatfeisdheerny:vNirountrmieenntstaml aayndalseocopnroommoictehtahveogcroinwtthheofMhiadr-mAftilialnotrigcanstiastmess,insu1c9h9a8s.pfiskria, Paul Faeth, director of the economics program at the World Resources Institute, has pub lished a study that demonstrates how a trading system could work to reduce nutrient loadings in several areas of the upper Midwest.89 The key requirements of a trading system are present: asonuirdceens)ti;frieaabsleonseatbolyf aecffteocrtsivreestpeocnhsniibqleuefosrtonudterfiiennet adnisdchvaerrigfeys' t(hbeotghepnoeirnattisoonurocfecsraendditnso(innpcoluindt ing those generated by nonpoint sources); and enormous variations in the price per ton that different actors would have to pay to reduce their contributions of nutrients. Because nonpoint sources of nutrients have done so little to control their contributions, they c8a2npneorcwenmtaokfe teontoalrmniotruosggeanmdsirseclhaatirvgeelsy'acnhdea8p4lypFearceethntciotefstaot1a9l9p8hostsupdhyotrhuast dciosncchlaurdgeeds tihntaot American waterways are from nonpoint sources.90 Another study estimated that effective trad ing among point- and nonpoint sources of nutrients could be arranged within 900 watersheds in the United States.91 Most impressively, a 1994 EPA study estimated that nutrient trading c$o6u5l8dmreidlluiocne ttohe$7c.o5stbsiollfioinmopnletmoteanl tiinncgrePmreesnidtaelnctoCstlsinetsotinm'saptreodptoosreadnCgelefaronmW$a5tebriIllnioitniattoiv$e9b.6y billion. Most of those savings (75 to 92 percent) w'ould be derived from trading among point and nonpoint sources.92 Faeth developed detailed analyses of the sources of nutrients in three areas: the Minnesota RcoinvseirnV. aHlleeyc;othnesidSeargeidnanwotBoanylwyaptoerinsht-esdouinrcMe idcihscighaanrg; easndbutht ealRsoocnkoRnpivoeirnwt wataetresrhbeodrnineWanisd wind-borne nutrients from fields under different types of tillage systems. Faeth estimated that 51 to 69 percent of the phosphorous in the three water bodies was coming from agriculture.93 He then estimated the costs of four approaches to reduce nutrients in those rivers: imposing tighter performance standards on the point sources p(BroMviPdsi)ntgo fparrommeorstewciothnsceornvvateinotnional subsidies to adopt "best management practices" imposing performance standards on the point sources, but allowing them to trade with nreodnupcotiionntss,oaunrcde,sin(thheispeoxianmt spoleu,rctheewpoouilndt psaoyurtchees nwoonupldoinnetesdoutorcbesuytothmreaeke"emsotismt aotfedth"e pounds of phosphorus reduction for each pound they avoided reducing on-site) imposing 50 percent of the net reduction on the point sources and 50 percent on farmers. To achieve the former, the point sources would be allowed to trade with one another and with nonpoint sources; to achieve the latter, public funds would subsidize Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00068 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century farmers to implement conservation measures. Unlike traditional BMP programs, however, the programs would be performance-based, and targeted at achieving the highest reductions possible per dollar. theTthhreefeouarrethaso. pItniotnheapMpeianrnsetsootbaeRthiveemr ocsatsec,osFt-aeeftfhecetisvtiemwaateystothraetdtuhcee pnruictreiepnetsr ipnoeuancdh ooff phosphorus removed would be $19.57 for the traditional regulations; $16.29 for the traditional BMP subsidies; $6.84 for point/ nonpoint trading; and only $4.36 for a program combining trading and targeted subsides.94 tionFsaientthh'sreeestriemaaltpelsacaerse.tFhoerrtehseutlitms oefbaeisnogp,hhioswticeavteerd, tmheoydaerliensgtiellxjuersctiesestibmasaeteds.oFnariethalacnodntdhie World Resources Institute are working closely with the Great Lakes Trading Network, a con sortium of states in the upper Midwest committed to implementing trading programs to reduce environmentalproblems.95 Actual effluent trading systems are operating at severalplaces in the Utrandiitnedg. SEtxatpeesr,iehnocweevilelur,stvraalteidsantiontgotnhley washsautmwpotirokns,sbeuctoanlosomwisthsamt daokees innott.heir discussions of The state of North Carolina has almost a decade of experience with a nutrient allowance cap-and-trade system. TheTar-Pamlico River drains some 5,440 square miles and suffersfrom excess nutrients. Computer modeling in the early 1990s estimated that 92 percent of the nitro gseewnaignethtreeartimveernwt afasccihotmieisnganfdroomnenoinndpuositnritaslopularcnets.,Iann1d9m90o,stthoefstthaete'rseDstefproamrtm1e2nmt oufniEcnipvail ronment and Natural Resources signed a permit with those point sources, directing them as a groupto reduce their total nitrogen discharges by 12 percent below their 1991 actual levels. The ffhaaaicvlieehdttioteospckaoeyueapldftewheeobirarksaeogdugtortenhgetahtdeeemetamailgissnsoiiftouhndsoewboetlfootwhacethihrieeevxcecaetphe,adttehrneecsaeus,lsetosicsnieaantnitoiyanlwlyoafayppthooeilnlyutwtsiooisnuhretcadex.sIowffot$hu5eld6y per kilogram of nitrogen per year. The state would then use those payments to pay the agricul tural sources of nonpoint pollution to install BMPs: a system similar to the one proposed by Faeth for rivers in the Midwest. butTithiestsetrilml isnopflathcee.TTahr-ePpamoilnictosoaugrrceeesmheanvtehsatvayeecdhuanngdeedr tshoemirewcahpatthorvoeurgthheouptastht e10peyreiaords,, despite a 35-percent increase in flow Observers believe that the flexibility in the group permit enabled the participating plants to improve their technology when it was most opportune for each plant, thus saving their customers money.96 The drafters of the agreement did not expect tBhMe Ppso.inTthseoularcceksotfoparcohgireevses i1n00repdeurccienngt ncoonmppoliinant cneu,trainedntthlouasdainvgosidinpathyeingTafre-ePsatmo hfcinoanhcaes made some observers question the effectiveness of the overall approach, however. Those who expected the system to lead to trades between the point sources and farmers--and thus com pensate for a lack of regulatory' controls over farm runoff--have been disappointed and critical of the system.97 O f course, if the state had set the point sources'group-cap low enough, the mtrieemntbleorasdws orautlhdeervtehnatnuailnlysthalalveevfeoru-mndoriet mexopreenescivoenonmutricieanl tt-orepmayovfaarlmteecrhsntooloregdieusc.e their nu It bears repeating that North Carolina was able to develop and implement its innovative nutrient-reduction program because the federal NPDES program, which requires all major dimispcohsaergteecrshnooflocognyv-beansteiodnlailmwitastoenr pnoitlrlougtaenntsortophcoomspphloyruwsi.t9h8 permit requirements, does not Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00069 70 Environment.gov In California'sCentralValley, a group of farmers hasjoined with severalregulatory authori ties to address the problem of selenium in surface waters. Irrigation has leached selenium from soil and lead to concentrations in surface waters that harm migratory birds and other wildlife. Tinh1e9G94r,asasimlasndtos rBeydpuacsestPhreojaemcto,uanctaopf-asenlden-tiruamder-esyacstheimngptrhoepoSsaendJobayqEuninviRroivnemr ebnyta1l5Dpeefrecnesnet over fiveyears. TheC alifornia Regional Water Quality Control Board and a host of other local, state, and federal agencies, set a selenium limit in an irrigation system that reaches some 100,000 acres. The farmers in the region have organized into seven districts, which can buy and sell selenium allowances asneeded to meet their own needs. If the districts exceed their allowances, trhegeyulhaatovreytoauptahyorfieteys;wiifllaclllothseetdhiesitrriacctsceesxscteoedthteheirirrigalaltoiownanscyesstebmyemnotirreeltyh9a9n 20 percent, the Since the inception of the trading system, districts have made four trades: two exchanges of load allocations for specific months, and two exchanges of load allocations for the duration of the project. Eight or nine new trades were being negotiated during the preparation of this rloewpo--rtc.1e0r0taPianrltyicloipwaenrtsthgaenneirfarlelyguvliaetwortshheasdysattetmemapsteadstuoccpeesrsm; tirtaenascahctiinodnivciodsutsaladreisrcehlaartgivee--ly and selenium loads are dropping (See Figure 3-1.)One reason the system is effective is its state- FIGURE 3-1 : SUMMARY OF SELENIUM DISCHARGES Oct-96 Feb-97 Jun-97 Oct-97 Feb-98 Jun-98 Oct-98 Feb-99 Jun-99 Oct-99 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00070 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 71 of-the-art monitoring network, including a remote site that automatically collects and analyzes water samples every six hours, and relays information about water quality and flow rates by phone to administrative offices.101 Generally, in market-based systems, larger is better. The more potential buyers and sellers, Wtheitmh oonrelyefsfeivceiennatnthde1m3amrkaertkwetilplabretiactipdaenlitvse,rriensgpepcrtoivdeulcyt,stohresGerrvaiscselsanatdtshBeylopwasessPt proojsescibtlaenpdritchee. Tar-Pamlico Association are probably as small as systems can be and still offer much value. Reducing Air Pollution Through Allowance Trading The Southern California airshed provides a vastlymore complex and dynamic market, and suffers from a different problem: smog, the combination of ground-level ozone and fine par ticles. Ozone impairs breathing and forcesthe elderly and the veryyoung indoors in many parts oemf tiThssehioecnoRsu(enSgtOiroyxnaFanlidnCeNlpeOaarnxt)iicAnleicrslu,IdnineccselnautldilvionefgsthMsuelamfraktaeejsot,r(cRsatuEastCieoLenAvaerInyMsm)oouforrceressseuorliffouauri-sr ahpneodalllutnhtiitoernfofgeincetntsh-.oexLidoes Angeles area. The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) has managed the market since 1994, setting a declining cap on allowances for SOxand NOx, and then allo cating "RECLAIM trading credits" among major sources. Those sourcesmust stillinstallBACT atanrdgeMts.A10C2 ATlttehcohungohlofagciielsit,iebsuotptheeraytianlsgoamt tahye bcrueyatoironseollfctrheedmitsatrokemt egeott tthheeiirr asplleocwifaicnceemsifsrseieo--ns a property right bestowed by the pubhc to private enterprises--newfacilitieshave to buy credits from operating sources to cover their SOxand NOxemissions. Brokers and a computer-based listing of credits for sale facihtate trades. throTuagbhle139-917s.ummarizes the volume and value of trades in the RECLAIM system from 1995 TABLE 3-1: SUM M ARY OF RECLAIM TRADING, 1994-1997 PO LLU TA N T NUM BER OF TRADES TONS TRADED $ VALUE OF TRADES SOx NOx 64 15,085 $ 2 0 ,0 0 8 ,0 0 0 549 54,665 $ 5 9 ,4 2 2 ,0 0 0 SourcPersogSraCmATQhrMeeD-Y,eaArnAnuudailtRaEndCPLrAogIrMessARuedpiotrRt,,ep1o9r9t8fo.r the 1997 Compliance Year, SCAQMD, RECLAIM The numbers in the table understate the magnitude of trades by showing only those that happened between facilities. Each facility also has the option, under RECLAIM, of trading aalmloocnagtioinnd,iivtsidfaucailliptyo-llleuvtieolncaspo,ubrcuetsthweitthaibnlethdaotefsacniolittys,hporwovthidoesde tthraedfeasc.iAlitnydstiatyisstbhealot wfleixtsibtioltitayl that firms participating in the New7JerseyFacility-Wide Permitting Program found so valuable. Through 1997, the RECLAIM program produced net reductions of almost 14percent for SOx memoirsesiroendsuacntdion1s0.o6vpeerrctheentnfeoxrtNthOrexeemyiesasriso.nsA. nTdhethdeetcrlaindiinngg csaypstsehmouslhdofuolrdcehesulpbsrteangtiioanllayl Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00071 72 Environment.gov businesses find and implement the least-costly ways to achieve those air-quality goals. The South Coast Air Quality Management District originally intended to include VOCsin the RECLAIM trading program. By 1995, however, regulators dropped the idea because of pohtical and technical problems. VOCs are harder to monitor than SOxand NOxemissions (awlshoicmh,oirne RdiEveCrLseA: ItMhe,rearaeremhounnitdorreeddscoonf tdinifufoeuresnlyt cbhyermeliicaabllse, setaacchk winistthruimtseonwtsn). pVroOpCerstiaerse. Some VOCs are highly toxic to humans and other organisms, raising equity concerns about trading'spotential to concentrate emissions--and possibly human exposure and health risk-- in localized hot spots. (Even the geographic distribution of SOxand NOx trades poses some equity issues. Thus RECLAIM has two distinct trading zones: a coastal zone and an inland zboencea.uTseraodfinacgtirvuilteysaaltotenmg ptht etoceonassutr.1e03th) at air in the downwind inland zone doesnot deteriorate The success of RECLAIM'Sprograms suggests that statewide or regional cap-and-trade systems could be an effective way for states in the eastern United States to meet the NOx rTehdautctoirodnesr,EtPheA"oNrdOexreSdIPinca1ll9,"9810,5urneqduerireitds r2e2spsotantseisbailnitdytthoepDreisvterinctt corfosCso-sltuamtebpiaoltloutrieodnu.1c0e4 emissions of nitrogen oxides by fixed amounts by 2003 and 2007. EPA set the reduction quotas at levels intended to help reduce the long-range transport of NOx and ground-level ozone, which ispartially responsible for dangerously high levels of ozone in the eastern United States. MadiddiwtioenstaelrNn OanxdcoSnoturothlseronnstthaeteisr,bwushiincehssgeesn. eAralttheomuguhchEPoAf twhaatsouzsoinnge,ahuathdorreistyistgerdanimtepdoistinbgy the Clean Air Act, several midwestern states sued the agency in an attempt to block the action, which held up implementation until June 2000, when EPA prevailed in court.106 Now that the regulations must be implemented, many states are considering using cap-and-trade systems to achTiehvee tehxeisstipnegcisfyiesdtermedoufcNtioOnsxcaosnetfrfoiclsiegnetlnyearaslplyosrseiqbluei.res specific types of large emitters-- power plants, industrial boilers, and cement kilns--to meet specific rate-based standards (mea sured as units of nitrogen oxides per-million units of exhaust volume). The evolution of those specific standards has resulted in a system that failsto achieve effective and efficient NO xreduc ttioodna.yB'syrreognulSawtioifnt,s:of the Environmental Law7Institute, identifies some of the problems with A major problem with rate standards under the Clean Air Act is that they dolidffseoreunrctieasttehbaettownelyenneoelddtaonmdeneetwa rpellaantitvse,lcyrweaetaikngstaansdiganrdif,iwcahnitlebniaeswtosowuarrcdess face a very stringent one. Thus, older largely coal-fired plants emit NOxat levels of 100-630 parts per million (ppm) of exhaust volume, even though some could reduce NO xat prices as low as $300 a ton. However, the stringent New Source Review (NSR) standards apphed to new and cleaner gas-fired pinlasnotms eresqtautierse3thpepmmt,orerqeudiurcinegthineviresatlmreeandtys tlhoawt NcoOstxferommiss$i2o,n5s0t0oto9 $p2p0m,0,0o0r per ton of NOxreduction. These new source standards are so stringent that they impose significant costs on new7sources, and discourage investment in clean technologies.107 A cap-and-trade system for NOxreductions would create incentives to invest in the leastcostly reduction strategies first (adding controls to coal-burning plants)while eliminating some of the disincentives for installing gas-fired turbines and industrial cogenerating facilities to the Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00072 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 73 grid. Allowance trading would also tend to favor reductions in mercury and S 0 2from coalburning plants and carbon monoxide from gas-fired plants.108 Eight states in the Northeast, allmembers of a broader 0 zone Transport Commission, have atedmopttheadt cwoemnpt aintitboleopruelreastieosntaibnli1sh9i9n9g.1t0h9e "NOxBudget Program," an allowance trading sys In 1999, these states instituted a stringent emissions cap and allowance trad ing system requiring 912 units to reduce emissions by 55 to 65 percent from the 1990 baseline. Despite initial expectations that many sources would need ttoo uasceheiexvpeetnhseivsee ednede-porfe-dpiupceticoonnst,rothlsesfulcehxiabsilsietyleacftifvoerdceadtablyytitchreecdaupc-taionnd-(StrCadRe) approach led to unexpected results. Chief among these were that most (126) of the 142 coal-fired units achieved 20 to 30 percent N0 Reductions through ocopmerpaltiiaonncael cthhraonuggehs aalonnuem, wbietrhoouft tpeocshtn-coolomgbieusst.i.o.nacnodnntrootlso.nTlyhSisCaRll.oAwseda consequence, compliance costs, after initial volatility at the program'sstart in which prices ranged from $3,000 to $7,000 per ton, have settled down to less than $1,000, significantly lower than estimated. This may foreshadow low7 ccaopmfpolriaancberocaodstesrfogrrothuepEoPfA1N9 OstaxtSeIsP.11c0allthat would impose a NO xemission States interested in using a cap-and-trade system, however, will face an unfortunate chal lenge: EPA lacks specific authorization to implement such a system on a regional basis. A rlaerggieoneamlicsaspio-nasndso-turracdees tahpaptraoraechthceopurlidminarcylutdaerg3e9t2s ocfoaElP-bAu'srnruinleg. pTorwadeirnpglaantttsh,earsewgeiollnaaslostchaeler would be appropriate because the pollutant mixes in the atmosphere across regions, and toxic hot spots are not of particular concern with NOx emissions. In the absence of a federally coordinated regional market, individual states could implement their own trading systems. They could also collaborate to build multistate markets, as ishappening in the Northeast, though doing tsaogreesqouifretrsaadisnugb,staanndtiaulsceotrmamdiittimoneanltroefgsutlaatteorreysoauprpcreosa.cShteastetsocmoueledt, othfecioruermseis,sfioornegliomthites.advan When EPA and the states decide to tackle the even-more-daunting health risks posed by sulfates and other fine particles, they will probably find cap-and-trade systems among the best saocrluotsisonbsr.oSadulfaairtessh,eldiks.eENPOAx,haarseegsetanbelriashteeddbaymmoanniytolrairnggenceotmwbourksttioongasothuercrems oanreditnrfaonrsmpoartitoedn on their transport and fate. Data from that system, coupled with the lessons from the NOx trading efforts, should provide EPA with a foundation for establishing regional cap-and-trade systems for sulfates in the near future. featAulrlesofinthcoosmemcoanp:-and-trade systems for controlling air and water emissions have several They are a different form of "command-and-control" regulation. Pubhc authorities set ttrhaencsfaoprsmantrdatdhietinoncaolmremgaunladtioang,rowuhpileofcopnatritnicuiipnagnttos tuosemteheetpthuebmlic. 'sAasustuhcohr,ittyh7etosypsrtoetmecst the public good. The more flexibility participants have in how they generate or use credits, and the lower the transaction costs for finding a trading partner, the more efficient the market. The Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00073 74 Environment.gov more efficient the system, the lower the overall cost society will have to pay to achieve its environmental goals. tThheepsuybshtecmwsaanrtes.nSootuprecrefsecmt.aRyemgauklaetofarslsme calyaismetstahbeocuatptshteocorehdigiths ttoheaychaireevgeetnheeraretisnugltsor using, and monitoring systems may fail to catch such fraud. On the other hand, the systems need not be perfect to be highly effective. The systems shift the respective roles of regulator and regulatee in ways that improve the effectiveness of both. Stephenson and his colleagues observe: "Allowance trading recognizes that a centralized agency has limited ability to know all the pollution control walittehrnfairtsivt-ehsaanvdakilnaobwleletodgeeacohf iintsdoivwidnuuanlidqiuscehcairrgceurm. Rstaatnhceers,,thiseinintdhievibdeusatlpdoissicthioanrgteor, determine how to manage its waste stream. In an effective effluent allowance trading system, the role of the government regulators shifts from identifying who must control effluents and how they should do so, to establishing water quality goals and monitoring and enforcing discharge limitations." 111 America's experience with cap-and-trade systems demonstrates that they are highly effec tive approaches for implementing publicly driven pollution-reduction goals, provided that the sources of pollution can be identified, monitored, and "regulated," that the sources face vary ing prices for making environmental improvements, and that the pollutants being traded are unlikely to create toxic hot spots. Open-Market Systems and Offsets tiso aaAtltleodmwopzfetiirnnmgsstatsotoemismhepaflvleeemxaiebdnioltiptaytenidnoocppoeennnt-rm-omlalairnkrkgeettthsseyyisrsteteemmmitssosoieronnacscooluofrsaVegrOeelCraetsid.vuMec,tiaiconhni"gooaffnf,snefuto"trrpieerxnoatgmsraapmnled,, other water pollutants. As implemented, the systems are generally productive, though unlikely by them selves to help America achieve its goals for cleaner water or air. Their weakness stems from the lack of a cap, the regulatory- driver that would motivate firms to participate. procInesas:ninopeeitnh-emr acrakseetgseynsetermat,inagffiremwemr VigOhtCisnsatnadll tahneeowpppoierctuenoitfyetqousiepllmaenntmorissshiountsd-rowdnuca tion credit. Depending on the program, that credit might be good for a particular year, or considered "permanent." In some states, regulators verity- a credit before listing it on a state rfcaeocgriirnsetgsepraoornefdlaaitnvigavielilanybculreenacusrseeudianitlsVc.iAOrcCufimremsmtaeinslsscieeow:nahsnebreueyniounnstudhaeiltlssytpabetiergmmpiritogtedhdut cwletivaoennlt. ytBoeuabyru,infyogtrhtehaxetaccmrreepddleiitt, icafoniudtlidas keep the firm "in compliance." Or a firm might be subject to a new technology requirement, and find it cheaper to meet its emissionslevelby buying someone else'sreduction than installing the new technology-. willAnfotetrreasfuirlmt inbuuynsaacccerpedtaitb,lseohmeealstthatreisskpserfoforrpmeoopnl-esiitnetihnespaercetaiosnusrtroouvnerdiifnygthtahtethfaecipliutyrc,hthauses combining some of the safeguards assured by traditional permits with some of the efficiencies of a market. A state may formally modify-the seller's and purchaser'soperating permits to lock in tHheixi,mRpuldiceart,ioannds oSfutghaermtraannsoafcfteiroann, aesxawmelpl.le from Michigan'sopen-market VO C program : Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00074 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 75 We interviewed an environmental manager at a firm that needed credits to comply with a new regulation governing emissions associated with startup and shutdown of manufacturing lines as a stopgap measure until it could ocstobamtratpiunlpiaaanpncedermhshaiudttmditoonwdointfipceuamtriicoshsnai.osnTesdh, ecarncedodmittshp.eaTnchyoe'mscepoxaminsytpinawgnoypuepldrumrhciahtvadesiedfdanctoewtdocnotoovnnes-r of emissions for less than $10,000 (including a broker's fee). Time spent on tdhaeystrwanosrakcintigonwiitnhcltuhdeecdretwdiot bdraoyksetro, tlweaorndaaybsocuotmthpeleptirnoggrtahme n, etwceosstoartyhpreae ypeerrwanodrkc,oarnpdoraadteayofofircetw. Ionotobttaali,ntihnegcfoinmalpaapnpyrsopveanltflreosmsththaenc1o0mpperasnoyn's-dlaawys on the transaction. It took the state between two and three weeks to approve the transaction. The environmental manager found the MDEQ extremely httorealgnpesfauncle,triakotnneo. awNnlodewdsgetelhlaacbtrleeh,deiathsnadisnwgthailielnifneugdtutfoaremw.1i1lo2irakritcyownsittrhucthtieveplryogtorafmac,ilhietahteopthees The Clean Air Act requires major sources of air pollution to install BACT or MACT. That statutory requirement prevents EPA from allowing firm s to purchase credits to meet the same performance goals that the technology achieves. For most firms, installing those more-or-less sbtuayncdraerdditdseavnicdefseewlitmraidneatseoscacnuyr,fausrtshheorwlnegianlTnaebelde t3o-2re. dItuicseliekmelyistshioantst.raTdhiunsg, wfeowufldirbmeshneeaevdietro, overall costs lower, and environmental results at least as good if firms could buy credits rather than installing BACT or MACT. TABLE 3-2: VOC TRADING ACTIVITY UNDER OPEN-MARKET AND OFFSET SYSTEMS PROGRAM TYPE PROGRAM OPENMARKET M ichig a n Texas INCEPTION AVAILABLE NUMBER OF DATE CREDITS GENERATORS 1996 5 ,0 4 2 25 1997 38 4 CREDITS USED 161 10 NUMBER OF USERS 13 1 OFFSET N e w Jersey Louisiana N ew York 1995 1994 1994 615 6,032 2,646 15 10.2 5 29 Not Not available available 43 476 6 Texas 1993 4 ,9 4 5 59 2,693 18 N ew Jersey 1977 14,440 157 1,540 12 Note: Credit units are in tons per ye a r for offset programs and tons for open-market programs. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00075 76 Environment.gov States generally design their open-market systems to produce an environmental benefit by requiring a purchaser to buy more credits than it actually needs. The purchaser is then com pelled to "retire" those extra credits, resulting in a net reduction in air emissions after the trade. ySetaatOressf.f1s1a3elstopr"orgetriarme"s credits permanently if they have gone work in similar ways. In those areas of unsold for more than five the country failing to meet or 10 EPA's ambient air-quality standards, no large new source of air emissions can be constructed or extensively modified unless it first offsets its new emissions by eliminating emissions elsewhere in the non-attainment area. Most offset programs require firms to eliminate more emissions tthhaant rtehdeuyctwioilnl aisdddettoeramninaeirdshbeydt,hteheprreobgyrapmro'sd"utcriandginagnreattiroe,d"utchteiornatiion oemf eismsiiosnsiso.nTshreetisriezde toof emissions added. Trading ratios ensure that in each transaction the total emissions drops very slightly,114 and states may apply different trading ratios to achieve various policy goals or to make some trades mincorreeasdeessiarsatbhlee dthisatnanocethbeerstw. eInenNthewe gJeenreserayt'sorofafnsdetupsreorgorfatmhe, fcorerdeixt ainmcprelea,setsh,ewthriacdhinegncroautiro ages trades within smaller geographical areas. Such a policy keeps the public benefits of the trade "close to home," and reduces the chance that a transaction would create a new toxic hot spot.115 The imposition of trading ratios is another way in which government agencies manipu plartoegmraamrkse, thfoowrceevsetro, aprreodthuecier raellsouwltsanac"efrfeoer"emcoanrokmeticwgoruoldwnthota.nTdhseompreimteacrhyn' boelongeficitasloinfnooffvsaet tion, along with their prevention of pollution increases. Since early 1998, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality has been attempt ing to establish an open-market system for effluents in surface waters. The department wanted ttohoaslelowwhivcohlubniotaarcycutrmaduleastea.mTohnegsptaoteinatlsaonwd annotnedpotoinatllsoowurfcierms osftoaullsetycpreesdiotsf teoffmlueeentttseecxhcneoplt ogyrequirements. The department hoped that the system would encourage voluntary emission reductions in waters currently meeting water-quality standards, and in those impaired waters where the state is developing place-specific regulatory' programs known as "total maximum dailTyhleoaddesp"aorrtmTeMntDhLass.b11e6en revising a draft rule in collaboration with EPA's Region 5 office, and published a version for pubhc comment at the end of 1999. Citing prohibitions in the Clean Water Act, EPA insisted that the state drop the potential for firms to meet their technol otrgaydirnegquAircecmorednitnsgthtoroKuegrhr, tehteatp. urchase of credits, and that the state narrow' the scope of The agency suggested to Michigan that it permit only nutrient trading The provisions that were dropped would have provided more opportunities for trading to take place, might have substantially reduced the transaction costs mofetnratsdiinngw, aantdercoquuladlihtyavaetalfefsosredrecdoisntcsrtehaasnedtorapdpiotirotunnailtiEePsAto-asaffneccttiiomnepdroavpe proaches. A fundamental, unresolved issue between MDEQ and EPA is the extent to which trading ispermissibleprior to theestablishment of aTMDL. While the department regards EPA's proposal [the agency's since-withdrawn August n1e9w99oprreoxppoasnedde"dRseovuirscieosndsitsochtharegNinPgDinEtoSaPnroimgrpaamire.d. w. "a]tteorrbeoqduyireasoaffsmetasjfoorr Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00076 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 77 step forward in recognizing the potential environmental benefits of trading, the restriction of pre-T MDL trading to offsets is clearly a far narrower vision of the potential of trading to achieve early reductions in pollution than the tiaisposupnersowiasicEthhPiAnem'istbvroeiedqwiueitdrheainat,ftoohrnemcMealaimcThoiMdgiaDfnicLasttiaisotendw.evMideelDotpEreaQdd,ibnaegnliypevrcoehpsaosnusgacelhs. aAinreraeqllluaoitcreead ment would create a cumbersome disincentive to trading117 Michigan'snegotiations may prefigure conflicts that could arise in other states interested in developing nutrient trading systems. As explained fully in the next chapter, the process of danevdeploopliitnicgaallnydciommpplleemx.enEtvineng aunTdMerDthLefobresotnoefocrimrcuomresptaonllcuetsa,nittswinillabweayteearsrhsebdefisotreecThnMicDalLlys will be in place in many impaired waterways, so EPA policies or regulations that restrict the iomthpelremhaenndta, toionnceoifntrpaldaicneg, asyTstMemDsLinctohueldmeesatnabtilmiseh mthaeycbaepcfoomr eabnountreisenotf-ctroandtienngtisoyns.teOmnitnhea watershed-and the kind of environmental and economic benefits Paul Faeth described could ensue. In a sufficiently flexible market with few constraints and low transaction costs, trading under the TMDL cap would constantly--and efficiently--reallocate the scarce resource of the watershed's assimilative capacity The TMDL rules, however, do not explicitly authorize that kindFeodfefrlaelxirbelgeuslyastiteomnsarnedqumiraeytehvaetnp, oasinMt-sicohuirgcaene'sffelxupeenrtielonacde sliumggitessbtse, awctriivtteelny dinistcooNurPaDgeEiSt. permit. EPA has interpreted that to mean that each source must receive an individual NPDES perm it, and that any exchanges of control responsibility would need to be approved on a caseby-case basis and included in each NPDES permit. EPA'srationale for requiring each effluent gtroavdeerntombeentf'osramuatlhiozeridtywtiothtiankeaneNnfPoDrcEemSepnetrmacittioisnsthaagtadinosint geascohwpoeurlmd imt ahionltdaeirn. tShuecfhedaerreal quirement for pre-approval of trades through individual NPDES permits would eliminate the potential for flexible, timely trading and would reduce incentives for undertaking pollutionprevention activities. Such a regime would also eliminate the kind of group (watershed)permit that North Carolina issued to the sources on the Tar-Pamlico.118 Group permitting would gcrreoautpe wonoeulNdPdDetEeSrm-tiynpeeapmeromngittfhoermasenluvmesbheorwofthpeolionatdsoruerdcuectdiiosnchraersgpeorns.siMbileitmiebsewrsouolfdthbee shared. While that concept would add decisionmaking flexibility to dischargers, EPA head quartershas not made clear itsposition on group permits. Region 4 of EPAhas authorized such La opnegrmIsiltafnodr SthoeunNdeufeslet tRhievyern,ebeudtedthseeppraoraptoensetnattsutoofryaanuutthroiernizt-aatilolonwfaonrcaemtroardeinflgexsiybsltee,mmaforr ket-like system.119 Michigan had proposed an alternative approach to enforcement in its open-market rule. Trades between point and nonpoint sourcesof pollution would be both registered and enforced by the state. Point sources would have their permits modified "by rule," to acknowledge the iemvepraycttraodfet.rTadhees stthaeteywmoaudled:htahveeytwheoureldspnoontsinbeileidtyfoofrmenasluNriPngDtEhSatpcerremdiitts mweordeifliecgaittiiomnastefolyr generated and used. Enforcing such a system iswithin the capacity of most state governments. Indeed, the challenges would be similar to those Massachusetts faces in keeping its Environ mdireencttaelnRfeosrucletms Penrot garuatmhorhiotyneosvteraenadchcrpeodiinblte-s.oEuvrcene piefrMmiict,htihgeanfewdeerrael aaglleonwceydctooulsdevsteirllEaPuAdi'ts Michigan's management of the program as a whole. And if Michigan proved to be lax in its Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00077 78 Environment.gov management of the trading system and water quality declined as a result, EPA could exert pressure on the state to strengthen itsprogram.120 States adopting the approach might thus find it advantageous to develop some public-accountability mechanism to replace the Clean Water AcocvtIe'tsrrepedrmobvayiisntihsoentosNbePenDasbeEelSinnpgwrhionegdtrhiavemird.EuPalAs wtoilbl aripnpgroevnefothrceeMmiecnhtigsaunitspldainre.cItnlydeaegda,iintsrtemdisacinhsartogebres seen whether EPA will approve any of the open-market systems. At the time most of the re search forthisproject tookplace, EPAwasinvolved in severallarge policymaking and rulemaking exercises that are immediately relevant to the trading programs described in this chapter. The OSeffpitceemobfeAr i1r9a9n9d,12R1awdihaitcihonsuhpaedrciessdueeddtihtse D1r9a9f4t EEccoonnoommiicc IInncceennttiivvee PPrrooggrraamm GRuuildesa,nFceinianl Rule and Guidance.122 The Office of Water was seeking public comment on proposed rules relating to the implementation of TMDLs and NPDES permits, as noted above in the discus wsiohniSchtoaftiesMstoaincbdheictghoaemni'resbpeufrfsoeigncrteiasvmsee.sohnOanOvecJrtuoelysbpe1or3n2,d12e,0d20d000i,f1fEe. PreAntplyutboliEshPeAd'salafciknaolfrcelvairsietyd TMDL rule, or conflicting signals. Hix, Ruder, and Sugarman explain: ISmtaptelesmseeenktattoiosnubPmlaintsth(eSiIrPp)froorgraacmhisevtoingEPoAr masairnetvaiisnioinngs taotttahienimr eSntattsetwatiudse. In so doing, the states need clear guidance on the program design, implemen tation, and review elements necessary for federal approval. None of the pro gramswe evaluated has received approvalfrom EPA as SIP revisions. Sticking pinoginthtsebceetwrteaeinntyEPoAf eamndissstiaotnessriendpurcotgioranms, papupbrliocvianlvreollavteempernimt,aarnildyptoroegnrsaumr transparency to the public. While states have worked with EPA to resolve these issues, EPA has yet to approve programs, primarily due to its lack of a final Economic Incentive Program (EIP) guidance document. . . . Debate over emission quantification protocols could also take some time to resolve. The discussion of quantification protocols for open-market pro grams contained in the draft guidance is intended merely as a starting point fdoerbdaeteveolvoeprinpgroatopcoolliscbyeotwnepernotsotcaotelss.aDndueEPtoA,thaes wcoenllteasntaiolaucsknoaftucroensoefntshues within EPA's Office of Air and Radiation, the agency may not adopt a final policy in the near future. Uncertainty also exists regarding whether EPA will base approval decisions on the provisions of the new EIP guidance in cases where states developed programs in response to the 1994 guidance and the 1995 open-m arket trading rule. Statesargue that theyencounter difficultyin developingprogramsaccordpinrgogtoragmuisdtahnactewtheraet ddoeevsenloopteydetperxioisrt.toEPisAsuhaanscyeeot tfothdeetneermwignueihdoanwciet.wIinldl tereeda,t the draft EIP guidance leaves blank the section titled "How does this guidance apply to existing EIPs?" Staff within OAR's Office of Policy Analysis and Re vEiIePwasnudggtheasttsctohnastidsteartaetipornogwrialml bsewgiivllelnikteolythboeseheplrdogtoratmhes"thspaitrwit"eroefdtehseignneewd to follow past guidance. It is unclear exactly what this will entail. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00078 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 79 The extent to which lack of program approval by EPA's0 ffice of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) hinders trading varies among programs. According to EPA's draft EIP guidance, firms participating in programs that lEaPcAk feendfeorracleamppernotvaacltmioanys banedincvitiiozleantiolanwosufiStsI.PIrneqMuiicrhemigeann,tsDaEndQsustbajfefcbt teo lieves that lack of federal program approval has had a chilling effect on credit use, but not on generation. This assertion is supported by the fact that credit use increased after 1997 when EPA issued a notice of proposed approval. Following this announcement, credit use--which had been virtually nonex mistaernktepdrleyvi(o1u5s0l.y64(otnolynslOustoednsiunstehdeintwthoeyfeoaurrspsrineccee)d.mIngyceoanrtsr)a--st,htarsadinicnrgeapsreod gram staff at agencies in Louisiana, New York, and Texas suggests that lack of formal EPA approval does not impede trading While the New York pro gtcoaranemtnschloaoucrkrtcasogfmeeditenrrgaadsl.ianTpghpirsIonfvaavTloe, rxEaabPsl,AeTrheNavsiRenwCo,Ctheodswttahefvafet rst,huagepgpperesotasgrsrtahtomathhathvaese ndroeognsueigllanittietfldie community does not care that the program lacks federal approval. The busi ness community and TNRCC have established mutual trust through ongoing negotiations with EPA on TNRCC's operating permits program, and firms feel comfortable participating in non-approved trading programs.123 Firms that participate in any of the new permitting or trading systems described in this report take a number of risks that would discourage most firms--and regulators--from inno vating When the economic stakes are high enough, however, firms and regulators come for wofatrhde. Kpoesrsri,beltea,l.thdoesucgrhibaettcwoonesixdaemrapblleescoofs"t.trIandMesi"ninnewsoattae,rsRhaehdrsMthaaltthineglp, eadloecxaplafnirdmt,haenrdantghee state regulatory agency agreed to an offset arrangement in which Rahr agreed to finance-- astnrdea, mthraosucgohmiptseNnsPaDtioEnSfporerimts iotw, rnemdiasicnhalerggealolyf loiaxbylgeefno-rd--epnloetninpgoimntanttuetrriienntot rthedeuMctiinonnessuopta pRaivrker,.wInhiWchayalgarnede,dMtoasfsinacahnucseetthtse, EcoPnAnRecetgioionno1fhreelspieddennteigalowtiaatseteawsaimteirlasrypsetermmsittofotrhaenpoaffrikc'es expanding treatment system in exchange for a permit to discharge into the Sudbury River. In both cases, the net impact on the health of the rivers isclearlypositive, and the firms saved large sums of money even though the permitting required extended periods of study and negotia wtioenre.1e24nTcohueratwgeodptehrrmouitgshsumgagrekstewtshtoattrmadigehetfbfleuaecnhtiaelvloewd aifnpceosi,nbtusot tuhrecetswaonadgnreoenmpoeinnttssaoruerscteilsl essentially negotiated permits, not market-driven trades. Both agreements created extremely high public and private transaction costs. Although productive, then, the agreements are not viable models for addressing the nation's nonpoint water pollution problem. Exploiting Competition Paul Faeth'sproposals for nonpoint source reductions raised the possibility of maximizing the environmental impact of public payments to farms by targeting the payments to projects tshuabtsiwdioeus--ld idneclliuvderintghethboisgegiensttegnadiendstpoerreddoulcleare.rHoseiocnoanntrdanstoendptohianttwpoitllhuttrioand--itiownhailchagthriecfueldtuerraall government and states have generally handed out equally to all farmers meetings certain Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00079 80 Environment.gov TABLE 3-3: THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S SALINITY CONTROL PROJECTS UNIT/ STUDY CONTROLS RFP IMPLEMEN (TONS/ DATE TATION YR.) USDA CAPITAL COST RECLAMATION CONTRACT COST (AWARDED) ANNUAL RECLAMATION 0&M COST OBLIGATIONS COSTS PER THRU5/99 ($M) TON Hammond 1996 19962001 4 8 ,1 3 0 $0 $13,486,000 $5,001,000 $0 $22 N avajo W ell 1996 1998- 500 $0 Plugging 1999 $ 7 1 ,0 0 0 $0 $0 $1 1 Cottonwood 1996 19981999 8,506 $0 $2,100,000 $1,955,680 $0 $20 W ellington 1996 1998- 14,532 $0 $3,935,400 $3,935,000 $0 $22 2000 Ashley 1997 19992000 9,000 $0 $3,269,000 $3,269,000 $0 $29 Duchesne 1997 1999- 2 0 ,4 1 7 $0 $ 9 ,1 2 7 ,0 0 0 $ 1 7 5 ,0 0 0 $0 $36 County 2004 Ferron 1998 1998- 47,407 $4,109,028 $10,802,744 $3,408,707 $0 $25 2002 Paradox N a n o filtra tio n 1998 19992002 8 1 ,5 0 0 $0 $10,264,236 $1,799,723 $1.17 $24 Allen Lateral 1998 19992000 8,125 $601,000 $ 2 ,4 1 2 ,0 0 0 $ 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 $0 $30 Uncompahgre 1998 1998- 2,295 $0 Demo 1999 $ 8 8 9 ,6 0 0 $ 8 8 9 ,6 0 0 $0 $31 Price 1998 1999- 16,153 $1,009,400 $5,182,650 $0 $0 $31 (addition) 2001 L. Brush Cr. (Sunshine) 1998 1999 2,764 $185,000 $ 8 5 8 ,0 0 0 $ 8 5 8 ,0 0 0 $0 $30 North Carbon 1998 19992000 10,245 $416,270 $ 3 ,4 9 9 ,9 0 8 $ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 $0 $31 M offat 1998 2000- 5,1 12 $750,000 $ 1 ,0 6 6 ,4 4 0 $0 $0 $28 2001 Highline 1998 2000- 8,870 $1,700,000 $2,100,000 $0 $0 $34 2001 BIA - Ute 1998 1999- 5 3 ,3 4 4 $0 $ 1 9 ,7 8 8 ,3 7 3 $0 Tribe 2005 $0 $30 Price R. 1 998 Pending 4 8 ,0 0 3 $0 $0 $0 $1.30 $27 Improvement Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00080 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 81 UNIT/ STUDY CONTROLS RFP IMPLEMEN (TONS/ DATE TATION YR.) USDA CAPITAL COST RECLAMATION CONTRACT COST (AWARDED) ANNUAL RECLAMATION 0&M COST OBLIGATIONS COSTS PER THRU5/99 ($M) TON Burns Bench 1999 2000- 21,468 $1,206,000 $4,465,514 $0 $0 $21 2001 Farnsworth 1999 2000- 9 ,5 5 7 $0 $ 3 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 $0 $0 $27 2001 UT DWR - 1999 1999- 1,900 $0 instream Flow 2000 $506,931 $0 $0 $21 Moore Group 1999 1999- 17,587 $1,174,930 $4,733,160 $0 $0 $27 2000 O uray Park 1999 NEPA 4,637 $0 $ 9 4 4 ,9 0 5 $0 $0 $16 Seeley-Collard 1999 1999- 905 2000 $102,667 $ 1 8 5 ,6 9 0 $0 $0 $25 W estern 1999 NEPA/ 2 5 ,78 0 $1,821,141 $ 6 ,8 7 5 ,0 0 0 $0 $0 $27 Uintah CS TOTALS 4 6 6 ,7 3 7 $13,075,436 $ 1 0 9 ,8 1 3 ,5 5 1 $22,191,710 $2 $26 Notes Cost effectiveness computed using no federal replacement cost and 8 percent interest.) S ource! U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1999 criteria. The U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, however, has devel oped a strong case for using the market to target conservation funds. In a research report forthis pinrnoojevcatt,ioRnosbienrtthAedCleor,loMraidcoheRleivSetrraBuabs,ina.n12d5 Heather Green describe the bureau's successful Since 1973, the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program has spent some $700 mil lion to reduce the salinity of the river to levels meeting requirements set by a United States treaty7with Mexico. Much of that money has gone to large public works projects, including a desalinization plant near the Mexican border, aswell aslarge capital-intensive irrigation projects. TInhe19b9u5r,eaCuopnlgarnensseda,ubthuoilrt,izaenddaowchnaendgteh,oasendprtohjeecbtsu;raenadu Cstoanrtgerdesasnhaadnntouaalpcporomvpeeetiatciohnonfoer. funds for salinity7reduction. Public and private entities can apply proposing to implement specific changes to reduce point- or nonpoint runoff A team from the bureau and affected csteartteasinratynkthsatht ethperopproojseacltssewacohulydeaarchfoierveesttihmeapterodmcoisset-defrfeescutlitvse. n(eTshseanredsurilstsk--area sfuunmcmtioanrizoefdthine Table 3-3.)Under the old system, the bureau'sprojects cost an average of $70 per ton of salinity7 removed from the Colorado. Under the new competitive system, costs have ranged from $11 to $36 per ton, and have averaged $26 per ton.126 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00081 82 Environment.gov The results in the Colorado River Basin simply underscore the power of competition and markets. Entrepreneurs could reduce salinity at a lower cost than government officials using traditionalmanagemen t tools. When the bureau introduced market forcesinto itsprogram, the NcoOstxotfraadcihnigevsiynsgtesmpescdifeicscernibveirdoneamrleinertailngtohailsscwheanpttedro. wn,just as it did with the SO ,, SOx, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions The United States is many years away from deciding whether or how to regulate green house gas emissions: carbon dioxide and other gasses that contribute to long-term climate csphhanegriec. sTchieentpiastnseclorneccolugdneiztehsatthraetdtuhceirnegisthnoe pgoroliwtitchalocfognrseeennshuosufosreagcatsioenm, tihssoiuongshims doesstiaratmbloe. Emissions trading could be part of a plan to achieve that result. Carbon dioxide is amenable to cap-and-trade systems because it is transported globally tthhreoreugahreoumt itlhlieonastmoofsspohuerrcee,scorefactainrbgonno dpirooxbildeemwsoorfldlwociadle,orwriethgigorneaalthvoatrisaptoiotsn;sainndthbeeccaousstes they would face to reduce emissions. At the national or global level, the best way to find and implement the least costly reductions would be through some form of dynamic market-based system, possibly a cap-and-trade system, possibly a tax or fee system. Any cumbersome permit procOenssewoof uthlde cardevaatentuangnesecoefsdsaervyelaonpdinwgatsrtaedfiiinlgtrsaynsstaecmtisotno rceodstus.ce S 0 2, SOx, NOx, nutrients, and other pollutants is that the experience helps the nation learn more about the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches to credit generation, verification, trading, and en fdoerccaedmeesntot. cSoumche.knowledge will lead to better choices about greenhouse gas emissions in the Delivering Results The innovative trading systems described in this chapter demonstrate that governments can gexoapllso.itInmdaerekde,ttmheecehxaanmispmlesswsuitghginesat trhegaut ltartaodriyn'gcosnytsetexmt tsoaarcehoienveeothfethpeubbleisct'saepnpvrioraocnhmeesntthael nation could use to reduce nonpoint sources of nutrients in surface waters and nitrogen oxides in the air. Yet trading--particularly in water systems--remains controversial. EPA offers rhe torical support, but neither EPAnor Congress has taken the stepsnecessary'to test the potential of tTrardadininggtosyrestdeumcse dthoepnoasteionne'swintetrcahcntaicballe, plerogabll,emansdwpitohlintiocnalpochinatllpeonlgleustiothna.t must be ad dressed. Some of the technical issues are probably immutable, and shouldprevent certain kinds of trading But many of the so-called "problems" with trading are either overstated or solvable. This section distinguishes among those issues. Technical Issues The technical challenges to establishing trading systems to reduce environmental pollution relate to the laws of nature, and to the scientific capacity' to understand and manage chemical, bcoionlsotgriacianlt,saannddphhoytssicpaoltisn;tmeroancittioornisn.gT; harnedemtyapneasgoifncghaalslyesntgemestahraetpaalrltoiwcusltarraldyerselaemvaonntg: sdpiaffteiarl ent types of pollutants or environmental impacts. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00082 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 83 Spatial Constraints There is great variation in how pollutants behave in air and water, and those variations determine the spatial constraints society might reasonably impose on a trading system. Sulfur dcaiorxriiedde,fnaritbroegyeonndoxthideeisr,paonidntssuolffatoersigteinndbytowdiinsdpse.rTsehoant cise wrehleyaCseodntgorethsse cartematoesdphtheerea, caindd-raairne trading system as a national market, and why states are interested in regional markets for NOx and, possibly, for sulfates and other fine particles. Nitrogen or phosphorus in a river moves with the river, and concentrates in its lakes or backwaters. Hence, proponents of nutrient trading systems generally see them operating within particular watersheds. Most volatile organic com ptooubnedhsigbhrelyaklodcoawliznefda.irAlytqraudiciknlgy sinysttheematthmaotsaplhloewree,dsofothr eairsiigmnmifiecdainattenetowxiccoinmcpeanctrtaitsiolinkeolyf VOCs could thus create a local hot spot: a place where a few people could be exposed to elevated and potentiallyhazardous levelsof the pollutant. Because of the risksthey pose, aswell as how they behave in the environment, some chemicals may be entirely unsuited for trading For such toxics, society' may prefer to use stricter controls or outright bans. Monitoring For trading systems to work, each credit or allowance must be clearly defined and verifiable. When a power plant says that it has reduced its emissions of SO2by five tons, and thus has five tmonadseofthaellroewdauncctieosnto, asneldl,tthhaetpitlawnitllccaonnutisneuietstcooonptienruaoteusin-eamccisosridoannscmeowniitthorittsopvoesrti-ftyrathnasat cittihoans allocation. Such monitors do not exist for VOCs, however, or for nutrient runoff from farm fields. Thus the challenge of defining exactly how' much of a credit a given improvement in perAfosrmCahnacpete"rg2endeermateosn"sthraastesdt,alhleodwiemveprl,etmheendtaiftfiiocnultoyf' otrfadminegaspurroinggraomrseisntitmhoatsiengaraenfaisr.m's emissions is not unique to trading systems. In the world of conventional air permitting, for example, regulators are comfortable estimating emissions based on what they know' about chemical inputs, measurable outputs, and the workings of various machines. Facility-wide caps AonlthaoirutgohxicthsefyorinIntrtoelduanced oathdeegr rfeiremosfhuavnecebretaeinntbya,stehderoeniessntiompataerst,icnuoltaracrteuaaslomn ewashuyrecmareenfut.l estimates--backed up with appropriate documentation--should not suffice as the basis for generating and using credits or allowances. Paul Faeth'smodeling of the Upper Midwest was based on estimates of erosion and runoff fernoomugdhiffteoreunstetyinpedseofifnfiniegldcsruednidtse.r Idtififserreelnatticvoenlydistiiomnpsl.eTthoovseerielsytitmhaatteas afaprpmeahr atos bcoenpvreerctiesde acreage from moldboard cultivation to no-till cultivation or to conservation. Therefore, man aging the enforcement of such a system maybe better placed in the hands of state agriculture officials than EPA inspectors. Faeth recommends using U.S. Department of Agriculture-certi fciheadnfgaer,manpdlatnhnenersmtaokidnegteprumbilnice ahofiwst omfawnhyecrreeadnitds haofwarmcremdiitgshatrgeegneenreartaetefrdomanda upsaerdti.cTulhaer approach would use third-party' certification, similar to StarTrack's, in its reliance on public accessto information about the audits. Publishing the list of credits would enable the public and pcoamrtMpiectoiitproearsnsttoosptkhoeishetpoicnatoaterbdsthvoeenirriefaiagccarhetieoomnthetneetcrs'hs.ncoolmogmieistmareentpso,spsirbolvei:dsionmg eanaraedadviatiiolanballeinnocwen.tIivnestrfour ments flown over rivers in small airplanes can detect changes in water temperature, an indica Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00083 84 Environment.gov tor of some habitat changes and nonpoint problems. As noted above, water quality in the Grasslands trading system is monitored in part by an automated device that reports its sam pling results by phone. Remote sensing devices, including some in satellites, can detect the presence of certain algae blooms related to excess nutrients,127 and could help EPA or a state monCiutorrretnhtelyi,mthpeacotnolyf ma naurktreitendet mmaanndagfeomr aednvt asnyscteemme.nts in water monitoring technology is coming from firms interested in better point-source monitors to check their compliance with NDPES permits. Regulatory agencies have not invested much in technologies to detect nonpoint problems or measure the quality of surface water because those data have been bonetltyemr marogninitaolrliynrge,lehvoawnetvteor,thinedruesgturylarteiospnoonfdsp.oTinhtesofouorcdesi.ndWushteryre, ftohrereexaismapdlee,mnaeneddsfotor know how its products smell and taste, and so has been developing "artificial noses" and "artificial tongues," small sophisticated sensors capable of detecting low levels of a variety of complex chemicals. Similar technologies might have useful applications in the verifica tionGoofveenrnvmiroenntmaegnetnacliepsercfoourlmd adnescieg.n128trading programs to encourage the development and use of better monitoring technology simply by establishing lower (cheaper) trading ratios for credits that can be verified directly than for credits that are only estimated. Conversely, trading ratios can be set to increase asthe certainty of comphance decreases. Both tactics should stimu late the market for better ambient water-quality data. Cross-pollutant trading Trading systems are simplest when credits are all in the same units: "pounds of S 0 2dis cohfacrrgeeddittsovtahrye:aTirh,"efVorOeCxatmrapdlein. gTshyestseymstseminspalraecemionrseecvoemrapl lsetaxtoesr aplrloobwletmradatiincgwohfeanlltohweatynpceess for hundreds of very different chemicals as if they all had the same characteristics and environ mental hnpact. The Rahr Malting offset agreement worked because the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency established a set of conversion factors that allows Rahr to offset units of BOD t(iboino,chanemd oictahleorxaycgtievnitideesmthaantds)hwouitlhd huenliptsreodfuecroestihoenflcoowntorofln,ulitvrieesntotsckinmtoatnhaegMeminennet,soretaveRgiveetar. Those trading ratios are not technically exact, but they work: they produce a reasonably pre dictable environmental result because they are based on years of observation of the river, and on reasonably good science. tendInedshtoorbt,utirladdiinngtrasydsitnegmrsaotifotesnahnadvoetthoerreclyonosnearvpaptrioveximmeaatisounre, santodcfoormthpeant rseaatesofno,rttheecyhnhiacvael ambiguities. Legal Issues CleTanheACirlAeacnt AAimr AencdtmanednttshoefC1le9a9n0 WestaatbelrisAhcetdtrtehaetStr0ad2itnragdiinngdifsfyesrteenmt,waanyse.aTrhietlrevIeVrsoiofnthoef the statute specifically authorized bubbling, offsets, and other components of a trading system . The Clean Water Act, in contrast, is silent on trading, neither authorizing nor rejecting it. Both dstiastcuotuersaegmespchearstiazien tahpepluisceatoiofntseochfntroalodginygto reduce pollutants, however, and that emphasis Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00084 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 85 The Clean Air Act requires major sources of pollutants to install BACT or MACT. That technology standard ensures that every plant installs a minimum level of control, and elimi nates some of the difficultyEPA and the states had regulating air toxics on a performance basis. As noted in the discussion above on NOxcontrols, however, such standards do not provide tiencchennotilvoegsiefos.r Tfihrme ssttaoturetedupcreectlhuediersesmomisseiopnosssbieblloewfotrhmosseotfhtartadcianngb: ea aficrhmievceadnnwoitthmseteatnwdahradt might be considered its emissions baseline (the level that would be achieved by operating the BACT or MACT standard) simplyby buying emissions reductions elsewhere. The SO2trading system differs in that regard: rather than requiring each utility to install a uniform technology-- feilneecdtrosesttaotifcospctriuobnbs.erTso, froerdeuxcaemthpeleir--emthiessCiolnesa,nuAtihirtiAesctcaoluloldwiendsttahlelmscrtoubcbheorossoerabmuornngloawn-usunldfuer coal or generate less electricity; they could even increasetheir emissions, provided they purchased allowances from others. The relative simplicity of measuring SO2emissions compared to other air toxics is one reason Congress could break from the technology standard for utihties. Indeed, tuhtiehptireosgorafm"bhaacsksalcidhiinevge"difmtheaesyupraubrcleharesdeuacltloiownasnicneSsOra2thaenrdtfheawneinnvsitraollnsmcreunbtableirsst.s today accuse The Clean Water Act does not require point sources to adopt any particular technology but the technology-based performance standards required in the act tend to be used that way Firms have a propensity' to install the same technologies that regulators used to set the stan dard.129 Those practices inhibit technological innovation, as well as the kind of flexibility that tradSintegphsyesntseomnserteawlwarrdi.te of the potential for provisions of the Clean Water Act to discourage both the generation and use of credits by sources with NPDES permits. The act requires en tities with NPDES permits to seek renewals every five years. Regulated entities may fear that if trheegyulaagtogrrsestshiavteltyhecyonsthrooulltdheimirpdoisscehtaigrghetesracnodnstreolllsoratbraennkewthaelirtiamlleo.wances, they will signal to If this occurs, the surplus allowances created for sale or banking would be lost and superior performance would be penalized, rather than rewarded ... The tChWeirAptehrumsitctreedateefsflaunenitnclhennittisv,ewfhoirchdiwscohualrdgetrrusntocadteo tnhoe msuoprpelythoafnamlloewet ances and ultim ately undermine any allowance trading system carried out under the act.130 Moreover, the act's anti-backsliding provisions "prohibit permitted dischargers from pur chasing allowances that will enable them to discharge more effluent than the technology-based performance standards will allow:" 131 "The current anti-backsliding language of the CWA reflectsthe statute'sfocus on the use of technology-based control requirem ents by an individual source, rather than on the achievement of watershed water quality goals."132 "DrEaPftAFhraams beweeonrksefonrdiWngatmerisxheedd-sBigansaelds oTnratdraindgin,"gthinewagaetenrcsyheadnsnofournscoemd:e"yEeParAs.wIinlliatsct1iv9e9l6y support and promote effluent trading within watersheds to achieve water quality objectives, including water quality standards, to the extent authorized by the Clean Water Act and imple monenaticnregarteivgeuluastieonosf."of13f3seAtsn.dB, uatstnhoeteadgaebnocvye's, dErPaAfthfarasminedweoedrksguopepsoortnedtoseavsesrearlt:p"eTrmraidtsebsatsheadt depend on fundamental change in EPA's enforcement and compliance responsibilities will not be allowed." 134 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00085 Environment.gov The final TMDL rule does not include allowance trading as an implementation option. The final rule makes reference to the draft framework, but that framework only authorizes offsets among permitted sources, provided that each NPDES permit is modified to reflect the ex ucimhedapnleegmme poehnfatresmisspooornensicibnoidsltii-tvieeifdsf.eucaOtlifvNfesePctDsoonEftSrtohplaestrttrmyaptietesgtipeernsodsvutiodchecsaarlsirtygtlrehoiigunhpcetprnaetnrimvseaictfsto.iorSnitnecdopishvtesid.nuTsoahlnesactanotdensthitnios colleagues conclude that the emphasis on the individual NPDES permit could call into ques tion the legality of the kind of flexible group permit that North Carolina issued to the sources on the Tar-Pamlico.135 Political and Policy Issues Trading and the use of other market-based incentives raise a host of familiar--and largely unresolved--policy questions. That lack of resolution has probably kept trading on the mar ginsEoPAf 'ms roesgtuelnavtoirroynrmateionntaallemhaansaaglewmayesntbeefefnortths.at a polluter should pay to clean up its pollu tion. America made progress against industrial polluters largely by vilifying them: by framing pollution as a moral wrong, not merely a rational business decision. Trading systems, however, focus on making rational business decisions yield environmental benefits. They help create a system that embeds the costs of pollution in the price of goods and services, and thus tends to dsyisscteomuraadgveotchaetemdobsyt dFeasettrhucdtoivees noofttvhiolisfeygfaoromdesrasnfdorspeorvlilcuetsin. gThTeo nthuetrcieonntt-rraerdy,uicttipornoptorasdesintog subsidize farms for cleaning up. The salinity-reduction system managed by the Bureau of RcleacimlamtoabtieoanbilnetthoemCaokleo;riatdporoRviivdeersdcaosehs nfoortnfeocrceesslaarnydcoawpnitearlsitmopdreolviveemreonntst.hTe rheedouvcetiroanllsgtohaelys of the systems are to minimize the total costs of achieving an environmental goal. Just who pays those costs depends on how the system is organized. EPAhas tended to put the financial onus on the point sources it regulates--on Rahr Malting, on the point sources covered by the TarPamlico group permit--and then let them pass the costs on to their customers. RECLAIM and tohtuhsersuabirs-ipdoizlliuntgiothneogffrsaedtuparolgardaomptsiotennodftoclpeuant ethreteccohsntoolfocglyeabnyuepstoanblnisehwedanednteexrpprainsedsin. gMfairrmkest, systems could be designed and implemented to distribute costs more broadly, or to keep them focused on the firm or farm actually causing the pollution in question. Most of EPA'sregulatory programs start with the principle that if a point source cancontrol tiotsipnosltlaultliosuncwhittehcahnkonloowgineste, ctohndoolotghye;iritfsahirouslhda.reEsP,Aevaenndiiftssostmateufteirsmre'squshiraerealilsmdaisjporroppoollrutitoenrs ately expensive or produces little environmental benefit. Most of the trading systems described here--including the open-market systems deemed acceptable by EPA--require firms to install mandatory technology before they can begin trading, even though the trading systems might achieve more efficient results if some firms bought pollution allowances or offsets instead of instSalolminge pceleoapnleupoptepcohsneotrloagdying because they consider a government "sale" of pollution rights as a moral affront. Supporters counter that in most permitting programs, governments are already simply giving firms permission to pollute. BecTahusee otrvaedrianrgchsiynsgtepmosliacrye dinistpeuntdeedabtoouptrotvraiddeinmg,ohreowfleevxeibr,iliitsyatboofuirtmesnivnirhoonwmtehnetyalmjuasntaicgee. their emissions, many Americans oppose trading because they fear what firms might do with Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00086 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 87 that flexibility. The principal objection is that trading would allow firms to concentrate pollu tion geographically, particularly in poor communities and communities of color, thereby cre ating ever-higher exposures to hazardous pollutants and ever-higher health risks to the disad vviasnotraygeCdo.uRnucidletrodaoncuEmPeAn-tpsrtohpeosoebdjefcrtaimoneswroairskedfobrytrtahdeinNgatVioOnCalsEannvdirhoanzmarednotaulsJauisrtipceolAludt ants.136 Environmentaljustice advocates have been able to make a case significantly strong to slow the development and adoption of VOC-trading systems. Hix, Ruder, and Sugarman's analysis of several VO C trading programs showed that some states have taken serious precautions to prevent trades from creating hot spots. The on-site ienvsepnemctioornespsroomteectsitvaetetshraenqutyirpeicbaelfpoerermpuitrtcinhgasperrosgcraanmuss.eTthheeirinVsOpeCct-ieomnsisrsaiiosnestchreedtriatsnsmaacytiobne costs for VOC trades, but are justified if the credits could add significant health risks to sur rounding neighborhoods. EPA and states understand that in order to make trading systems pvaeonrldsiteiecsaatsallbaylcivisdihairbnalgien,etsahsneedyntTniaealer-sdPaftaoemgiulniavcroodl,svv.eoDaceabslrpooiptaepdtohrnaeennfgatevs oosrtfialbsl tlhaeakvreeehsoucloldtnsesorisdf ietnrraadbdeliseniggfenpainrrogogftrhatehmessypsaotsehmdciys tool, and EPA has not yet found a way to allay that fear. The pohtical anxiety7about hot spots and trading seems to be partly responsible for the slow adoption of nutrient trading in water shedDse,saigsnwinelgl, aenvdenimthpoluegmhentotxinicg eaxtproasduinregs sayrsetenmot, psuacrht oafstohneeptroogreradmuc.e nutrients in water sheds, involves making scores of large and small pohcy decisions, ranging from those discussed above to setting the most productive and socially acceptable trading ratios or enforcement arrangements. Those choices are largely pohtical in nature, and will thus likely vary7from state tsotasttuattoer,yorrewfoartemrs.hed to watershed. The most fundamental choices may require state or federal To date, EPA has had a difficult time with various state proposals for open market or capand-trade systems in air and water. The agency has tended to keep them under review for months or years, sometimes issuing letters of support, but not publicly accepting them as offi cial parts of delegated federal programs. One EPA reviewer of a draft of the Ruder paper on VwOheCthterradthineyg pcorougldraomrssehxopulladinaepdprtohvaet tthheosaegepnrcoyg'rsarmegsioansaplaorftfiocefsiwndeirveiodufaslphStIPoSpinbieofnosreasthtoe agency issued a final version of its EIP guidance: tIioanctouafltlhyethreinviksethdaEtIoPn.eMoorsmt roergeiopnrsotgarkaemthsewpilolsbietioapnpthroavteSdIPpsriroercetoivfeidnaplriizoar to proposal of the revised EIP should be grandfathered; a couple of regions take the position that we shouldn't consider programs until the guidance is finalized.137 areTsuhpaptoksiendd toofbceonmfuaskiionngwdeitchiisnioEnPsAfruasbtorauttehsothwostheethreroguiognhaoluotffthiceesstaanted annadtiofendaelrparlosgyrsatmems who would likemore timely and definitive answers about proposalsto test innovative approaches to environmental management. Findings be Tamheonmgatrhkeetm-boasstedefmfeecctihvaenaisnmdseffofircrieednut cthinegUponliltuetdioSntadteesscwribilelddeinpltohyisicnhathpitserdeacreadliek.eTlyhtoe Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00087 Environment.gov potentialfor allowance-trading systemswithinwatershedsto spur significantreductionsinnonpoint runoff of nutrients is clear and imminently practical. If EPA and Congress provide only some assurances to states with programs in the works, tests will soon get under way EPA is currently sending a contradictory message, however, by both encouraging and frustrating innovation. A Regional Market for N 0 XAllowances Finding 1:Nitrogen oxides, particularly from older coal-burning power plants, are a major cause of smog throughout the eastern half of the United States, and are overdue for reduction. Aincceanpti-vaensdf-otrraedffeicsiyenstteNmOexnrceodmucptaiossnisn,gasmwoesltl aosfathbeettMeridawligenstmaenndt oEfansat tcioonualdl ecnrveiartoenmmaernkteatl and energypolicies. Creating and managing such a market is an appropriatejob for EPA, which could devise and implement uniform trading rules acrossthe region more effectivelythan could individual states or partnerships of states. Now that the courts have upheld EPAsNOxSIP call, wEPoAuldshhoeullpdtehxaptepdriotecetshse. development of such a system. Explicit authorization from Congress The framework adopted for the regional NOxtrading system may be applicable to fine particles such as sulfates, as well. The agency should continue to learn from ongoing monitor ing of fine-particle transport and health effects over the next few years, looking for the most fcoorstE-ePfAfecttoivcerteoaotelssaevvaeirlaabl lreegtoiorneadluccaepms aojnorsusolfuartceese.mOisnsieoanps,praonadchaltlhocaattbeeaalrlsowstuandcyewsoaumldonbge larger emitters. Trading in Watersheds Has Great Potential couFldinbdeiunsged2:toTrheedruecies ample evidence to conclude that trading of allowances for nutrients point and nonpoint pollution in many of the nation's watersheds at costs far lower than could be attained through traditional point-source controls alone. Although there is no technology to monitor precisely either base loads or reductions from nbeonspuoffiinctiesnotutrocevs,eariplyprtohxeimgeantieornattieocnhnainqdueussceooufplcerdedwitisthfoprernioudtriicenotns-.siTteraindsinpgecutinodnesrshthoouslde conditions is appropriate because of the relatively low risk of nutrients creating hot spots. With more toxic or persistent hazards, much more precise measurement systems would be necessary to support a trading regime. of rFeginudlaitnogry3a:cAtiollno.wAanccaep-taranddi-ntrgaidnewsyastteermshiesdtsracdaintioimnaplroinvtehwataittesrtaqrutaslwityithbeacaleusgeailtaisutahfoorrimty establishing rules to force changes in how firms manage their environmental impacts. The system is untraditional--and generally superior to many forms of regulation--in that it then puts the responsibility of deciding how best to respond on those individuals who are best able ttohefimndotrheedmynoasmt eifcfimciaenrktesto-lbuatsioend. cMonatkrionlgs rtheqeutirraenssintieown wfraoyms ofafctihliitny-kbiny-gfaacnildityacpteinrmg ibttyinbgottho regulators and the entities they regulate. Managing that transformation in attitudes and prac tices is an important challenge for EPA, state agencies, and the private sector. Finding 4: Experience from Rahr Malting, the Tar-Pamlico and San Joaquin River trad ing systems, and the Colorado River salinity-reduction program, illustrates the range of ap Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00088 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century proachesto trading within watersheds. Offsets and open-market systemscan deliver some value; cap-and-trade systems are more certain to produce a desired environmental result, however. The latter is likely to work particularly well as a tool to allocate reductions under a TMDL. Bianleldociwavuiadsneucaetlratcrdoaisdntsignagsnydssytbsetemenmsesfi.intsvT,ihtoeethcTreaerrdt-ioPtoaglmsenhthecaroattsdoyirsrsteecamtnlydliinunksfeleudresentmcoeismcsoiaoskntess cfceahenosibcweeistbhbleaanstderdeaddoiinnngtwhseiytishr tem; targeted subsidies or even pollution taxes could work just as well. Finding 5: Trading among point and nonpoint sources of nutrients in a watershed will be pgrreosdsuwctiilvl neeoendlytoifetsrtaanbsliaschtinoenwcosysststeamres ltoowenafnodrcteheagsryesetemmenistsdyamnaomnigc.trSatdaitnesg,pEaPrtAie,sa.nRdeCquoinr ing NPDES permit modifications for each trade isunworkable and unnecessary. State enforce ment should suffice on nutrient trades, particularly if EPA audits the performance of the over maalnladsntaaitgtseenpmergeonogttriaaomtfiotrrnaastdhfioenrrgtppheraronfgotrrhamemaisnn,cdieifvnpideacuretanslseparersyrhm.ipitsa.gErePeAmceanntsustoe iptsregsrsanstta-mtesaktointgigahuttehnortihteiens- EPA's Ambivalence Finding 6: EPA'sindecision on state plansfor allowance-trading systemsisunfortunate and ceonuconuterrapgreo,dourcteivveen. TinhtaetrprreegtioEnPaAl opfofihcecsyhdaivffeerdeinvtelrygienntdoifpfeinreionntspaabrtosuotfwthhiechcoinunnotrvya,tiisonbsottho reasonable and acceptable. It is unacceptable, however, for disagreements among the regions and programs to go unresolved. Headquarters has the responsibility of resolving internal de bateSstaatnedomffiackiailnsgtrdyeicnigsitoonsesatcacbolirsdhinmglayr.ket-based programs complain that they do not know what EPA wants-or will accept. They make the same point about numerous other proposed innovations. The authors of several of the Academy's research reports conclude that EPA should be more specific in itsguidance, setting clearer national specifications for state-led inno vinagtiosynsst.eTmhs,einAccraedaseemdysppeacniefilc,ithyo-wweovuelrd, ldoiscakgirneeasn.aIrnromwa'nseytaorfeasos,luinticolnusd,ipnrgecthlueddinesgiggnooodf itdraedas and the possibility of productive variation among the states. The panel believes that faster, crisper decisions from EPA--not more specifications or more predictable pronouncements-- would encourage innovation. Finding 7: VOC trading programs, because of the potential of some air toxics to create localizedhealth risks, create particulartechnicaland politicalchallenges. Several stateshave shown considerable ingenuity- in addressing those challenges. They have hnposed higher trading ratios to discourage trades across long distances, and required on-site review- of credit uses to protect dagevaeinlostpheoftfescptoivtse. aTnhdersetsapteosn,swibilteh aEpPpAr'osaecnhceosufroargreemdeunctinagndVcOaCrefeuml oisvseiorsnisghtht,rocouuglhdtcroandtiinngue to EPA isjustified in being cautious with VOC trading The agency- has the responsibility- to guard against environmental injustice. And it has a secondary interest in preventing the tool of tiarmlalodpwlienamgnecsneytstetredamdVisnOignCfgrotermnaedrbianelcg, oasmnydsintegtmheusvsecmnouamlkdoerheietipgmohhotteriencidzpeiufdfbichthucaltnanaindtdiasgetxoepndecanyysiaPvpoeporrtloeyh-aecdnodsnircoeensisvatebhdooosuert environmental problems for which trading is an especially appropriate tool. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00089 90 Environment.gov Trading and Technology Finding 8: EPA is quickto remind criticsthat most of its "technology standards" are really "performance standards"--requirements that firms reduce emissions to certain levels. Yet the teChxlepeaosnsaumWreeasntoeerrtu-Apncedtrufaoenrrdmisakaisnr-tcopeoellmeluvpteilloos.nyeItnersa,cdtaihsneegnspwionhlsiiecsriteeinscgporonentvrseounlctthfeictrehmcnhsonflrooolgomygybpuriesyvsinoegnutncsdrhepdauribtmsliftcouplaoltlotiacciyan.l When such risks are not likely, however, allowing trades may accomplish more environmental good than a rigid application of technology standards. finaFnicniadliinngce9n:tiMveafrokretf-ibrmassedtostdreavteegloiepsathnadt daellpolwoyfimrmosretoesffeellcetimveispsoiollnusticornedpitrsewveilnltpioronvtiedceha niques and pollution-control technologies. But that equation works only if firms can actually sell those credits. Allowance markets have been inhibited by requirements that firms may not purchase allowances to meet existing technology standards. ensFuriinndgienngvi1ro0:nmSteantetaslajunsdtiEceP,Aenccaonuurasegitnragdtihnegdreavtieolsoptommeneteot fpunbewlicmpoonliictyorgionaglste, cinhcnlouldoignyg, and providing environmental data to the public. Recommendations 1. Authorize and encourage trading systems. ancEePtrAadainndg Cproonggrraemsss,shpoarutlidcualgagrlryescsaivpe-laynedn-ctroaudreagsyesstetamtes,s atonddepvaerltoicpualanrdlyimsypstleemmsednetsailglonwed to reduce nonpoint runoff of nutrients in watersheds. a. wCoatnegrrsehsesdsshfoourlnduatruitehnotrsizaendexotethnedrepdosltlautteanotrsruengliioknealyl atollocwreaanteceto-txraicdihnogt psproogtsr.aTmhsaitn authorization should ensure that states would be able to develop a variety of approaches likely to improve environmental conditions at reduced costs. For example, Congress should authorize states to implement nutrient cap-and-trade systems that would enable pnooinnptosionutrscoeusrtcoesm. eet strict performance requirements by purchasing reductions from b. EsyPsAtemshsoaunldd rgervoiusep iptseTrmMitDs LwiathnidnNwPaDterEsSherduslewshtoenexthpolisceittlyraaduetshaorreizleinaklelodwtoanacceh-iteravdiningg a net improvement in water quality. The goal of those revisions should be to create dynamic markets for allowances with low transaction costs for participants and regula tors alike. c. Congress and states should encourage the coordination of allowance-trading systems wfoirthreodtuhceirnmg narukterite-bnatsreudnoenffvoirrornemsteonritnalgprriopgarraiamnsh, asbucithata.s targeted subsidies to farmers Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00090 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 91 2. TCorreeadtuecerethgeiopneravlacsiavpe-haenadlt-htraanddeecsoylsotgeicmalsdfaomraNgeOcxa.used by smog in the eastern half of the United States, and to do so at the lowest possible cost, Congress should explicitly autho rriezgeioEnPaAl atoircproelalutetarnegtsiosuncahl caaspfi-naendpa-trrtaicdleess.yTstheemasutothroerdizuacteionnitrsohgoeunldoaxlisdoeesnacnodupraogsseibstlayteotahnedr federal effortsto reduce the cost of controlling VO C emissions, including carefully constrained cap-and-trade systems. 3. DEPeAveslhoopulmd oinnvietsot riinndgevteeclohpninoglomgoiensit.oring technologies that will facilitate trading sys tems. EPA and states should create an incentive for the developm ent and deployment of better monitoring technology by setting trading ratios that favor trades that can be closelymonitored. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00091 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00092 CHAPTER 4 Protecting Watersheds: A New Confluence he next EPA administrator and Congress will have an opportunity to help reframe how7 the nation manages water pollution and the impacts of human activities on the health of watersheds, and to lead the wayfor allcitizens and officialsto become involved in that tdiiosntianlcptcoaripintpitc-rsaoolapucurhcbeelsidctoiisswcshuaeat.ergrTephrpeoetcrehmcatilitlosenna:gntehdweinitlelncbheewntiocraefilqn,urdiermgeumolareetnoptrsyro7fdaopur pcctrlioevaaencwhinaegymus bptooidcmoiepmdabiirniendteratwwdaio ters, and a "civic" approach that engages the broader public's interests in environmental qual ity aEnPdAohtahsebreeecnonaottmemicpatinndg stooceixalpgaonadlsitsinfowcuhsolferowmattehreshneadrrsoawndrecgoumlamtiounniotifeps.oint sources to aqumaloirtye sctoamndparredhse.nEsiPvAe'smlaanteasgt eemffoerntt--oiftswahdooleptwioanteorsfhTedMs DtoLacrehgieuvleatsiopencsifriecqaumiribnigensttawteastetroallocate the responsibilities for cleanup of polluted waters among all sources, including indi vidual landowners--ishighly controversial. Yet EPAregulation isnot necessarily in direct con fuslunicgetagwseisilttyhs. ctIhnoadllteaebtodop,ra-bdtoiovtwhe cnairveriecngeeunclevasitrsooarnryymrieennqgturaeilrdiesimmen.etRsn--etsseaaalnorcdnhglcowocimathlmcteiosclslhiaonbnioceradaltbaioyssntihsectaaAnncceac,doee-nemxvyiisrsto,tnraomlnbegenliyt tal data, and funding--for improving water quality and achieving related environmental, so cial, and economic goals. Making the transition to a regime that addresses both nonpoint and point source pollution reoffnemctievnetlya'lwhielal tlathk,eams asunmy ymeaarriszeadndbybeadwifafitceurslth.eBdubtiiotliosgeisssteinnttiearlvtioewAemdefroicrath'silsornegp-otertr:m envi It is our children who will see the real benefits of this. I come up against this yreoaulictyanevoefrteyntimmeeaIsduorebtihoemiomnpitroorvinegm.eInfta. pBouitnwt soorukrocne anpopnepaorisnotrsdoiusracpepseisarbsy, nature incremental. What you can measure at any point of the stream repre sentsthe sum of everything that happens, good or bad, upstream and upslope. You can't have measurable impact on the health of a stream draining 100 square miles by fixing a quarter-mile of bank.138 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00093 94 Environment.gov This chapter expands on the challenge of those words, and lays out a strategy for making progress. It also details the critical roles that EPA and its state counterparts have in cleaning up the nation's waters. Among the most pivotal challenges is choreographing the efforts of EPA aanndd sthtaetebarogaendceirepsuwbiltihc.thReewduocrkinogfnoothneprofiendt eproallluatnidonstfartoemagaegnrciiceusl,tluorceaal nledaddeervse, lloapnmdoewnnt ewrisl,l require a coordinated effort unlike any EPA has yet undertaken, because success will depend in part on changing how Americans use their land. The previous chapter noted several of the legal and regulatory hurdles EPA must overcome to encourage cap-and-trade systems for re ducing nutrient runoff into surface waters. This chapter looks at how7EPA and state environ mgael,notarlgaangieznactiieosncaal,nawndorpkoaliltoincaglsihduerdcilveisct"owsautcehrschoeodpemraatnioagn.ement" efforts, and identifies le The Academy commissioned four research teams to conduct case studies of watershed management efforts that have made environmental improvements. From that research, the pwzaaittnihoelnthaseg, aeaimnndceorwgnecitnlhucdeheoasfrtdhn-aeetwaa'rdinnvesadtnitcueetxsiopinnersteisecunhccnheolaoisnglyap,nopdlaitrtritcuicasutlslaparrnloydbilnleofmcoar-mlsnoaoltvnioignnogtveaecnrhndnmocleoongltlyaa,lbcooorrugaptailnveide decisionmaking, will make progress possible in the next decade. The Problem of Nonpoint W ater Pollution The Clean Water Act of 1972 set the goal that all rivers, lakes, and estuaries should be swimable and fishable. To help in that endeavor, the statute created the National Pollution Discharged Elimination System (NPDES), which gives EPA powerful tools to reduce pollution ffsrapocemicliitfipiecosliwoncthaastiototuenrcsc.hensA,omil.oeog.n,iegfsatcthhioleistyieecstaotnohluasstearrteeoletmhaeseeedtseeitgmaniilisefsdiicoaanngtestnaacmnydorauerngdtuss.l1ao3t9fioIpnnosaltldhudtaiitotitnoenlil,npstooinincwet-atsthoeerusracicnet waspassed, Congresshas appropriated more than $75 billion for EPA'suse in funding construc tion of local, publicly owned wastewater treatment works (POTWs),140 which has proven valu able in reducing point source pollution. Indeed, regulations and subsidies have been quite successful: point sources have signifi cdaranmtlyatriecdalulcyeidn mthaeniryiwmaptearcstheodns.riOvenrst,hleawkehso, laen, tdhoeustguha,ritehse. gAonadls owfattheer CquleaalintyWhaatserimApctrohvaevde not been met. When states surveyed the nation's rivers, lakes, and estuaries, they found that about half of the locations assessed failed to meet the states'own water-quality standards. The pderivmelaorpyecdasaereoafs.th(SateefaTilaubreleis4"-1n.o)npoint" runoff from farms, ranches, forestry operations, and The data cited in Table 4-1 are suspect. The summary' figures are based on varying stan dards across states, on incomplete sampling, on different protocols for gathering and interpret ing samples, and on extrapolating data from single points to long stretches of river. (They are, however, the best available: there is simply no reliable and consistent set of ambient watertqhuealpirtiymdaartya'.)cNauosneeothfepleosllsu,tmioonstinknmoowstlerdivgeerasbalendpalartkieess.aMgroeset twhoautlndoanlpsooiangtrseoeutrhcaetslaarregien-sdceaelde physical modifications of rivers and streams--damming, diverting, channeling, and draining wetlands--have substantially impaired water quality' as well. impTrohveeremiesngtosoidn rweaastoenrsthoedthihnekatlthhatasruebtsetcahnntiiaclarlelyduaccthioienvsaibnlen.oAnpgoroinntopmoilsltustihoanvaenddebvreoloapdeedr simple tests that show' whether there is so much nitrogen in the soil that additional fertilizers have no effect on yields. Precision farming--w'hich involves placing global-positioning-system Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00094 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 95 TABLE 4-1: PRIMARY CAUSES OF FAILURE TO MEET WATER-QUALITY STANDARDS Size Percent assessed Rivers and Streams 3.66 million miles 23 Water Quality Good: meets designated uses 55 % Threatened 10 Impaired 35 Sources of Impairment in Impaired Waters Nonpoint sources A g ric u liu re D am s; h y d ro m o d ific a lio n F o re s try 58% 20 7 H a b ita t m o d ific a tio n 5 A tm o s p h e ric d e p o s itio n Urban runoff and point sources U rba n ru no ff/storm sew ers n % C o m b in e d s e w e r o v e rflo w s M u n ic ip a l p oin t sources 10 In d u stria l d is c h a rg e s Other sources W a s te d is p o s a l o n la n d 7 R esource e xtra ctio n 9 Lakes, Ponds, and Reservoirs 41.4 million acres 42 46% 9 45 31 % 15 5 8 12 % 1 1 6 5 Estuaries 90,465 sq. mi. 32 47% 9 44 15% 23 28 % 12 28 15 12 Sources U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, The Quality of OurNation's Water: A ArSeuvpmaomilraatsbrylseuoabf tmthweitwNteawdtieobpnyaa.slgtaWotvea/ste,3rt0r(Qi5bbuea/sli9,tyt8eIrnrervpietnootrrotir/eys9:,81cb9or9mo8cmhRiuesprsoeiro/tnptosd, fCaoBnndagrsteehsdse, oEDnPisA1tr98i9c48t1-oSSft-aC0t-eo0lS0ue1mc, tbJiuoiann.e3N20o05t0(eb0: ), Percentages may not add up to 100 because more than one source may impair a river segment. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00095 Environment.gov locators on farm equipment and monitoring the application of fertilizer and pesticides--can tell farmers how to cut their chemical use--and thus their costs and nonpoint runoff--without reducing yields significantly. Interest in the functioning of ecosystems, along with the new7disci podlefisnniegewno7fsttecocorhnmnsweiqravutaeetsriomfonarbnmiaoaglonegamyg,eihnnagtsswylesadtteetmrobsn.oeEdwive7essn.cipSelnoatmnifteiicnsigunbsviueggrhbetasta,ntaianordneahaslaohsnasgvpesatrcrkereaadfmtetbhdaenbdkeetstv,eeorlrowspaimmyseptnloyt leaving those areas uncultivated, can reduce polluted runoff dramatically7 But farmers, developers, and other landowners have relatively weak incentives to use tech nologies or techniques that could reduce polluted runoff Because it isin their immediate finan czioanleisnwtehreesrtetroundoofsfoi,smgraenatyesrta.nPcrheecrissioanndagfarircmueltrusresthilal spblaenetncmroaprskeintehdigahnldyaedroopdtaebdleprriipmaarriialny to cut costs and raise yields, rather than to provide environmental benefits. And EPA lacks authority7to require permits from sources of "nonpoint" pollution. In par twdiechvuielcalhor,aptrehedethaagereesanisncgyolnhelalyasringfoetshsttaastoturuutroncreoyfo7affufpltohowollrusititenydttoorursentogorufmflaFtseuerwruthenreosrfmofrforcrooemm, EmbPionAsectdaangserrwiecgeuurlatlugarteeaslryouspnteeormfaftsif.or14on1ms, Then, too, EPA lacks statutory authority to regulate the quantity of water in rivers. Diver sions from a river or lake can have a tremendous impact on "fishability" and "swimability." Ealslpoeccaitaiollny oinf twhaetWereasmt, ohnogweuvseerrs,.state governments vigorously defend their authority over the In short, EPA has a problem that it shares with many other federal agencies: limited tools and inadequate data to meet an ambitious goal. 0 f course, EPA'swater program isnot the only governmental entity that has tools and responsibility to improve water quality Several other fed eral agencies gather data about water quality; study water-quality problems; have some regula tionrfyo'ramuathtioornitytoofvaerrmwearste;raqnudasliptyenodr bcliollsieolnysrteolahteedlppfraorbmleemrssasnudchoathseernsdraendguecreedposlpleucteieds;rpurnoovfifde In addition, state and localgovernments are part of the "answer" to water-quality problem s. States help finance cost-sharing programs for preventing erosion and polluted runoff State legislatures can enable agencies and nonprofit groups to purchase "instream" flows to assure tohradtintahnecreesisseetnsotuagnhdawrdastefrorinseripvtiecrssytostesmupspaonrdt fsistohremriewsaatenrdroutnhoefrfpSutbahtec aunseds.loPcuabl lliacnhdeuasltehstatutes guide farming and forestry policies, as well as zoning and construction practices. Finally, states can adopt environmental regulations that exceed federal requirements. The Environmental Law Institute reports that as of 1997, about half of the stateshad a water-quality Mstaatnutyestthaatet sahllaodwscrreagftueldatoiothneor fwr7auynso"ftfofrmomakneobnepstominatnsaogurecmese,nint cplruadcitnicgefsa(rBmMsaPns)dednefovrecloeapbelde,aroeraas.t least something more than voluntary; by linking them to other enforcement mechanisms."142 Maryland has perhaps the strongest regulatory7regime: its new nutrient management statute requires farmers in certain watersheds to draft and implement nutrient runoff plans, and to have those plans approved by state-certified consultants or by state extension agents or soil conservation danisitmricatl sfetaefdfi1n43g Mopaenraytisotantses(ChAavFeOrse)c,ewnhtleyrepacshsiecdkelnesg,ishloagtiso,natnodcsotenetrroslapreolrlauitsieodn ofrropmencnoendf.ined It would seem, then, that state and federal regulation is an effective way to reduce nonpoint source pollution. But farmers have successfully resisted state and EPA regulation of practices tfharamt minagyparfafcetcitcwesatteormqueaalsituyr.eIsnadpeperdo,vseedvebryallsotcaatelslahnadvoewadnoerpst.eEdnsftaotructeems leinmtitiisnaglsroegoufltaetniocnauof tious, and, complain environmental advocates, often ineffective. Most states rely more heavily Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00096 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 97 on technical assistance to landowners and on cost sharing of measures to control farm runoff than on enforcement, and many use enforcement as a small, last-resort component of pro grams to manage agricultural runoff144 In truth, practical pohtics give property owners substantial discretion over how they use nthiceiipraolwonr claonudn.tyZgoonvinegrnamnednotst,haenrdd,ifroerctmlaanndy-ruesaesocnosn,traocltsioanreatgtehnaetralelvlyelaisporeftreongianteivffeecotfivmeuat addressing water quality at the watershed scale. The heart of the challenge isthis: Congress has directed EPAto improve water quality, yet the statesand localgovernmentshaveprimary' authorityto regulate landuse.Nowthatnonpoint sources are themost seriousand pervasive sourcesofwater pollutionthroughoutmuch of the United States, tohfefendaetiroanl,wstialtleb,eanabdlleotcoalaacgheienvceieists, awnadtetro-qcouanlniteyctgfoeadlseroanllfyunifdist fainnddsawutahyosrtiotiecsoworidthinsatatetethaendeflfoocratsl authorities, private voluntary actions, and a broad chic commitment for change. Two New Tools: Collaboration and TM DLs In recent years, EPA has tried two new approaches to focus action on improving water quality, as opposed to simply writing more or tougher NPDES permits: "community-based environmental protection," which entails supporting collaborative local efforts to protect indi vlaitdouraylawpaptreorsahcehddseotrertmheiinrecdombypoamnebnitesn;tawndat"etroqtaulamlitayximum daily loads" or TMDLs, a regu During the 1990s, a new kind of watershed protection effort emerged rapidly in the country; particularly in the West. Local activists and leaders of interest groups made attempts to resolve conflicts in water use, water quality, and other environmental practices. In response, EPA and porthoemrofteedtehrealidageaenl coifesmaasnsaiggninedg eemnvpilrooynemesentotawl porrokbfluemll-stimatethweitwhaltoecraslheedffolertvse,l,anstdrebsseignagnthtoe connectionsbetween and among people, their homes, their livelihoods, and their environment. EPA organized a "watershed academy" to train federal, state, and some nonprofit staff in technical issues of water quality, as well as how7to design and manage a collaborative process fzoernwsbaetettresrheacdcpersostteocwtiaotne.r-Tqhuealaitgyednactya.alIsnoacdrdeiattieodn,wEePbA-baansdedotihneforramgeanticoinesscyhstaenmgsedtothgeivireocwitinplanning processes, reaching out more aggressivelyto engage citizens from all affected groups, and trying hard to achieve consensus. The TMDL initiative moves in a somewhat different direction: toward more federal regu laastsiuorne. t(hSaete wTaabtelre p4o-2ll.u)tTiohneiCs rleeadnucWedateenroAucgthretoqumireeedt EstPaAte awnadtesrt-aqteusaltiotyw' srtiatendpalardnss.tBhauttwthilel complexity'of monitoring water quality and implementing a system to achieve specific ambient results appeared overwhelming in the 1970s, so EPA gave priority to the simpler engineering and legal challenge of defining technology standards for point source discharges. As powerful members of Congress recommended,145 EPA ignored the TMDL provisions of the Clean WpriaotreirtyA' bcetcfaoursyeeoatrhs,ersasytriantgegqieusitwe eorpeegneltytining 1th9e78jobthdatonthee.14a6gSeinnccye d1i9d97n,ohtogwiveevethr,eamsearihesigohf court decisions has forced EPA and states to start writing the plans. Asmentioned earlier in this report, EPA'sTMDL regulations require all statesto write plans tfoorid"iemntpifayirtehde"twotaatlermshaexdims--umabdoauitly20lo,0ad00oof fptohlelumtaanctrsotshsatthecacnoubnetrayccTohmempoladnasteadreinsuappwoasteedr body without violating its state's water-quality standards. TMDL plans must also allocate the Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00097 Environment.gov responsibility for pollution-reduction among unpermitted nonpoint sources, as well as among traditionally regulated point sources.147 TMDLs could thus provide a tool for EPA and state environm ental agencies to become more directly involved in land use decisions by local govern ments and in decisions by farmers and other landowners. How Will TMDLs Work? It is too early to know how7TMDLs will function in practice. As of spring 2000, EPA had approved some 1,500 TMDLs, mostly within the past three years. Many of those addressed noenwlywpoaitnetrsshoeudrcmesa,nhaogweemveern,tleeaffvoirntgs.unclear the question of how nonpoint sources will fit into TABLE 4-2. TMDLS: A PRIMER In 1972, Congress determined that state standards were not effective in reducing pollution, so it added tw o new requirements in the Clean W a te r A ct o f 1972: subsidies for publicly owned wastewater treatment plants technology-based regulations for effluents from different kinds o f point sources Congress also retained provisions for state water-quality standards; Section 3 0 3 of the act authorizes EPA to require that states: write water-quality standards and identify waters where technology-based effluent requirements from point sources are not "stringent enough" to meet standards prioritize those waters, "taking into account the severity o f the pollution and the uses to be made of such w a te rs"148 determine the total maximum daily load of pollutants "necessary to implement the applicable water-quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and w ater quality" for w ater bodies that do not meet standards149 prepare plans to reduce pollutants so that the w a te r bodies can meet standards In practice, states do submit annual 3 0 3 (d ) reports classifying w ater bodies. For many years, however, EPA and states ignored the requirement to write TMDLs and prepare plans to allocate responsibilities for meeting standards. Successful lawsuits by environmental groups in more than two-dozen states since 1 996 have made moved TMDLs to the top o f the agenda for EPA and most states. In July 2 0 0 0 , EPA published regulations that w ould require all states to estimate TMDLs and write implementation plans, regardless o f whether they had been sued. Quite clear, though, is the controversy surrounding the TMDL program. The agricultural in dustry has fended off EPAregulation for decades: it ishardly likelyto embrace the TMDL regula tIifoangs.riLcoucltaulrgeocvaenrndmodegnetsmaelsaosuhraevsetshtarot nwgofuilndafnocricael finacrmenstitvoecslteoanreusips,tlaocstarliwngaesntetwTaMteDr tLresaytmsteemn.t works and major industries will probably have to clean up their effluents to meet TMDLs. In addition to political issues, there are questions about the administrative and technical fneeneacvseiirbsosilnairtmyyeodnfatTatalMoaDfrfeiLcimsa.liEssshxianpvgee,rtmsbedoeidsnaeglqsrueaietreeacbfroliautwitcewadlh,oefathnthedredTTeMMadDDliLnLeswsreiaglrlueblaettoiwooontrsik,gahpbtr.loetT.e15hs0teiMnygafetnhayar tstthtahateet TMDLs will drown local collaborative processes in a sea of paperwork and technical contro- Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00098 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 99 versy Some of our researchers agreed, judging that a push to write TMDLs would upset col laborative processes and environmental improvements in the watersheds they studied. Others felt TMDLs would help, if implemented with care. Comparing TM DLs and SIPs One way to judge the possible impact of TMDLs--and to suggest ways of avoiding tech nical and management problems--is to look at how7State Implementation Plans (SIPs) have worked for air quality. The Clean Air Act requires that those states participating in EPA's airAquiralQituyaplriotygrSatmantodsaurdbsm(iNtSAIAPQsfSo)r.aBiro-qthuaSliItPyscaonndtroTlMregDioLnssrtehqaut diroenaont maseseestNsmaetinotnoaflAwmhebtiheenrt pollution in particular locations--airsheds or water bodies--exceedsregulatory standards. Both require states to prepare and implement plans to reduce pollutants to meet standards. But there are important differences as well, and those differences cast doubt on whether TMDLs as currently proposed by EPA can work effectively. (See Table 4-3). TABLE 4-3: A COMPARISON OF THE SIPS AND TMDL PROCESSES T ech n ica l Issues Num ber of poiiutants Nature of key poiiutants W h o sets standards Quality of ambient data national monitoring system Complexity of models umber of regions P o litica l L e ve ra g e Key environmental issues Federal sanctions S IP S TM D LS six chemical EPA good yes 15 hundreds chemical, biological, physical, and temperature states poor ? possibly more than 2 0 ,0 0 0 public health mostly ecological; cut off federal highw ay funds states cannot run EPA water-quality programs In s titu tio n a l A rra n g e m e n ts Regional institutions Technicai capacity and political influence of state environmental agencies metropolitan planning organizations; significant but often overpowered by transportation departments N o formal role for watershed or regional organizations under draft EPA regulations; USDA agencies often play key roles in watershed collaboration; some states support watershed councils or field staff. significant: sometimes close, sometimes adversarial relationships with state departments of agriculture Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00099 Environment.gov Technical and Procedural Issues SIPs have become a central feature of air-quality policy in the last 30 years, and are tech nically and procedurally quite complex. A SIP consumes massive amounts of time, paper, fesotnareterpgsryempauansrtidnapgmo, leaintdidcoapSltIciPnasgp.itSaanol:dmTeshuSebIFmPesditeatriranelgRseoaglisoStneIPrgc.1ao51nndtAassionEshPmeAaovrrieelygthuaalmantei3no0dn0esdpanathgdaegtsuiotifdisraeunqnculeiikrceehlmyanethgnaetst, anyone really understands them. In the words of one authority on environmental law, "The SIP process is widely recognized as unwieldy and cumbersome, dependent as it is upon insti tutiAonltahlomugehchSaInPissmhasvoefbteheenmaopsotwdeifrffiuclutlot oklinfdor."i1m52proving air quality, many states and metro politan areas have found it extrem ely difficult to write SIPs that are both technically sound and politically viable.153 The SIP system is open to various kinds of confusion, delay, and gaming. The statutes set deadlines for writing regulations on various topics, but EPA is often unable to meet the deadlines. States, too, maybe unable to meet the deadlines setby EPAregulations, and trheqeyuiorcecmaesniotns.alElyPpAr,epstaarteesw, henavt isroomnme ceanltla"lcishtes,atienrdSuIsPtrsy," wanhdicchoculretasrlayrgduoenoatbcooumt pqluyewstiitohnEabPlAe baselines, over-optimistic assumptions, and "paper offsets" which promise reductions in emis sions that would never take place. Currently TMDLs are far simpler than SIPs. It is certainly conceivable, though, that the pToMlluDtaLntpsr,oacsewsselcloauslda hbeeacvoymreeleiaqnucaelloyncmumodbeelrssoomf de:iffhearvininggqufaarlimtyoarlel oTfMwDhiLchs rfeosrtfoanr minoarde equate data. The Clean Air Act requires states to prepare SIPs in metropolitan regions that do not meet wNabAroitAuetQ22S00,.0,0C000u0rTrseeMnpDtalryLatsteh. ewraetearrebo1d5i7essfuacilhtoremgieoentsw, tahtuers-q1u5a7liStyIPsst.anSdtaatredss,hsaovtehedyetmerimghint ehdavtehtaot EPA has established NAAQ S for only six pollutants, including carbon monoxide, ozone, particulates (dust), lead, and chemicals that are the main ingredients of smog TMDLs might cover many more pollutants. The number depends on how states have framed their watertqhuealrietsyuslttaonfdjaursdts.aCfelwearclhyetmheicrealas;rethmeyanfyolflaocwtoarsswtheallt firnofmluepnhcyeswicaatlearltqeuraaltiitoyn. Ps rtoobwleamtesrabroednieost and adjacent land, biological factors such the introduction of non-native species, water tem perature, and changes in the volume and timing of water flows. EPAs initial planning docu mSteanTtethsseusseteeemcsuhicnnhgiclmaylosfduoegulgsnetdsotaptthiroeandt ihocutfnwadhrSeeItdPhseironvfcilsouuldabetsistoanmnscoaenrseitcotoarukinlidnggedpvaelatnactueaawnlldhyembneaatdchoeevqmeuraaettdiec.aailr-mqoudaleiltsy.' data are not available, whether changes in air emissions will cause violations, and whether control measures proposed by states will improve air quality sufficientlyto meet NAAQ S. EPA publishes extensiveguidance that includes detailed specificationsfor modeling, aswell asfor the design and operation of various control measures. ampSloem, wereitairnlgy TTMMDDLLss fhoarvoenalylsoonbeeepnolbluastaendt--onnmitroodgeelns--thaint tahree tceocmhnpilceaxllaynadncdosatdlym. iFnoirsterxa tively complex area of Long Island Sound took four years and cost $20 million.154 Our re searchers reported that the models used in the watersheds they studied were of limited reliabil ity, Tevheenaaufttheor rms oanfySIyPesacrsanoffeuesdethanedir mimopdreolvsewmitehndt.ata from a well-established national system of air-quality monitoring, one that has uniform national standards and consistent procedures Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00100 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 101 for gathering data. Water-quality data are far less consistent and less reliable: there are no national standards. States face different water-quality problems: polluted runoff comes from farms, timberlands, and urban areas, depending on individual state makeup. In some states, wuthsaeetiserorofpwwonlalutwetriaotanelsrco-qovumaarelyistfyfrroosmtmansudtpaatsretdrtseo.asmtatoer. uFpowr tihnods.eSroeailscoonns,dCitioonngsraenssdhcalsimalalotewveadrys'twateidsetloywTrhitee Thus state standards are often quite different; adjacent states set levelsfor the same pollutant that may differ by orders of magnitude. EPA's initial catalogue of "major pollutants causing impairment by state" illustrates that fact. It groups pollutants into eight broad categories, and nsheoigwhsbtohraint gsosmtaetesstawteitshrespimoriltamr cinliimmaatlesp,rosobilles,masnwdiltahnpdoullsuetsa.nts that cause major problems in States also use different protocols to gather and report water-quality data. Both EPA and state environmental agenciesgather far more data about emissionsfrom regulated point sources tAfhotcamunsoaspbproihmuertaircaimlAybdoimneniitnssicsuoternsadtoiitofinoinndtse.orTehshatveteoUnt.hSae.timoG,neasoullcomhgoiacnsailtwoSaruitnervrgefysloywasntsedmantshdfeoaNrqwuataaitotiecnra,lilfbeOu. tcethaeniircdaantda As water-quality professionals write TMDLs over the next 15 years, they may develop inex pensive ways to gather water-quality data and build models to serve as the foundation for allocating responsibilities for cleaning up watersheds. Across the nation, many state and local gbloivnegrndmateanbtass,eassgwreolul nasdfeeddeinragl aegoegnrcaipehsi,cnoinnfporromfiatst,ioanndsycsotemmms,erucsiianlgfirdmatsa, acroellreacptieddlybaostshemby remote sensing data and more conventional methods. Together those entities are also making progress in overcoming the technical barriers to bringing the data together in usable form. pmreonTbtlhseemthUsa.tiSn.mtFehoaerseuPsrtaecSiwefircavtiNecreothretahmswpaeelsrrtea:atduscyrieepnraotnivsdtesncfllaaynriotiyvneeWrxpsiettrhnesatihmvoessweinadyasmttoaa,dllaonacdiurmpinlaefnnoetrmswwa-atiittoehrn-iqnaubsatolriuutyt land uses nearby they can pinpoint spots where temperatures are warm, and where there is significant sedimentation and emissions of pollutants. The process is relatively- inexpensive, costing about $20,000 per day; and, in a small watershed, taking only a day or twro to complete. iSntaOterereggounl.ators used that method to gather data for a TMDL in the Grande Ronde watershed On the whole, the attempt to create a model watershed program in Grand Ronde illustrates how civic watershed protection efforts can keep TMDLs from becoming an expensive and controversial overlay. With more than $5 million of support from the Bonneville Power Admin icsitersahtiaovneabnedetnhewNorokritnhgwc-eosltlPaobworeartiPvlealnynoinngwCaoteurnschiel,dfawr-mateerrs-,qruaanlcithyeirsss,uaensdsignocvee1r9n9m2e.nAt acgoemn mittee of local leaders and federal and state agency officials, supported by a technical inter agency committee, approved 260 projects to protect endangered species and control nonpoint pollution. Projects included fencing to keep livestock out of streams and riverbanks; fish pas sthaugessc;ocohlainngnewlarteesrtsorfaotriosnalsm; aonnd.13p3lanting vegetation to control erosion and shade the stream, Over the years, collaboration has built a technical foundation and shared understandings that have led to agreement about how a TMDL might be written and implemented. When Oregon had to write TMDLs for portions of the watershed, the participants agreed that there ssheloeucltdedbwe aotnelryteomnepeTraMtuDreLafsotrhethleimwi-taintegrsfhaecdto, rainndptrhoavtidiitnsghohualbditbatefnoarrsraohwnoinn ascnodpteh.uTshtheye one variable to be addressed by the TMDL.136 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00101 102 Environment.gov Links Between Planning and Action SIPshave two powerful featureswhich TMDLs lack: sanctions if states submit unacceptable plans and links between SIPs and other key regulatory mechanisms including land use. SANCSTIIOPNsS can trigger sanctions that are powerful enough to foster substantial local debate, and sometimes, significant local action. The Clean Air Act provides that states unable to submit an acceptable SIP cannot receive federal highway funds.157 State transportation agencies must submit Transportation Improvement Plans to the U.S. Department of Transportation in order to obtain federal transportation funds. And the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA21) provides that a state's TIP must be in "conformity7'with its SIP.158 On paper, the conformity requirement is a powerful tool. In practice, the transportation planning process has a great deal of technical and political momentum which Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO s) and state environmental agencies cannot easily stop, or even deflect. Transportation plans take years to prepare, and make extensive predictions for the future. They forecast patterns of development and the demand for highways and other trans portation facilities; they describe construction and maintenance projects to meet that de mand; and they document who will pay for the projects. Those are highly contentious issues involving large sums of state and local money, as well as many private, local, and state deci sions about land use. The first round of decisions about TIP-SIP conformity under ISTEA and TEA21occurred in the late 1990s. Research by Arnold Howitt and Elizabeth Moore in 15 major metropolitan areas found that state air-quality agencies and MPO shad a difficult time influencing transpor tation planning Both had to add significant staff with expertise in modeling transportation demand, and had to build new working relationships with state transportation departments. Thus environmental agencies and MPO swere generally reactive, not proactive, participants in transportation planning159 Momentum has also been on the side of transportation planners at the federal level. Statutes require that the U.S. Department of Transportation decides whether to accept an MPO's decisions about conformity Howitt and Moore report that in practice, the Federal Highway Administration has led that review; working closely and generally agreeing with EPA and the Federal Transit Administration. However, since the Federal Highway Administration has of fices in every- state, it has generally been far more directly involved with MPO s and state deci sions than has EPA.160 The conformityrules also provide for extensive public participation. The Surface Transpor tation Policy Project, a relatively well-financed and sophisticated national organization, works closely with local groups to encourage federal and state transportation departments to build more mass transit and write plans that will protect air quality. Howitt and Moore, however, report that such advocateshave played keyroles in only a third of the regions. In severalregions, they have been so discouraged by the complexity of the TIP-SIP-conformity process that they have ignored it, directing their energies elsewhere.161 In most metro areas, the media and top state and local officials have paid little attention to the TIP-SIP-conformity process, reacting only when federal highway funds are threatened as a result of disagreements among agencies.162 The sanctions for not writing acceptable TMDLs are far weaker. EPA can write TMDLs when it findsthat a state'sdrafts are unacceptable. And the agency can withdraw state authority for administering Clean Water Act programs and cut off federal fluids. But since EPA lacks Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00102 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 103 authority to regulate nonpoint sources, throwing out state TMDLs would mean that EPAwould have lessauthority and lessmoneythan state agenciesto achievethe goalsof the Clean Water Act. Nonetheless, EPA and Congress could create incentives for strong state TMDL programs. fmTaharmedeeferssdoeamrnaedl aogdtohjvueesrrtlmnamnedneotnswt tnionevtrhese.stsCseompnrogorrgeerstashmaannsdt$oth4teabrUigl.heSot.nsDuaebnpsniaduritaemlslyetonitnaoccftoiAosntg-srsihtchauarlittnuwgreophuralodvgehraaamlvreesatfhdoyer biggest environm ental benefits: they could add explicit links to TMDLs. EPA could enforce its suggestions that states similarly target 319 funds for nonpoint source cleanup. In addition, Congress might link state TMDLs to bigger pools of federal funding such as income-support payEmPeAntcsofuolrdfaalrsmoeerns,cobuurtaaggerisctuatletusrtaol liinntkertehsetsTwMouDldL rpersoisctetshsattosfturonndginlyg decisions by giving local collaborative processes important roles in writing TMDLs. Those processes might build agreement on how to spend available monies. LINKSNTAO AOTQHESR RaEGnUdLATSOIRPYsPRtrOiCgESgSeErS other regulatory requirements besides SIP-TIP conformity. In regions that do not meet NAAQS, new sources of air emissions must comply not only with detailed, industry-specific emission standards (new source performance standards) but must also install "reasonably achievable control technologies" for all sources. New and expanding industries may emit significantly more of the six pollutants covered by NAAQ S only if they compensate by offsetting reductions in other sources. In regions that are pristine, such as na tional parks and wilderness, new sources must comply with comparable regulations for "pre vention of significant degradation" in air quality SIPs do influence key decisions about air quality, but their most powerful impacts are probably indirect--through NSPS, RACT, and PSD technology-based regulations for specific industries. SIPs also encourage states to address air-pollution problems not directly regulated by EPA. In some regions, states have developed voluntary or regulatory programs to reduce emissions from small sources, and they have tried various strategies for cleaning-up vehicle emissions, or even slowing the steady growth of vehicle-miles-traveled. EPA develops methods to quantify7 the air-quality benefits of such measures so states can get "credit" for them in modeling to determine whether their SIPs meet air-quality standards. There are also links--weak but well targeted--between SIPs and local land use decisions. One of the strong points of the SIP process is that SIPs make sense geographically States prepare SIPsfor metropolitan regions where air-qualityproblems are concentrated. By statute, metropolitan planning organizations (MPO s)play a central role in decisions about SIPs. Re gional councils of governments, which are controlled by local elected and appointed officials, manage most MPOs. That link provides a bridge to bring land-use issues into transportation and air-quality planning, even though local officials generally guard vigilantly against any weakening of their control over land use. There are also institutional paths to address interstate air-quality7problems. EPA and states have formed multistate entities to negotiate agreements about interstate air-quality issues, and they would have to work out ways of enforcing any agreements. Such efforts are alwaysdifficult, but have had some measure of success. In the early 1990s, for example, state environmental agencies formed a multistate consortium, the 0 zone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG), to develop better methods of measuring the movement of air pollutants from the Midwest to the East. OTAG successfully accomphshed that task, but w7as unable to negotiate an agreement among states about how to share responsibilities for cleanup. So the final decision was left to EPA--and to the courts. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00103 104 Environment.gov In contrast, the Clean Water Act provides few links between TMDLs and other regulatory processes. Congress could make specific provisions for tougher regulatory requirements for point sources, nonpoint sources--or both--for water bodies that do not meet water-quality ptshtraaiontdrhiaatyrvdwes.eantCeaorcsnthegedrdeses,nsbfhouartscietdaiisrbeulceptreteodqstuthaiarteetmsstoeomnmtesaUfkoSerDannAonefxpuponhidncstitfsoloirnuckrocteonssTehrMavvaDetiLtoasnr.gbSeeetevtdaerrtgahleeotemfdtohtsoet shsttiargtihens- gent regulations at high-priority areas like estuaries, wild and scenic rivers, and impaired wa ters. 163 Neither the Clean Water Act nor EPA'snew TMDL regulations provide for any mechanism to connect TMDLs with interstate water-quality issues or with land-use decisions. Once again, iatsiismuiplatrobsotdatyetsotoadmdraeksestfhiletelrisntka.teEwveanteturaplolyll,uEtiPoAn iasnsudetsh--e psotastseisbmlyatoydfiensdigint uassetfrualtetgoyetsotacblleiasnh up the "dead zone" at the mouth of the Mississippi River, for example. So far, EPA has shied away from linking TMDLs to interstate issues in the Mississippi drainage, hoping that cleaning uadpdarlelsosfotthheersmdoawllnersttrreiabmutawryatwera-tqeurashlietydspwroobuleldmesvaesnwtuealll.ly restore life to the dead zone, and In any event, the TMDL process faces an uncertain future. Although EPA has enacted regulations to drive the program, there isno guarantee that the regulations willwork effectively. Indeed, without tough sanctions and without well-developed linksto other regulatory processes oinratdoesqtuaateteanddatalo,cwaleadkecmisoiodnemls,akanindgesnyvsitreomnsm, tehnetaplrcoogmrapmlexciotiuelsd. founder under the weight of On the other hand, the example of the Grande RondeTMDL suggests that the regulations just might work in watersheds where citizens and agencies have built good working relation ships on watershed issues. Civic Approaches to Watershed Protection For decades, the federal government has made attempts at comprehensive watershed man agement. In the 1930s, for example, the Water Quality Board within the National Resources Council developed a nationaltemplate for comprehensive watershed planning From the 1950s tshinrso,uugshuatlhlye t1h9o7s0esa,ftfheectIinngtemriuolrtiDpleepsatrattmese. nWt istuhptphoeretexdceppltaionnnionfgthcoeuTnecnilnsefsosreemVajaollrewyAatuetrhboar ity, however, which implemented a broad program of dams, power generation, soil conserva tpiloann,neidnugc16a4tion and social development, most of the proposals have not gotten far beyond The 1972 Clean Water Act continued those efforts with its new- requirements for compre hensive watershed planning, including the Section 208 process led by multicounty planning agencies. But lacking statutory authority and pohtical clout, most planning agencies were able to do little to implement the 208 plans, sothe planshave, forthe most part, lain fallow Congress, EPA, and most state environmental agencies eventually lost interest in comprehensive plan nasinsgu,bpsuidttiiensgfothr ewirasreteswouartceerstrtoeawtmarednttecphlannotlso.gy-based regulation of individual sources, as well The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act created three new watershed program s at EPA. The Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bayprogram swere formal federal-state efforts.165 The gamraenntsdfmorenctosmaplsroehcerenastievde,thineteNrgatoivoenranlmEesntutaalrymPurlotigyreaamr p, wlahnincihnghaisnp2r8oveisdtueadriseusb. stantial EPA Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00104 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 105 In the 1990s, a new wave of "bottom-up" watershed efforts emerged around the country. Some were truly grassroots programs, organized and led by citizens, local officials, or nonprofit groups. In many cities, business, civic, and elected leaders have tried to spark economic devel ocopumnetrnyt, btoyoc, lceiatinzienngsuhpavdeoowrgnatonwiznedwsautcehrfreoffnotrstsatnodiminpdruosvtreiathl earqeuasa.liItyn othfelifseu. burbs and the Other bottom-up efforts have taken a more aggressive approach, working to build agree ment among differing local groups--even if it means redefining issues and challenging policies and programs of governments. Indeed, many of the grassroots programs began asreactions to bureaucratic failures to address problems, or as confrontations between regulators and local mintaenryesstuscahbcooultlanbeowrarteivgeulaactotiroyn-sp.ro(Tphoesa1ls9.9T7hAucsaidnedmepyernedpeonrct eonfrEomPAaignecnlcuideesdisaachasaellmstuadrky ooff a grassroots effort in Montana that persuaded the state legislature to let it resolve local water shed disputes, but which refused public funds for its work, getting its support from a philan thropic foundation.)166 havSeuscohugehfftotrotsrehsaovlevebeceonnfpliacrttsicaubloaurltyswalimdeosnporeraodthinertheendRaoncgkeireesdanspdePciaecsi.fi0c tNhoerrtshbweegsatn. Swohmene state fish and game departments tried to set aside waters for in-stream flowsto protect fisheries. Some arose when conservation-minded individuals moved into ranching, logging, and mining communities, and began pressuring the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and other federal agencies to enforce the requirements of environmental statutes passed in the last 3se0arycehaersd. tRogaeththeerrthtoancrdafivt icdoemtphreoirmcisoems.munities, some new arrivals and long-term residents Other civic watershed-protection efforts have emerged from government agencies them selves. State and federal field staff have often taken the initiative to establish new mechanisms Mforaswsaocrkhiunsgetctso,llOabreograotniv,ealnydacWroassshianggetnocny--fiensetsabalnisdhewditwh actietirzsehnesd. cAonudncailfsetwhasttaitnecsl--udneodtarebply resentatives of various stakeholder groups, as well as front-fine staff from multiple agencies. For this project, the Academy commissioned research teams to assess 17 different civic watershed efforts. Three teams studied eight local- and state-led efforts in relatively small wa taetrteshmepdtss (aftrowmat3e2rshtoed25p0ro,0te0c0tisoqnueamreemrgielesa)n. dTihneflucaesnecseiellvuesntrtsa:te the different ways that such Caron Chess and Ginger Gibson of Rutgers University studied a small basin in the New Jersey suburbs outside New York City: runNofafvfreosminhkoRrsievfearr,mNseawndJenresweyd.evTehloepsmtuednytse, xaasmwienlel sasato15r-eydeuacreefpfoolrltuttoiornedfruocme pmoallruinteads and boats, so that the state could re-open shellfish beds for commercial use. The project began with an agreement between the EPA regional administrator and the state environmental com missioner to invest discretionaryfundsto demonstrate how regulators could work cooperatively wofithloacgalriicnuiltitautriavleisn.teSriexstlso.cAalsttaotwenesmspeltoyuepe aw-jooriknetdcionmthme iatrteeea,foarnydeathrseiarnodffeincciaolsu,raagloendgawhoitsht county health stafls, local nonprofit groups, and individuals, took leadership roles. The results included tougher local zoning ordinances, a prohibition on discharges of waste by boats, cost sharing of improved farm management practices and marinapump-out stations, and the opening of shellfish beds.167 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00105 Environment.gov Stephen Born and Kenneth Genskowof the University of Wisconsin at Madison studied six local efforts in Washington, Wisconsin, and North Carolina, as well as state efforts to promote collaborative watershed action: 168 D ungeness W atershed, Washington. After conflictsbetween farmers and the Jamestown S'Klallam tribe about irrigation, fishing, and endangered salmon, a county commissioner or ganized a collaborative process, led by a local agricultural extension agent. That led to a series of formal and informal teams, studies, and organizations; state funding; the creation of an pederuicoadtsiobnyarlecdeunctienrg; virarriigoautsiorne.storation projects; and an agreement to protect salmon in dry Nisqually River, Washington. After litigation between a municipal wastewater treat ment system and the Nisqually tribe about water withdraw als and fishing of endangered spe trchaieteisv,reitvh, enero.lonTcrhaeelgsuptlalaatetnolresypgpiasrllkaanetodnritnhhgaedgfrothoruempsa,ttaaitoelnaennodvf tifrriuovsentm,afaefnniltieaadtleuadcgaeotnrigocanynawilzrpairtteoiojaenc"st,s,tieanwnclaiunrddteisnrhpgipraeptcilvoaelnl"acbefonor ter, and a citizens group. The groups have addressed fisheries, shellfish, habitat, runoflj aes thetic problems, and other issues. memTobmeroorfrTorwo-uWt UanulipmaictaedWbeactaemrsehceodn,cWernisecdoanbsoiunt:eArolsoiocnalalnanddsoewdinmerenwtahtoiownaisnaanfiaschtiinvge stream that runs along her property Finding no single agency was responsible for the overall welfare of the river, she formed a citizens group, which learned how fertilizers and manure fsarpnoedmcpiaeflasptrimlcaisndnewsinewrgeeerdfefeosgerrte.apdSiintnaggteinwatogatetenhrceqiegusraobluirtonyudTgwhhateteogrthraoenurdpiswslooueubslbdiineedtvoeftonhrteuaaelfslfytoacrteto:nathtpaapmtrofinaprarmtieatfwieoerntlillsfiozaernrdas streams as well. As a result, the state has spent almost a million dollars on cost sharing of best management practices on farms, streambank protection, and stocking wild trout. orgBanliazcekd mEaarntyhcWonsaetrevrasthioendp,rWojeiscctsoanlsoinng:tAhelosctraelacmha, pintevritoedf TthreousttaUtenlaigmeintceyd,awndhicfahchualtdy from the nearby stateuniversityto conduct a comprehensive study The universitygroup worked with county extension agents and the U. S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Caanloadnrgsceeorslvta-anstdhiofainrllinSwgearpsvrifcooegrcr(eaNdmRtsoCtScol)o,rseaedn,udthccoeospoeopplelaurratteitcedidprwuatniitnohgffainfbrorsotmraedafeamrrmeclmseaeanrngudipnegpxupcsiathnizededinnfgogrrsorueubgpuu.rlbWast.ihoenns Upper Little Tennessee River, North Carolina. A local resident w-ho was a fisheries bViaollloegyiAstuotrhgoarnitiyz:eTdhaactomnfeeerteinncgelecdontvoecnreedatbioynaosmf aalnl toonw-and,vaocciaticzyencsognrsoeurvpaatinodntohregTaneniznaetsiosene, which has worked with NRCS, a local power utility; and others to organize projects to reduce polluted runoff from farmlands. wcoeullLns,toyanongrdgCacrnoeinzecekedr,naNcaoibtrioztuehnt sCwcaaotrmeormliqinusasail.oiItnyn. Irinet swtphooernkwssewattoiethrfsitshhheedkeilfxlost,ercnaosinsomtnaamslelirntvoaiwtcieonan'snowdfaadtleroirncsakulinrpegpslwoyu-atrhtceeer conservation district to organize water-quality monitoring, education and outreach, and cost sharing for best management practices on farms. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00106 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 107 Mark Imperial of Indiana University and Tim Hennessey of the University of Rhode Is land studied a state-local effort in a small watershed in Rhode Island:169 Salt Ponds, R hode Island. The state coastal zone management program provided funds itsolathndess.tTatheeurneisvuelrtsinitgyptolawn rlietdetaomtigahntaegrelomceanlztopnlainngforergnuilnaetisomnsatlol ppornodtescitnwsiedtelaandstsriapndofgbroaurrniderwater, extension of sewage lines, and state review of local decisions about developments near the water or over a certain size. How Gvic Efforts Work Asthose brief vignettes illustrate, each civic watershed effort has a unique story Each of the Academy'sresearch team sasserts emphatically that no template fits every case. Indeed, the key to success isfor participantsto design a collaborative processthat fitslocal environmental issues, icnosmtitmutoionnesl,ehmisetnotrsy., and personalities. As Table 4-4 demonstrates, however, there are some TABLE 4-4: C O M M O N FEATURES OF COLLABORATIVE WATERSHED PLANNING SCIENTIFIC, R A T IO N A L G e o g r a p h ic s c o p e : focuses on systems and subsystems (watersheds and tributaries); I n f o r m a t io n b a s e : relies on inventories of scientific and technical information about watershed resources; CO M PREHENSIVE G o a ls : sets bro a d , ecosystem-oriented goals as w e ll as econom ic and sometimes social goals; P A R T IC IP A T O R Y O r g a n iz a t io n a l lin k s : includes intensive efforts to engage nonprofit, civic, and sometimes private sector organizations as w ell as to coordinate multiple agencies and levels o f governm ent; D e c is io n m a k in g s t y le : engages leading citizens and agency officials in voluntary efforts to build mutual understanding and agreem ent about goals and activities; T o o ls : uses a w id e variety o f tools to engage participants and motivate action, including market incentives, regulations, social pressures, and education. A D A P T IV E A c tiv itie s : works incrementally, relying on monitoring and assessment to adjust activities to changing conditions and to lessons learned. Sourcfera:mAedwanprtke,dsfereoAmdBleor,rnStarnaudbGeeannsdhoGwr;e3e,nw, i9t.h elements from Chess and Gibson, 79. For a similar Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00107 Environment.gov At the heart of many successful watershed efforts are formal collaborative processes that bring together representatives of agencies, landowners, and citizens. Formal collaboration is important for two reasons. The first is that key interest groups may not share the same knowl tesuadrmgeedealcbeovoleullatboeofnruvanitridvoeenrmsptreaonnctdeasilnspegrsobarleemwsaoyrs atoboburtinugndtherelyleinagdeercsoonof mvaicrioanuds isnotceiraelsitntgerroeustpss. Stotrtuhce The second reason is the deep differences of opinion that often exist about how to allocate the responsibilities for reducing runoff or for protecting habitat and ecologicalbalances. Regu lated parties, such as wastewater treatment plants and large industries, may argue that they hoafvreedaulrceiandgynpoanipdotoinmt peoeltluthtieoinr ocwaunspederbmyitthreepqruaicretimceesnotsf,uannrdegshuolautleddnboutshinaevsesetos.cUovnerergthuelactoesdt parties, including farmers, real estate developers, and small landowners, may resist regulation and pressure to change their practices. A carefully designed and well-managed collaborative pcorollcTaebhsoesrmabtaiasvyiecyprirueolldceesasfnsoerasgcbroreilnleamgbtoeonrgatetiatvhbeeorudaet chsimosiwaolnltomnuaamklliobncegarta(eupcspoulyastlsltyoabnwedtawtoeetrhesenhre1db0-ulaerndvdeeln5se0ff)faooirrfltysr.e. pFroersmenal tatives of different interests, responsibilities, and points of view Often each group or agency represented starts with a more-or-less fixed position about what should or should not happen next. One wayto find common ground isto shift the discussion from current positionsto shared gaochalise.veIfthpoasreticgiopaalns--ts acnand tahguresemoondisfpyetchifeiicr gpooaslisti,otnhse.y may then be able to agree on how to Collaborative processes in watersheds usually work as follows:170 nCurmisbise:r oCfopllaarbtioersa.tiIvnespormoceecsasseesso, fatepnewndoirnkgbaegset nwchyednetchiseiroeni--s aec.gri,siasTthMatDthLr,eaateefnfsorat to make a point source spend significantly to bring it into regulatory compliance, or the listing of an endangered species--provides the crisis. Representatives of the interested parties will usually participate only if dropping out would threaten their interests. Inclusion: The processes will not be successful unless the participants include repre sentatives of all interests that might veto the implementation of an agreement. But there are some groups that often cannot participate easily in local collaborative processes. Panodornpaetioopnlea,l menivniorrointimese,natnadl gnreowupasrroifvtaelns linacckotmhemruensoituiercsems atoy pbaertleicftipoautte, ifnorloecxaalmple, processes. A small grant by EPA, the relevant state environmental regulator, or another public agency for travel costs and technical assistance to such groups can sometimes hsieolnpailnfvaoclivlietatthoorsme wayhoalmsoighehltpo. therwise not be included. Small grants to hire a profes Rules: Collaborative processes function best if they have a clear set of rules to guide their discussions. In addition, agency staff can help participants by explaining the finofromrmalaplrwocaeydsutorems aankde tshuebsstyasntteimvewruolreks. of governm ents, as well as by demonstrating kCeoepminmg uinntiocuactihowni:thEpaceheros fotrhheopmaertiacgiepnacnitess,shaosuwldelhl aavse"paenrmexipssliicoint stotranteeggoytfiaotre," to assure that the constituencies they represent will agree to the results of collaboration. To foster broad community interest in reaching agreement, collaborative groups also need an explicit strategy for keeping in touch with the general public. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00108 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 109 nTeicmeses:arIyt usually takes a for agreement great deal on shared of time to build the trust and mutual understanding goals--and on strategies to meet those goals. But deadlines are also helpful: otherwise participants may tire and drop out. Some groups ccarenamteutshteerptrhesesiunrteetronaclormeseoltvoeatgoreseetmtehneti.r Oowfncoduerasdel,inifesa,gbeuntcyofdteenadalgineenscyarperotocoestsiegsht or too distant, they can derail local negations. Local or regional watershed processes are intensely political processes: not in the partisan sense, but in that a mix of public interest and legal schedules drivesthem.They become forums for Wbriantegrisnhgebdetetfefrortetschdnoicnaoltinffuonrcmtiaotnioansinatoratthioenpaolllyitidcaelsipgrnoecdesesnagnidnemerainnaggoemr leengtadlepcriosicoensss., however, but as turbulent democracy at work. The enthusiasm and energy- of citizens ebbs and flows. Under the leadership of a charismatic leader, or in response to a dramatic event, volun thaebaeporpus ytmgtaooyatlugsaranlvnaodnvipezrreiloefroaitdriee"srvs.ihcAitpotrttyho:"aatBgseutnatgcfeyo,lsliottawmffinaogynacbeewawinci,sotelhltaeobyolmertaatayivfbeoerecmfofoamlrteccowolelmaabreyos;rtamotiaavygereepvereomnceebnsest become dormant. If the problems in a watershed are complex and conflicts are deep, however, it may take a series of collaborative efforts to make significant progress. Agency involvement also ebbs and flows. Chess and Gibson report that the process in the Ntoapvaesgiennkcwy aotfefircsihaelsdsitnarstuedbutrhbeanefNfoertw, bJuertsceiytirzaennsinanredvleorcsealforoffmicitahlasttoinokToovmeor.rrow-Waupaca: Federally Supported Watershed Management Efforts watTerhseherdess.earch teams also studied nine efforts organized under federal authority in larger Imperial and Hennessey- studied four National Estuary Projects, as well as a unique federal- state effort at Lake Tahoe. EPA'sNational Estuary- Program (NEP)provides between $4 million and $10 million for four to five years of scientific research and planning for each project, all of which involve many federal, state, and local agencies, as well as user groups, scientific experts, panladn,owthheicrhinctoevreersstetdhepfaurltliearsr.ayT-hoef irsessuuelst ciosnafrcoonmtipnrgethheenwsiavteercsohnesdeirnvaqtuioenstiaonnd. EmPaAnaapgpermovenest the plans and then provides small continuing grants to the sponsoring organization, but does not provide special funding for implementing the plans. waDreeIlnalwanadreBaIynslaconsdt aBboayuts$, 2Dmelilaliwona.rIet.foOcunseeodfotnhenufitrrsitenptasrftircoimpatnhtespinouNlEtrPy,iDndeulas try, stormwater runoff, septic systems, and sewage treatment plants. At the last minute, however, the agricultural industry refiised to endorse the plan, and EPA reluctantly paglarneendintgobaocdceypitnatoleassnaogngprreosfsiitveordgraanfti.zaTthioenD, welhaiwcharies laegniesulattruarlectohnevnencoernvoefrtdeidsctuhse sions about water-quality issues. The nonprofit has helped the state environmental agency- develop TMDLs for nutrients that have won general acceptance. N arragans participants in eNtEt PB.aTyh,eRphroodgreamIslcaonsdt E. PNAar$ra1g1amnsileltitonB,ayanwdaist another of took seven the first years to rceocnodmucmtesncdieanttiiofincsr:easneadrcthhaatnwdowulrditecoasnt eaxnheasutismtivaetepdla$n39th2amt cilolniotnaitnoedimmpolerme tehnatn. T5h00e Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00109 110 Environment.gov state environmental agency is working on many of the plan's ideas, but the research team reports that the plan is generally ignored, and that the planning process was so difficult that it retarded rather than promoted cooperative problem solving NETPameffpoartsB. aByu,ilFdilnogriodnae.aTrlhieer project at Tampa state and regional Bay is one of the most successful planning, it forged an agreement among local governments for specific measures to reduce pollution from wastewater treatment plants, reduce nutrients, and grow more seagrasses. Key local governments established a new organization under the state joint powers act to oversee implemen tation. The commitments to reducing nutrients were accepted by EPA as a TMDL. Tillamook Bay, Oregon. Tillamook Bay is a recent NEP effort built on a long wsearsierseloaftiovtehlyerfrpeleaonfncinognfelifcfto.rTtshleedmbaynafegdeemraelnatnpdlasntaatdedargeessnecdiessu. cThhduisfftihcueltpilsasnunesinags nutrient and bacterial runoff from the watershed'smany dairy farms, sedimentation from farms and timberlands, degradation of shellfish beds, and endangered salmon. Tofhtehecopulnanty'segsotaablsliasnhdedpraonjeecwts", pwahritcnherhsahviep"beogrugnantiozaattitorancttofeodveerrasel eanimd pstlaetme feunntadtiinogn. Lake Tahoe, California-Nevada. A federal-state compact created a regional planning authority with regulatory authority over land use and environmental issues. Arefgtuerlaatigornesa.tSdienacleo1f9c8o7n,tcroitvizeernsys,, tthhee bauusthinoersistycoamdomputenditya,palannd tthhaetaiuntchluodrietydhsaovmeetitgighhtt eonpeedd raepglualnatfioorn$s,9o0r0gmanililzieodn aofbuacstsiyosntsemto tpororetedcutcweaatierrpqoullaultiitoynanadndotthraefrfiecn,vainrdondmeveenl tal values. Robert Adler, Michelle Straube, and Heather Green studied what they call the oldest con tinuing operating effort in the country' to address nonpoint pollution. StaCteoslohraasdagoreReidvtehraBt 1a.s3i6nmSilaliloinnitaycrCe foenettrooflwPartoergrwaitmh .noSimncoere19th72an, thabeoUunt i1te1d5 ppm of salts would flow into Mexico in the Colorado River. Almost half of the salinity comes from natural sources; most of the rest is from irrigated agriculture or evapora tTiohne fBroumrearuesoerfvRoeircsl.aTmhaetiopnrosjpeecnt tb$e1g2a0n masilaliofendoenraallydecsoanlitnroatliloedn ppluabnlticthwaot rhkassenfefovretr. been operated because small salinity control projects upstream have made sufficient reductions. Congress has appropriated almost half a billion dollars for such projects, including between $9 million and $50 million in recent years to three federal agencies. aSrteatnesopparrotvicisipioantes finorthfoerpmroajlepcatsrtaicnidpaotvieornsebeyaocttihveirtiepsarthtireosu. gh two councils, but there They also evaluated three newer large ecosystem restoration projects that are much more col laborative in character, comparing them with the keyfeatures of the Colorado River Basin Project: is tCheencetrnatelrapinedceSoofuftehdeFrallo-rstiadtae ePffroorjtsectot.reAstUorSe.tAhermFlyoCridoarpEsvoefrgElandgeins,eearvsapsrtoajreecat tirnibFallo,raindda pthriavtaitnecllaunddess. Ta hneatpioronjaelcpt aisrpk,arat wofiltdhliefesertetfluemgee,natstowaenlluansuesxutaelnlsaivwesusittabtey, Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00110 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 111 the national park and refuge, charging Florida with failure to apply its own waterquality standards to runoff from large privately owned sugar cane farms. The Corps has proposed $8.3 billion of modifications to an extensive system of canals it built 50 ycSoeoamurtsmhaiFgttoleoetrsoidodavreafrrisonemepirnfivgloaotthdeesf.aCMrmoarlpnasyn'dwsstoaatrnekdaatnnoddpfrreeodltaeetrceatdlthparegoecjneoccaitsest.saClpcaoirnttiigecrsiepasanstdeansidnubFvualrorbirsoiduoasf have set aside substantial funds for the CS&F and other restoration projects, but far from the lull $8.3 billion. staCtehs,etsharepeeoafkwehBicahyhPavr oe gpar artmici.pTatheed CachteivsaeplyeainkethBeapyrowgartaemrshuenddreeraachfoersminatloasgerveeen ment with EPA and the District of Columbia. Each of the three states agreed to reduce nutrients flowing into rivers and thence to the bay by 40 percent by 2000. Congress psurochvidoethsearbmoueta$su1r9ems ialsliostnataensndueaclildyetotothtaekper.ogram, supplemented by state funds and eSraaCclr-AastmLatFeenE-tlDoocRaBlivaeeyfrf-oDDrteetllottaap, rwPohrteioccghtrwlaieamsted.roTqwuhnaeslitCtryeA,ameLnFdfEraoDnmgpeCrroeadglirfsaopmrenciiiase'ssa,vnaanisntdtCehreaanbgteirtnaacltyVi,nafltelhedyeand just upstream from San Francisco Bay Agriculture, mining, logging and urban de velopment in the Central Valley and in the delta itself contribute to poor water quality finlotwheoafrweaa.teInr.aCdAdiLtiFonE,Dexhteanssdiveeveirlroipgeadtioanpalannd lfeovrereessftoorrifnlogotdhceoenctorsoylhstaevme cinhathnegeddetlhtae, and has already spent $177 million of state and federal money on restoration activities. Comparing Civic and Agency-Led Collaborative Efforts proWjechti,ltehethoethCeorlaogreandcoy-RleidvecrolBlaabsoinraStiavleinpirtoycCesosnestrhoalvperaoggrraemat diseaal itnracdoimtimonoanl wpuitbhlibco-wttoomrksup civic watershed efforts. There are important differences, however. One concerns the size of the watershed. The larger a watershed, the harder it is for citizens to lead. Collaborative processes depend on rTehguusl,arciftaizceen-t-ole-fdaceeffcoortnstaucsut,aallnydfoticmuse ocnonssmtraalilnwtsaatenrdshdeidstsa,npceerhinatpesrfleerseswthiathn sauchhunindtreerdacmtioilnes. long in rural areas, even smaller in more congested areas. In larger watersheds, agencies often dominate the process of collaborative planning, perhaps along with a well-funded, professional athdavtTomchaeacysycwagloreorokufpbtehlsiekt.ewWtahtheeerCrsehhepedsroatphbeuleasmksehsaBapnaedysFtshooeluukntiidonandtsiooafnr.pellaoncnailn, ga acnodllapbroorbalteimve-sporlovciensgsamppayrosaucch ceed; where problems are larger or involve more interests, government agencies may need to take a stronger hand. One of the biggest challenges of watershed management is designing an institutional sys tseymste--maopfoaliwticaatelrjushriesdd.icAtisotnheorCsheetsoafpjeuarkisedBicatyioPnrsotghraatmcainlluascttraotnesp, rsoobmleemwsa--tetroshfeitdtheeffnorattsuarrael "nested." That is they include both citizen-dominated efforts for small tributaries and agencyled efforts for the larger watershed. In such cases, the agency-led efforts set broad goals and preogliucliaetsowryitphroincepsustesf,rommobthileizecoflulanbdoinragtifvoer rpersotcoersasteiosnfoarntdricbluetaanryups,tarenadmms,acrsohoarldrinesaoteuracgeesnfcoyr Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00111 112 Environment.gov research. Meanwhile tributary-level efforts involve volunteers, try to influence broader water shed goals, obtain their shares of funds and other resources, shape local government policies, and meet their shares of watershed-wide goals. tahcocrIuiftmyt:huelSayutecacrmeesossrfuaucllcaecsuostlfhluaolb,roibtryoatthPivaeargtciecintiipczyae-nnlt-esldeldeaanprdnroctcoietisrzseeesnsp-ehlecadtvoeenfnfeooartnlseodgteahvleearl'uostpihnoadriikvtiyind,dubaiunlitftyothramenyadlmvaaauly ues. Ideally the participants also gain stature in the community for their hard work and lead ership, while the organizations they represent accrue credibility as well. Agency-led watershed efforts may generate similar informal authority. Working relation Ismhippseraiamloanngd fHroenntn-leisnseeyagreepnocryt sthtaaftfimn saoymbeeocofmthee pwoawteerrsfhueldfosrtcheesyfsotrudaigerde,etmheenretcaonmdmacetniodna. tions of a formal multiagency planning process became social norms that governed the behav ior of local officials and their agencies. laeggeiInsnlcayat-udlrdeeidtoiaornnfdrtoocmiitnizfaoenrnme-lxeaedlcaueutftifvhoeortrsbi.tryaS,nopcmohleitaicgcieatnilzcbeyan.c-Ikletidncgaenfafnaodlrstoslesgbeaeelkhaefulotphrfmourlaifltoyrreacaroetgoimnpipteioolernctatfenrdotmtoofftbhioceitaihrl to "sponsor" local collaborative efforts: encouraging them, earmarking small amounts of pub lic funds for planning and start-up projects, and ensuring that agency managers and lawyers give front-line staff sufficient latitude to custom-design local agreements. fronStt-rloinnegesxuppeprtosrftrofrmomfedtoepraellaencdtesdtaoteffaicgieanlsciaelss,oahsewlpelsl aasgfernocmy-ulendiveefrfsoirtitse.sIanndthweeEllv-feirngalnacdeeds,, professionalenvironmental advocacygroups, came to an informal consensus about what needed to be done to protect the ecosystem from nutrients. That informal agreement developed a prsetoaswutele'tsrwfguaolsvineafrfonorormrmatoallladcuohthlilsoarbliaotwyr:aytTeivrhseetposrtobacaretcsoksfoamfmfeolaintnigignaagtgifoeunnlciaynntsedtraalfegfaetvhnecaytthedeviseiscnsutuusesailtoloynstlhecdeamteoxepthweerhtsde.enTstihghnee of the Everglades restoration project.171 Thusif collaborative efforts are successful, they can develop powerful political and bureau cratic momentum.They can mobilize politicalcommitmentsby elected officials, setnew agency paonliicniteesr,ecshteadngceitiazgeennrycyTphreaycticcaens carnedatperoacceodnutreexst, iinnfwluheinccheTlaMndDoLwsnaenrdproatchteicrerse,gaunladtoarroyursee quirements might work. Civic Watershed Efforts Can Improve the Environment Agency staff and environmental advocates who are comfortable with traditional regulatory practices are often skeptical about collaborative civicprocesses. The words of a former state agency7 official about the civic action devoted to cleaning up the Navesink River summarize that feeling: It's a buzzword . . . Show me where EPA is enforcing. Show me the building bans [when municipalities reach the capacity of sewage treatment plants]. Even with the new ways of doing things, you can't forget the municipalities only do what they have to do.172 The Academy panel directed its research teams to identify7watershed efforts that were re ported to have produced positive environmental results. In most cases, the researchers found significant environmental improvements, beyond what would have happened through tradi tional regulatory programs alone. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00112 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 113 TABLE 4-5: SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES WATERSHED PO P U LATIO N S IZ E / /P R O G R A M WATERSHED AREA PROBLEM POLICY CHANG ES A N D EN VIR O N M EN TAL OUTCOMES Delaware Inland Bays (DE) 1 3 3 , 1 0 0 / 3 0 0 square miles Nutrients from poultry farms, septic systems, stormwater, and sewage treatment; habitat loss from development. Agricultural BMPs implemented N e w sewers: $ 158 million 1592 acres of land acquisition: $ 13 million 3 7 ,5 9 4 acres of farmland preservation 6 0 ,0 0 0 acres of farmland conservation planning 1 point source removed w a te r use plan, TMDL, and tributary strategies developed. Narragansett Bay (Ri, M A ) 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 / 1 ,6 0 0 square miles Sewage treatment, sewer overflows, failing septic systems, sediment contamination. W hole state designated "no discharge zone" for recreational boating Salt Ponds (Rl) 3 2 , 0 0 0 / 32 square miles Nutrients from septic systems, sewage treatment plants, and stormwater. Prevented developm ent on undeveloped barrier beaches. Required higher density requirements in large developments, buffer zones and setbacks, Coordinated state/iocal review of development projects Consistent state/iocal priorities for investment in infrastructure. Lake Tahoe (CA, NV) 5 3 ,0 0 0 / 501 square miles Nutrients from stormwater runoff; sediment erosion and habitat destruction from development. BMP retrofit program encouraged homeowners to install NPS controls Coordinated transit system and implemented redevelopment projects Proposed an Environmental Improvement Program: 1018 actions, $ 9 0 0 million Tampa Bay (FL) 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 / 2 ,3 0 0 square miles Nutrients from stormwater runoff, sewage treatment, phosphate mining, fertilizer production. Habitat loss. Established 1 1 measurable goals for nutrient reduction and habitat restoration 41 action plans developed that are expected to exceed goals. Established collaborative monitoring program, Florida Yards and Neighborhoods program, and developed Boaters G uide to Tampa Bay. Created Tampa Bay Estuary Program, a partnership o f six local governments to manage over 2 0 0 actions identified in the action plans. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00113 114 Environment.gov TABLE 4-5: SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES (continued) WATERSHED PO P U LATIO N S IZE / /P R O G R A M WATERSHED AREA Tillamook Bay (OR) 17 ,0 0 0 / 5 7 0 square miles Navesink River 95 square miles !NJ) Dungeness River (W A) 1 5 ,0 0 0 / 2 6 0 square miles N isqually River 7 2 2 square miles (W A) PROBLEM POLICY CHANG ES A N D EN VIR O N M EN TAL OUTCOMES Closed shellfish beds and threat to salmon from bacterial contamination; sedimentation from d a iry farms, septic systems, stormwater runoff and forestry. Habitat restoration projects and BMPs implemented in Tillam ook State Forest and on agricultural land. Specific targets established for nutrient reduction. Created Tillamook County Performance Partnership Coliform bacteria from agricultural and urban runoff, and boats. O pened 6 0 0 acres of shellfish beds. Stricter requirements imposed on some new developments. Agricultural runoff reduced with federal assistance of $ 1.2 million in cost shares to landowners for BMPs River designated as "no discharge" area for boats; pumpout stations installed in marinas. W ater allocation, land conversion, sediment, bacteria, irrigation and agricultural runoff; threats to salmon and shellfish beds. Special trust w ater rights created to protect salmon based on agreement by irrigators to limit w ater w ithdraw als for irrigation during periods of low flow. Habitat restoration projects developed and implemented Research and public education conducted via Dungeness River Natural History Center Dungeness River M anagem ent Team formed -- a partnership among 13 stakeholder groups and intergovernmental agency representatives that generated substantial funding. Development, agriculture, forestry, land and stream modifications; threats to aesthetic values, salmonid habitat, water quality, and shellfish beds. Land trust facilitated sale o f land to public utility for mitigation measures to protect riparian conservation corridor. W astew ater treatment plant used innovative process for reclaiming all of its effluent BMPs adopted throughout watershed Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00114 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 115 TABLE 4-5: SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES (continued) WATERSHED PO P U LATIO N S IZE / /P R O G R A M WATERSHED AREA PROBLEM POLICY CHANG ES A N D EN VIR O N M EN TAL OUTCOMES Tomorrow and W aupaca Rivers (W l) 13 ,0 0 0 / 3 0 0 square miles Nutrients, ground-water contamination, sediment, and degraded habitat from agriculture and urban development; threat to coldw ater fishery. Changes in agricultural management practices led to drop in phosphorus and sediments running into streams by 21 percent and 12 percent, surpassing 10 percent reduction goals. State funding used to pay for land use planning that resulted in a significant reduction of stormwater problems and increased citizen understanding Habitat improvements carried out along a mile o f river Black Earth Creek (Wl) 10 0 square miles Nutrients, sediments, and habitat degradation from urban and rural sources. BMPs totaling $ 2 .5 million installed by 108 landowners Acquired wetland and riparian corridors and carried out instream improvements Prevented further degradation of water quality and sustained coldw ater fishery in the face o f population and economic growth. Formed regional bi-county sewage treatment commission U pper Little Tennessee River (NC) 2 8 ,0 0 0 full-time residents, up to 5 0 ,0 0 0 during summer/ 4 5 0 square miles Sediment, urban and agricultural runoff, streambank erosion; threats to endangered species Planted trees, installed fencing, restored and organized cleanups along various segments of riverbank; also subsidized agricultural BMPs and conducted volunteer monitoring M easurable increases in w ildlife and decreases in siltation. Residents formed a land trust to carry out land acquisition; high landowner acceptance Long Creek (NC) 6 8 ,0 0 0 + / 62 square miles Agricultural and urban runoff, streambank erosion; sediment, nutrients, and bacteria. Assistance to farmers w ho installed 12 7 0 BMPs; agricultural erosion reduced by 6 0 percent, nitrogen by 10 percent, and phosphorus from four dairies by 70 percent. Construction of wetland, and restoration of a reach of urban riparian corridor Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00115 Environment.gov TABLE 4-5: SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES (continued) WATERSHED PO P U LATIO N S IZE / /P R O G R A M WATERSHED AREA C olo ra d o River Basin Salinity Control Program (CO, W Y , UT, NM , AZ, NV, CA) 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 square miles San Francisco Bay-Delta Program (CA) N /A . Central and South Florida Everglades Program (FL) N /A . Chesapeake Bay Program (DC, MD, PA, VA) 6 4 ,0 0 0 square miles PROBLEM POLICY CHANG ES A N D EN VIR O N M EN TAL OUTCOMES Sait loading from inefficient irrigation, erosion from development, and w ater diversions for increased consumption, and point sources. Initially implemented irrigation improvement projects, then on farm improvements in w a te r delivery which had 100-percent farm er participation Introduced market based open bidding approach for selecting salinity control projects. Comprehensive program to control salinity from BLM lands (35% o f the basin). C o lorado River Salinity Control Forum established among the 7 basin states, adopted and maintained uniform salinity standards, preventing further degradation in the face of population and economic growth. Mining, wastewater treatment, urban and agricultural runoff; effects o f land use and w a te r diversions on water quantity and distribution; threats to endangered species Funded more than 173 restoration projects totaling approxim ately $ 17 7 million Alteration of water flows; mercury, nutrients, water shortages, salt-water intrusion; threats to birds, fish and endangered species. Strategic plan developed by South Florida Ecosystem Task Force intended to coordinate more than 2 00 projects focused on restoration. Comprehensive plan for restoration developed by Arm y Corps of Engineers and SFW M D with input from federal state local and tribal agencies and academic institutions Nutrients, wetlands loss, decline of submerged aquatic vegetation, reduced fish populations. Ban on phosphate detergents According to model, 40-percent reduction goal met for phosphorus and will be met by 2 0 0 2 for nitrogen, but the m od e l's assumptions have been questioned. Agreement to a goal of 40-percent reduction of nutrients by 2 0 0 0 , reduction targets for each o f the major tributary basins, and more specific performance goals, such as restoration of submerged aquatic vegetation from 7 0 ,0 0 0 to 1 1 4 , 0 0 0 acres by 2 0 0 5. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00116 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 117 In the Navesink River, water quality improved so much that the state could open 600 acres of commercial shellfish beds that had been closed since the 1960s. In addition, local governments imposed stricter requirements on some new developments, enforced s(doommeelsatnicd-aunsiemlaalwwsamstoereissqturiictetlysiagnndifipcaasnsteidn asonmewe s"upbouorpbearn-swcoatoepreshr"edosr)d. iInnanacdedition, the state hnposed a no-discharge policy on boats, and helped finance installation of pump-out stations at marinas. In the Dungeness watershed, farmers agreed to limit their withdrawal of water for israrlimgaotnio. n during periods of low flows to ensure there would be adequate water for pInurtchheaNseidsqbuyalllaynwdattreurssthseadn,dsesvtaetrealpharuknsd;raenddaacrleoscaolfwvaasluteawblaeterriptraeraiatmn elanntdpslawnetrere claimed all of its effluent so as not to add pollutants to the stream. In the Tomorrow-Waupaca watershed, phosphorous and sediments running into streams dropped by 21 percent and 12 percent respectively. In addition, there have been "physical changes [that] remove significant stormwater problems and changes in the design of new subdivision developments that reduce stormwater problem s" along with greater citizen understanding that could lead to more land use changes.173 In the Upper Little Tennessee River, farmers have adopted animal feed- and wastemwiathnafgenemcinegn,t asnysdtepmlasn, tcehdanstgaebdiliczreodppvienggetpartiaocnticaelos,npgro15temcteildessotrfearimpasraiannd crioprarirdiaonrs.arTehase results include reducing agricultural erosion by 60 percent, as well as a 10 percent reduction in nitrogen and a 70 percent reduction in phosphorous from animal waste systems at four dairies.174 In the Salt Ponds, new rules prevented development on barrier island beaches and tightened requirements for density in large developments, buffer zones and setbacks, on site waste disposal systems, and stormwater and erosion control.175 In Tampa Bay, local governments have agreed on 105 projects that their models say will reduce nutrient loadings and surpass the goal of returning the acreage of seagrasses to 1950 levels. The governments are also well on the road to exceeding their goal of restoring 1,600 acres of habitat. The Colorado River has delivered the required amount of water, within the salinity limits established by treaty. In the Chesapeake Bay the agreed reductions have been achieved for phosphorous, and will be achieved shortly for nitrogen. EPA and the signatories to the agreement recentlyadopted new goals for nutrients, other pollutants and for seagrasses. In the Everglades, the Corps has not yet won approval and full funding for its proposed massive "re-plumbing," but both Congress and the state have dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to purchase sensitive lands as part of the restoration effort. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00117 118 Environment.gov The researchers concluded that those results were significant, but cautioned that it is diffi cult to prove that collaborative processes and interagency coordination were the key factors that resulted in environmental improvements. As is often true in program evaluation, there wtahneedrreerenhloaatdieoabnsesilehynipcnsoo,mscopoailtrlwaatbaiovsredaitcfiafvisceeuspl.trEotocaeccsohsm.wDpaauterrerinslhginetkdhseeafmcfooourntrgsinetvhooeflvcaealdlsethas,ecooerfmwfopirtlthes,xwtmhaetierxresowhfeeadrcsetwimvhiateineryes changes in local economic conditions, laws, programs, budgets, and personnel, so it was even hard to compare the before-and-after of individual cases. There were also big data gaps, in cluding data about environmental conditions, agency expenditures, and volunteer activities. andTagheenAcyc-addreivmeyn--'s recasenaprcrohdcuocnecelundveirsotnhmatewntaatlegrasihnesd. Mmeaansaugreinmgetnhtosaeppgraoinaschisedsi--ffibcuoltth, hcoivwic ever, especially in the short term; and proving conclusively that any particular strategy, agency activity, or collaborative breakthrough was the sole cause of a change in water quality isusually uiompfptrhoigsasitdibkclieno.dn(twTroholeusliAdtucbaaetdioevnmesr,yyopdraifdnfeieclliuvdletertcosidtadetedissitagicgnaa,lilanyssvtwacleoildml aamsnisqswusiieotrensiebnxegpceasntuussdievieeits.)btehlaietvweodusludcthrysttuodiseest Judging the success of watershed efforts solely on the basis of a few months or years worth of water-quality data may be misleading Some political actions may take many years to pro mduocreeatomdeoaswuirtahbclheaimngpiancgtwoneawthaeterroqrueacloitnyo;manicd cmoenadsiutiroanbslethcahnanwgieths iannwy autnedreqrulyailnitgycmhaayngheavine land use or management. Furthermore, because science cannot fully model all the interactions in a watershed many changes are inherently ambiguous. Rhode Island'sSalt Ponds, for example, cover only32 square moscpiilteeinmst,iusamtns ddnoiatrrneoogotenfnuelllooyafudtnihndegemrmsotiagsnht dthbeheaovwaitlytshureerfssaeictaeer.c1w7h6aetSdeorshaalantlhdloogwurgolhaugnthodeowrneatsaeyrrsetiesnmitgesnrsaincotftharneedawlwporrhloadgt,rtyehseest at the Salt Ponds, e.g., tighter controls on land use, no one really knows how effective those mpoelaicsyumreaskwinilglbdeififnicpurlottmecatkinegsepnrvoigrroanmmeenvtaalluqautiaolnityamTbhiegusaomuse. scientificuncertaintythat makes of wCahtaenrgsheesdinewffoartetsr. qTuhaelitryesaerearncohtttehaemosnlaylsvoalcuoanbsliedecrreitderwiohnettoheursethine aesffsoesrtssinsgtrtehnegsthucecneesds jurisdictional understanding of local environmental challenges, as well as capacity to take wise action. The researchers found that most of the efforts they studied did lay the basis for effective lcoonllga-bteorrmat,ioandsaputnivperomveadnatgheemmenotr.alIen, mjoobstsacatissefsa,ctIimonp,erainadl aenfdficHieenncnyesosfeyagreepnocyrt,owpeartaetrisohnesd. Collaborative efforts led to the creation of governmental and nonprofit institutions that are successfully raising funds for projects, monitoring water quality, helping with cleanups, and educating the public. And in communities with bitter divisions among environmentalists and loggers, ranchers, or farmers, collaboration hashelped rebuild communication and trust, which is ceOrtnaitnhleyoimtheprohrtaanndt ,btohtehrteosetharecphaerrsticfoipuanndtsexaanmd ptoletshoefhceoallltahboorfattihveelwocaatelrpsohleitdiceaflfoprrtosctehsas.t had not yet proven their long-term worth. For example: In Delaware Inland Bays, the second phase of the NEP process has led to agreement on a TMDL, which is reducing nonpoint runoff of nutrients by 40 to 85 percent and atmospheric deposition of nutrients by 20 percent.177 The state environmental agency is Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00118 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 119 now working to allocate responsibilities to meet the TMDL goals, however, which may not be easy for both technical and political reasons. Tanhde dLeopnegndCsreperikmeafrfoilryt oinnNfuonrdths fCroamrolUinSaDisAstailnldyothunegl,ocaaclcocordnisnegrvtaonBcyordnisatrnidct,Greanthskeorw; than on active support in the community. While it has reduced agricultural runoff, "the partnership has not addressed the watershed's major water-quality threats related to urbanization ... "178 Neither did the Upper Little Tennessee Watershed effort face up to land-use issues in its early years. However, Born and Genskow do report that efforts to date have built public winoterrkeostfitnhewlaotecraslhceodnsperrovtaenctciyondiastnrdict".aAddseadrelesguilttimofacaycoanntdroinvcerresyasaebdotuhtelascnodpues"e,ofa the citizens group has begun lobbying the county commissioners for zoning changes in flood plains, as well as for new construction standards for rural gravel roads.179 parnodjOeacfgttsee,nnccclieoealslnaiunbpvooroalrvtiervedestaponrrodacteieosxsnceiostefsdtp.aarTrtthsilceouwflialryrs,ltyaasvclicseioabmdleeprslsiitsleohsomoknefnoatrsreimvaerarlyyosbruelcacksemes,satelhlsedtopeumkreocehnpastpsreeaotoipoflnea particularly scenic tract of land or conservation easement, or an educational project for stu dents and local citizens. Sometimes such small projects can generate the agreement and energy to lead to larger initiatives. At other times, however, the result is what Imperial and Hennessey tchaell b"riganisdsoumes.a18c0ts of environmental kindness," small, unconnected actions that do not address Making Watershed Approaches Work watWerhqicuhalictoyllaanbdorwahtiivceh wmaatkeersohnedlyeaffmoratrsgpinaaylodfifffienrelnocneg?-Mterymri,adsyfsatcemtoarstipcliamyparopvaretm. Nenotts ainll communities have the social capital--shared concern about environmental conditions, cadre of local leaders, network of relationships, and effective local institutions--to organize an effec tive collective process. Successful collaborative processes do build social capacity, but they must be bTahseedwoonrksionmg ereslahtaiorendsheixppsebrieetwnceeesnaangdebnecliieesfsa.nd local collaborators are also critically im portant. To accomplish more than "random acts of environmental kindness," collaborators need access to solid scientific information about local situations, as well as to sufficiently cred wibhleicdhataaretoomfteonnidtroirveennvbiyrornemguelnattaolrycornedqiutiiorenms.eTnhtseyormsutasnt dseatrdssig. nificant but achievable goals, Equally important, agencies need to open their doors to working with collaborative pro cesses. Regulators often find that difficult. Finally, money isimportant. Agencies and local collaborators need enough money for plan ning--but not too much--and they need funding to help finance prevention and restoration projects. Setting Useful Goals reqAuicrehicehvainnggethinehnoewxtminacnryesmecetnotrsooffitmhepreocvoenmomenytsusine lwanadte,rwqhuicahliwtyililninmtuorsnt rweqatueirrsehcehdasnwgeilsl Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00119 120 Environment.gov in people's understanding of environmental problems, attitudes, and practices. Neither EPA nor most state agencies can--or should--force change of that magnitude, but they can foster change through watershed initiatives. Balancing the political and technical aspects of water dsheesWdcrmiabteaednrsaihngeetdhmsisearnreetpiinsohrotenraeettnoetfmlytphcteosmgtorpealaectxkcnshoyaswltleleemndgsg,eeastnchduatrthrceeonnmtelpywlefmaxciotiynd,gealpnoudfbtwloicadtoeefrafslihccieoadlmsm.praenhaegnesmiveenlyt with an individual system as a whole. Narrowing the range of choices, focusing on the most salient goals, describing uncertainty and setting reasonable expectations: those are the skills required of agency leaders and citizens in watershed management efforts. In cases where agen cdieecsissiuocncs.eed, they can improve the ability of citizens and voters to make informed pohtical Collaborative watershed efforts can lead to major, sustained improvements in water quality and other environmental conditions only if they reach agreement about technically sound ontoahcfecv-ugarrraoitoueundsdamtcaehaaasbnuogrueests.wfEoaPrteAirm-aqpnurdoalvsiittnaytgceowangadetientircoiqneussa,claiastnywiemllparsorveehtahbelecthoaonlcsefosroefsstiumccaetisnsgbtyhperiomvipdaicntgs Most of the 19 watershed efforts studied focused their activitieson a smallnumber of waterquality goals that could be quantified and tracked over tune. In some watersheds, scientists are able to identify one or two "limiting factors" that prevent a stream from supporting an impor tPaanctifuicseN. oFrothrwexeastm. pTlheu, scorioslinwgawtearteisr tcermitipcearlaftourressu,popfoterntincgaussaeldmboynsitnresammabllantrkibaulttaerraietisoinn, tahree an obvious indicator of trouble.181 In estuaries and bigger rivers, the limiting factor maybe nutrients--nitrogen or phospho rous--which stimulate the growth of algae, make the water more turbid, and ultimately, de pPlreotjeecittofofcluifsep-rsiumpaproirltyinogn orexdyugceinn.gTrhuenoCfhfeosfanpuetarkieenBtsaaynPdriongcrraemasianngdththeeacTraemagpeaoBf aseyaEgrsatsusaersy. In Delaware Bay the most recent goals are to reduce atmospheric deposition of nutrients and nonpomt runoff of nutrients. Focusing on one or two narrow goals can be a useful strategy because it simplifies the politi cal challenge of motivating change and communicating results. It can also keep actors focused oPnroagrcalemarhlyasdfeoficnuesdedsefot or falombojesctt3iv0eys.eFarosroenxathmepalev,etrhaegeCaonlonruaadlosaRliinvietyr--Batshien cSoanlicneintytrCatoionntroolf dissolved salts--at one point in the river. That has provided a stable target and an easy' way to set priorities. sheTdhperodciessasdtvoaingtangoereooftahenraerrnovwirognomaleisntthalapt riot mblaekmess,iat npdos/soibrlteofmorispsaortpicpiopratuntnsitiinesthfeorwcaotmer prehensive watershed improvements, including economic gains. Then, too, a narrow focus may even encourage adoption of policies that exacerbate other environmental or social prob lems. In the Colorado River, the focus on salinity drives programs that are indifferent to possible impacts on threatened and endangered species. Adler, Straube, and Green recom meveenr,dththaat tptrhoejepcrtosgthraamt rebdroucaedesnaliitnsitgyoaallssotoofintecnlurdeeduecnedaonthgeerreednvsipreocniems.eTnthaelyprdoobnleomtes,,hsouwch as sedimentation. Too many goals can be as much of a problem as too few. The Narragansett Bay National EHsetnunaeryssePyrorjeepcot rwt athsautn: able to agree on a specific goal and suffered as a result. Imperial and Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00120 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 121 [T] he final [plan] contained more than 500 recommendations addressing almost every conceivable problem . .. recommendations to coordinate exist ing policies and activities, develop new policies and plans, prepare legislation ttauannrdec,enaenawnddtroepgcuoubnllaidtciuoecndtsum,coeanntifiotoonrrc,ienmglaaakwnesdianenvndevsirtremogneumnlatestniiotnanlsea,nspvsrieorsovsnmidmeenettnestca.hl..ninigcfoaraallssatwsrsueircse vague and there were no performance measures.182 The researchers reported several different formulas for striking the right balance between complexity and political expediency. on aSommixeooffetnhveiproronjmecetnstastlacteodndthiteioirngsoaanlds itnecthenrmolosgoyf-sapmebciifeinctocpoenrdatiitinognsst,aannddarmdsa,noyrfooncupsaerd ticular high-priority problems. In Tillamook Bay citizens and agency staff had been through so many other watershed planning efforts in recent years that they were eager for action. They developed list of specific goals, including: Achieve at least a 25 percent reduction in bacteria and sediment loads to rivers (appar ent decreasing trends by 2005; statistically significant results by 2010.) Protect against decline in eelgrass beds due to degradation or loss. Menadnaanggeer6e7dpseprecceienst Hofabthiteawt CatoenrssherevdastpiornivPatlealny shtealnddafordress.ted riparian areas under Enhance 500 miles of continuous riparian habitat in the 0-500 foot elevation band to healthy conditions by 2010. Upgrade 1400 miles of state and private forest roads by 2010. Construct 18 cow7pads to protect livestock in flood-prone areas by 2000.183 In many smaller watersheds, citizens insist on setting both environmental and social goals. Iitnissuicmhpcoarsteasn,tctoollapbreosreartvioenaresatrlolyngbelgoicnasl waghreincuelntuvriarolninmdeunsttaryli,stwshainledfaagrmenecrys satgafrfeeagtrheaet tihtaist important to protect the environment. Standards The research teams generally agreed that regulatory standards could drive collaborative problem solving. But Adler, Straube, and Green who studied the largest watersheds, stressed the importance of legally established water-quality standards as the foundation for goals. The Colorado River salinity goal, for example, is anchored in the granite of an international treaty According to Adler, Straube, and Green, the goals of the CALFED project rest on an agree mine1n9t9b4etawfteeernyethaerssotaftecoanntdroEvPerAsyabAosutthienytenroimte:water-quality standards, which were adopted Prior to the negotiated standards, it was not possible to make significant in vdeissptmuteen. tTshinisrceosntofirramtiosnth, ebeficnaduisnegsthferoemndthpeoCinRt BofSrCePstoarnadtioCnheesfafopretaskweaBsainy evaluationsthat consensusdecisionson basic program performance standards Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00121 122 Environment.gov is an extremely important foundation on which to build a more comprehen sive program of intergovernmental cooperation.184 The researchers are critical of restoration efforts in the Everglades because there isno firm wagorrekesmefefnotrta, bfoocuutswedatoenr-cqounaslittryucgtoioalns.toTmheeeptrocejerctatiins tpercehcneodlionggicmalosretanlidkearadst,raradtihtieorntahlapnubaslica search for ways to meet a numerical goal.185 The effort is driven by a court agreement about one performance variable: the concentra tion of phosphorus in waters that leave a vast area of privately owned sugarcane farms in fcoerntaraplhFolsoprhidoarunsorstthanodfatrhde, Eovreargclaoduerst-.oBrdye2r0e0d3,,dthefeaustlattestoanfdFalrodridoaf m10usptawrtisn pEePrAb'silalpiopnrowvialll become enforceable. But Adler, Straube, and Green believe that the uncertainty about how the success of wetlands efforts could undermine agreement. They write . .. at least during the initial phases of the program, the absence of a numeric water quality standard may be less relevant because the planned controls are more technology-based than water quality-based .. . depending on the suc cess of thistreatment method or the state of Florida'sfuture success in adopt ing a water quality standard less stringent than the federal default standard, iltuitsiopnososifbtlheitshuatnacderdtiatiionntyalutnretialtmtheenitnwdielltebremrienqauteirefdutu. .r.e pmosatpyocnoinmgpthroemreissoe timely ecosystem restoration.186 beeInmwpoerrkiainl ganodn Hwaetnenre-rsesleaytesdtuidssieudessfoomr seowmheattismmea.lTlehrewyadteesrschriebdeshwohweraegemnacnieys magaeynccioems heatdo agreement on specificgoals, and then try to ratify the goals in regulatory processes like TMDLs. EPA did accept the goals and action plan written in Tampa Bay and it has accepted the goals that the Delaware Inland Bays project wrote. In Tillamook Bay however, it is not yet clear whether the state environmental agency and EPA will accept the goals and plans as TMDLs. Improving Data, Improving Decisions In a successful watershed effort, decisionmakers--including the general public--get fre kqeueepnst puepodpalteesfoocnusthedeironprwoghraetssthteoywaarrde tmryeientgintgothaceciromgopallissha;ntdheobijnefcotirvmesa.tiTonhamt ainyfoarlsmoahtieolpn them revise their goals asthey learn more about the way their watershed and economy interact. Part of EPA'schallenge in watershed efforts ishelping to develop a set of environmental and management indicators that will inform decisionmakers and be significant to the public. The Chesapeake Bay effort started with the goal of restoring fish and oysters to the bay Although tohffe?r)e, wevaesrdyiosnaegrienevmolevnedt awbaonuttewdhtyo friesshteorrieesahhaedacltohlylaepcsoedsy(sotevmer.fiAshnindgo?ndeisienadsiec?antourtroiefnhteraultnh wpeoruhladpbseletshsetucrlbairditiytyowf othueldwfaotsetre:r aa hheeaalltthhyy ooyysstteerr ppooppuullaattiioonn.would filter out turbidity, and Maryland State Senator Bernie Fowler, who was formerly a commercial fisherman, drew attention to turbidity--which does not generally factor into daily conversation--by creating "the Bernie Fowler Sneaker Index," a public version of a Secchi Disktest. On a fixed day every June, Fowier wades into the Chesapeake Bay at the same spot, announcing the depth at which Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00122 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 123 his sneakers disappear from his sight. Figure 4-1 indicates his progress toward his ultimate goal: visibility in chest-high water. Fowler'spublicity efforts have galvanized people to care about the total ecological health of the bay And, as discussed earlier, it was the state agency that alerted tcsheitedizirmeisneksnsitnfarttoihmoenTaagonrmdicfouirslrhtouhwraa-blWicthaaetu.mp0aiccnaallyswtshaetreeorpusighnhegdtihnthetoaattghtehenegciryro'wsueanftdfeowrrpatstredorib.dletmhesgweennetrafal rpudbeehpcerreathliazne FIGURE 4-1: BERNIE FOWLER SNEAKER INDEX 6 5 4 lST - 1 3 2 1 0 1950's 1960's 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1995 1997 1998 1990 2000 S ourcBea!yCP.roBgerranmard Fowler, 1992-1993 Charlotte Chesapeake Bay Commission; U.S. EPA Chesapeake To tap the energies and political support of citizens and to engage localgovernments, agen cies may organize separate planning and activities around smaller tributary watersheds. In addition, agencies often organize extensive outreach efforts to foster involvement. One of the mwaoysst tporobduuilcdtipvuebwhcayssuptopodrot,tahnadt itsotehdruocuagthe tvhoelugnetneeerraml pounbiltiocrianbgousytswteamtesr:shtheedyparroebleexmceslalenndt opportunities. In the Chesapeake Bay for example, volunteers have helped restore seagrass beds, conducted inventories of streamside forest buffers, and prepared a comprehensive assess mBaeyn'st coiftizoennemoofnthiteorminogrperiomgpraamire,d187clraeueknschinedthine b1a9s8i5n,.hAansd14t5hevoAllulniatneecersfworhothme oCnhietosarpweaatkeer quality weekly. Although some legal and technical agency staffers are reluctant to rely on data gathered by volunteers, EPA and many state agencies have developed formal protocols and quality-control procedures to ensure the reliability of that information.188 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00123 124 Environment.gov The Role of Science Bernie Fowler's sneaker index is a demonstration of sound scientific research: he took the science and made it comprehensible to everyone. People now know that it is not just the big Bopaeltdimaoreraesi,nadsuwstreilelsatshaattmaorespphoelrluictindgeptohseitCiohne.saOpfeackoeurBseay, ,sbcuietnrcuencoafnf nfrootmalfwaarmysscaonudndt eovnela meaningfulpresentation of itsresults. Scientiststhemselvesmust find waysto help decisionmakers understand environmental problems and identify choices for action. Almost all watershed efforts invested in scientific research to assess problems, help set goals, and monitor progress. For example, Born and Genskow report that all of the six watersheds tshcealyesitnuvdeiendtooriregsaonrizmedodwealtienrg-qAunalditayllmthoeniAtocraindgemefyfo'srrtes,seaanrdchthearst froeuproortfetdhtehsaitxsucsieedntwifiacteinrsqhueidryand monitoring provided an invaluable foundation for planning and action. In no case, however, did technical information by itself answer the kind of value-laden questions at the heart of most winadtiTecroasthoseerdst gtmooaathnlseagaeenxmdcluednseitvoeneflfooopfrtsos.tthrIanetdreegceioedns,cateosrnCmshmeeesatsytahsnewdmaGm, idpbesaocinwsiraoetneprmosrhatek"deorevsfefhro-arrvte.el"i1at8on9ceexoenrcsisceienthtiefnicjudgment. Technical information--whether it concerns the interrelationships of species in a river, information about the hydrology of a watershed, or predictions of economic growth and its impact on environmental stressors--is an essential component of a wise decision. Uncer tuanicnetyrtainintayllovaseprteicmtse tohfroinufgohrmadadtiitoionnuaslureaslelyarccohnafnodunredgsudlaercmisoionnimtoariknegrso,fhcoowndeivteior.nsRsetrdeuncgitnhg ens the capacity of the public and their representatives to keep refining their decisions. The specific goals of successful watershed projects are usually based on a mix of scientific informa teinotniTf,ihcveabnlau,setisos,ooa,fnidngopmaolasli.ntyiFcoaorlfectaxhlaecmuwlpaaltteieo,rnasshg.eendcsisetsuhdaievde, btheeerneuissionnggtohiengsacmonetmroovdereslyoafbfolouwt sthine sthcie Colorado River Basin for more than 25 years, yet the model does not adequately describe the historical flows in the river.190 The models that describe salinity in irrigation return flows seem solid, but there is "considerable uncertainty ... about the efficacy of individual salinity control projects." Therefore, say Adler, Straube and Green, estimates of salt reductions for specific proTjehcetsre"sahroeuslidmbilearusqeudesftoironpslaanbnoiuntgtphuerCpohseessapraetahkeerBthaaynmpordeceils.1e92pTrehdeicCtioAnLsF."E19D1 project is focusing a great deal of attention on fish health and habitat, but there are four competing models to measure hydrology--and extensive controversy about their relative merits. As a rIemsupletr,itahleanpdroHjeecntniesssneoyt-uaslsinogartghueemthoadteslsintcoemmaakney dcoecmispiountesrambooduet lwsrheiscthopnrdojaetcatsantod faussnudm.1p93 tions that are open to challenge, they are useful for planning purposes, but not for setting regulatory- requirements. In fact, most of the nation's environmental protection system rests on imperfect models of olinshe rkeignudlaotor rayn-ostthaenrd. aTrdhse fqour adnrtiintkatiinvgewriastke-ra,sasierspsmolelunttiotono,las nEdPtAhehacsleuasneudpfoorf dheaczaadredsotuosewsatasbte sites are controversial and unverifiable. Scientists and regulators understand the uncertainty involved in those tools and compensate for it with large safety- factors when they set regulatory standards. (The safetyfactors are also controversial: scientistsand advocates argue about whether tchoevyerahreowovfeerw-pqruoetesctitoivnes oscrieunncdeerc-apnroatnescwtievred.)eBfinuittitvheelyg.e0nenreaol pf uthbelicchiaslolefntegnessufarcpirnisgeadgteoncdiiess and leaders in watershed management projects is helping others understand that the limits of Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00124 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 125 science--along with the inevitability of uncertainty--need not preclude decisive action, in cluding regulation, standard setting, and public commitment to attaining specific goals. Integrating Collaboration into Agency Processes and Cultures Many agencies do not have an easy time participating in local collaborative processes, or even coordinating their work with other agencies. There are several impediments, including entrenched regulatory processes, agency structure, staff without necessary skills, and insuffi cient resources. REGUSLAoTmOReYtPiRmOCeEsSSrEeSgulatory decisions provide the spark that gets collaboration going Endan gered species were key drivers in the Nisqually and Dungeness watersheds, and litigation about water-quality standards was a driving force behind collaboration in the Everglades, the Colo rado River, and the CALFED project. In other watersheds, there were other immediate drivers, such as citizen concerns about water quality, but regulatory concerns were important as well. Even though regulations often sparked local action, our research teams reported unani mously that EPA and state regulatory programs were not well linked to local collaborative processes. Agency staff responsible for regulatory programs or subsidies for w'astew'ater treat ment went about their work quite independently of their agencies' efforts to support local watershed activities. Several researchers reported that some participants in collaborative processes had difficul tiesworking with state and EPAregulators, even though staff members from other parts of state agencies were actively involved in local discussions. In the Navesink watershed, for example, state regulators delayed for months before taking action on a project that was an important part of the collaborative effort, finally deciding that it did not need a permit.194 Born and Genskowreport that effortsby states like Wisconsin to organize agency operations around sub-state regions--in Wisconsin, around watersheds--could be extremely helpful to localwatershed efforts.195North Carolina and some other states have reorganized their permit ting programs to synchronize the renewal of permits within watersheds. Although that should facilitate planning and action in the watersheds, the Academy's researchers did not find any signs it was doing so yet. Oregon, Washington, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and some other states have begun build ing state watershed councils and statewide networks of councils in individual watersheds. The researchers did not study those councils in depth, but they did report skepticism on the part of some local leaders. One issue is whether the state-established councils cover areas that are too large. Leaders in the Navesink watershed, for example, expressed concern about being com bined with other nearby watersheds. STAFFFrCoAPnAtC-IlTiYne state and EPA staff, participating directly in local collaborative processes, played key roles in many watersheds. But state and federal agency staff that participate in such efforts must have a special set of skills; engineering ability and a knowledge of environmental regula tions are not enough. As a county health official told Chess and Gibson: I found th at. . . getting the water clean is the easy part. The hard part is the human side and getting people to work with one another, getting mutual re spect and confidence . . . building those bridges.196 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00125 126 Environment.gov Agency staffmust learn about the particular localmix of institutions and politicaltraditions in individual watersheds, as well as the history of past collaborative efforts. They must have good communication skills, must listen carefully, treat unschooled citizens respectfully, and eastxgaepfnlfacmiineesam, gabenendrcstyhwreuhilnoetselegaanrdidtylosoccifaelancgtioefnlilccaydbeopbrroaacttieeossnscselsem,awurlsiytthaTolshuoet ybbeeminaubgsltdeeatlfoseonraspiirsvoeetaoencr dtdtomhmeaininnaetgeerereifnsutgsnAdosfgftehrnoecmnydisparate sources without losing their focus on the goals of the local watershed process. Imperial and Hennessey report that watershed collaboration is "advanced governance," and that training program sfor many environmental regulators do not cover the necessary skills panardtikcnipoawteleidngceo.1l9l7aFbourrathtievrempororcee,smseasn.yRaeggeunlcaiteosrydoagneontcgieivs,eftohreeirxeammpplloey, euesusamlluychhaivnecfeanrtimveotroe permits to write and facilities to inspect than staff available. Collaboration is often personally rewarding, but it usually means adding more work and more stress--without more pay or promotions.198 INVOCLVeINrGtaOiTnHERagAGeEnNcCiIEeSsAaNrDeGaOlVmERoNMstENaTlSways indispensable participants in collaborative watershed efforts. Involving the U.S. Department of Agriculture'sNatural Resources Conservation Ser vice is often crucial, partly because its staff in virtually every- county enjoys good working rela tionships with individual farmers, local farm organizations, and state and local conservation districts. Often NRCS staflj and sometimes USDA agricultural extension staff as well, play criticalroles. In the Naveskinkwatershed, for example, agricultural extension staff worked with farmers to reduce runoff from manure, as well as to develop cost-sharing requirements for implementing improvements. It isalso important to get local government officialsinvolved, especially in rural counties and rapidly developing suburban and exurban municipalities. Unless those agencies are involved, watershed collaborators will be unable to address land-use issues. Imperial and Hennessey report that the Narragansett Bay NEP was unable to involve local officials actively in collabo rative activities, which largely accounts for its meager results.199 It is equally important--but often difficult--to get state and county- transportation depart ments involved. Highways and roads often contribute to nonpoint problems, and transporta tion departments often have budgets that are large enough to afford some measures that would prevent such pollution. Financing Watershed Protection Collaborative approaches to watershed protection almost always appear costly in the short run: they must be custom-designed and are inevitably time-consuming In addition, there is often only inadequate water-quality data, and/ or poor information about the effectiveness of cleanup strategies. Agency managers often find it easier to put their resources into permitting, ienrtsorerepvoiretwedinaglmapopslticuantaionnimsfooursrleyntehwaatlitoifspmerumchitseafsoireprotoinsttsaorut racecso,lflaobroerxaatmivpelew.a0teursrhreesdeeafrfcohrt when agencies have a small amount of slack resources they can devote to local collaborative pmroecnOetnassletihsf.edeocthiseior nhmanadk,etrosolamckutchhemwiollnteoymfoarkecodlelacbisoiorantsioinn,thpelafnacneinogf,uanncderstcaiienntyce. Icmanpebreiadleatnrid Hennessey reported that the $11 million in grants to the Narragansett Bay estuary' project Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00126 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 127 impeded agreement. The money encouraged participants to invest too much time and energy in planning: they supported scientific research that was of only marginal assistance in making decisions, for example.200 The researchers recommend that Congress and EPA redesign the National Estuary Program to provide lessfunding for planning, some funding for implementa tionTphreojreecstesa,racnhdersaaclulrtoepffofroterdaltlhfautnmdoinngeyafftoerrima ppelerimodenotaftitiomnew. asmore important, and often harder to find, than money for planning Moreover, implementation usually takes much more money than planning over longer periods of time. Adler, Straube, and Green report that rela ttrivoellPyrsotagbralemf,uenvdeinngthisooungehothfethfeunstdrionnggfeosrt aimsppelcetms oenf ttahteioCnodloerpaednodsRoivnecroBnagsriensSsiaolninailtyapCporno priations that do vary from year to year. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has long offered subsidies to farmers, ranchers, and foresters who will take steps to prevent soil erosion. Its Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) paacnaciddoiusfnatrthsmefeosrirsn6gt5loepwleairrtgcheednsrttasowofuearrclolesfoeiodfnef-repadrleofrnuaenldfliasmnaddllssoffcoraortmewdafttaoerrmcsohinnetdgropfloroor tf1enc0ot-iynoepnaorpirnpoetjresiocotudsrs.c.eTphoelluCtiRoPn Until recently, CRP was designed largelyto compensate farmers for withholding their lands from production, not forprotecting water quality201 Since the 1996 Farm Bill, however, USDA's Natural Resources Conversation Service (NRCS)has given farmers 120 percent cash incen tives to create nutrient "filter strips" along ditches, creeks, and rivers, i.e., not to till or plant in ttohorseetirrieplaarniadns,abrueatsh.aTshbaeteinncleesnstievfefehcatisvbeeiennreegniooungshwtiothenhcigohuerraglaenmdapnriycems.idNwResCteSr'ns Cfaornmseerrs vation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) allows states to add their funds for taking ripar ian land out of production. As of mid-2000, almost a dozen states had done so. graTmhseinFtaormtheBi$l2l 0a0ddmreislhseodn wEantveirroqnumalietnytainl QotuhaelritwyaIynsceanstwiveelsl. PItrocgornasmol,idaantdeddisreevcetreadl pthroat EQIP funds be targeted to "the highest environmental benefits per dollar spent," as deter mined by state agencies, technical committees, and local work groups. Sixty percent of the funds go to "priority" watersheds, those with serious water-quality problems. For example, NgrRamCsS, iwshinicvheshtienlgpEfaQrmIPerfusnudsse hfeeratviliilzyeirns hmiroirnegeefxfipceiertnstltyo20p2repare nutrient management pro But Congress has declined recent proposals to increase funding for EQIP. Instead, it has increased fivefold over the past decade the appropriation for EPA's Section 319 cost-sharing program for reducing nonpoint pollution, as shown in Table 4-6. to iWmphleenmtehnetyianrethaeviarilwabaltee,rfsuhneddssfprolamnsEtPhAats 3e1m9eprgroedgrfarmomarceovlelarbyohrealtpivfuelptorotcheossseeswihnoowthaenrt watersheds. But while 319 wras designed as a demonstration project, EPA is now encouraging states to use it to reduce pollution in high-priority watersheds, not to attempt to rephcate suc cessful efforts from other areas Even with that change, however, Imperial and Hennessey criticize the 319 program. It is, mtheeyntsaatiyonst,ililstoofotepnodoirrleycftoecdutsoedpuinrpmosaensythstaattems;aiytsbfeunddififnegre, natstwhaelnl aloscoatlhoebrjefuctnivdeins.gAfocrcoimrdpinleg to them, the criteria for federal grants change frequently, making it difficult for watershed leaders to plan and act effectively203 preIttnydeAedp,etehrerpevroiecwesesroofffAunddleinr,gSitmrapulbeme,eanntdatGiorneoenf 'ws raeteprosrhtesdaipdrothteactttihone eeaffrolyrtshiisstnoortyaolwf tahyes Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program "illustrates the worst qualities of pork barrel Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00127 128 Environment.gov TABLE 4-6: FUNDING FOR ERA'S SECTION 319 PROGRAM FISCAL Y E A R * 1990 1991 N O N P O IN T SOURCE G R A N T S ** $ 3 8 .9 $ 5 1 .0 A V A IL . FOR T M D L D E V ' T 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 $52.5 $ 5 0 .0 $ 8 0 .0 $100.0 $100.0 $100.0 $105.0 $200.0 $200.0 250.5 12.8 12.8 12.8 40.0 40.0 *Operating Plan, except 2001, which is the President's Budget. **Dollars in millions Sources U.S. EPA Office of Water politics" by reaching consensus "through the use of subsidies and by ignoring controversial issuTesheanpdolsiotilcustioofnws raetgearsrhdeledssprooftethcetiiornmoefrtietns."re20s4emble those of traditional pubhc works pro grams, marked as they are by intensive lobbying, and the earmarking of funds for politically favored watersheds. In contrast, the competitive-bidding processthat the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program has adopted is a prom ising way to direct funds to the most environ mentally beneficial purposes. gaegteTtmhhieennrgtesaidns,odhntoehw.eIecfvleeloar,cnaaulpbceoonlfelpafbiotoltlrouattaeipvdperlupynrinoogfcfe:tsrtsahedesiytaiaroernesaaulncpceuefbsfshefccutilwvieonrwpkaesyrpsotuolaimtdicionsbgtiolcizwiteiazrteeensrosshuaerncddemsloaacnnadl officials that watersheds are worth protecting, both private and pubhc money may follow Private funds for protecting natural areas and environmental quality have increased dra mtioanticeaallsye.mFeendtesraalnadnsdimstialtaertaarxralanwgse,maleonntgs,wpirtohvsitdaetethlaentdo-oulsseulesegdislbaytiolannaduttrhuosrtisz,ifnogrceoxnasmerpvlea. And those local, regional, and national bodies have grown rapidly--from 743 in 1985 to 1,227 in 1999--and have protected approximately 4.7 million acres of land.205 Although the source of that data does not distinguish among the types of land protected, it is likelythat much of the work of land trusts in America has had direct or indirect benefit to water quality. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00128 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 129 TM DLs and Watershed Protection The agency's TMDL regulations do not provide an adequate frame for effective waterqualitymanagement. They contain detailed information about procedures, the scope of TMDL dinogcuwmateenrtssh,eadndprdoegardalminesst,hbauttcthaneytaapretshielenetnmeragnyyatnodpicpsotlhitaictaalrecacpriittiaclaollfy liomcpalorctoalnlatbinorcartaivfte processes while also informing, driving, and disciplining these process so they can achieve real environmental gains rather than making only marginal improvements. For example, they: gReenqeuriarleepnucboluicrapgaermticeinptaftioornwaattesresvheerdalcsoplelcaibfiocraptoioinnt,sbinutthoeffeTrMstDateLs pnroocfleesxsi,bailnitdyoinffer designing that participation to fit local collaborative processes. Direct states to complete TMDLs within 10 to 15 years for all waters that do not meet water-quality standards, but set no goals for actual improvements in water quality until 10 years after a TMDL has been completed. Thus the program sets no real perfor movaenrscieghgtoawlsil.lNfoeciuthseorndporeoscietdrueqraulirceomanpyhainndceep. endent assessment. Inevitably, then, EPA Encourage the "watershed approach," but do not explain how states might hnplement that approach when a watershed hes in multiple states, or when only portions of it fail to meet water-quality standards. NDaetsicornibael Ecusrtureanryt fPerdoegrraalmpr,oogrraomthse,rbfuetdoerfafelrwnaotevrispiorongorafmhoswmtihghet3c1h9anpgroegtroamhe,lpthme eet the deadlines for writing TMDLs, to take practical steps to bring watersheds into compliance with water-quahty standards, or to address other environmental, economic, and social goals. Require that states develop rehable data for TMDLs, but offer no advice about how7to deal with inadequate data and no significant commitment for help in improving data. rDuononfof;t asnpedcdifoicnalolyt raeustohlvoeriztheethperoubsleemofsccarepa-atendd-btyratdhee sNyPstDemEsSapsearmmietatinnsgtroegreudlautcieons that inhibit states from issuing group permits or allowing permit modifications by rule. Ra eTqMuiDreLthpaltanstawtielsl pleraodvitdoecale"arnehwa7abtleer,abnudt edfofenctoivteexdpellaivinerhyomwecEhPaAniwsmill"dteoteernmsuinree tihfat that condition has been met. poliSctiaetseanendvpirroongmraemnstatol aagdednrecsiesspraoreblienmas imnuscphecbifeicttweratpeorsshiteiodns. tShtaantesEaPnAd tloocdaelsgiogvneernffmecetinvtes have substantial constitutional authority over land-use practices. Environmental conditions and the "ecology of governance"--the institutions, working relationships, and attitudes that make collaboration and effective action possible--vary so widely from one watershed to an other that no single collaborative model will work nationally And because states have more gexratemnssiwveitahnodthdeivreernsevifrioelndmpernestaeln,ceectohnaonmEicP,Aa,ntdhesyocairael bpreottgerramabsl.e to link environmental pro Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00129 130 Environment.gov By failing to explain how the TMDL process will work, and failing to specify- how much discretion EPA will allow states to exercise in working with collaborative watershed processes, the TMDL regulations have fostered fears that many EPA regional offices will micromanage ossttfaaptteeroeTgffMroersDtssL,tosptacrtuoesgstrofaemma-rsdt.ehLsaiatgcEnkPiwnAagtoeavrnesyhrsneidegahmrt-watenirlalmginepemeveritfnaotbrplmyroafgonrccauemsgosontaolpsfriootrcloiencdadulercpaoelnndddeitetainoiltnsa,s.simsFeupssretmdhieennrg-t more, tough EPAoversight about procedural matters willnecessarily insert EPAfar more deeply into the details of state and local land-use decisions and into the management of state agricul tural and infrastructure: programs about which EPA has limited expertise--and less legal au thorTithy:ere is, of course, no statutory basis for EPA to conduct negotiations with states about goals for watersheds or other purposes. But the Government Performance and ResultsAct does require EPA and other federal agencies to set national goals, and over the last five years EPA wastnaadtteetsrhs'ehoeswdtanpterpsoehtreafcovtreimodnaensvtcerleaotepggeodyaltsah. saEyt sPwteAomualtdnhdaaltlsoctawotueslstdactboeesutulodsecudussettoosmrueciczhoenatchiselyeTsEtMePmAD'stLoGpcPrroRagfAtraagmonatalostitwohneitaihrl institutional and environmental situations, and would give EPA tools to ensure accountability, transparency, and effectiveness. The following chapter reviews how that system has worked so fthara,tapnedrfeoxrpmloarnecset-hbeasmedanaapgpermoaecnht taondfuonrcgtaionnizeaftfieocntaivleclhyainngEePsAth. at will be necessary to allow Findings Finding 1. The nation has new opportunities to make progress in its long drive for cleaner, hhaevalethoiergr,amnizoerde eccoolnlaobmoircaatilvlye vwaalutearbslheesdurpfraocteecwtiaotenrse.ffAonrtsinicnreraescienngtnyuemarsb.erInofadcdomitimonu,nliatineds trusts and "save-the-river, save-the-bay" advocacy groups have grown. New technologies are increasingly capable of documenting polluted runoff and of providing comparatively inex pensive ways of reducing such pollution. Many farmers, developers, and other landowners hmaavneybwecaotemrseheindcsr.eaFseindgelrya-l acwouarret dthecaitsipoonlsluatebdourtunToMffDisLaremgaujloartioenn,vilriostninmgesnotaflepnrdoabnlegmereidn species (especially in the West), and slowly tightening state regulation are persuading many landowners that if local collaborative processes are not successful, additional state and federal regulation may be inevitable. Thus popular support for more effective control of nonpoint pollution is slowly building nationally and locally notFailln, dwiantgers2h. eCdos.llTabhoeryatciavne processes lead to help build public improved environmental quality in many but understanding of environmental problems in watersheds. They can develop social norms and political momentum that can transform atti tudes, thus encouraging voluntary watershed protection activities, improved compliance with rreegguullaattoiorny.reTqhueiyremcaenntdse,vaenldopstasttreaatengdielosctaol imnietieattibvreosatodeprroetnevcitrwonatmerenqutaalligtyo--alsinthclaundjinugsttiwghatteerr quality (e.g, protection of critical or scenic habitat), while also addressing local economic and wsoocriEkavlacebonlenscpmeorohnocsty.hTolyphtfeiuyonnccsat,nioaasnlwisnoeghllpearlpos cdienestcseiesgsiroamntematyaeklceeharndsicetoaqluiasinpodplaeptdeodlt,iotiinmceaaflfnienacfgtoievrmethpaertiiorojrnee,csttphsouinnsspisboriomlidteiuecssii.tnug ations, however. Lacking good data about the extent and causes of environmental problems or Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00130 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 131 enough political will to challenge powerful local interests, collaborators may settle for "feel good" projects that make no significant impact on environmental quality. And if key landown ers feel they can afford to refuse to participate, collaborative processes are likelyto fall apart, or to result in little environmental improvement. theyFainredcionmgp3l.eRmeegnutalartyioanpparnodacchoellsa.bTohraeteivffeeccitviviceneensvsiorof nlomcaelnctoalllaacbtoivraittiieosnadreepneontdasltoenrnaagtievnecsy: support. Success depends on setting meaningful, achievable goals, monitoring progress, and making necessary changes--all of which require agency information and assistance. fortIsnbaedgdinitiinonr,eafecdtieornaltoreaguthlarteiaotn, sec.ga,nadnrievnevciroollnamboernattailopnr.oMblaenmy tchiatitzecno-nlecdercnosltlhaebopruabtihvce, eofr as an attempt to set right a past agency action that failed to achieve environmental goals, or in response to a proposed action by a government agency that would impose significant costs on tloohfcesatrlaeetsecooaunnrocdmefseicdneeinreatdeleraedgstetson. cTmyhapukoselimccioeaslnl,yapbproaarcrattiticicoeipns,asnauntscdceesnsttsaeffurfli,Nnstoounccehothlaleaslbetsoesrc,ahatnigviecenapclrioienscfeuossrsumeasalldtyiiosptnrr,ouvsstitfdaufelf assistance, and funding for the process, as well as administrative discretion and project funding to implement agreements. Just as "bottom-up" collaboration depends on agency support, effective regulation depends oRnegcuitliazteinonssuaprpeonrto.tTseiglfh-timerprleegmuelanttiionng;dtoheesynhoatvgeuimarpaanctet eonbleyttwehr eennvreirgounlmateedntpaalrpteiersfodremciadnecteo. comply or when agencies force them to do so. The sources of polluted runoff are numerous and small, and EPA's constitutional and statutory authority over land use is weak. Regulations waagrielelnpbceeireessnubfaoedrseciddeeatsbhlEeeyPaAnmdaunpsodt lciitotiscmsatplallytyescuaonstudaninateraerbplaeasrostinssltpyerdiof:vtociditdeizoteenscosh;innaiscniasdtl ooantnhdceorfminppaunlbicahincaclaes;nuldpapnnodorontw.prnoefrist In particular, EPAs new TMDL program, requiring states to write and implement plans that would reduce pollution from both regulated and unregulated nonpoint sources, may fail without strong support from citizens, local officials, and states. The SIP process has become ceovonlfvuesionvge,rctoimmeplteoxa, dadnrdesfsrumstarnatyinmgotroeakllinpdasrtoiefsp;othlleutTioMn DanLdpmroocreeslsoccoautilodnbsethwaonrsSeI.PIst, cwohuillde lacking the sanctions that make SIPs persuasive to state and local officials and community leaders. On the other hand, strong local collaborative processes may be able to build broad support for effective measures to achieve the goals of the TMDL program. saryFiinnfdrainstgru4c.tuCroenogfreisnsf,oErmPAat,ioanndasntadtepoelnivciierosntomesnutpaploargtesntcroiensghlaovceanl octoylleatbbourailttivtheeenffeocretss. Good data about local watershed conditions, linked to information about habitat and land use, is essential to focus local collaborative processes on the most important problems. Yet EPA and state environmental agencies have not developed a strong database of water quality aSrteanndoatrdavs,aislaabmlep.ling procedures, and reporting practices vary widely, so comparable data Afew states--Wisconsin, Oregon, Washington, Massachusetts, and Maryland among them-- have invested significant energy and resources in building local institutions at the watershed ldeevveel,loapneddintigfohcteursirneggustlaatteiownastfeorr-qcuoanlciteynptrraotgerdamansimatatlhfeewedaitnegrsohpeedraletivoenl.s.SBevuetrmalohsatvsetarteeceenntvliy ronmental agencies, and EPA regional offices as well, are preoccupied with case-by-case man Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00131 132 Environment.gov agement of permits for point sources, and have thus devoted less energy to nonpoint sources and other watershed issues. Congress and EPA have allowed most states to continue operating the 319 nonpoint pro gmrualmtiyseoanr tshtreatbeagsiics eofffoarntntouarlepdruocjeecpto-bllyu-tperdorjeucntolfafnidninthgefomrodsetmthornesattreantieodnws,artaetrhsheerdtsh.an as a EPA'sNational Estuary Program has helped some watersheds to develop sound plans, but has over-emphasized planning and scientific research, has provided no support for implemen tation, and has failed to hold local programs accountable for continued performance. Congress has provided increased funds for some USDA cost-sharing programs but has not hexapsacnudtethdethsetamffionsgt toafrgtheeteNd aptruorgarlaRmess,oeu.grc,etsheCEonnsveirrvoantmioenntSaelnQdeuea.lity Investment Fund, and Federal regulatory requirements, including the mandate that states write TMDL plans, could stimulate and help focuscollaborative watershed efforts, if EPAwere to design and manage the TMDL process properly Recommendations For States: 1. Set watershed-protection goals. To meet the rising public concern about watershed health, fulfill their constitutional respon sibilities for land use, and forestall federal regulation, states must step forward with creative, asegtgarmesbsiivtieowusagteoraslhsefodr-pwroatteercsthioend pprroogtercatmiosn. ,Aasnda fsotarrrte,dsutactteiognoovefrpnoolrlustaenddrulengoifsflaTtuhreeys sshhoouulldd also invest sufficient political and financial capital to make those efforts successful. For thenparts, state environmental agencies should change their structures to focus on performance goals, and train their staffs to work effectively with local collaborative processes. 2. ISntitriaetninggthsetantecboosntd-sihssaureisnfgoralnanddtceocnhsnerivcaatli-oans;seinsctoaunrcaegipngrolagnrdamtruss.ts; regulating con centrated animal feeding operations; targeting of 319, State Revolving Loan, and other costsharing programs; and experimenting with nutrient trading programs are all positive steps. 3. ESaucphpsotartte ceonvlliarobnomraentitvaleawgeantceyrsshhoeudldpcruosctoemss-deessign its watershed program to fit local environmental, institutional, and social realities. Agencies should organize internally to pro vide state staffing support for collaborative watershed activities, arrange their perm itting activi ties to encourage the development of watershed-wide strategies, and ensure creative consider faotiropnooinftbsroouardceesn.4vironmental and economic issues, aswell as case-by-case permitting decisions 4. SDtaetveeelnovpiraondmeqenutaatleagdeantcaiefsosrholoulcdawl,osrtkactelo,sealnydwinthatEioPAna, lasdwecelilsaios nwmithakloicnagl .govern ments and other federal and state agencies, to develop better data about watershed issues. With federal cooperation and support, they should adopt standard national sampling and quality- Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00132 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 133 control procedures, increase the density of monitoring data, and work with local governments and others to link environmental with land-use and other data. For Congress and EPA: 1. Improve and fund water-quality data. Congress should direct EPA to improve data about water quality and provide the agency sufficient resources to do so. EPA should insist that states make major improvements in the quality, coverage, and comparability of data that they gather and submit to the agency 2. Identify the most cost-effective ways to reduce polluted runoff. goaElsP. AThsheoaunldalpyrsoisvisdheoaulddetaadilderdesasnathlyesifsuollfshpoewc4*7ttrhuemnaotfiotnhrmeaigtshttomweeattenratqiounaaliltywaatnedr-qsuhoaluiltdy identify the most promising "first steps" in a long-term strategy for improvement. The agency should attempt to quantifythe costs and benefits of various cleanup programs, and provide that iannfdorsmtraatteiogniesf.or states and local collaborative processes to use in formulating their own goals 3. Encourage state experimentation. EPA should offer explicit opportunities for states and individual watersheds within states to tsehsotupldrobmeitshinegfaacptoprrioeascwhehse.reSitnanteosvashtioounldis nporotdbuecemd.erIeflycoluarbtodreactoisriioenssfaonr dincnuorvreantitosnt:attuhteeys dexopneoritmpeenrmtatiitosnu.ch flexibility, EPA should ask Congress and courts for permission to allow 4. ANfteergcootniasuteltantiaotniowniathl aCnodngsretasst,eE-lPeAveslhgouoladlssefeokrtoclenaegnoutipa.te specific agreements with states about goals and schedules for meeting water-quality standards. Those goals would then gfaeuldlioedwreaalnncocotesj-tut-rssahtdatihrniegngpTprMorogDgrarLmampsr,so,aclneodscsae,lxbcpoueltrlaiamblsoeornaottaitvthieeornefswftoeirptthss,ottohthereeurdpiugncnreaodvpiaontlgilvuoetefadwpparurteonrao-cfqhlujeaisln.ictyluddaitnag, Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00133 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00134 CHAPTER 5 Focusing the EPA-State Relationship on Environmental Results rotecting the environment and public health in the United States is both technically difficult and legally administratively, and even morally contentious. Each of the 50 states and the many sovereign Native American tribes has a different set of environ cooffmicpesleaxnmdinestnetatratpell,aesynovcoiirfaolr,neamlanetdinoptnaosllhaiitgpicesanblcepietrwsoabeseletnhmeasynadanttademmooppnptg--orEtbuPonAtiht'sieivnsa.driTivohiudissuanclahlytaipoatnnedarlceaoxnlaldemcrtieinvgeeisloytn--hael to meet the challenges inherent in those issues. The chapter focuses on the five-year history of the National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS), and in particular on three substantive challengesNEPPS catalyzed: defining and measuring "environmental" performance recasting the federal-state partnership to focus on environmental results finding a new role for EPA's regional offices now that states manage most federal programs competently The Academy commissioned five research team s to explore those issues. Lee Paddock and Suellen Keiner, of the Environmental Law Institute,206 and Jeanne Herb, Jennifer Sullivan, NMEaPrkPSStoagurgehetmene,natsndinA1ll6enstaWtehs.iteH,aomfitlhtoenT, eRllaubsiInnosvtiittuzt&e20A7llsocohkueldera(tHthRe&iAm)pcleomnseindtearteidonthoef tshtaenddiofffifcbuelttywoefenreCsoallvifinogrndiaisapnudteEs PbAetwoveeernthsetastetastaen'sdaiEr-PtoAxiacbsopurtotghreamre,laaticvaeseetfhfeacttiivlleunsetrsasteosf environmentalefforts.208 William Gormley of Georgetown University, examined the painfully slow emergence of environmental performance measurement and performance-based man iatgseelmf einntto.20"9EJPoAdiNPeerwraEs,nogflaPnedrr"atsharnodugAhssroeociragtaesn,izeavtailouna,teadcEoPmAmRitemgieonnt t1o'seenffcoorut rtoagterainnsnfoorvma tion, and as sharp a break with EPA's traditional management systems as the regional admin istrator could sustain.210 systTemheisrehsaeradr,cfhreursstr'afitnindginwgosrpka,rpaallretilctuhloasrelyrweaicthhoeudtisntatthuetoprryecchedaningge cohrasputsetrasi.neCdhlaenagdienrgshtihpe. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00135 136 Environment.gov Making "performance management" work willrequire much more reliable information about environmental conditions andmuch more technically and politically astute managers. Better environm ental data and a better understanding of program effectiveness can make it easier for mmeanntasgaemrsotongmEaPkeAcrheogiicoensa, lbouftftihceesyadnodnsottataeloangeengcuiaersacnatneelebaedttteor daemciosiroenesf.fNecetigvoetiaaltlioncgataigorneoef responsibilities, but negotiations can break down over truly trivial issues of enforceability or preceden t. A focus on environm ental results can engage the public, but only if federal and state regulators make an effort to open the doors. Those problems notwithstanding, the NEPPS process still holds potential as a tool for rec toenrcciloinngtasintastethaenpdafnedele'srarleicnotmermesetsnidnaetinovnisrofnomr menatkailnpgrothteacttaiochniienvespmeecnifticmpolarceelsik, ealnydTthhies cphaanpel does not beheve the goals of NEPPS can be met easily. Donald Kettl has said that the attrac tiveness of performance measures is exceeded only by the difficulty of their design and imple meleemnAteatntriutosenc.paeTnrhnfooarttmibsaecnepcrerte-abdinaiclsyaetdterdumeoaninnaogelnedmvwieroanyntsmsyoesfntetdamolipmnrgoutsbetucbsteiionfenls.usi.dN, deyitnhaemr,ica.sTdheumsomnsatnrayteodf iitns previous chapters, can predictions or projections always be quantified before the fact: some times they cannot be so even after the fact. The challenge to EPA and the states isfinding clear, distinctive ways to evaluate performance, and then actually doing so, taking advantage of the promise inherent in NEPPS. Defining and Measuring Environmental Performance At one time, responsibility for environmental protection rested with individual states. They caolluklidndesn.aScot manedsteantefos,rclieketoCuaglhiforergnuial,attoioonksaosrtreossnegnstitaalnlyd iaggnaoinrestepnovlilruotinomn.enOtathledresg, rfaeadraftuiol tnhaotf tough regulation would costjobs, did not.211 The environmental legislation of the 1970s and 1980s, however, explicitly centralized au thority in Washington. No longer would the federal role in environmental protection be simply that of providing some funding and technical assistance. The new laws created strong regula tdoerlyegpartoegtroamthes,manthdedreesscproibnesdibiinlitgyrfeoart ddaeyta-tiol h-doawy tmheaynawgoeumldenotpoerfamteo.sSttaaitre-sacnodulwdaateskr-EquPaAlittoy programs. To do that, though, they would have to pass legislation and write regulations that paralleled federal laws, and build the administrative capacity to implement those rules. EPA set uopf t1h0orseegoioffnicaelsotfoficheesltpo"pirtos"visdteataesdedgerveeeloopf sintrdoinvgideunavliartotennmtieonntatol psrtaotteesc,taionnd penrocgoruarmagse. d each Today, driven by federal mandates and fueled by EPA funding, most stateshave assumed the responsibility for managing most EPA programs.212 State environmental agencies now make more day-to-daydecisions about environmentalmanagement than does EPA. Stateswrite more than 90 percent of allpermits, take more than 75 per cent of all enforcement actions, and have fearralmgoorveedrnamy-eton-td.2a13ySctoantetabcut dwgiethtsbfuosrinpeosllsuetsioanndcoonthtreorlshoauvreceinscorfeapsoelldutsiuobnsttahnatnialdloye: sththeeafveedr age state relies on EPA for only 26 percent of its budget for pollution control. Some states are monoreenvdierpoennmdeennttalornegEuPlAatitohnan.21o4thers. As a group, states probably now spend more than EPA Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00136 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 137 Asindividual states enhanced their capacityto protect the environment, however, they came to resent their subservience to the federal agency Thus it came to pass that in 1995, EPA and the elected leaders of the Environmental Council of the States, acting for all 50 states, signed tlThahteieoNnaasghtriieopenmbaeletEwnntevweinarostnhamomseeungttuaoalvlPecerhnrfamollreemnntgaenenctteoitPtireaasrntmnsfeoorsrstmhriepespnAovgnirrsoeibnemlmeeefnnotrt,aewlnghvoiicvrhoernpnmraonemncetias,eltdopramotnaeekcwetioirtnea. partnership based on performance. Many state officials held out high hopes for NEPPS. As the next section demonstrates, however, the old does not alwaysgive way gracefullyto the new, even when they share common goals. Determining "Equivalency'' o f State Programs To protect and preserve their environments, many states adopt statutes and regulations that eaidtdhreersscotphye oqruersetfieornenocfeefqeudievraallenstcayt:utwesh.eBthuetriift aissatastestrdiensgiegnnts aiststohwe ncoprrroegspraomnd,inEgPAfedmeurastl program. HR&A'sanalysis of California's air toxics program illustrates how difficult thatjudg ment can be. TABLE 5-1: NUMBER OF STATES WITH DELEGATED PROGRAM AUTHORITY CLEAN AIR ACT N ew Source Performance Standards NESHAPS Prevention o f Significant Deterioration Title V O perating Permits N e w Source Review CLEAN WATER ACT NPDES Pretreatment/POTWs State Revolving Fund Sludge Management Construction Grants Wetlands 404 IN YES PROCESS PARTIAL NO 39 1 9 1 38 2 10 0 45 0 4 1 21 29 0 0 46 1 1 0 37 0 4 8 29 1 0 19 48 0 0 2 9 3 0 37 46 0 0 3 2 0 0 42 N A /N D 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 6 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00137 138 Environment.gov TABLE 5-1: NUMBER OF STATES WITH DELEGATED PROGRAM AUTHORITY (c o n tin u e d ) IN YES PROCESS PARTIAL NO N A /N D RESOURCE CONSERVATION A N D RECOVERY ACT Subpart C, Base Program 47 1 0 2 0 Subpart C, Corrective Action 31 3 0 16 0 Subpart C, M ixed W aste 39 1 0 10 0 Subpart C, BIF 19 4 0 27 0 Toxicity Characteristics Revisions 34 3 0 13 0 LDR California Wastes 37 2 0 10 1 LDR 1 /3 Wastes 36 3 0 1 1 0 LDR 2 / 3 Wastes 21 3 0 26 0 LDR 3 / 3 Wastes 27 0 17 0 Subpart D, Solid W aste 29 1 8 3 9 Underground Storage Tanks 28 2 0 20 0 SDWA Public W a te r System Supervision 48 0 0 2 0 W ellh e ad Protection Program 36 1 0 4 9 Underground Injection Control 1422 34 0 0 16 0 Underground Injection Control 1425 35 0 1 9 5 FIFRA 2 3 (a) State Cooperation, A id and Training 44 1 1 0 4 2 3 (b) State Cooperation, A id and Training 44 1 1 0 4 Endangered Species 24 5 0 9 12 W o rker Protection 48 1 1 0 0 G roundw ater Protection 29 1 1 0 4 6 Source: Environmental Council of the States, http:/ / wwT.vsso.org/ ecos/ delegations/ statutes/ cwa. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00138 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 139 Both EPA and California agree on the fundamental principle of the state's program: to clean up the air. And both require that large sourcesof air pollution install equipment to reduce air emissions of toxic chemicals. It is in implementation where agreement breaks down. EPA sspoemceififelesxteibcihlintyoltoogciehsotoosebeaumsoedngbypodsifsfiberleenttecinhdnuosltorgieiess, .bDutoCinaglifsoo,rnthiaepsrtoavteidaersgmueoss, tsipnudrussttericehs nological innovation, which should reduce transaction costs. There are other small but irreducible differences between the programs as well. The state and EPA use somewhat different methods for monitoring, testing, and accounting for emis sions. In addition, EPAhas slightlymore stringent requirements for record keeping, and prefers a toFuogrheexraamppplreo,aEcPhAtoreeqnufoirrecseminesnpte.ctions every six months, but California recommends that a third-party auditor submit an annual report. EPA requires that each permit explicitly incor porate manufacturers' requirements for operating, installing, calibrating, and maintaining ecIfoqnaunsipisamtcecenintdtweunisttheadltrheaeltemeaasaecnhhuafssaitcnet;ouCraedarvlsief'orssrpeneiicamifpipceaarctmitoointnss,pswuimbhlipicclhyhmreeauqlstuhti,breCe atkhleiapftotreanqtiuathiepesmtsaiebtenlitfsohbreesreoafpepereerranftcoeerd. mance and/ or financial penalty proportionate to the scale of the violation. Under the same circumstances, EPAusuallyrequires a financial penalty and a shutdown, even if the facilitywas operating well below7a health-risk standard. perNfoormneathneclee-sbsa,sCedaltihfoarnniEaPoAf'fsi.cEiaxlsplfieceiltltyhaCtatlhifeoirrnpiarorgergaumlatiessb2o4t4h smubosrteansctreisn,goefntwahnicdhmEoPrAe regulates only 189, and it regulates somewhat smaller sources as well. It also mandates that sources inventory their emissions and disclose them to the public if local air-quality districts tdsoaexvcivicdyeraetnghduelywatepiololn-soe, ri"gtssaitngeinczihefdnicipacnoaltpcurialsapkcase.c".itEIymPtAopl,iechniotslwuyr,eevtheaerd,eswqtahutiaeltereeaplcirekosntoeowcntliaeodnngaoitnfigopnCuabalhlricefophruentaialatt'ihso,pnaioninndeaieitrsr efforts in pollution prevention, is not quite so confident of the state's ability to preserve and protect the environment without substantial agency oversight. California and EPA have spent seven years comparing the differences between their re pqaurieretmheentwtsoaanidr-taopxpircosapcrhoegsr.aSmins.cTe h1e9y93fr,atmhreede tsheepiasrsauteesj,oeisntat bcloismhmeditcterietserhiaavfeorwcoormkepdartoincgotmhe programs, conducted a line-by-line comparison of state and federal regulations, examined how state regulations are implemented, and, finally, narrowed the debate to 24 of 200 differences between the programs. its oUwnnabplreotgorarema--chwfiinthaloaugt raesekminegnEt wPAithtofeddeelreaglaoteffitchiealsr,esthpooungsihb,iltihtye fsotarterepgruelsasteidngahaeiratdoxwicitsh. Thus as EPA slowly finalizes federal requirements for different industries, California firms will face two somew-hat different regulatory systems. Some state officials fear that industry, frus trated by the confusion, may press for state legislation that would weaken California'sprogram, or even move out of the state. It seems certain that the debate will end up in court. tionTihnepcearsfeorimlluasntrcaet-ebsawseedll mthaenfaugnedmamenetn, taanl dditshceonlentetecrt boeftwitseeimn pthleemspenirtiattoiofnN. EAPtPruSefpoeurnfdoar mance-based system encourages innovation, and constantly defines and refines accountability measures as appropriate. Using those criteria, California's legislation is a close approximation toofxifcesdfeorarlsroemqueiyreemares,ntms.onSittaoter tohfefiicriaplesrffeoerlm, tahnecreefcolroes,eltyh;aatnEdPtAhesnhoaunladlylezte tthheemir rreesguulltsa.teInaiar true perform ance-based system, the state argues, those results would be the deciding factor in Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00139 140 Environment.gov determining state performance. But EPA and the state are still arguing about procedure, not yet considering actual performance. Monitoring State Management o f EPA Programs As stated earlier, most states adopt statutes and regulations that closely parallel federal re quirements. In those situations, EPA oversight focuses on implementation of activities con ducted by states and EPA regions. The agency'sheadquarters staff issues annual guidance for each of the national programs in its media offices--air, water, waste, and toxics--and in the eonfftohreceamgeennctyofwfiiclel.dTohtoosme deeotctuhmoseentgsoaarltsi.cFuolarteexnaamtipolnea,ltphoehwcireistteannddsopceucmifyenwtshaptrdeipfafererednbt pyatrhtes EPAOffice of Enforcement and Comphance Assurance covernationalprioritiesfor enforcement in particular industrial sectors, comphance assistance priorities, and special requests. wquitahErtPreeArgsihogeneasnd,eqarauslawlyretellelrtsassaEslsPeoApaprrreaegtpeiaorrneesgsidoceoncnaidsloewlhiodorakwtep7tdloaenfnrsaffmoorreceewnmrfieotntrectnemmaegemnretoeirmnaneedancatshotphfrauotngedrnaesmrusr.teaHnsdetaiatndegs will complywith the guidance, but the effect of the detailed guidance from Washington isto put great pressure on states to conduct a specified number of activities. EPA also uses the grants that it makes to state environmental agencies to influence state o2p0e0r0a,tifoonrse.xTarmadpiltei,onsuacllhy,geraacnhtsEtPoAtalperdog$r7a8m5 mofiflihcoenm. ade large, separate grants to states. In FY Prior to NEPPS, EPA regional officesused annual work plans to pass their requirements for a specific number of activities on to states. In those plans, states had to document, in great gdisresotuauiinpl,gshnooofwtpicmeerusmcoihtfteevfeifosolriatnttihNoeneyswwoJroeu0rls.d0e3yexipnpeer1ns9od9no4-ny.2e1e5aarcshfoarctiisvsiutyin--g aasdsmpienciisfitcraatsiv0e.1oprderesrosnt-oyespaersciffoicr NEPPS sought to shift "the primary focus of the EPA and state dialogue from `bean-count ing'[of activities] to identification of environmental priorities for each state and the appropri ate actions to address these priorities."216 The agreement that established NEPPS emphasized performance measurement in its guiding principles: c"oCunotnrtyi.nuous environmental improvements are desirable and achievable throughout the A core level of environmental protection must be maintained for all citizens. National environmental progress should be reported using indicators that are reflective of environmental conditions, trends, and results. JcooinndtiEtiPoAns/wsthaitleeprleasnpneicntigngshtohueldnebeedbfaosread`olenveelnpvlairyoinnmg feinetladl'gacoraolsssththaet acroeuandtarypt.a..bl"e21t7o local As part of implem enting NEPPS, EPA and states negotiated a set of 30 "core performance measures" to guide EPA oversight. Some of these measures focused on agency activities, but sevTerhalefaogcrueseemd eonnt eonnvciororenmpeernfotarlmoauntccoemmeesa.sures was an important step in a new direction for EPA and states. Paddock and Keiner, along with Herb, etal., found that NEPPS did encourage statesto pay more attention to data about environmental conditions, and it did encourage some states to invest resources in gathering better information. On the whole, though, NEPPS and Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00140 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 141 core measures have been only marginally successful in switching the basis of EPA oversight from activities to outcomes. One reason NEPPS has not succeeded is that it could not change the system of guidance baannecddamrmeegemiaononraoalvnpedrrolaagyorfaomnundmdeeearpnsltayagneendrtsirnesgnimcIhnpeslytderaseydfsuotsefemdastn,operwaobcwaensasdyeoosn,faftnhadceilaeitsttatiattuibndlgiesshe.xeSdchopamrnaegchetiecaaenddoqfturanuresttge,orist tiating detailed EPA-state agreements about specific activities that states would conduct. Some regional officials did agree to eliminate work plans, but when headquarters asked regions to deliver certain activities, officialspassed those requests on to state agencies, making it clear they expIenctiendsisatcintigoonnrecgoanrtdinleusesdocflowsehaotvNerEsiPgPhtSodfostcautemaecntitvsistiaeisd,.EPAofficialsfeltthey had a strong case. After all, decisionmakers need both information about environmental conditions and good data about state activities to evaluate a state program. Furthermore, congressional pres Mdsuisraceyoan1nt9di9nf5ueedaegsruraeclhesmtaatettunetntetisitosdenel.fmcalneadrltyhaetnEvPisAiokneeedplecslossEePtrAacakttoefntsitoantetaoctsitvaitteiesa.ctIinvditeieesd,,iwt hdiildenthoet Some state officials did their share of resisting aswell. Many were not enthusiastic about the prospect of an EPA report with comparable performance measures for all 50 states, for ex ample. Despite the fact that it took almost four years to negotiate an EPA-state agreement on tshuerecs.orSetapteerfooffrimciaalnsccelamimeatshuaretst,hseommeeasstuarteess hdaovneortefaulwseadystoadgdatrhesesr tahnedprreopbolertmasllmoofstthiemmpeoar tant in their states, and that the definitions are unclear or inadequate. They also protested that the core measures added to their reporting burdens, and taxed tight budgets. dcoamtaFpatiocleaEdtiPowAnitrohefgssiuotcanhtse,opbpeuprtfootshrimteioaangn,ecEne.cPyAdhoaess bnaoctkgeadthdeorwthne. dSatatatefsrosmubmthiet rmegoiroen-osri-nletossacnoamtipolnetael The second problem with the core measures is that they developed separately from the measures that EPA uses to report its goals and progress to Congress under GPRA. In concept, GPRA should fit quite neatly with NEPPS. The statute requires that EPA and other federal mageenntcitehsepprleapnasr,easntdrarteegpiocrpt ltaonsC, osnugbrmesitsboundgreestuslttsh.aTt shhuoswbohothwGfuPnRdAs wainlldbNe EspPePnSt tfoocimuspolen planning, priority setting, and results. However, GPRA has reinforced the fragmentation of the agency along traditional media lines and discouraged cross-mediaplanning, priority setting, and action. The agencyhas adopted e1v0eGr, PthRerAe gaorealasl,ssoosmepeaorfatwehgiocahlsefxoprliaciirtlqyuianlvitoylvweamteurltqiupalelitayg,eenncfoyrocfefmiceesnta,nrdesperaorgcrha,mans.dHotohwer major program s. Once the agency divided its work into such broad goals and sub-goals, tradi tional, fragmented patterns of planning and action reestablished themselves. Thus GPRA has discouraged the multimedia planning and activities that were an explicit aim under NEPPS. EPA recently published a memorandum showing how the core performance measures of NofEmPPeaSsurerleast.eTtohietsAGcPaRdeAmgyo'salrse,saenadrcihnedres,edh,otwheevreeri,srseupbostratntthiaalt osvtaetrelaspsbtielltwbeeleienvtehethtewroe saertes significant disconnects between GPRA and NEPPS measures, and that regional office staffs pay more attention to GPRA goals and measures than to goals and measures the EPA regions negFoetidaetreadl wstaitthutsetsattehsaut rnedqeurirNeEfuPlPlSd.ocumentation about spending of federal dollars have also been irritants. In accordance with the Financial Management Act of 1996, OMB published accounting standards to establish mechanisms for tracking the expenditure of federal funds. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00141 142 Environment.gov That same year, EPA began using those standards in its GPRA annual plan and goal-based budget. EPA regional offices were asked to assign state activities and hinds to between 30 and 40 codes that the agency developed to track expenditures to meet GPR Agoals. Some regional roaesfsfkitecodersinsmtgaattehdseetotohldesiuarcpotpiwvlyintytgh-bueeaissnsefedoswramobaortkuipotlnha.onwSsftoatotressaelplporaocrataettesetfEeudPnAdthsgarstapntehtnset. brFeyuqrsuttheasetetrsmw, oaanrsedt,atonhttehayemroobreujegncitotentdos that they do not gather data that fits the GPR A codes. Thus, states said, much of the data submitted by regions is "bogus, worthless."218 The third and more fundamental problem is that EPA and states do not gather adequate data about environmental conditions. Water-quality data are in perhaps the worst condition, iatssndiastciuosnsaeldneintwthoerkporefvaiioru-qsucahlaitpytemr.oBniutot rviinrgtu--allwyearlel doefvtehleopaegdentocytr'sacdkattahesyrestgeumlas--toreyxpcreopctefsosr. EPA gathers a great deal of information about permits, enforcement, and emissions, but rela tfiovlelolywhinttglecahbapotuetr.a)mbient conditions. (EPA's efforts to develop better data are discussed in the Performance-Based Management in the States Many states use performance as a basis for various programmatic and budgetary decisions. uGsoerimnfloerymsatutidoinedabthoeuetfefnovrtisroonfmOernetgaol pne, rFfloorrmidaan,cVeiirngimniaak,ianngddNeceiswioHnsa.mBpusthevireenttohgoautghhetrhaonsde states are considered leaders in performance-based management, Gormley says their progress has been slow. Each of the states has taken a different approach to performance measurement. As part of tithsasttrcartoesgsicagpelnancyejaucrhisdOicretigoonns.sGtautebeagrneantcoyrmiaul bstiednenviealol pplabnenscahnmd abrukdsgtehtartefqouceusstsonarperforbalmemeds around the benchmarks, andtheO regon Progress Board reports perform ance asletter grades. The process enjoys strong support: some local officials and nonprofit organizations even use the state benchmarks for planning and budgeting In Florida, both the governor and the fleogrisstlaatteuraeghenacvieesp.uVshiregdinsieap'sapraetrefloyrfmoarnpceerfmoremasaunrceem-beanstesdybstuedmgseftoscaunsdomn aanfeawg'ekmeyenotbsjeycsttievmess for each agency. Based on their previous experience with measuring, allfour states are making improvements in quantifying environmental performance. For example, Florida has developed measures of "suemnvpitrioonnmoefnetalelcctirtiiczietynsahnipd"frseuschhwasatheor,uarsnddothneataevdetroagsetadteaiplayrvkes,htichlee-amveilreasg-terarevseildeedn. tOiarlecgoonn has developed a sophisticated way of blending eight different measures of water quality into an iNnodretxhtehaastteisrnsesntsaitteivs ehatoveshjoairnptldyedteervieolroaptieodn4i0n maneyassuinrgelseocfopnodliltuiotino.nNperwevHenatmiopns. hIinredeavnedloopthinegr tsheolfs-edeavnedlooptehdermsetaansudraersdsth, astnatteomEaPnAa'sgecrosreanmdeealseucrteesd. officials paid far more attention to their Despite their expertise, however, those four states are facing significant technical barriers to using performance measurement to improve environmental quality Environmental conditions wwaraeesaitnahbfellrue,eetnoccoeanddojnumosittcdoaanctltayivabitbyyo,cuoatcmcepindlvieainrntoscn,emawneidnthtmarleaqgnuuyalaloitftiyhoentors fataanckdteosrttsha.o2t1es9eaBgeuextnocngyeonnaoecutiosvfiftatihecsetobfruosutinratlssotoaatbecys- Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00142 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 143 count. All their state environmental agencies still rely heavily on data about outputs (activities), have only some information about outcomes (emissions and changes in environmental quality), and have virtuallyno information about impacts(how agency activities influence environmental ceonnvTdirihotienomnOser).engt(aSolenecPoTnraodbgiltreieos5ns-s2B.a)oraerdchdaonegsinregp, obrutt"tkheey"tafsakctoofrsmthoadtemlinagy ihmelppacetxspilsaienxwpehnysisvpeecainfidc fraught with methodological issues and scientific uncertainty. Thus state agencies rarely con daiurcqtuthalaittyanpalalynsniisnegx,coerptsiwmhileanr irteigsunleactoesrysapryro' cfoersssepse.cific decisions about permitting, regional TABLE 5-2: PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT AND OUTCOME MEASURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT STATE/PRO G RAM Florida, Dept, o f Environm ental P ro te c tio n O reg o n Dept, o f Environm ental Q uality (H azardous W aste) N e w H am pshire "Indicators of Progress" (W aste) V irg in ia Dept, o f Environm ental Q uality O regon Progress Board "B enchm ark Project" (Environm ental M easures) NUMBER OF MEASURES 162 156 74 5 15 PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT MEASURES 62% PERCENTAGE OF OUTCOME MEASURES 38% 76% 24% 64% 36% 80% 20% 6.6% 93.4% S o u rce :W illia m T. G o rm ley E nviron m en ta l P erform ance M ea su res in a Federal System , 2000. Nonetheless, agency managers in all four states are beginning to use performance data to minagkeexdamayp-lteos-daarye mdraanwangefmroemntGdoecrmisiloenys's--anaanldysiins.some cases to set broad policies. The follow Florida. When data showed that petroleum storage tanks in some parts of the state were out of compliance--not detecting leaks properly--the state agency improved its tWrahineinngprporbolgermams esm, celragriefdieadtrsuhleelsl,fiasnhdpllaaunntsc,htehde aagmenajcoyrainrrdaunsgterydefdourcvaotliuonntainriytitartaivine. ing sessions at the plants, and strengthened inspections. imOporretgaonnt s.oWurhceenofduartbaasnhosmweodg,tthhaet cars and other mobile sources had become an agency shifted employees from regulating indus trial sources into program s for mobile sources. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00143 144 Environment.gov theNweawstHe parmogprasmhirwea.sW16h0e0n,thheehcioremdmnieswsiosntaefrflteraarnnsefdertrheadt the complaint backlog for some cases to the Depart ment of Justice, and, to cut down on frivolous charges, decided to accept only written complaints in the future. talVgioraglsin, tihae. When writing new nutrient m Department of Conservation anagement plans fell short of departmen diverted resources to those programs. Gormley found that most state legislators and legislative staff support the concept of mea sOunriengreraessounltsfo--r bthuet raellmucotsatnnceevteor ruesleytmheorienfhoeramvailtyioonntpoecrhfooromseanacpeadrtaictauliasrthcaotulresgeisolaftaocrstioanre. well aware of the technical shortcomings of the data, even if they may not understand all of the technical details. In addition, there is a good deal of confusion about performance mea msueraesmuerenst.gGo uoprm, ele.gy, rcelpeaonrtesr tahiratormwaantyerp, ushboliucldofgfeictimalsorheamveontheye, vainedwththoaste pthraotgsracomres pwohoorsley should get lessbecause, presumably; they are not doing a goodjob.220 Sometimes, popular logic runs the other way as well: if a program is showing good results, decisionmakers may decide that it does not need more money. lookNaetitthheermoafrtghionsreaathpeprrothaacnhetshme taoktaels:mtouacshkswehnseer,eocfancoaulresge.isRlaetuasreonordaicntaatgeesntchyatgoetntehsehmouolsdt improvement from additional dollars. That question would focus attention on impacts, but unfortunately EPA and the states have little systematic information about them. Gormley found that performance measurement systems were more robust where top offi hciaavlselaiklreedatdhyemforamnudlautseedd.thTehme mtoomstaskteridkeincgisieoxnasm, npolet mwaerseilny Ftolofirnidea-t,uwnheeproelitchyepsrtoapteoseanlvsitrhoeny mental agency developed a "focus-watch" system. The agency publishes quarterly reports that include both output and outcome measures. Agency leaders review7the data and designate certain issues for emergency action or close attention. That helps keep managers and staff fWochuasteedveorntthheesatagteenocryi'sssguoea,las,gaenndciietsaclsaoneunsseupreesrftohremyapnacyecmloseeasauttreensttioongetot iismsupersoivninfrgotnhteodfatthae. pubhc, as well as to alert managers. Simple reporting formats--like grades from "A'to "F"-- make itpossible to rely onjudgment rather than technical analysisto deal with the difficult issue of impacts, which is especially useful with citizens and elected officials. envGiroornmmleenytaclopnoclliucyd7etshathnaitnmsoemaseuroitnhgerafnideldms,abnuatgsiniggniffoicrapnetrlyfobremhainndcethies msitouraetioadnviannecdeudcian tion and health policy. For example, at least 43 states now7participate in the National Assess ment of Educational Progress, which reports test scores by state, even though participation is voluntary: And health maintenance organizations serving 65 percent of national enrollees re port performance data on as many as 70 measures221 heaFltiheisspsoecfuarlaatheesatdhaotftehnevreiroarnemthenretaelrmeeaasosunrsewmheynpt.eOrfnoermisathnactethmereeasisugrreemateenrtaignreeedmuceanttioanmaonndg health and education experts about measures and causation. The second reason isthat governor^ other influential politicians, and interest groups have supported the development of performance mtoeryasaugreensciinest,hhosaevefietaldkse.nTrheespthoinrsdibisiltihtyaftoirnddeepveelnodpeinngt npoenrfporromfitanocrgeamniezaastuiorens^. rather than regula Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00144 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 145 Re-negotiating the EPA-State Partnership As well as performance-based management, the May 1995 NEPPS agreement encouraged cross-media efforts to set priorities and manage programs, a newly cooperative relationship bTehtewegeunidEinPgAprreignicoinpsleasnodfstthaeteaaggreenecmieesn, toinnectluhdaetda:lso called for extensive public participation. " . . . EPA/ state activity plans and commitments should allocate federal and state resources to the highest priority problems across all media and should seek pollutionprevention approaches before management, treatment, disposal, and cleanup. The new approach to the EPA/ State relationship should facilitate and encourage pubhc understanding of environmental conditions and government activities. A differential approach to oversight should provide an incentive for State programs to paderdfroersms pwroeblll,ermews awrhdeinreg ssttarotenpgrsotgarteamprsongereadmsasasnisdtafnrceee.i"ng222up federal resources to To those ends, EPA replaced its old work plans with negotiated Performance Partnership Agreements (PPAs), which set goals and objectives in terms of environmental performance. Developed in concert with EPA regional office, a PPA describes how both organizations will work together to meet common goals. In addition, NEPPS allows states to combine grants for individual EPA programs into Performance Partnership Grants (PPGs). Positive, But Limited impacts in mTehaesurerisnegarecnhveirrsonagmreeenttahlactoNndEiPtiPonSsh, aansdgeinneorraglalynieznincgouthraegirepdlastnanteinsgtoairnovuensdt tphreioirrietnieesrgaineds strategic goals. They report that NEPPS has had the most impact in states with a strong plan ning tradition, and where state commissioners and top EPA regional managers were enthusi astic supporters of NEPPS. For example, when the governors of Massachusetts and Illinois decided that all their state astgaetencsiterastwegoiuclpdlawnsri.tTe hsteraOtekglaichopmlanase,ntvhieroennmviernotnaml aegnetnaclyawgernocteieistsmfiorsdtisfiteradtePgPicApsltaon bceocnocmure rently with its first PPA. In environmental departments in Missouri, Texas, and Utah, state straUtetgaihc'psllaonnsgwtr'eardeittihoenboafsisstfroatretghiecirplPaPnAnsi.ng proved a particularly' good match for NEPPS. Even though the governor was pushing for more autonomy in all state-federal relations, the process of writing a PPA that fit the state's strategic plan was a useful way to work through the differences between state and EPA perspectives. The negotiations revealed a shared concern about the effects of rapid growth in small towns in Southwest Utah. The state brought a re gional association of governments into the discussion, and the result was an agreement that csuobujnetcyt htoeareltghudlaetpioanrtumnednetrsfwedoeurladlboergsitnatreelgauwl:aTtinhge EsmPAallredgriinokninaggrweeadtetrospyrsotevmidsetshtaatffwseurpepnoortt to get the regulatory process started. That situation epitomizes the promise of ajoint approach to performance-based manage ment. Together, three levelsof government defined a problem and worked out a way to address Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00145 146 Environment.gov it effectively. The agreement willhelp meet EPA'snational goal of safedrinking water, and itwill tap legal authority and community support at the local level. The multimedia nature of NEPPS was also veryhelpfulto states like Oklahoma and, at least iiannmiMtioanilnlgyn,aeNgseoontracthyandCdivaMirsoiaolsinnssaatc,hhwauthsoeeptrtees,rcawotemhdimcrhaiswtshieeorrneiernredsoewrpgeearnnedizterinnytgilnyaggTteohneceynPcpPorAoupgrarroagcmeescslseonasltesirorecwloyooerpklieemrdaitwnioaentll ing the traditional air-water-waste divisions. A senior Minnesota official observed, "It is hard to imagine how media-specific categorical work plans would have worked given MPCA's new7 organizational structure."223 andTbheettreerseuanrdcehresrtsanaldsionrgepbeotrwt teheant tNopEPsPtaSteoafntedn EpProAvirdeegdioannaloopfpfiocritaulsn.itEyPfAorrmegoiorensd,iafolorgeuxe ample, are beginning to use PPAs as the basis for oversight. In some states, dialogue between state commissioners and EPAregional administrators led to increased work sharing In MassancEhoPutAsyereetttgsd,ioethlneeaglNaotEeffdPic.PeIStnoporretohdceuerscsesthaaetpelpse,ermdmliaetnabydactEokPlaoAngoaifngfiracepiearmlosgesnraatidmthtahthtaasttetwnhteatshdirimealeposogtruatetaenoetfmtoNptlEhoPeyPesetSastlteeo,dbthutoet joint priority setting, but most state officials disagreed. They reported that the dialogue helped them understand each other'spriorities, which washelpfiil, but that neither EPAnor their state changed its position. ageNncEyPwPSashaabsleretoduccuetdthseomnuemobf ethreopf aitpsearwnnourakltrheaptoErtPsAtoreEqPuAirefrsoomf 2st5a0tetso. T1h4e0.T22e4xNasEsPtaPtSe speeded the process by which Oklahoma and Texas allowed EPA regions to access state data bases electronically, eliminating the need for many written reports. btheatwtStuehecahnt ENanPEeAPcdPanoSdtahslatiadntefaos,mrbmauajtotidrooinmesiplnlauocstttdroaentsecdsraitbyhe-ettoph-oedtateyynptoiicpaalelrosafittiuaoanptsieoirnnfo.orBnmolyathnthcreeres-ebeaaorscrehdfoteruearlmaotfsiotrhnesepho1irp6t states they studied. In eight states, impacts have been marginal. Two states of the 16 never participated. One other state dropped out of the PPA process, and another dropped both its PPA and PPG. relaNtiEonPsPhSippsraotvtihdeehdiganheospt lpeovretlus,nbituyt,foatrbbeesttt,errecsuolmtemduinnuicnactihoannganedd rgeelnateiroanllsyhibpestbteertwEePeAn-sEtPatAe and state program managers. It is true that EPA and most states shared information about priorities, but only in New England did a regional office set priorities jointly with states. At a November 1999 national conference of NEPPS coordinators, several state officials pcoeompplelarineaedd NthEatPtPhSe pdrooccuemssenwtass; afrnudsttrhaatitntgo;pthaagteontchyeroftfhicainaltshweesrteafpfawyihnogplirtetlpeaarettethnetimon,.feAws the initial wave of interest in NEPPS subsided, the researchers report that fewer state officials paid attention to the PPAs. They negotiated with EPAregions outside the NEPPS process issueby-issue-instead of within the context of a strategic plan. uneTashielyrwesiethartcrhaderitsiocnoanlcmluadneatgheamt tehnet scyosntetimnus,ewd hviicahbiilsitaynoufnNteEnPabPlSe sisituinatdioonu.bt. It coexists Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00146 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 147 TABLE 5-3: THE IMPACTS OF NEPPS ON STATES STATE UTAH IL L IN O IS M INNESOTA COLORADO IN D IA N A M IC H IG AN O H IO W ISC O N SIN DELAWARE RESULTS PPA is based on the state strategic plan and on a com parative risk project. Some disagreement about performance measures for enforcement. Few funds shifted under PPG. A PPA provided the fram ework fo r the Southwest Utah Partnership Initiative, a communitybased pilot initiative involving three levels of government, formed to address rapid growth in the region. It resulted in several complem entary initiatives being undertaken in a short period of time, and has become a model for other areas in the state. PPA was integrated into the first state strategic plan. PPG shifted about six percent of federal funds to pollution prevention and regulatory innovation. Strong public involvement process. NEPPS and state strategic planning w ere mutually reinforcing, and used to move towards integration of planning, budgeting, evaluation and measurement o f results. PPA includes agreements to a dispute resolution process between EPA and the state, and to negotiate enforcement and com pliance priorities. An area of concern is that EPA still does programby-program evaluations, but MPCA does multimedia assessments. PPA incorporated the goals of the state strategic plan. Five percent o f EPA grant funding was reallocated to projects reducing risk. M ost recent PPA includes comprehensive plan for stakeholder involvement. PPA became state agency strategic planning document -- although designed around strategic goals and priorities rather than media-specific programs, it was supplanted by political priorities for each division. Second PPA includes accountability measures for enforcement. Section 3 19 funds w ere kept separate from the PPG because the requirements d id n 't w o rk well with non-point pollution problems. PPG funding still tracked as separate grants because o f other accounting needs. State did not participate in NEPPS because o f the costs o f public participation, o f selfassessment, and o f other reviews and coordination required, because it did not reduce the w o rkloa d in other states, and because o f lack of EPA flexibility in negotiating core performance measures. Although there is a commitment to joint planning with EPA, in practice, a dual w ork planning process is taking place because no new planning has occurred. However, NEPPS serves to coordinate the priorities of the regional EPA office with those o f the state. PPA links goals to performance strategies. State is piloting the use o f performance-based management based on the PPA, but has concerns regarding the core performance measures and also regarding federal and state roles and responsibilities fo r enforcement. PPA development was linked to state strategic plan and allow ed individual programs to devote more effort to "w hole basin activities." However, to gain the support o f program managers, upper management promised that the relative distribution of federal funds would remain the same, thus it created another layer o f management. N o savings were reported. The PPG was dropped for FY 2 0 0 0 in favor o f a return to categorical workplans. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00147 148 Environment.gov TABLE 5-3 : THE IMPACTS OF NEPPS ON STATES (continued) MASSACHUSETTS NEPPS reinforced existing state/federal cooperation on the developm ent o f environmental indicators, initiated development of a state strategic plan, and complemented a multimedia reorganization previously undertaken. As a result, NPDES permitting and inspection activities were shifted to a five-year basin schedule, the state and region w ere able to focus on the NPDES backlog, and the shift to centralized management o f grant funds increased upper management control of funding. M IS S O U R I NEPPS was integrated with state strategic plan, simplified the budget and provided flexibility in allocation of state funds. Section 31 9 funds w ere shifted into NPDES to handle a backlog, and a ir program funds w ere shifted to hazardous waste. Five percent o f funds w ere set aside for agency-wide priorities and crosscutting projects. Administrative w ork shifted to a higher level rather than reduced. NORTH C A R O L IN A NEPPS provided impetus fo r aggressive public participation approach, which facilitated communication among different media programs and cross-program planning, because stakeholders view problems in terms o f issues rather than programs. A PPG was not pursued because o f resistance at the program level. OKLAHOMA Development of first PPA was concurrent with developm ent of the first agency strategic plan, and consists o f a short fram ework document that delineates federal and state roles, and commits state to provide real time access to state management and data systems in lieu o f program activity reporting. Program commitments are not documented. Enforcement roles are an area of concern. Financial flexibility under the PPG is limited because the DEQ budget is heavily fee-based, thus redirection o f federal funds w ould give the appearance that fee-payers were subsidizing other programs. TEXAS PPA based on state strategic plan. Reporting requirements w ere reduced from 2 5 0 items to 140. Residual funds from RCRA w ere redirected to TMDLs and the NPDES backlog, but led to concerns that the reallocation of funds provided the basis for the subsequent reduction of the RCRA budget. Enforcement problem atic because it is seen as adding another layer to existing enforcement programs, because of disagreements on priorities, and because the state took a more multimedia approach. W A SH IN G TO N PPA serves as w orkplan fo r all covered grants and includes performance measures, which added a layer to existing reporting requirements. Flexibility did not materialize. Impediments to A Performance-Based State-EPA Relationship The EPA-state agreement creating NEPPS was ambitious, but one cannot expect a com ptelaemtestrcaonnsffiorrmmtahtiaotnthoef dEiPsAapapnodinsttmateenatgoefncmieasniyn sfitvaeteyeoaffrisc.iAalssmisebnatsieodneind tehaerliireur,ntrheealriessteicarecxh pectations of the discretion that NEPPS would give to states. They hoped that EPA would stop questioning state agencies about their activities, would pay attention only to changes in environ mental conditions within a state. Of course, given the unevenness of the available data on envi ronmental conditions, EPA could not have taken that approach. Then, too, one cannot measure poefrafogremncayncperosgorlealmybs,yaenxdamaninailnygzienngvtihroenirmeefnfetactldoantae:nsvuicrhonmmeeansutarlepmeernfotramlsoanrecqe.uiresmonitoring NEPPS faced barriers other than unrealistic expectations. EPAofficialsfeared NEPPS would allow states to weaken environmental protection; state program managers were uneasy about cross-media activities. And top EPA officialsgave only intermittent, uneven support to NEPPS. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00148 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 149 Opposition to N EP P S Inside EPA Academy researchers report that many EPA officials are "made profoundly uneasy about the granting of flexibility, and the diminution of traditional accountability and leverage mecha nisms under NEPPS." 225 As mentioned earher, many EPA employees insisted that congres tsiieosn. aTlhperecsosmurme aenndt offedoenreacl ostnastcuiteenstdioeumsaEnPdAedretghiaotntahleofafgiceinaclryekspeeopnscilbolseeftorraNckEoPfPsStaitsetyapcitciavli: EPA does not merely have a duty to maintain control of state programs; in many instances it has the legal obhgation to do so. In many cases, the states are icmanplaenmdehnatsinrgesFueltdeedrainl nlaowtssutiattseapnrdocgoraumrtse.nNfoortceamcteinngt oofnthsetamtuatnodryatmesa.nMdaeteets binygroeturraionbihnggaotirobnys uCnodnegrrelasws pisronvoitdiancgualtu"srataltaubtoerryrabtiaosnistfhoartNcaEnPbPeS.r"em226oved The Office of Enforcement and Comphance Assurance was particularly vocal in insisting on the importance of EPA oversight of state activities, reflecting deeply entrenched agency support for supervising states. An influential 1991 EPA report, Enforcement in the 1990s, conveys a deep distrust of states'willingness to enforce, and our researchers reported that it still accu rately represents the views of many OECA employees: Many states still do not have strong enforcement programs, and the current oversight system, which monitors how states address specific violations, is nspeeccetsisvaer,yEtPoAa'sssvuirgeiltahnactethiseraekiesyadfaecqtuoartienemnfootricveamtinegnt.stFatreomacOtioEnC, Aev'sepneirn those states with relatively strong programs.227 tahnedmMfeateonlytphesatratfotuernmodfefsircpNieacElisfPhicPavnSeu, mEarPbgAeureasdgorcefoeendnsiftsootrelceneatmvlyeeotnhvteearccththiooeincpsea.soTtffhteoewoylycseouanprsstitodhetahrteeEnsPtfaoAtrecsshe. moSuoelmndtenaostttoaatoselks, left enforcement out of their PPAs, handling it by a separate work plan. According to Herb, el at, enforcement issues have been a constant source of acrimony and ill feeling for many years. Until quite recently, the Office of Enforcement and Comphance Assurance prepared its plans finogr itnhdeuosftfriyces'esclotonrgs-asntadndaninnguwalrpitrtieonrictioems wmiitthmmenint itmo jaolicnotnpsluanltnatiinognawndithevsataltueast,ionnotowfiethnsftoarncde ment activities with states. OECA has begun soliciting state comments on national enforce ment priorities, but those initial steps have not alleviated the tension.228 Misgivings about N EP P S Inside States "NEPPS can work only where a state has the vision to take advantage of it," a state environ mental commissioner said at a roundtable on the research commissioned for this report. In NseEvePrPaSl s,toapteesn,lnyootpopnolysiwngasatnhyepvriospioonsawletoakt,ramnasfneyrsftuantedspfrroogmraomnediprreocgtorarsmwteoreanskoethpetirctahlraobuoguht a PPG. They feared a reduction in their control over the programs they managed, and thought they might have fewer resources with which to do their work. Many EPAprogram directors felt that same skepticism. As a result, both sets of program directors tracked PPG expenditures program-by-program, undercutting the purpose of combining accounts. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00149 150 Environment.gov In contrast, most commissioners were supportive of NEPPS, feeling that its emphasis on results and on multimedia approaches would give them more leverage over their agencies. Some comm issionersused NEPPS to overcome a long tradition of independent divisionswithin their agencies. Only afew used PPGsto transfer substantialfunds, however.229Nationally, states tchoenstootliadlabteuddgoentlsyo3f0stpaeterceennvt iorof nthmeeirntgarlapnrtosgirnatomPs,PoGnsl.y SsiixncpeeErcPeAntgoraf nsttsatceosvpeernodnilnygswomaseaoff fected by PPGs. Thus, while NEPPS did reduce the number of grant applications, saving time and paperwork, its substantive effect in most states was insignificant. Weak Support From the Top NEPPS was a compromise between what is necessary to make performance management work and what was politically possible in 1995. Thus the agreement w'asvague. EPA gave little guidance to regional offices and states about howto implement it, which left the door open for reexvpieerwimaenndtastiigonno.fAf fnrdomgetthtiengmtehdeiaagorfefeicmesenort sthigeneOdffwicaesosof iEmnpfoorrctaenmtethntatatnhderCeowmapslniaonfcoermAasl surance, which might have delayed the agreement for some time. The process of writing the agreement also bypassed a public debate that would have solic ited input from businesses and environmental groups. Some leaders in the negotiations were rtheluuscbtaenatbtloe troeakcilhl itobuetfoenreviitrosntamrteendt.a0l gthroerusptsr,iefdeatroinegngthagaet ethnevyirwonomuledntoaplipsotssebuNtEwPePreSu--naabnlde to get much interest. The lack of broader participation in the creation of NEPPS left the door open for exaggerated expectations and fears, leading to a polarization of attitudes. mstaotAnetlehmnsovosifrtoftrnhomemaegnthrtaeelesmptareorntg,tr,EatmPoAps.lEeTPahAdeeorEsfPfsiAceieamOlsfewfdicederievoisfdpetehdaekaiIbnnogsupttoetchttheoermpGereerisntsseraoabfloNaunEtdPthPseoSmw. Weearkietnhgeiinsosnsoaixlf offices issued reports highly critical of state enforcement practices. The first of those reports, criticizing enforcement in Pennsylvania, led that state's environmental agency to call off its preparations to participate in NEPPS. While the agency did prepare a strategic plan covering all oSfhiotrstlpyrothgerraemafst,eirt, dthide nmootsstuvbismibilteitaadsvoacPaPteAf.or NEPPS in the agency an associate admin istrator, resigned. Her job was split between two officials, and the responsibility for EPA-state relations was assigned to a lower-ranking appointee in the Office of Congressional Relations asinndcAeIsncttoiemnrggeropevasessrisonendma, elimnmtpaalltetAemrfsfeanairtrsae.tiaAolnwccpaoryrosdbtihlneegmftisorosPtcapcduridrororeicdtkya'afsnowdretlKhl.aeEtinPoeAfrf,icdteihd. avt edreycliistitolenfowrams aclrtirtiacianl, ing of itspersonnel about NEPPS, or about the broader topic of results-based management.230 That deprived states and EPA employees of the opportunity' to air their hopes and fears about NEPPS, or to learn about successiul ways of implementing the program . PPGs proceeded for three years under regulations that dated to 1983, and were a major tiimonpsedinimJuelnyt1t9o9p9o,oHlienrgb,fuetnadl.safnrodmPasdepdaorcakteanpdroKgreaimnesr.rEevpeonrtatfhtaetrmEPaAnypEuPblAisahnedd sdtraateftorfefgicuilaals were not certain how much pooling would be possible. As of July 2000, EPA had not prom ul gated final regulations for PPGs. Also, the federal statutes that ensure accountability for the use of fSedeevrearlafluontdhsearraegqeunicteypmreasncarigpetimvee,natnadcmtivaiytiestsilwlbeereaamlsaojoprocoornlystirnatiengtroantesdtawteidthecNisEioPnPmSa. kTinhge agency announced major initiatives like the Clean Water Action Plan in the middle of the year, Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00150 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 151 for example, upsetting work on PPAs and PPGs. Not until 1999 did the headquarters media offices publish their annual guidances to regions simultaneously--and early enough to guide state-regional office negotiations about PPAs and PPGs. tEioPnASaihmneduadlltiqatntuleeaorctueosrmlsypewenticetohnucmreaagikneidnregsstuiatlttedssi---fbfaicesuevldetnfmothraonthsaeegmwemitthoenpptoa--ortrtiocriepsciagotnredusepfofeffocetrinvNveiElryoPinPnmSt.henWetapitlrhopigrnorattwemco, years of the agreement, more than 40 states had signed PPAs and/ or PPGs covering one or more EPA programs. (See Figure 5-1.) To entice so many states to participate, many regions accepted half-hearted state implementation. FSipresct,ifEicPaAllyalEloPwAendesgtlaetcetsedtotoskpipusthhethsreelef-kasesyefsesmateunretsooffeNnvEiProPnSm. ental conditions, and of state and EPA programs. Over time, many states found it convenient to dispense with that part of strategic planning: merely writing a short section on the topic in their PPAs, for example. toinnegS--peacorortneodvf,eENnPEdAiPscPhuSesa.sdiTnqghu--uasrptEeriProsArsitpailleilstowwPPietdGh rssetfagrtioeomsntaoPlPomfAfoiscv,eeps,efuermnngdiasttgibniengtgwscetiaetitnzeespntrsoo, goprraaprmtriecspipwaarititenhgoinuptloasnnelsty. That removed a powerful incentive for preparing a PPA: if a state agencycould reallocate funds without writing a PPA, the only benefit from negotiating the agreement was the hope that the negotiations would persuade a region to adjust its activities to help accomplish state goals. invoTlvheirddw, tahsearne ehxapslibceitepnuvrpeoryseliottlfeNpEuPblPicS,innveoitlhveermEePntAinnoNrEmPaPnSy. oAfltthheousgtahtegsedttiidnmg uthceh ptoubaldic vance it. EPAregions allowed statesto limitstheir effortsto perfunctory exerciseslikeholdingpublic hearings or placingnotices in newspapers. Some statestried to arousepublic interest, but found that mseelfn-atssswesesrme etonotsbarnodaPdPaAnsdwienrcelundoetdpatortoicmuluacrlhyignofoodrmvaehtiiocnlesafboorudtisrocuustsinioenasgweinthcyciptirzoegnrsa:mthse. docu How N EPP S Could Work The experience of the few7states that did take planning and public involvement seriously sugIglelisntsoihsohwadNEsiPgnPiSficmanigthstubcceecsosmine menograegeinffgecctiitviez.ens and advocacy groups. It tied the self- assessments that were part of writing PPAs directly to state-of-the-environment reports. Those reports are interesting, accurate, full of clear text and graphics, and widely publicized. The PstPaAtIens.a1lDs9oo9gi6no,gtthesenosvttioartooeknhmeclaedrnewtfauollirskptsslhaaonnpndsitnoogthgeert members of the public actively involved in preparing public comments on a state-of-the-environment report. Then it convened meetings to review7the second draft of its PPA. By the third PPA, it convened separate focusgroups of environmentalists, businesspeople, and local officialsto discussthe draft PPA in detail. Environmentalists were quite well organized, offering detailed comments. Texas and North Carolina have also actively sought public comments on draft PPAs. Min nageseontcaiehsaesnguasegdedittshseeplfu-abslsicesascmtievnetlyininmdeeevteinlogpsinwgitah stthaete-smtataendleagteisdlastutrraet.egInic apdladnititohna,t soovmere lapped with their PPAs. And other states have used a finished PPA as a tool to explain their programs to the public. theTphuobsliec,teacshwn7eiqlluaesstcoouenldcobuerdaugpeliacgaetnedcyelssteawffhteorec.oSneslifd-earsstehsesmsuecnctecsasensbaenad dsehvoirctecotomeinnggasgoef current programs. State agencies could ask businesses, local governments, and environmental Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00151 152 FIGURE 5-1 : STATES WITH NEPPS AGREEMENTS Environment.gov advocates to offer their assessments of environmental quality and agency performance. They cEoauclhdocfotnhdouscetscteupstsowmoeurldsuhrevlepyisdaenndtifcyotmhemmisosisotniminpdoerptaenntdeennvt iervoanlmuaetniotanlsisbsyueosuftascidinegpaarsttiaetse. agency, and thus the largest opportunities for improved performance. Even better, the NEPPS process could include an assessment of both state agencies and EPA rheagvieognraelaotfpfiocetes.nAtias ldfeosrcmribiseudndabeorsvtea,ntdhiengwso. rNkiEnPgPreSlactoiounldshsihpesdbseotmweeepnubEhPcAlirgehgtioonnsthane dimstpaoters tant support that EPA regions give states. And self-assessments of regions could begin to pro vide answers to the nagging question of why EPA regions employ just as many people after delegating programs to states than they did when they ran the programs themselves. If robust self-assessment and planning processes involve the pubhc, they might begin to bardidogwentwhearcdhasspmirableotwf elaexnetnhfeosrtcaetemceonmt amnidsswioenaekrsp'edrefsoirrmesafnocref.leDxiobnileitywaenlld, NEEPAPPsStafpfrofecaerssseosf could offer an opportunity for exploring evidence about whether state activities are having any impact on environmental conditions. Rigorouspubhc self-assessment and planning could place NEOPPfScoonurasne,ennotinreelyodfifthfeorseentmfoeuasnudraetsiown,ilalnwdoirmkpwroitvheotuhtesstyeastdeym, dsuetbesrtmanitniaeldlysiunptphoerftuftruorme. leaders in EPA, states, and other organizations. NEPPS is a process; it presents opportunities to Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00152 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 153 tackle tough issuesand make real environmentalprogress. If EPAand statesbegin to useNEPPS to bring critical information to the attention of the pubhc and decisionmakers, and if leaders in agencies, environmentalgroups, the media, and communities decide theywould rather address tmouogrehriaspsuidelsyththaanniigtnhoarse dthoenme ,sothfearn. NEPPS could transform environmental governance far Transforming an EPA Regional Office About one-third of EPA's regional staffers work on agency program s that cannot be del tewgaot-etdhitrodsstawteosr,ke.cglo, sSeulypewrfiuthnds,t2a3t1eosroonndtheolesgeattheadtpstraotgesrahmavseacnhdosoetnhetor nmoattttoerrusno.fTchoemomthoenr concern. Regions hold a pivotal position in EPA-state relations. They are responsible for managing gEstoPavtAeesrg,nrrmaenegtnisotsnt,oaalsntaadntedfso,croraovsegsrr-sebigaothrdtdeoeraflissotsaufteeEs,pPmrAosagnrdaaimrgeiscn,tgpcrEooPnvAtiad'csitnrwgeliasttphieotcnhisaehhipzpuesdbwhtcei.tchhInnloicacadaldl isatuinopdnp,otrtrihtbetaoyl provide a channel for state and local perspectives to flow to EPA headquarters staff Regional staff members often participate actively on agency-wide teams to draft new7programs and manBaegtwemeeennltaatepp1r9o9a3chaensd. 1999, Regional Administrator John DeVillars made EPAs Region 1 office in Boston one of the most dynamic centers of innovation in EPA. Earher he had been secretary of the environment in Massachusetts, and one of the governor'stop aides. But he did not share the view of many state officials that once EPA delegated programs to states, its re gteoxiopmnearalikmoefeftnihcteeastirsoehngo,iuoblndealsliehovrfiifnnikcg.e.I."n.asnttheaaindt s,EthiPteAutsiaaownnd7rfeoogtchiuoesrneardelgooufnflaictboeosryladsagcaehfnaocnricgeees.f..o..r.hianandlaonbv'toakrtaieotpontr.ypHafcoeertbwrioietldhd the times."232 DeVillars sought to transform the regional office in four ways. He challenged ingrained habits both by his own leadership style and by reorganizing the office. Second, he directed the new7Office of Environmental Stewardship to de-emphasize traditional inspections, and to tinhveemstemdioareofrfeiscoesurocfesaiirn, whealtpeirnagnsdpewc7aifsitceiinndtuosatrineeswp7rOevffeincet poofllEuctioosny.stTemhirPdr,ohteecctioonnsotolidwaoterdk directly with citizens in specific communities and with state environm ental agencies. And fourth, he sought to focus all of the region's work on results. To symbolize those transformations, DofefiVciialllasrisnchheaandgqeudarttheersnparmoetesotfedth, eanodffiictewfarsonmotEuPnAtilRJeagniuoanry12to00E0PtAhaNt eEwPAEAngdlmanidn.isStroamtoer Browner made the new name official. Jodi Perras reports that those efforts have led to significant change. And thus, although not necessarily the only model for changing the roles of EPA's regional offices, they represent a possible new7mission for the regions. New Structures, titles, and 1Hays of Thinking In 1992, shortly before DeVillars arrived, a management consultant reported that the re ganiodngaol aolffsiecettignagveMtoanoamgeurcshwaetrteensteitoinn tthoecirriswisayms,aannadgemmaennyt,fealnt deitlhacekreudncshyastlelemnagteicd polrabnonrinedg with their work. The average tenure of top managers was 20 years and five months, and a Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00153 154 Environment.gov majority had spent their entire career in one EPA media office. Many of the agency'sjunior managers believed their supervisors did not care enough to be helpful. DeVillars shook up the office. He combined separate air, water, waste, and toxics programs ionftothaenseixwsOtaftfeisceinotfhEecroesgyisotenm.23P3rTohteectOiofnficaendofpuEtnhvairlof ninmseenptaarlaStetemwualrtdhsnheidpibaroofufigchestfcoormeapclhi ance and pollution prevention staff into the same office as enforcers. Many top managers were re-assigned, and many lost their supervisory responsibilities, becoming senior technical advis ers. DeVillars pushed staff to rethink their jobs and embrace their new responsibilities. "A lot ocuftutisnwgetrherotouogbhubruetatuecr.r"a2t3i4c," said one regional manager. "John cut through it like a laser sword Using Enforcement and Compliance to Prevent Pollution The region's Office of Environmental Stewardship diverted staff from enforcement to pdoislilnuvteiostnedpirnevtreandtiitoionn, ainl sctraetaesoinvegrsthigahttginrsopuepctfioronms. Tthhreeneutmo b4e5rfouflli-ntsimpeecteiqonusivaanldenfitnwesodrkroeprsp.eIdt by about 60 per cent in the first sixmonths after the reorganization,235 which provoked a storm of protest from the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance at EPA headquarters. Once staff settled into their new responsibilities, those numbers increased somewhat, and tfhineerseogniomn aajdoorpinteddusattroiaulgfhirmapsp, raonadchsigonnemd aancyoennsefonrtcaegmreeenmt ceanstesf.orFoar$e3x5a0mmpliell,ioitnlecvleieadnulaprgoef PCB spills. The region also ordered the Massachusetts Military Reservation to stop training activities that scattered a million pounds of lead bullets a year, along with propellants and other litter, on land over the aquifer for 500,000 people. expBeruitmtheentcienngtrwailththtreucsht noifcathl easnseiswtaonfcfieceanwdasfotorbuesaeracnacrreoatsnadlothnrgewatiethnisntgicktrsa--distiimonualltaennefoourcsley ment if performance did not improve. It worked with trade associations, universities, states, environmental groups and other organizations to create new institutions offering technical assistance and less-polluting technologies for key business sectors. For example: the WUanrinvienrgsuitnyivoerfsiNtieeswabHouatm,popsssihbilreee,nafonrcneomuenntcainctgionths.eTahcetiornegiinona lleevttieerdtoa $235080c,0o0ll0egfeinseanadgauinnsit versity' presidents, and inviting them to attend a compliance assistance symposium. An over flow crowd responded; and universities and colleges began volunteering to help one another comply. it w'Vooulludntraerdyuacueditosrbeylcimheimniactaelcpoemnpaalntiieess. oInn tchheetmwiocaylepalrasnftoslltohwatincgonOdEuCctAed'saaundniotsuanncdemdiesnctlotsheadt violations, no New England firm stepped forward. So the region developed a two-year strategy in cooperation with trade associations and state agencies. Firms received letters announcing a two-year series of technical assistance workshops and targeted inspections. Forty-five percent poafnthiees c1o78ndcuhcetmedicaalspellfa-natusdiint: tahgeoroedgiroenspaottnesnedaecdcoarwdionrgkstohoOp,EaCnAd h10eapdlqanutasrtferorsmsteaifgfhAt ccoomn fidential survey conducted later by the region and a trade association found that 95 percent of the 31 firms replying said the workshops were helpful, 75 percent were more likely to conduct pserelfv-aeundtiiotsn, 4m8epaesurcreesn.t had actually conducted an audit, and 19 percent had adopted pollution- Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00154 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 155 Protecting Special Places The new regional Office of Ecosystem Protection has teams that work with state and local officials, environmental groups, and businesses in 17 "special places," including rivers, urban wianrhceiallused, teahsnedmrieovssettur aohrfaiedBs.oasP"teoDrnh"aaipnnsdwthCaetaehmrigbqhuriaedlsgitteyp.,roiItfniwle1o9ue9flfd5o,erttahirseninraentghi"eoAnC'--mhaafridlsehesatRbhlieeveaarnnwndoasutwenircmsehamebdel,enwtehvthiecrahyt day of the year--by 2005. The Charles River initiative grew out of an enforcement action EPA took against the MassachusettsWaterAuthority, aregional agencyresponsible forwastewatertreatment in eastern Mstoarsmsawchautesretrtusn. oTfhf,eaanudthpooroirtyincformasptrluacintuerdetthhaattEcoPmAbwinasedigtnooarlilnogwnroanwpsoeiwntasgoeutroceflso,wpriinmtoartihlye river. Rather than the traditional one-problem-at-time approach, the water authority wanted EPA to consider more holistic remedies. DeVillars sent letters to all of the facilities in the tdCieohrnatsar.lkeDesevRVoilivullenartraswrtyahteeenfrfsohcrhetsdaltltoehnaagdtedhdraedtshseptehhreemafiudtlssl,oriafnnfsgoeervmeorifanlngloatnrhgpeeomifnaotcifalinatdierosputoonindftoosrmofuurapceccoopmarloiitbnilogenmintsosptuhenact stood in the way of meeting water-quality goals for the watershed. A large environmental advocacygroup, major universities, and several large employers are members of that coalition, which has a small staff It operates independently of EPA, but the regional office does coordi nateEPoAn sNoemwe pErnogjelcatnsd. also used traditional regulatory tools, pushing local governments to clean up combined sewer overflows. But it assisted those governments as well: by examining maps of city sewer systems to identify outfallsthat had never been permitted, for example, and bitnhyfeoswirgmantiecnrigstihmzeedenm.sTtohhraaetnrsdeiagmioopflnyualpnoidcfekfriicsnetgaanuldspointhrgealdspheetadainloidrnggcalcneoaizmneinpegldiauuncpcaetaifpotelnaranltshpwerioirtghdraoemgacsshwaoonfudtlphduegbtooliwcainltoysntiong way to cleaning up the river. Each day, for example, red or blue flags at key access points along theArinvderthteellricviteirzeisnms wuchhetchleeranthere. rIitvsegrriasdceleraonsethfraotmda"yD. " to "B" by 1999, and the number of d2a0y0s5,thbauttthcleearrivlyerthisesrweigmioanbalel iannitdiaftiisvhea--bleesdpoecuiballelyd.thTehreerpiovretr cmaardy--nohtagseitncarsetarsaeigdhcto"mAp'liin ance, supported voluntary efforts by citizens and businesses, forced local governments to take action, and brought the goal within reach. A New Approach to Oversight EPA New England also changed its approach to state oversight. All six states in the region have participated in NEPPS since 1997, writing both PPAs and PPGs. Several PPAsinclude not ospnelycifqicuagnotaitlastfiovregeastthimeraitnegs mofispsirnogpodsaetda.improvements in environmental conditions, but also mulTtihmeerediiasoliftftilceeds,oounbetftohraetatchhe srteaoterg, panroizvaidtieona shinelgpleedpoeinnctooufrcaognettahcattthpaatrthieclippsatmioank.eTNhEePsPixSwork smoothly The reorganization also encourages regional staff to get into the field more often, improving communications between the region and states. Staff also had to become faarmrainligaermweinthts,abburtoasdoemrerahnagdetoofimEPpArovperotghreaimr sc.omSommuenirceagtiioonna,ltsetaamffwfolorukr,isahnedd ninegtohteiantieown Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00155 156 Environment.gov skills. And, of course, some EPA staff felt that the agency had less control over state activities, and openly longed for the old days. Due to the steep learning curve, some staff reluctance, and staff attrition, the region was initiallyhampered in its ability to provide expert technical advice tiongsTatahmteeuraletgigeminoecndieiasal.,soafctehra-nthgee-dfaictstaapppprrooaacchh ttohaotviesrcsoignhsitsotefnsttwatiethenNfEorPcPeSm.ePnrtioprrotogr1a9m9s3,,eremgbiornacal enforcement staff had sampled case files, accompanied state inspectors on some visits to facili ties, and conducted detailed quantitative reviews of enforcement statistics for individual media programs. Starting in 1994, the region'sOffice of Environmental Stewardship began multime vdiisaitps,robgurtaimt arlesoviecwons.dTuchteedofyfeicaerlsotinllgs,tpurdoiegdrasmom-weiidnedrivevidieuwals,cawsheiscahnidncselundteindsdpiescctuosrssioonnsswomithe state managers about enforcement pohcies, documentation of improvements in state programs, and written reports with specific recommendations. Since 1999, those reviews have covered cstoamtUepnlaliniakdnecreaengayisosoinstahtalenrecnEefPoeArffcoreermtgseioansnt,wpEerPollAgarsNamteraws.dEiAtinogcnloaamnl demnuiftsoteerdceePomPfeAnsstta.totewaonrdk oreugtiaognraeleemnefonrtcseamboeuntt officialsmeets regularly Although states and the region still disagree about penalties, and about the appropriate mix of enforcement and assistance, the working relationships are generally cooperative and amicable. andApltrhaoctuigcehs,thtehenerweg' iaopnprdoidacnhosthsihftreidnkthferofmocutosufgrohmcriintidciivsmid.uaItl tcoaoseksstoomberosatadtesstattoe tpaoshkcfioesr levying inappropriately smallpenalties--or none at all--on many violations, and it complained about under-staffing in some states. When a budget cut threatened the Rhode Island agency wfeidtheraal1p7ropgerracmens.t rTehdeuclteigoinslaintusretarfefstthoererdegthioenfaulnodfsf.ice threatened to withdraw delegation of Managing for Results Despite the success of the Charles River initiative, Perras reports that the region has not yet devTelhoepegdoaalsstorof nthgecruelgtuioren'osfegnofoarlcseemttienngt/acnodmmphananagceinrgeffoorrmresswuletsr.e that firms would under stand regulatory' requirements more fully, conduct self-audits, comply with regulations, and prevent pollution. The region did not develop ways to measure success or failure until OECA objected to the reforms, and it stillhas difficulty in developing useful measurement information. conTdhuectmbeofsotrree-laianbdl-eafwtearyitnospaescsetisosncsoomfpahraanncdeoamndsapmolpluletioonf fpirrmevse.nBtiuotnthweoruelgdiohnavdeebciedeendtiot would be a far better investment of inspectors'time to send them to firm sthat were more likely to have violations. Regional staff developed a confidential survey form to send to firms, but getting approval from the Office of Management and Budget was difficult and time-consum ing. Furthermore, 0 MB directed the region not to regard the surveyresults as a random sample: pimrepsruomveadbltyhefiirrmpsratchtaicterse.plied to the survey were more likely to have attended workshops and Reorganization efforts have also been complicated by pressure from EPA headquarters to deliver results and numbers that fit the agency's 10 GPRA goals. Even though the region orga npilzaendni1n0g tseyasmtesmt,osttaryfftfooualnidgnittehxetr"asopredciinaalrpillya'cdei"ffieccuolstytostefimt thperorejegcitosnw'simthutlhtiemaegdeinaceyff'soGrtsPiRntAo that structure, which islargely built around separate EPA programs. There are a small number Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00156 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 157 of GPRA sub-goals for distinct sub-national places--e.g, the Great Lakes--but EPA New England's special places had no home in the hierarchy of GPRA goals. Furthermore, since many GPRA measures count activities of separate agency programs rather than changes in memuiAlstsismitohenedsiroaergweioonnrvkis,rtoraunngmdgelfernodtmatlocfmoocneudasisituniorgenosth,nethoreveespruraleltslssrouefsrueitlsftsoi.nrnGoPvaRtiAonnsu,mit fbaecresddpisrtersascutreedtostparffodfruocme other measures of agency activities. One of the most frustrating pressures concerned the Clean Water Act requirement that NPDES permits be reissued every five years. Like many other regions and states, EPA New England developed a large backlog of NPDES permit renewals. Iqnuamliatynythraivneirsspaonldlultaekdersu, tnhoefpfoBinutt fsaocuerdcewsitthhactroitbictaailnrethpoosretspbeyrmthietsEaPrAe lIenssspoefcatotrhGreeant etorawl aatnedr the GeneralAccounting Office, and criticism from Congress and environmental advocates, the region eventually pulled staff off other work to work down the backlog. Transformation or Turmoil? The reorganization of the region was not popular. Changing EPA New England ran into the same opposition as NEPPS did. Program managers in the regional office objected to the multimedia organization, and the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance pro tpeosltleudtiostnrepnrueovuensltyiown hinesnteDadeVoiflltarrasdiatsiosinganleedn2fo0rcoefmthenet 1a2ct0ivOitiEesC.AIn-dfuenedde, dOEstCafAf taondwothrke roen gion were unable to agree on work plans for fiscal years 1998 and 1999. DeVillars admits he could have handled the reorganization in a better way For example, athltehirouregchohmemsepnednatt1io8nms.oWnthhsensetehkeinrgeosrtgaaffnriezsaptioonnsetotookheisffpeclatnins, 1h9e9c5h,obsoethnoatntoinftoelrlonwalmopainnyioonf surveyand a separate surveybyPEER, PublicEmployeesforEnvironmentalResponsibility, showed that a large majority of regional staff opposed the reorganization. Editorials in the Boston press criticized the reorganization, as well as the other changes that the region was making Four years later, however, most EPA stafij state officials, and others seem to agree that the rtueorer--ganthizeaitniognraainneddtwheayresaosfsitghninmkeinngt oanf dloancgti-ntegr--m opfrothgerarmegimonaanlaogfefircseh. a(vIteiscqhuaintgeeddiftfhiceulctutlo quantify such a change, however, and the Academy did not ask Perras to conduct a formal opinion survey)Many interviewees in the regional office said they had a much broader view7of the agency's work, and of their own jobs. State officials reported that regional staff seemed to bapepmrooarcehctoonceenrfnoercdeambeonuttiennv19ir9o9n,m2e2nlteaaldreesrsulotsf. mWahjeonr rtehgeioBnoastlonenGvliorboencmrietinctiazledgrDouepVsi--llairns' cluding the Conservation Law Foundation, the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, and Save the [Narragansett] Bay--sent a letter to the editor that said: "En.g. l.aJnodh'ns eDnveViroilnlamrsenhta.sHbieseennfaorhciegmhleynet fpferoctgivraemle--adceorminbinpirnogteacgtignrgesNsivewe, tough actions against violators with effective compliance assistance--isnoth ing short of outstanding. There is no one in the country that has taken more tough, groundbreaking stands on major environmental issues.236 On the other hand, many regional employees remember DeVillars with decidedly mixed emotions, and both regional and headquarters staff complain that the reorganization will not Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00157 158 Environment.gov be truly workable as long as EPA headquarters is organized by media offices. But states like Massachusetts that have also reorganized to disband media offices do seem comfortable. Ultimately the verdict on the reorganization and on DeVillars'leadership stylewilldepend, in part, mostnaatntehyaerneedfsfpreeecgctitivso,ennbaeulstsstaaosfffworietthhpeoNrrtEatsPhpPaetSctt,hsteohefdahpyirs-otcaoeg-sdesnayodafwtforoarrkncsohffoamrnmgaean.tyiIonfnriotiinastlf-raliernsfeurlortesmgaircoeonmpalrpoelmmetipes.lionBygoeetihns has changed very little over the past five years. The following chapter addresses this question squarely: is transformation possible? How7 deep must it run? How might it occur? Findings proFgrianmdsinmgor1e. Some states are beginning effectively and efficiently A to use performance-based tools to manage their small but increasing number of state environmen tal agencies has invested in performance-based management systems. They have: gathered better data about changing environmental conditions published and publicized state-of-the-environment reports ctaolnpdruoctetecdtiosnerious self-assessments of whether their activities contribute to environmen thought strategically about how to improvement their performance engaged the public and state legislators in framing their goals and strategies used tools like Florida's "focus-watch" system to manage for results The art of performance management is still at an early stage in environmental policybehind education, health, and some other policy areas. There are significant technical prob tliefmicsrienlamtieoanssuhriipnsg; aenndviraognemneenratalllapcekrfoofrmevaanlcuea:tipvaeuicniftoyromfastoiolind daabtoau;tupnrcoegrtraaimntye7fafebcotuivtesnceisesn. Performance management does not eliminate controversy or give managers simple answers to complex problems; rather it focuses the attention of decisionmakers and the public on re sults, and thus encourages creative thinking and more effective policies and programs. Because ostfateenlveigriosnlamtoernstaanl dpeortfhoerrmdaenccisei,otnhmeyarkaerreslyaruesaewmaeraesoufrethseatleocnhentoiccahl oshoosertcaopmaritnigcusloafrmcoeuarssuereosf action. In some states, however, they are beginning to use such data to fine-tune proposals and explain them to the pubhc. Thus performance measurement and management may, over tune, begin to frame issues and shape pubhc debate. Performance measurement will improve more rapidly when EPA and state agencies invest tdheeciirsioennmeragkieesrsiunsemsouncihtodraintaginenmvairkoinngmdeenctiasliocnosn. dLietgioisnlsatorarst,heenr vtihroannmaecntitvailtiaedsv, oacnadtesw, hanend managers could be using performance measurement far more effectively and creatively than they are currently formFitnhdeinEPgA2-.sTtahtee National Environmental Performance Partnership System sought to trans relationship, encouraging priority7setting, multimedia management, and Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00158 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 159 more effectivejoint efforts for environmental protection. However, because NEPPS is an over lay on a deeply entrenched culture that focuses on process rather than results, it has had a marginal impact on most states, and its future viability is in doubt. paagretEmiePesA,natansndydsdtmeismocssotuthsrtaaagtteefobecrnuovsairdoontnhdmineetkaniintlaegldaabagocecunoct uieennstviainrrgeonosmtfiltelhndeteaealpcplteyivrfciotoiremms moanfitcateegd.eOntocrigterasanadinzitadiotirnoeangl,umplalaatennd ning and budgeting systems, incentive systems, management styles, and profoundly ingrained procedures and attitudes all reinforce a focus on producing specific activities. The agencies' information systems focus on the regulatory process--permits, emissions, inspections, and ecnofnocrecnetmraetnedt aocntiostnast--e prraotcheesrsetsh.aTnhoant emnavkireosnimt heanrtdalfcoornthdeitipounbs.licAtnoduEnPdAerostvaenrdsigahntdhpaasrltoicnig pate effectively in debates about state pohcies and programs. It also frustrates state officials in their efforts to adapt federal programs to local conditions, and to find more effective ways to iandtdoNreaEsrPsguPemnSveeinnrotcsnomaubreaonguteatslpsirstoascuteeessd.tuoDrgaelabtdahetetearsiblase.btoteurtetnhveirsotrnemngetnhtaolfdsattaateanpdrosgertapmrios roitfiteesnfdoer geennveirroante mental protection. But it has had significant impact in only the few states where top agency officials were personally committed to the new approach, or where there was a tradition of strategic planning and management. ciesNaEnPdPESPAdidregciroenatse, bouptptoorptuEnPitAieosfffoicriacllsogsearvecowoepaekraatniodninbceotwnseiestnentotpsuopfpfiociratltsoinNEstPatPeSa,gaennd program directors in most regional offices and some states resisted it openly Enforcement was especially controversial, with many state officials maintaining that EPA should judge their ptianeirNlefoderwamcEacnnogcuelnatbninydg,rweosfhueelntrsefortarhcteheemreregtnihotananacltbiovyfiftpiiceroescbceyosmsb,obatihnndeEdPEAmPAure'lsgtieimonnefosdriacane,dmafsettenartte-tosh.fefCi-cfoeancifntlisacisststweinsagssmmoenuntdteoedf state enforcement and compliance assistance efforts, along with tough criticism of perceived state shortcomings. NEPPS promised a two-track system for EPA-state relations, allowing more flexibility to tshtaetiersptehraftoramchainevcee,d soouEtsPtaAndbiancgkeednvdiorownnm. eEnPtAal arensdulEtsC. OStSatedsidreasigsrteeed oannycoforermmaelarsaunrkeisntghaotf might allow comparison of state performance, but many states refused to report all measures, and EPA has decided not to assemble--even at the regional-office level--the data that could make such comparisons possible. botNh osttwatietshsatnadndrienggiointssswhoerretctoomcinognsd,utchtesreeriisousisgsneiflfic-aasnsteessvmideenntcseththaatteNngEaPgPeSd cthoeulpduwbloircka. cIf tively, and use those assessments as the foundation for planning and budgeting, the EPA-state partnership could be far more productive. Finding 3. EPA's 10 regional offices, which employ 8, 753 people--nearly 40 percent of fElPexAi'bsitloittyalwsitthaftfhoefn1e8ed,96to7--mapilnatyaitnhethceenintrteagl rriotlyeoinf EbPaAla'nscniantgiotnhael nreegeudlafotorriynnsyosvtaetmio.nTahnedy also must cope with the inevitable differences between state and federal priorities. They must consider their special responsibilities for cross-border environmental problems, and for han gdiloinngalEoPfAfi'cserselaarteioinnsdheiepds awtitthhetrfirboanltgloinveeronfmtreanntssfaonrmd ilnogcaEl PgAovienrtnomaenptesr,foarsmwaenllc.eT-dhreivreen organization. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00159 160 Environment.gov Many of the innovative approaches piloted at EPANew England have been quite successful and could be transferred to other regions: the blending of compliance assistance with tradi tional enforcement; intensive goal-driven work with other agencies in high-profile watersheds aanndcecaocmtivmituiensi.tiTesh;earnedgiaofntehra-tshceo-fmacbtinmeudlttoimugehdniaesosvteorwsiagrhdtsovfiosltaattoersewnfiothrcfelemxeibnitliatyndincdoemalpinlig with companies, local governments, and state agencies that sought more efficient, more effec tive approaches to environmental protection. The EPA New England model isnot perfect, not the only way to transform a regional office, and, indeed, may not work in other regions, each of which has unique characteristics and problems. Recommendations Despite its poten tial, NEPPS cannot succeed, or EPAregional offices transform them selves as needed, without substantial changes in EPA as a whole. If NEPPS isto be a tool that focuses ncoatuinotnraylkantotewnthioown ownelleintsvigrooanlms aernetableipnrgobmleemt,st,heanadg--enpcyermhaupstscmhaonrgeeimfupnodratmanetnlyta--llyleittss tohlde ways. To prevent NEPPS from being yet another ebbing tide of reform, the agency must allow' states--and itself--room to demonstrate further the capacities for innovation and results that exist among federal, state and local government managers, as well as in industry, nongovern mental organizations, and the public itself The Academy panel thus makes the following rec ommendations for the agency and its partner states. /. Renew the commitment to NEPPS. shipEtPhAroaungdhsNtaEtePsPsSh.ouInldcroennseuwlt7atthieoinr wcoitmhmloictmalegnotvteorntrmanesnftos,rmnaintigonthael afendderreagl-isotantael reenlvatirioonn mental groups and businesses, EPA and the states should reform that partnership program . ConEgPrAessansdhosutaldtepsrsohvoiudledaangyreneecoenssaahryigshtaetrutfoloryo-rafuorthpoarritziactiipoantiofonr ianrNefEoPrmPSed, iNncEluPdPiSng. : a. Selfassessment. States should prepare full self-assessments, setting environmental priorities and analyzing progress based on analysis by both agency staff and independent experts. EPA should offer support to states for developing models for such assessments. Regional offices should also complete self-assessments of their own activities and performance. b. Publicparticipation. States and EPA regions should make creative and effective efforts to penugbahgceinlefgriasmlationrgs,perniovriirtoiensmaenndtaalssaensdsibnguspinroegssregsrso. ups, local governments, and the c. Coreperformance measures. All states should compile core performance measures; EPA should gather them and make them pubhely available. d. Grants. EPA should make performance partnership grants only to states that have completed performance partnership agreements. e. Arfter-therfactoversight. Regional offices should not conduct "real-time" oversight of state programs that are participating in NEPPS. Instead, regions should monitor state perfor mfacatnecveatlouaatsiosunrseotfheantvsitraotensmaernetaclopmeprflyoirnmgawncitehaNsEpaPrPtSofangeregeomtiaetnintsg, raenndewcoenddaugcrteeamfteern-ttsh.e- Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00160 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 161 EPA should encourage all states to participate in NEPPS. To that end, it should invest in substantial improvements in environmental monitoring, measurement, and evaluation. In addition, regional offices should conduct self-assessments with public participation regardless pooapfrewtriachtieipotahnteisorsnsutfiafntiecNsieEpnaPtlryPtiStco,ipebanetacebaluiensetNhneEomPtPtaoSll.psaBtarutteitcsEihpPaaAvteesfbhuuolluiylltdipnebNrefEosParmPtisSaf.ineNcdeowmsiitanhngllaeegsmesm-othdeaennlt-iisunpntooivsteshirbesnlae-l for the EPA-state relationship because federal-state relationships are inherently dynamic, state capacities and institutions are diverse, and some conflicts between state and national goals are inevitable. of dNifEfePrPeSntisahloouvldernsiogthitnbcalusedde uap"otwn oa-tgreancekr"icsydsetefimnitfioornsotafte"ss,uopreprrioorv"idpeefroforramfaonrcmea. lIpnrsotecaedss, EPA should offer substantial additional discretion, including waivers to regulatory require ments for delegation of EPAprograms, to states that make firm commitments to achieve speci fmieednetanlvgirooanlsm. eInntaadl dpietriofonr,mEaPnAceshthoautldmoofrfeerefsfuicchiendtilsycraentdioneffteoctsitvaetelys mfoereitnsnnoavtaiotinvaelpernovgirraomn designs that hold promise for substantially more efficient and more effective environmental performance, such as the implementation of cap-and-trade systems to reduce air pollutants or nutrients in watersheds. EPA should encourage states to ask for such discretion to test "perfor mance track" regulatory systems; other promising ways to address non-point problems; and addTithioenEaPl Ainnaodvmaitnivisetraaptporrosahcohuelds tgoivaedadrseesnsiotorpagneantcioynmalanenagvierrownmhoenistaalcpcoriuonrittaibesle. directly to the administrator responsibility- for NEPPS, other EPA-state relationships, and the manage ment of EPA's system of regional offices. 2. Revitalize regional offices. As states assume operational responsibilities for federal program s and develop innovative waysof accomplishing their own and national environmental goals, the role of the EPAregions becomes more important, not less. Regional offices play the pivotal role in balancing flexibility wEPitAh pshreosuelrdviantivoingooraftethietsinreteggiorintya-looffftichees,naantidoncalalrisfyysttehmeirorfoelensv. ironmental regulation. Thus Regions should be held accountable for improvements in environmental performance, in cluding effective performance by states under NEPPS, addressing high-priority regional envi ronmental issues, and contributing to the achievement of national environmental goals. reguRleagrimoneaeltiandgms iannidstrcaotmorms ushnoicualdtiohnavweitthhethneecaedsmsairnyisttoraotlosrtoanadssduerepuetfyfeacdtimveinpiesrtfroatromr;ansuceb: stantial regional budgetary authority; sufficient and capable staff; and authority to make deci sions about state performance plans, proposals for waivers, and approval of innovative state programs. 3. Reform the GPRA planning and budgeting systems. EPA should accommodate both NEPPS and regional accountability a. EPA's GPRA systems should encourage regional and other place-based goals. b. bEePtwAesehnosutladteenacnoduEraPgAe gsotaatless, atondesrteacbolinschileentvhierodnimffeernetnaclegsotaolst,hdeefeixnteendtifpfeorsesinbclees. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00161 162 Environment.gov c. EPA should finalize its Part 35 regulations to allow maximum state flexibility in the use and accounting of expenditures under Performance Partnership Grants. The agency should not request or report state expenditures in greater detail than required in PPG tahpaptliaccactioounnst.inIfgnreucleesssaalrlyo,wEsPtAatesshofluelxdibsielietky riengsupleantodriyngorthsetiartuPtPoGrys.changes to ensure Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00162 CHAPTER 6 Transforming EPA one of the innovations discussed in the previous chapters can flourish without major management changes at EPA. Those innovations are not simplynew tools that could be dropped into the old tool kit of regulation, permit, inspection, and enforcement. laollnogwa' nsothne-IEnrsPetsAeualedtm,istphtleooyyimtereapsnrtosofvomermaekntevhikereouynsdmeeoecfnisttiraoalndpsirtoaiobtenocautlitroeenmgubislyastiaooprnyrs'eatsoncodrlisbc. eoSdnotmaromelooteufcnthhtn.eoTplhorogegyierssah,miafsst EPAs role from making day-to-day decisions--or watching closely as state agencies make decisions--about compliance by individual firms to one of setting rules for decisions, and then evaluating whether programs are achieving promised environmental results. Further mmoenrets, wabitohuint sthoeciianlncoovstastiavnedprporgorgarmams, EefPfeActeivmepnleosyse, ersatmhaekr ethdaenciasiboonustbtaescehdniocnalbcroleaadnjuupdgin individual cases. This chapter assesses EPAs efforts to build the capacity it needs to maintain the integrity of ttchhoeerelnapasrttoidogenrca'samdreesg.--uTlShatiuosprreyercfsouyrnsdtdeimasneadnsctiohtsuerrOoaglfefiincsghe,iofatfst.lEeIntasfeotxurpcpleatmionesanhptooawinndtE.CPSAoumpheparslfiuatrnnadcneshfAaossrsmmuaeraddnetcwseuo--bosotfvainetsr tial progress in embracing a broader more results-oriented vision of its purposes, and OECA has begun to do the same. But the reforms in Superfund and enforcement have not required EPA to surrender day-to-day control of decisions about compliance by individual firms. edgTe,haencdhsakpiltlesrthaelsyowreilvl ineewesdEinPAthseeffuftourrtes:tonoetqouniplyitdsoetmhepilrojyoebess, wbuitthtothienfionrfmormanadtioinnv,oklvneotwhle public as well. Here the story is sobering. With many hesitations and false starts, the agency is just beginning to build the capacityto understand how'environmental conditions are changing, paasgreewpneadlraleaffosorrwtahheewtmohrealrdnEaogPfeApmearefnnodtrmsstteaapntesceae-nfbfdoarstthesdeapmreraomngaragakmeimngiemnaptn.ryovdeifmfeernetnscteh. eTahgeencchyapmtuerstomffaekrse atno Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00163 164 Environment.gov Reinventing Superfund Superfund is"an old program that has learned new tricks," according to Robert Nakamura and Thomas Church of the State University of New York at Albany, who assessed Superfund refoSrumpsefrofurnthdeisA"ccaodmemmayn23d7-and-control" from top to bottom. Congress created the program in 1980, when toxic wasteswere discovered oozingfrom the ground at a school at Love Canal, near Niagara Falls. The statute238 gives EPA extensive authority' to manage the cleanup of hazardous waste sitesthat EPA includes on itsNational Priority List (NPL) The agency has the responsibility for taking emergency actionsto contain wastes and prevent human exposuresto toxics, and then to dcoevnitsaemaincaletiaonnu.pTshtreatsetgaytu, utesueaxlplyrefsisneasnacecdlebarypsroemfeereonrcaellfoorf ptheermpaarntieenstrcelsepaonnuspibs.le for the original The statute takes an extreme position on the "polluter pays" principle. Any entity that has sent hazardous waste to a Superfund site, has transported such waste, or has owned or operated the site may be liable to pay for any, or all, of the cleanup. Liability is "joint and several," that iosu, taorefsbpuosnisniebslse oprarctayninsohtabalfefofrodr ttohepfauylltchoesitrosfhacrlee,aneuvepnififotthhaert rpeasrptoyncsoibnlteripbaurtteiedsohnalvyeagtoinnye amount of waste. Liabilityisalso retroactive and strict. Responsible partiesmust pay for cleanup even if they sent wastes to a site before the law7was passed, used the best management practices at the time, or were encouraged to do so by government agencies. on WremhielediEaPtiAoncaantntohot dseelseigteast.eIanutthhoosrietycfaosersS,uEpPeArfusntadffsirteestationtshtehsetaftiensa,lsoaumtehostraittyes(hseulbpjewctotrok court oversight) to make decisions about cleanup standards and means. (In addition, several states have developed their own statutes governing cleanups at hazardous waste sites, the vast pmuabjSloiorcimtpyeretoismfsewedsh-ficocohrnmfalriocertenin-oegtxptoernnesstshivueereNcslPeoLann.c)uepwsraancdkefdasttheer aScutipoenr,fuwnhdaptervoegrrathme.pAritcme.oCstomsitpesa,ntihees and local governments potentially responsible for those cleanups complained that the program was costly and unfair. They also were critical of the fact that different EPA regions ran the program differently causing substantial inequities in the costs of similar cleanup efforts. In l1it9t8le6h, eEaPltAh sritsaktetdo tpheaotp, lceo.2n39trTarhyatto, opfrecvoauirlsine,gmpaudbehcmoapniyniwono,ndSeurpwerhfyunsducshitaeslaprogseepderrecleantitvaegley of the agency's budget was pouring into unneeded cleanup actions. Thus by the early 1990s, pressure was building for reform. Even before the Clinton Admin istration took office, stakeholders from all sides of the issue had convened to try to reach con osefnasulesgoisnlaatisveet coofmrepcroommmiseenthdaattidoindsnfoort mCoaknegrietsthsraonudgthheCoagngenrecsys.TThheeirbriellp'sofratibluerceaomnelythheeicgohrte ened the sense that action was needed. In the early years of the Clinton Administration, it looked as if Congress and the adminis tration would work together to draft and adopt legislation to make the Superfund program more cost-effective and responsive to community needs. When a coalition in Congress fell raepianrvte,nhtoSwuepveerrf,ucnhdantocebsef"ofraslteegri,sflaaitreedr,raenfodrmmodrieedef,fiacniednti.n" 1995, EPA announced it would The Superfund Reforms The administrative reforms were extensive. Nakumura and Church report they amounted to a "fundamental modification of goals, norms, and operational procedures" for EPA regions.240 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00164 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 165 The agency relaxed its insistence on "polluter pays" by stepping forward to pay for up to 25 percent of the costs of cleanup, assuming the responsibility for "orphan shares" left behind when responsible parties had gone out of business or could not afford to pay EPA sought to mubnyaickfeoearmsthinleygptIrhnoegthpreraamncatimmceoerooeffcefhqaauirringtaeibnsslge, bibtigymchooadrvipfiinoegrdartiietosgniinostnteharelporfeufftlailctceioossnat doomff cjionleiinsatnteuarpnt,dhweshepvirceohrgahrlaalimdabfoimlrictoieredes them to seek compensation from other responsible parties. To reduce the overall costs of cleanup, EPA issued "land use" guidance and adopted "pre sumptive remedies" that allowed staff to consider--before selecting remedies--how sitesmight rsetaansodnaardblfyobr ecluesaendupintthhaetfwutouurled. Bmeafkoereetahcehcshiatengsaef,eEePnAoutrgihedfotor raecshidieevnetiaaludneifvoerlmoprmisekn-bt,adseady care facilities, and schools--regardlessof the likelihood of such uses. The reform allowed cleanup standards to be designed for whatever uses are reasonably expected to occur. If a site were not teTonhbsauetruicnshegadtnhfgoaert riimtewspidalisecncitcoleynstr,aetihlnaeexdaegdaentnhdceuynswltiaoktueulltdye'tosofptceraenufleseeraevhneacrsemofmotorepoheufrtmmheaancnohennetatalcmthleiaonnrauttihpoesn.einnvpirlaocnemaefntet.r EPA also relaxed the threat of future liability for owners of contaminated sites identified by states but not yet on the National Priority List. It "archived" three-quarters of those sites and began sending "comfort letters" or writing "prospective purchaser agreements" at other sites, colnartihfyeinNgPELP24A1's intent not to invoke Superfund's tough liability provisions by placing the sites The most popular part of EPA's Superfund reinvention efforts has been its Brownfields program, which is much smaller than Superfund. It has directly financed redevelopment of sites posing a low risk of human exposures to toxics. The program has awarded $65 million in pfulanndnfionrgcgleraannutsptaon3d0r0edceovmemloupnmiteienst,aatn6d8msitaedse.242$40 million available from a revolving loan EPA leaders have proudly proclaimed the success of that reinvention effort. They point to data showingthat cleanups had been completed at 50 per cent of allNPL sitesby 1999, up from only five per cent in 1991, and that cleanups had begun or were complete at 90 percent of all NPL sites, up 30 percent during those same years243 The agency now predicts that all current NprPedLicsittsetsh, eaxt ctheeptptohloicsieeastitfeindsetriatul fteacdiliintieths,ewpirllobgeracmlea'snreedinuvpenwtiiothninwfiilvlecyuetathrse. Tcohsetsaogfecnlceyanaluspo by over $1.3 billion.244 The 1995 reinvention, however, should not get all the credit for speeding the pace and ycueattrisnogfthpleanconsintsgo, fhtcilgeaatniounp,saantdNePnLginaneedriontghedreshiagznawrdeoreuscowmasintegstiotefsr.uAittiomnaannyywsiateys:,bthye1l9o9n5g, many sites were ready for final decision and construction or completion. In addition, some of the cleanup technologies that the program promoted in early years, especially for permanent decontamination of groundwater, were proving to be ineffective and extraordinarily costly. Thus it was perhaps inevitable that the agency would back away from the goal of permanent nclaetaionnu.p and accept containment as a more reasonable "solution" for some kinds of contami Nakamura and Church conclude, however, that the reinvention reforms had a significant impact. They studied closelythe implementation of the program in two Northeast regions that manadnamgaedae tmhiardjoor fchthaengNePsLinsSiteusp.eTrfhuenyd.found that regional officials took reinvention seriously Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00165 166 Environment.gov Managing the Reforms The 1995 reinvention effort was the latest in a series of efforts to reform the program. Congress amended the statute in 1986, and top EPA officials attempted periodicallyto increase toChuhesulpyracachnearoelypfzocerldet .at2hn45autpInrse, tiahnnvedepntaotsiotm,nmawkaeansythfareer pgmirooongrearalsmoufcfcmiceiosasrlfesuhletfahfdiacnrieensthitsetaenedadrrleeiqfeourriemtaffsbo.lreTt.shNtheaeekymahmpahduarpsairseavnoidn enforcement, on getting responsible parties to pay as much of the costs of cleanup as possible, and on high standards for remediation were deeply lodged in the statute--and in the manage ment of the program in regional offices. venTtiohne p1l9a9n5srderienwvehnetiaovnilwy aosnmidoeraesstuhcactetshsefurletghiaonnaelarolfifeircersefthoermmsseblevceasuhsaedthbeeeangednecvye'lsorpeiinngover the years, ideas with which they were comfortable. Furthermore, top EPA managers gave regional staff substantial flexibility in applying the reinvention ideas. And the administration mkeand"eprreoignrvaemnt.ing Superfund a priority : President Clinton himself called Superfund a "bro Perhaps the most important reason for Superfund's transformation was that Congress ap peared likely to implement its threat to make dramatic changes in the program. In 1993 and 1994, the agency participated in intensive congressional negotiations for statutory reforms that would leave most of the program intact--only to have Congress reject compromise legislation matothree dlarsatmmaitnicutree.foWrmhesn, stuhcehRaespaubbalnicdaonnsintogojkoicnotnatrnodl osefvCeroanlgliraebsisliityn; 1a9n9d5,tuthrneiynpgremssaendagfoer ment of the program over to states. Although Congress did not pass that legislation either, many Superfund employees recognized that if the program did not change, the legislative ttaihsoesna1ut9alt9kw4e olheuoglldidsl.ca2o4t6invteinpuroe--poasanlds manidghtht ebe19su9c4ceeslesfcutilo. nNsatkhaem"curriatiacanldeCvehnutr"cthhactalml tahdeefraeiliunrveenof Ihe Results o f Reinvention Nakamura and Church say that the years since 1994 have been the "finest hour" of the SupWerhfuenndEpPrAogarcacmep. tBedutctohnetasitnormyeinstnooft ocvoenrt.amination as an acceptable alternative to com plete cleanup, the agency required "institutional controls" such as zoning or restrictive cov enants in deeds. The agency also committed to monitor each of the sites every five years to benehsuinredtshcahterdeumleaiinnimngakcionngtiatmsfiinvaet-iyoenarwmooulnditnooritnpgrveisseitnst. Tsihgneivfiicsaitnstarrieskcso.sFtloyr, aantdunraer,eElyPAfouwnads any flaws in the containment systems, so managers began allocating scarce resources to clean ups instead. Nakamura and Church suggestthat the agencypermit self-certification by property owners, as in the Massachusetts Environmental Results Program, in lieu of inspections by public em preloqyueieres.sTphoet imnsopveecwtioonusldb,yofeictohuerrsfee,dpeursahl tohresctaotset ogfovtheerninmsepnetcst.ions back onto site owners, and The other continuing issue isthe cleanup of as many as 450,000 hazardous waste sites that are not on EPA'sfists. Virtually all of those sites are less seriously contaminated than Superfund tshitoesu.gShtastoems eanEdPAlorceagligoonvaelronfmficeianltssswayillthperocboambplyetpelnacyetohferceegniotrnaallrooflfeiciens icnlemanainnaggitnhgemcleuapn,uapls could be put to good use on other non-federal sites when the Superfund cleanups have finished. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00166 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 167 Although the Superfund reinvention was successful by other standards, it did not signifi cantly improve working relationships between EPA and states. Indeed, Nakamura and Church report that the state officials they interviewed knew little about Superfund reinvention, which ftcooocmruespseeldeaxrocanhneEdrsPvAfao'rsrytohwwiisndsemtluyadfnyraorgmeepmepaleatnectde. tcEooPpmAlam-cseetan,ttbesuratebtlahoteuiotsnEtasPtheAipaisnndfalbeloxociubatillhiotafyzfiaacnridadlosuuwnsrhweoaascsootenmaspbitlleaesinneaersdes that their predecessors had made years ago. In short, the 1995 reinvention of Superfund caused important changes in the Superiund program, which contributed to making the program more efficient and speeding the pace of csiloeannaul ppsre. sTsuhree--expinertiheencaebssehnocwesohfoawctcuoanlsliesgteisnltatlieoand--erschainp,hgeolpodtramnasnfoargmemEePnAt,parnodgrcaomnsg.res Enforcement ties.OTvheer tfhirestpwasatsetoigchetnyteraarhsz,eEaPuAthhoarsitmy afodreetnwfooricmempoernttanint achnaenwgeOsfifnicietsoefnEfonrfcoermceemntenatctainvdi Comphance Assurance (OECA). The second has been to develop a broader range of activities to encourage comphance. Reorganization has had a dramatic impact not only on OECA, but also on the entire agency 0 ECA has become one of the strongest voices within the agency on policy and, as previous chapters have shown, a conservative force on innovation. assiBstuatncOeEinCtoAthisendoetsiganmfoorntohleithn:ewnelyitcheenrtrisaliitzeimd penerfvoirocuems teontcohfafnicgee..0EvPeAr thbeuipltasctofmivpehyaenarcse, OECA has provided funding to trade associations, and business-assistance programs for nine national, sector-specific web- and telephone-based centers that provide "first-stop" shopping abbusoiuntersesegsu.laOtoErCyAreqdueivreelmopeendts,apvoallruietitoynopfrteovoelnsttihoant, afinrdmostchaenr iunsfeortmo aatsisoenss, pthriemiracriolymtpohsamnaclel status, including audit protocols, checklists, and in-depth compliance assistance guides. 0 ECA also developed and hnplemented one of the pilots of StarTrack: the Environmental Leader ship Program. And 0 ECAhas played an important role in designing the agency'sperformance tracIkn itnhneolvaasttifoenws.years, OECAhas also implemented a strategy it calls "integrated comphance assurance" which is designed to exploit a variety of tools available to the agency to persuade regulated entities to achieve lull comphance with the law Those tools include traditional en finoerctehmeiernpt,ecrfoomrmphaanncceeaansdsisctoamncee;inatnodccoommpphhaanncceebinecfoenretivinessp, ewchtoicrhs eanrrcivoeu.rage firms to exam Moving to Integrated Enforcement Jeanne Herb, of the Tellus Institute, assessed six integrated enforcement efforts for the Academy247 The primary purpose of those efforts was to make EPA enforcement more costeafnfdecbtiyveusbiyngrelaecshs-ienxgpmenosrievefamcieliatiness,tobyatdadrrgeestsinlgesEs-PsAeriwouosrkvioonlahtiiognhs-.priority sectors and issues, Three integrated enforcement efforts involved applications of EPA'saudit disclosure policy. The efforts are "integrated" in the sense that they involve self-evaluation and comphance assis tance, as well as traditional regulatory practices. EPA Region 5 (Chicago) sent letters to 22 steel mini-mills, suggesting that they conduct self-audits, offering compliance assistance, and notifying them that EPA would inspect Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00167 168 Environment.gov facilities that did not respond. Ten submitted self-audits disclosing 1,200 violations, mostly of paperwork and reporting requirements. EPA resolved those cases without imposing penalties. EPA also inspected the facilities that did not respond--and filed enforcement actions against half EPA Region 4 (Atlanta) has enough staff to conduct only one full inspection of publicly owned wastewater treatment facilities (POTWs)per year. The office sent letters inviting 68 POTWs to conduct self-audits, and most did so. The office has not decided how to handle POTWs that do not participate. In 1996, a major telecommunications firm disclosed to EPA headquarters that it had not met statutory- requirements to notify state and local officials about hazardous substances pmraenseangtematemnot roeftthhaonse3s0u0bfsatacnilciteise.s,EaPnAd fhinaeddntohtepfriermpar$e5d2,r0e0q0uiarnedd pselanntslectotenrcsetronianbgout 30 other firms. Half conducted self-audits, and 13 reported similar violations at more than 6,000 facilities, paying more than $600,000 in penalties. At this writing, EPA had not yet taken action concerning the firms that did not respond. Herb also studied three other efforts: In 1992, Congress passed legislation requiring landlords and real estate agents to prergouvliadteioinnsfofromr athtieonpraobgoraumt ainnyllaetaed1-b9a9s6e.dTphaeinntintostehaodmoebf umyoevrsi.ngOdEiCreActlpyutboliesnhfeodrce those regulations, as usually happens, EPA offered compliance assistance for one year, including extensive on-site technical assistance. Under a subsequent "interim enforce mcoenndturcetsepdomnsoerpeotlhicayn,"1E0P0A0 irnesgpieocntsioinnsv,eastnedd ihsesauvedily51in7pNuobtliicceaswoafrNenoenscsoamndplieadnuccea.tiBount, the agency took enforcement actions only on "egregious" violations. The regions filed 19 civil complaints, asking for about $700,000 in penalties. Now OECA has issued a tougher permanent enforcement policy EPAs New England office sent letters to all colleges and universities in the region, notifying them of a major enforcement action against the University of New7Hamp shire, and inviting them to a conference on regulatory compliance. The region also ocorgmapnliizaendcea assesciosntadncceo,ncfreereantecde,acwonesbuslitteedwwitihthhealpfofucul singfroorumpaftiroonm, aconldleigsessu,epdropvreidssed releases about subsequent enforcement actions. She reports that colleges and universities have increased their efforts to come into compliance: self-disclosing and adopting "best practices" from one another. The OECA national office trained regional staff about equipment necessary for reduc ing certain air emissions at oil refineries. Hearing of that, some firms told EPA infor mally they were installing the equipment, and four firms self-disclosed apparent viola rtieofnins.erMiees--anwanhiulen,uasugaelnlcyyhsigtahffpienrscpeenctategde.and found violations at 85 percent of 110 Herb reports that the integrated approaches probably did increase the overall efficiency of hEiPgAh-sperniofroirtcye7imsseunets.efOfoErtC. AThheays ahpapdedairfefdictuoltryemacehasmuorirnegfbaceinlietfiietss,chheoawpelyv,era,npdatrhtleyybdeicdaaudsderietsiss Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00168 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 169 still developing reliable information about how many firms are in compliance with agency rules. The agency'sdata systemsmeasure activities, e.g, inspections, litigation, and fines, rather than compliance per se. dsietugBareteienoenofsfi,tfstloehxativaberiglnietoyttfscoeorcmt0oerEse,CaaAsni.ldyItHtowearresb-ddfioeffupinlcoduyltthrfeoastroitunhrteceegosfrfawitceehdetonenapfpeoprrmlcyeimdttieeffenestrrereenqstputooironelddsetadondiuninffuuensrueenxatl pected ways. (For example, enforcement units in the regions sometimes found it difficult to obtain resources to follow up with firms that submitted self-disclosures.) The OECA office in Washington found that it had to consult more fully with regions in Jsuetsttiincge'spreinofroitricees.mOenEtCstAalla)lisnodduisstcroyvterraeddeitashsaodcitaotiownosr,kainndnmewemwbaeyrsswofithCothnegrDesesp. artment of States are missing from the list of partners in OECA's integrated enforcement efforts. Al though states perform about three-quarters of all enforcement activities, OECA did not work rcseuloprseoedrltystwthaitateths0stotEatsCetiAacgkhetnaocstirheesesiibnsataesdnicyisnootfeftghirneastspeiedxceetfinofofnorstr,sccsetimutadetiineotdn.esf,Ifnfoidnretesesbd, y,aHnsdteartlebisti.ngoIantteisostneta.hda,t OstaEteCoAffpicrieasls At the same time that 0 ECA has begun to reinvent enforcement, the office has emerged as a critic of several other reinvention efforts at EPA, as well as in the states. 0 ECA's assigned role in EPAreinvention, consistent with itsresponsibilities for assuring compliance with statutes and rfieagbuillaittyioonfs,ihnansovbaeteinontos prariospeoissesudesbyabtohuetsatcacteosunotraboitlhiteyr, tErPanAspoaffriecnesc.yTtohuthseEpPuAb'lsicu,nadnedrlvyeinrig policies and management have caused OECA to become a critic of many reinvention efforts, when it perceived them as threats to the federal government's ability to enforce individual pfierrmm0siEtfsrC.omA lperdoosepcpuotsiiotinonfotrorsetgautela"taourydivtiporliavtiiloengseaanndd simhiemlduendittyh"epirroingrtearmnsa,lwrehciocrhdism, pmrouvniidzeedd the firms disclosed their violations to state agencies. OECA objected that several state pro grams were too lenient on violators, undercutting enforcement. It insisted that states model their audit programs on EPA's audit policy It threatened that EPA regional enforcement staff wofouwledaikntsetravteenreulteos.eInnfoarclme ofestdearlal lcraesqesu,irsetamteesnhtsavcaesbe-abcyk-ecdasdeoiwf fni,rmmsotdriifeydintgo ttahkeeirapdrvoagnrtaamges significantly to meet EPA objections. Controversy about OECA had a partisan tinge. At the same time that the office began to emerge as a force in the agency, Republicans won control of Congress, and made efforts to cut ttohoe OofEteCnAinbsutdagteete.nMfoarnceymgeonvterenffoorrst--s; oanf dbottohpppaorltiiteisc--al daepcploairnetdeethsaattOEEPACAbewgaasnincrteitrifceizriinngg states for lax enforcement. However, OECA's powerful role within EPA has far deeper roots than the latest twists in partisan politics. Enforcement has been central to EPA's operating ethos since the founding of the agency Congress--along with the American people--pays close attention to data about teinofnosr,cfeimnees,ntanacdtiovtihtieers aptetnhaeltaiegse.ncy quickly criticizing any downturns in the number of inspec- 0 CEAhas defied the conventional wisdom that reorganizing a government agency accom plishes nothing more than disrupting the flow of business as usual. The centralization of en faogrecmemenetn. tEsPtaAffpirnov0idEeCdAOhEaCs AmawdiethaerneoalugdihffreerseonucrecienstahnedeavuotlhuotirointyotfoEhPaAvepaolmicayjoanr dimmpaanct on overall agency policy. On the other hand, the office has been a major constraint on Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00169 170 Environment.gov reinvention efforts in other parts of EPA and in the states. Thus while it has opened the door for some innovation in the agency'senforcement program, it has also strengthened opposition to change within EPA. Information and Evaluation: Tools for Performance Management To make the nation's environmental management system work effectively in the inform a tion age, the nation needs authoritative information about environmental conditions, and about whether agency efforts have helped improve those conditions. EcoTnwomo incesw,-aEnPdAInonffoivceast--ionth--e sOhoffuiclde boef Eabnlveitroonpmerefnotraml Itnhfoosremfautnicotnioannsd. ItnhdeeOedff,itcheeocfrPeaotliicoyn; of these two offices was an important step ahead for the agency. But neither has the mandate, the staffing, or the authority it needs. The Office o f Environmental Information The EPA Administrator announced her intention to create the Office of Environmental Information (OEI)in October 1998. EPA'sinformation office had been a sub-unit of the office that isresponsible for administrative functions like human resources, budget, grants, contracts, aangdenfcaycitloitoieksamnaimnapgoermtaenntt.stBepytmowovairndgdtehme roenssptorantsiinbgiltihtyaftoirnfinofromramtiaotnioinsnooutt soifmtphlaytaonffaicdem, tihne istrative service to the agency, but, like regulation, market incentives, and community-based collaboration, is a tool for protecting the environment. Along with upgrading inform ation sys tems, OEI is responsible for operating EPA's website, managing its internal telecommunica taigoennscsyy'sstveimsiso,nafnodr rOuEnnI iins:g the Toxic Release Inventory and various smaller programs. The " ... to advance the creation, management, and use of data as a strategic resource to advance public health and environmental protection, inform rdoencimsieonntmalackoinngd,itaionndsi.m" 2p48rove the public's access to information about envi But the administrator failed to give 0 El the mandate, authority, or toolsnecessaryto do that jAoblm. oTsht tewoofyfiecaershaasftesrtathrteedagwenocrky avnenryousnlocweldy,itnsoctrebaetigoinn,nEinPgAohpaedrantoiotnasppuonitnilteOdcatpoebremr a1n9e9n9.t assistant administrator to run OEI. Neither had the office yet begun drafting a strategic plan to guide its activities. It will not even convene an advisory group to develop the framework for such a plan until 2001. In addition, OEI inherited functions that lost staffing and budget in recent years.249 twoFsuigrtnhifeircmanotrbeu, tinanitcsiellaarrlyyimssuoenst:htsh,eOcEosItwanads utinmdeerthhaetabvuysipnreesssseusraenfdroomthCerorneggruelsastetod aedndtirteiesss spend gathering information for the agency; and the possible failure of firewalls to protect data systems from disruption, and from public access to confidential business information. Finally, dsoismcleosminegmcbeertrasinofinCfoornmgaretisosnhaabvoeurtetcheenetlnyvpiruosnhmedenlte,gsiusclahtiaosnrethgaiotnwaloauilrd-qpuraelviteyndt aEtPa,Aonfrothme grounds that disclosure undercuts local economic development efforts. Any laws to that effect would further hinder OEI's operations. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00170 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 171 In addition to its other problems, OEI has defined its role far too narrowly The office has interpreted its mandate as increasing access to, and usability oij information contained in the agency'scurrent data systems. That iscertainty an important task. EPA'sInspector General, the ytGheeeanrpseorcoaolrmAqpuclcaaoliinutyendtoinfagbtho0euftdfitachteae, mtfhraaegnymycooennf ttEaePidnAn.'saSotuuwcrhne ecomofmtphlpoelyaaeigneestsn, camnyid'srrisonerfvotehrrmaelasottuiroutsncitdsueyrseetxeapmnedsr,thsaishsawtoverelylfooasrf the agency itself Each major program built its own data system. For years, each system has its own way of identifying sources of pollution--e.g, by the location of a smokestack, a front gate, or an office, and by the names of parent organizations or a subsidiary Different information isfysntoemt ismhpaovsesidbelfei,nteodlcinekrtaalilnthteocshensiycsatletmersm. s in different ways. For many reasons, it is difficult, OEI plans to fix those problems by developing an "integrated information infrastructure." 0 El willbecome a data exchange--that is, it will set standards to ensure that the data gathered maanneadnlytpezodesdtaeadslyobsntyegmseiadfceohrthaoesfsditaghtneainfmrgoeemdaicoahthofafefcriicsleiutscyhisaocsfihfniecgcelkse.eiBddeyfnotthrifeieeerrnr,odarsot,afsa2kn0dt0h0ac,tainht pabslaetnaaskgetognrheaagtvaleeteaidmstpafinlvede years. But OEI lacks the authority to accomplish even that narrow, if important, mission. The responsibility to decide what should go into each information system still lies with the media fooffritchees asnysdteOmEs,CaAnd. Thhasenaossdisitraenctt aadutmhoinriitsytr'aotvoerrothfeObEuIdgisentootrtshteafnfathtiaotnsaulppproogrtrsatmhemsyasntaemgesr. EPA has established the Quality Improvement Council to develop data standards that could integrate the media office'sdata systems. But agency officials agree that the council operates on csbpouendcsgieaenltsspufrosorjaetnhcdtes,tinhbfauottrOtmhEaattIioilsanlcesksyssstctheloamunst.itthsTephmreesdecelovcueesns.csTiolhrduwosaeisst aiasbllqloeuctiaotteeacpalepbaoorruttthioa$nt1,t0haenmdmilfleiaodrnilaefsoosfrtfhivcaaenrsiwothuilesl retain the upper hand.Linking the agency'sdata systemsis an important issue, but EPAhas not yet asked the central question: what kind of information does the nation need to address envi ronmental issues? And it isunclear that Congress is ready to ask the question either, despite its immEePdAiadteevreelloepveadncietstointfhoermGaotivoenrnsmysetenmt PsetorfoprrmovaindceeinanfodrmReastiuolnts aAbcot.ut activities and emis sions at permitted facilities. States do the day-to-day work of permitting and enforcement at most facilities: they will need to gather detailed inform ation about regulatory processes in order to manage their programs. EPA could encourage them to make much of that information avail aabbloeuptutbhleiccluy,rraednitrsetcattiuosnoifnpwehrmicihttsienvgeprarolcaeressaelsreaat dayllpgeorimngitEtePdAfaictsihetlifedso. Tesondoettneremedinienftohramt sattaitoens aremanaging theregulatoryprocessproperty; EPAneedsinformation about onlyarandom sample of sites, and, perhaps, about all sitesof aparticular kind, e.g, for industries or locationswhere EPA has identified an important multistate, regional, or national problem. To meet its other oversight responsibilities, plan its own activities, and report to Congress, EcuPrArewntillyl naeveadilafbalre.bAetstedreisncfroibrmedatiinonChaabpotuetre4m, itshseionnastiaonndlaecnkvsiraodnemqeunattaelicnofonrdmitiaotinosnthaabnouist water quality EPA and states do gather somewhat better information about air quality at the level of whole metropohtan regions. Since the mid-1960s, states have built a national system of saenvceer.aBl uhtutnhdereadgeanicr-yqcuoauliltdyamlsoonuistoerfianrg-bseittetesrwiintfhorEmPAat'isofninaabnociuatlasiurpqpuoarltitaynidn nteecihgnhibcoarlhgouoidds and along highways of special concern. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00171 172 Environment.gov At the operational level, states, local governments, and communities also need to be able to link information about air and water quahty, as well as about waste management and local contam ination, with the inform ation that they use to make decisions about land use and invest ments in local infrastructure. Cresting an Institutional Base for Data It would be hnpossible for any central organization to specify'a national information strat egy that willwork at all times at all locations. Many federal agencies gather data about environ mOceenatanliccoanndditiAontms.oBspeshiedreisc EAPdAm, itnhiesytrainticolnud; et:hethUe .US..SD. eGpeaorltomgiecnatl oSfurAvegyriacnudltuthree'sNNaatitounraall Resources Conservation Service and Forest Service; the Weather Bureau; the Fish and Wildlife Service; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Department of Energy; and the Department of Defense. State and local governments have their own information needs oanfdressyosltuetmiosn. .Different communitieswill need different kinds of information and different levels But some organization in the federal government needs to take the leadership in defining data needs, and in providing sufficient incentives to ensure that states, federal agencies, and other parties do gather information in formats and on schedules that will meet the needs of mCoitntegeretsos,caogoerndcinieast,eawndiththsetaptuebelincv.i0roEnml heansteasltaagbelinschieeds,awnheinchvigroanthmeernmtaolsdt aotfatshteanddaatardisncEoPmA systems, aswell as a great deal of information that isrequired by state laws and not shared with EPA. But the committee's mission focuses on aligning the technical dimensions of state and mEcoPemAnmtianiltftroeeresmuwlatitslil,o"pnidriseoynrstititefimyzetsh,torhaseethaaerrreeaathss,awnahneedxrepplsuotrarsinnudgeadrddiefivfzeearlteoinoptninnwgeielddl hastafavoersttiahnnefodmramrodsasttivtooanlu.sauEbpPlpeAoersntavytihsroothsnee areas."250 Data standards are centrally important. As the environmental protection system moves to more reliance on state and locally run programs, as well as on self-certification, third-party audits, cap-and-trade systems, and other market-oriented innovations, the role of EPA and wstahtiecheontvhieror npmaretinetsalcoalgleecntcaiensd mmaaykeshdiafttafraovmailacbollel.ecNtiongsindgalteaetnotitsypweciilflyhionugsecoonrd"ictioonntsroul"ndtheer data, and data standards willensure the different parties can accessdata gathered by others. But OEI has not asked the data standards committee to look beyond data already available. ronWmehnattakliinndfoorfmoartgioann,izuastiinognbsohtohulcdarlreoatds tahnedpsrtoicckessstoofledaedfitnhiengditvheersneaatirorany'sonfeesdysstfeomrsetnhvait will meet those needs? In the late 1980s and 1990s, many experts favored the creation of an independent bureau of environmental statistics. Headed by a qualified professional and protected against political influences by an authorizing statute, such a bureau might become a credible source of authori tDateipvearitnmfoernmt'astBiounr,eaasuthoef LEcaobnoormDiecpAarntamlyesnist'shBavuerebaeucoomf Le afbororecSotantoismtiiccs daantda.thTehCeoNmamtioerncael Academy of Public Administration'spanels on EPArecomm ended creation of an independent bureau in 1995, and again in 1997. cabCinoentgdreepssaratmlmeonstt. cTrheeatbedilltfhaeilebdupreraimu airnily19b9e3c,auassepoafrtreosfistaanpcroeptooseallevtoatienlegvEaPteAE, PbAut taolsoa because of disagreement about such a bureau's authority It isnot clear how7the mission of an Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00172 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 173 EPA-based bureau would fit into the broader picture of the many federal and state agencies that gather information about environmental conditions. It is clear, however, that the OEI is inadequate as presently constituted. It is too weak, too ntoaorrcolwosleylyfolcinukseedd,ttoopoofloitciucsaeldleoandearcscheisps, taosdwaetlal ainssbteeiandgoinf sounfftihceieenxtliystfeunncdeeadndanqdusatlaitfyfeodf. EdaPtAa,, state environmental agencies, the public, Congress, and many other parties need extensive, authoritative information about environmental conditions in order to craft policies and man age programs that protect the environment. Environmental policy is so controversial--and existing data are so insufficient--that there should be a leading agency with broad responsibili tiesAanbdurseuafuficoiefnetnavuirtoonnmomenyttaol swtaintistthices,pluebdlibcy'satrpursot.fessional appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate for a fixed term, and with sufficient budget and independence to be insulated from the political process, ismandatory It may be appropriate to establish a board of reaexdppmoeirrnttisssoatrlnaedtloyhrt.iogShaulpychorleiastipbceuacrllteyeaduappsprhooofiuensltdseidohnaovaflefsicatioualtg,hueosirdpiteeyctinhaoelltybouanrnleyaoutfof,icrwaiaotlhrkaesrwctihothnantErohPvaAevriasnnigadliatsstsadatienreeEcnPtvoAir ronmental agencies but also closely with other federal agencies, local governments, and other interested parties, including private firms and nonprofit organizations that are beginning to gdeavtheelorpdiantafoormf tahteioirnoswysnt.ems that make government data available to the public, as well as to The bureau should also have the capacity to hire first-classmanagers and staff OEIhashad difficulty attracting staff because of low salaries and the slow7pace of federal hiring systems. Information specialists also often expect a far more dynamic workenvironment than EPAoffers tforodmay.thPeeorhrgapansitzhaetibonuarelacuonsshtorauilndtsboefcfoendsetriatultbeudreaasuacrqaucyas,ia-gsowveellrnams fernotmalpoorlgitainciazlaitnifolnue, nfrceee. Innovation and Evaluation at EPA To make decisions to best achieve results, decisionmakers need information about causation paserwmeillttainsga,btoeucthennicvairloansmsisetnatnaclec,oenndfiotirocnesm. eTnht,eyanndeeeddutocaktnioonw--wahreethreesrpaognesnicbyleafcotirvcithieasn--gees.gin, polluting behavior, and ultimately in environmental conditions. They also need to know7the effect on the environment of other factors that are far beyond the influence of EPA or state agencies: normal fluctuations in climate or the function of ecosystems, or changes in economic conEdPitAionasndorstteactehnaogleongcyi.es have even less information about those causal relationships than about environmental conditions. EPA'sOffice of Research and Development and several other federal agencies do gather information about the scientific causes of changes in ambient envi ronmental conditions. But no agency systematically gathers information about the impacts of regulation and other programs on environmental conditions. andUEnvtiallu1a9t9io5n, ,thwehaicghenwcaysdhideahdaevde baysmanalalsesvisatlaunattiaodnmdinivisistrioatnoirn. TitsheOfdfiivciesioofnPwoaliscya,nPilna-nhnoiunsge, consultant for program managers. EPA administrators and deputy administratorsused OPPE to provide objective written or oralreports about specificproblems on request. It also did occasional laonwalpyrsoefsiolef actrtorassccteudttifnegwisesnueems fioesr,thbeutadalmsoineiastrrnaetodr.liTttlheeredcivoigsnioitnio'snn.oInt-dciodnnfrootnptautbiloisnhalasntyyleo af nitds reports, and most of its files were destroyed in 1996 when a broken water pipe flooded its office. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00173 174 Environment.gov The demise of the evaluation office was a symptom of a pervasive reluctance to submit agency programs to independent, objective evaluation. Many agency managers are wary of commissioning studies because anything in writing could become public, and because anything cCroitnOicgcareclsaossf.ioangaelnlycympaenrfaogremrsandocehcinoduldthbirede-pmabrtayrroarsgsianngizoartidoanms taogidnog in the hands of a hostile research on problems or program effectiveness. And EPA programs do support many conferences, newsletters, and university-based centers to share ideas, identify best practices, and build interest in and support of EPA and state activities. But very few of those reports are critical, independent evaluations. Nceenittrhaelrdiesptohseirteoraynoyfargeepnocryts-.wIinddeeceodo, rmdiannaytiroenpoorftsthaorseenreevseerarpcuhblgisrahnetds, oarndagthreuesmdeonntso,toarpa pear on lists of publications, library catalogues, or websites. 0 ccasionally the agency has con tracted for evaluations, and then either demanded changes in the analysis and conclusions or oosibtmhjeepcrltyisvtnaeotsitsftopicrusbwtlhhisiahctheedtvhtahelyueacrteoopursoldrctbo. euIlnhdeaulddsed.aitcIicnoodnu,enemtdao,bsmlte.opsrtogprraomgrsamdos ndootncootlleescttabblaissehlirneeasdoantaaboler O f course, EPA is far from the only government agency that has resisted evaluation. But a few federal agencies have built influential, highly professional evaluation offices. The Depart ment of Education has an evaluation office that conducts highly credible research about the feoffretchtoivseensetsusdoiefsf,eudseinragltphreomgrianmpse.riTohdeicHreoauustehCoroimzamtioitnteoefotnheEadguecnactiyo'snpirsoagprarmimsa. rIyn caudsdtiotmioenr, over the past two decades, Education's evaluation office has helped develop widely used mea sures for evaluating the success of individual schools across the country in educating students. rsoiounTtianhleeelvyDaseleuptaaatristoimdne.efnCotroonefvgHareleusaaslthtiohansasn,ddwirheHcicutehmdaartnehaSctoernavdisucmecstaelaldlspeoeitrhhcaeesrnatbayrgicaehcoetfrnattdhraietliodangepeonafrcthymi'sgehbnluytadplgroeoftffeibcsee or by units within individual programs.251 There are some signs that parts of EPA are interested in opening themselves to evaluation, or seizing the role for themselves. As the Academy started this project, several managers of small innovative programs in the agency did request that the panel commission independent eefvfaelcutaivtieonnesssooffththeeirirpparrotigcrualmars,porothgerarsmhoopreidnntohvaat taiopno;sistoivmeeegveanluuaintieolnywhoopuleddgteotitmhepmrovaetttehne tion and more resources. In the last year, EPA's Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation has begun planning a msmaanlyl boufttshyestfeumnacttiiconefsfoorft tthoeevdaislubaatnediendnoOvfaftiicoenosfinPtohliecya,gPenlacnyniTnhga, taonfdficEeviasltuhaetisounc.cIetsshoarstoa mission to encourage innovation within other parts of EPA, and it manages some reinvention efforts as well. The office has also conducted its own evaluation of the XL program, and orga natiizoend. a small task force of people from other EPA offices that are interested in program evalu temTahtiec sGeolfv-aesrsnemssemnetnPtse.rfTohrme astnacteutaenrdeqRueisreuslttshAatctthmeaaygaelnscoyfoartcteemthpet atogemnecaystuorecothnedupcetrfsoysr mance of program s in broad terms. EPA's Office of Planning, Analysis, and Accountability is developing the agency's response to GPRA, but at this writing does not plan to do project- ssppeacwifnicsoanmaelypsirso.gTrahme NevaatilounatailonEnbvuitrohnams nenottadloPneerfsoormyeatn. cAesPnaorttenderisnhtihpeSpyrsetvemiouaslscohacpotuelrd, the self-assessments that states have performed as part of NEPPS have been very broad-- Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00174 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 175 where they have been done at all--and EPA'sregional offices have not done any formal selfassessments. The biggest new claimant for the role of agency evaluator is the EPA Inspector General. In hFseiYnedd0sf0ui,nntdhFseYfoS0re1an.anTteehwAeppIrGporgoirspaermimaetbivoraanlcsuinaCtgiootmnhamotfifotitcpeepe.oCartdoudnnegidtrye;$ssp3mlamnaiynlliwinoegnllttoaodhdtihraeedIadGsitm'isoabnnuaydlpgaoesst,i1t2pio0anrftsrloyannadts line evaluators, aswell asvarious managers and supervisors. TheIG sees that as an opportunity not just to add an additional service, but a way to provide strategic guidance to the office's current agenda of financial and program auditing evaMluaatnioyna. tTEhPeAy paorientsktoepatilcaaclktohfatexthpeerIieGn'cseoifnficperocgarnambeecvoamlueataiouns,eafunldstohuerycearoefsupsrpoigcriaomus that IG staff will be willing to publish positive, or even sympathetic, analysis of EPA programs, especially since the inspector general reports to Congress, as well as to the EPA administrator. IIanGbdusesheea.dv,ewdiothnethme uecxhcepprtoiognraomf ethvealIuGatiaotnthine rDeceepnatrtymeaerns,t foofcuHseinaglthinsatnedadHounmwaanstSe,efrvraicueds,, afenwd EPA's IG could possibly perform program evaluation, however. Certainly it currently has the best chance of getting enough resources to make a major contribution. The office's close link to Congress might turn out to be an advantage, even if the relationships between Congress caannd bthueildagtehneccyarpeamciatyin' foasr fdiirsstta-cnltaassnwd oarskpoanlidticaarleapsuhtaastiboenefnorthiendceapseenfodremncaenaynydeafrasi.rnIefstsh,ethIaGt office might provide useful leadership to the continuing process of innovation and learning. But the IG'soffice would have to transform itself to be able to do that job. The staff prima rnsitalryrorncoogwmb7eppnrriotsgteorswacmaerrsdtisafinceaddrepafusukblhiwnchsapecethccoetiuronnthtaoenftatshgaeennfadccyotstf.hoIeltlsrocwauuelddtuittroheresis,rtsuotlaeltosi.sotkTicchilaoenssoe,lfyafinacdet cawlneoaaurlyllydstdsheawfviinetehdtoa, retrain its staffj encouraging an entirely different approach, as well as a high tolerance for ambiguity7. The best approach could be for new staff members to have different skills. Ideally; the office would field teams that included not only staff with traditional accounting and statis tpiocaliltisckailllss,cbieunttiasltssoamndansaogcieomloegnisttsc,oncosumltmanutns,itpyodliecvyeslotapfmf efrnotmexsptaetretsa, npdublohccalagdomvienrinstmraetniotsn, experts, andjournalists. The office has already identified 60 vacant positionsthat could be filled by such new staff members. Creating an Institutional Base for Assessment There is room for many different kinds of evaluation of EPA and state programs. Tradi tional evaluation studies ask hard questions and expect hard answers: was program X imple mented as designed? what were the immediate results? has the program added to the overall effectiveness of agency activities? was it cost-effective? In recent years, many evaluators have vuisdeudafloprrmogarlaqmusa.si-experimental designs and emphasized quantitative data to evaluate indi Those formalistic approaches provide useful inform ation, but if an agency is in the process oevfefnunmdiaslmeaednitnagl.tArasnEsfPoArmmaotvioens,tothweayrwdsilpl oylileuldtioannspwreevrsenthtiaotna, rceroinssc-ommepdlieatep--rogarnadmsso, menectiomuers aging collaboration, relying on states and local governments to use their own legal authorities, and using market- and information-based tools, the questions facing evaluators are more com- Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00175 176 Environment.gov plex. Should they look at the way a program functioned traditionally or evaluate how well it is changing to fit the new ways of doing business--exploiting new technological opportunities, building new knowledge, shaping public attitudes and voluntary action? Should they look at iantedliFyvoitrdhueaaxtlaEmpPrApolgear,naadmnsste,avotearslmuhaautvostertnlhooeotykcitonamgkepaltaietmhdeowrNeitPhcDothmEeSpsrtpeahetuermntosirityv'per,reosqgyusriatrememm-wwenoidut eltdhaanptoptthrioocaesceihmp?emrmeditis be renewed every five years. An analysis of NPDES permittees might quantify how much pollution they were causing and estimate how7much pollution would have been avoided if EPA had required permits renewals. That would be interesting information but would miss the real iSsosume.eSheavveerainl vEePsAtedreegnioenrgsyanind ssutaptpesorhtainvge dciovlelarbteodrasttiavfef wfroatmerNshPeDd EprSoctoesnseosn.pSouincht pprroobcleesmsess. take time in the best of conditions, and work best when the agency can provide solid placespecific data and scientific analysis, when agency staff has the skills to work in collaborative parnodcInevsotshleuasn,t tcaaanrsdye,wcwlhehaeanntutsphhseorauerledisneaovctarlfeuodarittbohlrcesotsmhtruiednaygt?oTfhneewNPreDgEulSatporroyg7rreaqmuiorevmereanltismifitecdolnlaubmorbaetrioonf years, watershed efforts that are still formative, the agency's water program as a whole, or a broader set of environmental issues? In situations like those, framing the question will require just asmuchjudgment asfinding the answer, and clear quantitative resultswillbe hard to locate. Eanvdalfuoartothrse caannalbyrtiincgalraigpoprrotoacshtu. dTiehsebmyaenxapgliecritslyolfaayninegvoaulutartaitoionneaflfeosrtfocranthgeuqaurdesatigoanisnsatskbeiads, by conducting multiple studies that ask somewhat different questions and make different as sumptions about the key factors to be examined. Often that is done best by engaging several budiingfdfueeorreusntsatanendxsipwnegerrtsso,tfobtushtteuadisycsltuuheseste,srbaomeftetesctruluddseitecesirscoiaofnnqsyu,ieeaslntdidopnionsw.eAveirntfauibnlldfyiinvtdoidinnugeaswlts7htruaodtuywnwdilsilllloenafodmt tgooivraeecutlinegaahmrtelyr framed investigations. In short, especially when an agency is in the midst of a transformation process, evaluation should be a learning processfor allinvolved. There isroom formanyplayers and many different gaprapmroamchanesa.gAerlsl oafndEPpAol'sicoyfmficaeksemrsi,gahstwdeolluasesfpuulbwliocrks,tuidnicelsu.ding confidential analysis for pro Independent experts should play a central role in the overall evaluation picture. The vital evaluation efforts at the federal Departments of Education and of Health and Hum an Services are part of a much larger community of evaluators and analysts outside government who rceogmumlairslysiosnusbmjecatnyotihnedrepfeednedreanl tpervoaglruaamtiosntsooifnfdeedpeernaldeednutcsactriuotni,nhyeaTlhthe, afenddewraellfgaorevepronlmicieenst, as do many philanthropic foundations. The universe of policy analysts and evaluators who specialize in environmental issues is much smaller, however. Many philanthropic foundations porfetfheer troeginuvlaetsotriyn7asydsvtoecma--cyr--atshueprptohratnindgisepnavsisrioonnmateenstachl golraorusphispo.rCaonmalypzairnegdtthoetshheoerntceormgyi'nigns venesvtierdoninmeevnatlaulaptirnogtewcetilofanreisrepfaoltrrmy. or public high schools, the nation'sinvestment in evaluating Philanthropic foundations and the agency might invest in independent analysisby environ mental advocates, academics, and consultants. Private firms and trade associations also could supEpPoArt carneddibCloen, ginredsespecnoudledntplsatuydaiesc,riatsicsaolmcaetahlayvteicarloreleadiyn dbouniled.ing a broad community of independent evaluators. The agency should routinely require peer review for all evaluations Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00176 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 177 published for the general pubhc, and, inmost cases, that independent evaluators conduct them. The agency could workwith foundations and universities to develop a network of independent evaluators and an easily accessible electronic library' of their studies. The Management Agenda at EPA Since its earliest days, EPA has had two important assets: an intelligent, highly motivated staff; and a pubhc that expects the agency to live up to its name, to be truly a protector of the environment. EPA has never had a shortage of good people with good ideas, and most admin pisrtoratetocrtisohnaavtesgmivaellnssctaalfefitnhdeefmreoendsotmrattioontepstrothjeecitrs,idceleaasrainbgohuotuhsoews, tmoainmuparlosvoenebnevsitrpornamcteicnetas,l and through innovative "niche" programs. In the last eight years or more, the agency and states have tested a series of new approaches to environmental protection. The task facing the EPA today is something quite different than ndoemnpornosfittrsathinavgeenxocwitindgevneelowpeiddeeans,ouhgohweidveera.s Tanhde eangoenucgyh, esxtapteersi,ebnucseintoesbseesg,inadtovocchaatensg,eatnhde system fundamentally EPA's culture, mission, and authority derive primarily from a series of detailed regulatory statutes. Law and regulations are at the core of the agency'sidentity But now the agency needs ttohaatlltohweyspurbosvtaidnetiablelyttgerreeantevrirdoinsmcreentitoanl ptorostteactetiso,nprciovsatteefffiercmtisv,ealyndAontdheErPs--A noenetdhsetocopnrdoivtiiodne authoritative information about the environment, so that it can allow such discretion. Now and into the 21st century, many of the most pressing environmental problems are beyond the direct tcaiovnnaettwiroownl oatoyf poErfPomAteocobtritlahinzeiynengovtihtisreoernmfmepdleoenyrtae,lebrsue.tgTtuohlaadttooirss.othEitePnAeesescdeansncaesntoielflwpt7hrsoetrvmaitdeaegnyathgfeoermcdoerminvtpicnahsgsablaleenhndagvtehiofearcmainnodg the agency's top leadership. The administrator and other senior agency leaders can use several different management tools to meet that challenge. In addition to a adopting a more sharply focused policy agenda taonodlsretofratrmaninsfgotrhme athgeenacgye'nscrye.laTtihoensahdipmwiniitshtrsatatotersc, othueldadremoirngiasntrizaeto,rasdhjouustldthueseamgeanncayg'sepmlaennst and budgets, reward staff for different kinds of behavior, hire staff with different skills and experience, or try to change the culture of the agency through personal leadership. EPA's Media-Based Organizational Structure As earlier Academy panels and many others have noted, EPA is a fragmented agency The media officescame to EPAfrom different federal departments in 1970, and stillhave somewhat different cultures. Each office has its own authorizing statutes, and there is no organic act or other over-arching legislation that sets the mission of the agency and provides criteria for set wtinitghipnrioonrietimeseadniad oreffciocen,coilrinegvednififneroennceems.eMdiaanpyroaggreanmcywemithpilnoytheeessmamakeerethgeioirnaelnotifrfeicce.areers Previous Academy reports recommended that Congress and the agency consider reorga nizing along functional lines, instead of air-water-waste-toxics-enforcement. The agencymight hstarveengsethpeanrawteoorkffiincgespfaorrtinnefrosrhmipastiwonit,hwsrtiatitensgarengduolatthioernse,nctoitmiesp.l2i5a2nScee,vaenradl ssctaietenscea,nidnttewnodeEdPtAo regions have reorganized along those lines in the last five years. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00177 178 Environment.gov Certainly no organizational structure is perfect, and agency-wide reorganization would consume large amounts of time and energy, as John DeVillars found out in EPA'sNew England office. Furthermore, reorganizations are seldom effective if they are not wellmanaged, strongly osubpvTpioohuresteafdrdombmyinttoihspetraasgutoecrncemcsysigloehaftdOteryrEst,CoaAnbdraidnagdneitmhtheaetpegadaipnbfsyubalelyctwleselaoerwnantshtdaercmtriosefpdlOiyaEaorIft.fiiccuelsapteerdsomniaslsliyo.nT, hasatis, however, would require close attention to the day-to-day workings of the agency, and the ad ministrator has other essential duties, like framing a strategic vision, leading public debate about environmental priorities and strategies, and working with Congress, the White House, and0octchaesriofendaellryaldaugrienngciEesP.A'shistory, the deputy administrator has been a hands-on manager of key agency initiatives. That approach might work again; the White House should allow the new administrator to select a deputy who would enjoy the administrator'sfull confidence and hdeacsAitshdioedniitsnioatenbraoelulsytt,aitnnhndeoavskdaimtlilosinnto,issbtureabtjaoerchtactnoodursled-voainseswmigbanynoatthgheeerraodkefmytihonefifspitcrriaoatcloserscsoleroadfr etarpuautnhtsyoforFirtomyr tieonxgmamEaPpkAlee.f,itnhael administrator might delegate more authority to regional administrators, an approach that would meet the goals outlined above. Or the administrator could give the assistant administrator for policy, economics, and innovation the authority and the staff resources to lead the process of tarnadnspfloarnmnaintigo.nT. hAenofitrhsterwaopupldrosaucpherwvoisueldfrboentt-olinneamopeedreaptiuotnieasl feoffrobrtost,hinocpleurdaitnigonesnafonrdcepmoleicnyt and regional offices. The second would supervise pohcy and planning functions, including the regulation-writing activities of the media offices, and the research, budget, and management fmoupenencrtta.itoiBnosuntsoafcsothutheldeagedeninrsecucyrte. Tsquhupiaectrkvaeiprspodrreocoaicfsihbomonstihgahbetonafuoptrpicneenamorvetonattisoiamnn.dplyreagdidonaanlootfhfeicrelsa,ytehreodfempuatnya' gfoer Alternatively; the administrator might choose to tacklethe fragmented structure of the agency haneaddi-monp,leemithenertibnyghaanvianggenacllyr-ewgiidoenarleostfrfuiccetsurrienogr.ganize on a multimedia basis, or by designing Plans and Budgets The administrator should also reform the agency's response to the Government Perfor mpfreaarmnfocerewmaoanrnkdcfeRo-erbsbausuletislddApincagtr.tpnAeesrrfsdohirsimcpubasnesetcwde-eibneancsEehdaPpAmteaarnn5da,gtthehemeseltenagtteisasl,taaEtniPodnAt,hshaeoffuoolrudmnpdaratotfviooirdnaefntoehrweb7usdtiialadtluiontgoguryea between the agency and Congress--as well as between the agency and states--about goals, priorities, and budgets. As hnplemented by EPA, however, the act has reinforced the fragmen tation of the agency along traditional media fines, and has impeded innovation. The agency's GPRA plan and budget nominally cut across all of the major units of the iasgednivciyd.eSdevaemraolnogfftihceems s.hAareserensiopronlesiabdielirtsyhifporgeraocuhpGthPaRtAhagsoarel,parensdenthtaetibvuedsgferot mforaellacahgegnocayl offices supervises the process of writing the plan and budget. On close examination, however, it is clear that GPRA plan has just begun to encourage multi-media planning and action. air,Twhaetebr,uwlkasotfe,thaendbutodxgiecst.sTtilhl eflroewasreintwfooursusbesptaarnattievestmreualmtims teodtihaegfooaulsr fmorapjoorllmuteiodniaporfefviceens: tion and forglobal, cross-border problems. Together they account for 6.8 percent of the agency's Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00178 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 179 budget and minimal portions of the budgets of the media offices. Four of the 10 GPRA goals focus on the work of one media office. They account for 76 percent of EPA's budget. From 75 percent to 95 percent of the budget for each of those four goals belongs to one media office. Taadnhmyefiurnenimsdtsra,aiwtnioditneh,rthgoeefnetexhrceaelpbctuoiodungnesoteflf,1o.ar2ntpdheecrchgeioenaftlosfiffnltaohnwecsbiautlodogafefitccfoeolrlr.ewNctaoisotnseemcoofannsdaugpmepemodreitaninto.gfTfoihcffeeicrreeescm,eaeivi.gnes, ing four goals cover the budgets of the officesof enforcem ent and compliance assurance, infor mation, research and development, and administration; the media offices have only minimal budget responsibilities for those goals. thatTChaotnbguredsgseht aasndesgtaoballisshtreudcttuoreeninchoiubriatsgeagfeonccuysi-nwgidoenarcetsiounlt.sIirsonreicdaulclyin; gtheinpcreinmtiavreys' vfoehr itchlee divisions within EPA to work together on important problems. In addition, the GPRA system is impeding flexibility. The agency aligned its GPRA plan tfciiagcnuhnlttloyptrwoqicutehicstskh.lyeTbhchuedaangdgemte:iientvsiesptrlryaa'nltionwrecictohouorlrudetsrpealfosonordmcshttaohneagGisnpPgeRciitAfsicbpgulaodnag,lelatonsodtsreounbcitjneugcretti,hvaee.lcTionhmkuspsbleethtxweaeanegdnendthcifey plan and budget so that the plan would focus on top priorities and cover less than the total of the budget, while the budget would correspond to the organizational structure of the agency.253 Staffing the Agency In the next several years, EPA will have another important opportunity' to change the cul ture of the agency A large portion of the Senior Executive Service and other high-ranking staff will become eligible for retirement soon. The administrator could use that as an opportunity to reesgtaibolniss;hrethcreupitoinligcisetsroonfg,rodteadtiicnagtesdtamffanamagoenrgs fmroemdisataoteffaicneds laoncdalbgeotvweernenmehneta;dsqyustaermteartsicaanlldy promoting staff who have the skills necessary to function in a perform ance-driven organiza tion; and rewarding innovation and prudent risk-taking In addition, the agency will need to hire more economists, communicators, managers, computer experts, and geneticists, and pro portionately fewer engineers. Leading and Making Decisions As this report has documented, the agency has often had difficulty making decisions about wdehceatdhee,rtohrenaogtetnocyalhloaws'ainpnporovaactihveeddienmteoronfsftircaetiiosnsupersobjeycetsmtpohmasoivzienfgotrhwearnde.eFdofromr toeraemtwhaonrka. Total Quality Management, partnership, and consensus have been the key themes of EPA management. That approach has strengths: it can open the door to fresh ideas from the "bottom-up," iron out differences and thus strengthen agency decisions, and build greater staff understanding oanudtgrsouwppthorotfotfhedeacgiseinocnys.'sBeaurtlyEPcAomhmasitmanenintsttoitutotiuognhalecnufoltrucreemtehnatt, iasshwigehlllyasritsok-daevcearsdee,saonf political controversy surrounding its decisions. That culture, together with the emphasis on cvoantiTsoenhn.esupsr,ehssausrbeefeonr a recipe for interminable internal debate, delay; and deadlock about inno consensus has encouraged many dedicated and talented EPA employees to speaktheir mindsfreelyand, in many cases, to become active promoters of particular approaches Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00179 Environment.gov to environmentalprotection, trying to persuade others to follow suit. The agency ishill of policy and program entrepreneurs, honestly looking for the best way to contribute to environmental protection. As a result, the agency has a large number of small, independently minded offices, nonCeeortfawinhliychancaEnPmAoabdilmizieniesntroautogrh msuupspt obrutitlod wbrinoatdhesuagpepnocryt foovrehritsooitrshideerads.ecisions, both outside the agency and inside. But to transform the agency, to move beyond another round of interesting but marginal innovations, the administrator must give clear direction and focus to theIang2e0n0cy1',sawnoerkw. EPA administrator could break with the past, taking giant steps to set the mageenntcaylpornotaeccotiuorns.eAthsathtewiinllceoamrninigt amdomreinriesstpraetcotr, emxoarmeiinnefsluheenrcoer, hainsdremspoorneseibffileictitievse, sehnevoirrohne must consider carefully how internal reforms will be viewed by Congress, the White House, other federal agencies, and environmental and business groups, as well as by important con mstietunOet,nnjecuissettseapisnwisniod1ue9ltd9h3beeCatgaoreoenslctByabroliwshnaerpeoswtaebrlfiuslhbeudraeapuowoferehnovuirsoenamt OenEtaClAin.fAornmoathtieornwaonudldasbseestso revive NEPPS. A third would be to establish an independent entity with the responsibility for independent assessment of state and EPA innovations. Findings proFgrianmdsi.nTgh1e. Some successfiil innovation at EPA is agency finds it easiest to innovate when taking place within individual agency it retains control over the management poafcpEerPooAgfrcahlmaesasn.buepenatabSluepteorfburnedaksittehsealnodgjmamoviinngitsefSfeucptievrefluyntdopernocgoruarmag, eshcalerapnlyupinacnredarseindgevtehle opment at other sites. Driven by the threat that Congress might dismantle key portions of the Superfund program in the mid-1990s and supported by the president and the EPA administra tor, agency managers implemented changes that had been developed and tested over the years ianbothuet aSguepnecrfyu'snrdegciloeannaul posf,fiEcePsA. Wdihdiloeffiet rdsidomnoetlasnudrroewndneerrscaosnsturoralnocveesrthsiatet-tbhye-isritseitdeescwisoiounlds not be listed as Superfund sites. It also helped many localcommunitiesplan and finance cleanup and redevelopment of Brownfield sites that were not listed. EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance has also begun to experiment with more voluntary' approaches such as coofmitsplaitatnecnetioasnsiosntatnrcaed,istieolfn-adlisecnlofosurcree,maenndtpaucbtilviictiperse,sasnudrei.tsHcorwitiecvisemr, OofEiCnnAovstailtliofoncpursoegsrmaomsst led by states or other parts of the agency has been a powerful block to new approaches to environmental protection. manFaginedmienngt a2r.eEsPtiAll'sineftfhoeritsr tinofabnuciyld. Ethfefoirntsfrtaosttrruanctsufroermforprmocueltsismesedthiaa,t pceurtfoacrmroasnscthe-ebfarsaegd mented organization of the agency have had httle success. The new information office has the responsibilityfor integrating the agencies many information systems, but it lacks the clout to do ptsiore.os,gTrrhaaemthaseg,reatnnhcdaynt'hsaeidnddfeorserismgsnianotigfotnthheesysusyntesdtmeemsrlyasriinesgssttiiilslllsduuiern:edcweterhdathttoeinwcfoaornrdmtsroatrtliaoocnfkiidntsogftrahallgetmhaegeenpntrecoydg,rraCemgounalgacrtteoisvrsiy, states, and the public need? EPA has never had much capacity' to assess the impact of its work Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00180 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 181 on environmental conditions, and it has disbanded its evaluation program. Within the agency some units are just beginning to build evaluation capacity Recommendations In 2001, the new EPA administrator will have the opportunity to set the agency firmly on anewpath, building on a rising tide of innovation and intellectual progress. A fewkey decisions can begin the fundamental transformation of the agency, equipping it to provide stronger, more authoritative leadership to state environmental agencies and the nation, and focusing the mageenntcayl pornottehcetimono.sTtoimprpoovritdaennt atotiothnealelnevaidreornsmhiepnitnasnedttitnhgeebnivgigreosntmoepnptoarltguonaitliseasnfdorpreinovriitrioens, the new EPA administrator should: tionE1s.PaABnduniealenddalsaytshsitserocofanhpgoa,cwiitnbydetsoetptpoeronpvrdiodeteenctatuotthfhefoiecrinetvaotiirvfoenemninevfnoirtr.moAnamtnioeenwnaotbaffolicuient sefhonorvumilrdoandtmeiofeinnne.tatlhceodnadtia that the nation needs about changing environmental conditions. It should also define the data that Congress, EPA, and the public need to have confidence that federalregulatoryprogramsare being managed effectively by the agency or by states. The office should work closely with states tsoibglea.thTehresuncehwdaotfafiicne tshheomulodsthcaovset-esfuffefcictiiveen,tleinasdtebpuernddeennscoemferoamnd pleoalistticinatlrupsrievsesumreasnnaenrdptohse policymaking process to become a credible, authoritative source of information and analysis. fedeE2rP.aAlCresrhgeouaulatldteofraiynn'apnirncoedgraeapsmeersni,edms eoanfrktinectd-aeinppceaencnditteiyvnetfs,o,arvuotahlusonsretiatsarstyim'vaeneadnstsce.oslslambeonrtastiovfeheofwfowrtse,llasntdateotahnedr activities help protect the environment. Studies published by the agency should be peer-re viewed, and should be held to the highest standards of objectivity and independence. EPA should also work with private foundations, corporations, state governments, universities and oletahrenrisntghaatbocaunt wsuaypspotortpsruocthecstttuhdeieesn, vtoirobnumildenat.vibrant, independent capacity for continued 3. Foster a management culture of prompt decisionmaking and action. fcolermaTrhdteehleeagdvamatliuionensis,otnrfaorterosmrpsos,nhaosinubdlidlibtuieeshse,arvtehiooerrgfoaunlflitzaharetriaooynrg,oaafnnmidzhaatuniomanga.enmWreehsniolteutroEcoePlsAm--amnpuaesgrtseormenteaanlitnl--eaitdtsoestrtrsrahoninpsg, commitment to environmental protection, the administrator should encourage timely decisionmaking,prudent risk-taking, and a focuson environmentalresultsrather than on process. The agency also needs to transform its working partnership with state environmental agen cies. Thus EPA's regional offices are in many ways at the crux of institutional changes the abgeecnocmyenpeoewdse.rfSuolmfoercoefstfhoer rinegnioovnastihoanvaenadlroeragdaynriezoartgioannaizl ecdhaanlgoen.gTmhueltaidmmeidniiastfrinateosrannedehdasvtoe find ways of continuing the process of regional transformation. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00181 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00182 CHAPTER 7 Transforming Environmental Governance he nation's environmental management "system" is so rich and complex that no one institution--not Congress, not EPA, not the states or Wall Street, or even the myriad NGOsand private companies--controls the system. Yet each of those institutions, act vcoamtiomnusinndigteisescser,piabanerdadtceiolnym,thpciaasnnriceehspa.2on5r4gteBhetahcveaeussoyersiptgermionm.atIiensdidnegaenpddr,aepcatricochpeashgfaoasrtcedhdeaan-lwginietgdhiwnthiEtehPstAyhs,etes2tm1ast.etTCahgeeenntiuncirneyos's, outstanding environmental problems emerge at many points in the system, EPA and Congress must redefine their leadership roles to foster broad innovation. In fact, the nation will meet its environmental and social goals only if Congress and EPA deploy new policy tools to better manodbiNliGzeOths,etnoaaticohnie'svreesthouartcteras.nsTfohrmisactihonapotferenlavyisroonumt aensttraaltgeogvyefronraEnPceA., Congress, businesses In 1995, an Academy panel found that the nation's system for protecting the environment was "broken"--in the sense that it was not addressing high-risk problems, was not responding tpeoarocebhnlveoimfro-tnshomolsveeinntrgaelscppaerpocatbcsl,ietmtyhose ftshsyatsatttecemrso, scissietisdetsiel,lnabvnridrooktnhemne.epnHritivaglahtme-r-eisdsekicat,poraronfbdilremwmasssi,tfaiwnilacisnlugrdetigonugdlranatwoin-ng-op2n5o5tihInnet water pollution, smog, and the emission of greenhouse gases, are not responsive to tradi tional federal or state pollution-control programs. The innovations examined in this report demonstrate practical ways to correct the system 's failings, to transform environmental gov ernance as a whole. tal mEaacnhagoefmtheenptrseyvsitoeums:cthhaeprteelrastioofntshhiisprsebpeotrwt feoecnurseegduolnatoonrseapnadrtboufstihneesnseasti;othne'smenavrikreotnpmlaecne; watersheds; the interface between EPA and the states; and strategies for organizational change. Each chapter described promising innovations, documented how some had been frustrated by NbuGsiOnesssasaws eulsl)u,aalnadt cEaPlAled(afnodr riennesowmede,cmasoerseineffsetacttieveenevffiorortnsmtoenmtaakl eagcehnacnigese,. bTuosgineethsseerst,haonsde chapters present a case for the transformation of EPA, state environmental agencies, and the system within which they operate. The Academy Panel summarizes that case in the findings listed below. The section following the findings reprises the scenarios that opened this report and draws from them a strategy- to Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00183 Environment.gov tune the nation's environmental protection system to the problems and opportunities of the 21st Century in America. The chapter closes with the panel's recommendations to the next EPA administrator, the next Congress, and those businesses andNGO s that must help lead the tartatnhsefoernmdaotifonth.eTphroesveioruescocmhampteenrsd.ations synthesize and expand upon the recommendations Summary Findings ronFmienndtainl greg1:ulTahtoeryUangietendcyS. tates needs--and will continue to need--a strong national envi EPA must have the capacity to set national environmentalgoals and regulatory standards,particularly fporropvroidbelemEsPAthaatncdrosostshtaetrefoerdneartaiolneanlvboirrodenrms, oerntthaaltapgoesencriiseksstthofeutcuarpeagceinteyrattoionids.eCntoifnygarensds must manage environmental problems of national and global significance. The system in which the agency operates must give states and municipalities latitude to set their own environmental goals as well. It should encourage technological innovation, civic engage mtheenpte, rafnodrmthaencseproefadthoefeknntoirwelseydsgteem. E. PA and Congress must set the direction and assess Vigorous enforcement by EPA andstates has been thefoundation of the nation's regulatory system and qwuilallciotyntAinumeetoribceaninsdiwspaennts.abAles. tThheensattaiotuns aqdudor,ehssoewseovtehre,rwpilrlonboletmdeslbiveesridtehsepeonlvluirtoionnmbeyntal large, highly visible facilities, and encourages businesses to redesign their products, services, and production processes to reduce negative impacts on the environment, EPA dTanehvdeeyslotmaptueissnttneaeglesrdoattdeoedtdesertvrmaetilenogpeiewasdatdyhisatittoobnamallaainkncefeothrtmheoamsteioonsnteowabftocouiovtliscmwcaairtkpheattc-ribatydasiateindodntoapolulrbsel,gicaunloadptiitononio.n. Finding 2: EPA and the states have demonstrated the potential and challenge of perfor mance-based management. Federal and state regulators have made serious efforts to incorporate more environmental information into mtheaikredsecsiseinonsse. tTohaogseenecfyfoorftfsichiaavlse, bshuosiwnenssthesa,tarneddetfhineinpgubshucc.ceTshseiny henavveiroalnsmo ednetmalotnesrtmrasted that environmental measures alone are insufficient for agency management. The states have not done enough to make "core performance measures" work and EPA has not encouraged them to do better. State commissioners and EPA need to renew their efforts to define measures that each will use to set priorities, measure success, and improve the environment. .NeitherEPA nor most of the states has made the changes necessary to realize thefidipotential of the NaraetiosonualnEdn:vtihroantmEmPAta'lsPreergfoiormnaanlcoefPfiacretnsearsnhdipthSyestsetma.teTshsehofuulnddnaemgeontitaatlepprienrcfoiprlmesanocfeNEPPS objectives based on thorough analyses of the environmental and management problems they face. The states should acknowledge that it is fair and appropriate for EPA to compare their programs'performance using some form of "core performance mea Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00184 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 185 sures." EPAs program offices and regional offices should acknowledge that EPAs oversight of states that are doing their jobs should focus at the program level, not at the activity level or on individual permits. withFiinntdhienagg3e:ncEyPAansdstiantutthoerys'tfartaesm. ework and its conservative culture inhibit innovation both Pilotprojects have demonstrated thepotential of newpolicies and tools to improve the environment. For a number of years, EPA, states, businesses, nonprofits, and other entities have developed asynsdtetmesst,eadnndecwoltloaoblosriantiavesearpiepsrooafcihnenso,vfaotriveexaemffoprltes--. Sheavveeraplroofvethdotshea--t tchaepy-acnadn-dtrealdiveer environmental improvements more effectively or efficiently than traditional tools. NeitherEPA nor its state counterparts has transformedits coreprograms to use new tools to address effectively or efficiently some of the mostserious environmentalproblemsfacingAmerica. Innovation at EPA and the states is still of marginal significance. There is no system to identify and sustain the most productive innovations. EPA's successful innovations and management reforms have been those it could carry out within a single nationalprogram office. Most efforts to innovate acrossprograms havefailed. The agency made a significant improvement in the management of the Superfund program, in OECAs use torfaditisnagusdyisttpemolsiciyn aanirdp"oilnlutetagnratst.edThenefaogrceenmcye'nste"fftoorotlsst,oancodoirnditnhaetedeivtsenloaptimoneanlt porfogram offices through Project XL, priority setting through NEPPS or GPRA, the Common bSaesnesde Ionrigtaiantiizvaet,ioonrsecreomsyasitnemfupnrdoatmecetinotnal,lhyouwneavbelre, thoavweodrkemtoognesthtreart.ed that EPAs media- Finding 4: Reducing the damage to surface waters and estuaries caused by nutrient runoff is within reach. Aopsphoirftt,untoitiTesM. IDmLplsemanedntsitnagndTaMrdDs Lbassiesdmonosatmlikbeielynttowsauteccr-eqeudainlitpylpaocesesswphaerrteiccuilvaicr cinhsatlilteuntgioenssaanrde strong, extensive environmental data are available, and citizens have a relatively sophisticated under standing of environmentalproblems and management. In such locations, TMDLs should yield reengvuirlaotniomnenotfapl obienntesfoitusrfcaerssaulpoenrei.or to those that could be achieved by traditional aOllpytfilmexailbalepparpoparcohaecshw. Cillavpa-raynbdy-wtraatedreshsedy,stseomEsP,Aanadndeovtehnerfoepdeerna-lmagaernkceietstwraidllinnegedsaynsteexmcesp,twioinll work in some areas. In others, state and federal agencies may need to target public funds to produce the largest possible gams. Finding 5: The federal government must be a source of credible, authoritative, and useful environmental data. Information technologies mayfundamentally change howfederal and stategovernments regulate orhold fmirmansaagcecomuentnatblseyfosrtemmese"tinagt etnhveirfoancmileintytallerevqeulirceamnenhtes.lpInpfloarnmtamtiaonna-rgicehrs"iednenvtiirfoynpmroebnlteaml s and opportunities for waste-reduction. More facility-level caps, whole-facility regulation, Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00185 Environment.gov and cap-and-trade systems within airsheds or watersheds are possible in part because of better monitoring systems to hold firms accountable to the public and one other. Such trading systems provide incentives for firms to find their own best ways to reduce teermnavdisiersoisonynmsst.eemntsalahnaersmsenattiathlecolomwpeosnt epnostsoibflaencyosnta. tTiohnoasleeafftotrritbtuotersedmuacye mgraekeenhcoaups-aengda-s No institution will be abk to controlthe information on "thegreen web,"and a diversity of sources will probably strengthen environmentalawareness. Nevertheless, Americans and American pthoelyicycamnatkreursstwanildl nueseed. Tahseougrocveeornf mcreendtibslheo, uclodmbpeatrhaabtlesoeunrvcier.onmental information eExPiAst'ss tOofdfiacye,otfhEenovfirfoicnemseunftafelrIsnfforrommatitohne lsaackmsethoeraguathnoirziatytiiotnneaeldws teoaakcnheiesvsetihtsamt hisasisonu.nApsaiirted Project XL, NEPPS, and the Common Sense Initiative: the office needs the authority to reshape and integrate the agency's media-based data systems. indiFviindudainl agn6d: cEonlvleicrotinvemveanltuaelspoalnicdygaonadls.diCreicvticacintivoonlvmeumsetnctonintineunevitroofnlmowenfrtoaml pAromteecrtiicoanniss' important, particularly' in addressing problems at the locallevel. Collaborative watershed-man agement projects demonstrate the potential for locally driven action. The challenge of reduc ing environmental threats to large interstate bodies of water illustrates the need for state and federal action as well. For the 21st Century denravmTirhaotenicmnalealntyit'oainln'gstoheveceotrnhnoraemnecye,d.etAeccalhtdhneosiucsagilhnccteahpeCaycohintaygv,reeassnsedrpvaeesndsvetidhroemnnmoastetionotnaflwthceeolln,ldatowitdisoatynhstahtheahivraevinecahfdraeanqmgueeadd cies manifest themselves in the numerous ways identified in the previous chapters. Adopting legislation--or adapting institutions--for the economy, technology, and environment of 2020 or 2030, however, remains a difficult task. To help readers imagine how a new system of envi rfroanmmeednttahlregeovsecrennaanricoesmoifgthhteevfuotluvree:ovtherethGereneenxtWtwebo, oOrltdhrGeelodrye,caadneds,LtohceaAl Ocapdteiomny. PTahneeyl illustrated how choicesmade by Congress, EPA, states, businesses, and ultimately, by American voters and consumers, could influence the future of the nation's entire environmental protec toiof ntThehefefIonGrttsre.erenneWt toebgiemnaegrianteedeanvwiororlndmwehnetrael bguasiinnse.ssTehs,echonigshulmyedres,siarnadblNe GfeOatsuuressedotfhethpeowsceer nario--its reliance on information and individual choice--were tempered by the lack of a stabilizing rudder: EPA had lost much of its authority; both as a regulator and as a provider of reliable information. The resulting system was so volatile that it appeared at risk of degen Weraittihnogu:t ianfsotrromnagtinoantioconualldrebgeucloamtoerymperoregrnaomis,ee; nivndiriovnidmueanl tcahl opircoeteccotiuoldn wbeocuolmd beeaanagracmhye. of chance. OId Glory described a world in which Americans vested their trust and authority in federal iancshtiietuvteiopnusb. hTchpouserpionssetistuwtiiothnsmhiandimdeavl edliorepcetdcsoonpthroisl.tiIcnastetedatdooolfsitnoflmexaixbilme itzeechthneiciralcasptaancditayrdtos Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00186 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 187 and complex regulations, EPA relied more on financial incentives, market drivers, and the power of information to ensure that individuals, companies, and communities did their part to protect the environment. The scenario described a world less chaotic than the Green Web, but iastclsseopnuaobrniloeicdlmeessascnrcidobanetndeeabctyteeccdhretnoaotcitnhrgaecaAy--cmitweizreieclnlarmnyewpaeniotihpnolgeu,atntthhdeeefrefeneavcltiirsvooenu--mrcbeeunottafaltnuinantcdiroeenrasastilannagudrtiihnsokgroiittfywl.ooTsuihnldeg need to respond to a crisis. Local 0 ption presented America as a nation of committed citizens acting through local and state institutions--both public and private. Communities of interests fought for their values, wachhiicehvewdetrheeiirncernevaisrionngmlyenmtaelasaunrdedecionnoemnvicirognoamlsenatnadl cteerlmebsr.atSeodmtheeciromabmiliutynittoieusseanlodcastladtees mocracy to connect people, action, and results; others, however, remained victims of circum stance: of depleted natural resources, cross-border pollution, and a downward cycle of poverty nfToehcieuthsfeeedrdestohrauelgigrhotavcnetoirornnmasseslnuotmcapelrldoyvaaidsneawdteiaolln.vaaSlloucmaobnelsebesnuessruivnsiecosesn--esegnfolvooiurdoriinsnmhfeoedrnmtianaltitqohunoaslaeitnycd.oNrnedastietiaioorncnahsl--; NobtGhuOet risst found it difficult to manage national operations under such varied circumstances. Three visions of the future of environmental governance: three worlds somewhere between utopia and dystopia. The panel's preferred vision of the future diverges from each of those tsicoennasryisotse,mhothwaetvcear.nTahdedrsetrsasteengvyiorountlmineendtableplorowbilseimntse--ndinedcltuodfinogstethroasneecnavuisreodnmbyemntaalnpyrsomteacll sources--effectively and at the lowest possible cost to society; one that can exploit the power of new' information technologies, particularly' in ways that will help strengthen informed connec tbieonaIsntratuhmsetoepndaganvneodl'tserversilsi,aitobhnlee, wesonhuvircicrhoewnomef meinniftgo,hrgmtocvaatelilronennmvaierbonontumategtneht.ngecoeiven,sEv,iParAonndomrbeuansniton, teehsnesaerbsf.leindgercailtiazgeenns,cycowmill panies, and public agencies to make informed choices about the environment. EPAwillremain a strong regulatory force, the agency that guides nationwide action on problems of national or global significance. The agency will be using a broader range of tools to mobilize action than ictoumsepsatnoideasy,,choomwmevuenri.tMiesa,rkanetd-biansdeivdimdueaclhsatonisinmnso,vsautceh, taosfailnlodwthaenicreo-twrandbinegstswysatyems tso, wmielledtrtihvee public's environmental targets. States with aggressive, successful environmental programs will lead the way in many areas, and EPA will respond with appropriate technical support, even working for change on the states' behalf in Congress when authorizing statutes inhibit state finonrtos,vaantidonto. mInoednivfiyrotnhmeemnt.igfotvh,esyysftaeimltos awroeriknapslpalcaenntoedm. oTnhituosretxhpeeirmimpeancttastoiofnexanpdercimhaenngtealweifll not be forced to wait for "consensus" among bureaucrats or stakeholders. The environmentalprotection system evolvestoward one based on performance, on achiev ing improvements in environmental quality and related social goals. The panel's vision, like environmental protection, willnot "just happen." Rather, the next administrator must act stra itnegtihcaellya'gteonmcyakietsietlhf,apanpdenc,hbaullieldnignigngonenintrietinactihveeds aclorenasdtiytuuenndceierswtaoydino smtaoterse,,ctoomtapkaenireiss,kasntdo achiTehveeneenxtvEirPoAnmademnitnaisltgraotaolrss.hould beAmerica's chief advocateforenvironmentalprotection, the definerof AEPmAe'srnicaatinosnaolpfutrhpeoswe.oPrkartht oatftthhee naadtmioinn--isttrhaetoAr'smleearidcearnshpiepocphlea--llenstgilel nweielldbsetotodkoeetoppreromteincdt itnhge environment. Another part willbe to listen to Americans and build a pragmatic political agenda Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00187 Environment.gov that moves the nation forward. The administrator'ssuccesswillultimately depend on his or her ability to work with Congress, the states, and individuals to define national environmental goals, and to focus the nation's energy on achieving them. A truly gifted administrator will tcaiececrsnoaemnddpwltishitheh tpehrnaivvtiarwtoeintshmeoceutnottraalcaptnirdnogtaenacsytiionfnuh.meObonerrmsohafensyitsaitsaestuatehnse,daplfoitencrnalaalcallg,eaecnotcifivetihsstews ioinlnlNlbyeGianOhstesi,atucdotiomofnmEcuPonAni. 7he administratorshouldfocus the nation's attention on asmallnumberof significant,environmentalprob lemsthatarenot,beingaddressedbythecurrentregulatorysystem. The panel has recommended that those include smog, nonpoint water pollution, and greenhouse gases, though other problems that rreesqiustireenidm-mofe-pnispeeinssotliututitoionnsaclecrhtaainngley, ftihteolnisttshhaotullidst.beBsemcaaullseenaodudgrhestsoinegnasbulcehthperoadblmeminsiswtriall tor to stay focused. O f course, EPA will have to continue most of its conventional work even as the administrator helps it adjust to new ways of doing business. As the agency develops strat ecgoiveTesrhtemo arodermdeuinecifsefterncatotoivnrepsohwoianuyltdsputooslelmuthtaieonnnaegwoerttocholielsmooalftdeepncrvhoirabonnlgemmeenostraalsspmrwooetegllc,.tihoonwtoevaedrd,reitsss personnel will dis thoseproblems. The administrator should help the nation adopt the most effective management strategies available, even when doing so will require new authorization from Congress, new relationships with the states and regulated entities, and new attitudes and activities within the environmental protec tion system. Generally the new environmental agenda will require an increased use of: information: better measurement of environmental conditions and trends to help define problems, maintain accountability; and measure the success or failure of innovations; market tools and other approaches that create strong incentives for states, companies, and individuals to find the cheapest ways to reduce pollution; place-based management strategies encouraging multimedia problem solving To make progress in reducing nutrient runoff into surface waters, for example, the admin istrator should: encourage states or regions to hnplement dynamic trading systems among praoiisnettahnedqnuoalniptyoionft dsoatuarcuesse,dstfroerngdtehceisniothne-mwaaktienrg-mHoeniotorrsinhge nsheotwulodrkwaomrkowngiththtehestaretegsioannadl offices to find the most effective management structures in each region to work with other federal agencies, states, communities, and watershed councils in addressing the runoff prob laetmeds ains tshpeeycifuincfpolladc,eps.roTvhideinadgmdeinciisstiroantmoraskheorusladnedntshuereptuhbalticinwniotvhatthiveeinapfoprrmoaactihoens tahreeyevnaeleud to keep improving programs. In places where local institutions or state agencies are already making significant headway, the administrator should ensure that the agency provides techni cal and political support--and captures lessons for others to learn. The administrator should develop a comprehensive strategyfor change. The innovations discussed in mthiesnrteapl goortveilrlnuastnrcaeteinthAemcoemricpaleixsistoycoofmthpelexadamndinsiostrroaototerd's icnhasltlaetnugtees: atnhde rseylsatteimonsohfipensvthiraotnit seems actively to resist change. The next administrator will need a strategy to overcome that inertia. The strategy must include ways in which the administrator will allow the agency to mcooubldiliazceciotsmtpahlesnhtsw, iathndthweinllewin7ftuosoelsi.tsTchueltsutrreatwegityhmaunstapinpcrleucdiaetiaomn eoafnws hoaftcEooPpAeraantdingotwheitrhs Congress on the statutory reforms and financial resources that will be necessary to more effec Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00188 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 189 tive and efficient environmental protection.The strategy must also involve the states, or at least those states that are firmly committed to environmental protection and prepared to invest the time and resources necessary for testing new ideas. The administrator should also support taafgfieAasncisnetrsasoetecfgueyrninvtogirottahncemknleeantntiaoolnnop'srogeainnnvtiizpraootnilolmuntesionantna,dlffoburutuseirxneae. msspglreo, umpsigahstthsetayrtrewcoitghnaizpepmrouvtaulsaloafdsvtaante initiatives to create allowance-trading systems in the Upper Midwest. The agency might en cdoiruercatgmeothnoitsoerisntagtessystotemin,stthituustectrreaadtiinngg irnactieonstifvaevsofroinrgthcerepdriivtsavteersieficatbolretothdroevueglhopsobmetetekrintedchof nsioglnoigfiiceasnttopadrettneecrtshcihpawngitehstihnenDoenppaortimnternutnooffAfgarnicdulwtuartee,raqswuaelliltya.sbTihpaertpilsaann csohaoluitlidoninbculiulddienga among the members of congressional committees handling agricultural and transportation issues. The focus of the congressional action would be authorization to EPA and the states to mimopnlietmoreinngt mtecohrenoslwogeeiepsi,nfgunaldloinwgafnocred-atrtaad-ginagthperroinggraamnds,rfeupnodritninggf,oarstwheelldaesvfeolrofpamrmenstuobfsindeiews to secure nonpoint reductions in the absence of allowance-trading systems. Continuing the nonpoint example, the administrator'sinternal-management strategywould need to reward personnel from the Office of Water, OECA, the Office of Policy Economics, and Innovation, and the regional officesthat prove themselves able to work together with states caanpdacwitayt'eorsfhtehde acgoeunnccyil'ssttroadsiotlivoenpalropbrolegmrasmesxptoedaidtidoruesslsy.plTachee-bsatrsaetdegpyrosbhloeumlds, swtrheinlegathlseontethste ing new7organizational models at the regional offices and headquarters. The strategy should ensure that the agency'spersonnel office ishiring new7staff capable of w'orking in communities, wutonitcehenrmvtiaariornknteymttehsnyatstatwelmipllrsao,ctwecciotthmioapnda.vnaynthceedtradnastiaticoonmtommuanrikceatt-iboansteedchanndoliongfioersm, aatnidonw-riitchhsaopmperooafchthees At the heart of the nonpoint strategy, however, would be a public commitment to reduce nutrient runoff to improve water quality and reverse the damage to fisheries and ecosystems in rivers, lakes, and estuaries. The administrator should carefully frame that national goal, and bsuurieldd paunbdlriceploegrtietidm, athcaytfpoarritti,ctuhleanr eefnfosrutrseartheaetvtahlueanteadtifoonr'sthaenidr etfhfeicaacgyeanncyd'scopsrto-gefrfeescstiivsemneesas, and that all the myriad actors in the drive for cleaner water have access to reliable, up-to-date information. Simultaneously; local and state leaders should frame goals for their own water sheds. EPA and the states should reconcile their goals, responsibilities, and workplans through ashriopbSuyststnemeg.otiation structured as part of the National Environmental Performance Partner In the 21st Century, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency must be capable of re sponding rapidly to changing economic and environmental conditions, regardless of the par ticular problems it tackles. The agency must be able to adapt itspolicies and program sover time and for particular places. It must have a relationship with Congress--and a statutory base-- tahgaetefoacsthersstainten,oevaacthiocnoamnpdaandya, petaacthiofna.rAmn, dtoEbPeAemquuasltlhyedlpyncarmeaitce,tihnevesnytsitveem, satnhdatmwoitlilveantceodutro find the best, least-expensive way to fulfill its social and environmental obligations. The agency and Congress must replace the nation's traditional emphasis on compliance with a focus on performance. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00189 190 Environment.gov Summary Recommendations The Academy panel offers the following recommendations with the hope that readers will see them as a summary of this volume and the recommendations that conclude Chapters 2 EtAhncrvoairduoegnmhmye6np.taaIlnnPedrleosteetdcht,aiottnhpieunbf1loi9lsl9ho7ew.diBnSgeetctriaenucgsoPemrtihomriisetienrsed,paGotierotttninissgbRbeueisinuldgltspoiunnb1lai9ns9hd5erdaenaddfufriRrienmsgolttvhhineegwttrhaoenrPksairtoaiofdnotxhtooef a new administration in Washington, the panel addresses its first recommendations to EPA's new administrator. In a broader sense, though, all its recommendations are intended for the entire community of Americansthat shapes environmentalpolicythrough theirjobs, their erne engagement, and their passions. The next EPA administrator should: 1. Tackle the big environmental problems a. tuShneeldenecratttatiwoknionoganrwdthilCrleroeenqogurfiertsehsetihnmedoaesdvtmedliiofnfpiiiscnturglattsroterrmattoeagianiedinsogtpoteainndvndiorrovensastmitvheenetmtoaol. lcBshytaolnleeacndegdsersesitsyas,ntdshuoecsnhegaange problems. The panel suggests three environmental issues as worthy of a national commitment of energy, resources, and innovation: reducing nutrients in watersheds reducing smog preparing to reverse the accumulation of greenhouse gases b. Define the challenges in terms of measurable environmental improvements. c. Commit the agency to deploy the most cost-effective tools to achieve those results. d. Build the nation's familiarity with the market-based tools that will eventually reduce greenhouse gas emissions. e. Encourage states to experiment with bold forms of regulatory and non-regulatory management, such as facility-wide permits, performance-based management contracts, cap-and-trade systems, pollution taxes or fees, information requirements, collaborative caopmprpolaiacnhcees-taosssiestttainncgegtooaollssaonfdvdaerisoigunsiknigndsstr.ategies for protecting watersheds, and f WinnoorkvawtiiothnsCwoonrgkr.eTsshteo asdemcuirneisthtreataourthshooruitlyd asnedekaepxpprloicpirtiactoinognrsensseicoensaslarayutthoomriazkaetiothnotsoe use cap-and-trade systems to reduce nutrients in watersheds and the components of smog in air. That authorization should enable EPA to issue group permits in airsheds and watersheds where states or EPA regions are capping pollution allowances, and using trading systems rather than traditional permits. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00190 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 191 2. Invest in information and assessment a. The administrator should work with Congress to create an independent, well-funded bsturerenaguthoenf ethnevierxoinsmtinegntOaflfiincefoormf Eatnivoinr.onInmtehnetaml Ienafnotrimmaet,itohnebaydlmeaindiisntgraetfofrorsthsotoulidntegrate and rationalize the data systems of the media programs, and to develop other objective data of high quality: In addition, the administrator should strongly support the office's efforts to work with the states to create a cooperative federal-state data system based on uniform definitions and comparable scientific methods. b. The administrator should invest money and political capital in building a credible and comprehensive system to monitor the quality of the nation's surface waters. That could bweatdeor-nqeubaylitiynssitsatnindgartdhsa,t aanlldththeasttathteesyhbarviengdethleegiratmedonaiutothroinrgitynetotwimorpklseamnednrtefpeodretral protocols up to high, consistent standards that would provide sufficiently detailed waterquality data to make sound management decisions. c. The administrator should use environmental data in decisionmaking at the national level, and when negotiating with states on National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS) agreements. The administrator should hold political and career managers accountable for achieving measurable environmental improvements. d. The administrator should build the agency's capacity to improve federal and state programs by investing in an external, peer-reviewed evaluation network. 3. Hold states accountable for results a. The administrator should redefine EPA's expectations of states in terms of environmen tal results, rather than only of process. b. Tsthateesadanmdinreisgtiroantoarl aonffdictehsebastsaeteprcioomritmieisssaionndewrsosrhkopulladnrseovnitasleirzieouNsEsPelPfS-a,srseeqssumireinntgs that informed by public participation. EPA should provide to those states with effective environmental programs substantial discretion in how they manage and deploy those programs. Regional offices should audit the effectiveness of such state programs, rather than review individual permits or activities. c. The administrator should also complete the transfer of routine regulatory functions from regional offices to the states. 4. fUosceusalolnthaecthoioevlsinagvacriliatibclaelteoncvhiraonngme menatnalaggoemalsent cultures and practices to a. Revamp EPA's planning and budgeting systems to move the agency towards strategic, performance-based management consistent with the intent of the Government Perfor mance and Results Act (GPRA), eliminating those practices that reinforce fragmented programs and relationships. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00191 192 Environment.gov b. Develop and implement a strategy for addressing the outdated organizational structure of the agency, starting with reorganization of the regional offices. If necessary; EPA should seek statutory changes to allow reorganization that would end the fragmentation odefltehgeataegmenocryeidnetocissieopnamraatkeimngedauiathoofrfiictye7s.anInd tmheanmaegaenmtiemnet ,fltehxeibaidlimtyitnoistthroatsoerosfhfiocuelsd, while holding regional administrators responsible for achieving environmental progress. The administrator should give regional administrators budget-implementation authority to facilitate regional accountability7and flexibility c. sDioenles.gaEtnesduerceisthioantmdiaskaignrgeeamutehnotrsitaymcolenagrlpyroangdradmemofafnicdeseoxrpeadmitoionugs,retghiooungshatfnudl hdeecaid quarters are identified promptly and resolved. Replace the agency's casual demand for "consensus" with an exphcit bias for action. Make certain, however, that actions are coupled with evaluation and accountability. d. Build EPA's management skills now to avoid a crisis as senior employees retire. The next mncoaeldonrgte;yo7e;fcaomnndaonminaitgceesrrnasanwtdiiolbnl unasleientrdeasdnse;e.iwnfsokrimllsa: teioxnpetretcishenionlopgliaecse-abnadsecdo,mcmroussn-imcaetdioian;mbaiontaegceh Congress should: 5 . Authorize EPA and the states to use the tools they need to tackle the big problems a. Authorize EPA and the states to implement allowance-trading systems to reduce pollution in air and w7ater, explicitly liberating such systems from the constraints of traditional facility-based permitting, provided that trades would not result in unaccept able risks in local areas. b. Empower EPA to let states try new approaches to address water quality and related problems in watersheds, including alternatives to total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) weffhiecrieentthlyo7stehaanlteTrnMatDivLess caopupleda.r likely to improve the environment more effectively or c. tAraudthitoiorinzaelapnedrmenitcsowuritahgewhstoaltee-feaxcpileitryi7maegnretsemwietnhtspeorrfo"brmeyaonncde--ctroamckplsiyasntceem"sstthraattegreiepsl.ace d. Work with the administrator to create a statutory basis for continued experimentation aanpdprionpnroiavtaitoinosnpinrotcheessn. ation's environmental system. Support innovation through the 6. Invest in information a. Appropriate sufficient funds for major improvements in environmental data and in program assessments. b. Authorize establishment of an independent bureau of environmental information and assessment. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00192 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 193 c. Direct EPA to redesign its implementation of GPRA to provide more information about the nation's overall progress toward meeting critical environmental goals. 7. Put aside partisanship because America wants Congress to solve serious problems. a. tMogeemthbeerrstoshsoetuladggurseesstihveeepnuvbilriocn-pmoelinctytgoodaelsmaonndstprraotevitdheatthpeomliteicaanlsptaortaiechsiceavne tchoemme. b. Share with EPA a willingness to try new7approaches that hold promise of better perfor mance, and must refrain from unfair criticism of EPA if some innovations fail. c. Become an environmental leader. Members of Congress should join the administrator and the state commissioners in explaining to Americans why action on the big environ mMeenmtableprsrosbhloeumlds hisenlpecbeusssianreyssanledadwehrys,iennnvoivraotniomneinstaeslsaednvtioaclaitnesm, aakndinggopvreorgnroesrss.find common ground on approaches that will achieve the nation's environmental goals at the lowest possible social cost. M e regulators and legislatures should: 8. Challenge EPA, Congress, and one another to transform environmental governance a. Continue to develop and deploy approaches to environmental protection that can tdieolnivaecrrmosesatshueranbalteiorne.suSlttastmesosrheoeuflfdecbtiuvieldlyeovraeluffaitciioenntilyn,toanthdebdeemsigondeolfs ifnonroimvaptilveementa programs. b. aCnodmimncirtetaoseenthveiroponlmiteicnatlalprimespsuroreveomneonnt,eraenjeoctthaerrotollbdaeclikveorfeennvviirroonnmmeennttaallrsetsaunldtsaradss, well as efficient programs. Accept the challenge of reporting on a meaningful set of core performance measures, and being judged in relation to comparable states. c. Commit to build adequate environmental monitoring systems. d. Make the next iteration of NEPPS work by investing in better self-assessments, expanding ptiuesblwicitphatrhtiecirpeagtiioonnalinofsfeictteisn,gpparritoicruitliaersl,yaonnd pvriogobrleomusslyonfeignotetriasttainteg srioglneisfiacnadncree.sponsibili e. lEaqnudi-pusceodmemciusinointisesthaantdprroegteicotnsorweinthhianntcheeesntavtiersonwmithentthael vtoaolulsesa.nd incentives to make Business leaders, NGOs, and foundations should: 9. Embrace more effective and efficient policies for environmental protection a. Reject calls for a rollback in environmental protection at the state or federal level. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00193 194 Environment.gov b. Work with EPA and states on trading networks; building credible environmental man agement systems (EMSs) and International Organization for Standards (ISO) 14001 registration. 10. Help build a national system for gathering, disseminating, and using environmental information. a. lPorcoavlidcoembemttuenritiinefsoramndatrieognualabtoouryt faigrmensc'ieens.vironmental performance to the public: both b. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO s) and foundations should support efforts to use environmental data and to evaluate environmental program s. c. The leaders in the information-technology revolution should lend their support and rteecsohunriccaels,tfoinhaenlcpiaEl,PaAnadnpdotlhiteicnalatsiuopnpbourtilcdoaulddyancacmeliecriantefotrhmeattriaonnsfsoyrsmteamti.oTnhoefirEPA by a decade. The next EPA administrator will have much good work to build on within the agency and nfaumelw,ocnmogmettmhheoitdtsestadfto,esrc.omInnasdkisiivtneigndteunalelvsai,drocenorsmmhipepnanttaoielhsp,erolcpgormtehsmesm.uTnmihtieaeykse,aNreevGerenOamsd,yoa--rnedepvrseotnagtreeesasgsh.earv--e fboeretnhoteusgtihntg Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00194 APPENDIX A The Research Papers Innovations in Regulation Evaluation of theMassachusetts EnvironmentalResults Program, b y S u sa n A p ril a n d Tim G r e in e r ISO 14001 and EPA Region Fs Star Track Program: Assessing their Potential as Tools in Environmental Protection b y je n n ife r N a s h a n d John E hrenfeld The PotentialandPitfalls of Innovative Permits: Learningfrom New Jersey's Facility- Wide Permitting Program b y S usan H elm s, J e n n ife r S ullivan, a n d A lle n W h ite Green Permits and Cooperative Environmental Agreements: A Report on Oregon's and Wisconsin's Regulatory Innovation Programs b y Je rry S p e ir Trading Systems to Reduce Air and Water Pollution Analysis of Volatile-Organic-CompoundAir Pollution TradingSystems b y Eric R ud e r a n d M ic h a e l H ix CrosscuttingAnalysis of TradingPrograms: Case Studies in Air, Water, and WetlandMitigation Trading b y R o b e rt Kerr, John Jaksch a n d S teve A n d e rs o n Governance in Watersheds The WatershedApproach--An EmpiricalAssessment of Innovation in EnvironmentalManagement b y S te p h en M . B orn a n d K enneth D. G e n s k o w Environmental Governance in Watersheds: The Importance of Collaboration to InstitutionalPerformance b y M a r k T. Im p e r ia l a n d T im o th y H e n n e s s e y TheNavesink WatershedManagementEffort by C a ro n C hess a n d G in g e r G ibso n Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00195 196 Environment.gov Lessonsfrom Large WatershedPrograms:A Comparison of the Colorado RiverBasin Salinity Control Program with the San Francisco Bay-Delta Program, Central and South Florida (Everglades) Prefect, and the Chesapeake Bay Program b y R obert W . A d le r a n d M ic h e lle S traube Changing the Federal/ State Relationship MixingManagementMetaphors: The Complexities of Introducing a Peformance-Based State/EPA Partnership System into an Activity Based Management Culture b y Lee P a d d o c k a n d S uellen K e in e r The National Environmental Peformance Partnership System: Making Good on its Promise? b y je a n n e H e rb , A lle n W h ite a n d M a rk S to u g hten Environmental Performance Measures in a Federal System, b y W illia m T. G o r m le y , Jr. Reinventing EPA New England: An EPA Regional Office Tests Innovative Approaches to Environmental Protection b y Jo d i Perras Limits to Environmental Protection Innovation: Can EPA Accommodate Calfornia and Other Leading-Edge States? byP aul Silvern Compliance Assurance and Superfund: Reforms at EPA Reinventing Supefund: An Assessment of EPFs Administrative Reforms b y R obert N a ka m u ra and Tom C hurch Towards Integrated Approaches to Compliance Assurance J e a n n e H e rb , M a r k S to u g h to n , J e n n ife r S ullivan, a n d M ic h a e l C ro w Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00196 APPENDIX B A Guide to EPA's Statutes Several major statutes form the legal basis for the programs of the Environmental Protection Agency. The Pollution Prevention Act seeks to prevent pollution through reduced generation of pollutants at their points of origin. TquhaeliCtylsetaanndAaridrsA, hcatzaanrddoiutssaamirpenoldlmuteannttsemreiqsusiiorne sEtPanAdtaordsse,tsmtaonbdialerd-ssofuorrcneewlhpnoitlsl,uatimonbiseonutrcaeirs-, and significant deterioration requirements. The act also authorizes a market-based emissions trading system to control acid rain, the review of State Implementation Plans, the issuing of permits for new sources in non-attainment areas, and hnplementation of international agree ments to protect stratospheric ozone. rTehguelaCtolerya'nanWd eantfeorrcAemcteensttpabroligsrhaems tfhoer sewage treatment construction grants program and a dischargesof wastesinto U.S.watersfrom point sources. It also requires that EPA approve Total Maximum Daily Loads prepared by states for nonpoint esoquuracteelpyolWluetatlnatnsdfsoarriemrpegaiurleadtewd autnedr ebroSdieecst,ioann4d0t4o, wwrhiitcehTrMeqDuiLressitfhasttapteesrmdoitsnboet disosuseodafdor discharge of dredge and fill material. The Safe D rinking Water Act establishes primary drinking water standards, regulates un derground injection disposal practices, and establishes a groundwater control program. TmauhetehnoStraoizlleiRdreeWgspualoasnttieosenD, oiCsfposmooslipadelanAnsdcatthaiaonznda,rtdhaoenudRs ewLsaioasutber,ilcwiethyCilAeocntthse(eCrCEvoRamCtiLopnAreaohrnedSnusRpiveerecfouEnvnde)rveyirstAoanbct lishes a fee-maintained fund to clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites. tTohxeicEremleearsegseanncdyePnlcaonunraignegs arensdpoCnsoems fmorucnheitmyiRcailgrhelte-atsoe-sK. now Act requires reporting of The Toxic Substances Control Act regulates the testing and use of chemicals, and the tFheedireursael. Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act governs pesticide products and Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00197 198 Environment.gov The E nvironm ental R esearch and D evelopm ent D em onstration Act authorizes all EPA research programs. TimhpeaNctasttiaotenmaelnEtsn.vironmental PolicyActrequires, in part, that EPAreview environmental Some statutes important to EPAs mission are administered by other agencies. Among them: the Farm Bill, administered by USDA, which provides the majority of fiinding for nonpoint source pollution control; the Transportation Act for the 21"' Century, administered by the Department of Transportation; the Endangered Species Act, administered primarily rbiylythaedmDienpiastretmreednbtyofththeeDIneptearritomr;eanntdotfhCe oCmomstearlceZ.one ManagementAct, which isprim a Note:eMpaohroeminef/olarmwraetigon and full texts of laws administered by EPA are available at: http:/ / www.epa.gov/ Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00198 APPENDIX C Glossary BACT Best available control technology BLM Bureau of Land Management, U. S. Department of the Interior BMP Best management practice CAA Clean Air Act CAFO Concentrated animal feeding operations CCMP Comprehensive Conservation Management Plan CEM Continuous emissions monitors CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and LiabilityAct CFR Code of Federal Regulations CWA Clean Water Act CZM Costal Zone Management DOE U. S. Department of Energy EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ECOS Environmental Council of the States EIP Economic Incentive Program EMAS Eco-Management and Audit Scheme EMS Environmental management system ERP Environmental Results Program (Massachusetts) FWP Facility-wide permit GAO General Accounting Office GEMS Green Environmental Management System (Oregon) GPRA Government Performance and Results Act GIS Geographic information systems GPRA Government Performance and Results Act GPS Global positioning system HCP Habitat Conservation Plans Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00199 200 Environment.gov ISO International Standards Organization ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Act MACT Maximum achievable control technology MOA Memorandum of agreement MPO Metropolitan planning organization MSWG Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Management Systems NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards NCRS National Resources Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture NEP National Estuary Program NEPPS National Environmental Performance Partnership System NESHAP National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants NGO Nongovernmental organization NO X Nitrogen oxide NPDES National Pollution Discharge Elimination System NPS Nonpoint pollution source OECA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance OMB Office of Management and Budget P2 Pollution prevention P4 Pollution Prevention in Permitting Project POTW Publicly owned treatment works PPA Performance Partnership Agreement PPG Performance Partnership Grant RACT Reasonably achievable control technology RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act SAMP Special Area Management Plan SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act SIP State Implementation Plan S 0 2 Sulphur dioxide SOX Sulphur oxide TEA21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century TIP Transportation Implementation Plan TMDL Total maximum daily load TRI Toxic Release Inventory USDA United State Department of Agriculture v o c Volatile organic compound Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00200 APPENDIX D The Panel and Staff Panel Members JPounbaltihcaPnoBli.cHy,oUwneisv*e(rCsihtayiro)--f NSopretchiaClAarsosliisntaanatttoCthhaepCelhHanilcle. lFloorrmanedr Professor of Planning and Secretary, Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources, State of North Carolina; Research Professor and Director, Center for Urban and Regional Studies, University of North Carolina; Mayor, Town of Chapel Hill; Director, Urban Policy Center, Urban American, Inc.; Director, State and Local Planning Assistance, US. Department of Housing and Urban Development. lAulvminbAusimG*r--ouPpr;eFsiodremnet,r Chambers Associates, Assistant Secretary for Inc. Former Executive Vice President, The Co Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy; Director and Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corp.; President, Alliance Technologies Corp.; Chairman of the Board, Thermo Analytical Inc.; Deputy Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Assistant Secretary, Policy and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Energy PMraortyecGtioand eA*g--enPcayr, tnSetart,eSoofnnIlelinnsocihs.eiFno, rNmaepr hD&epRuotyseAnsthsiaslt.anFtoArmdemrinDiisrteracttoorr,, Environmental Office of Sohd Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA; Associate Division Director for Superfund, Waste Management Division, U.S. EPA, Chicago, Illinois; Associate Regional Counsel, Office of Regional Counsel, U.S. EPA, Chicago, Illinois. MDoandailsdonF.; NKeotntlr*e--siPdreonftesSseonrioorfFPeollloiwtic; aBlrSoocikeinncges and Public In stitution; Affairs, University of WisconsinChair, Wisconsin Governor'sBlue Ribbon Commission on State-Local Partnerships; Former Chair, Wisconsin Governor's Blue Ribbon Commission on Campaign Finance Reform. JEonhvniJr.oKnimrline*n--talDAifrfeacitros,r,InCdeinatnear for Urban University Policy and the Indianapolis. Environment, Former Emery School of Pubhe and E. 0 Ison Professor of Public-Private Entrepreneurship, School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, Sacramento; Interim Dean and Associate Dean, School of Public Administration, and Co-director, Sacramento Public Affairs Center, University of Southern California. JCoennattehra,nVLearsmh--onPt LreaswidSencht,oWol;oVrledrmRoesnotuCrcoemsmInissstiitountee.r Former Director, of Environmental Environmental Conservation; H Law ead, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources; Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council; Peace Corps volunteer, Dominican Republic. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00201 202 Environment.gov JnainoertFLe. lNloowr,wTohoed U*--rbFaonrmInesrtiCtuhtaei;r,UAnditveidsoSrytaCteosuCnocmil monisUsinoenmerpolofyLmaebnotr Compensation. Statistics, US. Se De partment of Labor. Associate Deputy Commissioner for Data Analysis, Bureau of Labor Sta tistics; ChiefJ Division of Consumer Prices and Price Indexes, BLS; Research Associate, Wil liam L. Clayton Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University WanidlliaCmEOD., BRruocwkenlsinhagu-Fs*e--rriPsrIinndcuipstarliePsa;rAtndemr,inMisatdrartoonr,aUI.nSv.eEsntmviernotnGmreonutpal. Former Chairman Protection Agency; Senior Vice President for Law and Corporate Affairs, Weyerhaeuser Company; Deputy U.S. Attorney General; Acting Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Beverly -- Stein Chair, Multnomah County, Oregon. Former Oregon State Legislator. *Academy Fellow Project Staff lDegeeW, iBttJrouhnnsw--icTkh, oMmaaisneM; .DSirheacntonro,nCDeinrteecrtofro,rEtnhveirEocnomnoenmtayl Studies and the Program, Bowdoin Col Environment, National Academy of Pubhc Administration. Former Director, State Policy Program, Aspen Institute; Economic Policy Studies Director, National GovernorsAssociation;Director, Governor'sPolicy Office, Colorado. oRficAhaurgduAs.t M20i0n0a)r.d jFr.o--rmDeerpAustyso' DciiarteecDtoirr,eNcteowr, Hampshire Center for Pubhc Center for the Economy and Policy Studies (As the Environment, NationalAcademyof Public Administration; Director, Northeast Center for Comparative Risk; Director, Governor's Office of Policy Research and Coordination, Vermont. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00202 Selected Bibliography Adler, Robert W. "Integrated Approaches to the Water Pollution Problem: Lessons for the Clean Water Act," H arvard Environmental L a w Review 23. 1999. _____.''Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection," Environmental Law 25. 1995 Boyd,WJaamsheisn. gtTohne,NDewC:FaRceesoofutrhceeCslefoanr tWheatFeruAtuctr:e.A20C0ri0ti.cal Review o f the EPA's Prospective T M D L Rules. Carlson, Curtis, Dallas Burtraw; Maureen Cooper, and Karen Palmer. "Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?" Discussion Paper 98-44. Resources for the Future. 1998. Carpenter, S.R., N.F. Caruso, D.L. Correll, R.W. Howarth, A.N. PSoolcluietitoyn ooff ASumrfeacriecaW.at1e9rs98w.ith Phosphorus and Nitrogen: issues in SEhcoalropglye.yW, aansdhiUng.Hto.nS, DmiCth:.ENcoolnopgoiicnatl ColbuIrnns,tiTtuhteeof,oertRale.sGeraeracthLaakneds,PGurbealitcLePgoalcicyy. .W19a9s0h.ington, DC and Ottawa: Conservation Foundation and Davis, J. Clarence and Janice ton, DC:Resources for tVheMFauztuurree.k.19P9o8ll.ution Control in the United States: Evaluating the System. Washing EnviroPnomlluetniotanl."La1w99I7n.stitute. "Enforceable State Mechanisms for Control of Nonpoint Source Water _____. "Putting the Pieces Together: State Nonpoint Source Enforceable Mechanisms in Context." 2000. Environmental M anagement Report, Vol. 5, No. 1. New York City: McGraw Hill. 2000. Fallows, James. Savannah, The W Georgia. aNtereLwo rYdso:rkRCalipthy:NBaadnert'as mStuBdyooGkrsou1p9R71ep. o rt on industry and Environmental Crises in Faeth,WPoarulld. RFeesrtoiluerGcerosuInnds:tiNtuutter.ie2n0t 0T0ra.ding's Potential to Cost Effectively Improve Water Quality. Washington, DC: FisherC, Rityo:gPeernagnudinWBilolioakms. U1r9e9y6.. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement W ithout Giving In, 2ndedition. New York Horton, Tim and Bill Eischbaum. 1991. Turning the Tide: Saving the Chesapeake Bay. Washington, DC: Island Press Houck, Oliver A. "The Clean Water TMDL: Law, Policy and Implementation." Washington, DC: Environmental Law Institute. 1999. Howitot,fAthrenoTlrdananspdoErtlaiztiaobnetChoMnfooorrme.it`yTRanekgiunlgatTiornaninspNoortna-tAiotntaainnmd Aenirt RQeugailointys,P"lapnrneipnagr:edImfoprlethmeeUnt.Sa.tion EPA and the Federal Highway Administration, March 1999. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00203 204 Environment.gov HuntiPPnaagccdiiffoiincc,NRCiovhreathrrslweCseosatunandncidSl.aNr2io0S0rto0hm.ermnaCrsatlriofmor.ni`a`A."n PEovratlluaantdioannodfESuegleecntee,dOWRa:teTrsrhoeudt UCnoluinmciitlesdinanthde John, CDoenWgirtets. siCoinviaclEQnuviarrotnemrleyntPalriessms:. A19lt9er4n.atives to Regulation in States and Communities. Washington, D C: John, DeWitt and Marian Mlay, "Community-Based Environmental Protection: Encouraging Civic EednivteirdobnymKenetnalSisemxt."onI,n B et eatlt.erWEansvhirionngmtoennt,aDl DCec:isIisolnasn:dStPraretesgsi,es1f9or99G.overnments, Businesses, and Communities, Kenney, Douglas. Resource M anagem ent at the Watershed Level: Eomf eLragiwng 1E9r9a7o. f Comm unity-Based Watershed M anagem ent. ABnouAlsdseesrs,mCeOnt:o fUthneivCehrasnigtyingofFeCdeorlaolrRaodloe iSncthheool Light,TSutrebpulheentnESco..syLsatenmc.eNGeuwnYdeorrskoCni,tya:ndCoClu. mS.bPilaolUlinngiv.erTshiteyEPvreergssla.d1es9:95E.volution o f M anagement in a Loper, Connie A., and Ryan C. Davis. "A Snapshot of Stream Environmental Quality in the Little Conestoga Creek Basin, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania." Water Investigations Report 98-4173. 1998. Miller, Bill. "Court Lets EPA Enforce Clean Air Rule, Washington Post, June 24,2000. N ational men tAa lcPardoetemctyionoAf gPeuncbyl.icWAadshminingitsotnra,tDioCn.: SNeatttiniognPariloAritcieasd, eGmetytinogfRPeusublitcs:AAd.mNeinwisDtirraetcitoionn.fo1r99th5e.Environ National Academy Congress, EPA o & f Public Administration. the States. Washington, D CRe:sNolavitniog nthaelPAacraaddoexmoyf EonfvPiruobnmlicenAtadl mPrionteicsttiroant:ioAnn. A1g9e9n7d.a fo r National Academy o Planning at EPA. fWPuabshliicngAtdomn, iDniCst:raNtiaotnio.nRaelmAemcabdeerimngythoefFPuutubrlei:c AApdpmlyiinngisFtroaretisoignh.t T1e9c9h9n.iques to Research Nash,mDJeCenn,ntNaifloePrvoealmnicdyb.eJ"roh2pn-r3eEs,1eh9nre9ten9df.iealtdM. u"Eltin-vSitraotenmWeonrtkailnMg GanraoguepmReensteSarycshteSmusmanmditTohneEirMRSosl,esWinasEhninvgirtoonn, Ogg, Clayton. "Benefits from Managing Farm Association. Vol. 35, No. 5. October 1999. Produced Nutrients," J o u r n a l of the American Water Resources O strComam, Ebrliindogre. UGnoivveernrsinitgythPereCsosmm1o9n9s0:. The Evolution o f Institutionsfor Collective Action. New York City: O strom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. University of Michigan Press. 1996. Rules, Games and Common Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security. Opportunities and Obstaclesfor IS O 140 0 1 in Public Policy and Commerce. 2M0a0n0a. g i n g f o r a Better Environment: Parry, Pam. 2000. The Bottom Line: How to B u ild a Business Case for IS O 1 4 0 0 1 .Boca Raton, FL: St. Lucie Press. ReinhBaurdsitn, eFsosreSscthLo.oDl Porwensst.o2E0a0r0th.: Applying Business Principles to Environmental M anagement. Boston: Harvard Renn,KTluhwomeraAs cWadeebmleircaPnudbPliestheerrsW. 1i9e7d5m. ann, eds. Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation. Boston: Rodgers, William IT., Jr. Environmental Law, 2 ndedition. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.1994. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00204 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 205 Stephenson, Kurt, Patricia Norris, and Leonard Shabman. "Watershed-Based Effluent Trading: The Nonpoint Source Challenge," Contemporary Economic Policy, 412. 1998. Stephenson, Kurt, Leonard Shabman, and L. Leon George. "Toward an Effective Watershed-Based Effluent Trading System: Identifying the Statutory Environm ental Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 3, June 1999. and Regulatory Barriers to Implementation," The Stephenson, Kurt, Leonard Shabman, and William Shobe. "Comments to the Proposed NPDES Interim PanerdmAitptipnligedRuElceo: nIommpilcisc,aVtioirngsinfoiar PWolaytetercshhendic-BaansdedStAatleloUwnainvceersTitrya.diJnagn.u"arDye1p7a,r2tm00e0n.t of Agriculture Swift, Byron. "Grandfathering, New Source Review and N O x. Making Sense of a Flawed Sytem." Environmental Law Institute, draft. May 31,2000. United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Enforcement in the 1990s Project." 1991. _____, Office of Water and Office of Policy; Planning and Evaluation. "Incentive Analysis for Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Point/ Nonpoint Trading for Nutrient Discharge Reduction." 1992. United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Economic Incentive Program Rules: Final Rule and Guidance." 59 CFR 16690. April 7, 1994. _____8,0O0f-fRic-e94o-f00W2a.te1r.99"4P.resident Clinton's Clean Water Initiative: Analysis of Costs and Benefits" EPA _____. "Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading" EPA 800-96-001. May 1996 UniteDd oSctautmeseEntn.v"ir1o9n9m8 ental Protection Agency, Region 1. "StarTrack Program: Program Guidance United States Environmental Protection Agency. 100-R-99-002. 1999. Reinventing Environmental Protection: 1998 Annual Report. _______0.0A-0im06in.'gfJourlyEx1c9e9ll9en.ce: Actions to Encourage Stewardship and Accelerate Environm ental Programs. EPA 100-R- _____AR. en"gtRiudeleavgtiisroianod:nastPitoorontphPoeosleNidcayRtiiounlneSasul."pPpo6ol9lrutFtoaRnftR4D6ei0vs5ics8hio.anrAgsetuogEutlhsimte2iWn3a,att1ieo9rn9Q9S.uyasltietmy PPlraongnrianmg aanndd MFeadnearaglement _____. "Draft Economic Incentive Program Guidance." EPA 452/ D-99-001. September 1999. _____. Office of Air and Radiation, Clean Air Markets Division. "OTC NOx Budget Program Compli ance Report." March 27, 2000. UnitedshSeetat.teAs Eprnivl i1ro1n,2m0e0n0t.al Protection Agency. "EPA Asks Court to Lift Stay onN O xSIP Call." fact _____. "National Environmental Achievement Track Program Description." June 26, 2000. UnitedSoSutracteesPGolelunteiroanl."AGccAouOn/tiRnCgEODff-i9ce9.-4"5F.eFdeebrraulaRroyle19in99A. ddressing--and Contributing to--Nonpoint Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00205 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00206 Endnotes 1 Appendix B contains a brief guide to EPA's statutes. 2 EPA established the Toxics Release Inventory in 1988; it requires more than 21,000 U.S. facilities to report to EPA annually on their releases and transfers of more than 600 toxic chemicals EPA reviews tahneodnaltianeansoduprcuebloisfhiensfothrmematieolnecatrboonuictaflalcyilaitnieds'inempriisnstio. nTshaenEdnthveiriornremlaetnivtaeltDoxeifceintys.e "Scorecard" is 3 O f the 18,967 EPA employees, 8,753 work in regional offices, 6,727 at headquarters, and 3,487 in the wfiewldw. e(Upa.S.g. oEvn/vhiirsotonrmy1e/notragl/Prreostoeucrtcioesn/Abugdengceyt.,)"EPA'sBudget and Workforce, 1970-2001," http:/ / 4 National Academy of Public Administration, Resolving the Paradox of Environmental Protection, 1997. 5 See mvwnapawash.org/ innovationspapers. 6 N19a9ti5o.nal Academy of Public Administration. SettingPriorities, GettingResults: A N ew Directionfor EPA, 7 See supra note 4. 8 House, Conference Report On PER. 2158, Departments O f Veterans Affairs And Housing And Urban Development, And Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998. October 6, 1997, TI8323 9 A summary of that discussion is available on-line at wwwnapawash.org\ innovationspapers. 10 This report uses the word "firm" loosely to refer to any organization subject to environmental regulation or engaged in the implementation of an environmental management system. 11 tPohofalletunttihvooinrsoCenormnetgreounlltiaantlitroheengsUuhnlaaittveideonSletaidntetsto:hEesviUganlnuiafititceinadgnStthrteaetdSeyussctbetmyio,Jn.asC1iln9a9rce8onnrceveveiDnetwaiovonieafsltahpnoedlelufJftaeancnitctisveefVrnoemMss alaaznrudgreeekpff,oicfiniientndcsy sources. However, emissions of nitrogen dioxide and ozone, two of the six major air pollutants associated with energy consumption, have not been reduced. The authors document the lack of information needed to determine the extent of environmental improvement. 12 rUe.iSn.vEenPtA/ ,aRneniunvaeln9t8in/g9E8nrveirpoonrmt.epndtafl Protection: 1 9 9 8 A nnual Report EPA, 1999. http:/ / wwwepa.gov/ 13 hStetep:E/n/ vwirwovnvmepean.tgaolvA/cocpoputnintitnr/gaPcrcotgje/c.t of the Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxic Substances, 14 See http:/ / wwwscorecard.org/ 15 See http:/ / www:globalforestwatch.org 16 Susan April and Tim Greiner, " "Evaluation of the Massachusetts Environmental Results Program," 2000. 17 Susan C. Helms, Jennifer A. Sullivan, and Allen L. White, "The Potential and Pitfalls of Innovative Permits: Learning from New Jersey's Facility-Wide Permitting Program, 2000. (hereinafter Helms, et all) 18 Jennifer Nash, John Ehrenfeld, Jeffrey MacDonagh-Dumler, and Pascal Thorens, "ISO 14001 and E20P0A0.R(ehgerieoinnaf1te'srNStaasrhTraancdkEPhroregnrafemld:,A2s0s0e0ss.)ing Their Potential as Tools in Environmental Protection," Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00207 208 Environment.gov 19 WJerirsycoSnpseinir',s"RGergeuelnatoPreyrmInintsoavnadtioCnoPorpoegraratimves,E"n2v0i0r0o.nmental Agreements: A Report on Oregon and 20 See Appendix C of April and Greiner for a sample certification document. 21 Ib id .,2 4 . 22 Ibid., 2 6 . 23 Ibid., 27-30. 24 Personal communication, Susan April, July 2000. 25 April and Greiner, op cit, 43-44. 26 Ibid., 18-19. 27 Ibid., 41-43. 28 Ibid., 35-36. 29 For more on Project XL, see Helms, et a t, and TheParadox of Environmental Protection, op. cit. 30 Helms, e ta l, 39. 31 Pam Parry; The Bottom Line: H ow to B uild a Business Casefo r IS O 1 4 0 0 , 2 0 0 0 , 3. 32 Jennifer Nash and John Ehrenfeld, "Environmental Management Systems and their Roles in Environmental Policy," Multi-State Working Group Research Summit on Environmental Manage ment Systems, November 2-3, 1999. 33 Nash and Ehrenfeld, 2000 34 Organizations of all sizes and types may adopt an EMS: large corporations may implement a wcoirthpionrathteo-sweidfaecislyitsiteesm--,morayinaddivoipdtutahlefiarcoilwitinesEwMitShsi.nLaikceowrpisoer,aptuiobnli--c oarngdaneivzeantiionndsi,vsiudcuhalapsraocsetsastees's department of transportation or an individual wastewater treatment plant, may adopt an EMS. To istismspizliefyorthsetantuosm. enclature, this report generally refers to an adopting entity as a "firm," regardless of 35 The Environmental M anagement Report, January 2000. 36 See, for in Public example, Policy and Pacific Institute, Managing Commerce, March 2000. a Better Environment: Opportunities and Obstaclesfo r ISO 14001 37 The best-known European standard is EMAS, the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme. 38 Parry, 6. 39 Ford and GM press releases are available at wwwMSWG.org 40 Nash and Ehrenfeld, 2000, 19, 28-29. 41 Ibid. 42 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Environmental Law Institute, "National Database on Environmental Management Systems: The Effects of Environmental Management wSywswteMmsSoWnGth.oergE.nvironmental and Economic Performance of Facilities," June 2000, at 43 Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Management Systems, "EMSs, Environmental Performance, and Compliance, Final Draft," December 1999, at wwwMSWG.org, Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00208 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 209 44 U.S. EPA Region I, "StarTrackProgram: Program Guidance Document 1998," August 1998. 45 S14ta0r0T1radcokesalnloowt.s firms to hire their own EMS consultants to serve as the third-party auditor; ISO 46 Nash and Ehrenfeld, 2000,19,45. 47 Ibid, 66-67. 48 Ibid, 59-60. 49 Ibid., 70. 50 Ibid., 68. 51 U19.S9.9E, P1A3-,1A5i.m ingfo r Excellence: Actions to Encourage Stewardship and Accelerate Environmental Progress, July 52 wU.wS.wEePpAa.,g"oNv\aptieornfoarlmEnanvcireotnramcke,ntal Achievement Track Program Description," at 53 Jeff Smoller of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources uses those phrases frequently in public remarks. 54 Letter from Bill Stone, project manager, Environmental Assistance Division, MIDEQ , Nov. 10,1999 (on file with Speir). General information is available at wwwstate.mi.us/ deq/ ead/ tasect/ c-3/ . 55 Available at http:/ / wwwpca.state.mn.us/ programs/ projectxl/ xl-legpdf 56 The statute is available at http:/ / wwwpca.state.mn.us/ programs/ projectxl/ la-bill.pdf 57 A description of the program is available at http:/ / wwwepa.state.il.us/ iso14001/ summary.html 58 Wisconsin Statutes Annotated 299.80. 59 "Interested person" is defined by the statute as "a person who is or may be affected by the activities at a facility that is covered or proposed to be covered by a cooperative agreement or a representative of such a person." WSA 299.80(1 Xf) 60 Speir, op. cit., 6-17. 61 Speir, 17. 62 See Speir for detailed descriptions of each proposal. 63 OAR 340-014-0135, in Speir, 34. 64 Speir, 35 65 pSeeremCiat saet SittsuAdyloh1,ainfacRielistoyl.ving the Paradox o f Environmental Protection, for a discussion of Intel's "P4" 66 Speir, 36. 67 Ibid.. 68 As of February 2000, 12 of the 18 participating firms had approved FWPs; four more permits were pending approval; and two firms had dropped out of the program. (Helms, et a l, op cit, 22.) 69 Ibid., 52. 70 Ib id , 55-56. 71 Ibid., 49. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00209 210 Environment.gov 72 End., 51. 73 Ibid., 53. 74 Ibid., 54-55 75 Ibid., 52-53 76 Ibid., 68. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., 64. 79 Ibid., 65. 80 Ibid. 78. 81 Ibid., 73. 82 See Appendix A, Resolving the Paradox o f Environmental Protection. 83 Ptieorns,oJnaanlucaormy m11u,n2i0ca0t0i.on, Timothy Mohin, manager, corporate environmental affairs, Intel Corpora 84 Natural Resources Defense Council, The Dow Chemical Company; et a l, Preventing Industrial Pollution at its Source, 1999. 85 F(Fooreostnt oLt.eRs oeimnihtaterdd.t), D ow n to Earth: Applying Business Principles to Environmental M anagement, 2000. 86 Michael Flix, Eric Ruder, and David Sugarman, "Analysis of Volatile Organic Compound Air Pollution Trading Systems," 2000; and Robert Kerr, Steve Anderson, and John Jaksch, "Crosscutting Analysis of Trading Programs: Case Studies in Air, Water and Wetland Mitigation Trading Systems," 2000, hereinafter, Kerr, et al. 87 Curtis Carlson, Dallas Burtraw, Maureen Cropper, and Karen Palmer, "Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What are the Gains from Trade?" 1998; Dallas Burtraw Cost Savings, M arket Performance, and Economic Benefits o f the U S . A cid R a in Program, 1998, 3-5. 88 Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 89 Paul Faeth. Fertile Ground: .Nutrient Trading's Potential to Cost-Effectively Improve W ater Quality, 2000. 90 Faeth, 7; S. R. Carpenter, N.F Caraco, D.L. Correll, R.W. Howarth, A.N. Sharpley, and VII. Smith, N onpoint Pollution o f Surface Waters w ith Phosphorus and Nitrogen, Issues in Ecology, 1998. 91 AFaneatlhy,si1s6f;oUr .CS.leEaPnAW, OatfefricAecotfRWeaauttehroarnizdatOiofnfi:cePooifnPt/oNlicoyn;pPolainntnTinrgadainndg EfovraNluuattrioienn,t"DInicscehnatirvgee Reductions," 2000. 92 FanaedthB,en17e;fiUts.,S".1E9P9A4., Office of Water, "President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative: Analysis of Costs 93 Faeth, 30. 94 Ibid., 33. 95 Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, "Second Progress Report on the Trading of Water Pollution Credits," September 1999. 96 "ecTohneomTairc-Panamd leincoviprooninmtesnotuarlcseucccoenstsr,o"lcpornocglruadme KcaunrntoSttbepehdeensscornib,eLdeionnaanrdy oSthhaebrmwaany,bauntdaWs ailnliam Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00210 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 211 PSehrombeit,tiinngcRomulme:eInmtspsliucbamtioitntesdfotroWU.aSt.erEsPhAed. -Sbeaese"dCAolmlomweanntcsetoTrtahdeinPgro."poJasneduaNryPD17E,S20I0n0te. rim 97 Kurt Stephenson, Leonard Shabman, and L. Leon Geyer, "Toward An Effective Watershed-Based Effluent Allowance Trading System: Identifying the Statutory and Regulatory1Barriers to Implemen tation," in The Environmental Lawyer, at footnote 175. June 1999. 98 Ibid. 804. 99 Kerr et al. 28-30. 100 Ibid., 31. 101 National Academy of Public Administration, "The Future of Water Quality Monitoring," in Remembering the Future: Applying Foresight Techniques to Research Planning at E P A . 1990, 179-180. 102 Kerr describes the allocation rules on 25-21. 103 Kerr et al. 27. 104 wU.wS.wEePpAa.,g"oEvP/ AairAlinskkss/Cfomuarltstiop.pLdifft Stay on NOxSIP Call: Fact Sheet," April 11, 2000, at 105 EinPgACilsesaunesAair"ASIcPt rceagllu"lawtihoenns.itEdPiAremctsussttaatpesprtoovreeveiascehthsetairtes'tsaSteIPi.mplementation plans for implement 106 Bill Miller, "Court Lets EPA Enforce Clean-Air Rule," Washington Post, June 24, 2000. The new rule will apply to 19 of the 22 states included in the original SIP call. 107 BEnyrvoirnoSnwmieftn,t"aGl LraanwdIfnatshtietruitnegd, rNafetw, MSaoyur3c1e,R2e0v0i0e,w3.and NOx: Making Sense of a Flawed System," 108 Ibid., 7. 109 UPwr.aSor.ge,EraMPmAa,sCsOaocfmfhipcuelsieaotntfscA,eNiRreeawpnodHrRat,m"adpMisahatirirocehn,,2NC7el,we2a0nJ0eAr0s.eiryT,MhNeaerpwkaerYttsiocDrikpi,vaPitsieninognns,syt"al1vte9as9nw9iae,OraeTnCCdoRNnhnOoecxdtBeicuIusdtlg,aneDtde.la 110 Swift, 5 (references omitted). 111 Stephenson et al., 803. 112 flix. Ruder, and Sugarman,o)u7i., 51-52. 113 Ibid., 52. 114 fralitxio.sRhuadveer,reatnirdedSulegsasrtmhaann oshnoewpethrcaetnitnoffoutortoaflfrseegt tiroandailnignvaerneatosriynoNfeVwOYCosrkfraonmd pToeixnatss,otruardceins,g37 115 Kerr, et a l, 8-59. 116 Ibid., 40-41. 117 Kerr, et a l, 41-42. 118 Kurt Stephenson, Leonard Shabman, and William Shobe, "Comments to the Proposed TMDL Rule: Implications for Watershed-based Allowance Trading," January 17,2000. 119 HR 3313 (106th Congress). 120 Kerr, et a l, 44. 121 U.S. EPA, Draft Economic Incentive Program Guidance, September 1999. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00211 212 Environment.gov 122 U.S. EPA, Economic Incentive Program Rules, Final Rule and Guidance, April 7, 1994. 123 PIlx, Ruder, and Sugarman. 41 (references omitted). 124 Kerr, et al., 67-69. 125 Robert. W. Adler, Michele Straube, and Heather Green, "Lessons from Large Watershed Programs," 2000, 9-10. 126 Ibid. 42-49. 127 National Academy of Public Administration, Remembering the Future, op at. 128 Ibid. 129 Stephenson, Shabman, and Geyer, 798. 130 Ibid. 802. 131 Ibid. 803. 132 Ibid. 811. 133 U.S. EPA. Office of Water. Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, May 1996; and at wwwtepa.gov/ owow/ watershed/ summary.html. 134 Ibid. 135 Stephenson, Shabman, and Shobe. 136 ITix, Ruder, and Sugarman, 59-63. 137 EtrPatAiocno.mments on a draft research document, on file with the National Academy of Public Adminis 138 AQsusoetsesdmeinntSotefpIhnennovMat.ioBnorinn EanndviKroennmneenthtaDl M. Gaennasgkeomwe, n"tT,"h2e0W00a,te5r8s.hed Approach: An Empirical 139 National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits. 140 Uow.Si.nEtrnov2i.hrotmnml.ental Protection Agency; Office of Water: An Overview; 3; http:/ / wwwsepa.gov/ OW/ 141 The EPA faces similar dilemma under the Clean Air Act: a lack of authority to address directly the urengduelralytoinrygccoanutsreoslsoofnaiurtiploitlileust,iofanc.toMrioesst, ovefhtihcelepermogisresisosntso,waanrddscecrlteaainnekrianidrshoafs scmomalel bfurosimneEssPeAs,'sas well as from requirements that automobile manufacturers sell cars with high gas mileage. But as those cvoehnitcrolel-smtoiloeks throavlde,lecditiceasugsreeswmionrtoe pthoellucotiuonnt,rwyshidiceh, aanlmdotshteouffsseetosfreaduutocmtioonbsiliens egmreiwssiTonhsefirnocmrease in regulated sources 142 E1n9fo9r7ce,uab,hlei.StateM echanismsfor the Control of Nonpoint Source WaterPollution, Environmental Law Institute, 143 IPnustttiintugtteh,e2P0ie0c0es, 6To0g.ether: State Nonpoint Source Enforceable M echanisms in Context, Environmental Law 144 Ibid., p. 5. 145 IsnawThseecCtiloenan3W03ate[irnAcclut dTiMngDTLMPrDogLrsa]m:asLapwroPvoidliicny,ga`nadgIammpleempelnatnatifoonr,tOhelivneerxHt goeuncekrawtiroitne's. T"HheouSseensattaeff w7as less sanguine: in the w'ords of one Senate staff member, `We didn't take it seriously and thought it Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00212 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 213 AwauodtumhlodinrbiosetfrfatohtooelriSsthoenf`oaartsestihbgeinllEsaPencAdontcodhawariyarspoterfitoiitmrsitPeyu'abtnolidcsmeWcotoinoreknys3tC0o3oimmwmphleietntmeieet,ncwtamiat.s'e.eStqoeunaaalllltoyocrdaMitrieoucnstk,oitefe,lrlpeinrsiognuctrhicpeeasEl PinA the years ahead.." 24. 146 HSeoeuTcko,ta5l0M-5a1x. iEmPuAmalDsoaislytaLteodaidns4U3nFdeedretrhael RCelegaisnteWr 6a0te6r6A4ctth,a4t3itFseoduegrhatl Rtoeg"eisntseurr4e2"3t0h3atq"ucouterrdenint State water quality management programs will not be disrupted" by TMDLs. 147 Houck, 5. 148 USC 1313, 303(dXlXA). 149 USC 1313, 303(dXC). 150 NKounrtpSotienpthSeonusrocne,CPhatarlilceinagNe,o"rrCiso,ntaemndpoLraeroy nEacrodnoSmhicaPbomliacyn,41"W2, a1t9er9s8h;eJda-mBeasseBdoEydff,luTehnetNTerwadFiancge:oTf hthee Clean Water Act: A Critical R eview o f the E P A 's Proposed T M D L R ules, 2 0 0 0 . 151 Robert W. Adler, "Integrated Approaches to the Water Pollution Problem: Lessons from the Clean AonirtAhactt,a"rtHicalrev,atrhdoEungvhir otnhmeepnatanl eLlacwomR eevsietwo, 1995. This section somewhat different of the Academy's report draws heavily conclusions. The recommendations in Adler's article center on changes in the Clean Water Act that would avoid the difficulties that have arisen in the SIP process, whereas our analysis suggests ways to design and manage the TMDL process. Adler's article was written before recent court decisions about TMDLs, and long before EPA began drafting regulations for the TMDL program. 152 Wilham H. Rodgers Jr., Environmental Law , 1994, 148. 153 After 25 years of work, and some improvement in regional air quality, there is not a SIP that describes how the Los Angeles-South Coast region can come into full attainment of air-quality standards. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 postponed the deadline for the South Coast SIP again, to 2010. ACdolmerm, LitlaterveaordnLEanwviRreovniemwe, n1t9a9n5.dSPeuebalilcsoWRoordkgseRrse,pEonrvtir1o1n0m1e-n2t8al8Loanw tRheeviCewle. a7n0.AHireAqcutoAtemsethnedmSeennatste of 1989, 1st session: "The reasons `for the failure to achieve healthy air are many. Among them are the understatement of emissions in inventories submitted by the States and approved by EPA; inadequacies in models used to predict ambient air quality; failure of some States to implement some of the controls they had committed to in their SIPs; failure of some of the controls to achieve the projected emission reductions, and the failure of EPA or the States to require additional controls when it became evident that the attainment deadlines would not be met.'A statutory failure is no reason not to try again, and Congress in 1990 attacked the intransigent non-attainment problems with the same set of tools that had been tried and found wanting earlier: a revised redesignation authority, new deadlines, harsh SIP and permit provisions, and stiff sanctions The most conspicuous feature of the new package, though, is that it looks a great deal like the old, with the ruffles and flourishes of 20 years'experience." 154 EPA estimates that the costs of writing TMDLs will be substantial, but far less than the costs of writing SIPs. Fourteen case studies conducted by EPA show a range from $4,039 to $1,023,531 wdehpeetnhderintgheoynatrheepsoizinetoofrthneonwpaotienrtshseodur,ctehse. EcoPmApelestxiimtyatoefstohfetmheodcoesl,t tohfeTtyMpeDsLofdpevoellluotpamntesn, tanwdill ta(h2v5eerp3a5egrepceefrrnoctme) nTt$hc3oo3sn,0es0ind0uefmroerbdtethrosebd4eo0onpfoemtrcieendnciltuuomdfeTceoMsmtuDpalrLeiexssitc,yof,onarsniwddehr$iec1dh12tTo,0Mb0eD0 rLfeolsraattihrveoesleyexpsoiefmchtpeilgdeh,ttocoob$me6pm3l,eo5x0rie0tyfor coothstelyr.c(rTithicesEoPfAthOe fTfiMceDoLf WreagtuelratainodnsWclaatiemrsmheudcshphroigvhideerdcothstes.fiSgeueretshetoAAsscoacdieamtioynsotafffS)tSatteataensdand IWCnotaeatrsestrataQltSeutaWaltietaysteOPrlrPagonalnnliuinztigaotnaionCnd,oM"nCtaroonmlaAgmedmemneitnnstiasRntredagtRourelsac,toitomhnem(E4en0nvdCiarFotiRnomnPseaonrntta1tlh3Ce0o)PuarnnocdpiolthsoeefdNthRaeetviSoitsnaitaoelnsPs, oatolnludTtthahneet Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00213 214 Environment.gov Dhtitspc:h/ a/rwgewEwliiwmpinexattiroan.coSmys.tem Program and Federal Antidegradation Policy," January 20, 2000, at 155 Putting the Pieces Together, 91. 156 See http:/ / waterquality.deq.state; or.us/ wq/ TMDLs/ TMDLs.htm 157 Fquedaleirtyalafruenndostfocrohveigrehdw.ay safety and for transit and other projects that would improve regional air 158 The requirement was retained from TEA21's predecessor, the Intermodel Surface Transportation Act (ISTEA). 159 APTrrroanntoesplcdotriFotalntoiowAnigtCte.onancnfyodramEnitldyizRtahebegeuFtlhaetdiMoenrosaoilnrHe1,i5gLhiNnwokinan-ygatATtardianmnmsipenonirtstRatrteiagotinioonansn,,dpMAreiarprQcahruead1li9ffy9oP9r,ltahxnieni.iEngn:vImirpolnemmeenntattailon o f the 160 Ibid., xiii. 161 Ibid., xiii-xiv. 162 Ibid., xiv. 163 Environmental op.at., iv-v. Law Institute, Enforceable State Mechanismsfo r Control o f Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 164 Robert W. Adler, "Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection," Environmental Ijiw 25:4,1995. 165 The Great Lakes program also included Canada, which has signed treaties with the United States calling for joint action to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem". See Theo Colborn ITorton and Bill Eischbaum, Turning the Tide, Saving etal., Great Lakes, the Chesapeake B ay, G1r9e9at1L. egacy? 1990; and Tim 166 aSbeeouUt poptheer rCcloalrlkabFoorrakticvaeseprsotcuedsyseins iRne stohlev iWn g ethste,Psaerea dDoox uogf lEansvKireonnnmeeyn,taRl ePsrooutreccetiMona. For nage information m ent at the MYdqWeuaaavifntefoeaetrlgesuveh,tmieAicdoethnonLterF,oyv.UefPil:nnthhAiiQvelnleuieArpinssnsisv,cteyiIysrrs,ooem"nnfeHmenCitegCoohnlf.otFCatrhlaoreemudnCnootthrzvayS,necNPgmheianoweugonslFl,tW,eNo"df.eoHrHLvaiagelawRhmrdo;CbylBeeo; uroiSnnu9utltr,dhsyea1eNnr9E,en9mwC8ees;orM,gElSio.ndergMapMEdtaeroalam,ersko1btif9oe, 9Crna7,o2n;m"9dJWm,aB1une9ane9rmitBb7yaa-;rByraSaaxbsttEeeeovd.nseTWenLehaLiitontet.grrlespht,ehe",deA Ecosystem M anagement in the United States: An Assessment o f Current Experience, 1996, 87-88. 167 Caron Chess and Ginger Gibson, "The Navesink Watershed Management Effort," 2000, 9,27-29,40. 168 Born and Genskow; op at. 169 Mark T. Imperial and Timothy Hennessey, "Environmental Governance in Watersheds: The Importance of Collaboration to Environmental Governance," 2000. 170 There is an extensive literature on collaborative processes See Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting AJPtCoaeodmYtmmeeemsr:isonWNWniessig:taeorlTdatkihteaeiemtori,nEnaRgv,nuoARnllgeeurssete,iodoelGsnvm,ianeoFmngfatetIishWrnenasietPntishtdasuortaCuaiondtondomGsxCmfivooooirnmfngEpCPeInootnvleol,inelrcc1oRetn9ievims9eno1eAuCn;rctciCtatieiolsaznP,es,nre1o19PtSe99act49rtuit.0oidcn;yi'p,aa2Ont,idroNtnEw,alit1inin9oo9Rnr5ae;OlnEAnslt,cirnaToodmhreo,mOmRysoatoysrofWGmPae,urbbGdlleonicvreearrnnaidnngdthe 171 Stephen S. Light, Lance Gunderson, and C ,S. Holling, The Everglades: Evolution o f M anagement in a Turbulent Ecosystem, 1995, 147-151; States and Communities, 1994, 125. and DeWitt John, Civic Env ironm en talism : Altern a tiv e s to R e g u latio n in Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00214 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 215 172 Chess and Gibson, 43-44. 173 Born and Genskow, C-15. 174 Ibid., F-13. 175 Imperial and Hennessey, 25. 176 Imperial and Hennessey, 51. 177 Ibid., 15. 178 Born and Genskow; 52. 179 Ibid., E-14. 180 Imperial and Hennessey, vii. 181 Aarme ofunlgl oofthseerdifmacetnotrss,thwaatrcmoevrerwtahteergsraavreelpbreodbsabwlhyearlesosaslhmaollnowsepra:wann.d they are shallow because they 182 Imperial and Hennessey, 11. 183 Ibid., 38. 184 Adler, Straube, and Green, op. at., 97. 185 The project is the result of successful litigation to protect the Everglades National Park as well as a federal wildlife refuge from nutrient-enriched waters The nutrients come from large farms and wdeavteelrotpoedthaeroeacseafnaritnootrhdeenr otorthp.roTtehcet pcrooabslteaml ciitsiems afrdoemwdoerssterubcytitvheefdloivoedrssioTnheofUl.aSr.gAe rammyouCnotrsposfof Engineers and its cooperating federal and state agency partners have proposed constructing artificial wraetetlaannddstahnedtirmebinugildoifngthaen"esxhteeentsfilvoews"yostfemwaotefrddraoiwnangtehecarnivalesr. oTfhgeraCsosrtphsatseisekthsetoErveesrtgolraedbeostohfthe csspooeuncttirheo-slc,,epanrnterdvaelwnFatlitooernridqoauf.alIsitatylht.wasamterulitniptrluesoiobnje,cstuivpepsl,yinocfluaddeinqguaptreotdercitnikoinngofwtahtreerafteonr ecdoaasntadl ecnitdieasn, gfleoroedd 186 Adler, Straube and Green, 106. 187 cSietemAonll.ihatnmce. for the Chesapeake Bay, Citizen Monitoring Program at http:/ / www.acb-online.org/ 188 CCoonnensiteoAga. LCorpeeekr aBnadsiRn,yLananCc.asDtearviCs,o"uAntSy,nPapenshnosytlovfanSitar:eAamCEoonpveirroantimveenPtraoljQecutableittywienenthteheLittle Residents of Lancaster County, the Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay, and the U.S. Geological rSeuprovertys./"wWriatter-Resources Investigations Report 98-4173, available at http:/ / wwwpa.water.usgs.gov/ 189 Chess and Gibson, 72. 190 TSthreaurbeaesaonnds fGorretehne,i6n9a.ccuracy are unknown but may have to do with errors in data input. Adler, 191 Ibid., 75. 192 Ibid., 93. 193 Ibid., 101. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00215 216 Environment.gov 194 Chess and Gibson, 42. 195 Born and Genskow, 54-55. 196 Quoted in Chess and Gibson, 27 197 Imperial and Hennessey, 91 198 Ibid, 45; Chess and Gibson, 86. 199 Imperial and Hennessey, 9-12 200 Ibid., 95. 201 Uto.--S. NGoennpeorainl At ScocuorucnetiPnogllOuftifoicne,,""1W99a9te,r3Q3-u3a4l.ity: Federal Role in Addressing--and Contributing 202 See Clayton Ogg, "Benefits from Managing Farm Produced Nutrients," Journal o f the American Water Resources Association, O ctober 1999, 1019-1020. 203 Ibid., 92. 204 On file with the National Academy of Public Administration. 205 See the Land Trust Affiance website, http:/ / www.lta.org/ whatlt.html. 206 LinegeaPPaderdfoocrmk aanncdeS-Buealsleedn SKteaitnee/rE,P"AMPixairntgneMrsahnipagSeymsteenmt MinetotaapnhoArcst:ivTithye-BCaosmedpMlexaintiaegseomfeInnttroduc Culture," 2000. 207 Jeanne Herb, Jennifer A. Sullivan, Mark Stoughton, and Allen L. White, "The National Environmen tal Performance Partnership System: Making Good on its Promise?" 2000. (hereinafter;Herb, et ed.) 208 Hamilton, Rabinovitz & Alschuler, "Learning from Innovations in Environmental Protection: Three California Perspectives," 2000. {hereinafter, HR&A.) 209 Gormley, op cit. 210 tJoodEinPveirrroansm, "eRnetainlvPernottiencgtiEoPn,A" N20e0w0.England: An EPA Regional Office Tests Innovative Approaches 211 SSaeveanJanmahe, sGFeaorllgoiaw, s1,9T7h1e. Water Lords: R alph N ader's Study Group Report on Industry and Environmental Crisis in 212 The Superfund program and several small programs work somewhat differently; statutes do not allow EuconPndAceetrorandgineregleegcmlaeeteanntausupwthoiotfhrihEtyaPzAfaor.rdUtohnuedsseewrpamrsoteegmrsaiotmersas,ntiondcasltuoadtfeiuns.ngHdienorwsateafvenewdri,cnsagesvewesrictahllesEatnaPutAeps, hothafovSseeuppsaetsarsfteeusdnddleosgimitselusactihonof tohfeficaensarleytsaisinanthdenfeingaoltiaautitohnorniteycefossraarpyptroovdaels,iganndanodfteimn pnleegmoetinatteclfeinananucpiapllaanrrsa,nbguetmEePnAtsrewgiitohnal corporations and other parties responsible for cleanup. 213 TSthaefffoigfutrheefoErnpveirrmonimtseisntfarol mCoEunnvciirloonfmtheentSatlaPterostgeacvtieotnhAe geestnicmya,tEenofofrceenmfeonrtcienmtheen1t9a9c0tisoPnrsojienct, 2-15. interviews with Paddock and Keiner. See also Paddock and Keiner, 124. 214 EGPoArmalreeyl'essfsigpuorpeuslaorues,praenldimairneairnytehsetimWaetsets.orHSeoruetpho; rwtshtehraetasmmosatnoyflathrgees,tiantedsutshtraiatlriezleydhsetaavteisly, bount niCnooFtuYanlcl,9il6sop, ewfnthdheemreSoatrsaetsetosantreeppsopolelrutnstdisoinlniggchootlnnytprdooilfl.lfueTrtiehonuntsfcEiogPnuAtrreogslrEwanCatsOsstSloigsshtatayltysestohvaaemtrto$hu8antbtfeiledldioteonra.alTbfhouuentdEs$n7fve4il4lrofmrnomimlleion5nt8al Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00216 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 217 peqneurvitciereondntifmtfoiec2nu0tltapltoperrccooetmenctptoiaorfnestEaanPtedAsnapanetndudrsaitnlagrteeossnopuberenctdewsineigenn,crbe1ea9cs8ae6udsaebnyads11w490e9lp6le,arascneednn.vtthidraoutnrismntagetnethtbaaultdppgreoerttiesocdftoi.orInt is paguebnlicciews,omrkasneyxpsteantdeidtuerpeasrftomrewnatsstoefchleeaanltuhp,awndasatgewricauteltrutrreeaotpmeerantte, aEnPdAdprrinokgirnagmws.aFteurrtshyesrtemmosre, comprise more than half of EPA's budget, while state spending for those purposes foils under many different agencies. 215 The figures are from a 1994 New Jersey work plan for regulation of surface water quality, quoted in Resolving the Paradox o f Environm ental Protection, 144. 216 MJoianyt C17o,m1m99i5tm. ent to Reform Oversight and Create a National Performance Partnership System, 217 Ibid. 218 Herb, et al., 63 219 Gormley, 16. 220 Ibid, 24. 221 Ibid., 39. 222 Joint Commitment to Reform Oversight and Create a National Performance Partnership System, May 17, 1995. 223 Quoted in Paddock and Keiner, 28. 224 Herb, et al., 34. 225 Herb, et al., 69. 226 Comment provided by an EPA official to the draft report by Paddock and Keiner. 227 EOPEACAOf'sfivcieewofs dEonfnoorct esmeeemntt,oEhnfaovrececmheannt ignetdhein19th9e0si,n1te9r9im1,,25-27.. Paddock and Keiner report that 228 Paddock and Kreiner, 54-55. 229 Fpeorrmexitamrepnleew, aTleaxpapslriecpatrioognrsamIllmineodisaslemt oasstid$e16.6pmericlleionnt otof hitisrPePaGcofnortrpaoctllourtitoonrepdreuvceenatiboancaknlodg of corrorsesacluigttninfgunindistifaotirvwesatAernpdr,osginracme tsh.e funds are more fragmented, several states used PPG s to transfer 230 There were frequent meetings of NEPPS coordinators in EPA regions and states, but no training of staff in the different media offices. 231 EPA projects that most Superfund sites will complete cleanups by 2005, so unless Congress authorizes aggressive new cleanup programs--perhaps remediation of contaminated sediments or of sites that aclreealnesuspcsoSnitnacmeitnhaeteSdutpheartfuSnudpeprrfougnrdamsitepsa--ysitfoisr paolsasrigbelesthhaarteroegf ioovnearlhoefafdiceasctmivaityiense--edadlemssinsitsatfrfatfioorn, general management--a cutback in Superfund staff could shrink the regions substantially. 232 NTroavnesmcrbipert o23f,re1m99a8rk, squboytJeodhinnDPeerVrailsl,a5rs.to the Quinnipiac River Symposium at Yale University, 233 Superfund staff remained in a separate office. 234 Quoted in Perras, 16. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00217 218 Environment.gov 235 Ibid. 236 PJaemrreass,R6.3G. omes and Douglas I. Foy, Letter to the Editor, Boston Globe, November 17,1999. Quoted in 237 Rtraotbievret.RNeafokrammsu,r"a20an00d.Thomas Church, "Reinventing Superfund: An Assessment of EPA'sAdminis 238 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 239 U.S. EPA, Unfinished Business, 1986. 240 Nakamura and Church, 2000, 17. 241 EPA maintains a list of almost 42,000 sites on its Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen FassianYttediso9.hn8Na,,daareknssadepmneLtcuit3airv0bae0ialliynct.yodTmICnhffheoourr1trm2cleh0at0,ttie2osr0inst0eaS0sny,ods2ntw8et-mhr2ie9t(t.CNenEaRt9i0oCnpLarIloSPs)pr. ieIoctrthiitvayedLpaiusrrtcchahirvaeesmedromargeorrpeeoetlmhluaetnnetd3s 1tah,s0a0on0ftFhaoYs soe0f0oFtaYhned9r 8 242 Ibid., 30. 243 In addition, the rate of completing cleanupsjumped by more than 35 per cent between FYs 93 through m96oarendthFaYn 2937-098si.teFseawreneliwkesliytetsowbeereadaddeddedtotoththeeNNPPLLe.vIefnotunaellayc,ctehpetsptohretioGnAoOf seistteismcaotme tphlaettesdomorewunhdaet r construction drops from 90 per cent to 70 per cent. Nakamura and Church, 2000,45. 244 Ibid., 25 2 45 Robert Nakamura and Thomas Church, Cleaning up the M ess, 1993. 246 Nakamura and Church, 2000, 48. 247 Jeanne Herb, "Toward Integrated Approaches to Compliance Assurance," 2000. 248 EPA handout, "The Office of Environmental Information", n.d. 249 EPA's Office of Information Resources Management, the predecessor to OEI, reported that after adjustments to reflect shifts in responsibilities from one office to another, its staff had been cut by 11.1 percent between FY 92 and FY 99, while EPA'stotal staff had increased by 9.9 percent during that period. The OIRM budget, adjusted, had fallen from $19.1 million to $13.3 million (30 percent) EPA Office of Information Resources and Management, Charting a N ew Course, June 1999, 13-14. 250 EPA Office of Environmental Information, http:/ / wwwepa.gov.edr/. Standard Update, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2000. Available at 251 EhtPtpA:/O/fwfiwcewoefpEa.ngvoivro.endmr/e. ntal Information, Standard Update, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2000. Available at 252 National Academy of Public Administration, Setting Priorities, GettingResults, op. at, 127-131. 253 BAecfaodreem1y99r7ec, opmlamnneinndgeadntdhabtuEdgPeAtibnrginwgebreoitnh dfuifnfcetrieonntsoifnftiocetshaensdamdied onfofitcwe.oErPkAtohgaesthtearkeclnostehlay.t Tstehpe, but has welded the two functions together too rigidly. 254 Fleoardeexrsamseptlien. mThoetioSntattheeoIfSMOa1ss4a0c0h1ussetattnsdsatradr;teEdnavisreolfn-mceerntitfaiclaDtieofnenpsreogarnadma; gargoruopupofoffabrmusidniesstrsicts RineCclaalmifoatrinoina pmraodmeoatecdatph-eanidde-taraodfesosylisctietmingwboirdksffoorr ssealleinniituym-r;emduacntaiognerpsrowjeitchtisn; MtheicUhi.gSa. nBaunredasutaotefs in the Upper Midwest initiated plans for trading nutrient runoff and created the Great Lakes Trading Network; EPA helped state agency employees and others create networks of practitioners in indicator Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00218 Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century 219 rdeesedtvaiebrleloicspthmEedPenAtth',seecnGavtoeigvrooenrrnimcmaelnegntartalPnmetsrafnfooarrgmheamignehcneetraspnyrdsiotRermietsysu, olatrnsdcArocwtsasat-nemrdsehadeuiadthwmoorarinzkae. gdMesmatarektenestt;tfoaonrccdoensCs,oosnlhigadrpaeetsedsabnyd ignefnoerrmataetdiosno, mcoenosfumtheerndeewmtaencdh,noanlodgigeosvtehrantmweilnltleaacdtiotonsa--hteaaxleths,ierer geunlvaitrioonnms, esnpte. nding--have 255 National Academy of Public Administration, SettingPriorities, GettingResults, 6. Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00219 Sierra Club v. EPA 18cv3472 NDCA Tier 10 ED 002061 00178453-00220