Document KJpYbJwak8oMdwajzRBjy1vX2
Document 90
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:
Thomas Catenacci Thu, 27 Feb 2025 10:27:23 -0500 Woods, Andrea Dietderich, Ben; DOE NEWS Re: [EXTERNAL] Press inquiry - Free Beacon
Sounds good, appreciate it! Thomas
On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 9:54 AM Woods, Andrea <andrea.woodsghsdoe.gov> wrote: Hi Thomas,
Ben is actually on the road today with the Secretary but let me check into this for you. Will do our best to get you something by 2pm today.
Thanks!
Andrea
Andrea Woods Deputy Director Office ofPublic Alfitim
MOBILE (b)(6) - Sec. Wright
From: Thomas Catenacci <catenaccik)freebeacon.com>
Date: Thursday, February 27, 2025 at 9:51 AM
To: Dietderich, Ben
hq.doe.gov>
Cc: DOE NEWS <doenews@hq.doe.gov>, Woods, Andrea <andrea.woodsa.hq.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Press inquiry - Free Beacon Hi Ben,
In its final days in office, the Biden administration issued a waiver exempting a wide range of DOE programs from being required to meet Build America, Buy America standards for solar panels. The move opens the door for recipients of large federal grants and loans--including those awarded via the Grid Resilience and Innovation Partnerships Program and LPO's Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment Financing program--to source solar supplies from China. https://www. energy.govisite s/defau lt/files/2024-12/BABA%20WAV%20202508%20Omnibus%20Proposed%20Nonavailability%20Solar%20WaiverV02012.12.2024%20CLE AN.pdf
Is this something that DOE is reviewing? Is it considering an action to rescind this omnibus waiver?
Deadline for this is 2 p.m. EST.
Best,
Thomas Catenacci Reporter I Washington Free Beacon e: catenacci@freebeacon.com c. (b) (6)
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Document 91
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:
Jordan Christman Tue, 25 Mar 2025 13:57:59 +0000 Barrios, Audrey Rogers, Evan M.; Inguanta, Michael; Woods, Andrea; Affolter, Shawn [EXTERNAL] RE: Mock Hearing 3/26
Good Morning All, Apologies for the delayed response--I unfortunately have a conflict during this time tomorrow. Please keep me updated on future hearings though, and I will do my best to participate. Thanks so much.
Best, Jordan Noelle Christman
eoe raI Relations
o: (b) (6) m (b) (6) e: christmanj@api.org
200 Massachusetts Ave NW Washington, DC 20001
www.aoi.org
American
Petroleum
PIP
vii , Institute
From: Barrios, Audrey <audrey.barrios@hq.doe.gov> Sent: Friday, March 21, 2025 2:25 PM Cc: Rogers, Evan M. <evan.rogers@hq.doe.gov>; Inguanta, Michael <michael.inguanta@hq.doe.gov>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Affolter, Shawn <shawn.affolter@hq.doe.gov> Subject: Mock Hearing 3/26
Caution: Stop. Look. Think. This email Is from an outside source. Please use the Phlsh Alert
butt on if suspicious.
Hello-
Would you be interested in participating in a mock hearing for Wells Griffith on 3/26 from 3-5PM at the James Forrestal building. If you are able to participate, please reply all and we will be in touch next week with additional instructions.
Thank you, Audrey
Audrey Barrios
Advisor to the Secretary U.S. Department of Energy OFFICE 202.586.6994 MOBILE (b)(6)-Sec. Wright
EMAIL Audrev.Barrios(&hq.doe.qov
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Document 92
From: Sent: To: Subject:
Alana Goodman Mon, 5 May 2025 11:05:58 -0400 Woods, Andrea Re: [EXTERNAL] media inquiry - Cholla coal plant
Andrea, checking back to see if you're able to comment on this. Thanks! Alana On Fri, May 2, 2025 at 11 :10 AM Alana Goodman <goodman@freebeacon.com> wrote: Monday at 10 a.m. Thanks! On Fri, May 2, 2025 at 11:05 AM Woods, Andrea <andrea.woodsghg.doe.gov> wrote: Ili Alana,
What's your deadline for this?
Thanks! Andrea
From: Alana Goodman <goodman@freebeacon.com> Date: Friday, May 2, 2025 at 11:02 AM To: DOE NEWS <doenewsgthg.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] media inquiry - Cholla coal plant
Hi,
It's Alana Goodman with the Washington Free Beacon. I'm reaching out about the Cholla coal plant in Arizona. During an investor call yesterday, Arizona Public Service said Cholla isn't reopening as a coal plant.
President Trump in his executive order on coal last month directed Secretary Wright to make sure the coal plant is reopened. Is the DOE aware that APS is moving forward with plans to permanently close it? What steps is the DOE taking to stop this from happening? Also, in January the DOE approved a $1.8 billion loan guarantee for APS to fund various projects. Is that loan still expected to go forward, even if APS declines to reopen the plant?
Thanks,
Alana
Alana. Goodman Senior Investigative Reporter Washington Free Beacon Cell: (b) (6)
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Alana Goodman Senior Investigative Reporter Washington Free Beacon
Alana Goodman Senior Investigative Reporter Washington Free Beacon
Document 93
From:
Matthew Boyle
Sent:
Thu, 12 Jun 2025 20:56:59 +0000
To:
Dietderich, Ben
Cc:
Elizabeth Moore; Matthew Sparks; Hebert, Ashley; Woods, Andrea; Lamanna,
Isabelle; Larry Solov; Sam Geduldig
Subject:
[EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Attachments:
Breitbart.Wright.png
Great
Ben -- we should have the venue figured out very soon and also we are tracking fyi planning to do a news story announcing event sometime early next week probably Monday Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 12, 2025, at 4:47 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Good here.
From: Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com> Date: Thursday, June 12, 2025 at 4:46 PM To: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>, Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>, Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>, Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>, Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>, Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Don't we need the time on there? It's 10 AM, right? Doors open 9:15?
Get Outlook for iOS
From: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org> Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2025 4:23:24 PM To: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Ashley Hebert <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Ben Dietderich <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Andrea Woods <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Isabelle Lamanna <Isabelle.lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Doels this flyer ok with you guys?
<Breitbart.Wright.png>
On Wed, Jun 11, 2025 at 10:23 PM Matthew Boyle <mboyle breitbart.com> wrote: Awesome. We are working on nailing down venue and also the guys will send flyer draft here tomorrow for your guys' signoff as well. Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 2:18 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashley.heberticiThd.doe.gov> wrote:
Perfect -- let's lock it in! Standing by for the location and any additional details.
Warm regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2025 2:07 PM To: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Yes and yes - if you guys are ready to lock in so are we Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 1:51 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hd.doe.gov> wrote:
Hi Matt,
How's Tuesday the 24th? We can be flexible on timing -- does 10:00-11:00am work well?
Ashley Hebert Director of Scheduling & Advance Office of the Secretary I U.S. Department of Energy Office: (b) (6) Cell: (b) (6)
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2025 12:27 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Here I'm going to add everyone from our team here
Adding in our Breitbart CEO Larry Solov and VP Elizabeth Moore, Matt sparks from Alfa, and Sam Geduldig from CGCN
But yes we can definitely do event that week, and yes we will definitely make energy in BBB a major part of it. Just let us know which day works best and what time the secretary can do -- again late morning usually best -- and then we will go ahead and confirm it all and lock down a venue and everything
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 12:04 PM, Matthew Boyle <mboyle breitbart.com> wrote: Absolutely yes let us know what day
And yes without question Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 12:01 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Hey Matt,
We just had an opening on the week of June 23rd . Would a day during that week be possible? One request for us - is there any way we could tie the big beautiful bill into the programming? We would love to discuss the bill as there is so much potential in it for energy production in the United States!
Best,
Ben
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Date: Monday, June 9, 2025 at 11:22 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich hq.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Breitbart event with Secretary Wright? Ben,
Per our conversation earlier, wanted to follow up with what we need to do to lock in an event in late June or early July with Secretary Wright.
Basically, all we need from you guys is a date and time - ideally late morning, like 10 am or 11 am hour - on a weekday where he can come to an event for an hour in downtown DC. What would happen there is we will have a green room where he can hang before we go up on stage, and then after a little bit there he and I will go up on stage and I would interview him for about half an hour or so. Then he's clear to leave very easy on your guys' end.
Once we have a date and time, we along with our partners - CGCN and ALFA Institute -- will book a five-star downtown DC hotel ballroom for the event. And all he has to do is show up for it and be him and do a great interview with me.
We ideally need at least a couple weeks notice out from the date to work out all the logistics. So at this stage, if he has any openings the week of the 23rd of June or the week of June 30 that includes the beginning of July that would be amazing. Once we confirm a date and time, I'll rope in our broader team to hash out logistics and venue and everything with you guys and we can set up a brief call in the lead-up to it as well to discuss things.
Let me know if we can get a date on the calendar soon.
Thanks,
Matthew Boyle Washington Bureau Chief, Breitbart News
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
********-***********************************-************-*******
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information. ******************************************************************** ******************************************************************** This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Document 93 Artameat I
0
i , PISCUSS:11
ENERGY SECRETARY CHRIS WRIGHT &BREITBART'S MATTHEW BOYLE
TMCAY JUNI :1
l74C11
Document 94
From: Sent: To: Subject:
Katelyn Bledsoe Thu, 10 Apr 2025 19:09:46 +0000 Woods, Andrea [EXTERNAL] Re: Meeting Request - Zack Dell of Base Power Company
Understood and thanks for your help!
Get Outlook for lOS
From: Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov> Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2025 3:07:45 PM To: Katelyn Bledsoe <KBledsoe@afphq.org> Subject: Re: Meeting Request - Zack Dell of Base Power Company
Hi Katelyn,
I don't handle individual meeting requests with the Secretary so I don't have an update for you, but I can check in with our scheduling team and see where this stands.
Thanks, Andrea
Andrea Woods Deputy Director Office ofPublic Affairs
MOBILE (b) (6)
From: Katelyn Bledsoe <KBledsoe@afphq.org> Date: Thursday, April 10, 2025 at 3:02 PM To: Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Meeting Request - Zack Dell of Base Power Company
Hey Andrea - I hope you are having a great week. I wanted to follow up on this and see if you all think this might be a welcomed opportunity with you all? If there is something else you all have in a mind, Zack is super open.
Thanks! Katelyn
From: Katelyn Bledsoe <KBledsoe@afphq.org> Date: Monday, March 24, 2025 at 9:17 AM To: andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov> Subject: FW: Meeting Request - Zack Dell of Base Power Company
Good morning!
Sent the request for Zack Dell of Base Power Company this AM.
Let me know if you all have any questions.
Katelyn
From: Katelyn Bledsoe <KBledsoeafphq.org> Date: Monday, March 24, 2025 at 9:15 AM To: (b)(6) - Sec. Wright Subject: Meeting Request - Zack Dell of Base Power Company
See attached for the meeting request form from Zack Dell of Base Power Company.
Thank you!! Katelyn Bledsoe
Katelyn Bledsoe Managing Director of External Affairs Americans for Prosperity
C: (b) (6)
C1)''AFP
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************x***********************************************
*************************************************** ,************** This message does not originate from a known Department ofEnergy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Document 95
From:
Ferns, Conor
Sent:
Mon, 23 Jun 2025 16:37:39 +0000
To:
Matthew Sparks
Cc:
Elizabeth Moore; Hebert, Ashley; Matthew Boyle; Woods, Andrea; Lamanna,
Isabelle; Larry Solov; Sam Geduldig; Dietderich, Ben
Subject:
Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Hi Matt, yes, we established 8am tomorrow, Kevin from security and I will see you all then!
Conor Ferns U.S. Department of Energy / Office of the Secretary Office Cell:(b)(6)
From: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org> Sent: Monday, June 23, 2025 12:13 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com>; Woods, Andrea candrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com>; Ferns, Conor <conor.ferns@hq.doe.gov> Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
OK, we can do security walk through anytime from 6 AM. just let me know what is best
On Mon, Jun 23, 2025 at 12:00 PM Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderichahq.doe.gov> wrote: Here you go!
From: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>
Date: Monday, June 23, 2025 at 11:18 AM
To: Elizabeth Moore <emooreqi!breitbart.corn>
Cc: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebertghq.doe.gov>, Matthew Boyle <mbovle(Oreitbart.com>,
Dietderich, Ben
hq.doe.gov>, Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods(ibhq.doe.gov>,
Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna(aq.doe.gov>, Larry Solov <latTy@breitbart.com>, Sam
Geduldig <p,eduldig(t0cgcn.com>, Ferns, Conor <conor.ferns@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
We have two LED screens that flank the stage. Can you please send me the DOE logo that you would like to be shown on the panels?
On Wed, Jun 18, 2025 at 2:36 PM Matthew Sparks <snarks(&buildalfa.org> wrote: (b) (6) Matt Sparks
On Wed, Jun 18, 2025 at 2:27 PM Elizabeth Moore <emoorefLi/breitbart.com> wrote: My phone below if anyone needs....
Regards,
Elizabeth Moore EVP Breitbart News Network (b) (6)
From: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hg.doe.gov> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2025 1:36 PM To: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.clietderich@ho.doe.gov>; Matthew Sparks <sparks buildalfa.org>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Woods, Andrea <and rea.woods@hg.doe.gov>; La manna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hg.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldiggcgcn.com>; Ferns, Conor <conor.ferns2hg.doe.gov> Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Hi Matt,
We currently have a Microsoft Teams link included in the calendar invitation, but if a conference line is better, we can use the below. Just let me know your preference and we'll be there!
Dial-in: (b) (6) Guest code: (b) (6)
Wann regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.corn> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2025 12:32 PM To: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hg.doe.gov>; Matthew Sparks <sparksPbuildalfa.org>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hg.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hg.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <tarry@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldigPcgcn.com>; Ferns, Conor <conor.ferns@hg.doe.gov> Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Hey guys do we have a conference number for today at 2? Do we need to use mine? Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 16, 2025, at 3:35 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebertAhq.doe.gov> wrote:
Wonderful, all set! Also adding in Conor Fems from om advance team, who will look to schedule a walkthrough with yow- team and our security.
Warm regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Sent: Monday, June 16, 2025 2:14 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hg.doe.gov> Cc: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hg.doe.gov>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hg.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <lsabelle.Lamanna@hg.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Let's do Wednesday 2 pm Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 16 2025, at 12:34 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hg.doe.gov> wrote:
Wednesday is prefe1Tedhere!
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbrut.com> Date: Monday, June 16 2025 at 12:33 PM To: Hebert, Ashley <a hley.hebert@hg.doe.gov> Cc: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>, Dietderich, Ben <ben.ctietderich@hg.doe.gov>, Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>, Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@bg.doe.gov>, Lamanna Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hg.doe.gov>, Larry Solov <laiTy@breitbart.com>, Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Ce1tainly - either one of those works for me. Me and Matt Sparks should definitely be on th.is call and probably Elizabeth Moore from our side at very least. Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 16, 2025 at 12:03 PM Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hg.doe.gov> wrote:
Thanks, Matt, sounds great! Can we set-up a call for later th.is week to discuss logistics and messaging? Below are a few windows on our side:
1. Tuesday June 17th 1:30-2:00pm EDT
2. Wednesday, June 18th, 2:00-4:00pm EDT
Warm regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org> Sent: Friday, June 13, 2025 5:25 PM To: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
We are locked and loaded for the Conrad on 6/24 On Thu, Jun 12, 2025 at 4:57 PM Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> wrote: Great
Ben -- we should have the venue figured out very soon and also we are tracking fyi planning to do a news story announcing event sometime early next week probably Monday Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 12, 2025, at 4:47 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Good here.
From: Elizabeth Moore <emoorea,breitbart.com> Date: Thursday, June 12, 2025 at 4:46 PM To: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>, Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>, Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods(cithq.doe.gov>, Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamannaahq.doe.gov>, Larry Solov <larrya,breitbart.com>, Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Don't we need the time on there? It's 10 AM, right? Doors open 9:15?
Get Outlook for iOS
From: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org> Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2025 4:23:24 PM To: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Ashley Hebert <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Ben Dietderich <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Andrea
Woods <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Isabelle Lamanna <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Doels this flyer ok with you guys?
<Breitbart.Wright.png>
On Wed, Jun 11, 2025 at 10:23 PM Matthew Boyle <mboylegbreitbart.com> wrote: Awesome. We are working on nailing down venue and also the guys will send flyer draft here tomorrow for your guys' signoff as well.
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 2:18 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert(iiThq.doe.gov> wrote:
Perfect -- let's lock it in! Standing by for the location and any additional details.
Warm regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2025 2:07 PM To: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Yes and yes -- if you guys are ready to lock in so are we Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 1:51 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebertAhq.doe.gov> wrote:
Hi Matt,
How's Tuesday the 24th? We can be flexible on timing -- does 10:00-11:00am work well?
Ashley Hebert Director of Scheduling & Advance
Office of the Secretary! U.S. Department of Energy Office: (b) (6) Cell: (b) (6)
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com>
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2025 12:27 PM
To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Hebert, Ashley <ashlev.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Larnanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.corn>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Here I'm going to add everyone from our team here
Adding in our Breitbart CEO Larry Solov and VP Elizabeth Moore, Matt sparks from Alfa, and Sam Geduldig from CGCN
But yes we can definitely do event that week, and yes we will definitely make energy in BBB a major part of it. Just let us know which day works best and what time the secretary can do -- again late morning usually best -- and then we will go ahead and confirm it all and lock down a venue and everything
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 12:04 PM, Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> wrote:
Absolutely yes let us know what day
And yes without question Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 12:01 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Hey Matt,
We just had an opening on the week of June 23rd . Would a day during that week be possible? One request for us -- is there any way we could tie the big beautiful bill into the programming? We would love to discuss the bill as there is so much potential in it for energy production in the United States!
Best,
Ben
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Date: Monday, June 9, 2025 at 11:22 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Ben,
Per our conversation earlier, wanted to follow up with what we need to do to lock in an event in late June or early July with Secretary Wright.
Basically, all we need from you guys is a date and time -- ideally late morning, like 10 am or 11 am hour -- on a weekday where he can come to an event for an hour in downtown DC. What would happen there is we will have a green room where he can hang before we go up on stage, and then after a little bit there he and I will go up on stage and I would interview him for about half an hour or so. Then he's clear to leave -- very easy on your guys' end.
Once we have a date and time, we along with our partners -- CGCN and ALFA Institute -- will book a five-star downtown DC hotel ballroom for the event. And all he has to do is show up for it and be him and do a great interview with me.
We ideally need at least a couple weeks notice out from the date to work out all the logistics. So at this stage, if he has any openings the week of the 23rd of June or the week of June 30 that includes the beginning of July that would be amazing. Once we confirm a date and time, I'll rope in our broader team to hash out logistics and venue and everything with you guys and we can set up a brief call in the lead-up to it as well to discuss things.
Let me know if we can get a date on the calendar soon.
Thanks, Matthew Boyle Washington Bureau Chief, Breitbart News
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************
******************************
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
******************************************************************** ********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
*******************
**********************************************
Document 96
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:
Lamanna, Isabelle Tue, 15 Apr 2025 18:45:46 +0000 Matthew Boyle; Dietderich, Ben Hebert, Ashley; Woods, Andrea RE: Breitbart event details --
Hi Matthew,
Thank you for your patience as we work to get back to you as Ben and the Secretary are out traveling over the past few weeks.
This is definitely something we're interested in doing, we are just booked at max capacity right now with travel and other commitments.
Can we touch base towards the start of June to look at something for July or August?
Thanks so much for understanding the craziness right now.
Have a great rest of your week,
lzzy
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Sent: Monday, April 14, 2025 2:44 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event details --
Hey guys I'm back in the U.S. now and wanted to follow up again and see if we can't lock in a date for sometime in May or June soon so we can start doing all the preparations for it? Let me know Sent from my iPhone
On Mar 31, 2025, at 12:47 PM, Matthew Boyle <mbovIe breitbart.com> wrote:
Great thanks Ben and nice to meet you guys. Keep me posted on whether we can lock in a date. Would be great to lock one down this week so we can get everything organized venue wise and event production wise.
Thanks, Matthew Boyle Washington Bureau Chief, Breitbart News
Sent from my iPhone
On Mar 31, 2025, at 12:40 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Thanks, Matthew! Adding in our scheduling team to see if this is something we could potentially schedule in May or June!
Best,
Ben
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Date: Tuesday, March 25, 2025 at 9:37 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Breitbart event details --
Ben,
Great talking to you earlier today, and hopefully we will be able to lock down something very soon in terms of an event date and time. Even though she didn't join us on the call, I'm including Andrea here as well.
The gist of these is as follows: We need to lock in a date and time, ideally in the morning like the 9 or 10 am ET hour, for a date ideally sometime in the first couple weeks of May. Anytime May 5-16 any weekday in there would work great for us.
Once we lock in a date and time, our partners - CGCN and the ALFA Institute -- would with event productions company to go find a venue and make everything go off amazingly.
The commitment we need from the Secretary is a confirmed date and time, and the gist of the event is that we would do a 30-40 minute interview on stage with him {I would be the one doing the interview) and we would broadcast that live on our site and across our social platforms. The event we did with Secretary Burgum last week got pretty wide pickup (I can send some examples if needed) in addition to our site.
I would say it's best if he blocks off an hour or so on his schedule just so he can arrive and hang in green room and everything goes smoothly so we don't have to rush when he arrives.
Let me know if the Secretary has any dates in that timeframe that work well for him, and how we go about locking it in and then we'll take it from there.
Thanks, Matthew Boyle Washington Bureau Chief, Breitbart News
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments. links or requests for information.
******************************************************************** ********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Document 97
From:
Hebert, Ashley
Sent:
Wed, 19 Feb 2025 04:55:59 +0000
To:
Laura Ciciarelli; Cortina, Cynthia; Woods, Andrea; Dietderich, Ben; Wardell,
Jonathan; Lamanna, Isabelle
Cc:
Mike Maloof; Stephanie Groen
Subject:
RE: 2.20.25 RGA Energy Panel Briefing
Thank you, Laura! Looking forward to meeting you tomorrow morning.
Ashley Hebert Director of Scheduling & Advance Office of the Secretary I U.S. Department of Energy Office: (b) (6) Cell: (b) (6)
From: Laura Ciciarelli <Iciciarelli@RGA.ORG> Sent: Tuesday, February 18, 2025 8:29 PM To: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Cortina, Cynthia <cynthia.cortina@hq.doe.gov>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Wardell, Jonathan <jonathan.wardell@hq.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Mike Maloof <mmaloof@rgppc.org>; Stephanie Groen <sgroen@rgppc.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] 2.20.25 RGA Energy Panel Briefing
Hi All --
So sorry that I missed the call today, but I wanted to send the updated briefing for you so that everyone is up to date. This briefing includes the questions that Governor Gianforte will ask the Secretary during the panel. Please let us know if you have any questions. Thank you!
Laura Ciciarelli
Chief Operating Officer
Republican Governors Association
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 250
Washington, DC 20006
(b) (6)
(O)
(b) (6)
(M)
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Document 98
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:
Matthew Boyle Wed, 16 Apr 2025 13:43:26 +0000 Dietderich, Ben Lamanna, Isabelle; Hebert, Ashley; Woods, Andrea [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event details --
Certainly -- as soon as you guys are ready we would love to get something on the calendar. I'll follow up in a few weeks or so.
Sent from my iPhone
On Mar 31, 2025, at 12:47 PM, Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> wrote:
Great thanks Ben and nice to meet you guys. Keep me posted on whether we can lock in a date. Would be great to lock one down this week so we can get everything organized venue wise and event production wise.
Thanks, Matthew Boyle Washington Bureau Chief, Breitbart News
Sent from my iPhone
On Mar 31, 2025, at 12:40 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Thanks, Matthew! Adding in our scheduling team to see if this is something we could potentially schedule in May or June!
Best,
Ben
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Date: Tuesday, March 25, 2025 at 9:37 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Breitbart event details --
Ben,
Great talking to you earlier today, and hopefully we will be able to lock down something very soon in terms of an event date and time. Even though she didn't join us on the call, I'm including Andrea here as well.
The gist of these is as follows: We need to lock in a date and time, ideally in the morning like the 9 or 10 am ET hour, for a date ideally sometime in the first couple weeks of May. Anytime May 5-16 any weekday in there would work great for us.
Once we lock in a date and time, our partners - CGCN and the ALFA Institute -- would with event productions company to go find a venue and make everything go off amazingly.
The commitment we need from the Secretary is a confirmed date and time, and the gist of the event is that we would do a 30-40 minute interview on stage with him (I would be the one doing the interview) and we would broadcast that live on our site and across our social platforms. The event we did with Secretary Burgum last week got pretty wide pickup (I can send some examples if needed) in addition to our site.
I would say it's best if he blocks off an hour or so on his schedule just so he can arrive and hang in green room and everything goes smoothly so we don't have to rush when he arrives.
Let me know if the Secretary has any dates in that timeframe that work well for him, and how we go about locking it in and then we'll take it from there.
Thanks, Matthew Boyle Washington Bureau Chief, Breitbart News
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
******************************************************************** This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Document 99
From:
Byers, Dan
Sent:
Wed, 5 Mar 202515:50:35 +0000
To:
Dietderich, Ben; Woods, Andrea
Cc:
Guith, Christopher
Subject:
[EXTERNAL] Follow up
Attachments:
US LNG Impac: Study_Phase 2 Summary Presentation_March 2025.pdf, G7
Natural Gas and Energy Security Core Messages Final.pdf
Thanks for the call Ben and Andrea. Attached is the embargoed S&P study that will come out tomorrow morning. The slide deck is pretty dense, but pasted below are the key takeaways that will be part of our press release.
Second, pasted below is a little bit of background on the G7, as well as the expected attendees at Monday's energy security forum. Last, attached is the messaging document we shared with the G7 after last year's meeting.
Let us know if you have questions.
Dan (b) (6)
(ID) (4)
(13)(LI)
(13)(LI)
(ID) (4)
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
S&P Global
Major New US Industry at a Crossroads
A US LNG Impact Study -- Phase 2
Document 106 Attachment 1
Report by Commodity Insights and Market Intelligence
March 2025
Parmis.slon lo reprint or d
2025 by 55P Global Inc.\ r wrabon approval of S&P
Preface, Acknowledgements & Key Conclusions
Study Preface
In the S&P Global December 2024 Phase 1 report, we examined the remarkable rise of the US liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry. In less than a decade, this sector has become a major export industry, contributing more than $400 billion to U.S. GDP and supporting hundreds of thousands of American jobs. This development has not only contributed positively to the US economy and export earnings but has also strengthened the international position of the United States and deepened relations with many other countries.
This Phase 2 companion study expands and complements key aspects of our first phase study:
1. The environmental impact of further development of US LNG -- in particular, the potential net impact on global GHG emissions of 40 million tons of incremental LNG export capacity tied to projects that are on hold or in the pre-FID (Final Investment Decision) stage from the Phase 1 Base Case
2. A State and Congressional-district level economic impact assessment, analyzing the I impact of US LNG across the national economy.
3. The potential benefits of infrastructure debottlenecking across the value chain, focusing primarily on the Northeast gas market
On the emissions front, Phase 2's central finding is that increasing US LNG exports leads to 780 million tonnes of CO2e (GWP20) lower GHG emissions globally between 2028 and 2040 than would be the case if demand were met by the likely alternative sources The study demonstrates why the bulk of demand -- absent US LNG -- would largely be met with other hydrocarbons, not renewables. This future saving equates to the entire emissions reduction achieved in Germany over the past decade. The reason for this savings is driven by the lower GHG intensity of US LNG compared to the average intensity of the combined energy sources that would replace that LNG in global markets.
This analysis shows that end-use combustion accounts for a significant 57 to 87% of the lifecycle intensity of coal, oil, gas and LNG. Varying levels of methane emissions in the supply chain prior to end-use lead to significant differences between the sources and pathways of each fuel. This highlights the need for frequent and reliable monitoring of methane emissions and the benefits of transparency in GHG intensity.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the Phase 1 Base Case outlook demonstrated that US LNG exports can contribute an additional $1.3 trillion to US GDP through 2040. This Phase 2 report illustrates that the economic impact extends beyond the seven core producing states, with 37% of jobs and 30% of GDP contributions occurring in nonproducing areas.
The third part of the report examines the economic benefits of ending one major and costly distortion in the US energy system. This would be achieved by removing bottlenecks in infrastructure especially across the Northeast region. While the Northeast region has sufficient proved reserves to meet all U.S. demand for 17 years, existing pipeline constraints hinder optimal production. These result in gas prices in New York and Boston that are 15-40% higher than the national annual average, and 145% and 160% higher in the key winter heating month of January -- imposing a heavy and unnecessary cost burden on consumers. Expanding egress capacity from the giant Marcellus supply by about 6 billion cubic feet per day could reduce January prices by 20% and 30%, respectively, from 2028 to 2040 (17-27% annualized), resulting in cumulative savings of $76 billion for consumers by 2040.
S&P Global
7 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
2
Preface, Acknowledgements & Key Conclusions
S&P Global Study Acknowledgements
S&P Global (NYSE: SPGI) provides essential intelligence. We enable governments, businesses and individuals with the right data, expertise and connected technology so that they can make decisions with conviction. From helping our customers assess new investments to guiding them through ESG and energy transition across supply chains. we unlock new opportunities, solve challenges and accelerate progress for the world. We are widely sought after by many of the world's leading organizations to provide credit ratings, benchmarks, analytics and workflow solutions in the global capital, commodity and automotive markets. With every one of our offerings, we help the world's leading organizations plan for tomorrow, today. For more information visit www.spglobal.com
This study offers an independent and objective assessment of the economic, market and global impact of the US LNG Industry built from a detailed bottom-up approach, at the asset and market level, technology by technology. It represents the collaboration of S&P Global Commodity Insights and the Global Intelligence and Analytics unit within S&P Global Market Intelligence supported by the world's largest expert team of over 1,400 energy and economic research analysts and consultants continuously monitoring, modelling and evaluating markets and assets. Explanation of the detailed study methodology is included in the Appendix. The analysis and metrics developed during the course of this research represent the independent analysis and views of S&P Global. The study makes no policy recommendations.
The study was supported by the US Chamber of Commerce. S&P Global is exclusively responsible for all of the analysis, content and conclusions of the study.
S&P Global
S&P Global Project Leadership Team
Project Chairman, Daniel Yergin Vice Chairman, S&P Global
Executive Project Sponsor, Carlos Pascual Senior Vice President, Global Energy, S&P Global
Expert Advisory Committee Lead, Michael Stoppard. Chief Global Gas Strategist, S&P Global
Energy Transition Advisory Lead, Eleonor Kramarz, Vice President, Energy Transition Commodity Insights Consulting
Project Director, Eric Eyberg Vice President, Gas & Power Commodity Insights Consulting
Project Manager, Horacio Cuenca Senior Director, Energy Transition Commodity Insights Consulting
Project Team Leads. Leandro Caputo, Executive Director, Gas & LNG Commodity Insights. Mohsen Bonakdarpour, Executive Director, Global Intelligence and Analytics, Market Intelligence, Ed Kelly, Executive Director, Gas & LNG Commodity Insights Consulting, Madeline Jowdy, Global Head of LNG, Commodity Insights Consulting
Relationship Manager, Linda Kinney, Head of Business Development, Commodity Insights Consulting
Communications Lead, Jeff Marn, Public Relations Executive Director, S&P Global
CO 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
3
Preface. Acknowledgements & Key Conclusions
As the LNG `pause' is lifted, the Phase 2 US LNG Study highlights emissions benefits, economic impact beyond producing states and New England infrastructure constraints
Continued development of US LNG (40 Mtpa of pre-FID or `halted projects") results in global GHG emissions being 324/780 M tCO2e (GWP100/GWP20) lower by 2040 than they would be if demand were met by the likely energy alternatives. This is equivalent to the UK's road transport emissions over the same period.
End-use combustion generates 57 to 87 percent of analyzed fossil fuel emissions. The rest arise from each fuel's supply chain, with methane being the primary cause of differences in their GHG intensity
Coal emits roughly 70% more greenhouse gases than the US LNG it would replace across all the alternatives analyzed
US LNG's unprecedented growth is enabled by an extended cross-state value chain, that reaches beyond the core-producing states - about 90% of every dollar spent remains within United States supply chains
Of the annual average of 495,000 Us jobs supported through 2040, 37% will be in non-producing states. As
nfl
many jobs will be supported in on-producing states as in Texas
Over the same period, LNG Exports will contribute $1.3 trillion in GDP. with $383 billion or 30% in non-
producing states. On a per capita basis, producing states benefit from a cumulative $13.2K GDP per capita
The US Northeast (NE) has vast amounts of low-cost gas reserves in the Marcellus and Utica formations (New York. Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio), sufficient to meet nationwide demand for -17 years
Due to pipeline constraints these reserves are being developed at a suboptimal rate, pushing gas prices at Boston, Chicago and New York City Gates up 160% higher than the national gas market in peak months
Expanding NE pipeline capacity by 6.1 Bcf/d could reduce HH gas prices by $0.20/MMBtu and significantly lower prices across the region. Cumulative nationwide consumer savings could reach $76 billion through' 2040
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
4
Contents
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Appendix
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
S&P Global
O 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
5
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Incremental US LNG is less GHG-intensive than modelled alternative energy sources, based on the best available data and analysis to date (including coal under any scenario)
This analysis considers the GHG emissions impact of 40 Mtpa incremental US LNG capacity (pre-FID or 'halted' projects in our Phase 1 Base Case) relative to the alternative energy sources it would displace
We use S&P Global's detailed life cycle emissions assessment approach for US LNG and energy alternatives, combining the latest public, proprietary and third-party satellite and flyover data
/A
S&P Global
End use combustion is responsible for 57 - 87% of GHG intensity for coal, oil, gas and LNG Supply chain methane emissions are currently the key driver of variation between fuel pathways With the global focus on US methane emissions, US LNG producers stand to benefit from the increased
availability and granularity of measurement data as importing regions demand stricter quantification
Incremental US LNG exports from the projects in our Base Case would result in 324 ! 780 M tCO2e (GWP100/GWP20) lower emissions over 2028-2040 compared to emissions of the modelled alternatives
This is equivalent to the emissions of the UK road transport sector between 2028 and 2040
- Coal's lifecycle GHG emissions are on average 65% - 70% higher than the sources of LNG analyzed across the selection of US or alternative global LNG projects
O 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
6
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
In Phase 1 we modeled the global energy response to the US LNG `Extended Halt' Scenario with fossil fuels and renewable generation replacing impacted US LNG exports
LNG Change in S&P `Extended Halt' vs. Incremental US LNG' Scenarios - Yearly Average 20282 - 2040
Mt LNG equivalent, yearly average 2028-2040
40
85% of the response comes from non-US fossil fuels
14
LNG projects in Canada,
Mozambique and Qatar are
accelerated; new capacity
from Argentina, Indonesia,
Oman and Russia is brought
5
online as response2
Incremental US LNG Global LNG Response
Coal
Indigenous Gas
Oil
Renewables,
% of halted
and Piped Imports
Nuclear & Others
capacity
A comprehensive analysis of the global energy mix -- integrating market and economic drivers, policy frameworks, and country-specific
_Mt
energy system factors - shows the LNG gap would be 85% backfilled by fossil fuels from global sources
1. Considers 2028 as it Is the first year in v Source: S&P Global
FrPr,i , tc as hash case: 2 This is not an exhaustive list of projects included in S&P's Base Case. which Includes protects in At ic;tralin Malaysia. Papua New Guinea and United Arab Emirates.
S&P Global
0)2025 by S&P Global Inc.
7
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Phase 2 evaluates the GHG emissions impact of incremental US LNG (pre-FID or 'halted' projects) in our Base Case, relative to the alternative energy response modelled in Phase 1
Critical Definitions of the Lifecycle GHG Intensity Estimate from Production to End Use Combustion
Example supply chain for LNG
111
ii
Upstream operations
Gathering & Boosting
Gas processing
Transmission & Storage
Liquefaction
Shipping
Regasification
End-Use
Functional unit: 1 MJ (LHV) delivered
to end use
Emissions allocation: Total GHG emissions allocated to all co-products on an energy basis, in
line with industry best practices
Gas pathing: based on current and expected physical flows, calibrated using expert opinion of
S&P Global gas analysts
End use: combustion by fuel type not adjusted for efficiency, as
Phase 1 modeling already factors these into fuel volume responses
Gas feedstock supply: Reflects a weighted average of the mix of upstream plays supplying each LNG facility
Shipping routes: Destinations based on contracts and forecasts. Each LNG plant considers the mix of distances, fleet composition, and vessel features
10 US plays feeding 6 LNG terminals
9 LNG carrier types
12 aInntder5nagtaiosneaxl ppolaryt spifpeeeldininegs 7 LNG terminals
91 Shipping route combinations (13 terminals to 7 destination markets)
1. Both the natural gas and LNG value chain would typically include a local distribution segment after long-distance transmission or regasification and before delivery to the final point of consumption, This study assumes delivery of natural gas, LNG, and alternative fuels to a point adjacent to the regasification terminal or transmission line to simplify comparisons across fuels. Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
8
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Emissions from incremental US LNG exports in the Base Case are 27 / 65 MtCO2e (GWP100 / GWP201) lower per year than the alternative energy sources modelled
GHG Emissions Corresponding to `Extended Halt' vs. Incremental US LNG Scenarios2
M tCO2e, 100-yr GWP, yearly average 2028-2040. midpoint methane intensity3
Emissions of the global energy response that would replace incremental US LNG exports
Incremental US LNG exports in the Base Case
27 61
31
2
24
62
The difference
181
between
scenarios is
154
65 MtCO2e
with GWP20'
Coal
Indigenous Gas
Oil
Renewables,
Alternative
Global Energy
Net Global
Incremental
and Piped Imports
Nuclear & Others LNG Sources
Response Total
Change
US LNG
1. Global Warming Potential (GWP) is a measure used to compare the impact of different greenhouse gases on global warming. It quantifies the heat a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere over a specific time period, relative to carbon dioxide (COO, which has a GWP of 1. See the appendix for full results in 20-yr GWP; 2. The volume of impacted LNG exports at risk and the response of the global energy system are based on the results of Phase 1; 3. Midpoint methane intensity represents the middle of the modeled methane uncertainty range. For results on the full range of methane uncertainty, sea appendix. Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
9
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Increased exports of US LNG would lead to 780 MtCO2e less emissions (GWP20) 20282040, equivalent to the emissions of the UK's road transport sector over the same period
Equivalent to the emissions of:
Emissions impact from incremental US LNG exports compared to alternative global energy response
27 / 65 million
tonnes CO2e (GWP100 / GWP20)
avoided per year on average
More than twice the cars in Los Angeles county each year (14 million gasoline-powered passenger vehicles) (GWP20) 7 average sized coal-fired power plants over a year
3.6 million homes' worth of energy use for one year
324 / 780 million
tonnes CO2e (GWP100 / GWP20)
avoided cumulatively 2028 - 2040
The UK road transport sector between 2028 and 2040 (GWP20)
A third of the reduction in EU27 energy-related emissions (GWP 20) over the past decade
The CO2 absorbed by 5.4 billion trees over 10 years
g potential of each (1.:, ciffers dep, ng on the time horizon considered, as each gas has a different lifespan in the atmosphere and a different ability to absorb energy. The UNFCCC publishes two time horizons to show the short- and long-term effects of GHGs on global warming: 20 years and 100 years. Both the 100-year and 20-year GWPs sourced from the IPCC AIRS were used to convert emissions into CO2 equivalents. The equivalence conversions are done with average weights or volumes of the selected gases. Equivalences are intended for illustrative purposes only and should not be used to inform or guide decision making.
Source: S&P Global, US EPA, IEA, Our World In Data/Global Change Data Lab
S&P Global
0)2025 by S&P Global Inc. 10
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
GHG intensity is driven by end-use combustion: Coal replacing US LNG is 65% more intensive in GWP100 terms than US LNG across the impacted destination markets
Weighted Average Full Lifecycle GHG Intensity' (Production to End Use)
gCO2e/MJ `)/O share of methane emissions in the supply chain (excluding end use)
100-yr GWP
Mid. point
methane 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 share2
Incremental US LNG
+65% *-
34%
Alternative LNG Sources
Indigenous Gas and Piped Imports
Oil
7
44%
64%
IMF
31%
Coal
58%
Renewables
0%
20-yr GWP 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150
+69`)/O
I 1
Mid. point methane
share2 57%
68%
87% 53%
77% 0%
End use MI Supply chain CO2 I Supply chain methane
I Supply chain methane variability range
Near-zero supply chain methane intensity (aligned with OGCI target and expected EU methane threshold) for projects delivering gas to EU
Methane intensity in the supply chain is much more uncertain on the fuels of the global alternative energy response than the US LNG
value chain because of the emphasis on quantification and mitigation in most US plays in recent years
1. Averages show nrclude lire weighleu avieraes of al ieedstock gas and shipping distances to cestination markets lot each fuel, 2. The share of methane emissions n the supply chain up to regasilication, exOuuting and use, based on the midpoint range of methane variability; Key parameters from Phase 1 informing this GHG lifecycle intensity analysis include: a) LNG projects impacted, including the US LNG projects impacted under the US LNG 'Extended Halt' Scenario and the International LNG response (accelerated startup dates or incremental): b) upstream supply pathways and balance to each LNG facility at the play or basin level, for both US and international projects; c) shipping destinations and volumes from US and International LNG facilities, oil producers, and coal mines to respective end markets; d) global energy response. considering the efficiency of generation (heal rate) in the replacement of gas by other fuels in each destination market. Therefore. the end use of this LCA only reflects the combustion factor of each fuel Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
72025 by S&P Global Inc.
11
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
S&P's analysis evaluated 20 - 300 times more observed methane data for US supply chains relative to alternative sources, which had less accessible and detailed monitoring
Global O&G Methane Emissions Intensity Estimates (Production to Gas Processing) Sourced and Uncertainty Range Defined
Intensity for relevant basin in each country, %CH4 released / %CH4 in gas stream'
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Methane uncertainty range assumed
United States avg.
Max-min range
Canada Mozambique Qatar Argentina Indonesia Russia (W. Siberia) Oman China Norway2 Russia (E. Siberia) Algeria
Company disclosure
I
r
Literature
_2.0_
3.8 - 3.5 ^
.0
I
3.5
_4.9_ _
io.o
t11.1T11.5.07.001MIE 11L1:15.5 171 11F=_ _2-
Satellite: GHGSat-based estimate
Flyover data accessed by S&P Global covered >280 bn pixels in the Permian basin
while the satellite data sample analyzed averaged just 0.9-13 bn pixels across Middle East, Central Asia and N
Africa
IEA country estimates
S&P Global Vantage models
.4i Satellite: Sentinel-2 based estimates
IEA country factor applied to US TROPOMI estimate Satellite: Analogue based on Sentinel-26 A Satellite: TROPOMI-based estimates
1. Expressed as methane emissions (on an energy basis) divided by methane content of the throughput, with marketable gas being the common denominator across the supply chain; 2. Although no satellite measurement was available for Norway in our study, the range is based on company disclosure with limited variability given the strong regulatory pressure and record of methane measurement and control by operators in the country; 3. IEA methane Tracker 2024 normalized with S&P Global O&G production data per country; 4. Average of US TROPOMI measurements with a methane scaling factor from IEA; 5. Average estimates at the country level: 6. For countries where no measurement data is available, we include the average intensity for upstream derived from Sentinel-2 observations to determine the uncertainty range. Refer to the appendix for additional information on satellite coverage across regions Source: S&P Global leveraging TROPOMI. GHGSat, and Sentinel-2 observations: academic research (papers listed in appendix); and IEA's Global Methane Tracker
S&P Global
7 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
12
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
The resulting GHG intensity of alternative sources of LNG and other fuels varies widely, mainly due to methane, but flaring, reservoir properties, and operations also contribute
Lifecycle GHG Intensity of LNG, Oil, and Coal Delivered to the Destination Markets Assumed
gCO0e/MJ, 100-yr GWP
LNG and natural gas
0
50
100
Methane Share (excl. end use)
Oil (diesel oil)
0
50
US LNG Plant A
[
US LNG Plant B'
F 1
Incremental
US LNG Plant C
E I
US LNG
US LNG Plant D
1
US LNG Plant E
L
US LNG Plant F1
L
38%
Saudi Arabia
36%
30%
Iraq
30%
Norway
39%
36%
Nigeria
Alternative LNG Sources
Canada Accel. Project Mozambique Accel. Project'
Qatar Accel. Project Argentina New Project Indonesia New Project Russia (W. Siberia New Proj.)
Oman New Project
Indigenous
China (indigenous)
Gas and
Norway (pipe export)
Piped
Russia (E. Siberia) (pipe exp.)
Imports
Algeria (pipe export)
- - 1 = 0 1 1
A M I E =
I EL:3 = =I
I
= =I
l==
17 - 55% 47 - 64% 9 - 50% 19- 58% 24 - 48% 13- 71% 41 - 66%
37 - 89% 18%
26 - 91% 32 - 89%
Coale
0
50
China
Australia
Indonesia
Colombia
Poland
100
I 1
I B
100
ICI I 1:
IJ I
Methane Share (excl. end use)
46 - 82% 12- 63%
5% 38 - 87%
73 - 75% 60 - 62% 25 - 27% 31 - 33% 31 - 33%
End Use MI Gathering & Boosting Production III Gas Processing
Transmission & Storage Liquefaction
Shipping Regasification
Refining (oil only) Land Transport
Supply chain methane emissions Supply chain methane variability range
I. Electric.-Or yen liquefaction plant assume. 2. For he lifecycle analysis of coal, methane observation data are not available. Therefore, the methane range has been assume as a sensitivity of the IPCC factors. aligned ath the range obLainect for gas analys,s Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
13
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Considering a 20-year GWP emphasizes the relative impact of methane emissions on lifecycle intensity differentials across the various fuels
Lifecycle GHG Intensity of LNG, Oil, and Coal Delivered to the Destination Markets Assumed
gCO2e/MJ, 20-year GWP
LNG and natural gas 0 50 100 150 200
Methane Share (excl. end use)
Oil (diesel oil)
0
50 100 150
Incremental US LNG
US LNG Plant A
i
US LNG Plant B'
US LNG Plant C
1
US LNG Plant D
t
US LNG Plant E
1
US LNG Plant F1
I
62%
Saudi Arabia
59%
53%
Iraq
IN .___. _. 3
53%
Norway
63%
59%
Nigeria
I -- Li
Methane Share 200 (excl. end use)
31 - 68/O 21 - 67%
7%
32 - 83%
Alternative LNG Sources
Canada Accel. Project Mozambique Accel. Project'
Qatar Accel. Project Argentina New Project Indonesia New Project Russia (W. Siberia New Proj.)
Oman New Project
Indigenous
China (indigenous)
Gas and
Norway (pipe export)
Piped Imports
Russia (E. Siberia) (pipe exp.) Algeria (pipe export)
I 11-. I I= D I =. I= I IM = = = 3 I= = 3
i- - - I
I_ = = 3
34 - 77% 70 - 83% 19 - 73% 38 - 79% 46 - 72% 25 - 87% 65 - 84%
62 - 96% 38%
49 - 96%
57 - 96%
Coale
0
50
China
Australia
Indonesia
Colombia
Poland
100 150 200
Im G
ID
89 - 90%
81 - 83%
50 - 53%
52 - 54%
57 - 59%
End Use Production
Gathering & Boosting
Gas Processing
.
Transmission & Storage Liquefaction
Shipping Regasification
Refining (oil only) Land Transport
Supply chain methane emissions Supply chain methane variability range
I. Electric.-Orven liquefaction plant assume. 2. For the lifecycle analysis of coal. methane ouservatior data are not available. Therefore, the methane range has been assume as a sensitivity of the IPCC factors. aligned wth the range obtained for gas analysis. Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
14
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Variations in methane intensities among gas sources are driven by country-specific emissions rate obtained from satellite observations and literature
Midpoint Methane Intensity by Value Chain
Intensity, %CH4 released / %CH4 in gas stream'
US LNG `Extended Halt' Scenario Impact
Alternative LNG sources
Indigenous Gas and Piped Imports
3.00% 3.28%
3.48%
1.44% - _ 1.28%
128%
1.28%
1.40%
1.31%-
1.27% 1.66% 1.30% 1.52% 1.91%
1.57%
2.11%
.,
0.07%
US LNG Plant A
US LNG US LNG US LNG US LNG Plant B Plant C Plant D Plant E
. Production
US LNG Plant F
Canada Accel. Project
. Gas Processing
Argentina New
Project
Qatar Mozambique Russia
Accel. Accel.
(W.
Project Project Siberia
New
Liquefaction
Proj.)
Oman New Project
Indonesia New
Project
Gathering & Boosting V Transmission & Storage
Shipping
-- - US LNG average2 .. -
1. Methane emissions intensity expressed as methane emissions (on an energy basis) divided by methane content of the throughput, with marketable gas being the common denominator across the supply chain. 2. Weighted minimum and maximum methane across groups Source: S&P Global
Algeria China Norway
(pipe (indigenous) (pipe
export)
export)
Minimum average2 Maximum average2
Russia (E. Siberia)
(pipe exp.)
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
15
US plays delivering gas to Incremental LNG projects ye LNG sources
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Non-US feedstock gas is mostly sourced from large conventional reservoirs with lower fuel use requirements in production but often with higher methane uncertainty
Well to Transmission GHG Intensity Methane Intensity'
gCO2e/MJ 100yr GWP
%, well-to-pipeline
0 10 20 30 40
W. Delaware Eagle Ford Haynesville
US-shale gas weighted average: 9.9 gCO2e/MJ
0.75% 1.62% 1.08%
W.Midland
1.64%
Bone Spring
0.75%
Marcellus
1.04%
Bakken
0.97%
Scoop/Stack
2.25%
Well to Transmission GHG Intensity
gCO2e/MJ 100-yr GWP
Methane Intensity)
%, well to pipeline
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Canada Accel. Project*
Mozambique Accel. Project
Qatar Accel. Project I 111 Argentina New Project* EIII
Indonesia New Project
Gas response weighted range: 6.2 -- 18.8 gCO2e/MJ
0.3 - 2.1% 0.9 - 1.9% 0.1 - 2.6% 0.4 - 2.9% 1.5 - 4.8%
.42 Russia (W. Siberia New Prj)
.gc
I Oman New Project
1
0.05 - 4.8% 1.8 - 5.1%
China (indigenous)
1
0.3 - 4.4%
Norway (pipe export)
0.07%
Russia (E. Siberia pipe)
0.2 - 5.4%
Algeria (pipe export)
0.4 - 7.2%
III Production ill G&B
Gas Processing Transmission Well -to-pipeline methane emissions j Well-to-pipeline methane variability range
Note: Only pays contributing >100 mmcfid of production are shown. All US plays studied are unconventional gas sources. ' Denotes international unconventional gas sources. 1. Methane emissions intensity expressed as methane emissions (on an energy basis) divided by methane content of the throughput, with marketable gas being the common denorninaioi aci css the, supply cqair. Source: S&P Global data and moasurornonts Iron, TROPOMI
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
16
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
High-frequency, high-resolution methane flyover data available in the US indicates that upstream efforts to reduce methane emissions are gaining traction
Oil and Gas Production Segment Current Methane Intensity Levels
%CH4 released i %CH4 in gas stream1
Satellite-based (TROPOMI) Estimates
2023 2024
0.58 0.50
0.60 0.57
High-frequency and highresolution flyover observation data from Insight M can help attribute emissions to individual facilities, allowing a more granular understanding of trends within each play
Flyover-based (Insight M) Measurements
2022 2023
-28%.
0.87
V 0.62
0.40 0.40
- - - - - - - - - - -
0.17
0.17
Near-zero industry targets
0.28%2
0.20%3
Haynesville
Permian average
Haynesville region
Haynesville shale4
Permian average
Flyover data show Haynesville shale wells are already at or below industry near-zero methane targets.
Satellite and flyover data show a significant improvement in the Permian basin --a key source of feedstock for LNG exports
t. Methane emissions intensity expressed as methane emissions (on an energy basis) divided by methane content of the iiiii..uyi put, wine niaib.etauia yasl..)e.ny the cununuu Uellutimietui acluss t to supply chain, 2. ONE Future Gualitiuli talyet i.,:vcit. ..tiLnt), 3. Neal -tew eitelyy allocated methane intensity. aligned with OGCI 0.20% target for gassy plays. 4. The Haynesville region has -5.000 welts producing from the Haynesville Shale versus -28.000 vertical wells producing from other formations Source: S&P Global data leveraging measurements from TROPOMI, Insight M
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
17
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Achieving near-zero methane emissions in the gas and LNG value chains would make coal replacing US LNG 77% more intensive in GWP100 terms
Average Lifecycle GHG Intensity (Production to End Use)
gCO2e/MJ, 100-yr GWP
End use Supply chain
Supply chain methane Near-zero supply chain methane intensity'
Achieving near-zero methane intensity would mean:
0
Incremental US LNG (current)
Incremental US LNG (near-zero methane)
Alternative LNG (near-zero methane)2 Indigenous Gas and
Piped Imports (near-zero methane)2
Coal
15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 +65%
+77%
Reduction in GHG intensity of Alternative LNG and indigenous gas and piped imports that start from a higher intensity today
Reduction in GHG intensity of Incremental US LNG
Difference in GHG intensity between coal and US LNG (up from 65% under current methane intensity)
1. Near-zero energy allocated methane intensity, aligned w th OOO1 0.20% target for gassy plays. 2. Near-zero only for projects delivering to Europe Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
18
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Differences in results of S&P's analysis and other studies are driven by emissions allocations to co-products, 20- vs. 100-year GWP, and methane intensity assumptions
Supply Chain GHG Intensity Estimates Benchmarking (Excluding End Use)
gCO2e/MJ 100-yr GWP (except where noted)
Upstream Processing I Transmission Liquefaction
Shipping
(US to Europe)
0 Roman-White (2021)
Abrahams (2015)' S&P LNG Impact Study Average
NPC (2024) Zhu (2024) Marcellus
NEIL (2019) Zhu (2024) Permian Howarth (2024) (20-yr GWP)1 2
ac
Roman-White (2021)
S&P LNG Impact Study Average
O
NPC (2024) Zhu (2024) Marcellus
U)
Rosselot (2021) East Texas
NETL (2019)
Zhu (2024) Permian
Rosselot (2021) Permian3
ICF/API (2020) Abraham (2015) S&P LNG Impact Study Average Howarth (2024) (GWP-20)4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
S&P Global analysis reflects the mix of intensities between all sources of gas for each LNG facility and of destination markets. In contrast, other studies shown consider singleplay sourcing and single destination markets
The 2024 Howarth study is an outlier, mainly because it fully attributes methane emissions from the upstream and midstream sectors to the natural gas stream and thus overstates their impact on greenhouse gas intensity
This is a crucial difference with all other studies that allocate emissions of each value chain segment to all co-products of that stage (oil, condensate, gas, NGLs)
1. The Abrahams (2015) and Hcwarth studies group upstream, processing. and transmission emissions into a single category, consolidated into 'Upstream' for this chart; 2. The Howarth study allocates all emissions to the gas stream instead of to all co-products on an energy basis. This study is also not explicit on a single destination market, but the results shown correspond to a 38-day trip; 3.The Rosselot study's results with allocation of all emissions to gas are 80 gCO2e/MJ for East Texas and 177 gCO2e/PAJ for the Permian; 4. The Howarth study assumes coal is used domestically and excludes coal shipping; Note: Most of these studies use a functional unit of MWh of electricity generated or delivered. To enable comparisons with our study, all intensity results were re-expressed in MJ of fuel delivered to the plant, using the power plant efficiency factor quoted in the study. Where not disclosed. we considered a 55% efficiency for gas-fired combined cycle power plants and 40% for coal-tired plants Source: S&P Global and published studies
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
19
Contents
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Appendix
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
S&P Global
O 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
20
Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
The regional impact of US LNG export value chain reaches all US states integration is extensive, broad and homegrown
supply chain
9W
The regional impact analysis builds on our Phase 1 study, which demonstrated that the Base Case outlook will support an annual average of 495K jobs and generate $1.3 trillion in US GDP from 2025 through 2040
- Phase 2 analysis focused on providing a view at the state and congressional district level The sourcing of inputs for the US LNG export value chain will impact states beyond the seven core
producing states: Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico. Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia 37% of jobs and 30% of GDP contributions will occur in non-producing states in our Base Case
S&P Global
At the US congressional district level, the economic contributions will concentrate in districts with either (1) investment in natural gas exploration and production or (2) investment in liquefaction activities or (3) businesses within the extended supply chains serving the LNG export industry
0) 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
21
Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Growth in the US LNG export industry will utilize extended supply chains that involve both producing and non-producing states
Representative spending categories
Representative supplying states
Industrial equipment &
machinery
Construction equipment
Upstream field equipment
Machines and cutting tools
Medium / heavyduty trucks and equipment
Compressors, generators and cryogenic heat exchangers
Michigan Ohio Minnesota Illinois
00 00 00
Construction & well services
Information technology
Drilling wells support
Operations support
Upstream construction
Pipeline construction
Hardware Software IT services
Liquefaction facilities construction
Texas Louisiana Oklahoma Arkansas
California Washington Texas
Freight transportation
Pipeline transportation
Warehousing
Texas Louisiana Illinois
Materials
Frac sand
Chemicals
Cement and concrete
Steel and nonferrous metal
Pipes and pipefittings
gA
Professional & other services
Professional services
Engineering services
Equipment rental
Financial services
Pennsylvania Ohio Wisconsin
New York California Texas Florida
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
22
Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
In the Base Case, 37% of the jobs supported by LNG exports to 2040 will be in non-producing states'
Average annual jobs supported in the Base Case
Annual average direct, indirect and induced jobs, 2025-2040
Both Texas and the aggregate non-producing states will see approximately the same number of jobs
While the S938 billion of
cumulative direct capital
and operating spending
will be focused on
projects within the seven
producing states, the
follow-on indirect and
34K
induced effects will result
183K
in 37% of the jobs going
to non-producing states
24K
30K
11W
183K
17K
6K
495K 183K
Distribution of jobs, Base Case
Texas
Oklahoma Louisiana New Mexico Pennsylvania Ohio
Jobs at risk,
Extended Halt Scenario
41.5K
5.2K
5.0K
4.6K
4.2K
3.7K
1. Other key economic metrics such snow smiler distributions to non-producing states: 31% of sales activity and 30% of contribution to GDP accrue to non-producing states in the Base Case Scenario.
S&P Global
West Virginia
1.9K
Non-producing states
( --37% )
35.5K
Total 101.4K
2025 by S&P Global Inc. 23
Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Economic impact from US LNG exports will span the US, focused on the producing states and the industrial mix of the Midwest, East and West Coasts
State-level distribution of jobs, Base Case Scenario
Average annual jobs, 2025 - 2040
State-level distribution of GDP per capita, Base Case Scenario
Cumulative dollars of GDP per capita, 2025 - 2040
Average annual US jobs: 495K
US cumulative GDP per capita: $3.8K
S as, NH MA RI CT
li att
Producing states
Non-producing states (avg 4.1K)
On an absolute level, the distribution of jobs in non-producing states will show a "halo effect" around producing states
S&P Global
Producing states
Non-producing states (avg $1.4K)
When results are normalized such as GDP per capita the proportional economic impacts are more widespread
0 2026 by S&P Global Inc.
24
Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Congressional districts with major US LNG value chain activity have higher concentrations of jobs supported
Jobs Supported by Congressional District: Southwestern Cluster
Average, 2025 - 2040
Jobs Supported by Congressional District: Midwest/Mid-Atlantic Cluster
Average, 2025 - 2040
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence
Congressional districts with major upstream plays -- Permian, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Utica. and Marcellus -- will have major economic implications.
S&P Global
7 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
25
Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Congressional districts most benefited are in areas with the highest direct US LNG value chain activity, but gains are distributed throughout the US
Cumulative GDP per capita in producing states
$24.2K
$18.3K $18.2K $17.9K
$9.0K
I
$4.5K $3.5K
NM TX LA OK WV PA OH
_1. lc. Avg
Cumulative GDP per capita, top 20 congressional districts in producing states
$93.9K
$55.6K
S45.4K 9
$44.0K
O H
$43.1K
$32.1K $30.7K
11C\
H
$28.9K
1 0 O
$28.4K
1
N
525.9K 1
H
$24.6K 1
$23.9K
1 oo O z
322.3K I
I--
$22.2K
I CO H
$21.1K
I csr
$20 1K $18.6K $18.3K $18.2K
NUNN C\
r--
-
1-
$18.1K
co
Cumulative GDP per capita, top 10 non-producing states'
$10.1K
Cumulative GDP per capita, top 20 congressional districts in non-producing states
$12.4K 510.9K $10.3K $10.2K
$2.4K $2.3K $2.3K $2.2K $2.0K $2.0K $2.0K $1.7K $1.6K $1.4K
66.6K $5.9K $4.7K
$3.6K 63.5K S3.5K $3.4K $3.4K
$3.1K $3.0K $2.9K $2.8K $2.8K $2.8K
11
NM
AR IN DC KS IL MN ND WY UT CO US Avg
11
0
0
0co
9
OC
th
z i
OC
5-
2
z
Units: cumulative GDP per capita, 2025 - 2040, in thousands of real 2024 dollars
0
r- u7 to 0
co 0
z
1. The strong economic response of Arkansas on the state and congressional distnct levels is due to the role it will play as a key provider of upstream support services. The response of the New York congressional districts is due to the role they will play in providing financial and businesses services.
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc. 26
Contents
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Appendix
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
S&P Global
O 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
27
Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Unlocking the full potential of Marcellus and Utica shale gas through additional pipeline capacity would lead to lower prices and consumer savings, particularly in the Northeast
The Northeast has vast amounts of low-cost resources with the Marcellus and Utica shales a cornerstone of natural gas supply in the United States, representing 1/3 of the US Lower 48's total production in 2025, up from less than 1/4 ten years ago
The region has more than 620 Tcf of commercial gas resources, or enough to supply the entire US market for 17 years and the Northeast region for 77 years at current demand levels
AAA
S&P Global
Due to pipeline constraints, the Marcellus is being developed at a suboptimal rate (2% of resource per year being produced)
Lack of access to this low-cost gas has pushed gas prices at Boston, Chicago and New York up to 160% higher than the national gas marker, Henry Hub, (and elsewhere in the US) in peak months feeding into higher electricity prices to consumers
Expanding Northeast exit capacity by 6.1 Bcf/d could reduce Henry Hub gas prices by -$0.20/MMBtu, 1/3 more than the impact of a US LNG `Extended Halt' Scenario at similar volumes
Northeast markets see 20% to 30% gas price declines - $2.25/MMBtu in Boston and $1.23/MMBtu in New York in peak months
Cumulative savings to 2040 reach $76 billion, far exceeding the estimated $14 billion in capital costs necessary for the pipeline expansions
72025 by S&P Global Inc.
28
Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE
The Northeast has vast amounts of low-cost gas resources, much of which is at risk of underdevelopment due to natural gas pipeline bottlenecks
Lower 48 US Onshore Commercial Gas Resources by Play'
$/MMBtu, Tcf of gas resource Marcellus & Utica Plays Other 10
5
1 $55
Breakeven cost of supply ($/MMBtu)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 1,500 1,600 1,700
The Marcellus & Utica plays have 620 Tcf of commercial
-5 -
gas resources or enough to supply the entire US market
for 17 years at current demand levels
-10 Tcf of gas resource
1 Commercial ges resources are remaining recoverable volumes. economical at referred prices, that broadly align with 1P and 2P reserves but reflect a longer-term development outlook. Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights.
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc. 29
Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Despite having 620 Tcf of low-cost gas resources, pipeline constraints have caused Northeast and Midwest gas prices to be higher than Henry Hub over the last 15 years
Historical Natural Gas Prices - Northeast and Midwest Winter Peak Month Analogue (January) for the 2010 - 2024 Period
$/MMBtu, Real 2024
Gas prices have been up to 160% higher than Henry Hub in Boston, New York and Chicago since 2010 for peak winter heating season and
maximum pipeline constraints
$11.24
$10.52
$4.27
$4.71
Henry Hub
Source: S&P Global Commodity Insight:
S&P Global
Boston (Algonquin
New York
Chicago City Gate
City Gate)
(Transco Zone 6)
O 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
30
Unleashing the Marcelius & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE
The addition of several pipeline expansion corridors would bring more low-cost resources to consumers throughout the eastern US
Northeast Egress Capacity Expansions Proposed in "NE Pipeline Expansion" Scenario -- Total 6.1 Bcf/d expansions Capacity additions in Bcf/d and assumed in-service year
0.3 Bcf/d expansion to MidWest markets and into Chicago City Gate coming online in 2030
+ 0.25
+ 0.5
0.5 Bcf/d additional capacity into New York and 1.0 Bcf/d expansion to New England going into Boston City Gate. In-service 2029 and 2030 respectively
2.8 Bcf/d additional capacity to the Gulf Coast via smaller expansions in four major systems coming online in the 2028 - 2031 period
Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights.
S&P Global
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Capacity Expansions Marcellus Basin Utica Basin Pipeline
1.6 Bcf/d expansion to Southeastern markets via Mountain Valley and the Southgate expansion coming online in 2028 and 2029 respectively
0) 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
31
Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica; Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Northeast pipeline expansions would reduce gas prices across the entire US Lower 48, leading to a Henry Hub price reduction of 4% ($0.20/MMBtu) in the 2028 -- 2040 period
Henry Hub Annual' Real 2024 Price Real 2024 $/MMBtu
7
-- -- Extended Halt Case
Base Case
6
NE Pipeline Expansion
5
4
Henry Hub Annual' Price Differential Real 2024 $/MMBtu
1.0
-- -- Extended Halt
NE Pipeline Expansions
0.5
NE pipeline expansions result in a price reduction that is 1/3 more than a US LNG
Extended Halt with similar volumetric impact
0.0
3
2
1
0 2024
2026
2028
2030
Average 2028 -- 2040 [$/MMBtu]
Base Case
$4.44
NE Pipeline Expansion
$4.24
Extended Halt Case
$4.29
2032 2034 2036 2038 2040
Note: I . Annual average of monthly modeled prices for each scenario Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights
S&P Global
-0.5 -1.0 -1.5
Average 2028 -- 2040 [$/MMBtu]
NE Pipeline Expansion - $0.20
Extended Halt Case
- $0.15
2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040
O 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
32
Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE
These pipeline expansions would particularly benefit more constrained and higher priced NE markets, reducing prices up to 30% in peak months and 17-27% on average to 2040
Relevant Gas Hubs
Chicago CG
Henry Hub
fif Transco Z4
Got? of Mexico
Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights
Algonquin CG Transco Z6 NY
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Gas Hubs
Marcellus Basin OM Utica Basin
Pipeline
Change in Natural Gas Prices January Average - 2028 to 2040
Real 2024 $/MMBtu
Base Case NE Pipeline Expansions
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Annual % Reduction
Higher impact as seasonal demand spikes are alleviated by incremental
capacity
Limited impact aligned with lower scope for expansion (Midwest) and Henry Hub price
impact (Southeast)
. 5% ,
5.01 4.78
-29% 7.69
5.44
-19%
6.56 5.32
-5%
4.71 4.47
-6% 4.98 4.69
Henry Hub -4%
Boston (Algonquin City Gate)
27%
NY (Transco Zone 6)
- 17%
Chicago (City Gate)
/0
Southeast (Transco Zone 4)
S&P Global
(:) 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
33
Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Northeast gas pipeline debottlenecking would result in cumulative savings of $76 billion to 2040 to gas consumers relative to $14 billion of capital required for pipeline expansion
Northeast US Pipeline Expansion Summarized Results - 2028 to 2040 period
Real 2024 $
New England NY / New Jersey Midwest
Southeast
Capexl Estimated
$4.3 B
% Decrease in wholesale prices
27%
$0.5 B
-17O/O
$0.6 B
40/0
$2.5 B
50/0
Total Annual Savings less Opex2
$1.02 B $1.41 B
$0.93 B
$1.14 B
Most regions have higher annual household savings than the estimated
$11 from a US LNG Extended Halt.
Household Gas Savings3
$/year
Cumulative
$110
$1,435
$63 $17 $13
$813 $220 $170
In addition to residential savings of $15B, gas
consumers in the power, industrial and commercial sectors realize $27B, $22B and $12B savings respectively
during the period
Gulf Coast
$6.4 B
4O/O
$1.36 B
0-
$118
Total: $14.3 B
Total: $5.86 B 2028 - 2040 savings: -$76 B
On top of the direct gas related savings, Households would also benefit from lower electricity prices
1.Capex estimation based on analogues of historical expansions In the specific legions andior public Wings, a Annual sayings rule, to savings for all gas consumers, incluuing iusirJui
muushiai, puwei 4mi ulbers. These are net of incremental operating costs for
expanded capacty: 3. Considers residential demand and gas consuming households per region, calculated as discount in gas price ($/MtviBtu) multiplied by average consumption per pas-consuming residence for the 2028 - 2040 period.
Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, EIA
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
34
Contents
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Appendix
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
S&P Global
C. 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
35
Appendix - Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
The study evaluates emissions intensity across energy sources by analyzing supply chain segments and considering direct emissions
Goal and Functional Units
Scope
Goal: To estimate the impact on life-cycle GHG emissions of the US LNG 'Extended Halt' Scenario and the global energy response described in Phase 1, where US LNG exports are replaced by various other fuels and renewable electricity in selected target markets.
Functional unit: 1 MJ (lower heating value) of each fuel/energy source delivered to an end use point near an LNG regasification
terminal in the destination country. The results are expressed in terms of gCO2e/MJ.
End Use: The energy efficiency of the end use (e.g. gas vs. coal power plant efficiency) was considered in the global energy balance
model used in Phase 1. In Phase 2, the quantity of each fuel is taken as given, and therefore GHG impacts are compared on a delivered basis, not accounting for differences in the efficiency of end use (e.g., power plant heat rates).
Boundary: This study estimates the GHG intensity of each segment of the value chain for each fuel from production to end use combustion, accounting for volume/energy losses in each segment and producing an aggregated lifecycle intensity that is then multiplied by the variation in volume of each fuel identified in Phase 1.
Emission sources: CO2 and CH4 direct emissions' from combustion, flaring, venting and fugitives are presented using their 100year global warming potentials (AR6 GWP100) used for UNFCCC reporting. GWP20 results are also shown in this appendix.
Critical Supply Chain Segments
US upstream: The volume and GHG intensity of natural gas supplied from each US play flowing to each US LNG facility impacted is used to determine the weighted average upstream and midstream emissions. The gas pathing analysis is based on current and expected physical flows and has been calibrated using the expert opinion of S&P Global gas analysts.
Shipping routes: Shipping emissions for each fuel are based on a weighted average of the distance from the supply source (LNG facility, oil terminal, coal mine) to all the consumption markets impacted. For LNG exports, the destination markets are derived from both existing contractual agreements and forecast flows. Shipping emissions account for the total distance between ports, the fleet makeup, and typical vessel characteristics.
Methane: Across each segment of the supply chain for each fuel, methane emissions were analyzed based on the data available during the time of this analysis, starting with remote observational data (i.e. historic data from previous observation campaigns captured via satellite and flyover), followed by reported, literature-based, and modeled emissions using standard factors.
1This analysis excludes other greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide, that are relatively minor contributors to GHG intensity for the fuels under analysis
S&P Global
CO 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
36
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Emissions from incremental US LNG exports in the Base Case are 18 to 35 MtCO2e (GWP1001) lower per year than the alternative energy sources modelled
GHG Emissions Corresponding to the Impacted US LNG Exports and the Potential Global Energy Response'
Million tCO2e, 100-yr GWP . yearly average 2028-2040 for the range of methane intensities
Methane uncertainty range
Emissions of the global energy response that would replace incremental US LNG exports
35
8
160
18
Incremental US LNG exports in the Base Case
27 154
1
62
2
The difference
between
172
scenarios is
41 -87
MtCO2e
considering
GWP201
Coal
Indigenous Gas
Oil
Renewables.
Alternative
Global Energy
Net Global
Incremental
and Piped Imports
Nuclear & Others LNG Sources
Response Total
Change2
US LNG2
1. Global Warming Potential (MVP) is a measure used to compare the impact of different greenhouse gases on global warming. It quantifies the heat a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere over a specific time period. relative to carbon dioxide (CO2), which has a GWP of 1. See the appendix for full results in 20-yr GWP; 2. The volume of impacted LNG exports at risk and the response of the global energy system are based on the results of Phase 1; 3. Midpoint methane intensity represents the middle of the modeled methane uncertainly range. For results on the full range of methane uncertainty, sea appendix Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
37
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
We evaluated the typical segments of the LNG supply chain, which includes additional segments with significant energy requirements beyond the natural gas supply chain
Natural gas value chain Liquefied natural gas (LNG) value chain
i=?
Production
Pipelines
Liquefaction
Shipping
Regasification
End Use'
Exploration Development Production
Gathering Processing
Long- Distance Transmission
Main sources of GHG emissions2
Methane vents and leaks (higher uncertainty)
Treating / Stripping Liquefaction Storage Loading
Energy intensive segment
Shipping Trucking
Receiving Storage Vaporizing Transport to market
Fuel use (mostly CO2 from combustion) Methane vents and leaks
Combustion for heat or electricity (Petrochemical use)
Flaring
CO2 vented
CO2 vented
Lifecycle GHG emissions CO2e
- 20-25%
75 - 80%
I. BLAI i the ndIulal yds and LNG value chain typically Include a local distribution segment atter long-distance transmission or regasification and before delivery to the final point of consumption. This study assumes delivery of natural gas. LNG, and alternative lues to a point adjacent to the regasitication terminal or transmission line to simplify comparisons across fuels. Petrochemical use is not included In the illustration of fitecycle GHG intensity. 2. Key typical sources of emissions shown, but individual plays can vary significantly from the average, Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
39
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
In the oil value chain, methane emissions in the production segment dominate, while refining remain the most energy-intensive segments
rit
Production
Shipping
Processing
Exploration Development
Production Transport
Main sources of GHG emissions
Lifecycle GHG emissions CO2e
Methane vents and leaks (high uncertainty)
Flaring
CO2 vented
Shipping
Receiving Storage Refining
Transport to market
Energy intensive segments -- Fuel use (mostly CO2 from combustion)
- 14-33%
1.This study assumes delivery of oil and alternative fuels to a point adjacent to the oil refinery or transmission line to simplify comparisons across fuels. Petrochemical use is not Included in the Illustration of lifecycle GHG intensity. Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
End Use1
Combustion for
heat or electricity
(Petrochemical uses)
- 67 - 86%
CO 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
40
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
For coal most of the supply chain GHG emissions are due to logistics and operations, except for subsurface mines where methane plays a larger role
Production
Mining
Extraction
Post-mining
Processing
Storing
Moving
Transportation'
Land transportation via
truck or rail
Shipping
Receiving Storage Transport to market
Main sources of GHG emissions
Energy intensive segment
Methane vents (higher in underground mines)
Fuel use (mostly CO2 from combustion)
Lifecycle GHG emissions CO2e
- 5 - 14%
1 The model considers land transportation from mine to port (for exports) or mine to plant (for internal supply) and from port to plant for receiving countries. which occurs atter shipping. Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
Combustion for
heat or electricity
- 86 - 95%
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
41
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Data sources for LNG GHG emission intensity estimates by country (1 of 2)
Unconventional Gas
Drilling & Completion
Production
Gathering & Boosting
Gas Processing
Transmission & Storage
Cninft Istinn emissions Flaring emissions
Liquefaction
Shipping & Regasification
Methane emissions
End Use Transportation & Combustion
United States
Canada
S&P Global IMPACT: enhanced
S&P Global Center of Emissions Excellence (CofEE): Emission factor based on EPA and
emissions model calibrated against EPA
other reported data
S&P Global IMPACT: enhanced emissions model calibrated against EPA
CofEE: Emission factor developed based on EPA reported data
Measurement-informed estimates' based on TROPOMI and Insight M data assigned to value chain segments using EPA reported data
S&P Global IMPACT: enhanced emissions model calibrated against EPA
Reported data based on similar Alberta operations
CofEE's EF with reported data3
S&P Global IMPACT: enhanced emissions model calibrated against EPA
Based on VIIRS observation and EF derived from high-reliability reported data in US and Canada
CofEE's EF & literature N/A
Emission factors
CofEE's EF & literature N/A
OPGEE emissior factors
N/A
N/A
OPGEE emission factors N/A
Measurement-informed estimates' based on TROPOMI data assigned to value chain segments using EPA and other reported data
Emission factors
N/A
Based on analogue US plays taken from S&P Global IMPACT
Analogue from US emission factors
CofEE's EF with reported data3
CofEE's EF & literature
OPGEE emission factors
Argentina
Based on VIIRS observation and EF derived from high-reliability reported data in US and Canada
N/A
N/A
Measurement-informed estimates based on GHGSat and TROPOMI data assigned to value chain segments using EPA and other
Emission factors
N/A
reported data
1 TROPOMI estimates developed by S&P Global Center of Emissions Excellence and S&P Global Data Science team: 2 Liquefaction methane emission factor based on GHGSat and literature; 3 Leveraging average energy factors when no specific project data is available
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
42
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Data sources for LNG (2 of 2)
Conventional Gas
Drilling & Completion
Production
Gathering & Boosting
Gas Processing
Transmission & Storage
Russia, Oman, Qatar, Indonesia, and other int. gas
Modeled in S&P Global QUE$TOR
N/A
Based on VIIRS
observation
Satellite measurements, reported data, and EF
N/A
Modeled in S&P
N/A
Global QUE$TOR
N/A
Based on VIIRS
N/A
observation
N/A
Satellite, reported, &
N/A
EF
Modeled in S&P Global QUE$TOR
N/A
Modeled in S&P
N/A
Global QUE$TOR
Mozambique
N/A (subsea completions)
N/A
Based on VIIRS
N/A
observation
N/A (subsea completions)
N/A
Satellite, reported,
and EF
1. Liquefaction methane emission factor based on GHGSat and literature; 2. Leveraging average energy factors when no specific protect data is available
N/A
S&P Global
Cr)mh! istinn errissions Flaring emissions
Liquefaction
Shipping & Regasification
Methane emissions
End Use Transportation & Combustion
EF developed with reported data (CofEE)2
CofEE's EF & literature
OPGEE emission factors
CofEE emission
N/A
N/A
factors
Measurement informed' & emission factors
EF developed with reported data (CofEE)2
Emission factors
CofEE's EF & literature
N/A
OPGEE emission factors
CofEE emission
N/A
N/A
factors
Measurement
informed' &
Emission factors
N/A
emission factors
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
43
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Data sources for other fuels
Oil and Coal
Upstream
Midstream
Oil (all countries)
S&P Global Center of Emissions Excellence estimated modeled factors
by crude grades
Satellite measurements and emission factor
Emissions modeled
Coal
(all
N/A
countries)
UNFCCC emission factors
Emissions modeled N/A N/A
Emissions modeled N/A N/A
S&P Global
Downstream
Combustion emissions Flaring emissions Methane emissions
End Use
Volume Allocations
CofEE modeled factors N/A
Emission factors
N/A N/A UNFCCC emission factors include stockpile emissions
OPGEE & EPA emission factors N/A
N/A
OPGEE & EPA emission factors N/A
N/A
Total shipped oil exports from source countries via Commodities at Sea
Total destination import shares via Envisage/Global Gas analysis
Total destination import shares via Envisage/Global Gas analysis
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
44
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
In the US, S&P Global leveraged TROPOMI satellite observation-based estimates of methane intensity
US Upstream Methane Intensity Benchmarking
o/ of gas produced
Barnett
Bakken
Anadarko
Eagle Ford shale -
Appalachian shale
Marcellus -
a
Haynesville shale
o
Permian
;a
SO
S&P Global. 2023 (Insight M)
1
2
S&P Global, 2022 (Insight M)
S&P Global, 2023 (Insight M)
1. See next slide for details of academic studies considered Source: S&P Global and published studies
\
3
4
S&P Global, 2022 (Insight M)
S&P Global
5
9
Academic literature'
2014 -- 2017 2018 - 2021 2022 2023 2024 TROPOMI. 2023 TROPOMI, 2024 S&P Global estimates
10
11
Methane intensity, O/O
(:) 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
45
Appendix - Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Overview of global methane emission studies considered
Location
Study Sherwin et al.
MethaneAlR
United States
Chen et al. Omara et al.
Peischl et al.
Caulton et al.
Chen et al.
International
Source: Published studies
Zichong et al. Lechtenbohmer et al. Kleinberg, R. L.
S&P Global
Year published 2024/2025
2024 2022
2016
2015 2014 2023 2024 2007 2022
Basins considered (US only)
Barnett Denver Julesburg
Anadarko Appalachian
Bakken Barnett
Marcellus Permian Denver Julesburg Eagle Ford Fayetteville Haynesville
Permian
Anadarko
Eagle Ford
Appalachian
Haynesville
Barnett
Marcellus
Fayetteville
Marcellus
Haynesville
Marcellus
Countries covered
Argelia Iraq Qatar China
Russia
Russia
Oman Saudi Arabia
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
46
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
For international plays, GHGSat and Sentinel-2 plumes were used to estimate average emission rates and leak duration for certain value chain segments and asset types
Methane Intensity Methodology for GHGSat and Sentinel-2 Data Analysis
0 Analysis and attribution of CH4 plumes to facilities
All plumes were attributed to the closest O&G asset/infrastructure
- Assets were categorized into LNG plants, gas plants, pipelines and upstream'
Estimation of leak duration
For each asset with adequate plume and null observations, the duration of the plume was estimated using the midpoint method
For non-observed plumes under the threshold duration was estimated based on typical leak durations for similar assets and similar size plumes
ble NuIIIn..1.0
1
orpoki Wend lO4,11..I .
0 Define % of non-observed plumes
Assumed GHGSat and Sentinel-2 detection threshold is approximately 100 kgCH4/hr and 1,000 kgCH4/hr, respectively
A statistical distribution of O&G plumes was defined using the distribution of O&G plumes in the Permian basin from similar assets obtained from Insight M and select academic papers2
Calculated the % of nonobserved plumes for each asset type and detection threshold
100
% non-observed
(,) 80
.,,2, 60
.1 40
20
0 4100
500
>1,000
Detection threshold (kg/hr)
0 Calculate adjusted CH4 volumes CH4 volume is calculated using the
plume rate and estimated leak duration The % of unobserved plumes is applied to the total CH4 volume, not the plume rate Calculated the adjusted CH4 volumes by asset and country, using the following formula:
Volume of detected plumes 1 -- % undetected plumes
0 Estimate intensity
Assumed Sentinel-2 coverage includes all O&G assets in each country analyzed (total of 15 in Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia)
GHGSat coverage includes O&G assets in Argentina, West Siberia, Oman, Indonesia, as well as global LNG facilities onstream
Calculated CH4 intensity by energy content by normalizing the methane volume with the production or throughput3 for the corresponding assets included in the area of interest for detection
Estimated % of CH4 released divided by CH4 in the gas stream
1. The Upstream segment includes storage infrastructure, wells, and fields: 2. Distribution of observed 2022 and 2023 Permian basin methane emissions; 3. Prcducbon used to normalize Sentinel-2 plumes corresponds to the total production of the observed country, while
production used to normalize GHGSat plumes corresponds only to the production or throughput of the specific assets in the area of interest. The throughput used to normalize pipelines was estimated using the capacity of compressor stations, gas processing plants. electric plants,
or industrial plants in the corresponding pipeline system Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc. 47
Appendix - Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
70% of total CH4 upstream and midstream emissions come from facilities emitting at rates >100 kg/h, hence the importance of adjusting emissions from satellite observations
Methane Intensity Results for GHGSat and Sentinel-2 Data Analysis
0
Plume size (kg/hr):
Average leak duration by plume size'
< 10
10 -- 100 100 -- 1,000 > 1,000
Detection threshold (kg/hr):
% Unobserved plumes assumed
< 10
10 -100 100 -1,000
> 1,000
LNG plants
90 days 22 days 17 days 6 days
LNG plants
0%
N/A2
10%
50%
Gas plants
90 days 65 days 50 days 6 days
Gas plants
0%
N/A2
10%
50%
Upstream
90 days 71 days 54 days 6 days
Upstream
0%
23%
37%
77%
Pipelines
90 days 70 days 53 days 6 days
Pipelines
0%
N/A2
37%
N/A2
:1. For detection threshold of < 10 kg/h and >1,000 kWh it is assumed that all value chain segments will have similar durations as the upstream segment: 2. Not available information. Data not calculated Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
48
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Methane intensity estimates informed by Sentinel-2 plume detection (adjusted for its high sub-threshold detection using Permian basin distribution) are aligned with expectations
Sentinel-2 Estimated Upstream Methane Intensities for Selected Regions
Country
Algeria Iran Libya Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
May-Nov 2024 O&G Production'
Million boe 258 710 230 351
153
1,919 637
May-Nov 2024 CH4 Plume Emissions
ktGH4/yr 3,860
1,555 1,836
1,307 162
2,823 434
Methane Emission Intensity
%CH4 released I %CH4 in gas stream 5.46%
2.30%
8.06%
3.95%
1. Production adjusted based on Senlinel-2 analysis tImeirame between May 2024 to November 2024 Source: S&P Global
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc. 49
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Methane intensity of the international energy response is more uncertain given the limited availability to frequent and reliable measurement data
Select Sentinel-2 and GHGSat Observed Methane Plumes with Underlying Oil and Gas Assets from S&P Global Upstream Database
Select Sentinel-2 and GHGSat observed methane plumes with underlying oil and gas assets
Observed methane plumes by satellite GFIGS,*
Oil andgasinfrastructure
a LNG tiquelactsail plants
Gosprocessing plants - Gaspmetnes
a
AA
.0 F.ai t,
,:* e
I,.oft.,
."
,,,
A
Region Haynesville (2022) Haynesville (2023) Permian (2023)
Methane Detection Source Insight M
Insight M
Insight M
Estimated Coverage (Billion Pixels)
14.3
36.1
318.9
Permian (2024)
Insight M
281.9
Middle East
Sentinel -- 2
13.1
-
41.;* tea
a.4t .e
24. e
.
.te..t
..
is
Other Asia
Sentinel -- 2
9.3
North Africa
Sentinel -- 2
7.5
Yamal Peninsula (West
GHGSat
0.2
Siberia, Russia)
Source: Sentinel.2; GHGSat; S&P Global Commodity Insights, Upstream Content. Data crimpled Feb. 27, 2025.
Gtit4r f,
M
?xi: I'S- c.,; ,01,.,44 ',MI, I
0,1e",.^Ty
+.0,rI. ^ ^,k040
4PflnetIdtenreMrnmfirneno.40........0..0Ine.......t ,.... , , 00 , -, ...
-000......f..~.0
Vaca Muerta (Argentina) GHGSat
0.04
Sentinel-2 data coverage for: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt. Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman. Qatar. Saudi Arabia. Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan. United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan. between June and November 2024; GHGSat data obtained for Western Siberia, Oman, Qatar, global active LNG plants and select coal mines in Indonesia and Australia for January to December 2023 (not all areas shown on the map). Pixel count based on a spatial resolution of 20 m for Sentinel-2's B12 band that is sensitive to methane; 25 in fur GHGSat, and approximately "I in for InsightM's Leak Surveyor instiument
Source: S&P Global with publicly available methane plumes data obtained from the European Space Agency's Sentinel-2 satellites and methane plume data acouired from GHGSat. O&G infrastructure data from S&P Global's international E&P database.
S&P Global
2025 by S&P Global Inc. 50
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Failure to follow standard LCA approach of allocating emissions between co-products based on energy content leads to a significant overestimation of gas GHG intensity
Academic Studies Surveyed and their Main Parameters
Study
The greenhouse gas footprint of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exported from the United States
Reducing GHG Emissions from the U.S. Natural Gas Supply Chain
Author(s)
Howarth, Robert W.
National Petroleum Council (NPC)
Date Published Geography Covered
GHG Emissions Allocation Approach
October 2024
US exports using a world-average Emissions fully allocated to the gas voyage time (38-day roundtrip) production stream
April 2024
US exports to Europe and Asia
Allocation on energy basis between the key co-products
LNG Supply Chains: A Supplier-Specific Life-Cycle Assessment Roman-White et al. for Improved Emission Accounting
August 2021
US exports to China and Europe
Allocation on energy basis between the key co-products and fully to gas separately
Geospatial Life Cycle Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from US Liquefied Natural Gas Supply Chains
Zhu et. al
Comparing greenhouse gas impacts from domestic coal and imported natural gas electricity generation in China
Rosselot at. al
Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions From U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports: Implications for End Uses
Abrahams et. al
Source: Published studies
S&P Global
2024 2021 2015
US exports to China and Europe US exports to China
Allocation on energy basis between the key co-products
Allocation on energy basis between the key co-products and fully to gas separately
US and Russia exports to Europe Not explicit
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
51
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Our estimate of coal GHG intensity reflects the type of mine and coal produced in the largest suppliers to the destination markets impacted under the LNG Halt scenario
Main Drivers of Coal GHG Emissions Intensity
Case Comparison: China vs. Indonesia
Type of mine
Underground Surface
Bituminous
Methane IPCC factor
25 m3/ton
0 -0.75 g'MJ
0.3 m3/ton 0.009 g/MJ
27.8
China Indonesia
Typical type of mine Underground (high depth)
Surface
Typical types of coal
Lignite and bituminous
Sub-bituminous and bituminous
Moisture percentage
10/O
20% and 100/0
Type of coal
Shipping distance
Sub-bituminous Lignite Asia 4 Asia Asia 4 Europe
Heat content (MJ/kg)
Emission factor (gCO2e/MJ)
19.9 14.9 1.03 3.18
GHG emissions intensities
gCO2e/MJ (100-yr GWP) Upstream
11.5
IN China Indonesia End use
108 112
America 4 Europe
1.54
Low impact on OC; emissions
Legend:
I 4.
High impact on emissions
2.4 Mining
Note: Coal source countries and mine types were selected based on current trade flows to the selected destination markets Impacted by the LNG Halt in Phase I Source: S&P Global internal modelling assumptions and IPCC emissions factors
5.9 4.3
Operational
Combustion
S&P Global
0)2025 by S&P Global Inc.
52
Contents
Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE
Appendix
Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions
Appendix - Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
S&P Global
O 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
53
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Economic impact methodology: overview
Economic impact estimates -- including the direct, indirect, and induced effects of US LNG activity -- were generated for the US and 50 states and Washington DC.
Direct spending, initiated when firms engage local suppliers with operational and capital expenditures, initiates the economic impact sequence.
Direct suppliers engage with their suppliers, which begins the indirect contribution cycle.
Direct and indirect output contributions support corresponding levels of GDP. employment (jobs), wages and taxes.
Induced economic activity is initiated by the employees in the extended supply chain spending in their local communities.
The method of estimating this activity is based on inter-industry relationships captured by national and state input-output tables.
Direct economic contributions
(from spending with local businesses)
0
Direct spending is the catalyst
Value generated is revenue
on-going industry operations, or
less non-labor input costs
4,... capex Investment cycles, or
Changes to current o erating environments
A portion of value added is used to hire and pay wages to employees
Indirect economic contributions \ (from follow-on supply chain activity)
Spending wi h supp iers stimulates economic contributions throughout
the local supp y chains \.,
Taxes
ICE
Cinduced economic contributions \
(from workers re-spending wages)
Corporate and personal income taxes o ir
Contributions due to direct and indirect workers spending some
of their wages locally
S&P Giobat
(:) 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
54
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Building the national economic impact model
10 tables link the buying and selling relationships between producers and consumers within an economy. They underlie all economic impact analyses.
In essence, 10 tables are matrices of inter-industry flows of goods and services produced domestically and imported. Economic transactions occur at the intersection of a column (purchasing activity) and a row (sales activity). All values within the red border of the diagram represent exchanges between industries
The industry relationships expressed in the 10 table are the basis for the multipliers used in calculating the indirect activity initiated by US LNG value chain spending.
S&P Global Market Intelligence uses its own proprietary data and public data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics to assemble the state and US models.
Using the inputs assembled from domestic spending data, the models can estimate the indirect and induced output attributable LNG activity.
Lneur.Vy 1. A
Indutlry 2.
Ominimr.1
lockr.lry 45.
ffi
n4.51/y 1 A
', schwas 1, 01..rohes
Pischr...11:12 union ..or. I
...
NIVIMMIk145erci.e4
hm,/ ,
Inter.Saies,
di
Xi
-71
rtfAl lfy 2'
P.rcniki. PO 1mOtt
-.
Inell.:
a -.
...
0
RNAn./ IV 45.00. 'gm..
= inEer.SaIes2
d,
-.
....
lonfly 457
O
P.ICNIA4 il0 1.104 ',OnIx/ 4$
Kirlf.tef rill425mcAot 405 NI
-.
P..r.Aar..: kJ 45 4.4/. 4011M1 45
= Inter.SaIes,i
cl.45
x45
Inter.Plireh, Irtes.PurCli,
Hier Plgicle47,
Inter. V Inter.
L., Sales -- Parch.
S&P Global.
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
55
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Building the state economic impact models
S&P Global Market Intelligence used a standard matrix balancing process known as the RAS method to transform the BEA's national US models into companion sets of state models.
The RAS method iteratively scales and rebalances first the rows and then the columns of the Direct Requirements Matrix (a version of the 1O table called the A matrix below) until the coefficients converge to a create matrix that produces a balanced response to a targeted level of regional output.
This means that for a targeted level of state output, the sum of direct state intermediate purchases equals the sum of direct state intermediate demand. Once the new, state 1O table is balanced and reflects its industry composition, state-specific multipliers are created.
US 2022 A Matrix
S&P Global
Matrix multiply
Yields
Intermediate Matrix
State gross output diagonal matrix
A
Do row and column
Yes
sums meet
thresholds?
No
Updated A Matrix
4
Matrix multiply By intermediate matrix
Calculate scale factors
Create state multipliers
Final State A Matrix
0) 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
56
Appendix - Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Building the state economic impact models (cont.)
S&P Global supplemented its state 10 tables with a multi-regional input output model (MRIO).
The MRIO model approach allows estimation of indirect and induced economic effects in states without direct spending by capturing inter-state economic linkages and spillover effects, thus providing a more complete understanding of regional economic dynamics.
The basis of the MRIO is a gravity model to estimate trade flows. It considers the distance between states and the GDP of the industries involved as independent variables.
Industry and state-specific interstate trade flow totals are first determined by comparing the total intra-state spending (estimated in the state RAS process) with the proportion of goods imported from outside the US. The state/industry's gross output less intrastate spending and imports equals the total interstate spending. Essentially, all goods/services that are not sourced from within the state but are sourced from within the country are assumed to be interstate trade flows.
The formula is displayed below. That interstate trade total is distributed among states/industries
based on the gravity model coefficients. Gs,i = Gross output of state s for industry i Is,i = Total intra-state spending in state s for industry i (estimated
in the state RAS process) Ms,i = Total imports of goods from outside the US for state s and
industry i Ts,i = Total interstate spending for state s and industry i The relationship can be expressed as:
Ts,i = Gs,i - Is,i - Ms,i
S&P Global
7 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
57
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
US Economic impacts of LNG activity, 2025-2040
Base Case (cumulative real 2024$ or jobs) Total jobs supported (annual avg.)
Total
495,373
Direct
128,356
Indirect
147,401
Induced
219,616
Halt Case (cumulative real 2024$ or jobs)
Total jobs supported (annual avg.)
Total
101,513
Direct
29,372
Indirect
29,013
Induced
43,128
Gross Domestic Product ($M) 1,299,029 470,818 439.422 388,788
Gross Domestic Product ($M) 251,447 89,544 85,354 76,549
GDP per capita 3,764 1,364 1,273 1,126
GDP per capita 729 259 247 222
Data compiled Feb. 10. 2025. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence 2025 S&P Global.
S&P Global
7 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
58
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Economic impacts by state in base case, 2025-2040
(cumulative real 2024$ or average annual jobs)
State Texas Oklahoma Louisiana New Mexico California Pennsylvania Ohio Arkansas Illinois Florida Indiana New York Michigan Minnesota Tennessee West Virginia Georgia North Carolina Kansas Virginia Maryland Wisconsin Washington New Jersey Colorado
Total Jobs Supported 182,830 33,833 29,791 24,190 20,495 19,422 16,814 14,997 11,231 10,779 7,657 7,506 7,130 6,689 6,622 5,933 5,795 5,292 5,178 5,163 5,156 4,664 4,646 4,351 4,235
Gross State Product ($M) 599,732 72,146 80,563 48,483 49,569 58,300 41,526 30,163 26,266 21,028 16,593 24,801 13,994 11,978 10,119 14,848 13,785 12,436 6,203 8,730 8,859 9,468 10,651 9,285 10,390
Data compiied Feb. 10, 2025. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence 2025 S&P Global.
S&P Global
GSP per capita 18,282 17,893 18,213 24,213 1,236 4,528 3,542 10,094 2,168 809 2,422 1,288 1,425 2,017 1,360 9,046 1,153 1,078 2,275 984 1,378 1,620 1,296 978 1,624
State South Carolina Utah Missouri Arizona Kentucky Massachusetts Alabama Oregon Mississippi Iowa Nevada Connecticut Idaho Nebraska New Hampshire South Dakota Maine Montana North Dakota Washington, DC Wyoming Delaware Alaska Rhode Island Vermont Hawaii
Total Jobs Supported 4,066 3,903 3,767 3,593 3,509 3,130 3,075 2.785 2.736 2,277 1,819 1,507 1,349 1,243 752 672 644 640 535 532 503 467 438 413 336 285
Gross State Product ($M) 5,594 6,229 8,642 7,316 6,299 9,594 6,035 5,208 3,746 4,510 3,964 4,254 1,918 2,695 1,567 934 1,151 1,161 1,423 1,649 1,138 1,193 648 1,103 622 514
GSP per capita 1,005 1,687 1,384 862 1,382 1,326 1,198 1,171 1,340 1,451 1,215 1,194 1,001 1,371 1,122 1,063 842 1,028 2,003 2,300 1,999 1,065 927 990 994 356
CO 2025 by S&P Global Inc.
59
Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG
Economic impacts by Congressional District in base case, 2025-2040
(cumulative real 2024$ or average annual jobs)
District
Total Jobs Supported
TX-23 TX-34 TX-01 TX-11 TX-37 TX-24 TX-32 TX-19 TX-18 TX-14 TX-28 TX-27 TX-33 TX-38 TX-07 TX-30 TX-04 TX-13 TX-12 TX-06 TX-35 TX-15 TX-36 TX-17 TX-20 TX-26
Data compiled Feb. 10, 2025. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence 2025 S&P Global.
15,274 10,041
8,495 7,334 6,767 6,518 6,323 5,998 5,822 5,708 5,681 5,509 5,371 5,011 4,994 4,865 4,805 4,628 4,519 4,114 4,017 3,963 3,904 3,890 3,869 3,407
S&P Global
Gross District Product ($M)
64,339 39,892 33,541 32,208 16,744 17,174 17,327 22,005 19,448 21,322 21,851 20,705 15,773 15,733 14,095 12,691 12,678 15,687 13,345 12,715 10,955 13,416 13,336 13,099
8,802 10,588
GSP per capita
93,871 55,569 44,047 43,129 18,202 20,061 21,061 30,738 22,204 24,579 28,363 25,905 18,255 18,067 13,906 15,886 15,255 22,347 12,986 15,169 11,063 16,112 16,536 16,702
9,290 11,015
District TX-21 TX-10 TX-25 TX-09 TX-02 TX-29 OK-03 OK-01 OK-05 OK-04 OK-02 LA-04 LA-01 LA-03 LA-06 LA-02 NM-02 NM-03 NM-01 PA-09 PA-14 AR-03 AR-04 AR-02 WV-02 WV-01
Total jobs supported 3,345 3,335 3,334 3,169 2,792 2,703 8,968 7,709 6,553 5,907 4,696
11,048 5,362 4,383 3,363 3,224
10,088 7,743 6,359 2,774 2,688 4,811 4,066 3,657 3,983 1,950
Gross District Product ($M) 8,452
10,179 10,742 7,315
9,171 8,855 21,770 14,548 13,188 12,910 9,731 33,221 14,391 12,047 7,688 7,493 21,732 15,948 10,803 10,808 10,958 9,500 8,396 7,768 10,684 4,164
GSP per capita 9,103
11,839 13,274
7,700 9,003 10,039 28.903 16,304 15,928 16,476 12,553 45,403 18,576 16,993 9,944 10,440 32,111 23,909 16,405 14.643 15,215 10,866 12,421 10,229 12,465 5,309
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
60
Contacts
For more information on this report, please contact:
Eric Eyberg Head of Global Gas & Power CI Consulting
Eric.Eyberg@spglobal.com
Leandro Caputo Executive Director, Gas & LNG CI Consulting
Leandro.Caputo@spglobal.com
Linda Kinney Head of Americas Business Development
Linda.Kinney@spglobal.com
For Media information, please contact:
Jeff Marn Executive Director, Public Relations
Jeff.Marn@spglobal.com
2025 by S&P Global Inc.
61
Disclaimer
S&P Global Commodity Insights is a business division of S&P Global Inc. ("SPGCI"). The reports, data, and information referenced in this document ("Deliverables") are the copyrighted property of SPGCI and represent data, research, opinions, or viewpoints of SPGCI. SPGCI prepared the Deliverables using reasonable skill and care in accordance with normal industry practice. The Deliverables speak to the original publication date of the Deliverables. The information and opinions expressed in the Deliverables are subject to change without notice and SPGCI has no duty or responsibility to update the Deliverables (unless SPGCI has expressly agreed to update the Deliverables). Forecasts are inherently uncertain because of events or combinations of events that cannot reasonably be foreseen including the actions of government, individuals, third parties and competitors. The Deliverables are from sources considered by SPGCI (in its professional opinion) to be reliable, but SPGCI does not assume responsibility for the accuracy or completeness thereof, nor is their accuracy or completeness or the opinions and analyses based upon them warranted.
To the extent permitted by law, SPGCI shall not be liable for any errors or omissions or any loss, damage, or expense incurred by reliance on the Deliverables or any statement contained therein, or resulting from any omission. THE DELIVERABLES ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW, NEITHER SPGCI, ITS AFFILIATES NOR ANY THIRD-PARTY PROVIDERS MAKES ANY REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY, CONDITION, OR UNDERTAKING, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE, RELATING TO THE DELIVERABLES OR THE RESULTS OBTAINED IN USING THEM; INCLUDING: A) THEIR MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE; OR B) THEIR CONTINUITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS OR COMPLETENESS. The Deliverables are supplied without obligation and on the understanding that any recipient who acts upon the Deliverables or otherwise changes its position in reliance thereon does so entirely at its own risk.
The Deliverables should not be construed as financial, investment, legal, or tax advice or any advice regarding any recipient's corporate or legal structure, assets or, liabilities, financial capital or debt structure, current or potential credit rating or advice directed at improving any recipient's creditworthiness nor should they be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or as a solicitation of an offer to buy, sell or otherwise deal in any investment or securities or make any other investment decisions. The Deliverables should not be relied on in making any investment or other decision and should not in any way serve as a substitute for other enquiries or procedures which may be appropriate. Nothing in the Deliverables constitutes a solicitation by SPGCI or its Affiliates of the purchase or sale of any loans, securities or investments. The Deliverables do not constitute legal advice and SPGCI did not act in the capacity of lawyers under any jurisdiction in the preparation of Deliverables. SPGCI is not a registered lobbyist and cannot advocate on anyone's behalf to government officials regarding specific policies.
S&P Global Inc. also has the following divisions: S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Global Mobility, and S&P Global Ratings, each of which provides different products and services. S&P Global keeps the activities of its business divisions separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their activities. SPGCI publishes commodity information, including price assessments and indices and maintains clear structural and operational separation between SPGCI's price assessment activities and the other activities carried out by SPGCI and the other business divisions of S&P Global Inc. to safeguard the quality, independence and integrity of its price assessments and indices and ensure they are free from any actual or perceived conflicts of interest. The Deliverables should not be construed or regarded as a recommendation of any specific price assessment or benchmark.
No portion of the Deliverables may be modified, reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without the prior written consent of SPGCI (to be granted or withheld in SPGCI's absolute discretion).
Unless SPGCI has expressly agreed otherwise, the Deliverables are not works-made-for-hire and SPGCI shall own all right, title, and interest in and to the Deliverables, including all intellectual property rights which subsist in the Deliverables. Use of the Deliverables is subject to any license terms and restrictions agreed between SPGCI and the commissioning Client. The SPGCI name(s) and logo(s) and other trademarks appearing in the Deliverables are the property of S&P Global Inc., or their respective owners.
2025 by S&P Global Inc. 62
S&P Global
IGU INTERNATIONAL GAS UNION
UNION INTERNATIONALE DU GAZ
Document 99 Attachment 2 U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Natural Gas is Foundational to a Secure Cleaner Energy Future
Our organizations are grateful for ongoing dialogue with G7 member countries on the unique and vital role of natural gas in meeting shared energy security and climate objectives. We welcome the opportunity to share information and support the important process of the G7 Climate, Energy, and Environment working tracks. In furtherance of this dialogue, we share the following fundamental messages for consideration:
Natural gas is foundational to a secure, cleaner energy future, due to its critical ability to provide global and local flexibility for energy systems to meet the challenges of the energy transition.
Gas is going to play a key role in reducing emissions by replacing coal, oil, and wood, which still dominate today's global energy mix. It will also have a key role providing resiliency for power grids as they rapidly integrate larger shares of intermittent and decentralized generation while meeting the growing demand from electrification and the digital technology sector. Ensuring power quality and affordability will be important for the G7 economies to attract and retain digital technology and data centre sector investments.
At the same time, gas remains necessary to provide high efficiency industrial feedstock for heavy industry and fuel development and industrialization in Africa and parts of Asia, with two thirds of the world's population still lacking access to modem energy. Gas also plays a key role in the production of fertilizer, which is critical for food security.
Importantly, gas will provide a pathway for deeper decarbonisation through the addition of carbon capture utilization and storage and low and zero-carbon gas technologies. We stress that greater attention is necessary from policy and industry to the issue of addressing the significant gap in scaling these technologies for meeting the decarbonisation targets.
We also reaffirm that detection, measurement, and elimination of methane emissions from the natural gas value chains provides a critical opportunity to further enhance the environmental value of gas and to secure its license to participate in the energy transition. The right policies will also be important for ensuring that resources are invested efficiently and the greatest reductions in the shortest period are encouraged. A variety of public and private initiatives are providing momentum behind these goals, including but not limited to the Global Methane Pledge, COP28 Oil and Gas Decarbonization Charter, recently enacted methane regulations in the EU and U.S., the
U.S. Department of Energy's international measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification (MMRV) working group, and Japan's CLEAN Initiative.
Natural gas is necessary for security of supply, and diversified supplies within a global market are critical for helping Europe continue to manage the reduction of Russian gas imports, while supporting global affordability and resiliency of energy.
In the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, flexible natural gas supplies helped the people of Europe, Japan, and other nations heat and power their homes, factories, and businesses at a time of great need and uncertainty. Further diversification away from Russia is necessary, and with numerous forecasts projecting global natural gas demand to rise well into the next decade and beyond, so additional supplies of natural gas, particularly liquified natural gas (LNG), will be needed to supply world markets.
As this important work proceeds, it is critical to recognize that international demand for natural gas is likely to continue growing for decades. The LEA's April 2023 "Outlooks for Gas Markets and Investment" report forecasts that natural gas demand in Africa, the Middle East, and developing Asian markets will continue to grow through 2050, and that "an additional 240 bcm per year of LNG export capacity is needed by 2050 above what currently exists or is under construction."' Other well-regarded forecasts from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, BP, ExxonMobil, and Japan's Institute for Energy Economics project significantly higher global natural gas demand growth than lEA. As the lEA and Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) warned in their July 2023 LNG Strategyfor the World report, "If investment into natural gas/LNG is insufficient, a supply tightness could occur before a demand decline, putting global energy security at risk."2 The same report concluded that because it is difficult to ramp up production of LNG in a short period, "the world may risk facing prolonged periods of supply shortages if actual demand turns out to be higher than forecasts or expectations." Emerging trends from demand sources such as transport electrification and artificial intelligence-driven data centers suggest that this growth may indeed turn out to be higher than expected.
The 2023 IGU Global Gas Report shows that global investment levels in gas development declined by 58% between 2014 and 2020, and only started to marginally recover in 2021. Without additional injections, the current total existing and approved gas production level could decrease by a quarter from current levels in 2030 and continue the same downward trajectory thereafter. This would fall short of most gas demand projections, creating another significant energy security challenge.
Importantly, we are confident that this demand can be met in a manner that continues progress on emissions reductions.
o Indeed, the G7 has recognized this in numerous prior statements. For example,
1 https://www.iea.org/reports/outlooks-for-gas-markets-and-investment https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2023/07/20230719001/20230719001-1.pdf
the G7 Hiroshima Leader's communique stressed not only "the important role that increased deliveries of LNG can play" in addressing gas market shortfalls, but also that "publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response, subject to clearly defined national circumstances, if implemented in a manner consistent with our climate objectives without creating lock-in effects, for example by ensuring that projects are integrated into national strategies for the development of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen."3 o In December, nearly 200 nations that convened at the United Nations climate conference (COP 28) agreed to the UAE Consensus, which states that "transitional fuels can play a role in facilitating the energy transition while ensuring energy security"-- a clear reference to the potential for natural gas to displace higher emitting fuels.4 These goals are appropriate in light of data clearly showing that the energy crisis we are still experiencing has had a very damaging effect on the energy transition, as emissions in energy reached another record. In 2023, global coal demand reached record high, and contributed 65% to year-over-year energy sector emissions growth. This was a direct result of a supply/demand imbalance caused by the gas supply crisis, escalated by the reduction of pipeline gas flowing to Europe from Russia.
Across the globe, industry is working to ensure that natural gas projects are aligned with international climate efforts, and we remain eager to partner with governments around the world on the important technical and policy work necessary to advance international GHG reduction initiatives. Our members are also actively pursuing development of promising low-carbon technologies, including biomethane and renewable natural gas (RNG), CCUS, hydrogen, ammonia, and e-methane. Collectively, these efforts will ensure that natural gas--already providing enormous emissions reductions when replacing coal and oil--can continue to serve as an evercleaner component of the global energy mix.
Finally, we commend the Italian G7 presidency for its emphasis on strategic partnerships with Africa. Africa is the fastest growing and the youngest continent, holding a fifth of the world's population, a tenth of the world's gas resources. Yet, it is suffering from the lowest energy access per capita on the planet -- 50% of Africans lack access to reliable electricity. Enabling responsible development of natural gas and energy infrastructure holds great potential to provide an economic foundation that raises living standards, enhances energy security, and reduces emissions in a critically important region of the world that will be a center of energy demand growth for decades to come. As the International Gas Union detailed in a recent report, domestic gas resources can improve the lives of Africa's young and growing population, delivering the energy it needs to develop within a just energy transition.5 The report also highlights the role of gas as an ideal baseload fuel for complementing the rapid uptake of renewables, noting how "using its gas resources together with renewable
3 G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqu I The White House https://unfccc.intisitesidefaultifilesiresource/cma5 auv 4 gst.pdf
5 Gas for Africa report, 2023. Available at: https://igu.org/resources/gas-for-africa-report-2023/
energy technologies, Africa can build energy systems compatible with a climate- or carbon-neutral future and underpin the continent's sustainable economic development."
Moreover, the Senior Director of the African Finance Corporation, an African multilateral development bank investing in all forms of energy and infrastructure to support development on the continent, has recently shared with the IGU that "For a continent grappling with the urgency of industrialisation requiring reliable baseload power supply, energy transition efforts with the intermittent renewable systems are not a sufficient solution...the view at the AFC is that while renewable sources are the ultimate goal, Africa must also exploit its abundant reserves of natural gas as an essential transitional source of energy to support industrialization." (Emphasis added.)
Gas is critical to a globally secure and affordable energy transition in an energy-scarce world, and continued investment in natural gas supply and infrastructure must happen in parallel with accelerated investment in decarbonising gas technologies. Only then can we assure that the priorities of energy security and energy transition do not undermine each other.
Above all else, the G7 process is intended to advance shared economic and security interests among the world's leading democracies. The energy and financial reverberations of war and the global energy crisis have shown that these goals cannot be achieved without fundamental progress on both energy security and climate change. Natural gas provides the opportunity to continue progress on emissions reductions while ensuring energy and economic security imperatives can be realized.
Our organizations look forward to working with G7 nations to advance clear and consistent supportive policies building on past recognition that responsible development of natural gas and associated infrastructure is critical to achievement of these goals.
Document 100
From:
Dietderich, Ben
Sent:
Mon, 23 Jun 2025 15:59:55 +0000
To:
Matthew Sparks; Elizabeth Moore
Cc:
Hebert, Ashley; Matthew Boyle; Woods, Andrea; Lamanna, Isabelle; Larry Solov;
Sam Geduldig; Ferns, Conor
Subject:
Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Attachments:
Town Hall - PPT Auditorium Slide-SEAL ALONE.png
Here you go!
From: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org> Date: Monday, June 23, 2025 at 11:18AM To: Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com> Cc: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>, Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com>, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderichhq.doe.gov>, Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>, Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>, Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>, Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.corn>, Ferns, Conor <conor.fernshq.doe.gov> Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
We have two LED screens that flank the stage. Can you please send me the DOE logo that you would like to be shown on the panels?
On Wed, Jun 18, 2025 at 2:36 PM Matthew Sparks <sparks (b) (6) Matt Sparks
buildalfa.org> wrote:
On Wed, Jun 18, 2025 at 2:27 PM Elizabeth Moore <emoore breitbart.corn> wrote:
My phone below if anyone needs....
Regards,
Elizabeth Moore EVP Breitbart News Network (b) (6)
From: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert2hg.doe.gov> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2025 1:36 PM To: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich2hg.doe.gov>; Matthew Sparks <sEarks@buildalfa.org>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hg.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@ breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com>; Ferns, Conor <conor.ferns2h.g.doe.Lov> Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Hi Matt,
We currently have a Microsoft Teams link included in the calendar invitation, but if a conference line is better, we can use the below. Just let me know your preference and we'll be there!
Dial-in: (b) (6) Guest code: (b) (6)
Warm regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Boyle <mbovle@breitbart.com> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2025 12:32 PM To: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Woods, Andrea <a ndrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; La manna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com>; Ferns, Conor <conor.ferns@hq.doe.gov> Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Hey guys do we have a conference number for today at 2? Do we need to use mine? Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 16, 2025, at 3:35 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashlev.hebert hq.doe.qov> wrote:
Wonderful, all set! Also adding in Conor Ferns from our advance team, who will look to schedule a walkthrough with your team and our security.
Warm regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Sent: Monday, June 16, 2025 2:14 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; La manna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Let's do Wednesday 2 pm Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 16, 2025, at 12:34 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Wednesday is preferred here!
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle breitbart.com> Date: Monday, June 16, 2025 at 12:33 PM To: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebertPhq.doe.gov> Cc: Matthew Sparks <sparks buildalfa.org>, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich hq.doe.gov>, Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>, Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods hq.doe.gov>, Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>, Larry Solov <larrybreitbart.com>, Sam Geduldig <qeduldicacqcn.com> Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Certainly -- either one of those works for me. Me and Matt Sparks should definitely be on this call and probably Elizabeth Moore from our side at very least. Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 16, 2025, at 12:03 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert(@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Thanks, Matt, sounds great! Can we set-up a call for later this week to discuss logistics and messaging? Below are a few windows on our side:
1. Tuesday, June 17th, 1:30-2:OOpm EDT 2. Wednesday, June 18th, 2:00-4:OOpm EDT
Warm regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org> Sent: Friday, June 13, 2025 5:25 PM To: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
We are locked and loaded for the Conrad on 6/24 On Thu, Jun 12, 2025 at 4:57 PM Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> wrote: Great
Ben -- we should have the venue figured out very soon and also we are tracking fyi planning to do a news story announcing event sometime early next week probably Monday Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 12, 2025, at 4:47 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Good here.
From: Elizabeth Moore <emoore breitbart.com> Date: Thursday, June 12, 2025 at 4:46 PM To: Matthew Sparks <sparks buildalfa.org>, Matthew Boyle <mboyle breitbart.com> Cc: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich hq.doe.gov>, Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods hq.doe.gov>, Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna hq.doe.gov>, Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>, Sam Geduldig <geduldig cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Don't we need the time on there? It's 10 AM, right? Doors open 9:15?
Get Outlook for iOS
From: Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org> Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2025 4:23:24 PM To: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Cc: Ashley Hebert <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov>; Ben Dietderich <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>; Andrea Woods <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Isabelle Lamanna <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Doels this flyer ok with you guys?
<Breitbart.Wright.png>
On Wed, Jun 11, 2025 at 10:23 PM Matthew Boyle <mboylebreitbart.com> wrote: Awesome. We are working on nailing down venue and also the guys will send flyer draft here tomorrow for your guys' signoff as well.
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 2:18 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert hq.doe.qov> wrote:
Perfect -- let's lock it in! Standing by for the location and any additional details.
Warm regards, Ashley
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2025 2:07 PM To: Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderichPhq.doe.gov>; Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>;
Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov <larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth
Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Ycs and ycs -- if you guys arc ready to lock in so arc we Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 1:51 PM, Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebertahq.doe.gov> wrote:
Hi Matt,
How's Tuesday the 24th? We can be flexible on timing -- does 10:00-1 1 :00am work well?
Ashley Hebert Director of Scheduling & Advance Office of the Secretary I U.S. Department of Energy Office: (b) (6)
Cell: (b) (6)
From: Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2025 12:27 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov>
Cc: Woods, Andrea <andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov>; Hebert, Ashley <ashley.hebert@ho.doe.gov>; Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov>; Larry Solov<larry@breitbart.com>; Elizabeth
Moore <emoore@breitbart.com>; Matthew Sparks <sparks@buildalfa.org>; Sam Geduldig <geduldig@cgcn.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Breitbart event with Secretary Wright?
Here I'm going to add everyone from our team here
Adding in our Breitbart CEO Larry Solov and VP Elizabeth Moore, Matt sparks from Alfa, and Sam Geduldig from CGCN
But yes we can definitely do event that week, and yes we will definitely make energy in BBB a major part of it. Just let us know which day works best and what time the secretary can do -- again late morning usually best -- and then we will go ahead and confirm it all and lock down a venue and everything
Sent from my iPhonc
On Jun 10, 2025, at 12:04 PM, Matthew Boyle <mboyle@breitbart.com> wrote: Absolutely yes let us know what day
And yes without question Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 10, 2025, at 12:01 PM, Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
Hey Matt,
We just had an opening on the week of June 23rd . Would a day during that week be possible? One request for us -- is there any way we could tie the big beautiful bill into the programming? We would love to discuss the bill as there is so much potential in it for energy production in the United States!
Best,
Ben
From: Matthew Boyle <mbovle@breitbart.com> Date: Monday, June 9, 2025 at 11:22 PM To: Dietderich, Ben <ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Breitbart event with Secretary Wright? Ben,
Per our conversation earlier, wanted to follow up with what we need to do to lock in an event in late June or early July with Secretary Wright.
Basically, all we need from you guys is a date and time -- ideally late morning, like 10 am or 11 am hour -- on a weekday where he can come to an event for an hour in downtown DC. What would happen there is we will have a green room where he can hang before we go up on stage, and then after a little bit there he and I will go up on stage and I would interview him for about half an hour or so. Then he's clear to leave -- very easy on your guys' end.
Once we have a date and time, we along with our partners -- CGCN and ALFA Institute -- will book a five-star downtown DC hotel ballroom for the event. And all he has to do is show up for it and be him and do a great interview with me.
We ideally need at least a couple weeks notice out from the date to work out all the logistics. So at this stage, if he has any openings the week of the 23rd of June or the week of June 30 that includes the beginning of July that would be amazing. Once we confirm a date and time, I'll rope in our broader team to hash out logistics and venue and everything with you guys and we can set up a brief call in the lead-up to it as well to discuss things.
Let me know if we can get a date on the calendar soon.
Thanks, Matthew Boyle Washington Bureau Chief, Breitbart News
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
******************************************************************** ********************************************************************
This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information.
********************************************************************
Document 100 Attachment 1
