Document BnN22a91V4ndpn4wX2VG2X0k

RECEIVED. JAN 29 1974 MINUTES &&MamR,JEL VINYL CHLORIDE SAFETY ASSOCIATION MEETING CLEVELAND. OHIO OCTOBER 24-26, 1973 BUSINESS MEETING A. Minutes of the January 31, 1973 meeting were approved. B. Cash on hand as of October 23, 1973 -- $593. 23 C. Membership is now up to 36 companies including two from England, two from Mexico, and one each from Norway, Italy, and Canada. D. Registration and membership fee -- is $20. 00 for each person attending the meeting. PROGRAM A. Review of industrywide Safety Guidelines 1. Blend Tanks -- standards for safe operation; Attachment A Pete L. Bogart -- Tenneco Chemicals,. For the most part these vessels are atmospheric type and are used to hold resin slurries prior to drying. The primary hazard is unreacted Vinyl Chloride Monomer (V, C. M. ) which remains within the slurry after the stripping procedure. Key points presented in the Standard are as follows; a. Insure that V. C. M. vapor concentration within blend tank does not enter the explosive range. 1. Maintain vapor concentration constantly above upper explosive limit (U. E. L. ) -- not practicaL 2. Maintain vapor concentration constantly below the lower explosive limit (L, E. L. ) by air sweeping vapor space. RECOMMENDED WITH RESERVATIONS 3. Maintain inert atmosphere inside vessel vapor space. RECOMMENDED UCC 008954 2. b. Prevent conditions in blend tank area which may cause V. C. M. ignition 1. Use Class I, Group D, Division I electrical equipment. 2. Do not permit smoking. 3. Use Hazardous work permits. 4. Use flame arrestors on tank vents. 5. Tank vents should be remoted from ignition sources. 6. Be sure tank agitator bearing is in good repair to eliminate frictional heat sources. c. Prevent excessive exposure of personnel to anesthetic effects of V. C. M. 1. Eliminate necessity to work through tank hatches and manways. 2. Close and seal hatches and manways; use frangible seal. 3. Monitor tank levels with remote-reading level gauges. 4. Wash outblend tanks with remotely-operated fixed or rotating nozzles within the tank. 5. Adhere to all confined space entry procedures. 2. Vinyl Chloride Monomer Storage Criteria Don G. Miller -- Shell Chemical Company These standards are for V. C. M. storage of 50,000 gallons or larger. a. Layout 1. Make certain liquid cannot accumulate under vessel. 2. Vessels must be one diameter apart. 3. Drainage must be away from storage area. 4. A firewall must be located in such a way as to protect transfer equipment such as pumps, lines and valves. b. Pining 1. Install only the essential number of nozzles below the liquid level of vessel. 2. Use spring loaded, failsafe closed, firesafe, auto cutoff valves on filling and emptying linea 3. Keep piping above ground -- main piping should be supported on vessel foundations. c. Vessel Design 1. Design pressure 110% of monomer vapor pressure at maximum expected temperature -- at least 25 psig above working pressure. 2. Float gauges must have stilling chambers. UCC 008955 3. d. Fire Coverage 1. Use fire hydrant mounted fog monitors. 2. Use deluge rings on vessels -- deluge rings must be supplied via a buried fire water header. B. Reactor Entry -- Attachment B John C. Palinsky -- Universal P. V. C. Resins, Inc. Universal P. V. C. Resins is a subsidiary of Robin Tech. Ihjae miry procedures are derived from those of Allied Chemicals Company which was recently purchased by Robin Tech. Only highlights of the procedures are presented below. The entire procedure is presented in attachment B. 1. Any enclosed space greater than 4 feet in depth is a confined space. 2. Before entry of a confined space (reactor) the following steps must be taken: a. All feed and exit lines must be blanked off or removed. Vents to air need not be blanked. b. Reactor must be flushed out with water, then purged with air. c. Reactor environment must be tested 1. 20% or greater O- as indicated by M. S. A. meter. 2. 0% reading as inmcated by Johnson & Williams Combustible Gas Detecton 3. Studies using vacuum aerosol cans as sample collectors and chromatographic analysis have shown that the maximum residual V, C. M. concentration in a reactor before entry was 32 ppm. d. All electrical circuits pertaining to the reactor must be locked out at the breaker box. 1. Foreman puts lock on first; can not delegate this task. 2. Maintenance supervisor puts on second Iock if reactor maintenance is required. 3. Each person entering the reactor and each assigned observer must put on a lock. 4. All locks have only one key. If key is lost, the lock will be sawed off. 5. After work is completed, locks must be removed in opposite order of installation with foreman removing his last. ucc 008956 4. e. A written vessel entry permit must be properly executed. 1. Valve and blank checkoff list completed, 2. Proper people have signed. 3. Permit displayed at site of entry. 4. New Permit filled out after shift change before anyone enters vessel. 5. When job is complete, turn permit in to Safety Supervisor. 6. Permits are held for 90 days then destroyed. f. Man entering the reactor must wear either a harness or wristlets; no life line is attached to the man. g. A safety watch must be at the reactor opening to watch over and maintain constant dialogue with the man inside. The safety watch and man inside switch places with one another every hour. h. Wood and/or fiberglass ladders are used inside the reactors. i. An explosion proof drop cord is used for lighting inside reactor. C. Reactor Entry -- General Discussion Leader -- John C. Palinsky -- Universal P. V. C. Resins, Inc. 1. Air Products monitors the V. C. M. concentration continuously while man is in reactor. They use Johnson & Williams Sentox 2. 2. UUU. does not use a safety watch but rather a horn with 3-minute timer and reset cord. 3. New York state law requires a safety watch be present at the vessel manway during entry procedures. 4. 75% of the companies represented blank off or remove feed and exit lines to reactors before entry. 5. The states of New Jersey and New York do not recognize double valve and vent as a substitute for blanking or removing feed and exit line to reactors. 6. It is a requirement of O. S. H. A. that voltage of drop cord light be less than 32 volts. a. 22 Companies use drop cords. b. Of the 22, 12 use 110 volts and ten use 12 volts. 7. LC. 1 U. uses 110-volt light mounted'on a cart 8. Robin Tech is presently developing a Reactor Rescue procedure which may involve leaving an injured man within the vessel and administering aid. a. Maybe injury doesn't require that the man be removed from the reactor immediately. b. Reactor environment may be a breathable one. c. Robin Tech, is presently having rescue drills using mannequins. ucc 008957 5. D. Safety Valve Testing Robert L. Franz -- Union Carbide Corporation 1. It is responsibility of Department Head to determine the testing frequency for pop valves. a. Once every 0-12 months for S. V. in rapid plugging type service. b. Once every 12-24 months for S. V. in extreme temperature and/or pressure type service. 2. Each time a S. V. is tested the "color of the year" is painted on its cap. 3. A quarterly computer printout is issued listing all pop valves as well as: a. Location of pop valve b. Type of pop valve c. Service: V. C. M., latex, ethylene, etc. d. Last test date e. Retest date E. Safety Valve and Rupture Disk Testing -- General Discussion Robert L. Frantz--Leader 1. UCC Texas City plant uses RB 90 rupture disks -- no pop valves. 2. I Cl U. has had problems with RB 90 rupture disks. If th disc is for some reason distorted or "flipped" it will rupture at a much higher pressure than design. 3. A hydrostatic test on RB 90 can cause it to "flip' and render it useless as a reliable Bafety device. 4. L C.L U. has switched to carbon rupture discs and is quite satisfied with the results. 5. Olin Corporation has had bad experiences with rupture discs under pop valves. 6. Dow Chemical Co. does not protect safety valves with rupture discs. 7. The majority of companies represented at the meeting have rupture discs under pop valves. 8. 6 companies use only rupture discs as relief devices. 9. One company uses a 3 way valve under relief devices. The idea is to permit switching at a safe pressure to a secondary relief system after the primary system fails. During routine maintenance the 3-way valve was assembled incorrectly, but fortunately no incident occurred. F. Sizing of Relief Capacity for Large Reactors -- General Discussion Leader -- R. E. Frey --Diamond Shamrock 1. Design relief capacity at just what you need. 2. Do not pollute environment excessively by over-sizing relief devices. 3. Rule of thumb calculation method---- 0. 0012 in^/gallon of Reactor capacity. UCC 008958 6. 4. A technical bulletin written by W. J. Boyle -- Monsanto Chemical Company is available as an aide in sizing vessel emergency relief requirements. 5. A technical bulletin written by Or. Huff, Dow Chemical Co. -Midland, Michigan, theorizes 2-phase flow through pop valves. 6. The point was made that relief of P. V, C. reactors involves 3-phase flow -- solid, liquid, and vapor. G. Pressure Vessel Obsolescence and Inspection -- General Discussion Leader--John Ball -- Air Products 1. Vessel Obsolescence is caused by: a. Corrosion b. Erosion c. New Codes 2. Periodic inspections are necessitated by: a. Company codes b. te codes c. Insurance codes 3. Non-destructive testing methods a. Dye penetrant (used by 1 G I U. ) b. Audi-gage (used by 10 companies) c. Hydrostatic test (used by 10 companies) d. Vacuum test 4. 4 Companies test V. C. M. tanks annually. 5. Useful life of reactors a. Glass lined 1. Good as long as glass stays on (about 8-10 years). 2. Monsanto has 4 in use which were installed in 1948. 3. Monsanto has 1 reactor in use which was installed in 1938. 4. Another company has 6 reactors 16 + years old. 5. Still another company has 4 reactors 23 years old. b. Stainless Steel L Of great controversy; Stauffer Chemicals has several over 30 years old. 2. Stress corrosion cracking seems to be a problem with several companies. H. Q. S. H A. Experience -- General Discussion Leader--W. J. Bradford -- Olin Corporation 1. Olin Corporation Experience a. 32 Inspections L 13 Guised by complaints from hourly personnel 2. 3 Caused by fatalities b. 256 Violations c. $4000 In fines d. Contesting 1 citation for excessive noise 1. Must have no exposure greater than 115 dBA. UCC 008959 7. 2. Must make an 8-hour weighted average for noise exposure under 115 dBA. e. Cited for not having "NOT AN EXIT" signs. f. QS. HA. inspection was requested for a plant which was on strike; when inspector got there he refused to inspect the plant. g. Massachusetts Department of Labor requires X-rays as means of checking for bone aaroosteolysis (A. Q. L.). L New York requires X-rays also. Goodyear has people X-rayed once per year. 2. 15 Companies at V. C. M. meeting were checking for A. a I* a. 8 Suspected cases b. 5Ronafide cases 1. 3 Were reactor vessel cleaners. 2. 1 Was a packer with no history of VCM exposure. 3. 1 Was an operator who was previously a reactor cleaner. The University of Michigan Research Institute did A. Ol L. studies under a federal grant. The studies have been completed with the results showing higher incidences of acro-osteolysis in persons associated with P, V. C. industry than in persons of the general public. h. Inspectors asked about V. C, M. concentr.tci n testing procedures before entry of the vessel. i. Fork truck operators must have licenses on their person. j. Inspectors in all cases were very knowledgeable. L Handling Vinyl Chloride Monomer Leaks -- Attachment C Dr. Ralph Langdin -- Dow Chemical Company L Dow has mixed monomers in their production unit; vinyl chloride and vinylidene chloride. 2. 50 ppm V. C. M. in air has been for years recognized as the TLV. 3. Present laws state that 200 ppm is TLV; trend is downward. 4. Dow has a continuously monitoring V. C. M. leak detection system. a. Have capability of monitoring 36 separate points throughout operating area. b. Description of operation. L A filtered sample is pulled into instrument through 5/8" diameter Saran Vacuum tube. 2. Vacuum is pulled using one vacuum pump. 3. Sample enters catalytic furnace where the halogenated hydrocarbon is converted to an acid gas. 4. The acid gas then mixes with distilled water. 5. The conductivity of the water is measured and the change is charted as ppm vinyl chloride. ucc 008960 8. 6. Chart span is 0-500 ppm V. C. M. 7. A high V. C. M. concentration alarm sounds at 150 ppm. 8. The operator responds to the alarm by going to that sample point and tracing down the leak using a Davis Halide Meter. 9. He then returns to the control room and documents on the chart the cause of the concentration excursion. c. The sample point locations are in areas where the greatest possibility for leakage exists. L Around filter installations. 2. Above reactor manheads d. The sample tube can be up to 200 feet long. e. The instrument points are calibrated every 6 months using a saran bag filled with a known concentration of V, C. M, f. Approximately 20 samples are taken at each point each hour. g. The installed cost for a 12-point monitoring system is about $20,000. 5. Dow Chemical is now connecting sample point readings into a computer. Each morning a printout of die previous days sampling results is sent to the industrial hygiene department. On this sheet is tabulated maximum ppm V. C. M. and average ppm V. C. M. at every sample point throughout the unit. Time weighted averages for exposure can be derived by asking each supervisor how long his men were in each of the sample point areas. 6. B. F. Goodrich has purchased a Bendex V. C. M. concentration sampling system with 6 points. Each point reads into a computer and gives the same information as Dow's system. 7. B. F. Goodrich uses a Century Portable Combustible Gas Detector to trace down leaks. J. Safe Monomer Venting -- General Discussion Leader -- Mai Trowbridge -- Goodyear 1. Reasons for venting monomer a. Power failure. b. Rupture disk fatigue. c. Runaway reaction. 2. In the case of a power failure do the following: a. Put full cooling on reactors. b. Inhibit with styrene, or Alpha Methyl Styrene, or isoprene. c. Switch to alternate power source. 3. To prevent rupture disk fatigue: a. Change disks at predetermined time intervals. b. Operate vessel as far beneath the maximum allowable working pressure as possible. 4. In the case of a runaway reaction: a. Inhibit reaction. b. Put full cooling on reactor. UCC 008961 9. c. Keep stripping and vent lines clean, d. Make sure 3-way valves under rupture disks are assembled and installed properly. e. Keep ignition sources out of venting area. f. Be sure all negative pressure intakes at other units as well as own unit are shut down. g. Goodyear has never had an ignition during a reactor venting. 5. The E, P. A. in New York State says the emergency venting is permitted to reduce condition to a lesser hazard. 6. In Germany the PVC-producing companies have been forced to recover vented vapors. 7. 2 Companies inject steam into vented vapors to reduce probability of igniting vent discharges. 8. It was brought up that vent lines from rupture disks, pop valves, etc. , which were designed to discharge straight up into the air, should not have discharge ends cut off diagonally. This will cause a horizontal force component which can bend the pipe during a vent discharge of monomer. 9. 50% of the companies at the meeting use flame arresters on vents of V. C. M. recovery systems. 10. Arthur D. Little has developed a computer program on Y. C. M. vapor cloud dissipation. 11. S. W. Institute spent $50,000 to study the effects caused when Bprinkler systems are used to scatter V. C. M. vapor clouds. All the sprinklers do is stir up the vapors. They do not really scatter the vapors. 12. S. W. Institute is now asking for $6-$8, 000 to study the utility of water curtains to prevent flame propagation. K. Noise Control -- Lecture E. Schenke - Tenneco Chemicals 1. Laws which state noise standards a. Walsh-Healy Act b. Occupational Safety & Health Act 2. Noise consultants cost $350 a day. 3. Engineering controls ^ a. Decibel = 10Aogj0 ( "W"ref ) b. Double sound power and you increase dB by 3 ex. OdB+ OdB = 3dB 50 dB + 50 dB = 53dB c. Noise is a problem where sheet metal walls exist d. The floor for a massive blower and motor should have 3 times the mass of the blower and motor. e. High frequency noises can be attenuated using glass lined muffle rs. f. When doing noise surveys, use only "precision"-type sound level meters. Other types will give inaccurate results. g. "Handbook of Noise Control" written by Boranch is recommended ucc 008962 10. by Mr. Schenke. h. Noise mufflers are as effective on inlets as on outlets. i. New York City now has silent pile drivers which are being used when building subways. They are manufactured by Inge r s oll-Rand. j. Truck tire noise can be reduced by changing the tire and tread design. k. 5 companies at the meeting are insisting on "noiseless" electric motors for new installations. 4. OSHA is more concerned about general higlmoise level in frequ nted areas than specific high-noise levels in nonfrequented areas. 5. There is a strong push to reduce the 8-hour maximum exposure time to 85 dB A. Tenneco is in complete agreement with this philosophy. L. Monomer Exposure Standards -- General Discussion Leader - Pete Bogart - Tenneco Chemicals 1. 17 Companies have people specifically assigned to environmental health. There seems to be some difficulty caused by the overlap between worker health and worker safety. 2. The TLV for V. C. M. has officially been lowered from 500 ppm to 200 ppm as of January 1973. 3. Toxicity studies for V. C. M. a. MCA has industry involvement in a study dealing with animals. Study began in September of 1973 and will be completed by the end of January 1974. b. NIOSH has results of European toxicity studies; L Showed no malignancy at 100 ppm V. C. M.. 2. An effect level was shown at 200 ppm. c. Ralph Nader's doctor states that residual V. C. M. in booze bottles is excessive. There appears to be some controversy over the validity of this statement. 4. The TLV for V. C. M. in Europe is 100 ppm. Trends, as pointed out by the British representatives,are to reduce this value even lower in the future. 5. 4 Companies represented at the meeting are using 50 ppm as TLV but three of them really don't know why. Dow Chemical, the fourth company, uses 50 ppm based on animal studies; specific studies were not mentioned. 6. 11 Companies at the meeting are checking regularly for V. C. M. concentrations throughout their units. 7. The consensus of the representatives at the meeting was to resist lowering the TLV from 200 ppm to 50 ppm for an 8 hour exposure. There is not enough data to support moving to this lower level. ucc 008963 n. 8. Instruments used to measure low concentrations of V. C. M. a. British use a Derek which is accurate to -5 ppm at a 100 ppm reading. b. 3 Companies use a Century portable vapor analyzer. c. Tenneco plans to install a 36 point continuous sampling system similar to Dow's installation. Tenneco also is in the process of buying a centdry portable vapor analyzer at a cost of $3, 200. d. B. F. Goodrich uses a 12>point Bendix Sampling system. e. Olin Corporation is using a 24-point MSA continuous sampling system at their Assnet, Massachusetts plant. f. One company uses a J & W model SSK combustible gas detector to check for residual V. C. M. in plastic bags. 9. The 15-minute maximum exposure time is L 25x TLV or 250 ppm. 4 DAEllwood/jep December 2l, 1973 uco 008964 accidents and near misses 12. L VINYL CHLORIDE TANK CAR DERAILMENT - Herman Waltmate B. F. Goodrich A. What Happened 1. Four tank cars of V. C. M. were enroute to Stevens, N. J. from the B. F. Goodrich Calvert City, Kentucky plant via the Penn Central Railroad. 2. The cars derailed. 3. One caught fire on initial impact and ignited a boxcar of shingles. 4. The second car embedded itself in the boxcar of shingles and later exploded. 5. The third and fourth cars rolled over on their sides but were not damaged. 6. One end of the exploded car traveled over and through a heavily wooded area, hit and burned down a house one-quarter mile away from the derailment site. 7. See Attachment D for details and pictures. B How Did It Happen 1. The sixth car ahead of the first V. C. M. car had a faulty coupling, 2. A total of 13 cars of the 123-car train were derailed. IL CATALYST INCIDENTS A. General Tire Company - NEAR MISS 1. Stored two different peroxydicarbonate catalysts in a dry ice chest. ucc 008965 II CATALYST INCIDENTS A. General Tire Company - NEAR MISS (cont'd. ) 13. 2. One catalyst was taken out, warmed up, and then put back into the chest. It began to decompose in the chest but, fortunately, was discovered before the reaction became violent. No fire resulted. 3. LESSON-- Only the required amount of catalyst should be removed from the chest. Never put catalyst back into the ice chest after it has warmed up. B. General Tire Company - NEAR MISS 1. Stored two different peroxydicarbonate catalysts in a dry ice chest. 2. The ice supplier filled the wrong chest with dry ice, leaving the chest which needed dry ice empty. No fire resulted. 3. LESSON-- Be sure to check frequently on the supply of dry ice. Also, put dry ice in top of chest for better cooling. C. Uniroyal. Inc. 1. Thirteen trays of L P. P. catalyst decomposed and burned - FIRE. 2. The dry ice was delivered wrapped in paper. No one thought to check inside the wrapping to see how much dry ice remained. As a result, all the ice was con sumed and the chest and catalyst heated up - fire occurred. 3. LESSON-- Monitor ice supply and temperature of ice chest frequently. ucc 008966 IL CATALYST INCIDENTS (cont'd. ) 14. D. Monsanto 1. July 1973 received a shipment of L P. P. catalyst. 2. One of the chests exploded almost immediately - FIRE. 3. It was found that the shelves inside the chest were broken down when received. This caused nonuniform cooling of the catalyst by the dry ice, which permitted the catalyst to heat up. 4. LESSON -- Check all chests of catalyst when received. Make sure they are undamaged and packed properly with dry ice. IU VINYL CHLORIDE MONOMER TANK CAR UNLOADING SPILLS A. Dow Chemical 1. The flexible line connected to the tank car broke. 2. Lost 2, 000 gallons of V. C. M. - NO FIRE. 3. The excess-flow valve on the tank car did not operate; this would have shut off the flow. B. B. F. Goodrich 1. The fittings came loose from the tank car - cam lock type. 2. Lost 5, 000 gallons of V. C. M. - NO FIRE. 3. The excess-flow valve on the tank car did not operate. this would have shut off the flow. Many companies have had trouble with tank car excess flow valves ucc 008967 VINYL CHLORIDE MONOMER TANK CAR UNLOADING SPILLS (cont'd. ) 15. C. Suggested Safe Means of Unloading Tank Cars 1. Fourteen companies use swivel "jointed unloading lines. They work very well if joints are lubricated regularly. 2. Keep all flexible hose lengths as small as possible. 3. Make sure all flexible hoses have stainless steel braiding. 4. Inspect hoses and fittings frequently. BLEND-TANK EXPLOSION - B. F. C L . ENGLAND A. Equipment 1. 30. 000-Gallon Blend Tank a) Atmospheric vent, 12 inches in diameter. b) 75 Percent full of latex slurry. c) Had a manhole in top head 15 inches by 24 inches square. 2. A fan pulls air through the tank vapor space to sweep the V. C. M. vapor out and keep the concentration below the I* E. L. B. What Happened 1. Two separate explosions occurred. 2. The first one occurred, as best as can be determined, in the housing of the fan.' 3. The flames then propagated from the fan housing through the air duct into the blend tank where the second explosion occurred. UCC 008968 IV. BLEND TANK EXPLOSION - B. P. C. L . ENGLAND B. What Happened (cont'd. ) 16. 4. The manhole cover was blown off and the tank top head ruptured. C. Why Did It Happen 1. The fan impeller was installed backwards during a maintenance outage. Running the fan in this condition gave about 30% of the normal air flow. Therefore, the vapor space had a higher-than-normal concentration of V. C. M. - 9, 000 ppm. 2. The explosive mixture of air and V, C. M. apparently found a source of ignition at the fan. D. What Is Being Done To Prevent A Recurrence 1. The blend tank areas will now be treated with the same respect as reactor areas. 2. The tanks will be nitrogen inerted. 3. The blend tank vapor space will be tested regularly for the concentration of V. C. M, V. FIRE AT VENT ON STRIPPING STILL - Tenneco Chemicals A. What Happened 1. Lightning struck and ignited the vent from the V. C. M. stripping still which was located adjacent to the reactor building. 2. Thirty-foot flames above the roof of the reactor building were seen by a passing operator. ucc 008969 V. FIRE AT VENT ON STRIPPING STILL Tennaco Chemicals_______________ _________ (cont'd. ) 17. 3. The foreman evacuated the reactor building; then tripped the deluge system. 4. Eight minutes later the reactor building was re entered at which time the following was found: a) 60 Percent of the agitators were kicked off due to a momentary voltage drop caused by the electrical storm. b) Agitator belts were slipping. The belts got wet from the deluge water. 5. The agitators were restarted, 6. Two reactors began venting, at which time the reactor building was once again evacuated; reactor vents were pointed at flames from the stripping stilL 7. Finally, someone went up and closed the block valve on the vent from the stripping still which snuffed the fire. A B. What Is Being Done To Prevent A Recurrence 1. Recurrence a) Covers are being installed over the agitator belts. b) A steam snuffer is being considered for the stripping still vent. c) A bunker is being constructed outside and away from the reactor building. In the bunker will be a control board panel to permit monitoring of the reactors within the reactor building. UCC 008970 VI 2,200-GALLON REACTOR OVERPRESSURE Olin Corporation Assonet, Massachusetts 18. A. What Happened 1. Fluid first started leaking out of the agitator seal; then, later, V. C. M. started coming out. 2. Moments later the rupture disk blew, at which time the operator started venting through a manual vent valve. 3. The reactor pressure relief system consisted of a 4" rupture disk under a 4,,x6" pop valve. Thes devices were set at 160 lb/in^ and 195 lb/in , respectively. 4. The gasket on the manhead blew. 5. The glass inside the Pfaudler reactor was almost all spalled off; vessel was obviously overpressured. 6. An investigation of the incident revealed that the agitator was not started before the reactor heat-up. This is felt to be the cause of the incident. 7. The maximum temperature indicated on the reactor temperature recorder was 55*C. There were no pressure recorders on Olin's reactors. B. To prevent this from happening in the future, Olin has invested $100, 000 in interlock systems which will not permit the steam heat-up valves to be opened without first starting the agitator. UCC 008971 VII LIVE REACTOR OPENED BY MISTAKE 19. A Pantasote operator opened the m&nhead. Only a loss of V. C. M. resulted; no one was injured. To prevent this from occurring in the future, an air-operated rod automatically locks the manhead handle in place when pressure is put on the reactor. Four companies represented at the meeting have lights at the manhead, which come on when the reactor is pressured. VIIL BULK REACTOR EXPLOSION A. What Happened Georgia Pacific Plant (5 Fatalities) 1. Reactor was removed for maintenance. Z. Three thermowells were removed from the bottom of the reactor. The threads for the bolts which held the wells in place were tapped into the shell of the reactor. 3. When the thermowells were reinstalled, the bolts for one of the wells were not installed. The threads were all stripped out. 4. After the maintenance work was completed, the reactor was tested at 5. 5 atmospheres. No pressure leakag problems occurred. 5. The vessel was then filled with vinyl chloride monomer and the reaction started. 6. The thermowell broke loose at 50*C temperature and 100 psig pressure. Twelve tons of V. C. M. escaped. 7. The V. C. M. vapors exploded and killed five people. ucc 008972 VIIL BULK REACTOR EXPLOSION - Georgia Pacific Plant (5 Fatalities) (coat'd. ) 20. B. The cause of the incident was failure to replace the thermo well stud bolts before putting the reactor back into service. Georgia Pacific theorizes that this would never have happened if the proper Work Permit procedures had been followed. These procedures will be strictly adhered to in the future. IX. DUST EXPLOSION IN DRYING SILO - Imperial Chemical Ind. England (1 Fatality) A 125-mm feed nozzle was being installed in the top of the silo. When the welder cut through the wall, the explosion occurred - on person was killed. The cause of the explosion was thought to be residual V. C. M. in the silo chamber, or perhaps accumulations of impact modifiers which had been mixed into the resin. Some companies have gone to testing on a routine basis for combustible mixtures of vapors in their silos as well as air purging before any "hot" work is done to the system. DAEUwood/ ra December 26, 1973 Attachments UCC 008973 ATTACHMENT A BLEND TANKS Definition; A "Blend Tank" is defined as a vessel utilized to contain resin slurry prior to drying. Such tanka may also be referred to as "Slurry Tank" or "Holding Tank". Type: Blend tanks are normally non-pressure vessels equipped with power-driven agitators. (Slurry is retained under agitation.) Hazard: The primary hazard connected with blend tanks is associated with the unreacted monomer carried within the slurry after stripping. This in turn comprises two areas of concern: I. Explosibillty II. Toxicity Suggested methods of control for each catgory include: I. EXPLO SIBILITY A. Insure that vapors within the blend tank do not enter the explosive range. * B. Prevent any source of ignition within the tank. (Note: While either of these steps taken alone should theoretically suffice, experience has shewn that a combination of both objectives is required.) A-l. Maintain vapors constantly above the U.E.L. (upper explosive limit). Filling and emptying of the tank, varying monomer contents of the slurry, and varying rates of monomer release under agitation makes this approach impractical. * NO.T.. REC.O..M...M...E..N..D. ED. A-2. Maintain vapors constantly below the L.E.L. (lower explosive limit). This may be accomplished by controlling the amount of unreacted monomer carryover, or dilution of vapor within the tank. Preliminary indications are that t'he percentage of unreacted monomer carried over is greater than has heretofor been recognized. Until more efficient methods of stripping are developed and implemented, control of monomer quantity cannot be depended upon to achieve vapor-air mixtures below L.E.L. ucc 008974 -2- Dilution with air, introduced at atmospheric and exhausted mechanically; introduced mechanically or by pressure and exhausted at atmospheric; or introduced and exhausted at atmospheric ("open-hatch" method), is the most common current practice and has been thought for many years to be a satisfactory precaution. There is, hcwever, serious question as to whether introducing air into the vapor space may not actually increase the hazard by diluting the vapor below the U.E.L. There is also the problem of insuring that all the vapor space is sufficiently diluted. RECOMMENDED WITH RESERVATIONS Should the air-dilution method be chosen, the following precautions are suggested: - Introduce a sufficient supply of air, at a constant rate, to fully dilute the entire vapor space, regardless of slurry level, to below L.E.L. - Insure the reliability of air supply, including power supply to blowers or exhausters. - Design air Introduction or exhaust so that sufficient velocity is maintained to insure dilution. Do not rely upon natural draft. - Monitor the vapor space for monomer content. - Connect the monitor to an alarm and develop procedures to be followed if monomer content exceeds L.E.L. A-3. Inert the atmosphere of the vapor space Maintaining an inert atmosphere in the entire tank vapor space effectively precludes ignition of vapors. This can v be accomplished by introduction into the tank of an inert gas in sufficient quantity, at a controlled continuous rate, to preclude the presence of sufficient O2 to sustain ignition. It should be understood that introduction of inert gas does not preclude the presence of monomer in the vapor space. RECOMMENDED. uco 008975 -3- Where inerting is used, the following suggestions are made: - Nitrogen is the preferred inerting agent. Use of 00 usually involves an inert-gas-generator, which can cause safety problems of its own. - Insure a sufficient supply of inert gas, Introduced at a rate which will suffice to inert the entire vapor space at all times regardless of slurry level. - Monitor the nitrogen flow by the use of flowmeters or similar devices. - Check O2 level in the tanks by means of continuous-reading or frequent intermittent reading monitors. Such monitors should be programmed to give an alarm should the O2 content approach unacceptable levels, and should preferrably be designed to automatically increase N2 flow when such a condition occurs. - It is recommended that the O2 level in the tank not be permitted to exceed 8%. B-l. Ignition prevention In order to prevent ignition of monomer vapors in, and associated with, blend tank operations, the following precautions are suggested: - The blend tank area should be treated as part of the monomer train and all precautions taken in the reactor area should be applied here as well. These include, but are not limited to; Class I, Group D, Div. I electrical equipment; No smoking, flames or open lights; * Hazardous work (hot work) permit required. - Where tank vents are provided, they should be equipped with flame arrestors, and in the case of inerted tanks, conservation vents. - Vent discharge, even on inerted'tanks should be remoted from ignition sources. uoc 008976 -4- - Potential friction points, such as agitator shaft bearings, should be evaluated and precautions against static generation and friction heating, under both normal and abnormal conditions, taken. Examples; ` Use of soft metal collars at point of entry of agitator shaft through tank top. Use of mis-alignment sensing switches on shafts, etc. II. TOXICITY The second area of hazard which must be considered with blend tanks is exposure to the anesthetic effects of monomer. This consideration is of course not exclusive to blend tanks, but assumes particular significance because of the tendency to regard blend tanks as beyond the monomer area. Operations; The primary area of exposure is the roof hatches, or manways. These hatches are opened to check levels in the tank, to check the condition of the tank Interior, and to wash out the tank. Elimination of the necessity to perform these tasks through the hatch in turn eliminates most of the monomer exposure. It is recommended that: - Operating procedures be so developed as to obviate the necessity for personnel to go on or across the cops of blend tanks. - Hatches and manways be closed and sealed with a frangible seal, such as a railcar seal. - Tank levels be determined by the use of remote-reading level gauges. - Washout be accomplished by the use of remote-operated fixed or rotating nozzles within the tank. - Agitator motor switches and any other operating devices be located at ground * level. ucc 008977 Maintenance: When.it is necessary to go on top of a blend tank, to inspect, or perform maintenance, the buddy system should be strictly enforced. When entering a blend tank, all confined space entry procedures shall be followed. UCC 008978 PLASTICS DIVISION, PAINESVILLE PLANT SAFETY PROCEDURE NO. 3 SUBJECT: ATTACHMENT ENTERING VESSEL AND OTHER CONFINED SPACES B SCOPE "~ The term "vessel used in this procedure includes reactors, slurry tanks, storage tanks, dryers, silos, tank cars, tank wagons, bulk cars, bulk wagons, hoppers, bins, boilers and sewers; it also includes trenches, pits and open top containers more than four feet in depth. PROCEDURE 1. No one is to enter any vessel without a written vessel entry permit having been properly executed. The permit must be signed by the foreman in charge of the vessel. It must also be signed by the Maintenance Supervisor if maintenance employees are to enter the vessel. 2. A vessel entry permit will be valid only until the end of that shift. A new permit will be completed at the start of each shift when new personnel arrive on the job and before the vessel is entered. 3. The properly executed permit will be displayed at the site of entry. At the end of each shift and at the completion of the entry the permit will be removed from the job site and sent to the Safety Supervisor for review and filing. 4. All feed and exit lines to the vessel shall be blanked, or disconnected and removed, so that there is no possibi lity of any hazardous material or fumes entering the vessel vent lines which go direct to the atmosphere do not need to be blanked. 5. The vessel is to be flushed and purged in accordance with the procedure established for the vessel and product involved. Harmful vapors will be purged by vacuum and/or fresh air. Protective clothing and respiratory protection SHOULD NOT BE UEED AS A SUBSTITUTE for proper cleaning and ventilation. Tr residual product can not be removed before entry, special precautions are to be taken including, but not limited to, the use of fresh air masks for persons in the vessel, frequent testing of atmosphere, constant vent ilation, frequent relief of men in the vessel, continous presence of a foreman, etc. 6. All electrical circuits pertaining to the vessel will be locked out at the breaker box. The Production Foreman will put the first lock on the circuit, test the circuit to make sure it is safe, and will remove his lock last. The maintenance supervisor will put on the second lock, if maintenance employees are involved, and remove his lock next to last. He will also test the circuit. Each person to enter the vessel and each assigned observer will put on a lock, retain the key, test the circuit -1- UCC 008979 before entering, and remove the lock when his work is completed. 7. Vessels will be tested for flammable vapors, and oxygen deficiency, as applicable by the Production Foreman. The explosimeter test reading must be zero percent (0%). 8. A constant source of clean, fresh air will be provided in such a manner as to insure a safe atmosphere at all times during the entry. 9. The man or men working in the vessel must be under constant observation of a competent man outside the vessel. This observer must maintain regular verbal contact with the man or men in the vessel. At any sign of irregularity the observer is to notify the man or men in the vessel to get out. If there is any venting of VCM in the area, men in a vessel should be told to get out. In an emergency the observer is to signal for help and then attempt to assist the man in the vessel. Under no circumstances is the observer to enter the vessel until additional personnel are at the vessel. In an emergency in which toxic fumes or oxygen deficiency are suspected, additional personnel are to enter the vessel only while wearing a fresh air mask or a self contained air mask and while wearing a safety harness or wristlets. P 10. When a vessel entry is to be made, there must be at least one additional man available within hearing! distance of the alarm to help effect a rescue. 11. Every person who enters a vessel shall wear w.ristlets or a harness with lifeline attached. An exception to having a lifeline attached will be made in castes where a lifeline may become entangleid with scaffolding, agitator, and baffles of polymer reactors, so persons entering such circumstances will wear a harness without the lifeline attached. The requirement that a lifeline be attached shall be enforced in entry of other vessels. 12. A self contained air mask or a fresh air mask and hose shall be available outside the vessel and ready for use. 13. When a ladder is required to enter a vessel, the ladder must be made secure and must not bo removed while anyone is inside the tank. 14. Adequate illumination must be provided inside the vessel. The equipment must be properly grounded and must be inspected carefully before each use. If there is a possi bility of flammable vapors, only explosion proof electrical euqipment which is in good condition will be used. Electri cords shall be strung overhead so they will not be damaged. 15. If welding, cutting, or "Ilot Work" is to be performed in a vessel, a properly executed "Flame and Welding" UCC 008980 Safety Procedure No. 3 permit must be displayed at the job site. 16. Vessel entry permits are void if a man does not enter and start work within thirty (30) minutes after issuance, or if the work is interrupted for thirty (30) minutes or more. 17. Every attempt has been made to make the rules established in this procedure as fool-proof as possible. However, it is essential that all persons involved in each and every vessel recognize the hazards which may be involved and act accordingly. Enforcement of these minimum safe guards will under no circumstances be considered as relieving those from responsibility for unforeseen developments or circumstances. ucc 008981 ATTACHMENT C URfhK DESCRIPTION OK OPERATION: MC SERIES OK HALOGENATED HYDROCARBON ANALYZER. The sample is drawn into the instrument through the sample lines via a vacuum system. The vacuum system exerts equal amounts of vacuum among the six monitoring channels. Each sample Line is attached to seperate quartz tubes so that each point will be analyzed inde pendently. The sample is drawn into the quartz tube and a catalytic reaction occurs (the quartz tubes are heated to 900 C, depending on the compound). This catalytic reaction converts the halogenated hydrocarbon to an acid gas which is sent to tne detector. Here it mexes with distilled water and causes the conductivity of the water to change. In very close contact to this reaction is a specially designed conductivity cell, this cell and the scrubbing cell fit together as an integral unit and each sample point has as its* detector, on1'of these units. Thus, complete isolation for each sampling point, eliminating the necessity of stream switching. Each detector has its1 own electronics, and the range of each sample point can be adjusted to accomodate the application, thus it may be desirable to have different ranges for different sample points within the same manufacturing area. This can easily be accomodated. This display is continuous per point and ranges of 0 to 100 MV or 0 to IV are standard. Other ranges are available upon request. The alarm system is differential between channels or independent per point, (optional). Standard alarm output is a class "C" contact, audible and visual alarms are optional. Further information in the form of product brochures will be available shortly. A. E. D. INC. 1913 W. IRVNG PARK RD. CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 60613 312/ 3A8-6550 UCC 008982 SPECIFICATION SHEET MC 200 / 300 / 400 > J500 ( 600 Depending on number of measuring points. Ranker 0 to 10 PPM of Halogenated Hydrocarbon U to 100PPM 0 to 500 PPM Range are field alterable and alterable on a channel by channel basis Data Presentation; Continuous monitoring of each sample point Continuous display of each sample point via multi channel analog recorder. Alarm; Differential Continuous per sample point each with (audible tone and flashing light - optional) LengLh of sample lines: jOO feet or less Method of detector: Multi channel conductivity detector. UCC 008983 ATTACHMENT D SUMMARY VINYL CHLORIDE TANK CAR DERAILMENT Fort Wayne, Indiana - July 20, 1973 For your perusal, we have prepared the following compilation on the vinyl chloride tank car derailment. Data was obtained from newspaper articles appearing in the "The New-Sentlnel", July 21, 1973, Fort Wayne, Indiana; "The Journal-Gazette", July 21, 1973, Fort Wayne, Indiana; and from a report issued by 0. C. Johnston, July 25, 1973. At 3:40 p.m. on Friday, July 20, 1973, 13 railroad cars of a 123-car Penn Central train derailed one-half mile from the west city limits of Fort Wayne, Indiana. Four of the derailed cars contained vinyl chloride being shipped from the Calvert City, Kentucky plant to Hooker Chemical Company in Stevens, New Jersey. According to authorities at the scene, one of the vinyl chloride tank cars was punctured and caught fire in the initial impact. A box car of wood shingles also derailed and ignited in the initial derailment. A second tank car derailed and Imbedded itself in the burning box car. The other two tank cars were on their sides, off the track, but did not vent or burn. Authorities stated that some 3,000 to 5,000 residents in a two-square mile area surrounding the scene were evacuated at 6:00 p.m. when it became evident the second tank car might explode. The pressure relief device on this tank car was releasing and the time between releases was diminishing. The car exploded at 7:20 p.m. One home, one-quarter mile from the scene, burned to the ground following the explosion, when the end of the tank car shot into the residence; and the porch of another home was sheared off. Fortunately, there were no injuries reported. Penn Central officials notified CHEMTREC of the derailment at 5:35 p.m. The contents of the chemical cars was unknown for at least one-hour. The bills of lading were in the caboose but could not be reached at first, due to the proximity of the fire. The Calvert City plant was then contacted and confirmation made that the material was BFG's vinyl chloride. Gene Phillips and Oran Johnston (Calvert City's CHEMTREC Team) were dispatched from the plant to the scene. Upon their arrival they were escorted directly to the derailment site and found the following: two tank cars coupled together and lying on their sides, both were cool with no leaks; another tank car on its side at a sloping angle, punctured in the initial derailment and burning; and two hopper cars, two box cars, and a piggy back flat that had also derailed. The team was advised that a fourth tank car had exploded and burned itself out. After surveying the situation, the Goodrich team advised the fire chief to allow the burning vinyl car to burn itself out so escaping vapors did not saturate the area, re-ignite, and flash back. UCC 008984 -2- A decision was Chen made to allow the evacuees to return to their homes, with the exception of those living in the immediate area. This decision was based on the likelihood that when the liquid was completely vaporized and the car pressure gone, there might be a flash back into the car, drawing in oxygen, and could result in an explosion. To accelerate the burn off, the tank shell was warmed up with ambient temperature fire water. The tank shell had a heavy frost line at the liquid level, 4-6F., in comparison to the fire water at 60-70F. The warm water increased vaporization, accelerated the burn, and shortened the time required for burn off. The other derailed cars were retrucked and moved away, Penn Central brought two tank cars full of water and spotted them. Uater was pumped from these cars which were continuously filled from a hydrant one-half mile away. Early Monday morning the fire died down. After checking the frost line of the liquid on the exterior of the car, it was found to be down to approximately 150-200 gallons of liquid. The decreased surface of liquid reduced the amount of vaporization and the rate of burn. The water was cut off and after two hours the car was examined again; no frost line was found, indicating the liquid was gone and only the vapor remained. At this point, not knowing what would happen in the final bum out with the loss of pressure, it was decided to snuff the flame. Two fire hoses were tied and aimed directly at the fire. One fireman started the pump and the fire was snuffed at 11:15 a.m. (Monday, July 23, 1973). Water was continued for some twenty minutes and then one hose was shut down and a twenty foot section of 1-1/2" pipe was attached to it. The pipe was inserted into the car through the puncture, which was only 3" in diameter. The water on this hose was turned on again, flooding the car. The adjacent area was then checked with explosimeters and found safe. The car was completely filled with water and monitoring of the area continued. At this point Che Calvert City Team was released. The situation was well under control and their services were no longer needed. They left the scene at approximately 12:00 a.m., Monday, July 23, 1973. HW/kacs Attachments cc: Plant Managers Plant Safety Engineers Safety Council T. H. Smith R. A. Kelley R. C. Johns H, Waltemate ucc 008985 * ucc 008987 Vinyl Chloride Safety Association Cleveland Ohio Meeting October 24, 2b and 26, 1973 Agenda October 24 8; 00 A.M. 9: 00 A.M. 9:30 A.M. 10: 00 A.M. 10: 15 A.M. 11: 00 A.M. 12: 00 Noon 1:00 P.M. 2:00 P.M. 2: 30 P.M. 3: 15 P.M. 4: 00 P.M. Registration business Meeting - Ray Asti, Chairman Review of Industrywide Safety Guidelines P. Boget - Blend Tanks W. C. L. Rogers - Monomer Loading and Storage R. Asti - Future Assignments Coffee Reacton Entry (J. C. Pnlinsky - Universal PVC Resins, discussion leader) Safety Valve Testing - (R. L. Frantz - Union Carbide, discussion leader) Lunch Safety Valve Sizing - (W. J. Boyle - Monsanto and R. Fry - Diamond Shamrock, discussion leader) Static Control '(W. J, Bradford) Catalyst Handling - (R. Stack - PPG, discussion leader) Pressure Vessel Obsolcsence and Inspection O.S.H.A. Experience - (W. J. Bradford - Olin, discussion leader) October 25 8:30 A.M. 9: 15 A.M. 10:00 A.M. 10: 15 A.M. lh 15 A.M. 12: 00 Noon 1:00 P.M. Handling Monomer Leaks - (R. Dostal-Doco, discussion leader) Safe Monomer Venting Coffee Noise Control (H. Sclienke - Tcnnaco, discussion leader) Monomer Exposure Standard - (P. Kogart-Tonnaco, discussion lead i Lunch Accidents and Near Misses - All October 26 8:30 A.M. 12; 00 Noon Accidents and Near Misses, continued Adjourn ucc 008988 VCM SAFETY ASSOCIATION Attendees at October 24-26. 1973 Meeting Cleveland, Ohio Mr. J. T. Barr Earl Primeau Norm Brock M. M. Gorretson Harold Kling A. Godfried Don Young J. A. Gray C. Arthur GeUner Suchochleb Earl Gremillion A. F. Gallagher R. E. Frey J. Robert Mehall Ell Zinn Bob Dastal Larry Adcock Henry G. Smith Francis Hoy Harlan Jewett Joe Mudd Claude Acree Harry Lloyd Glen D. Schaef Herman Waltemate Amos Dixon Kal Trowbridge John C. Floros Brian D. Cole Maryin LeCornu D. B. Kopkinson J. R. Sanchez S. D. Law David L. Gendron H. L. Donaldson W. J. Bradford E. J. Goettman R. K. Carte Roy W. McCune K. K. Sheth Henry Rzempoluch William A. Keim Roy Stack Ray Asti I.. W. Hager Don Miller P. Bogart John T. Sweeney David A. Eliwood Jay E. Giffin R. L. Frantz Walt M. Iliff Norman C. Walter Jack Falinsky U. /'I DaUA*#a Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Allied Chemical Corporation American Chemical Borden Chemical Borden Chemical B.P.C.I. Certain-Teed Products Company Conoco Chemicals Continental Oil Company Continental Oil Company Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company Dow Chemical Company Dew Chemical Company Ethyl Corporation Firestone Plastics Company General Tire General Tire Georgia-Pacific Georgia-Pacific B. F. Goodrich B. F. Goodrich Goodyear Goodyear Great American Chemical Corporation Hooker Chemical Company ICI, Ltd - England ICI, Ltd - England Industries Reslstol, S. A. Keysor-Centuxy Corporation Monsanto Chemical Company Qlin Corporation Olin Corporation Olln Corporation (Assonet, Mass.) Olin Corporation (Assonet, Mass.) Pantasotc Company Pantasote Company Tantasote Company Pittsburgh Plate Glass Pittsburgh Plate Glass Stauffer Chemical Company Stauffer Chemical Company Shell Chemical Company Tenneco Chemicals Tenneco Chemicals Union Carbide (So. Charles, W. Va.) Union Carbide (So. Charles, W. va.) Union Carbide Uniroyal, Inc. Uniroyal, Inc. Universal FVC Resins, Inc. VINYL CHLORIDE SAFETY ASSOCIATION Air Products Mr. John T. Barr Technical Manager 5 Executive Mall Swedesford Rd. Wayne, Pa. 19087 215-687-6150 Allied Chemical Corp. Mr. D. L. Magee Gulf States Rd., Box 271 Baton Rough, La. 70821 504-356-3341 American Chemical Corp. Mr. Harold E. Kling Plant Manager P. 0. Box 9347 Long Beach, Calif. 90810 213-834-8571 Atlantic Tubing and Rubber Co. Mr. E. T. Biehl Mill Street Cranston 5, R.I. 401-941-9200 Borden Chemical Mr. Sherwood J. Moll Supervising Engineer 511 Lancaster Street Leominster, Mass. 01453 617-537-1711 BP Chemicals International Ltd. Iain Steel, Production Manager Devonshire House Mayfair Place Piccadilly, London W1X6AY Certain-Teed Products Mr. C. A. Geliner Valley Forge, Pa. 19481 215-687-5000 Conoco Mr. R. J. Freele Park 80 Plaza East Saddle Brook, New Jersey 201-845-3800 07662 Diamond Shamrock Mr. Harold E. Birr PVC Plant Manager c/o River Road Delaware City, Delaware 19706 302-834-4561 Dow Chemical Co. Mr. Larry Adcock Ouster Creek Division P. 0. Box BB Freeport, Texas 77541 713-233-6331 Ethyl Corporation Mr. H. G. Smith Operations Supt. PVC P. O. Box 341 Baton Rough, La. 70821 504-357-4361 Firestone Plastics Co. Mr. Fran Hoy Coordinator,`Special Projects P. O. Box 690 Fottstown, Pa. 215-326-2000 General Tire & Rubber Corp. Mr. J. Mudd P. 0. Box 68 Middle Road Ashtabula, Ohio 44004 216-998-1120 B. F. Goodrich Co. Mr. Herman Waltemate Process Engineer, Manufacturing 6100 Oak Tree Blvd. Cleveland, Ohio 44115 216-524-0200 Georgia Pacific Mr. Harry Lloyd, Industrial Relations P. 0. Box 629 Plaquemine, La. 70764 504-687-6321 ucc 008990 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Mr. M. Trowbridge 5408 Baker Avenue Niagara Falls, New York 14302 716-283-7682 Great American Chemical Corp. Mr. J. C. Flores V.P. of Manufacturing 650 Water Street Fitchburg, Mass. 01420 617-343-6973 Gulf Oil of Canada Mr. R. S. McLaren Mgr. Operations Resin & Compounding P. 0. Box 330 Shawinigan, Quebec, Canada Hooker Chemical Mr. H. Raster Plant Manager P. 0. Box 456 Burlington, New Jersey 08016 609-499-2300 Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. Mr. J. S. Seeker, Works Manager Hillhouse Works P.O. Box 3 Cleveleys Blackpool Lancs FY5 4QB England Industries Resistol, S.A. Mr. J. R. Sanchez Chief Production Engineer Presidente Masaryk N 61 Mexico 5, F. F. Keysor-Century Corporation Mr. H. R. Jepsen, Jr. 26000 Springbrook Road Saugus, California 91350 Monsanto Mr. David L. Gendron Production Supervisor 730 Worchester St. Indian Orchard, Mass. 01051 412-788-6911 Montedison Mr. Mario Ghezzi Halogens Improvement Manager Case11a Postale Milano 3596 Via Principe Eugenio, 5-20100 Milan, Italy Norsk Hydro, A.S. Mr. Per Rangnes Asst. Prod. Mgr. Plastics Dlv. Porsgrunn Fabrikker 3901 Porsgrunn, Norway Olin Corporation Mr. E. Goettman P. O. Box 317 Assonet, Mass. 02702 617-678-4591 Pantasote Co'mpany Mr. H. Rzempoluch Plant Manager P. 0. Box 356 Point Pleasant, West V. 25550 304-675-1020 PPG Industries Mr. R. Stack 1 Gateway Center Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222 412-434-3131 Promociones Indus trlales Mexicanas,S.S. Mr. Pablo Enriquez -Apartado Postal Num. 604 Puebla, Pue., Mexico 29620 _Robin Tech. Inc. Mr. John Ertel P. 0. Box 2342 Fort Worth, Texas 76101 UCC 008991 -3- Shell Chemical Company Mr. D. G. Miller Houston Plant P. 0. Box 2633 Deerpark, Texas 77536 713-479-2331 Stauffer Chemical Company Mr. R. A. Asti P. 0. Box 320 Delaware City, DE 19706 302-834-7846 Tenneco Chemicals Mr. P. L. Bogart P. O. Box 129 River Road Flemington, New Jersey 08822 201-782-4011 Union Carbide Company Mr. R. Frantz P. 0. Box 471 Texas City, Texas 77590 713-479-2300 Uniroyal, Inc. Walter Iliff P. O. Box 460 Painesville, Ohio 216-357-7574 44077 Universal FVC Resins, Inc. J. C. Palin ky Safety Supervisor 786 Hardy Road Painesville, Ohio 44077 216-352-6241 Please add any additions/changes or new members. Name of Co. : Name: Title; Address: _______________________________________ _________________________________ Phone: Mail to: Mr. P. L. Bogart, Tenneco Chemicals P. 0. Box 129, River Rd. Flemington, N.J. 08822 ucc 008992 V DISTRIBUTION Mr. A. S. Amatangelo Mr. C. Bayard Mr. J. L. Carvajal Mr. D. W. Finn Mr. G. M. Frisch Mr. C. E. Fry (2) Mr. R. E. George Mr. J. E. Giffin Mr. R. J. Hanna Dr. W. R. Manning Mr. B. D. Miller Mr. J. F. Moss Mr. G. L. Pettit Mr. J. J. Scharf (2) Mr. M. E. Sutherland Mr. R. J. Taylor Mr. R. N. Wheeler, Jr. Mr. R. J. Fabry Mr. R. L. Janney Mr. K. E. Gray Mr. C. H. Chambers Mr. M. N. Me Clung Mr. C. D. Santrock Mr. G. E. Vande Linde Mr. A. E. Thompson Mr. J. W. Allison Mr. G. H. Simpson, Jr. Mr. T. H. Austin 514 5 14 514 514 514 514 514 514 511 511 514 514 514 513 511 511 514 514 514 514 514 514 514 514 514 514 514 514 UCC 008993