Document 8YN7qN5kyn2Nm9eN0R9O2dL5

Document 18 From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Attachments: Lamanna, Isabelle Mon, 3 Feb 2025 20:57:53 +0000 Stephenson, Kendall Guith, Christopher; Byers, Dan RE: Invitation to Secretary Wright I CERAWeek Energy Security Forum March 10 Sec._Event Request Form.docx Hi Kendall! I hope you are having a great start to your week. My apologies for the delayed response on my end, it has been crazy over here as we are preparing for the Secretary Nominee to hopefully join us in the office here soon. Thank you so much for this awesome invite and sending it our way. Also- Meg is the absolute best!! Upon the Secretary's confirmation we will be starting to lock in meetings and events on his calendar, especially for CERAWeek. In the meantime, please have the appropriate member of your team fill out the attached form and return it (b)(6) - Secretary Wright for our records and consideration! We look forward to hearing from you. Thanks so much! Izzy Lamanna From: Stephenson, Kendall <KStephenson@USChamber.com> Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2025 12:58 PM To: Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Guith, Christopher <CGuith@USChamber.com>; Byers, Dan <DByers@USChamber.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Invitation to Secretary Wright I CERAWeek Energy Security Forum March 10 Dear Izzy, Congratulations to you, soon-to-be Secretary Wright, and his team on a smooth confirmation process thus far. I'm reaching out to invite Secretary Wright to a private energy security forum at CERAWeek for G7 ministers that is jointly hosted by the U.S. Chamber and International Gas Union (Megan Bloomgren advised that we reach out to you). This forum is now in its third year after initially resulting from industry coordination with the Japanese government during their G7 host year of 2023, and we believe it presents an excellent opportunity to advance Trump Administration energy goals related to security, energy access, and a broader change in narrative with respect to the long-term role of natural gas in global energy systems. A memo is attached that describes our proposed outline for this year's event, which will take place on the afternoon of Monday, March 10th in Houston during CERAWeek. The ultimate goal is to build momentum aimed at strengthening the G7's message on gas and energy security at Canada's energy ministerial. We will of course be inviting the Canadian federal government to participate in the event, but are also working closely with Alberta Premier Danielle Smith and her team on this strategy. We also think the gathering could provide an excellent opportunity to feature the energy access message of Secretary Wright's friend Magatte Wade. We're happy to discuss the event, the attached proposed agenda and deliverables with you further (also attached is a prior event agenda for reference). Thanks for the consideration and don't hesitate to reach out with any questions! Look forward to hearing back from you, Kendall Kendall Stephenson Senior Manager. Policy Global Energy Institute (b) (6) I kstephensonRuschamber.com I Global Energy Institute 'U.S. Chamber of Commerce U.S. Chamber of Commerce Global Energy Institute ******************************************************************** This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information. ******************************************************************** Document 18 - Attachment 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Event Information Request Form Thank you for your interest in hosting the U.S. Secretary of Energy at your event. To ensure that the appropriate individual within the Department of Energy is participating in your event and because the Office of the Secretary is committed to maintaining the highest ethical standards, we need the information requested below before we can agree to confirm a speaker. Please respond to the questions below and send your response to (b)(6) - Secretary Wright.. If you have any questions you may contact the Secretary's Scheduling Office at (b) (6) Title of the Event (please note if the event is a weekly, monthly, annual, etc.): Date of Event (please note if the date is flexible): Event Location (venue, address, city and state/country): Point(s) of Contact (Name, Email, Phone): Briefly describe the event in detail including the purpose and desired role of the Secretary (i.e. deliver keynote remarks, attend an event, meet with attendees etc.): Is the event a fundraiser? If yes, please explain who it is benefiting (i.e. specific charity, a political candidate, etc.): Audience Approximately how many people are expected to attend the event? Please describe the target audience of the event (elected officials, local community leaders, academics, industry representatives, public sector representatives, etc.). Will the attendees at the event include persons with a diversity of views or interests, or representatives from throughout an industry or profession, or the range of persons interested in a matter? (If yes, please describe.) Is the event open to the public (this includes ticketed individuals)? If not, please describe who is privately invited. Who are other .VIPs or speakers confirmed and in what role? Who are other VIPs or speakers invited? Remarks If you are requesting remarks, are there any specific issues you would like the Secretary to highlight/address in his remarks? What is the desired format of his remarks (will he be delivering the keynote, sharing the stage, participating in a panel or roundtable, etc.)? What is the public registration/ticket fee to attend/participate in the event? Will there be a teleprompter available? Will there be a podium? Communications/Press Is the event open or closed to press? If open, are you expecting local, state, or national news coverage? If this is an annual event, which news outlets typically cover the event? Will you be advertising or live streaming the event on any social media outlets or websites? (If yes, please explain.) Logistics/Other* What does the invitation include: registration/conference event fee; meals or refreshments; receptions or other entertainment; informational materials; and memento or token of appreciation What is the monetary value of the invitation to the Secretary, etc.? Please identify how the costs were determined. (Please attach separate sheet if necessary.) Does the invitation extend to the Secretary's spouse or other guest? If yes, will others in attendance generally be accompanied by a spouse or other guest? If the Secretary is not able to attend, is a surrogate desired? If yes, anyone specific? Any additional notes or information? Event Host and Sponsor Who is the event host? (Please identify and provide background on the Event host as well as any other organization involved in the Event.) Event host website/url. Is the event host a registered lobbyist or lobbying organization, and/or registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act? (If yes, please identify.) Is the event host a partisan political candidate, a representative of a political party or a registered political action committee (PAC)? (If yes, please identify.) Is the event host a 501(c)(3) organization or a media organization? (If yes, please identify.) Is the event host seeking or currently have any business interests with the Department such as permits, contracts, litigation, grants, etc.? (If yes, please describe.) Who are the sponsors of the event? Please identify and provide background information on the individual and/or entity. Are any event sponsors seeking or do they currently have any business interests with the Department such as permits, contracts, litigation, grants, etc.? (If yes, please describe.) With which Bureau or Agency does your agenda most align? Please list all, if more than one. *IMPORTANT NOTE: The purpose of these questions is to elicit information relevant to the ethics analysis and is not a solicitation or request for anything of value by the Department or any of its employees. Document 49 From: Sent: To: Subject: Forum March 10 Byers, Dan Wed, 12 Feb 2025 21:50:27 +0000 Fitzsimmons, Alexander [EXTERNAL] FW: Invitation to Secretary Wright I CERAWeek Energy Security Hi Alex, Hope all is well. Big congrats to you on the new role at DOE working for Secretary Wright! I'm not just saying this -- he is truly inspiring and thoughtful on all aspects of energy policy, and in my view the absolute perfect person for this job. Anyway, I'm sure you are swamped but I figured I'd be remiss if I didn't flag for you the invitation below to Sec Wright to headline our CERAWeek G7 energy security roundtable. Izzy has been very responsive and I've also spoken to Tommy Joyce about it, but just wanted to let you know I'm leading this event from the Chamber side so as you consider it I'd be happy to explain further why we think it would be a great opportunity for him and DOE. Dan (b) (6) From: Stephenson, Kendall <KStephenson@USChamber.com> Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2025 3:12 PM To: Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Guith, Christopher <CGuith@USChamber.com>; Byers, Dan <DByers@USChamber.com> Subject: RE: Invitation to Secretary Wright I CERAWeek Energy Security Forum March 10 Hi Izzy, Congrats to Secretary Wright on his confirmation and first week in office. As you consider this invitation, we wanted to share with you a few updates we've received from other governments over the past week or so. In general, we've received very positive feedback from most G7 ministries regarding the meeting. While we are still in the process of securing firm confirmations, nearly all countries have responded positively, and at the moment we're expecting to be joined by the following officials: Canada Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment Jonathan Wilkinson UK Minister of Industry Sarah Jones Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry Vice-Minister Takehiko Matsuo European Union Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen Alberta Premier Danielle Smith Italy is very interested and likely to send a senior official TBD We are still getting in touch with Germany and France On the industry side we are expecting: U.S. Chamber of Commerce Global Energy Institute President Marty Durbin  International Gas Union Secretary-General Mel Ydreos Canada Gas Association President and CEO Tim Egan American Petroleum Institute CEO Mike Summers (tentative) Asia Natural Gas and Energy Association CEO Paul Everingham As in past years, we will also be extending an invitation to senior leadership or board member of both Eurogas and the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (I0GP) Finally, and as noted below, we are reaching out to Secretary Wright's friend, Magatte Wade, to provide a perspective on the importance of energy access to human development. We'll keep you posted on our progress with meeting details in the days ahead, but if you or your team would like a call to discuss the goals and expected run-of-show further, we'd be happy to meet at your convenience. Best, Kendall Kendall Stephenson Senior Manager, Policy Global Energy Institute (b) (6) I kstephenson@uschamber.com I Global Energy Institute U.S. Chamber of Commerce U.S. Chamber of Commerce Global Energy Institute From: Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov> Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2025 12:08 PM To: Stephenson, Kendall <KStephenson@USChamber.com> Cc: Guith, Christopher <CGuith@USChamber.com>; Byers, Dan <DByers@USChamber.com> Subject: RE: Invitation to Secretary Wright I CERAWeek Energy Security Forum March 10 CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Good afternoon, Kendall! Thank you for getting this back to us so quickly. Our team will review it and get back to you as soon as possible. Thanks again! Izzy From: Stephenson, Kendall <KStephenson@USChamber.com> Sent: Monday, February 3, 2025 4:53 PM To: Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.LamannaPho.doe.gov> Cc: Guith, Christopher <CGuith@USChamber.com>; Byers, Dan <DByers@USChamber.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Invitation to Secretary Wright I CERAWeek Energy Security Forum March 10 Izzy, No worries at all. We know y'all are crazy busy so we greatly appreciate the response and consideration of the invitation. I'll be sure to send the attached form to (b)(6) - Secretary Wright but sharing with you as well as an FYI. Let us know if you need anything else. Thanks again and we look forward to working with you. Good luck with everything, lots of exciting stuff happening at DOE! Best, Kendall Kendall Stephenson Senior Manager. Policy Global Energy Institute (b) (6) I kstephensonausehamber.com I Global Energy Institute 11.1.S. Chamber of Commerce U.S. Chamber of Commerce Global Energy Institute From: Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@ho.doe.gov> Sent: Monday, February 3, 2025 3:58 PM To: Stephenson, Kendall <KStephensonpUSChamber.com> Cc: Guith, Christopher <CGuith@USChamber.com>; Byers, Dan <DBvers@USCharnber com> Subject: RE: Invitation to Secretary Wright I CERAWeek Energy Security Forum March 10 CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hi Kendall! I hope you are having a great start to your week. My apologies for the delayed response on my end, it has been crazy over here as we are preparing for the Secretary Nominee to hopefully join us in the office here soon. Thank you so much for this awesome invite and sending it our way. Also- Meg is the absolute best!! Upon the Secretary's confirmation we will be starting to lock in meetings and events on his calendar, especially for CERAWeek. In the meantime, please have the appropriate member of your team fill out the attached form and return it (b)(6) - Secretary Wright for our records and consideration! We look forward to hearing from you. Thanks so much! lzzy Lamanna From: Stephenson, Kendall <KStephenson@USChamber.com> Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2025 12:58 PM To: Lamanna, Isabelle <Isabelle.Lamanna@hq.doe.gov> Cc: Guith, Christopher <CGuith@USChamber.com>; Byers, Dan <DByers@USChamber.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Invitation to Secretary Wright I CERAWeek Energy Security Forum March 10 Dear Izzy, Congratulations to you, soon-to-be Secretary Wright, and his team on a smooth confirmation process thus far. I'm reaching out to invite Secretary Wright to a private energy security forum at CERAWeek for G7 ministers that is jointly hosted by the U.S. Chamber and International Gas Union (Megan Bloomgren advised that we reach out to you). This forum is now in its third year after initially resulting from industry coordination with the Japanese government during their G7 host year of 2023, and we believe it presents an excellent opportunity to advance Trump Administration energy goals related to security, energy access, and a broader change in narrative with respect to the long-term role of natural gas in global energy systems. A memo is attached that describes our proposed outline for this year's event, which will take place on the afternoon of Monday, March 10th in Houston during CERAWeek. The ultimate goal is to build momentum aimed at strengthening the G7's message on gas and energy security at Canada's energy ministerial. We will of course be inviting the Canadian federal government to participate in the event, but are also working closely with Alberta Premier Danielle Smith and her team on this strategy. We also think the gathering could provide an excellent opportunity to feature the energy access message of Secretary Wright's friend Magatte Wade. We're happy to discuss the event, the attached proposed agenda and deliverables with you further (also attached is a prior event agenda for reference). Thanks for the consideration and don't hesitate to reach out with any questions! Look forward to hearing back from you, Kendall Kendall Stephenson Senior Manager. Policy Global Energy Institute (b) (6) I kstephenson@uschamber.com I Global Energy Institute U.S. Chamber ofCommerce .---- U.S. Chamber of Commerce Global Energy Institute ******************************************************************** This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information. ******************************************************************** ******************************************************************** This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information. ******************************************************************** ******************************************************************** This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information. ******************************************************************** From: Sent: To: Subject: Guith, Christopher Tue, 4 Mar 2025 17:04:14 +0000 Byers, Dan; Woods, Andrea; Dietderich, Ben [EXTERNAL] DOE/Chamber CERA Chat Document 78 Microsoft Teams.Need help? Join the meeting now Meeting ID: (b) (6) Passcode: (b) (6) Dial in by phone .+ 1 206-413-8589 (b) (6) United States, Seattle ,Find a local number Phone conference ID: (b) (6) For organizers:.Meeting options Reset dial-in PIN ******************************************************************** This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information. ******************************************************************** From: Sent: To: Subject: Woods, Andrea Tue, 4 Mar 2025 17:05:51+0000 Guith, Christopher Accepted: DOE/Chamber CERA Chat Document 80 Document 99 From: Byers, Dan Sent: Wed, 5 Mar 202515:50:35 +0000 To: Dietderich, Ben; Woods, Andrea Cc: Guith, Christopher Subject: [EXTERNAL] Follow up Attachments: US LNG Impac: Study_Phase 2 Summary Presentation_March 2025.pdf, G7 Natural Gas and Energy Security Core Messages Final.pdf Thanks for the call Ben and Andrea. Attached is the embargoed S&P study that will come out tomorrow morning. The slide deck is pretty dense, but pasted below are the key takeaways that will be part of our press release. Second, pasted below is a little bit of background on the G7, as well as the expected attendees at Monday's energy security forum. Last, attached is the messaging document we shared with the G7 after last year's meeting. Let us know if you have questions. Dan (b) (6) (ID) (4) (13)(LI) (13)(LI) (ID) (4) ******************************************************************** This message does not originate from a known Department of Energy email system. Use caution if this message contains attachments, links or requests for information. ******************************************************************** S&P Global Major New US Industry at a Crossroads A US LNG Impact Study -- Phase 2 Document 106 Attachment 1 Report by Commodity Insights and Market Intelligence March 2025 Parmis.slon lo reprint or d 2025 by 55P Global Inc.\ r wrabon approval of S&P Preface, Acknowledgements & Key Conclusions Study Preface In the S&P Global December 2024 Phase 1 report, we examined the remarkable rise of the US liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry. In less than a decade, this sector has become a major export industry, contributing more than $400 billion to U.S. GDP and supporting hundreds of thousands of American jobs. This development has not only contributed positively to the US economy and export earnings but has also strengthened the international position of the United States and deepened relations with many other countries. This Phase 2 companion study expands and complements key aspects of our first phase study: 1. The environmental impact of further development of US LNG -- in particular, the potential net impact on global GHG emissions of 40 million tons of incremental LNG export capacity tied to projects that are on hold or in the pre-FID (Final Investment Decision) stage from the Phase 1 Base Case 2. A State and Congressional-district level economic impact assessment, analyzing the I impact of US LNG across the national economy. 3. The potential benefits of infrastructure debottlenecking across the value chain, focusing primarily on the Northeast gas market On the emissions front, Phase 2's central finding is that increasing US LNG exports leads to 780 million tonnes of CO2e (GWP20) lower GHG emissions globally between 2028 and 2040 than would be the case if demand were met by the likely alternative sources The study demonstrates why the bulk of demand -- absent US LNG -- would largely be met with other hydrocarbons, not renewables. This future saving equates to the entire emissions reduction achieved in Germany over the past decade. The reason for this savings is driven by the lower GHG intensity of US LNG compared to the average intensity of the combined energy sources that would replace that LNG in global markets. This analysis shows that end-use combustion accounts for a significant 57 to 87% of the lifecycle intensity of coal, oil, gas and LNG. Varying levels of methane emissions in the supply chain prior to end-use lead to significant differences between the sources and pathways of each fuel. This highlights the need for frequent and reliable monitoring of methane emissions and the benefits of transparency in GHG intensity. From a macroeconomic perspective, the Phase 1 Base Case outlook demonstrated that US LNG exports can contribute an additional $1.3 trillion to US GDP through 2040. This Phase 2 report illustrates that the economic impact extends beyond the seven core producing states, with 37% of jobs and 30% of GDP contributions occurring in nonproducing areas. The third part of the report examines the economic benefits of ending one major and costly distortion in the US energy system. This would be achieved by removing bottlenecks in infrastructure especially across the Northeast region. While the Northeast region has sufficient proved reserves to meet all U.S. demand for 17 years, existing pipeline constraints hinder optimal production. These result in gas prices in New York and Boston that are 15-40% higher than the national annual average, and 145% and 160% higher in the key winter heating month of January -- imposing a heavy and unnecessary cost burden on consumers. Expanding egress capacity from the giant Marcellus supply by about 6 billion cubic feet per day could reduce January prices by 20% and 30%, respectively, from 2028 to 2040 (17-27% annualized), resulting in cumulative savings of $76 billion for consumers by 2040. S&P Global 7 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 2 Preface, Acknowledgements & Key Conclusions S&P Global Study Acknowledgements S&P Global (NYSE: SPGI) provides essential intelligence. We enable governments, businesses and individuals with the right data, expertise and connected technology so that they can make decisions with conviction. From helping our customers assess new investments to guiding them through ESG and energy transition across supply chains. we unlock new opportunities, solve challenges and accelerate progress for the world. We are widely sought after by many of the world's leading organizations to provide credit ratings, benchmarks, analytics and workflow solutions in the global capital, commodity and automotive markets. With every one of our offerings, we help the world's leading organizations plan for tomorrow, today. For more information visit www.spglobal.com This study offers an independent and objective assessment of the economic, market and global impact of the US LNG Industry built from a detailed bottom-up approach, at the asset and market level, technology by technology. It represents the collaboration of S&P Global Commodity Insights and the Global Intelligence and Analytics unit within S&P Global Market Intelligence supported by the world's largest expert team of over 1,400 energy and economic research analysts and consultants continuously monitoring, modelling and evaluating markets and assets. Explanation of the detailed study methodology is included in the Appendix. The analysis and metrics developed during the course of this research represent the independent analysis and views of S&P Global. The study makes no policy recommendations. The study was supported by the US Chamber of Commerce. S&P Global is exclusively responsible for all of the analysis, content and conclusions of the study. S&P Global S&P Global Project Leadership Team Project Chairman, Daniel Yergin Vice Chairman, S&P Global Executive Project Sponsor, Carlos Pascual Senior Vice President, Global Energy, S&P Global Expert Advisory Committee Lead, Michael Stoppard. Chief Global Gas Strategist, S&P Global Energy Transition Advisory Lead, Eleonor Kramarz, Vice President, Energy Transition Commodity Insights Consulting Project Director, Eric Eyberg Vice President, Gas & Power Commodity Insights Consulting Project Manager, Horacio Cuenca Senior Director, Energy Transition Commodity Insights Consulting Project Team Leads. Leandro Caputo, Executive Director, Gas & LNG Commodity Insights. Mohsen Bonakdarpour, Executive Director, Global Intelligence and Analytics, Market Intelligence, Ed Kelly, Executive Director, Gas & LNG Commodity Insights Consulting, Madeline Jowdy, Global Head of LNG, Commodity Insights Consulting Relationship Manager, Linda Kinney, Head of Business Development, Commodity Insights Consulting Communications Lead, Jeff Marn, Public Relations Executive Director, S&P Global CO 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 3 Preface. Acknowledgements & Key Conclusions As the LNG `pause' is lifted, the Phase 2 US LNG Study highlights emissions benefits, economic impact beyond producing states and New England infrastructure constraints Continued development of US LNG (40 Mtpa of pre-FID or `halted projects") results in global GHG emissions being 324/780 M tCO2e (GWP100/GWP20) lower by 2040 than they would be if demand were met by the likely energy alternatives. This is equivalent to the UK's road transport emissions over the same period. End-use combustion generates 57 to 87 percent of analyzed fossil fuel emissions. The rest arise from each fuel's supply chain, with methane being the primary cause of differences in their GHG intensity Coal emits roughly 70% more greenhouse gases than the US LNG it would replace across all the alternatives analyzed US LNG's unprecedented growth is enabled by an extended cross-state value chain, that reaches beyond the core-producing states - about 90% of every dollar spent remains within United States supply chains Of the annual average of 495,000 Us jobs supported through 2040, 37% will be in non-producing states. As nfl many jobs will be supported in on-producing states as in Texas Over the same period, LNG Exports will contribute $1.3 trillion in GDP. with $383 billion or 30% in non- producing states. On a per capita basis, producing states benefit from a cumulative $13.2K GDP per capita The US Northeast (NE) has vast amounts of low-cost gas reserves in the Marcellus and Utica formations (New York. Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio), sufficient to meet nationwide demand for -17 years Due to pipeline constraints these reserves are being developed at a suboptimal rate, pushing gas prices at Boston, Chicago and New York City Gates up 160% higher than the national gas market in peak months Expanding NE pipeline capacity by 6.1 Bcf/d could reduce HH gas prices by $0.20/MMBtu and significantly lower prices across the region. Cumulative nationwide consumer savings could reach $76 billion through' 2040 S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 4 Contents Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE Appendix Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG S&P Global O 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 5 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Incremental US LNG is less GHG-intensive than modelled alternative energy sources, based on the best available data and analysis to date (including coal under any scenario) This analysis considers the GHG emissions impact of 40 Mtpa incremental US LNG capacity (pre-FID or 'halted' projects in our Phase 1 Base Case) relative to the alternative energy sources it would displace We use S&P Global's detailed life cycle emissions assessment approach for US LNG and energy alternatives, combining the latest public, proprietary and third-party satellite and flyover data /A S&P Global End use combustion is responsible for 57 - 87% of GHG intensity for coal, oil, gas and LNG Supply chain methane emissions are currently the key driver of variation between fuel pathways With the global focus on US methane emissions, US LNG producers stand to benefit from the increased availability and granularity of measurement data as importing regions demand stricter quantification Incremental US LNG exports from the projects in our Base Case would result in 324 ! 780 M tCO2e (GWP100/GWP20) lower emissions over 2028-2040 compared to emissions of the modelled alternatives This is equivalent to the emissions of the UK road transport sector between 2028 and 2040 - Coal's lifecycle GHG emissions are on average 65% - 70% higher than the sources of LNG analyzed across the selection of US or alternative global LNG projects O 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 6 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions In Phase 1 we modeled the global energy response to the US LNG `Extended Halt' Scenario with fossil fuels and renewable generation replacing impacted US LNG exports LNG Change in S&P `Extended Halt' vs. Incremental US LNG' Scenarios - Yearly Average 20282 - 2040 Mt LNG equivalent, yearly average 2028-2040 40 85% of the response comes from non-US fossil fuels 14 LNG projects in Canada, Mozambique and Qatar are accelerated; new capacity from Argentina, Indonesia, Oman and Russia is brought 5 online as response2 Incremental US LNG Global LNG Response Coal Indigenous Gas Oil Renewables, % of halted and Piped Imports Nuclear & Others capacity A comprehensive analysis of the global energy mix -- integrating market and economic drivers, policy frameworks, and country-specific _Mt energy system factors - shows the LNG gap would be 85% backfilled by fossil fuels from global sources 1. Considers 2028 as it Is the first year in v Source: S&P Global FrPr,i , tc as hash case: 2 This is not an exhaustive list of projects included in S&P's Base Case. which Includes protects in At ic;tralin Malaysia. Papua New Guinea and United Arab Emirates. S&P Global 0)2025 by S&P Global Inc. 7 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Phase 2 evaluates the GHG emissions impact of incremental US LNG (pre-FID or 'halted' projects) in our Base Case, relative to the alternative energy response modelled in Phase 1 Critical Definitions of the Lifecycle GHG Intensity Estimate from Production to End Use Combustion Example supply chain for LNG 111 ii Upstream operations Gathering & Boosting Gas processing Transmission & Storage Liquefaction Shipping Regasification End-Use Functional unit: 1 MJ (LHV) delivered to end use Emissions allocation: Total GHG emissions allocated to all co-products on an energy basis, in line with industry best practices Gas pathing: based on current and expected physical flows, calibrated using expert opinion of S&P Global gas analysts End use: combustion by fuel type not adjusted for efficiency, as Phase 1 modeling already factors these into fuel volume responses Gas feedstock supply: Reflects a weighted average of the mix of upstream plays supplying each LNG facility Shipping routes: Destinations based on contracts and forecasts. Each LNG plant considers the mix of distances, fleet composition, and vessel features 10 US plays feeding 6 LNG terminals 9 LNG carrier types 12 aInntder5nagtaiosneaxl ppolaryt spifpeeeldininegs 7 LNG terminals 91 Shipping route combinations (13 terminals to 7 destination markets) 1. Both the natural gas and LNG value chain would typically include a local distribution segment after long-distance transmission or regasification and before delivery to the final point of consumption, This study assumes delivery of natural gas, LNG, and alternative fuels to a point adjacent to the regasification terminal or transmission line to simplify comparisons across fuels. Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 8 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Emissions from incremental US LNG exports in the Base Case are 27 / 65 MtCO2e (GWP100 / GWP201) lower per year than the alternative energy sources modelled GHG Emissions Corresponding to `Extended Halt' vs. Incremental US LNG Scenarios2 M tCO2e, 100-yr GWP, yearly average 2028-2040. midpoint methane intensity3 Emissions of the global energy response that would replace incremental US LNG exports Incremental US LNG exports in the Base Case 27 61 31 2 24 62 The difference 181 between scenarios is 154 65 MtCO2e with GWP20' Coal Indigenous Gas Oil Renewables, Alternative Global Energy Net Global Incremental and Piped Imports Nuclear & Others LNG Sources Response Total Change US LNG 1. Global Warming Potential (GWP) is a measure used to compare the impact of different greenhouse gases on global warming. It quantifies the heat a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere over a specific time period, relative to carbon dioxide (COO, which has a GWP of 1. See the appendix for full results in 20-yr GWP; 2. The volume of impacted LNG exports at risk and the response of the global energy system are based on the results of Phase 1; 3. Midpoint methane intensity represents the middle of the modeled methane uncertainty range. For results on the full range of methane uncertainty, sea appendix. Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 9 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Increased exports of US LNG would lead to 780 MtCO2e less emissions (GWP20) 20282040, equivalent to the emissions of the UK's road transport sector over the same period Equivalent to the emissions of: Emissions impact from incremental US LNG exports compared to alternative global energy response 27 / 65 million tonnes CO2e (GWP100 / GWP20) avoided per year on average More than twice the cars in Los Angeles county each year (14 million gasoline-powered passenger vehicles) (GWP20) 7 average sized coal-fired power plants over a year 3.6 million homes' worth of energy use for one year 324 / 780 million tonnes CO2e (GWP100 / GWP20) avoided cumulatively 2028 - 2040 The UK road transport sector between 2028 and 2040 (GWP20) A third of the reduction in EU27 energy-related emissions (GWP 20) over the past decade The CO2 absorbed by 5.4 billion trees over 10 years g potential of each (1.:, ciffers dep, ng on the time horizon considered, as each gas has a different lifespan in the atmosphere and a different ability to absorb energy. The UNFCCC publishes two time horizons to show the short- and long-term effects of GHGs on global warming: 20 years and 100 years. Both the 100-year and 20-year GWPs sourced from the IPCC AIRS were used to convert emissions into CO2 equivalents. The equivalence conversions are done with average weights or volumes of the selected gases. Equivalences are intended for illustrative purposes only and should not be used to inform or guide decision making. Source: S&P Global, US EPA, IEA, Our World In Data/Global Change Data Lab S&P Global 0)2025 by S&P Global Inc. 10 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions GHG intensity is driven by end-use combustion: Coal replacing US LNG is 65% more intensive in GWP100 terms than US LNG across the impacted destination markets Weighted Average Full Lifecycle GHG Intensity' (Production to End Use) gCO2e/MJ `)/O share of methane emissions in the supply chain (excluding end use) 100-yr GWP Mid. point methane 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 share2 Incremental US LNG +65% *- 34% Alternative LNG Sources Indigenous Gas and Piped Imports Oil 7 44% 64% IMF 31% Coal 58% Renewables 0% 20-yr GWP 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 +69`)/O I 1 Mid. point methane share2 57% 68% 87% 53% 77% 0% End use MI Supply chain CO2 I Supply chain methane I Supply chain methane variability range Near-zero supply chain methane intensity (aligned with OGCI target and expected EU methane threshold) for projects delivering gas to EU Methane intensity in the supply chain is much more uncertain on the fuels of the global alternative energy response than the US LNG value chain because of the emphasis on quantification and mitigation in most US plays in recent years 1. Averages show nrclude lire weighleu avieraes of al ieedstock gas and shipping distances to cestination markets lot each fuel, 2. The share of methane emissions n the supply chain up to regasilication, exOuuting and use, based on the midpoint range of methane variability; Key parameters from Phase 1 informing this GHG lifecycle intensity analysis include: a) LNG projects impacted, including the US LNG projects impacted under the US LNG 'Extended Halt' Scenario and the International LNG response (accelerated startup dates or incremental): b) upstream supply pathways and balance to each LNG facility at the play or basin level, for both US and international projects; c) shipping destinations and volumes from US and International LNG facilities, oil producers, and coal mines to respective end markets; d) global energy response. considering the efficiency of generation (heal rate) in the replacement of gas by other fuels in each destination market. Therefore. the end use of this LCA only reflects the combustion factor of each fuel Source: S&P Global S&P Global 72025 by S&P Global Inc. 11 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions S&P's analysis evaluated 20 - 300 times more observed methane data for US supply chains relative to alternative sources, which had less accessible and detailed monitoring Global O&G Methane Emissions Intensity Estimates (Production to Gas Processing) Sourced and Uncertainty Range Defined Intensity for relevant basin in each country, %CH4 released / %CH4 in gas stream' 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Methane uncertainty range assumed United States avg. Max-min range Canada Mozambique Qatar Argentina Indonesia Russia (W. Siberia) Oman China Norway2 Russia (E. Siberia) Algeria Company disclosure I r Literature _2.0_ 3.8 - 3.5 ^ .0 I 3.5 _4.9_ _ io.o t11.1T11.5.07.001MIE 11L1:15.5 171 11F=_ _2- Satellite: GHGSat-based estimate Flyover data accessed by S&P Global covered >280 bn pixels in the Permian basin while the satellite data sample analyzed averaged just 0.9-13 bn pixels across Middle East, Central Asia and N Africa IEA country estimates S&P Global Vantage models .4i Satellite: Sentinel-2 based estimates IEA country factor applied to US TROPOMI estimate Satellite: Analogue based on Sentinel-26 A Satellite: TROPOMI-based estimates 1. Expressed as methane emissions (on an energy basis) divided by methane content of the throughput, with marketable gas being the common denominator across the supply chain; 2. Although no satellite measurement was available for Norway in our study, the range is based on company disclosure with limited variability given the strong regulatory pressure and record of methane measurement and control by operators in the country; 3. IEA methane Tracker 2024 normalized with S&P Global O&G production data per country; 4. Average of US TROPOMI measurements with a methane scaling factor from IEA; 5. Average estimates at the country level: 6. For countries where no measurement data is available, we include the average intensity for upstream derived from Sentinel-2 observations to determine the uncertainty range. Refer to the appendix for additional information on satellite coverage across regions Source: S&P Global leveraging TROPOMI. GHGSat, and Sentinel-2 observations: academic research (papers listed in appendix); and IEA's Global Methane Tracker S&P Global 7 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 12 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions The resulting GHG intensity of alternative sources of LNG and other fuels varies widely, mainly due to methane, but flaring, reservoir properties, and operations also contribute Lifecycle GHG Intensity of LNG, Oil, and Coal Delivered to the Destination Markets Assumed gCO0e/MJ, 100-yr GWP LNG and natural gas 0 50 100 Methane Share (excl. end use) Oil (diesel oil) 0 50 US LNG Plant A [ US LNG Plant B' F 1 Incremental US LNG Plant C E I US LNG US LNG Plant D 1 US LNG Plant E L US LNG Plant F1 L 38% Saudi Arabia 36% 30% Iraq 30% Norway 39% 36% Nigeria Alternative LNG Sources Canada Accel. Project Mozambique Accel. Project' Qatar Accel. Project Argentina New Project Indonesia New Project Russia (W. Siberia New Proj.) Oman New Project Indigenous China (indigenous) Gas and Norway (pipe export) Piped Russia (E. Siberia) (pipe exp.) Imports Algeria (pipe export) EL:3 = =I I = =I l== 17 - 55% 47 - 64% 9 - 50% 19- 58% 24 - 48% 13- 71% 41 - 66% 37 - 89% 18% 26 - 91% 32 - 89% Coale 0 50 China Australia Indonesia Colombia Poland 100 I 1 I B 100 ICI I 1: IJ I Methane Share (excl. end use) 46 - 82% 12- 63% 5% 38 - 87% 73 - 75% 60 - 62% 25 - 27% 31 - 33% 31 - 33% End Use MI Gathering & Boosting Production III Gas Processing Transmission & Storage Liquefaction Shipping Regasification Refining (oil only) Land Transport Supply chain methane emissions Supply chain methane variability range I. Electric.-Or yen liquefaction plant assume. 2. For he lifecycle analysis of coal, methane observation data are not available. Therefore, the methane range has been assume as a sensitivity of the IPCC factors. aligned ath the range obLainect for gas analys,s Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 13 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Considering a 20-year GWP emphasizes the relative impact of methane emissions on lifecycle intensity differentials across the various fuels Lifecycle GHG Intensity of LNG, Oil, and Coal Delivered to the Destination Markets Assumed gCO2e/MJ, 20-year GWP LNG and natural gas 0 50 100 150 200 Methane Share (excl. end use) Oil (diesel oil) 0 50 100 150 Incremental US LNG US LNG Plant A i US LNG Plant B' US LNG Plant C 1 US LNG Plant D t US LNG Plant E 1 US LNG Plant F1 I 62% Saudi Arabia 59% 53% Iraq IN .___. _. 3 53% Norway 63% 59% Nigeria I -- Li Methane Share 200 (excl. end use) 31 - 68/O 21 - 67% 7% 32 - 83% Alternative LNG Sources Canada Accel. Project Mozambique Accel. Project' Qatar Accel. Project Argentina New Project Indonesia New Project Russia (W. Siberia New Proj.) Oman New Project Indigenous China (indigenous) Gas and Norway (pipe export) Piped Imports Russia (E. Siberia) (pipe exp.) Algeria (pipe export) I 11-. I I= D I =. I= I IM = = = 3 I= = 3 i- - - I I_ = = 3 34 - 77% 70 - 83% 19 - 73% 38 - 79% 46 - 72% 25 - 87% 65 - 84% 62 - 96% 38% 49 - 96% 57 - 96% Coale 0 50 China Australia Indonesia Colombia Poland 100 150 200 Im G ID 89 - 90% 81 - 83% 50 - 53% 52 - 54% 57 - 59% End Use Production Gathering & Boosting Gas Processing . Transmission & Storage Liquefaction Shipping Regasification Refining (oil only) Land Transport Supply chain methane emissions Supply chain methane variability range I. Electric.-Orven liquefaction plant assume. 2. For the lifecycle analysis of coal. methane ouservatior data are not available. Therefore, the methane range has been assume as a sensitivity of the IPCC factors. aligned wth the range obtained for gas analysis. Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 14 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Variations in methane intensities among gas sources are driven by country-specific emissions rate obtained from satellite observations and literature Midpoint Methane Intensity by Value Chain Intensity, %CH4 released / %CH4 in gas stream' US LNG `Extended Halt' Scenario Impact Alternative LNG sources Indigenous Gas and Piped Imports 3.00% 3.28% 3.48% 1.44% - _ 1.28% 128% 1.28% 1.40% 1.31%- 1.27% 1.66% 1.30% 1.52% 1.91% 1.57% 2.11% ., 0.07% US LNG Plant A US LNG US LNG US LNG US LNG Plant B Plant C Plant D Plant E . Production US LNG Plant F Canada Accel. Project . Gas Processing Argentina New Project Qatar Mozambique Russia Accel. Accel. (W. Project Project Siberia New Liquefaction Proj.) Oman New Project Indonesia New Project Gathering & Boosting V Transmission & Storage Shipping -- - US LNG average2 .. - 1. Methane emissions intensity expressed as methane emissions (on an energy basis) divided by methane content of the throughput, with marketable gas being the common denominator across the supply chain. 2. Weighted minimum and maximum methane across groups Source: S&P Global Algeria China Norway (pipe (indigenous) (pipe export) export) Minimum average2 Maximum average2 Russia (E. Siberia) (pipe exp.) S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 15 US plays delivering gas to Incremental LNG projects ye LNG sources Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Non-US feedstock gas is mostly sourced from large conventional reservoirs with lower fuel use requirements in production but often with higher methane uncertainty Well to Transmission GHG Intensity Methane Intensity' gCO2e/MJ 100yr GWP %, well-to-pipeline 0 10 20 30 40 W. Delaware Eagle Ford Haynesville US-shale gas weighted average: 9.9 gCO2e/MJ 0.75% 1.62% 1.08% W.Midland 1.64% Bone Spring 0.75% Well to Transmission GHG Intensity gCO2e/MJ 100-yr GWP Methane Intensity) %, well to pipeline 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Canada Accel. Project* Mozambique Accel. Project Qatar Accel. Project I 111 Argentina New Project* EIII Indonesia New Project Gas response weighted range: 6.2 -- 18.8 gCO2e/MJ 0.3 - 2.1% 0.9 - 1.9% 0.1 - 2.6% 0.4 - 2.9% 1.5 - 4.8% .42 Russia (W. Siberia New Prj) .gc I Oman New Project 1 0.05 - 4.8% 1.8 - 5.1% Marcellus Bakken Scoop/Stack 1.04% 0.97% 2.25% China (indigenous) 1 Norway (pipe export) Russia (E. Siberia pipe) Algeria (pipe export) 0.3 - 4.4% 0.07% 0.2 - 5.4% 0.4 - 7.2% III Production ill G&B Gas Processing Transmission Well -to-pipeline methane emissions j Well-to-pipeline methane variability range Note: Only pays contributing >100 mmcfid of production are shown. All US plays studied are unconventional gas sources. ' Denotes international unconventional gas sources. 1. Methane emissions intensity expressed as methane emissions (on an energy basis) divided by methane content of the throughput, with marketable gas being the common denorninaioi aci css the, supply cqair. Source: S&P Global data and moasurornonts Iron, TROPOMI S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 16 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions High-frequency, high-resolution methane flyover data available in the US indicates that upstream efforts to reduce methane emissions are gaining traction Oil and Gas Production Segment Current Methane Intensity Levels %CH4 released i %CH4 in gas stream1 Satellite-based (TROPOMI) Estimates 2023 2024 0.58 0.50 0.60 0.57 High-frequency and highresolution flyover observation data from Insight M can help attribute emissions to individual facilities, allowing a more granular understanding of trends within each play Flyover-based (Insight M) Measurements 2022 2023 -28%. 0.87 V 0.62 0.40 0.40 0.17 0.17 Near-zero industry targets 0.28%2 0.20%3 Haynesville Permian average Haynesville region Haynesville shale4 Permian average Flyover data show Haynesville shale wells are already at or below industry near-zero methane targets. Satellite and flyover data show a significant improvement in the Permian basin --a key source of feedstock for LNG exports t. Methane emissions intensity expressed as methane emissions (on an energy basis) divided by methane content of the iiiii..uyi put, wine niaib.etauia yasl..)e.ny the cununuu Uellutimietui acluss t to supply chain, 2. ONE Future Gualitiuli talyet i.,:vcit. ..tiLnt), 3. Neal -tew eitelyy allocated methane intensity. aligned with OGCI 0.20% target for gassy plays. 4. The Haynesville region has -5.000 welts producing from the Haynesville Shale versus -28.000 vertical wells producing from other formations Source: S&P Global data leveraging measurements from TROPOMI, Insight M S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 17 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Achieving near-zero methane emissions in the gas and LNG value chains would make coal replacing US LNG 77% more intensive in GWP100 terms Average Lifecycle GHG Intensity (Production to End Use) gCO2e/MJ, 100-yr GWP End use Supply chain Supply chain methane Near-zero supply chain methane intensity' Achieving near-zero methane intensity would mean: 0 Incremental US LNG (current) Incremental US LNG (near-zero methane) Alternative LNG (near-zero methane)2 Indigenous Gas and Piped Imports (near-zero methane)2 Coal 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 +65% +77% Reduction in GHG intensity of Alternative LNG and indigenous gas and piped imports that start from a higher intensity today Reduction in GHG intensity of Incremental US LNG Difference in GHG intensity between coal and US LNG (up from 65% under current methane intensity) 1. Near-zero energy allocated methane intensity, aligned w th OOO1 0.20% target for gassy plays. 2. Near-zero only for projects delivering to Europe Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 18 Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Differences in results of S&P's analysis and other studies are driven by emissions allocations to co-products, 20- vs. 100-year GWP, and methane intensity assumptions Supply Chain GHG Intensity Estimates Benchmarking (Excluding End Use) gCO2e/MJ 100-yr GWP (except where noted) Upstream Processing I Transmission Liquefaction Shipping (US to Europe) 0 Roman-White (2021) Abrahams (2015)' S&P LNG Impact Study Average NPC (2024) Zhu (2024) Marcellus NEIL (2019) Zhu (2024) Permian Howarth (2024) (20-yr GWP)1 2 ac Roman-White (2021) S&P LNG Impact Study Average O NPC (2024) Zhu (2024) Marcellus U) Rosselot (2021) East Texas NETL (2019) Zhu (2024) Permian Rosselot (2021) Permian3 ICF/API (2020) Abraham (2015) S&P LNG Impact Study Average Howarth (2024) (GWP-20)4 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 S&P Global analysis reflects the mix of intensities between all sources of gas for each LNG facility and of destination markets. In contrast, other studies shown consider singleplay sourcing and single destination markets The 2024 Howarth study is an outlier, mainly because it fully attributes methane emissions from the upstream and midstream sectors to the natural gas stream and thus overstates their impact on greenhouse gas intensity This is a crucial difference with all other studies that allocate emissions of each value chain segment to all co-products of that stage (oil, condensate, gas, NGLs) 1. The Abrahams (2015) and Hcwarth studies group upstream, processing. and transmission emissions into a single category, consolidated into 'Upstream' for this chart; 2. The Howarth study allocates all emissions to the gas stream instead of to all co-products on an energy basis. This study is also not explicit on a single destination market, but the results shown correspond to a 38-day trip; 3.The Rosselot study's results with allocation of all emissions to gas are 80 gCO2e/MJ for East Texas and 177 gCO2e/PAJ for the Permian; 4. The Howarth study assumes coal is used domestically and excludes coal shipping; Note: Most of these studies use a functional unit of MWh of electricity generated or delivered. To enable comparisons with our study, all intensity results were re-expressed in MJ of fuel delivered to the plant, using the power plant efficiency factor quoted in the study. Where not disclosed. we considered a 55% efficiency for gas-fired combined cycle power plants and 40% for coal-tired plants Source: S&P Global and published studies S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 19 Contents Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE Appendix Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG S&P Global O 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 20 Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG The regional impact of US LNG export value chain reaches all US states integration is extensive, broad and homegrown supply chain 9W The regional impact analysis builds on our Phase 1 study, which demonstrated that the Base Case outlook will support an annual average of 495K jobs and generate $1.3 trillion in US GDP from 2025 through 2040 - Phase 2 analysis focused on providing a view at the state and congressional district level The sourcing of inputs for the US LNG export value chain will impact states beyond the seven core producing states: Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico. Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia 37% of jobs and 30% of GDP contributions will occur in non-producing states in our Base Case S&P Global At the US congressional district level, the economic contributions will concentrate in districts with either (1) investment in natural gas exploration and production or (2) investment in liquefaction activities or (3) businesses within the extended supply chains serving the LNG export industry 0) 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 21 Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Growth in the US LNG export industry will utilize extended supply chains that involve both producing and non-producing states Representative spending categories Representative supplying states Industrial equipment & machinery Construction equipment Upstream field equipment Machines and cutting tools Medium / heavyduty trucks and equipment Compressors, generators and cryogenic heat exchangers Michigan Ohio Minnesota Illinois 00 00 00 Construction & well services Information technology Drilling wells support Operations support Upstream construction Pipeline construction Hardware Software IT services Liquefaction facilities construction Texas Louisiana Oklahoma Arkansas California Washington Texas Freight transportation Pipeline transportation Warehousing Texas Louisiana Illinois Materials Frac sand Chemicals Cement and concrete Steel and nonferrous metal Pipes and pipefittings gA Professional & other services Professional services Engineering services Equipment rental Financial services Pennsylvania Ohio Wisconsin New York California Texas Florida S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 22 Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG In the Base Case, 37% of the jobs supported by LNG exports to 2040 will be in non-producing states' Average annual jobs supported in the Base Case Annual average direct, indirect and induced jobs, 2025-2040 Both Texas and the aggregate non-producing states will see approximately the same number of jobs While the S938 billion of cumulative direct capital and operating spending will be focused on projects within the seven producing states, the follow-on indirect and 34K induced effects will result 183K in 37% of the jobs going to non-producing states 24K 30K 11W 183K 17K 6K 495K 183K Distribution of jobs, Base Case Texas Oklahoma Louisiana New Mexico Pennsylvania Ohio Jobs at risk, Extended Halt Scenario 41.5K 5.2K 5.0K 4.6K 4.2K 3.7K 1. Other key economic metrics such snow smiler distributions to non-producing states: 31% of sales activity and 30% of contribution to GDP accrue to non-producing states in the Base Case Scenario. S&P Global West Virginia 1.9K Non-producing states ( --37% ) 35.5K Total 101.4K 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 23 Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Economic impact from US LNG exports will span the US, focused on the producing states and the industrial mix of the Midwest, East and West Coasts State-level distribution of jobs, Base Case Scenario Average annual jobs, 2025 - 2040 State-level distribution of GDP per capita, Base Case Scenario Cumulative dollars of GDP per capita, 2025 - 2040 Average annual US jobs: 495K US cumulative GDP per capita: $3.8K S as, NH MA RI CT li att Producing states Non-producing states (avg 4.1K) On an absolute level, the distribution of jobs in non-producing states will show a "halo effect" around producing states S&P Global Producing states Non-producing states (avg $1.4K) When results are normalized such as GDP per capita the proportional economic impacts are more widespread 0 2026 by S&P Global Inc. 24 Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Congressional districts with major US LNG value chain activity have higher concentrations of jobs supported Jobs Supported by Congressional District: Southwestern Cluster Average, 2025 - 2040 Jobs Supported by Congressional District: Midwest/Mid-Atlantic Cluster Average, 2025 - 2040 Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence Congressional districts with major upstream plays -- Permian, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Utica. and Marcellus -- will have major economic implications. S&P Global 7 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 25 Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Congressional districts most benefited are in areas with the highest direct US LNG value chain activity, but gains are distributed throughout the US Cumulative GDP per capita in producing states $24.2K $18.3K $18.2K $17.9K $9.0K I $4.5K $3.5K NM TX LA OK WV PA OH _1. lc. Avg Cumulative GDP per capita, top 20 congressional districts in producing states $93.9K $55.6K S45.4K 9 $44.0K O H $43.1K $32.1K $30.7K 11C\ H $28.9K 1 0 O $28.4K 1 N 525.9K 1 H $24.6K 1 $23.9K 1 Ooo z 322.3K I I-- $22.2K I CO H $21.1K I csr $20 1K $18.6K $18.3K $18.2K NUNN C\ r-- - 1- $18.1K co Cumulative GDP per capita, top 10 non-producing states' $10.1K Cumulative GDP per capita, top 20 congressional districts in non-producing states $12.4K 510.9K $10.3K $10.2K $2.4K $2.3K $2.3K $2.2K $2.0K $2.0K $2.0K $1.7K $1.6K $1.4K 66.6K $5.9K $4.7K $3.6K 63.5K S3.5K $3.4K $3.4K $3.1K $3.0K $2.9K $2.8K $2.8K $2.8K 11 NM AR IN DC KS IL MN ND WY UT CO US Avg 11 0 0 0co 9 OC th z i OC 5- 2 z Units: cumulative GDP per capita, 2025 - 2040, in thousands of real 2024 dollars 0 r- u7 to 0 co 0 z 1. The strong economic response of Arkansas on the state and congressional distnct levels is due to the role it will play as a key provider of upstream support services. The response of the New York congressional districts is due to the role they will play in providing financial and businesses services. S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 26 Contents Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE Appendix Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG S&P Global O 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 27 Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE Unlocking the full potential of Marcellus and Utica shale gas through additional pipeline capacity would lead to lower prices and consumer savings, particularly in the Northeast The Northeast has vast amounts of low-cost resources with the Marcellus and Utica shales a cornerstone of natural gas supply in the United States, representing 1/3 of the US Lower 48's total production in 2025, up from less than 1/4 ten years ago The region has more than 620 Tcf of commercial gas resources, or enough to supply the entire US market for 17 years and the Northeast region for 77 years at current demand levels AAA S&P Global Due to pipeline constraints, the Marcellus is being developed at a suboptimal rate (2% of resource per year being produced) Lack of access to this low-cost gas has pushed gas prices at Boston, Chicago and New York up to 160% higher than the national gas marker, Henry Hub, (and elsewhere in the US) in peak months feeding into higher electricity prices to consumers Expanding Northeast exit capacity by 6.1 Bcf/d could reduce Henry Hub gas prices by -$0.20/MMBtu, 1/3 more than the impact of a US LNG `Extended Halt' Scenario at similar volumes Northeast markets see 20% to 30% gas price declines - $2.25/MMBtu in Boston and $1.23/MMBtu in New York in peak months Cumulative savings to 2040 reach $76 billion, far exceeding the estimated $14 billion in capital costs necessary for the pipeline expansions 72025 by S&P Global Inc. 28 Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE The Northeast has vast amounts of low-cost gas resources, much of which is at risk of underdevelopment due to natural gas pipeline bottlenecks Lower 48 US Onshore Commercial Gas Resources by Play' $/MMBtu, Tcf of gas resource Marcellus & Utica Plays Other 10 5 1 $55 Breakeven cost of supply ($/MMBtu) 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 1,500 1,600 1,700 The Marcellus & Utica plays have 620 Tcf of commercial -5 - gas resources or enough to supply the entire US market for 17 years at current demand levels -10 Tcf of gas resource 1 Commercial ges resources are remaining recoverable volumes. economical at referred prices, that broadly align with 1P and 2P reserves but reflect a longer-term development outlook. Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights. S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 29 Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE Despite having 620 Tcf of low-cost gas resources, pipeline constraints have caused Northeast and Midwest gas prices to be higher than Henry Hub over the last 15 years Historical Natural Gas Prices - Northeast and Midwest Winter Peak Month Analogue (January) for the 2010 - 2024 Period $/MMBtu, Real 2024 Gas prices have been up to 160% higher than Henry Hub in Boston, New York and Chicago since 2010 for peak winter heating season and maximum pipeline constraints $11.24 $10.52 $4.27 $4.71 Henry Hub Source: S&P Global Commodity Insight: S&P Global Boston (Algonquin New York Chicago City Gate City Gate) (Transco Zone 6) O 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 30 Unleashing the Marcelius & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE The addition of several pipeline expansion corridors would bring more low-cost resources to consumers throughout the eastern US Northeast Egress Capacity Expansions Proposed in "NE Pipeline Expansion" Scenario -- Total 6.1 Bcf/d expansions Capacity additions in Bcf/d and assumed in-service year 0.3 Bcf/d expansion to MidWest markets and into Chicago City Gate coming online in 2030 + 0.25 + 0.5 0.5 Bcf/d additional capacity into New York and 1.0 Bcf/d expansion to New England going into Boston City Gate. In-service 2029 and 2030 respectively 2.8 Bcf/d additional capacity to the Gulf Coast via smaller expansions in four major systems coming online in the 2028 - 2031 period Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights. S&P Global ATLANTIC OCEAN Capacity Expansions Marcellus Basin Utica Basin Pipeline 1.6 Bcf/d expansion to Southeastern markets via Mountain Valley and the Southgate expansion coming online in 2028 and 2029 respectively 0) 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 31 Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica; Pipeline Constraints in the NE Northeast pipeline expansions would reduce gas prices across the entire US Lower 48, leading to a Henry Hub price reduction of 4% ($0.20/MMBtu) in the 2028 -- 2040 period Henry Hub Annual' Real 2024 Price Real 2024 $/MMBtu 7 -- -- Extended Halt Case Base Case 6 NE Pipeline Expansion 5 4 Henry Hub Annual' Price Differential Real 2024 $/MMBtu 1.0 -- -- Extended Halt NE Pipeline Expansions 0.5 NE pipeline expansions result in a price reduction that is 1/3 more than a US LNG Extended Halt with similar volumetric impact 0.0 3 2 1 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 Average 2028 -- 2040 [$/MMBtu] Base Case $4.44 NE Pipeline Expansion $4.24 Extended Halt Case $4.29 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 Note: I . Annual average of monthly modeled prices for each scenario Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights S&P Global -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 Average 2028 -- 2040 [$/MMBtu] NE Pipeline Expansion - $0.20 Extended Halt Case - $0.15 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 O 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 32 Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE These pipeline expansions would particularly benefit more constrained and higher priced NE markets, reducing prices up to 30% in peak months and 17-27% on average to 2040 Relevant Gas Hubs Chicago CG Henry Hub fif Transco Z4 Got? of Mexico Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights Algonquin CG Transco Z6 NY ATLANTIC OCEAN Gas Hubs Marcellus Basin OM Utica Basin Pipeline Change in Natural Gas Prices January Average - 2028 to 2040 Real 2024 $/MMBtu Base Case NE Pipeline Expansions 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Annual % Reduction Higher impact as seasonal demand spikes are alleviated by incremental capacity Limited impact aligned with lower scope for expansion (Midwest) and Henry Hub price impact (Southeast) . 5% , 5.01 4.78 -29% 7.69 5.44 -19% 6.56 5.32 -5% 4.71 4.47 -6% 4.98 4.69 Henry Hub -4% Boston (Algonquin City Gate) 27% NY (Transco Zone 6) - 17% Chicago (City Gate) /0 Southeast (Transco Zone 4) S&P Global (:) 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 33 Unleashing the Marcellus & Utica: Pipeline Constraints in the NE Northeast gas pipeline debottlenecking would result in cumulative savings of $76 billion to 2040 to gas consumers relative to $14 billion of capital required for pipeline expansion Northeast US Pipeline Expansion Summarized Results - 2028 to 2040 period Real 2024 $ New England NY / New Jersey Midwest Southeast Capexl Estimated $4.3 B % Decrease in wholesale prices 27% $0.5 B -17O/O $0.6 B 40/0 $2.5 B 50/0 Total Annual Savings less Opex2 $1.02 B $1.41 B $0.93 B $1.14 B Most regions have higher annual household savings than the estimated $11 from a US LNG Extended Halt. Household Gas Savings3 $/year Cumulative $110 $1,435 $63 $17 $13 $813 $220 $170 In addition to residential savings of $15B, gas consumers in the power, industrial and commercial sectors realize $27B, $22B and $12B savings respectively during the period Gulf Coast $6.4 B 4O/O $1.36 B 0- $118 Total: $14.3 B Total: $5.86 B 2028 - 2040 savings: -$76 B On top of the direct gas related savings, Households would also benefit from lower electricity prices 1.Capex estimation based on analogues of historical expansions In the specific legions andior public Wings, a Annual sayings rule, to savings for all gas consumers, incluuing iusirJui muushiai, puwei 4mi ulbers. These are net of incremental operating costs for expanded capacty: 3. Considers residential demand and gas consuming households per region, calculated as discount in gas price ($/MtviBtu) multiplied by average consumption per pas-consuming residence for the 2028 - 2040 period. Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, EIA S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 34 Contents Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE Appendix Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG S&P Global C. 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 35 Appendix - Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions The study evaluates emissions intensity across energy sources by analyzing supply chain segments and considering direct emissions Goal and Functional Units Scope Goal: To estimate the impact on life-cycle GHG emissions of the US LNG 'Extended Halt' Scenario and the global energy response described in Phase 1, where US LNG exports are replaced by various other fuels and renewable electricity in selected target markets. Functional unit: 1 MJ (lower heating value) of each fuel/energy source delivered to an end use point near an LNG regasification terminal in the destination country. The results are expressed in terms of gCO2e/MJ. End Use: The energy efficiency of the end use (e.g. gas vs. coal power plant efficiency) was considered in the global energy balance model used in Phase 1. In Phase 2, the quantity of each fuel is taken as given, and therefore GHG impacts are compared on a delivered basis, not accounting for differences in the efficiency of end use (e.g., power plant heat rates). Boundary: This study estimates the GHG intensity of each segment of the value chain for each fuel from production to end use combustion, accounting for volume/energy losses in each segment and producing an aggregated lifecycle intensity that is then multiplied by the variation in volume of each fuel identified in Phase 1. Emission sources: CO2 and CH4 direct emissions' from combustion, flaring, venting and fugitives are presented using their 100year global warming potentials (AR6 GWP100) used for UNFCCC reporting. GWP20 results are also shown in this appendix. Critical Supply Chain Segments US upstream: The volume and GHG intensity of natural gas supplied from each US play flowing to each US LNG facility impacted is used to determine the weighted average upstream and midstream emissions. The gas pathing analysis is based on current and expected physical flows and has been calibrated using the expert opinion of S&P Global gas analysts. Shipping routes: Shipping emissions for each fuel are based on a weighted average of the distance from the supply source (LNG facility, oil terminal, coal mine) to all the consumption markets impacted. For LNG exports, the destination markets are derived from both existing contractual agreements and forecast flows. Shipping emissions account for the total distance between ports, the fleet makeup, and typical vessel characteristics. Methane: Across each segment of the supply chain for each fuel, methane emissions were analyzed based on the data available during the time of this analysis, starting with remote observational data (i.e. historic data from previous observation campaigns captured via satellite and flyover), followed by reported, literature-based, and modeled emissions using standard factors. 1This analysis excludes other greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide, that are relatively minor contributors to GHG intensity for the fuels under analysis S&P Global CO 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 36 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Emissions from incremental US LNG exports in the Base Case are 18 to 35 MtCO2e (GWP1001) lower per year than the alternative energy sources modelled GHG Emissions Corresponding to the Impacted US LNG Exports and the Potential Global Energy Response' Million tCO2e, 100-yr GWP . yearly average 2028-2040 for the range of methane intensities Methane uncertainty range Emissions of the global energy response that would replace incremental US LNG exports 35 8 160 18 Incremental US LNG exports in the Base Case 27 154 1 62 2 The difference between 172 scenarios is 41 -87 MtCO2e considering GWP201 Coal Indigenous Gas Oil Renewables. Alternative Global Energy Net Global Incremental and Piped Imports Nuclear & Others LNG Sources Response Total Change2 US LNG2 1. Global Warming Potential (MVP) is a measure used to compare the impact of different greenhouse gases on global warming. It quantifies the heat a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere over a specific time period. relative to carbon dioxide (CO2), which has a GWP of 1. See the appendix for full results in 20-yr GWP; 2. The volume of impacted LNG exports at risk and the response of the global energy system are based on the results of Phase 1; 3. Midpoint methane intensity represents the middle of the modeled methane uncertainly range. For results on the full range of methane uncertainty, sea appendix Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 37 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions We evaluated the typical segments of the LNG supply chain, which includes additional segments with significant energy requirements beyond the natural gas supply chain Natural gas value chain Liquefied natural gas (LNG) value chain i=? Production Pipelines Liquefaction Shipping Regasification End Use' Exploration Development Production Gathering Processing Long- Distance Transmission Main sources of GHG emissions2 Methane vents and leaks (higher uncertainty) Treating / Stripping Liquefaction Storage Loading Energy intensive segment Shipping Trucking Receiving Storage Vaporizing Transport to market Fuel use (mostly CO2 from combustion) Methane vents and leaks Combustion for heat or electricity (Petrochemical use) Flaring CO2 vented CO2 vented Lifecycle GHG emissions CO2e - 20-25% 75 - 80% I. BLAI i the ndIulal yds and LNG value chain typically Include a local distribution segment atter long-distance transmission or regasification and before delivery to the final point of consumption. This study assumes delivery of natural gas. LNG, and alternative lues to a point adjacent to the regasitication terminal or transmission line to simplify comparisons across fuels. Petrochemical use is not included In the illustration of fitecycle GHG intensity. 2. Key typical sources of emissions shown, but individual plays can vary significantly from the average, Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 39 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions In the oil value chain, methane emissions in the production segment dominate, while refining remain the most energy-intensive segments rit Production Shipping Processing Exploration Development Production Transport Main sources of GHG emissions Lifecycle GHG emissions CO2e Methane vents and leaks (high uncertainty) Flaring CO2 vented Shipping Receiving Storage Refining Transport to market Energy intensive segments -- Fuel use (mostly CO2 from combustion) - 14-33% 1.This study assumes delivery of oil and alternative fuels to a point adjacent to the oil refinery or transmission line to simplify comparisons across fuels. Petrochemical use is not Included in the Illustration of lifecycle GHG intensity. Source: S&P Global S&P Global End Use1 Combustion for heat or electricity (Petrochemical uses) - 67 - 86% CO 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 40 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions For coal most of the supply chain GHG emissions are due to logistics and operations, except for subsurface mines where methane plays a larger role Production Mining Extraction Post-mining Processing Storing Moving Transportation' Land transportation via truck or rail Shipping Receiving Storage Transport to market Main sources of GHG emissions Energy intensive segment Methane vents (higher in underground mines) Fuel use (mostly CO2 from combustion) Lifecycle GHG emissions CO2e - 5 - 14% 1 The model considers land transportation from mine to port (for exports) or mine to plant (for internal supply) and from port to plant for receiving countries. which occurs atter shipping. Source: S&P Global S&P Global Combustion for heat or electricity - 86 - 95% 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 41 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Data sources for LNG GHG emission intensity estimates by country (1 of 2) Unconventional Gas Drilling & Completion Production Gathering & Boosting Gas Processing Transmission & Storage Cninft Istinn emissions Flaring emissions Liquefaction Shipping & Regasification Methane emissions End Use Transportation & Combustion United States Canada S&P Global IMPACT: enhanced S&P Global Center of Emissions Excellence (CofEE): Emission factor based on EPA and emissions model calibrated against EPA other reported data S&P Global IMPACT: enhanced emissions model calibrated against EPA CofEE: Emission factor developed based on EPA reported data Measurement-informed estimates' based on TROPOMI and Insight M data assigned to value chain segments using EPA reported data S&P Global IMPACT: enhanced emissions model calibrated against EPA Reported data based on similar Alberta operations CofEE's EF with reported data3 S&P Global IMPACT: enhanced emissions model calibrated against EPA Based on VIIRS observation and EF derived from high-reliability reported data in US and Canada CofEE's EF & literature N/A Emission factors CofEE's EF & literature N/A OPGEE emissior factors N/A N/A OPGEE emission factors N/A Measurement-informed estimates' based on TROPOMI data assigned to value chain segments using EPA and other reported data Emission factors N/A Based on analogue US plays taken from S&P Global IMPACT Analogue from US emission factors CofEE's EF with reported data3 CofEE's EF & literature OPGEE emission factors Argentina Based on VIIRS observation and EF derived from high-reliability reported data in US and Canada N/A N/A Measurement-informed estimates based on GHGSat and TROPOMI data assigned to value chain segments using EPA and other Emission factors N/A reported data 1 TROPOMI estimates developed by S&P Global Center of Emissions Excellence and S&P Global Data Science team: 2 Liquefaction methane emission factor based on GHGSat and literature; 3 Leveraging average energy factors when no specific project data is available S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 42 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Data sources for LNG (2 of 2) Conventional Gas Drilling & Completion Production Gathering & Boosting Gas Processing Transmission & Storage Russia, Oman, Qatar, Indonesia, and other int. gas Modeled in S&P Global QUE$TOR N/A Based on VIIRS observation Satellite measurements, reported data, and EF N/A GMloobdaelleQdUiEn$ST&OPR N/A N/A BaosbesdeorvnaVtioIInRS N/A N/A Satellite, reported, & N/A EF Modeled in S&P Global QUE$TOR N/A GMloobdaelleQdUiEn$ST&OPR N/A Mozambique N/A (subsea completions) N/A Based on VIIRS N/A observation N/A (subsea completions) N/A Satellaiten,drEepForted, 1. Liquefaction methane emission factor based on GHGSat and literature; 2. Leveraging average energy factors when no specific protect data is available N/A S&P Global Cr)mh! istinn errissions Flaring emissions Liquefaction Shipping & Regasification Methane emissions End Use Transportation & Combustion EF developed with reported data (CofEE)2 CofEE's EF & literature OPGEE emission factors CofEE emission N/A N/A factors Measurement informed' & emission factors EF developed with reported data (CofEE)2 Emission factors CofEE's EF & literature N/A OPGEE emission factors CofEE emission N/A N/A factors Measurement informed' & Emission factors N/A emission factors 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 43 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Data sources for other fuels Oil and Coal Upstream Midstream Oil (all countries) S&P Global Center of Emissions Excellence estimated modeled factors by crude grades Satellite measurements and emission factor Emissions modeled Coal (all N/A countries) UNFCCC emission factors Emissions modeled N/A N/A Emissions modeled N/A N/A S&P Global Downstream Combustion emissions Flaring emissions Methane emissions End Use Volume Allocations CofEE modeled factors N/A Emission factors N/A N/A UNFCCC emission factors include stockpile emissions OPGEE & EPA emission factors N/A N/A OPGEE & EPA emission factors N/A N/A Total shipped oil exports from source countries via Commodities at Sea Total destination import shares via Envisage/Global Gas analysis Total destination import shares via Envisage/Global Gas analysis 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 44 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions In the US, S&P Global leveraged TROPOMI satellite observation-based estimates of methane intensity US Upstream Methane Intensity Benchmarking o/ of gas produced Barnett Bakken Anadarko Eagle Ford shale - Appalachian shale Marcellus - a Haynesville shale o Permian ;a SO S&P Global. 2023 (Insight M) 1 2 S&P Global, 2022 (Insight M) S&P Global, 2023 (Insight M) 1. See next slide for details of academic studies considered Source: S&P Global and published studies \ 3 4 S&P Global, 2022 (Insight M) S&P Global 5 9 Academic literature' 2014 -- 2017 2018 - 2021 2022 2023 2024 TROPOMI. 2023 TROPOMI, 2024 S&P Global estimates 10 11 Methane intensity, O/O (:) 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 45 Appendix - Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Overview of global methane emission studies considered Location Study Sherwin et al. MethaneAlR United States Chen et al. Omara et al. Peischl et al. Caulton et al. Chen et al. International Source: Published studies Zichong et al. Lechtenbohmer et al. Kleinberg, R. L. S&P Global Year published 2024/2025 2024 2022 2016 2015 2014 2023 2024 2007 2022 Basins considered (US only) Barnett Denver Julesburg Anadarko Appalachian Bakken Barnett Marcellus Permian Denver Julesburg Eagle Ford Fayetteville Haynesville Permian Anadarko Eagle Ford Appalachian Haynesville Barnett Marcellus Fayetteville Marcellus Haynesville Marcellus Countries covered Argelia Iraq Qatar China Russia Russia Oman Saudi Arabia 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 46 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions For international plays, GHGSat and Sentinel-2 plumes were used to estimate average emission rates and leak duration for certain value chain segments and asset types Methane Intensity Methodology for GHGSat and Sentinel-2 Data Analysis 0 Analysis and attribution of CH4 plumes to facilities All plumes were attributed to the closest O&G asset/infrastructure - Assets were categorized into LNG plants, gas plants, pipelines and upstream' Estimation of leak duration For each asset with adequate plume and null observations, the duration of the plume was estimated using the midpoint method For non-observed plumes under the threshold duration was estimated based on typical leak durations for similar assets and similar size plumes ble NuIIIn..1.0 1 orpoki Wend lO4,11..I . 0 Define % of non-observed plumes Assumed GHGSat and Sentinel-2 detection threshold is approximately 100 kgCH4/hr and 1,000 kgCH4/hr, respectively A statistical distribution of O&G plumes was defined using the distribution of O&G plumes in the Permian basin from similar assets obtained from Insight M and select academic papers2 Calculated the % of nonobserved plumes for each asset type and detection threshold 100 % non-observed (,) 80 .,,2, 60 .1 40 20 0 4100 500 >1,000 Detection threshold (kg/hr) 0 Calculate adjusted CH4 volumes CH4 volume is calculated using the plume rate and estimated leak duration The % of unobserved plumes is applied to the total CH4 volume, not the plume rate Calculated the adjusted CH4 volumes by asset and country, using the following formula: Volume of detected plumes 1 -- % undetected plumes 0 Estimate intensity Assumed Sentinel-2 coverage includes all O&G assets in each country analyzed (total of 15 in Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia) GHGSat coverage includes O&G assets in Argentina, West Siberia, Oman, Indonesia, as well as global LNG facilities onstream Calculated CH4 intensity by energy content by normalizing the methane volume with the production or throughput3 for the corresponding assets included in the area of interest for detection Estimated % of CH4 released divided by CH4 in the gas stream 1. The Upstream segment includes storage infrastructure, wells, and fields: 2. Distribution of observed 2022 and 2023 Permian basin methane emissions; 3. Prcducbon used to normalize Sentinel-2 plumes corresponds to the total production of the observed country, while production used to normalize GHGSat plumes corresponds only to the production or throughput of the specific assets in the area of interest. The throughput used to normalize pipelines was estimated using the capacity of compressor stations, gas processing plants. electric plants, or industrial plants in the corresponding pipeline system Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 47 Appendix - Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions 70% of total CH4 upstream and midstream emissions come from facilities emitting at rates >100 kg/h, hence the importance of adjusting emissions from satellite observations Methane Intensity Results for GHGSat and Sentinel-2 Data Analysis 0 Plume size (kg/hr): Average leak duration by plume size' < 10 10 -- 100 100 -- 1,000 > 1,000 Detection threshold (kg/hr): % Unobserved plumes assumed < 10 10 -100 100 -1,000 > 1,000 LNG plants 90 days 22 days 17 days 6 days LNG plants 0% N/A2 10% 50% Gas plants 90 days 65 days 50 days 6 days Gas plants 0% N/A2 10% 50% Upstream 90 days 71 days 54 days 6 days Upstream 0% 23% 37% 77% Pipelines 90 days 70 days 53 days 6 days Pipelines 0% N/A2 37% N/A2 :1. For detection threshold of < 10 kg/h and >1,000 kWh it is assumed that all value chain segments will have similar durations as the upstream segment: 2. Not available information. Data not calculated Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 48 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Methane intensity estimates informed by Sentinel-2 plume detection (adjusted for its high sub-threshold detection using Permian basin distribution) are aligned with expectations Sentinel-2 Estimated Upstream Methane Intensities for Selected Regions Country Algeria Iran Libya Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE May-Nov 2024 O&G Production' Million boe 258 710 230 351 153 1,919 637 May-Nov 2024 CH4 Plume Emissions ktGH4/yr 3,860 1,555 1,836 1,307 162 2,823 434 Methane Emission Intensity %CH4 released I %CH4 in gas stream 5.46% 2.30% 8.06% 3.95% 1. Production adjusted based on Senlinel-2 analysis tImeirame between May 2024 to November 2024 Source: S&P Global S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 49 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Methane intensity of the international energy response is more uncertain given the limited availability to frequent and reliable measurement data Select Sentinel-2 and GHGSat Observed Methane Plumes with Underlying Oil and Gas Assets from S&P Global Upstream Database Select Sentinel-2 and GHGSat observed methane plumes with underlying oil and gas assets Observed methane plumes by satellite GFIGS,* Oil andgasinfrastructure a LNG tiquelactsail plants Gosprocessing plants - Gaspmetnes a AA .0 F.ai t, ,:* e I,.oft., ." ,,, A Region Haynesville (2022) Haynesville (2023) Permian (2023) Methane Detection Source Insight M Insight M Insight M Estimated Coverage (Billion Pixels) 14.3 36.1 318.9 Permian (2024) Insight M 281.9 Middle East Sentinel -- 2 13.1 - 41.;* tea a.4t .e 24. e . .te..t is .. Other Asia Sentinel -- 2 9.3 North Africa Sentinel -- 2 7.5 Yamal Peninsula (West GHGSat 0.2 Siberia, Russia) Source: Sentinel.2; GHGSat; S&P Global Commodity Insights, Upstream Content. Data crimpled Feb. 27, 2025. Gtit4r f, M ?xi: I'S- c.,; ,01,.,44 ',MI, I 0,1e",.^Ty +.0,rI. ^ ^,k040 4PflnetIdtenreMrnmfirneno.40........0..0Ine.......t ,.... , , 00 , -, ... -000......f..~.0 Vaca Muerta (Argentina) GHGSat 0.04 Sentinel-2 data coverage for: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt. Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman. Qatar. Saudi Arabia. Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan. United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan. between June and November 2024; GHGSat data obtained for Western Siberia, Oman, Qatar, global active LNG plants and select coal mines in Indonesia and Australia for January to December 2023 (not all areas shown on the map). Pixel count based on a spatial resolution of 20 m for Sentinel-2's B12 band that is sensitive to methane; 25 in fur GHGSat, and approximately "I in for InsightM's Leak Surveyor instiument Source: S&P Global with publicly available methane plumes data obtained from the European Space Agency's Sentinel-2 satellites and methane plume data acouired from GHGSat. O&G infrastructure data from S&P Global's international E&P database. S&P Global 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 50 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Failure to follow standard LCA approach of allocating emissions between co-products based on energy content leads to a significant overestimation of gas GHG intensity Academic Studies Surveyed and their Main Parameters Study The greenhouse gas footprint of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exported from the United States Reducing GHG Emissions from the U.S. Natural Gas Supply Chain Author(s) Howarth, Robert W. National Petroleum Council (NPC) Date Published Geography Covered GHG Emissions Allocation Approach October 2024 US exports using a world-average Emissions fully allocated to the gas voyage time (38-day roundtrip) production stream April 2024 US exports to Europe and Asia Allocation on energy basis between the key co-products LNG Supply Chains: A Supplier-Specific Life-Cycle Assessment Roman-White et al. for Improved Emission Accounting August 2021 US exports to China and Europe Allocation on energy basis between the key co-products and fully to gas separately Geospatial Life Cycle Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from US Liquefied Natural Gas Supply Chains Zhu et. al Comparing greenhouse gas impacts from domestic coal and imported natural gas electricity generation in China Rosselot at. al Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions From U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports: Implications for End Uses Abrahams et. al Source: Published studies S&P Global 2024 2021 2015 US exports to China and Europe US exports to China Allocation on energy basis between the key co-products Allocation on energy basis between the key co-products and fully to gas separately US and Russia exports to Europe Not explicit 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 51 Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Our estimate of coal GHG intensity reflects the type of mine and coal produced in the largest suppliers to the destination markets impacted under the LNG Halt scenario Main Drivers of Coal GHG Emissions Intensity Case Comparison: China vs. Indonesia Type of mine Underground Surface Bituminous Methane IPCC factor 25 m3/ton 0 -0.75 g'MJ 0.3 m3/ton 0.009 g/MJ 27.8 China Indonesia Typical type of mine Underground (high depth) Surface Typical types of coal Lignite and bituminous Sub-bituminous and bituminous Moisture percentage 10/O 20% and 100/0 Type of coal Shipping distance Sub-bituminous Lignite Asia 4 Asia Asia 4 Europe Heat content (MJ/kg) Emission factor (gCO2e/MJ) 19.9 14.9 1.03 3.18 GHG emissions intensities gCO2e/MJ (100-yr GWP) Upstream 11.5 IN China Indonesia End use 108 112 America 4 Europe 1.54 Low impact on OC; emissions Legend: I 4. High impact on emissions 2.4 Mining Note: Coal source countries and mine types were selected based on current trade flows to the selected destination markets Impacted by the LNG Halt in Phase I Source: S&P Global internal modelling assumptions and IPCC emissions factors 5.9 4.3 Operational Combustion S&P Global 0)2025 by S&P Global Inc. 52 Contents Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Transcending Boundaries: The Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Unleashing Marcellus & Utica: Easing Pipeline Constraints in the NE Appendix Appendix -- Beyond the Pause: US LNG Impact on Global GHG Emissions Appendix - Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG S&P Global O 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 53 Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Economic impact methodology: overview Economic impact estimates -- including the direct, indirect, and induced effects of US LNG activity -- were generated for the US and 50 states and Washington DC. Direct spending, initiated when firms engage local suppliers with operational and capital expenditures, initiates the economic impact sequence. Direct suppliers engage with their suppliers, which begins the indirect contribution cycle. Direct and indirect output contributions support corresponding levels of GDP. employment (jobs), wages and taxes. Induced economic activity is initiated by the employees in the extended supply chain spending in their local communities. The method of estimating this activity is based on inter-industry relationships captured by national and state input-output tables. Direct economic contributions (from spending with local businesses) 0 Direct spending is the catalyst Value generated is revenue on-going industry operations, or less non-labor input costs 4,... capex Investment cycles, or Changes to current o erating environments A portion of value added is used to hire and pay wages to employees Indirect economic contributions \ (from follow-on supply chain activity) Spending wi h supp iers stimulates economic contributions throughout the local supp y chains \., Taxes ICE Cinduced economic contributions \ (from workers re-spending wages) Corporate and personal income taxes o ir Contributions due to direct and indirect workers spending some of their wages locally S&P Giobat (:) 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 54 Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Building the national economic impact model 10 tables link the buying and selling relationships between producers and consumers within an economy. They underlie all economic impact analyses. In essence, 10 tables are matrices of inter-industry flows of goods and services produced domestically and imported. Economic transactions occur at the intersection of a column (purchasing activity) and a row (sales activity). All values within the red border of the diagram represent exchanges between industries The industry relationships expressed in the 10 table are the basis for the multipliers used in calculating the indirect activity initiated by US LNG value chain spending. S&P Global Market Intelligence uses its own proprietary data and public data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics to assemble the state and US models. Using the inputs assembled from domestic spending data, the models can estimate the indirect and induced output attributable LNG activity. Lneur.Vy 1. A Indutlry 2. Ominimr.1 lockr.lry 45. ffi n4.51/y 1 A ', schwas 1, 01..rohes Pischr...11:12 union ..or. I ... NIVIMMIk145erci.e4 hm,/ , Inter.Saies, di Xi -71 rtfAl lfy 2' P.rcniki. PO 1mOtt -. Inell.: a -. ... 0 RNAn./ IV 45.00. 'gm.. = inEer.SaIes2 d, -. .... lonfly 457 O P.ICNIA4 il0 1.104 ',OnIx/ 4$ Kirlf.tef rill425mcAot 405 NI -. P..r.Aar..: kJ 45 4.4/. 4011M1 45 = Inter.SaIes,i cl.45 x45 Inter.Plireh, Irtes.PurCli, Hier Plgicle47, Inter. V Inter. L., Sales -- Parch. S&P Global. 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 55 Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Building the state economic impact models S&P Global Market Intelligence used a standard matrix balancing process known as the RAS method to transform the BEA's national US models into companion sets of state models. The RAS method iteratively scales and rebalances first the rows and then the columns of the Direct Requirements Matrix (a version of the 1O table called the A matrix below) until the coefficients converge to a create matrix that produces a balanced response to a targeted level of regional output. This means that for a targeted level of state output, the sum of direct state intermediate purchases equals the sum of direct state intermediate demand. Once the new, state 1O table is balanced and reflects its industry composition, state-specific multipliers are created. US 2022 A Matrix S&P Global Matrix multiply Yields Intermediate Matrix State gross output diagonal matrix A Do row and column Yes sums meet thresholds? No Updated A Matrix 4 Matrix multiply By intermediate matrix Calculate scale factors Create state multipliers Final State A Matrix 0) 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 56 Appendix - Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Building the state economic impact models (cont.) S&P Global supplemented its state 10 tables with a multi-regional input output model (MRIO). The MRIO model approach allows estimation of indirect and induced economic effects in states without direct spending by capturing inter-state economic linkages and spillover effects, thus providing a more complete understanding of regional economic dynamics. The basis of the MRIO is a gravity model to estimate trade flows. It considers the distance between states and the GDP of the industries involved as independent variables. Industry and state-specific interstate trade flow totals are first determined by comparing the total intra-state spending (estimated in the state RAS process) with the proportion of goods imported from outside the US. The state/industry's gross output less intrastate spending and imports equals the total interstate spending. Essentially, all goods/services that are not sourced from within the state but are sourced from within the country are assumed to be interstate trade flows. The formula is displayed below. That interstate trade total is distributed among states/industries based on the gravity model coefficients. Gs,i = Gross output of state s for industry i Is,i = Total intra-state spending in state s for industry i (estimated in the state RAS process) Ms,i = Total imports of goods from outside the US for state s and industry i Ts,i = Total interstate spending for state s and industry i The relationship can be expressed as: Ts,i = Gs,i - Is,i - Ms,i S&P Global 7 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 57 Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG US Economic impacts of LNG activity, 2025-2040 Base Case (cumulative real 2024$ or jobs) Total jobs supported (annual avg.) Total 495,373 Direct 128,356 Indirect 147,401 Induced 219,616 Halt Case (cumulative real 2024$ or jobs) Total jobs supported (annual avg.) Total 101,513 Direct 29,372 Indirect 29,013 Induced 43,128 Gross Domestic Product ($M) 1,299,029 470,818 439.422 388,788 Gross Domestic Product ($M) 251,447 89,544 85,354 76,549 GDP per capita 3,764 1,364 1,273 1,126 GDP per capita 729 259 247 222 Data compiled Feb. 10. 2025. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence 2025 S&P Global. S&P Global 7 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 58 Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Economic impacts by state in base case, 2025-2040 (cumulative real 2024$ or average annual jobs) State Texas Oklahoma Louisiana New Mexico California Pennsylvania Ohio Arkansas Illinois Florida Indiana New York Michigan Minnesota Tennessee West Virginia Georgia North Carolina Kansas Virginia Maryland Wisconsin Washington New Jersey Colorado Total Jobs Supported 182,830 33,833 29,791 24,190 20,495 19,422 16,814 14,997 11,231 10,779 7,657 7,506 7,130 6,689 6,622 5,933 5,795 5,292 5,178 5,163 5,156 4,664 4,646 4,351 4,235 Gross State Product ($M) 599,732 72,146 80,563 48,483 49,569 58,300 41,526 30,163 26,266 21,028 16,593 24,801 13,994 11,978 10,119 14,848 13,785 12,436 6,203 8,730 8,859 9,468 10,651 9,285 10,390 Data compiied Feb. 10, 2025. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence 2025 S&P Global. S&P Global GSP per capita 18,282 17,893 18,213 24,213 1,236 4,528 3,542 10,094 2,168 809 2,422 1,288 1,425 2,017 1,360 9,046 1,153 1,078 2,275 984 1,378 1,620 1,296 978 1,624 State South Carolina Utah Missouri Arizona Kentucky Massachusetts Alabama Oregon Mississippi Iowa Nevada Connecticut Idaho Nebraska New Hampshire South Dakota Maine Montana North Dakota Washington, DC Wyoming Delaware Alaska Rhode Island Vermont Hawaii Total Jobs Supported 4,066 3,903 3,767 3,593 3,509 3,130 3,075 2.785 2.736 2,277 1,819 1,507 1,349 1,243 752 672 644 640 535 532 503 467 438 413 336 285 Gross State Product ($M) 5,594 6,229 8,642 7,316 6,299 9,594 6,035 5,208 3,746 4,510 3,964 4,254 1,918 2,695 1,567 934 1,151 1,161 1,423 1,649 1,138 1,193 648 1,103 622 514 GSP per capita 1,005 1,687 1,384 862 1,382 1,326 1,198 1,171 1,340 1,451 1,215 1,194 1,001 1,371 1,122 1,063 842 1,028 2,003 2,300 1,999 1,065 927 990 994 356 CO 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 59 Appendix -- Transcending Boundaries: the Broader Economic Impacts of US LNG Economic impacts by Congressional District in base case, 2025-2040 (cumulative real 2024$ or average annual jobs) District Total Jobs Supported TX-23 TX-34 TX-01 TX-11 TX-37 TX-24 TX-32 TX-19 TX-18 TX-14 TX-28 TX-27 TX-33 TX-38 TX-07 TX-30 TX-04 TX-13 TX-12 TX-06 TX-35 TX-15 TX-36 TX-17 TX-20 TX-26 Data compiled Feb. 10, 2025. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence 2025 S&P Global. 15,274 10,041 8,495 7,334 6,767 6,518 6,323 5,998 5,822 5,708 5,681 5,509 5,371 5,011 4,994 4,865 4,805 4,628 4,519 4,114 4,017 3,963 3,904 3,890 3,869 3,407 S&P Global Gross District Product ($M) 64,339 39,892 33,541 32,208 16,744 17,174 17,327 22,005 19,448 21,322 21,851 20,705 15,773 15,733 14,095 12,691 12,678 15,687 13,345 12,715 10,955 13,416 13,336 13,099 8,802 10,588 GSP per capita 93,871 55,569 44,047 43,129 18,202 20,061 21,061 30,738 22,204 24,579 28,363 25,905 18,255 18,067 13,906 15,886 15,255 22,347 12,986 15,169 11,063 16,112 16,536 16,702 9,290 11,015 District TX-21 TX-10 TX-25 TX-09 TX-02 TX-29 OK-03 OK-01 OK-05 OK-04 OK-02 LA-04 LA-01 LA-03 LA-06 LA-02 NM-02 NM-03 NM-01 PA-09 PA-14 AR-03 AR-04 AR-02 WV-02 WV-01 Total jobs supported 3,345 3,335 3,334 3,169 2,792 2,703 8,968 7,709 6,553 5,907 4,696 11,048 5,362 4,383 3,363 3,224 10,088 7,743 6,359 2,774 2,688 4,811 4,066 3,657 3,983 1,950 Gross District Product ($M) 8,452 10,179 10,742 7,315 9,171 8,855 21,770 14,548 13,188 12,910 9,731 33,221 14,391 12,047 7,688 7,493 21,732 15,948 10,803 10,808 10,958 9,500 8,396 7,768 10,684 4,164 GSP per capita 9,103 11,839 13,274 7,700 9,003 10,039 28.903 16,304 15,928 16,476 12,553 45,403 18,576 16,993 9,944 10,440 32,111 23,909 16,405 14.643 15,215 10,866 12,421 10,229 12,465 5,309 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 60 Contacts For more information on this report, please contact: Eric Eyberg Head of Global Gas & Power CI Consulting Eric.Eyberg@spglobal.com Leandro Caputo Executive Director, Gas & LNG CI Consulting Leandro.Caputo@spglobal.com Linda Kinney Head of Americas Business Development Linda.Kinney@spglobal.com For Media information, please contact: Jeff Marn Executive Director, Public Relations Jeff.Marn@spglobal.com 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 61 Disclaimer S&P Global Commodity Insights is a business division of S&P Global Inc. 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SPGCI publishes commodity information, including price assessments and indices and maintains clear structural and operational separation between SPGCI's price assessment activities and the other activities carried out by SPGCI and the other business divisions of S&P Global Inc. to safeguard the quality, independence and integrity of its price assessments and indices and ensure they are free from any actual or perceived conflicts of interest. The Deliverables should not be construed or regarded as a recommendation of any specific price assessment or benchmark. No portion of the Deliverables may be modified, reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without the prior written consent of SPGCI (to be granted or withheld in SPGCI's absolute discretion). Unless SPGCI has expressly agreed otherwise, the Deliverables are not works-made-for-hire and SPGCI shall own all right, title, and interest in and to the Deliverables, including all intellectual property rights which subsist in the Deliverables. Use of the Deliverables is subject to any license terms and restrictions agreed between SPGCI and the commissioning Client. The SPGCI name(s) and logo(s) and other trademarks appearing in the Deliverables are the property of S&P Global Inc., or their respective owners. 2025 by S&P Global Inc. 62 S&P Global IGU INTERNATIONAL GAS UNION UNION INTERNATIONALE DU GAZ Document 99 Attachment 2 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Natural Gas is Foundational to a Secure Cleaner Energy Future Our organizations are grateful for ongoing dialogue with G7 member countries on the unique and vital role of natural gas in meeting shared energy security and climate objectives. We welcome the opportunity to share information and support the important process of the G7 Climate, Energy, and Environment working tracks. In furtherance of this dialogue, we share the following fundamental messages for consideration: Natural gas is foundational to a secure, cleaner energy future, due to its critical ability to provide global and local flexibility for energy systems to meet the challenges of the energy transition. Gas is going to play a key role in reducing emissions by replacing coal, oil, and wood, which still dominate today's global energy mix. It will also have a key role providing resiliency for power grids as they rapidly integrate larger shares of intermittent and decentralized generation while meeting the growing demand from electrification and the digital technology sector. Ensuring power quality and affordability will be important for the G7 economies to attract and retain digital technology and data centre sector investments. At the same time, gas remains necessary to provide high efficiency industrial feedstock for heavy industry and fuel development and industrialization in Africa and parts of Asia, with two thirds of the world's population still lacking access to modem energy. Gas also plays a key role in the production of fertilizer, which is critical for food security. Importantly, gas will provide a pathway for deeper decarbonisation through the addition of carbon capture utilization and storage and low and zero-carbon gas technologies. We stress that greater attention is necessary from policy and industry to the issue of addressing the significant gap in scaling these technologies for meeting the decarbonisation targets. We also reaffirm that detection, measurement, and elimination of methane emissions from the natural gas value chains provides a critical opportunity to further enhance the environmental value of gas and to secure its license to participate in the energy transition. The right policies will also be important for ensuring that resources are invested efficiently and the greatest reductions in the shortest period are encouraged. A variety of public and private initiatives are providing momentum behind these goals, including but not limited to the Global Methane Pledge, COP28 Oil and Gas Decarbonization Charter, recently enacted methane regulations in the EU and U.S., the U.S. Department of Energy's international measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification (MMRV) working group, and Japan's CLEAN Initiative. Natural gas is necessary for security of supply, and diversified supplies within a global market are critical for helping Europe continue to manage the reduction of Russian gas imports, while supporting global affordability and resiliency of energy. In the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, flexible natural gas supplies helped the people of Europe, Japan, and other nations heat and power their homes, factories, and businesses at a time of great need and uncertainty. Further diversification away from Russia is necessary, and with numerous forecasts projecting global natural gas demand to rise well into the next decade and beyond, so additional supplies of natural gas, particularly liquified natural gas (LNG), will be needed to supply world markets. As this important work proceeds, it is critical to recognize that international demand for natural gas is likely to continue growing for decades. The LEA's April 2023 "Outlooks for Gas Markets and Investment" report forecasts that natural gas demand in Africa, the Middle East, and developing Asian markets will continue to grow through 2050, and that "an additional 240 bcm per year of LNG export capacity is needed by 2050 above what currently exists or is under construction."' Other well-regarded forecasts from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, BP, ExxonMobil, and Japan's Institute for Energy Economics project significantly higher global natural gas demand growth than lEA. As the lEA and Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) warned in their July 2023 LNG Strategyfor the World report, "If investment into natural gas/LNG is insufficient, a supply tightness could occur before a demand decline, putting global energy security at risk."2 The same report concluded that because it is difficult to ramp up production of LNG in a short period, "the world may risk facing prolonged periods of supply shortages if actual demand turns out to be higher than forecasts or expectations." Emerging trends from demand sources such as transport electrification and artificial intelligence-driven data centers suggest that this growth may indeed turn out to be higher than expected. The 2023 IGU Global Gas Report shows that global investment levels in gas development declined by 58% between 2014 and 2020, and only started to marginally recover in 2021. Without additional injections, the current total existing and approved gas production level could decrease by a quarter from current levels in 2030 and continue the same downward trajectory thereafter. This would fall short of most gas demand projections, creating another significant energy security challenge. Importantly, we are confident that this demand can be met in a manner that continues progress on emissions reductions. o Indeed, the G7 has recognized this in numerous prior statements. For example, 1 https://www.iea.org/reports/outlooks-for-gas-markets-and-investment https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2023/07/20230719001/20230719001-1.pdf the G7 Hiroshima Leader's communique stressed not only "the important role that increased deliveries of LNG can play" in addressing gas market shortfalls, but also that "publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response, subject to clearly defined national circumstances, if implemented in a manner consistent with our climate objectives without creating lock-in effects, for example by ensuring that projects are integrated into national strategies for the development of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen."3 o In December, nearly 200 nations that convened at the United Nations climate conference (COP 28) agreed to the UAE Consensus, which states that "transitional fuels can play a role in facilitating the energy transition while ensuring energy security"-- a clear reference to the potential for natural gas to displace higher emitting fuels.4 These goals are appropriate in light of data clearly showing that the energy crisis we are still experiencing has had a very damaging effect on the energy transition, as emissions in energy reached another record. In 2023, global coal demand reached record high, and contributed 65% to year-over-year energy sector emissions growth. This was a direct result of a supply/demand imbalance caused by the gas supply crisis, escalated by the reduction of pipeline gas flowing to Europe from Russia. Across the globe, industry is working to ensure that natural gas projects are aligned with international climate efforts, and we remain eager to partner with governments around the world on the important technical and policy work necessary to advance international GHG reduction initiatives. Our members are also actively pursuing development of promising low-carbon technologies, including biomethane and renewable natural gas (RNG), CCUS, hydrogen, ammonia, and e-methane. Collectively, these efforts will ensure that natural gas--already providing enormous emissions reductions when replacing coal and oil--can continue to serve as an evercleaner component of the global energy mix. Finally, we commend the Italian G7 presidency for its emphasis on strategic partnerships with Africa. Africa is the fastest growing and the youngest continent, holding a fifth of the world's population, a tenth of the world's gas resources. Yet, it is suffering from the lowest energy access per capita on the planet -- 50% of Africans lack access to reliable electricity. Enabling responsible development of natural gas and energy infrastructure holds great potential to provide an economic foundation that raises living standards, enhances energy security, and reduces emissions in a critically important region of the world that will be a center of energy demand growth for decades to come. As the International Gas Union detailed in a recent report, domestic gas resources can improve the lives of Africa's young and growing population, delivering the energy it needs to develop within a just energy transition.5 The report also highlights the role of gas as an ideal baseload fuel for complementing the rapid uptake of renewables, noting how "using its gas resources together with renewable 3 G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqu I The White House https://unfccc.intisitesidefaultifilesiresource/cma5 auv 4 gst.pdf 5 Gas for Africa report, 2023. Available at: https://igu.org/resources/gas-for-africa-report-2023/ energy technologies, Africa can build energy systems compatible with a climate- or carbon-neutral future and underpin the continent's sustainable economic development." Moreover, the Senior Director of the African Finance Corporation, an African multilateral development bank investing in all forms of energy and infrastructure to support development on the continent, has recently shared with the IGU that "For a continent grappling with the urgency of industrialisation requiring reliable baseload power supply, energy transition efforts with the intermittent renewable systems are not a sufficient solution...the view at the AFC is that while renewable sources are the ultimate goal, Africa must also exploit its abundant reserves of natural gas as an essential transitional source of energy to support industrialization." (Emphasis added.) Gas is critical to a globally secure and affordable energy transition in an energy-scarce world, and continued investment in natural gas supply and infrastructure must happen in parallel with accelerated investment in decarbonising gas technologies. Only then can we assure that the priorities of energy security and energy transition do not undermine each other. Above all else, the G7 process is intended to advance shared economic and security interests among the world's leading democracies. The energy and financial reverberations of war and the global energy crisis have shown that these goals cannot be achieved without fundamental progress on both energy security and climate change. Natural gas provides the opportunity to continue progress on emissions reductions while ensuring energy and economic security imperatives can be realized. Our organizations look forward to working with G7 nations to advance clear and consistent supportive policies building on past recognition that responsible development of natural gas and associated infrastructure is critical to achievement of these goals. Document 73 From: Guith, Christopher Sent: Thu, 6 Mar 2025 00:13:59 +0000 To: Guith, Christopher; Dietderich, Ben; Woods, Andrea; Byers, Dan Subject: Meeting (ScheduledMeeting)/Thread Id: 19:meeting_MzFlYTEzODgtZDdmOS00MTg5LTg3MTQtOGExODhkNDgyNDgz@thread.y2/Communicatio n Id: 84886f55-23ca-4e7d-9936-53c0c8e9f709/Guith, Christopher,Dietderich, Ben,Woods, Andrea,Byers, Dan Start Time (UTC): 3/5/2025 3:15:32 PM End Time (UTC): 3/5/2025 3:42:54 PM Duration: 00:27:21.6419767 [3/5/2025 3:15:42 PM (UTC)] CGuith@USChamber.com joined. [3/5/2025 3:39:28 PM (UTC)] CGuith@USChamber.com left. [3/5/2025 3:18:34 PM (UTC)] ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov joined. [3/5/2025 3:42:54 PM (UTC)] ben.dietderich@hq.doe.gov left. [3/5/2025 3:18:34 PM (UTC)] andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov joined. [3/5/2025 3:39:28 PM (UTC)] andrea.woods@hq.doe.gov left. [3/5/2025 3:16:39 PM (UTC)] DByers@USChamber.com joined. [3/5/2025 3:39:28 PM (UTC)] DByers@USChamber.com left. [3/5/2025 3:15:32 PM (UTC)] CGuith@USChamber.com joined. [3/5/2025 3:39:30 PM (CFTC)] CGuith@USChamber.com left.