Document 2Jd729ppDBRbpR75xdmY0Vg0N

EPCRA and CAA 112(r) Field Inspection Report Date: From: Through: To: Subject: November 14, 2023 Leonard Wallace and Andrew Meyer USEPA Inspector Mary Jane O'Donnell, Chief Waste and Chemical Compliance Section File Chemical Accident Investigation and Inspection, Clean Air Act (CAA) Risk Management Plan (RMP) Section 112(r) and General Duty Clause (GDC) Section 112 (r) (1) and Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) Sections 302-312, and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 103 of Coca Cola Beverages Northeast, Inc, East Hartford, Connecticut. I. GENERAL INFORMATION Facility Name: Coca Cola Beverages Northeast, Inc. Dun and Bradstreet Number: 06-553-6914 RMP Number: N/A Address: 451 Main Street, East Hartford, CT 06118 Inspector Names: Leonard Wallace, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Region 1 Andrew Meyer, USEPA Region 1 Aaron Gilbert, USEPA Region 1 Brendan Scher, Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG) Inspection Date: August 22, 2023 Type of Inspection: Risk Management Plan (RMP) CAA 112(r)(1) General Duty Clause (GDC), CERCLA 103, and EPCRA 302-313 Compliance Evaluation Inspection Purpose of Inspection: This inspection was conducted as a routine EPA CAA 112(r)(1)/EPCRA compliance evaluation inspection. The Coca Cola Beverages Northeast, Inc. facility in East Hartford, Connecticut was selected for inspection because the facility's Reporting Year (RY) 2021 EPCRA 312 Tier II report indicates that it stores extremely hazardous substances, including anhydrous ammonium and sulfuric acid in lead-acid batteries and because of an ammonia release that occurred at the facility on March 15, 2023, at approximately 11:50 pm.An estimated 60 pounds (lbs) of ammonia was released during the incident. Current Owner: Coca Cola Bottling Company of Southeastern New England, Inc. Current Operator: Coca Cola Bottling Company of Southeastern New England, Inc. Primary NAICS codes: 312111 Soft Drink Manufacturing Number of full-time employees: 177 Estimated Annual Sales: Current estimates annual revenue of $20 to 50 million (Manta). Relationship to other firms, parent corporation, subsidiaries, and location of off-site facilities: Associated businesses include Coca Cola Bottling Company, Coca Cola North America, and Coca Cola Beverages Northeast. II. GENERAL FACILITY DESCRIPTION Coca Cola Beverages Northeast, Inc. is located at 451 Main Street in East Hartford, Connecticut. Coca Cola manufactures bottled and canned soft drinks, packages soft drink products, and distributes products to various customers. The Facility operates 7 days a week and has separate buildings for its mixing and cooling operations, the ammonia machinery room (AMR), and product distribution warehouse. The mixing and chilling lines use heat exchangers with ammonia refrigerant to cool the soft drink product lines. According to the Facility's 2022 EPCRA 312 Tier II chemical inventory reporting, the ammonia refrigeration system contains 8,746.7 lbs of ammonia. The Facility also stores sulfuric acid in lead acid batteries in variety of equipment, At the time of the site visit, the Facility had approximately 177 full-time employees. Attachment 1 is a Google Earth aerial photograph of the Coca Cola facility in East Hartford, CT. III. IN-BRIEF/OPENING CONFERENCE The USEPA inspection team, consisting of Len Wallace and Andrew Meyer (USEPA Region 1), Brendan Scher (USEPA contract inspector), and John Burton (USEPA air monitoring contractor), entered the Facility at approximately 9:00 a.m. The inspection team presented identification to Bryan Misenheimer, Plant Manager, Coca Cola Beverages Northeast. Inspector Wallace conducted the opening meeting and explained the reason and scope of the inspection. Inspector Wallace presented the EPCRA Notice of Inspection to Mr. Misenheimer, who signed as the Recipient of the Notice. Mr. Misenheimer did not attempt to deny Facility entry to the inspectors, nor did he invoke any claims of Confidential Business Information (CBI) for purposes of the inspection. 2 Facility Representatives: Name Bryan Misenheimer Billy Mayfield George Fletcher Joni Speck Scott Sweet James Trigale Lydia Ortiz Title/Company Plant Manager Local 1035 Representative Speck Compliance Advantage HCG Associates HCG Associates HCG Associates Phone Number 860 895 5200 8602141736 8604556911 6034948421 5089580700 5082093620 7743657842 E-mail BMISENHEIMER@COKENORTHEAST.COM WMAYFIELD@COKENORTHEAST.COM jspeck@SpeckComplianceAdvantage.com ssweet@hcgassoc.com jtringale@hcgassoc.com lortiz@hcgassoc.com Inspector Wallace shared the following guidance documents with Facility representatives: 1. Guide to the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (Fall 2020) 2. EPCRA Quick Reference Fact Sheet (Fall 2020) 3. Small Business Resource Information Sheet (February 2020, EPA-300-F-20-002) 4. National Response Center Oil and Chemical Spill Reporting flyer 5. Chemicals in Your Community brochure (EPA 550-K-99-001, December 1999) 6. Safety Standards for Ammonia Refrigeration 7. Mr Wallace talked about CAMEO Chemicals is available as a website, mobile website, mobile app, and desktop program. The mobile app and the desktop program formats can be used offline. Inspector Wallace stated that, after the opening meeting, the inspectors would do a walk-through of the refrigeration process and chemical storage areas. He also stated that the inspection team would be taking photographs of items and areas of interest and a copy of all photographs would be provided to the Facility representative after the inspection. IV. PHYSICAL INSPECTION The EPA inspection team conducted a walk-through of the following areas at the Facility: Outdoor Ammonia System Warehouse Exterior Chemical Storage & Primary AMR Facility Production Building Inspector Wallace took 232 digital photographs during the inspection to document observed conditions. These photographs are referenced throughout the inspection report. The following sections discuss areas of concern identified in each area during the physical inspection. 3 Outdoor Ammonia System The ammonia High Pressure Receiver (HPR) and evaporative condensers are located in a fenced area adjacent to the indoor AMR and the production building housing the bottling lines. Also adjacent to the fenced ammonia area are storage tanks and associated piping for natural gas, glycol, cryogenic nitrogen, and cryogenic carbon dioxide. EPA inspectors identified the following areas of concern based on a tour of the area: The facility's wind trackers indicating wind direction at various points along the edge of the facility's roof, were not always clearly visible from all areas of approach (see photographs P1130013, P1130017, P1130023, and P1130043). Multiple entry doors from the outside of the Facility were not labeled with appropriate National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) diamonds to provide warning (see photographs P1130014, P1130038, P1130046, P1130073, P1130074, and P1130137). No labeled with appropriate National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) diamonds to identify gas cylinders inside fenced in area around the outdoor fuel cell (see photographs P1130026, P1130027, and P1130231). Facility piping for Natural Gas, Glycol, Cryogenic Nitrogen, and Cryogenic Carbon Dioxide was not consistently labeled to indicate contents and flow direction in different areas of the facility (see photographs P1130020, P1130021, P1130036, P1130055, and P1130232). The tanks of Cryogenic Nitrogen, and Cryogenic Carbon Dioxide was not consistently labeled to indicate contents on all approach ways to them (see photographs P1130022 and P1130034). Gated entrances/exits to the outdoor fuel cell area and the outdoor ammonia processing area were padlocked closed and not equipped with panic hardware (see photographs P1130024, P1130025, P1130027, and P1130084). No detection systems and/or audible/visual alarms were observed around the cryogenic nitrogen and cryogenic carbon dioxide tanks to detect low oxygen content in the air or to detect rapid temperature change. The HPR was not properly bolted down to the pad it was sitting on (see photographs P1130086, P1130097, P1130098, P1130099, P1130100, and P1130101). The HPR's King Valve signs were faded and partially painted over (see photographs P1130098, and P1130099). The HPR's King Valves were not clearly marked which one was the primary valve (see photographs P1130097, P1130098, and P1130099). The HPR, adjacent piping, and King Valve in the outdoor ammonia processing area lacked adequate bump protection (see photographs P1130097, P1130098, and P1130099). The High-Pressure Relief (HPR) valve header near the top of the evaporative condenser was equipped with a rain hat which would force ammonia relief discharge downward in the event of a release (see photographs P1130083, P1130110, P1130113, and P1130114). There were signs of surface corrosion on piping associated with the evaporative condenser (see photographs P1130115, P1130116, P1130126, P1130127, P1130132, P1130133, P1130134, P1130135, and P1130237). The emergency safety shower in the outdoor ammonia processing area lacked an accompanying emergency eyewash station (see photograph P1130086). Ammonia Pipes supporting pipes (see photographs P1130116 and P1130138). 4  The fresh air intake to the Ammonia Machinery Room (AMR) was not at ground level (see photographs P1130085). Warehouse Exterior The Facility had a separate warehouse building used for packaging and distribution of products. The inspection team surveyed the outdoor area around the warehouse building which housed cooling towers, transformers, and natural gas piping. EPA inspectors identified the following areas of concern based on a tour of the area: Transformers around the facility were not consistently affixed with labeling indicating Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB) content in transformer oil (see photographs P1130048, P1130067, P1130140, and P1130141). Backup generator with National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) diamonds (see photographs P1130049, P1130050, P1130051, P1130052, and P1130053). The cooling tower outside of the warehouse was described as not in use by facility personnel but lacked any indication of this status. Also, the cooling tower unit did not appear to be bolted to the cement pad on which it was sitting (see photographs P1130054, P1130056, P1130057, P1130058, P1130059). Natural Gas lines were not consistently labeled to indicate content and flow direction and were not provided with adequate bump protection at all critical locations (see photographs P1130060, P1130061, and P1130062). The process cooling tower piping, which contained a water and glycol mixture in the process water, was not labeled to indicate contents or flow direction (see photographs P1130063 and P1130065). Process piping installed with heat trace cable on the process cooling tower lacked heat tracer labeling for the piping run (see photographs P1130065, P1130066, P1130071, and P1130072). Plastic pallets were being stored next to warehouse (see P1130142). The propane cylinder storage cage located adjacent to the outdoor shed was not posted with an NFPA diamonds on the cage. Additionally, the propane cylinder storage cage was not anchored and not equipped with signage to indicate if propane tanks were full or empty (see photographs P1130144, P1130146, and P1130147). Chemical Storage & Primary AMR The Facility maintained a chemical storage room in the same building as the primary AMR. The primary AMR housed the compressors and process controls for the ammonia room. The AMR had exits leading to the production building, outdoor ammonia area, and the chemical storage area. EPA inspectors identified the following areas of concern based on a tour of the area: One of the emergency ventilation switches and the ammonia system emergency stop actuation button outside of the boiler room entrance required keys to operate which were not immediately accessible in case of emergency. The metal cabinet had a free wire inside of the cabinet without labeling or indication of use or function. (See photographs P1130076 and P1130078). There were no Ammonia audible/visible alarms located nearby the emergency station outside the boiler room (see photographs P1130074 and P1130075). The AMR relief valve header was being supported by evaporative condenser process piping (see photographs P1130116, P1130138, and P1130164). The placement of the make-up air intake vent is near the top of the wall and not at ground-level which may inhibit proper ventilation to the AMR (see photographs P1130085 and P1130182). 5  The emergency ventilation system did not have a backup power source so that ventilation could still occur in the scenario that a systematic power failure occurs. The Chemical Storage area had chemical containers that were not equipped with appropriate secondary containment (see photographs P1130153, P1130155, and P1130157). EPA inspectors observed that the Facility was actively storage two incompatible products (BiosperseTM CN8059 MICROBIOCIDE and DICOLUBE ADVANCED) nearby each without appropriate secondary containment (see photographs P1130161, P1130162, P1130163, P1130164, and P1130165). Piping in the Chemical Storage area was not labelled to indicate contents and flow direction (see photographs P1130156, P1130157, and P1130158). The door from the Chemical Storage area into the AMR only had an emergency shut down button. There was no emergency air ventilation override switch (see photographs P1130166, P1130167, and P1130168). The Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) on the door did not have the critical emergency shutoff valves clearly identified (see photographs P1130167, P1130169, P1130170, P1130171, P1130172, P1130191, and P1130197). The AMR used 5 different colors of paint on the ammonia tanks and pipes (see Photograph P1130176). Ammonia Compressor #2 and associated piping was observed to be vibrating significantly (see photographs P1130175 and P1130189). There was no label describing the function of an orange visual strobe next to the ammonia audible/visual alarm (see Photograph P1130190). There was no emergency safety shower/eyewash station outside the primary AMR egress door (see photographs P1130191, P1130196, and P1130197). Lower ammonia piping under high pressure near SV-181NH3 and other piping and valve needs bump protection (see photographs P1130175 and P1130189). Facility Production Building The Facility had a production building which housed forklift battery recharging stations, beverage manufacturing operations, and bottling operations. The three bottling lines were chilled by heat exchangers which used ammonia as their refrigerant. EPA inspectors identified the following areas of concern based on a tour of the area: The heat exchanger associated with the line 2 chiller had a damaged and illegible label (see photograph P1130241). Lithium batteries were not listed on Tier 2 Form. However, the Facility uses Lithium batteries to power some of their forklifts (see photographs P1130200, P1130201, P1130202, P1130204, P1130205, and P1130206). Scissor Lifts and Aerial Lift Equipment that are powered by Lead Acid Batteries were not listed on the Facility's Tier 2 Form (see photographs P1130210 and P1130211). The Flammables Storage cabinet inside of the facility was not marked as not in use (see photographs P1130206, P1130207, P1130208, and P1130209). A storage drum and associated transfer tubing of an unlabeled oxidizer was not provided with adequate bump protection (see photographs P1130212, P1130213, and P1130214). 6  Areas housing elevated ammonia piping in the production area of the facility were not equipped with accompanying ammonia detectors and audible/visual alarms to provide detection of ammonia leaks at the elevation at which release may occur (see photographs P1130219, P1130220, P1130221, P1130228, P1130229, P1130230, P1130231, P1130233, P1130234, P1130235, and P1130239, P1130242). The DICOLUBE ADVANCED tank and tube lines in the production area of the facility lacked adequate bump protection (see photographs P1130222, P1130224, P1130225). There were signs of surface corrosion on ammonia piping associated with the heat exchangers on the other 2 chiller lines (see photographs and P1130237, P1130243, and P1130244). V. OUT-BRIEF/CLOSING CONFERENCE Inspector Wallace emailed a copy of the preliminary areas of concern identified during the August 22, 2023, inspection to Mr. Misenheimer on September 12, 2023, and conducted a virtual closeout meeting on September 27, 2023. The following is a list of the preliminary areas of concern identified during the inspection at the Facility: 1. The facility wind trackers indicating wind direction at various points along the edge of the facility roof were not always easy to see (see photographs P1130013, P1130017, P1130023, and P1130043). 2. Multiple entry doors from the outside of the Facility were not labeled with appropriate National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) diamonds to provide warning (see photographs P1130014, P1130038, P1130046, P1130073, P1130074, and P1130137). 3. Facility piping for Natural Gas, Glycol, Cryogenic Nitrogen, and Cryogenic Carbon Dioxide was not consistently labeled to indicate content and flow direction in different areas of the facility (see photographs P1130020, P1130021, P1130036, P1130055, and P1130232). 4. Gated entrances/exits to the outdoor fuel cell area and the outdoor ammonia processing area were padlocked closed and not equipped with panic hardware (see photographs P1130024, P1130025, and P1130084). 5. The outdoor fuel cell gated enclosure lacks a second means of egress (see photograph P1130027). 6. No detectors/audio visual alarms were observed around the cryogenic nitrogen, and cryogenic carbon dioxide tanks to detect low oxygen in the air or to detect rapid temperature change. 7. Diesel Generators was not labeled with appropriate NFPA diamond (see photographs P1130049, P1130050, P1130051, P1130052, P1130053, and P1130139). 8. Transformers around the facility didn't all have Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB) labels (see photographs P1130048, P1130067, P1130140, and P1130141). 9. The cooling tower outside of the warehouse was described as not in use by facility personnel but lacked any indication of this status. Also, the cooling tower unit did not appear to be bolted to the cement pad it was sitting on (see photographs P1130054, P1130056, P1130057, P1130058, P1130059). 10. Natural Gas lines were not consistently labeled to indicate content and flow direction and not well bump protected at all critical locations (see photographs P1130060, P1130061, and P1130062). 11. The high-pressure receiver (HPR) was not properly bolted down (see photographs P1130086, P1130097, P1130098, P1130099, P1130100, and P1130101). 12. The process cooling tower piping which contained a water and glycol mixture in the process water was not labeled to indicate content, flow direction (see photographs P1130063 and P1130065). 13. The heat exchanger associated with the line 2 chiller was damaged and posted with an illegible label (see photograph P1130241). 14. Process piping installed with heat trace cable on the process cooling tower lacked heat tracer labeling for the piping run. Heat trace cable covered in insulation should have a caution label on the outside of the insulation every 10 feet. There appeared to be no method to warn firefighters and maintenance workers of an electrical hazard (see photographs P1130065, P1130066, P1130071, and P1130072). 7 15. One of the emergency ventilation switches and ammonia machinery room (AMR) emergency stop actuation button outside of the boiler room entrance required keys to operate which were not immediately accessible in case of emergency. The metal cabinet had free wire inside. (See photographs P1130076 and P1130078). 16. There was no Ammonia Audio Visual Alarm was near the emergency station outside the boiler room (see photographs P1130074 and P1130075). 17. The AMR relief valve header was being supported by evaporative condenser process piping (see photographs P1130116, P1130138, and P1130164). 18. The emergency safety shower in the outdoor ammonia processing area lacked an accompanying emergency eyewash station (see photograph P1130086). 19. The King Valve signs were faded, and partiality painted over (see photographs P1130098, and P1130099). 20. The HPR, adjacent piping, and king valve in the outdoor ammonia processing area lacked adequate bump protection (see photographs P1130097, P1130098, and P1130099). 21. The AMR relief valve header near the top of the evaporative condenser was equipped with a rain hat which would force ammonia relief discharge downward (see photographs P1130110, P1130113, and P1130114). 22. There were signs of surface corrosion on piping associated with the evaporative condenser (see photographs P1130115, P1130116, P1130126, P1130127, P1130132, P1130133, P1130134, P1130135, and P1130237). 23. The placement of the make-up air intake vent is near the top of the wall and not at ground level which may inhibit proper ventilation to the AMR (see photographs P1130085 and P1130182). 24. The emergency ventilation system did not have a backup power source so that ventilation could still occur in the scenario that a systematic power failure occurs. 25. Plastic pallets were being stored next to warehouse (see P1130142). 26. Propane Storage cage next to outside shed was not posted with an NFPA diamonds on the cage, Additionally, the propane cage was not anchored and not equipped with signage to indicate if propane tanks are full or empty (see photographs P1130144, P1130146, and P1130147) 27. Chemical Storage area had chemical containers not in secondary containment (see photographs P1130153, P1130155, and P1130157). 28. Two incompatible products: BiosperseTM CN8059 MICROBIOCIDE and DICOLUBE ADVANCED near each with no secondary containment (see photographs P1130161, P1130162, P1130163, P1130164, and P1130165). 29. Piping in the Chemical Storage was not labelled to indicate content and flow direction (see photographs P1130156, P1130157, and P1130158). 30. Lithium Batteries not listed on Tier 2 Form (see photographs P1130200, P1130201, P1130202, P1130204, P1130205, and P1130206). 31. Scissor Lifts and Aerial Lift Equipment that contains Lead Acid Batteries not listed on Tier 2 Form (see photographs P1130210 and P1130211). 32. Flammable Storage cabinet inside of the facility was not marked as not in use (see photographs P1130206, P1130207, P1130208, and P1130209). 33. A drum of an Oxidizer is not protected from bumps and the tubing was not protected as well (see photographs P1130212, P1130213, and P1130214). 34. The door from chemical storage area into the AMR only had an Emergency shut down button. There was no Emergency Air Ventilation override switch (see photographs P1130166, P1130167, and P1130168). 35. The Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) on the door did have the critical emergency valve clearly identified (see photographs P1130167, P1130169, P1130170, P1130171, and P1130172). 36. The AMR used 5 different colors of paint on the ammonia tanks and pipes (see Photograph P1130176). 37. Ammonia Compressor #2 and associated piping was observed to be vibrating significantly (see photographs P1130175 and P1130189). 8 38. No label describing the function of an orange visual strobe next to the ammonia Audio Visual alarm (see Photograph P1130190). 39. No emergency safety shower/eyewash station outside this AMR egress door (see photographs P1130191, P1130196, and P1130197). 40. The Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) on the door did have the critical emergency valve clearly identified (see photographs P1130191 and P1130197). 41. Areas housing elevated ammonia piping in the production area of the facility were not equipped with accompanying ammonia detectors and audio-visual alarms to provide detection of ammonia leaks at the elevation at which release may occur (see photographs P1130219, P1130220, P1130221, P1130228, P1130229, P1130230, P1130231, P1130233, P1130234, P1130235, and P1130239, P1130242). 42. The DICOLUBE ADVANCED tank and tube lines in the production area of the facility lacked adequate bump protection (see photographs P1130222, P1130224, P1130225). 43. There were signs of surface corrosion on piping on the other 2 chiller lines (see photographs and P1130237, P1130243, and P1130244). VI. FACILITY COMPLIANCE STATUS AND ELEMENTS OF PROOF - EPCRA EPCRA 302 (1) Does facility have on-site, at any one time, extremely hazardous substances (EHS) at or above the TPQ? Yes, Anhydrous Ammonia, Nitric Acid, Peracetic Acid, and Sulfuric Acid. (2) List or obtain documentation: Inspectors' observations; RY 2022 Tier II report. (3) How was maximum quantity on-site determined or calculated? Calculated using the capacity for different system components. EPCRA 303 (1) Facility Coordinator identified per Sec. 303 and date LEPC was notified? The Facility's Tier II report identifies Marah Liden, Safety and Environmental Systems Manager, as the Emergency Planning Coordinator. Date LEPC notified, unknown. EPCRA 311 (1) Is facility required to maintain SDSs under the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard 29 CFR 1910.1200.? Yes (2) Has the facility conducted a comprehensive audit to identify SDS chemicals on-site and to determine if 500 lb./10,000 lb./TPQ thresholds were exceeded? Unknown (3) List of OSHA chemicals manufactured, processed, used/stored, and obtained? Unknown (4) How were the maximum amounts determined? Ammonia system calculated using the capacity for different system components. Unknown for the other chemicals. (5) Section 311 info supplied to the: SERC (Y/N): LEPC (Y/N): Local Fire Department(Y/N): Date: Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 9 Chemical List: Available SDSs: Yes (6) Have any new hazardous chemicals, mixtures, or substances been introduced into the facility in the last 5 years? Unknown (7) If yes, has the facility submitted updated lists or SDSs? Unknown EPCRA 312 (due March 1 of year following reporting calendar year) (1) Was Tier II form submitted for all required chemicals? Yes. 2022 Tier II dated 02/27/2023. (2) What procedures are used to update Section 312 information for annual submittal and to ensure additional or new chemical data is submitted within 90 days? Unknown. (3) Was facility aware of annual reporting requirements under Section 312? Yes. (4) Had the facility completed and signed a list of all reportable chemicals on site on date of the inspection? No. Chemical inventory data requested during inspection for review following inspection. (5) Table of EPCRA 312 Hazardous Substances CAS # 7664-41-7 NA NA NA 124-38-9 77-92-9 NA NA NA NA NA 57-48-7 NA 7727-37-9 NA NA NA Chemical Ammonia Accu-Tab SI PPG Acifoam LP (contains Sulfuric Acid 3%) Biosperse Carbon Dioxide Citric Acid Dibac Divoflow Divosan Plus (contains Peracetic Acid 7%) Divosan Spectrum Easy Foam High Fructose Corn Syrup Lead Acid Battery (contains Sulfuric Acid 5.2%) Nitrogen Nonstick (contains Nitric Acid 30%) Oxonia Active (contains Peroxyacetic Acid 5.8%) Reflex (contains Nitric Acid 10%, Sulfuric Acid 2%, and Peroxyacetic acid 6.6%) Approx. Max. Wt. on Site (Lbs.) 17,493.4 * 1,072 900 800 225,000 50,000 400 17,664 * 800 800 800 348,799 9,000 56,650 880 400 3,200 10 TPQ (Lbs.) 500 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 Approx. Ratio (Actual/TPQ) 34.9 22.5 5 1.7 34,8 56.6 NA Resource NA Roubaix Based on the RY 2022 EPCRA Tier II Report Error detected on amount being reported on Tier 2 - * 1,800 4,800 * VII. ENFORCEMENT HISTORY A search of EPA's ECHO database found no compliance or enforcement actions for the Coca Cola Northeast Beverages Facility located at 451 Main Street in East Hartford, CT. VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE The demographic information in the environmental justice report for the communities surrounding the Coca Cola Beverages Northeast Facility indicates that the Facility is located in an Environment Justice area, Supplemental Indexes USA Percentile with 6 metrics above the 90th percentile for the 1-mile Ring Centered at 41.753850, 72.642352, CONNECTICUT, EPA Region 1 (Population: 5,836). 11 Attachment 1 Google Earth Image of Coca Cola Beverages Northeast 12